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North Korea as a non-nuclear power

Oliver SUTTON

Student Number 45270804

University of Queensland College (UQC)

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North Korea as a Non-nuclear Power

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) (Appendix 3, note 1) is considered

to be a rogue state due to human rights abuses committed within the country and the pursuit of

nuclear armament by the ruling government. According to the United Nations Human Rights

Council (UNHRC), the DPRK human rights violations includes the suppression of civil liberties

and crimes against humanity (2014). The DPRK withdrew from the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and, between 2006 and 2017 has successfully detonated

six nuclear devices and tested over a hundred ballistic missiles, some believed capable of

reaching most of the western world (Berlinger, 2017). The military-focused ideology of the

Regime and lack of global unity has the international community concerned about the

consequences of the country’s nuclearisation.

Obtaining the status of a nuclear nation turns a country into a potentially formidable

adversary due to the fact that any attack directed against it could trigger a nuclear war causing

devastating effects on the planet and possibly annihilating most forms of life. The DPRK’s

nuclear ambition would allow a relative unchallengeable position against foreign powers and

would hinder human rights improvements for the country’s citizens. The United States of

America (USA) wants North Korea’s denuclearisation and North Korea wants nuclear weapons

to protect itself and its ideology from the USA. The purpose of this Research Discussion Paper is

to theorise on the effects of the DPRK’s denuclearisation. Could North Korea’s peaceful

denuclearisation turn the country into an economic threat? The single goal of removing the

nuclear capability from Pyongyang could be argued to be short sighted as other non-bellicose

threats could erupt from the nation.

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Literature review

North Korea has been in the international news’ spotlight for many years due to the

country’s refusal to adapt to an evolving world. The alleged violations of human rights and the

nuclear development of the country are issues that are often raised at the United Nations (UN).

The Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) leader, Kim Jong-un has accelerated the country’s nuclear

program since its ascension to power in 2011 and, according to recent news is now in possession

of operational nuclear missiles (“North Korea's nuclear weapons: What we know”, 2018).

The North Koreans experience harder day to day living conditions than their South

Korean counterparts. The Regime shares the same repressive system as Stalin’s Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics (USSR), where civil liberties are non-existent and the ruthless conditions in

prison and political prison camps are a reminder to citizens not to criticise the government.

However, the main issue that has been discussed lately relates to the denuclearisation of North

Korea, which will be argued in this paper and could allow the country to become a major

economic power in East-Asia. To explain this theory, four main points of focus will be used,

international relations, the nuclear program, the people and country’s natural resources, and

finally the problems and solutions.

International Relations

From its proclamation in 1948 the DPRK has relied heavily on foreign aid to achieve

continuity and growth, and although the Soviets’ involvement was pivotal to the state’s creation,

North Korea has avoided the fate of other communist satellite states. At the end of World War II

the Korean Peninsula was divided at the 38th parallel with the Soviets administrating the north

and the USA the south. The WPK followed by the DPRK were created with Kim Il-sung as head

of state, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Soviets troops from the Korean Peninsula. From
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then on, North Korea’s rebuilding and modernisation was made possible with Soviet and Chinese

assistance. The USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were Pyongyang’s main

contributors in financial aid and trade with intermittent periods when political differences

favoured one or the other. There are notably four events that shaped the North in the following

decades, the Korean War (1950-1953), the Sino-Soviet Split (1956-1966), the Chinese Cultural

Revolution (1966-1976) and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991). These events served to

cement Kim Il-sung’s self-reliance “juche” ideology into the core policy of the Regime.

The Korean War nearly saw the destruction of the DPRK when the United States-led

United Nations forces were nearing the Yalu river on the Sino-Korean border (appendix 2).

Fearing the UN forces as a threat to its territory, the Chinese sent troops across the border and

the war took a sharp turn. Three years of combat and at least two and a half million people killed

(appendix 3, note 2) saw the signature of an armistice and a military stalemate with the border

being drawn again across the 38th parallel. China’s intervention, although motivated by its own

agenda, created a bond with North Korea and both countries have according to Towne (2011),

often referred themselves as “blood brothers” (p. 1). In the decades to follow and with an

irregular economy, some years saw China supply Pyongyang more aid than the USSR did.

The rapprochement between North Korea and China became more pronounced during the

Sino-Soviet split after Stalin’s death in 1953. The USSR went through a De-Stalinisation period

that undid most of the former dictator’s inhumane policies and criticised the Cult of Personality

which was a pillar of the PRC and DPRK’s control over their citizens. These doctrinal

differences between China and the USSR, with the former publicly denouncing the De-

Stalinisation as a revisionism of Karl Marx’s ideology and the latter’s policy on peaceful

coexistence with the West, deteriorated relations between the two countries. While still accepting
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aid from the Soviet Union, the Regime leaned towards China’s advancement method, which Kim

Il-sung felt more applicable than the Soviet model due to the shared socio-economic views of the

two East-Asian neighbours (Park, 1984).

In the mid 1960’s several issues weakened the Sino-DPRK relation and peaked at an all

time low at the beginning of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. During that period North Korea

renewed ties with the USSR which was a disappointment for China as the two countries were

competing to assert their own version of Marxism-Leninism (Borunkov, 1966). The USA-led

North-Vietnamese bombing was criticised by the Chinese Government which, as explained by

Borunkov (1966), was viewed by the Regime’s leadership as a weak response and a suspect

opportunistic behaviour. This in turn made the North dubious about receiving military help from

the PRC in case of aggression by the USA and the ROK (Borunkov, 1966). The Chinese Cultural

Revolution was seen by the KWP’s leaders as a ‘great madness’ (Soviet Embassy Report, 1967)

and anti-Korean slander in China mocked Kim Il-sung (Park, 1984, p. 291). These events were

detrimental to the entente between the DPRK and the PRC until 1969 when the diplomatic

relations were restored (Fadeyev, 1969). Pyongyang could not rely exclusively on the USSR and

the PRC’s trade anymore and had to develop international trade to endure.

Although North Korean diplomatic ties with the Soviets and China had an inverse

relationship, the country also traded and requested aid to other communist and non-communist

countries. Until 1961 the percentage of total trade North Korea had with non-communist

countries was between one and two percent. Park (1984) reported this number increased ten to

twentyfold in the 1960’s and almost reaching half the country’s total trade during the 1970’s.

The expansion of trade with non-communist countries was accomplished with the help of loans

taken from Western countries. This radical change can be explained by the Pyongyang’s urgency
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for modern industrial investments and economic independence from the USSR and the PRC,

both countries’ rivalry rendering them somehow unreliable at times. Arguably, these hard lessons

taught the DPRK that the end would justify any means, including loans and trade with capitalist

countries. What characterised the trades, the loans and the aid from China and the USSR was the

flexibility and forgiveness towards North Korea, which was in contrast with Western countries

where repayments had to be honoured.

The detente of North Korea towards Western markets came at the cost of loans of

between US$3.5 billion and US$8.5 billion (appendix 3, note 3). Moon-soo (2012) opine that the

need to modernise an ageing industry and the lack of grants from the USSR and the PRC , as

well as high confidence in its forecasted exports revenues are arguably the reasons why the

North borrowed from the West. Unfortunately the 1973 and 1979 Organization of the Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil crisis and the North Korean trade deficit hindered its ability to

repay outstanding loans. Although the Soviet Union provided Pyongyang with aid and generous

trade conditions through the 1980’s, it was not enough and in 1987, Kristof (1987) reported

North Korea to be declared a default state by a group of 140 Western banks. The collapse of the

Soviet Union in 1991 accelerated the decline of the DPRK’s precarious financial balance with a

domino effect. Equipment and fuel imports fell which impeded production and exports, reducing

the country’s liquidity and ability to buy fertilisers to grow food, in turn generating a famine

costing between 600,000 and one million human lives (Habib, 2011). Nauclér (2013) explains

that the ensuing foreign aid to the hermit kingdom, which would normally have been a political

issue, was in this case a security matter due to the tensions linked to the country’s nuclear

program.
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Nuclear program

The North Korean nuclear program dates back to 1956 with the help of Soviet training

and later on, the provision of research equipment. Various declassified documents by Ivanov

(1956), Puzanov (1958) and Moskovsky (1962; 1963) advise that initially the Pyongyang’s

nuclear intentions were peaceful but American missiles in South Korea and several shifts in

Soviet-Sino-Korean relations could have pushed the Regime to pursue its own nuclear deterrence

capability. This is another application of the “juche” ideology, which is characterised by low

speed, inefficiency and inflexible determination, but which ultimately succeeded in nuclear

armament.

North Korea’s nuclear program has made slow progress until the 1980’s, possibly

gathering knowledge and experience. However during the 1980’s the Regime developed a

nuclear infrastructure and signed the NPT but, in 1993 denied access to nuclear waste sites to the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors which created an element of tensions

and distrust. The NPT has been signed by 191 out of 195 countries and is an important treaty

with main purpose to stop the spread and eventually eradicate nuclear weapons. Pyongyang

threatened to pull back from the NPT and after some negotiations agreed to resume inspections.

More issues erupted after what seem to have been an intent of subterfuge by the North. The USA

declared that economic sanctions would be sought, which Pyongyang saw as an act of war. The

situation got diffused with the offering of fuel and two light water reactors (Appendix 3, note 4)

(Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2018, para. 11). After the dissolution of the USSR, given the ongoing

famine and economic difficulties, the nuclear bargaining power offered some relief to the hermit

kingdom, although it is unlikely to have been North Korea’s initial drive in developing nuclear

armament.
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There are several possible reasons for Pyongyang wanting nuclear weapons. The most

logical reason is protection against foreign attacks, notably against the ROK and the USA,

although this scenario is now highly unlikely due to Russia and China’s interests in regional

stability and permanent membership to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Another

possible reason as suggested by Moon and Lee (2009) was financial hardship and the weapon

trade sanctions imposed on North Korea, which were an impediment in procuring advanced

weaponry systems to defend itself and steered the regime to choose a relatively cost-effective

insurance. A reason also worth mentioning is yet again the “juche” ideology. As Huntley (2009)

highlights, for a state that prioritises its military as much as North Korea, the achievement of a

nuclear weapon, which has been done with little foreign help and a dire financial situation, is the

apotheosis of the “juche” ideology. The nuclear program can also be interpreted as a propaganda

tool towards the DPRK’s people.

The North Korean People and the Country’s Natural Resources

The blunt of this analysis is that the North Koreans are part of the natural resources. As

explained by Park (2012), the citizenry is divided in three main classes and 51 sub-classes

according to the "songbun", a hereditary political loyalty scoring system. For example, people

whose ancestors fought alongside Kim Il-sung against the Japanese occupation are likely to be

part of the elite class, living in the most affluent parts of the capital Pyongyang and working in

important positions, meanwhile those whose ancestors helped South Koreans will probably be

assigned manual labour occupations in remote areas. This management method, albeit very

inefficient since important governmental and managerial roles are not allocated according to

skills, has so far permitted the Kim regime to retain power. Hawk and Mortwedt Ho (2017)

accuses the Regime of the systemic use of human rights violations in prison camps and political
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prison camps. This is nonetheless a compliancy method that rewards obedient and submissive

citizens with relative freedom.

The prison system forms part of the Regime’s authoritarian apparatus and is composed of

two types, the Kyo-hwa-so which are prison labour facilities and the Kwan-li-so which are

political penal labour colonies. The Parallel Gulag written by Hawk and Mortwedt Oh (2017)

describes the Kyo-hwa-so as approximately 43 incarceration facilities for an estimated 70,000

criminal and political offenders, while the half dozen Kwan-li-so are believed to hold captive

between 80,000 and 120,000 political prisoners. While the Kyo-hwa-so are overt institutions, the

Kwan-li-so are secretive and unrecognised by the government and where “…real, suspected and

imagined, or potential adversaries of the Kim family dynasty, possibly including their families,

are ostracised without any legal or judicial process” (Hawk & Mortwedt Oh, 2017, p. 56). What

the two prison systems have in common are inmates treatments described as crimes against

humanity and the lack of dietary and general supplies. This preventative method against dissent

is conceivably effective and provides the regime with free labour to manufacture goods and

extract natural resources.

North Korea’s mineral resources could unleash the country’s economic potential,

unfortunately there are major obstacles caused by longstanding isolation, poor management, and

limited available technology. Kyung-so (2011) shows a stark contrast between the two Koreas

with an abundance in the North of natural resources consisting of over 200 types of mineral

deposits spread over 80 percent of the territory, some deposits size ranking in the world’s top 10,

while South Korea is poor in that regard. Kyung-so (2011) also lists the hurdles faced by North

Korea’s mining sector as an insufficiency of equipment and infrastructure, confusing legalities

and an inadequate electric grid. If Pyongyang can overcome these challenges, the estimated
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value of the country’s mineral resources has been reported by Dia (2018) to be between six and

10 trillion dollars. The amount of untapped mineral wealth in the DPRK would quickly find

buyers in the ROK and China, their proximity being advantageous in delivery costs and speed.

As previously stated, ongoing managerial and technological inadequacies are impeding the

country’s development, which can be seen in the food production sector.

Agriculture feeds the people therefore is a pillar of society, unfortunately for North Korea

the tools for productive farming are not available. When searching ‘North Korea farm’ on the

internet the majority of pictures depicts people working the fields, but only few pictures have

animals or tractors helping in the labour. Joyce Appleby (2010) restates that before the several

European agricultural improvements that followed the Middle-Ages, countries needed up to 80

percent of their population to work the fields in order to feed everyone. The innovations that

succeeded over the centuries raised the food output while reducing the labour needed, which in

turn facilitated the emerging industrial sector with workers. The agricultural knowledge to

produce an adequate supply of food is known to North Koreans, who must overcome an obsolete

infrastructure and lack of modern farming equipment. According to the Central Intelligence

Agency (2018), more than a third of the North Korean labour force is employed in agriculture,

compared to five percent in South Korea. If the DPRK manages to halve the necessary farming

labour force, this would equate to two and a half million workers able to be used in various other

enterprises. The obstacles to the country’s development are the accumulation of nuclear-related

sanctions and the inefficiencies that characterises command economies.

Problems and Solutions

The sanctions imposed on Pyongyang have gradually deprived the country’s abilities to

have a dynamic productivity. Considering the limiting factors associated with production, the
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country has achieved some successes by adaptation and innovation. Park and Pearson (2018)

discusses the DPRK’s vinylon, a textile fibre made from rocks due to local climate and priorities

not permitting cotton cultivation. There is also the recent usage of wood to run vehicles, an

antiquated technology that keeps trucks operational with the country’s limited oil access (Kirk,

2012). This has shown the persistence of the Regime in keeping with the ‘juche’ ideology,

although recent events could be interpreted in a change of policies in order to modernise the

country and lift international sanctions.

The amount of economic sanctions imposed by the UNSC have reached a level that

might not be sustainable by North Korea in the long term. Lynch (2018) reported United States

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stating “… Washington would agree to lift sanctions on North

Korea if the country agrees to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program”. The changes

that would follow North Korea’s economic release could have a domino effect. The influx of

trade related currency would help agriculture development, which in turn would raise the

nutritional standards. The importance of achieving sufficient food production links to one of the

UNHRC’s concerns of food deprivation in the DPRK correctional system as there would be

potential to amend the issue. Although the Regime denies those accusations, the incentive to

project a positive international image has been explained by Son (2017). The cessation of the

nuclear program and the potential bettering of human rights could ease Pyongyang’s concerns of

foreign attack and invasion.

The interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations (1945) implies two reasons as to

why a country would lawfully attack or invade another, the first reason is self-defence and the

second would be under specific circumstances such as threat to the peace and, with the

authorisation of the UN Security Council. The UNSC, to allow military action against the DPRK,
NORTH KOREA 12

could use the pretexts of forced denuclearisation or human rights abuses committed by the

regime. Therefore if North Korea was to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, signed a peace

treaty with the ROK and was to adhere to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, any

country attacking North Korea would be breaching chapter VII of the Charter of the United

Nations. There is also the case of Russia and China, two of the five permanent members of the

UNSC with veto privileges, who do not consider the human rights in the DPRK to be a “…threat

to international peace and security” (UNSC, 2015, p. 23) and who do not wish to continue seeing

USA’s troops in the region. Consequently China and Russia would likely veto any UNSC

resolution that would authorise American troops in North Korea. The shadow of American

intervention is reflected in Pyongyang’s military spending which, if switched towards

infrastructure policies could result in an exponential economic awakening.

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Current Research

The aim of this section is to provide this paper’s thesis statement with validating

arguments using recent research. A study by Choe and Mahoney (2018) supports the view of

North Korea as an economic potential, and has highlighted five elements involved. Firstly the

estimated quantity of rare-earth minerals in the North Korean ground have a substantial value, as

currently China has a quasi-monopoly of 95 percent of the world’s production. Secondly, the

transport of goods to and fro between South Korea, Japan and the Eurasian continent via the

DPRK is achievable with rail infrastructure developments, and would benefit all parties

involved. Thirdly, foreign investors could be attracted to establish competitive manufacturing

industries in the North due to low wages and a level of control on labour that only an autocratic

system can provide (Jung & Rich, 2016). Fourthly, the poor living conditions of many North

Koreans, added to the deep-rooted disciplinarian system, can suggest a pliable labour force

grateful for the financial betterment that foreign investments can lead to, which would in turn

raise the government’s revenue. Lastly, the benefit of regular employment is regular income, and

a side effect of income is purchasing power which will open new markets and raise the North

Koreans’ living standards, while the government will benefit from taxation and an increment in

the citizenry’s contentment, conformity and compliancy. With proper management and

reallocation of resources, North Korea could become a major industrial state in the region with

competitive low wages. Although there is untapped potential for the hermit kingdom to attract

foreign investments, many obstacles need to be addressed.

A country’s survival revolves around money, while a country’s prosperity revolves

around trade, but in the case of North Korea, which lacks money and the means to fully exploit

its natural resources, foreign investments could help overcome this hurdle. Jung and Rich (2016)
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outlines that foreign investors are attracted to profit, legal rights and fairness when conducting

business overseas, and while the lower labour cost in North Korea enables higher returns, the

vague legal system enhances the dangers of expropriation. The greatest physical obstacle is the

DPRK’s insufficient and ageing infrastructure. Electric blackouts are not uncommon with users

reporting as little as four hours of electricity supplied per day (Yeo & Kim, 2018). Bribes to

officials, as explained by Wang (2016), are to be expected by foreign investors to secure the

safety of goods sent or received and to haggle for preferential services. Wang (2016) also

observes the food insecurity to be a complication since the impoverished North Korean workers

are likely to be under-productive if undernourished, and there has been instances of foreign

investors having to provide food in order to maintain productivity which, adds costs and lowers

profits. Until the legal and technological problems are addressed, the incentives for foreign

investors to bring entrepreneurial skills to North Korea are challenged by the initial investment

required and the low level of legal protection. With a significant part of the DPRK’s population

living in poverty and the rarity of western luxuries and comforts, the introduction of global

consumerism could result in a rapid economic expansion such as the Industrial Revolution when

consumers had choices and disposable income. The principal challenge remains the complexity

for foreign investors to tap into the vast mineral resources waiting in the North Korean ground.
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Critical Issues

This research paper has three critical issues that relates to the accessibility of study

materials. The first problem encountered is the lack of reliable data from within the North

Korean Government. Demographic data is important to estimate the population’s production

capability as industrial investors would arguably choose to operate near concentrations of young

workers out of military obligations for example. Geological and landscape data would allow

outside planning for the establishment of infrastructure and facilities near sizeable mineral

deposits. The official data and statements issued by Pyongyang and the state-controlled media

are considered dubious due to the non-existence of civil liberties and the inaccessibility by the

foreign press. All usable data is acquired via testimonies and analytical work by various agencies

in the world, some governmental such as the Central Intelligence Agency, and some non-

governmental such as The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. The second issue is the

absence of human research surveys to gauge the public’s political views and other interests.

Although it could be assumed the general poorer population of North Korea is not happy and

wishes for changes, no anonymous polls or surveys are performed to assess the public opinion,

therefore the possibility of general public satisfaction cannot be discarded. This reasoning might

seem incompatible with the reports of human rights abuses and food shortage, but different

societies might have higher priorities in different values than the ones accustomed in western

countries such as Australia. The last critical issue of this research is the superficial understanding

of Pyongyang’s political system as it is more complex than what is generally depicted in the

media. The general perception by outsiders of the Regime is that Kim Jong-un’s position is

unmovable. Although the Kim’s family has been the subject of a quasi-deification, The

Economist Intelligence Unit (2017) explains that a consolidation of power has been necessary
NORTH KOREA 16

during the succession of leadership which included keeping the political elite satisfied and the

elimination of potential contestants to the political control.

Future Directions

The challenge in addressing the population surveys and the acquisition of reliable data

regarding North Korea resides in the danger involved. The media are controlled by the state and

the information allowed to be seen is not always a reflection of the truth. The data that can be

compiled by North Korean defectors is of help but limited to the location they came from, the

positions held, and in some cases exposure to random pieces of information or rumours. In recent

years mobile phones have become accessible and although locked to the nation’s network, they

could ideally be used to organise clandestine data gathering. Although not without dangers,

researchers could request smugglers and defector’s relatives who are considering escaping the

country to gather specific intelligence with modified or smuggled mobile phones. Another

method of data collection could be persistent requests by academics, which would remove the

danger factor although there is a certainty that the data provided or accessible would be censored.

Regarding the understanding of governmental hierarchy more research could be invested in

analysing the past and current consolidations of power. More details could be provided on the

removed potential enemies and the shifts in political elite favouritism. This research would

require gathering available data and making timelines of the DPRK’s officials and Kim Il-sung’s

entourage from before the separation of the Korean Peninsula. A chart of the current and past

ministerial positions could show specific patterns. Similar charts from regional and local

government staff could also demonstrate movements between departments or locations according

to merit or punishment. Such insight could unveil some information about the initial power

consolidation process and the continuity of the Regime.

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Conclusion

In response to the question ‘Could North Korea’s peaceful denuclearisation turn the country into

an economic threat?’, there are strong indications this could be the case. From it’s inception in

1948, North Korea has followed a path unlike any other country. The duress used to punish

diverging opinions in conjunction with isolation and propaganda, has instilled in part of the

citizenry a feared loyalty to the Regime, and the acceptance of drudgery. This indoctrination has

spanned several generations and has allowed a monarchy-like succession on the Kim’s family.

Stating that the Regime has total control would be erroneous, but the level of impunity and

disregard to human life suggests some well-established dehumanisation of the foundational

system in North Korean society. In some ways, the Regime could be viewed as a machine,

intelligent but devoid of empathy. Years of sanctions and economic isolation resulting from the

non-adherence to the NPT, have not prevented North Korea from developing a military nuclear

arsenal. This resilience, if applied to infrastructure and industrialisation has arguably the power

to lift the DPRK’s economy to prosperous levels, and if focused on mining growth could

undoubtedly compete against Australia’s mineral exports. Low wages would entice industries

who rely on labour-intensive production methods to relocate to North Korea for the purpose of

increasing profits. This shift in location would be beneficial for Chinese and South Korean

producers but may eventually reduce the availability of employment for unqualified workers.

Although North Korea has a relatively small population, the plausibility of it becoming an

economic power is genuine and could weight heavily on international markets. These changes

depends primarily on the leadership’s willingness to denuclearise North Korea. If this first step is

taken, sanctions will be lifted and the DPRK will again experience the wheels of progress.
NORTH KOREA 18

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Appendix 1

List of abbreviations

Abbreviation Explanation

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

NPT Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PRC People’s Republic of China

ROK Republic of Korea

UN United Nations

UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USA United States of America

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WPK Worker’s Party of Korea

NORTH KOREA 24

Appendix 2

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Appendix 3

1. For the purpose of this paper, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will also be

referred as DPRK, North Korea, the North, hermit kingdom, Pyongyang, and the Regime.

2. Although this number varies between sources, it is estimated to be between 2.5 and 3.5

million casualties.

3. The amount is adjusted to 2018, and please note this is an estimate as there are no

available records.

4. Light water reactors are commercial nuclear reactors with a complex design making

proliferation costly and easily noticeable.