FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

(POLICE POWER)

POLICE POWER - is the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution to make, ordain, establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws for the good and welfare of the State and its people.

 THE BASIC PURPOSES/ASPECTS OF POLICE POWER.

1. to promote the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people; (ASSOCIATION OF
SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY, 175 SCRA 343; US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85)

2. to promote and preserve public health; (VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA, September 21, 1987;
DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533 [NMAT]; LORENZO VS. DIRECTOR OF HEALTH, 50 Phil. 595—
apprehend and confine lepers in a leprosarium)

3. promote and protect public safety; (AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195; TAXICAB OPERATORS VS.
JUINIO, 119 SCRA 897 )

4. to maintain and safeguard peace and order; (GUAZON VS. DE VILLA)

5. to protect public morals; (CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUIO, JR., 455 SCRA 308; WHITE LIGHT
CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA, January 20, 2009; DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569;
ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967; VILLAVICENCIO VS. MAYOR LUKBAN OF
MANILA, 39 Phil. 778; JMM PROMOTIONS VS. CA, 260 SCRA 319; VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS,
February 13, 1983)

6. to promote the economic security of the people. (ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ, 101 Phil. 11155)

 DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN POLICE POWER AND POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (DIPIDIO VS GOZUN)

POLICE POWER EMINENT DOMAIN

The power of the state to promote public welfare The inherent right of the State to condemn
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and or to take private property for public use
property without compensation upon payment of just compensation
In the exercise of police power, enjoyment of a There should be compensable taking if it
property is restricted because the continued use would result to public use
thereof would be injurious to public welfare. In
such case, there is no compensable taking
provided none of the property interests is
appropriated for the use or for the benefit of the
public
Properties condemned under police power are Properties expropriated are for public
usually noxious or intended for noxious purpose; purpose and just compensation should be
hence , no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in paid.
the exercise of police power, property rights of
private individuals are subjected to restraints and
 burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state.

 TESTS FOR A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

a. the interests of the public, not mere particular class, require the exercise of police power;
(LAWFUL SUBJECT)
b. the means employed is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive to individuals. (LAWFUL MEANS). In short, the end does not justify the means.

CASES.
 An ordinance of the City of Manila requiring people or couples checking in different motels in the
city to register at the motel’s desk facing a public street and show their identification card, etc is a
VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER to promote public morals, i.e. curb prostitution or illicit
relationship. Police power is defined as the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution to
make, ordain, establish all manner of whole and reasonable laws for the good and welfare of the
State and its people. (ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR)

 An ordinance of the city of Manila prohibiting hotels and motels at the Ermita-Malate area to offer
“short-time” admission is unconstitutional and is not a valid exercise of police power. (WHITE
LIGHT CORPORATION VS CITY OF MANILA)

 An ordinance of the City of Manila that prohibits the operation of night clubs, etc in the Ermita-
Malate Area and gives the existing establishments three months to transfer to any place outside said
area under pain of imprisonment of up to 1 year and fine of 5,000 or change the nature of their
business to gift shops, restaurants, etc. is unconstitutional. It violates the due process clause by
depriving the owners of said establishments of their legitimate businesses and it also violates the
equal protection clause. (CITY OF MANILA VS JUDGE LAGUIO)

 A law (Letter of Instruction No. 869) prohibiting the use of heavy and extra heavy vehicles on
weekends and holidays when there is energy crisis is A VALID POLICE POWER MEASURE.
(BAUTISTA VS JUNIO)

 In an NBI investigation, it found that the “Fatima examinees gained early access to the test
questions during the Medical Licensure Examination. The Board issued Resolution No. 19
withholding the registration as physician of the examinees. SC stressed that like all rights and
freedoms granted by the Constitution, their exercise may be regulated pursuant to the police power
of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety and general welfare of the
people. As such, mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for the
respondents to practice medicine. (PRC vs DE GUZMAN et al)

 NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.

1. Requiring the private cemeteries to set aside a portion of their land area given as burial place for
paupers free of charge. It constitutes taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. (CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC vs ERICTA)
 2. The disposal of the carabaos or carabeef confiscated by the Director of the Animal Industry
without prior permit issued by the government to charitable agencies as it may deem fit. This
case illustrates that there might be a lawful subject but the means employed is illegal, then there
can be no valid exercise of police power. ( YNOT vs IAC)
3. Prohibiting the operation of night clubs. The operation is not illegal per se, they can be regulated
but not prohibited. (DE LA CRUZ vs PARAS)

ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

DUE PROCESS
- is a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial. (Per Daniel Webster in the DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE)

Kinds of Due Process

1. substantive due process- requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of
the person to life, liberty or property. In short, it is to determine whether it has a valid
governmental objective like for the interest of the public as against mere particular class.

2. procedural due process- one which hears before it condemns, or the procedure as pointed out
by Daniel Webster.

Classifications of Due Process

1. Judicial Due process (BANCO ESPANOL VS. PALANCA, 37 Phil. 921)
The requisites are:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and decide the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over
the property subject of the proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard;
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

CASES:
 Imelda Marcos was charged and convicted of graft and corruption by the Sandiganbayan. When it
reached the Supreme Court, she was acquitted because of the violation of her right to due
process. The court notes the bias and prejudice of Presiding Justice Garchitorena against the
petitioner as shown by his leading, misleading and baseless hypothetical questions of said
justice to RAMON F. CUERVO, witness for the petitioner. Said justice asked 179 questions to the
witness as against the prosecutor who cross-examined the witness and asked 73. Said number
of questions could no longer be described as “clarificatory questions”. Another ground
therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied IMPARTIAL TRIAL before
the Sandiganbayan. This is one reason why the case could no longer be remanded to the
Sandiganbayan especially so that the other Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5
 have retired. There is therefore no compelling reason why the case should still be remanded to
the lower court when all the evidence are already with the Supreme Court. (Imelda Marcos vs
Sandiganbayan)

 If an accused was represented by a non-lawyer during the entire trial though she thought that
he was a lawyer, his right to due process was violated and therefore he is entitled to a new trial.
(DELGADO VS CA)
 However, even if he was represented by a non-lawyer at the start of the trial, particularly when
the prosecution presented it evidence, but he was represented by a lawyer when he
represented his evidence, there is no violation of his right to due process of right of counsel.
(CONSULTA VS PEOPLE)
 Repeated failure of a party to present evidence justifies the court to consider the case
submitted for decision and hold that the party has waived the right to present evidence. (DBP vs
CA)

 Opida was charged of murder. Because the judge asked irrelevant questions during the trial SC
ruled that his right to due process was violated, for not being tried before an impartial court.
(PEOPLE VS OPIDA)

 Pp vs Opida is different as compared to case of PP VS MORTERA. In this case mortera was

charged of murder. When he arraigned he pleaded not guilty. Judge just made a comment for
giving the defense of self-defense. Then he asked for acquittal assailing he was not tried on an
impartial court. SC take into account the entire proceeding. The comment is not considered as a
pre-judgment of the judge.

 There was also a denial of due process. One of the members of the Second Division,
Commissioner Jaime Opinion was a law partner of Pacificador. He denied the motion to
disqualify him from hearing the case. The Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster
that requirement we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear
to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. (JAVIER VS
COMELEC)

 Mayor Alonte was charged of rape but was acquitted because his right to due process was
violated. The act of the respondent judge in rendering a decision without even giving the
petitioner the right to adduce evidence in his behalf is a gross violation of his right to due
process of law. The Decision rendered is NULL AND VOID for want of due process. (ALONTE vs
SAVELLANO)

 As long as there is a notice to a party in the hearing of a motion on the custody of their children
in a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage case, there is no violation of the right to due process.
(TAN VS TAN)

 The right of the accused to due process of law was violated when the judge issued a warrant for
her arrest even though she has not received any notice for her arraignment before the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City because the notice was actually sent to her through the
Chief of Police of Quezon City. (TAN VS JUDGE TABIN)
  Zambales appealed to the DENR. The Secretary of DENR said “the decision of the Director of
Mines is very very good” SC ruled that the first requisite of due process is not present.
(ZAMBALES VS MINING CORP)

 The case involves the heads of DOST. Anzaldo appealed the case to CSC. The decision was
penned by Clave where he stressed that the decision is very very good. SC ruled that the first
requisite is not present. (ANZALDO vs CLAVE)

2. Due process before Administrative Bodies (TIBAY VS. CIR, 69 Phil. 635)
The requisites are:
1. the right to a hearing which includes the right to present evidence;
2. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. the decision must have something to support itself;
4. the evidence must be substantial;
5. the decision must be based on the evidence presented during the hearing;

6. the tribunal or body must act on its own independent consideration of the law
or facts;
7. the board or body shall in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues
involved.

CASES:
 Atty. Erece was charged of dishonesty for collecting transportation allowance of the vehicle
assigned to him and for using the vehicle for personal use. He also denied the use of the vehicle
by the employees of CHR. Erece assailed that he was denied of his right to due process for he
was not allowed to cross-examine the complainants and witnesses. Administrative Due Process
before the Civil Service Commission does not require cross-examination of the complainant and
his witnesses by the respondent.(ERECE VS MACALINGAY)

 Mendoza assailed that he was denied of his hearing stage rights. There is no violation of the
petitioner’s right to due process when after the election protest against him was already
submitted for decision and the ballots transferred to the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
COMELEC went to deliberate on the case at the Senate Electoral Tribunal using the ballots
therein in the process without notice to the petitioner.(MENDOZA VS COMELEC)

 Maguddatu alleges that he never received the summons issued by HRET. He also denied that
Baldenas was a member of his household or his employee. He further claimed that Baldenas
was not authorized to receive any important documents addressed to him. And assuming that
he had authorized her, the summons received by her was never brought to his attention. There
is violation of the right to due process of law if a party he is declared as having waived the right
to file his answer despite improper service of summons. (MANGUDDADATU VS HRET)
  Cuanan was found guilty of sexual harassment and recommending his forced resignation
without prejudiced to benefits by the CSC. CA reversed the decision by the CSC. SC decides in
favor of the respondent - the right to due process on the part of the respondent was violated
when the Civil Service Commission reconsidered its earlier decision in favor of the former based
on a Motion for Reconsideration wherein said respondent was not furnished a copy thereof nor
given the chance to comment on it. (DEP ED vs CUANAN)

 There is no law, whether the Civil Service Act or the Administrative Code of 1987, which
provides that a respondent in an administrative case should be assisted by counsel in order that
the proceedings therein is considered valid. Not only, that, petitioner herein was given the
opportunity several times to engage the services of a lawyer to assist him but he confidently
informed the investigators that he could protect himself.(LUMIQUED VS. EXENEA)

3. Due Process in the Disciplinary Action against students (GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA
706)
The requisites are:
1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
2. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance
of counsel;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

CASES:
 Were private respondents accorded due process of law because there was no full-blown hearing
nor were they allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them?
This is the case involving offensive action causing injuries to James Yap. Private
respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v.
National University] where this Court held that “x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof.” (DE LA
SALLE VS CA)

 Petitioners who are students of the National University were barred from enrolment. The school
claims that their scholastic standing is poor and that they have been involved in activities that
have disrupted classes and had conducted mass actions without the required permits.
S.C. said that the following minimum standards must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process as mentioned above. (GUZMAN VS NU)

4. Due process in NLRC

The requisites are: Notice and Hearing
  Is there violation of the right to “due process” if there is no notice and hearing but the situation
does not fall under the four kinds of situational due process?

Atienza claimed that he was denied of the due process during the election of LP’s new
president. He mentioned about the Ang Tibay case covering the due process requirements.
However, SC ruled that “The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative
bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are
performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality “contemplates an authority to which
the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function.” The
constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the state’s powers thus, apply
too, to administrative bodies.
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary
between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument.
The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary government
action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In the latter case, the
specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process
guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its
citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties. (ATIENZA VS
ROXAS)

 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

The requisites for valid classification ( People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12)
1. There must be real and substantial distinctions;
2. It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. It must apply equally to all members of the same class.

CASES:
 QUINTO AND TOLENTINO vs COMELEC. The laws considering appointed officials of the
government who filed their certificates of candidacy “considered resigned” while elected
officials are not. This law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution

 GUTTIEREZ VS DBM. There is no violation of the equal protection clause when the
Compensation and Classification Act of 1989 includes certain allowances and fringe benefits into
the standardized salaries of most government employees but not to police and military
personnel.

 PEOPLE VS. JUDGE VERA OF MANILA. A law was enacted that any prison convicted of not less
than 6 years imprisonment is entitled for probation provided there is probation officer.
In Bagiuo City , A is convicted of 6 years imprisonment. He was entitled for probation since there
is a probation officer. While B who is convicted for 10 years in La Trinida, Benguet was not given
probation for there is no probation officer. This law is in violation of the equal protection law.

 HIMAGAN VS PEOPLE. The fact that the policemen charged with a criminal offense punishable
by more than 6 years are to be suspended during the entire duration of the case unlike other
 government employees is valid since it rests on valid classification because policemen carry
weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against
them.

 GUMABON CASE Gumabon was charged of Complex crime of Rebellion complex with murder
having a penalty reclusion perpetua (1950). In 1954 – P vs. Hernandez, SC held that no such
rebellion complex with murder, only rebellion with penalty 6 years maximum. Thus, Hernandez
was released after serving his sentence of six years. In 1960, Hernandez and 50 rebels – allowed
to have Muntinlupa. Gumabon and company are still serving their sentence for 10 years that
time. Are they entitled to be released? Yes. It is in violation of their rights to equal protection
clause. A law enacted which is favorable to the accused must benefit said accused. This is also in
relation to Article of the Civil Code wherein jurisprudence and court decision are case law

 LACSON VS. SB. Lacson who was a public official was charged of a case in a Sandiganbayan. As a
remedy of his conviction at SB, he can file a petition for certiorari before CA.On the other hand,
private respondents have 4 remedies – chances of acquittal. Is there a violation of equal
protection clause? There is real and valid classification. There is no violation of the equal
protection clause.

 UNIDO vs. COMELEC. The request and/or demand of petitioner for equal broadcast media of its
public meeting or rally at the Plaza Miranda last Saturday, March 21, 1981 was arbitrarily denied
by respondent COMELEC in its Resolutions. As the political campaign of the Kilusan ng Bagong
Lipunan (KBL) for "YES" votes used all the radios and televisions in the Pulong Pulong of its
political leader, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the political campaign for "NO" votes of
petitioner UNIDO should and must be granted the same right and equal use of the same
facilities for the remaining days of the political campaign for "NO" votes up to the plebiscite on
April 7, 1981;
COMELEC Resolutions states that this is contrary to the Constitution and the law, and
moreover, are unjust, unfair and inequitable, for said Resolutions violate the basic principles of
equality, good faith and fair play, and they are not conducive to insure free, orderly and honest
elections. SC held that there is no violation of EPC, even if the YES advocate is allowed there is
real and substantial distinction.

 BASCO vs PAGCOR. No violation of equal protection clause if Congress would legalize cock-
fighting and horse racing since police power could regulate gambling.

 PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs PRADO. There is no valid distinction for a law removing
the franking privilege of the judiciary while leaving the same of the Executive and Legislative
despite the fact that there is considerable volume of mails from the courts. Loss of revenue is
not a valid ground unless it would be withdrawn to all government offices.

 TATAD VS SEC. OF DOE.; LAGMAN et al vs HON FERRER et al. These petitions challenge the
constitutionality of RA 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and for
other purposes. RA 8180 seeks to end 26 years of government regulation of the downstream oil
industry. SC held that Section 5 providing for tariff differentials is germane to the subject of R
8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
  TIU vs CA. There is real and substantial distinction between business inside the Subic Economic
Zone and outside wherein those inside are exempt from other taxes as a result of the policy of
the government to accelerate the development of the portion of the Subic left by the
Americans.

 DUMLAO vs. COMELEC. A law was enacted which requires that all individuals greater that 65 no
longer allowed running any elective position. SC held that thee is no violation of equal
protection clause. It is germane to the purpose of the law in order to infuse young blood to
political systems.

 BIRAUGO VS PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION. The EO(Philippine Truth Commission) issued by

Pres. PNOY which is to investigate the anomalies during GMA’s administration. SC declared that
the order is unconstitutional because this in violation of the equal protection clause. Previous
administrations after their terms were not investigated – GMA should not undergo any
investigation too.

NOTE: A law is complete if it complies with: Completeness test and Sufficient of standard test

 THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers an effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision should be read with Section 18, 19 and 26 of RA 9372 (The Human Security Act or the
Anti-Terrorism Law)

REQUISITES OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT (UY vs BIR)

1. The warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

PROBABLE CAUSE - Facts and circumstance which will lead a reasonable discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has committed and that the object sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. ( P vs SY JUCO; ALVAREZ vs CFI; US vs ADDISON)

THERE ARE TWO (2) KINDS OF PC.

1. Executive PC
- to be determined by the fiscal ; determining whether to file or not to file a criminal case
in court and that the accused is probably of the offense he is charged of.

2. Judicial PC
- to be determined by the judge ; determining probable cause for him to issue a Warrant
of Arrest as a matter of course or not.

2. The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by applicant or any other
person;
 3. In determining probable cause, the judge must examine under oath and affirmation the
complainant
and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

4. The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things
to be
seized.

ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT: (PRIVATE PERSON/ANY)

1. When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing or is
attempting to convict an offense.
2. When an offense has just been committed and has a probable cause to believe base on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it.
3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURES: (PP VS ARUTA)

1. Customs searches
2. Searches of moving vehicle
3. Seizure of evidence in plain view
4. Consented searches
5. Search incidental to a lawful arrest.
6. Stop and risk measures.

CASES:

 UY vs BIR
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in
the community. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on
mere suspicion or belief. In this case, most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of
particularity, especially since the witness had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents
sought to be seized. THE SEARCH WARRANT IS SEPARABLE, AND THOSE ITEMS NOT PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBED MAY BE CUT OFF WITHOUT DESTROYING THE WHOLE WARRANT. This case provides
the requisites of a valid search warrant.

 PP vs CA
In applying for a search warrant, the police had in their mind the first four separate apartment
units at the rear of Abigail Variety Store in Quezon City to be the subject of their search. The same
was not however what the judge who issued the warrant had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS
ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SERAHC WARRANT. “WHAT IS MATERIAL IN DETERMINING THE
VALIDITY OF SEARCH IS THE PLACE STATED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT ITSELF, NOT WHAT THE
APPLICANTS HAD IN THIR THOUGHTS, OR HAD REPRESENTED IN THE PROOFS THEY SUBMITTED TO
THE COURT ISSUING WARRANT”.

 PP vs ARUTA
 The Olongapo PNP was tipped off by an informer that Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio the
following day with a large volume of marijuana. The following day she was searched without
warrant and the bag she was carrying contained 8.5 kilos of marijuana.
SC held that the marijuana obtained as a result of warrantless search is inadmissible as evidence
for the following reasons:
a. the policemen had sufficient time to apply for a search warrant but they failed to do so;
b. the accused was not acting suspiciously;
c. the accused’s identity was previously ascertained so applying for a warrant should have
been easy;
d. the accused in this case was searched while innocently crossing a street

 PEOPLE vs MONTILLA
An informer tipped the Cavite PNP that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio with
undetermined amount of marijuana. The informer likewise informed them that he could recognize
the said person. At 4 AM in the next morning, the appellant was arrested without warrant. The fact
that he consented the search as well as the fact that the informer was a reliable who had supplied
similar information to the police in the past which proved positive. The arrest is VALID.
 The case is similar to the case of People vs. Encimada where the appellant was searched
without a warrant while disembarking from a ship on the strength of a tip from an informer
received by the police the previous afternoon that the appellant would be transporting
prohibited drugs. The search yielded a plastic package containing marijuana. On Appeal, the SC
reversed the decision of conviction and held that Encinada did not manifest any suspicious
behavior that would necessarily and reasonably invite the attention of the police.

 TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE - “A SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT is a search warrant issued for more than
one specific offense like one for estafa, robbery, theft and qualified theft”
 STONEHILL vs DIOKNO
The petitioners are questioning the validity of a total of 42 search warrants issued on
different dates against them and the corporations in which they are officers, directing the peace
officer to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and
to seize and take possession of such personal property. The petitioners claim that the search
warrants are void being violative of the Constitutional provision on search and seizure.
As to the searches made on their offices, they could not question the same in their
personal capacities because the corporations have a personality separate and distinct with its
officers. An objection to an unlawful search and seizure IS PURELY PERSONAL AND CANNOT BE
AVAILED OF BY THIRD PARTIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PETITIONERS MAY NOT VALIDLY OBJECT
TO THE USE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM OF THE DOCUMENTS, PAPERS AND THINGS SEIZED
FROM THE OFFICES AND PREMISES OF THE CORPORATIONS, TO WHOM THE SEIZED EFFECTS
BELONG, AND MAY NOT BE INVOKED BY THE CORPORATE OFFICERS IN PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THEM IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY.
As to the documents seized in the residences of the petitioners, the same may not be
used in evidence against them because the warrants issued were in the nature of a general
warrant for failure to comply with the constitutional requirement that:
1. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and
2. that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
 BACHE & Co. CASE
The clerk of court received the evidence and asked questions. The judge issued search warrant when
satisfied upon the determination of probable cause by the clerk of court.
SC: The issuance of the search valid warrant is not valid. He did not personally determined by the
judge. The judge should be the one asking searching questions.

 ASIAN SURETY VS. HERRERA - A search warrant for estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance
fraud is a general warrant and therefore not valid.

 ELI LUI vs MATILLANO

In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by the employer, the residence of
a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain
entry into the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different personal properties therein which were
allegedly part of those stolen from the employer. They were in possession of a mission order but
later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search. Are the
things admissible in evidence? Can they be sued for damages as a result of the said warrantless
search and seizure?
Held:
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. There must be clear
and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. There must be proof of the
following:
a. that the right exists;
b. that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the existence of
said right;
c. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order that the said is
to be valid. The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held
liable for damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP
Garments vs. CA.

 GOVERNOR LEVISTE vs. JUDGE BALAMEDA, RTC of Makati (Aug. 2010)

- You cannot compel the judge – for he is exercising JPC.

 PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO

After the informant was given by the police the amount of P100.00, he went to buy marijuana
from the accused then returned to the police headquarters with said article. Thereafter, the
policemen went to arrest the accused without warrant. The arrest is not valid since it does not fall
under Section 5 Rule 113)
Likewise, after securing a search warrant authorizing the seizure of shabu and its paraphernalia
and an unlicensed firearm was seized instead, said gun is inadmissible in evidence.

 MAYOR SUSANA LIM VS. JUDGE FELIX OF MAKATI:

 Murder case
 Felix issued warrant of arrest to Lim
 In the present, the respondent judge relies solely on the certification of the prosecutor.
Considering that all the record of the investigations are in Masbate, he has not personally
determined the existence of probable cause. The determination was made by the provincial
prosecutor. The constitutional requirement had not been satisfied. The judge can’t positively
determine PC because he was reading the resolution of the fiscal who is not a witness to the
case. Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall:

(1) personally evaluate the reports and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest;

(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

 QUINTERO VS. NBI

The questions propounded are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of
leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant and conducting of
examination in a general manner would not satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a valid
search warrant

 SOLIVEN vs. MARASIAR

As to the requirement that the judge must “personally” determine probable cause, must he
examine the complainant and his witnesses face to face in order to comply with the said
constitutional provision?

It depends.

In connection with the issuance of a SEARCH WARRANT, he must personally examine the
complainant and the witnesses, with searching questions, face to face.

In connection with the issuance of a warrant of arrest, however, the word “personally” after the
word determined does not necessarily mean that the judge should examine the complainant and his
witnesses personally or face to face before issuing the warrant of arrest but the exclusive
responsibility on the part of said judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. As such,
there is no need to examine the complainant and his witnesses face to face. It is sufficient if the
judge is convinced of the existence of probable cause upon reading the affidavits or deposition of
the complainant and his witnesses.

 PENDON VS. CA - When the questions asked to the applicant for a search warrant was pre-typed,
the same is not valid since there could have been no searching questions.

 PEOPLE VS. HONORABLE ENRIQUE B. INTING reiterates the following doctrines:

(1) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. It is not for the Provincial
Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the judge alone makes this
detemination.
 (2) The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assist
him to make the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the
prosecutor's present to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual.
It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all other supporting
documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge to make
his determination.

(3) Preliminary inquiry should be distinguished from the preliminary investigation proper.
While the former seeks to determine probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest, the latter
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released.

 UMIL vs RAMOS
An NPA may be arrested without warrant while sleeping or being treated in a hospital because a
communist rebel is a continuing crime.

 PEOPLE VS. JUDGE VILLANUEVA OF BUTUAN CITY

 The city prosecutor of Butuan City filed several criminal cased and it went to the sala of Judge
Villanueva.
 What is the first thing that the judge must do upon receipt of criminal info filed in the court?
Ex. Rape case
1. Determine if there is PC
2. If convinced, issue a way of arrest
 Upon reading the record of the case the judge said that he was not convince that there is PC
so he issued an order to the fiscal to submit additional evidence before he will issue a Warrant
of Arrest.
 Fiscal said “ NO, he should issue the Warrant of Arrest as a matter of course because it is
already ministerial on the part of a judge to issue Warrant of Arrest because I already found PC
that is why I filed criminal cases in court.”

 PLACER vs. JUDGE VILLANUEVA

-filed several cases in court
-judge Villanueva who won for the first time said “I will not issue Warrant of Arrest, I’m not
convinced that there is PC. You submit additional evidence.
- fiscal did not submit evidence, so the judge dismissed and criminal cases because the fiscal did not
comply with is order.
- filed to SC to question actuation of the judge.

Was the judge correct in dismissing the case?

SC: No, because it will be the private complainant who will be prejudiced if the criminal case is
dismissed by the judge.
- The remedy that the judge can do for failure of the fiscal to comply with the order f the court
is to cite him for competent.
NOTE: The judge is not bound by the findings of the Prosecutor because the said finding is only
“probable cause” that a crime was committed. Probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of
arrest is a judicial function vested only in the judge. In fact, he can require the Prosecutor to submit
additional evidence if he is not convinced of the existence of probable for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. (P. vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465; Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463).
 CASTILLO VS. VILLALUZ. The court ruled that judges of RTC no longer have authority to conduct
preliminary investigations: This authority was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985.

 GERONIMO VS. COMELEC

 1980 Geronimo was elected mayor of Baras Rizal. He was ordered to vacate for a disqualification
case was filed before election, thus having 75 criminal cases pending. The warrant of arrest was
issued. Is the arrest valid?
SC.: No. Probable cause was not proven in each case. Every case is different from one another.

 GERONIMO DOCTRINE
 If disqualified with finality before election and the people rated that person, 2nd placer be
declared the winner. ( Cayat Doctrine – 04-26-07 ) - 1st

 LABO DOCTRINE
 if disqualified with finality after election, vice mayor be the next.

 2ND CAYAT DOCTRINE

 election in 2004 – disqualified because of moral turpitude.

04-01-04  not qualified

04-16-04 Cayat lawyer filed case
05-08-04  election – cayat won
05-20-04  denied MR for lack of merit and failure to pay the filing fee.

 the decision become final early as 04-16-04, second place be the one to take his place.
 If he was able to pay the filing fee, vice mayor be the next.
 no need for the complainant or the witnesses to be in front of the judge provided the judge
has the affidavit of the complainant and the witnesses and actually read them is convince of
the presence of PC.

 ENRILE vs SALAZAR
- Rebellion complex with murder
-issued Way to Enrile  was he able to determine PC? = YES!
The petitioner claims that the warrant issued is void because it was issued barely one
hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled to the respondent judge which could hardly
gave him sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation. Also, the petitioner claims that the respondent judge issued the warrant for his
arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under
oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, Section 2, of the
Constitution. This Court has already ruled that it is not unavoidable duty of the judge to make
such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by
PERSONALLY EVALUATING THE REPORT AND THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE
PROSECUTOR. MEREBY BECAUSE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD WHAT SOME MIGHT CONSIDER
ONLY A RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO COMPLY WITH THAT DUTY , GIVES NO
REASON TO ASSUME THAT HE HAD NOT, OR COULD NOT HAVE, SO COMPLIED; NOR DOES THAT
 SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICE TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY
HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED.

 PEOPLE vs MENGOTE
The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Blvd., in Tondo, Manila. When
the surveilance team arrived therein, they saw the accused "looking from side to side" and "holding
his abdomen". They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen that is why
they tried to ran away because of the other lawmen, they were unable to escape. After their arrest,
a .38 cal. Smith and Wessor revolver was confiscated from the accused and several days later, an
information for violation of PD 1866 was filed against him. After trial, Mengote was convicted of
having violated PD 1866 and was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua based on the alleged gun as
the principal evidence. Hence this automatic appeal.
Held: There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III,
Section 3 [2], of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification
given by Justice Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed." Further the
requirement prescribed by Section 5 Rule 113 are not complied with. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen,"
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in thie
presence.

 This is similar to PEOPLE vs. AMMINUIDIN, 163 SCRA 402 where the Court held that a
warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while he was coming
down the vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers.
He had not committed nor was actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in
the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was
no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the
constitutional requirement of a warrant.

o OPERATION KAPKAP is valid provided that those prescribed by Sec. 5 rule 113 of the
Rules of Court are present.

 PEOPLE vs. GO
The subsequent discovery in his car which was parked in a distant place from where the illegal
possession of firearm was committed [after he requested that he will bring his car to the Police
Station after his warrantless arrest) , of a drug paraphernalia and shabu, CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE
BEEN MADE DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. As such, the items do not fall under the exclusionary rule
and the unlicensed firearms, drug paraphernalia and the shabu, can be used as evidence against the
accused.

 SILAHIS INTL HOTEL INC vs SOLUTA

The petitioner suspects that the respondents who are officers of the Silahis International Hotel
Union were using the Union Office located inside the hotel in the sale or use of marijuana, dollar
smuggling, and prostitution. They arrived at the said conclusion through surveillance.
 In the morning of January 11, 1988, while the respondent union officer was opening the Union
Office, security officers of the plaintiff entered the union office despite objections thereto by
forcibly opening the same. Once inside the union office they started to make searches which
resulted in the confiscation of a plastic bag of marijuana. An information for violation of the
dangerous drugs act was filed against the respondent before the RTC of Manila which acquitted
them on the ground that the search conducted was illegal since it was warrantless and without
consent by the respondents.
SC HELD that the search is not valid and they are civilly liable under Art. 32 of the Civil Code. The
fact that the union office is part of the hotel owned by the petitioners does not justify the
warrantless search. The alleged reports that the said union office is being used by the union officers
for illegal activities does not justify their acts of barging into the said office without the consent of
the union officers and without a search warrant. If indeed there was surveillance made, then they
should have applied for a search warrant.

 The ruling in People vs. Andre Marti is not applicable here because in Marti, a criminal case, the
issue was whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of one’s constitutional
rights may be invoked against the State. In other words, the issue in Marti is whether the
evidence obtained by a private person acting in his private capacity without the participation of
the State, is admissible.

 PEOPLE vs ANDRE MARTI

Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export
Forwarders to send four (4) packages to Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes, owner of the place (no
relation to Shirley), received said goods and asked if she could examine and inspect it. Marti refused.
However later, following standard operating procedure, Job Reyes, co-owner and husband of Anita
opened the boxes for final inspection, before delivering it to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau
of Posts.
Upon opening, a peculiar odor emanated from the box that was supposed to contain gloves.
Upon further perusal, he felt and saw a dried leaves inside the box. Job Reyes then brought samples
to the NBI, he told them that the boxes to be shipped were still in his office. In the presence of the
NBI agents, Reyes opened the box and discovered that the odor came from the fact that the dried
leaves were actually those of the marijuana flowering tops.
Two other boxes, marked as containing books and tabacalera cigars; also revealed bricks or
case-like marijuana leaves and dried marijuana leaves respectively.
Marti was later invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the dried leaves.
Thereafter an information was filed against the appellant for violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act. The Special Criminal Court of Manila convicted accused Marti of violating sec.21(b) of said
RA.
Held: 1. The search conducted by a private person violate accused’s right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Constitution protection on search and seizure is imposable only against the
state and not to private persons.
In short, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
Case at bar will show that it was Job Reyes` initiative that perpetrated the search. He opened
the packages and took the samples to NBI. All the NBI agents did was to observe and look in plain
sight. This did not convert it to a search as contemplated by the constitution.

2. Yes, since the search was valid, the evidence from therein is admissible evidence.
 Art.III [2], on the admissibility of evidence in violation of the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, likewise applies only to the government and its agencies and not to private persons.

 PEOPLE VS SPO3 SANGKI ARA et al.

The accused-appellants decry that their arrest without probable cause and the violation of their
constitutional rights. They claim that the buy bust team had more than a month to apply for an
arrest warrant yet failed to do so. The accused also assailed that there was no probable cause to
arrest them. SC HELD that a buy bust operation has long been held as a legitimate method of
catching offenders. And probable cause in warrantless search must only be based on reasonable
ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.

 NOLASCO VS. PANO

A search incidental to a valid arrest must be done at the place where the accused is arrested. As
such, if accused was arrested while inside a jeepney, there is no valid search incidental to a valid
arrest if she will be brought to her residence and thereafter search the said place)

 PEOPLE vs. MARIACOS

- San Gabriel, La Union
- Police was informed that Mariacus was on board with a big red bag.
(Tip- full marijuana)
No personal knowledge but the search is valid because it involves motor vehicles.
- no time to go to court to secure a search warrant.

 ESPANO VS. CA
If the accused was arrested in the street during a buy-bust operation, the search of his house
nearby is not a valid search incidental to a valid arrest)

 PEOPLE vs LO HO WING
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a tip from one of its informers
about an organized group engaged in importation of illegal drugs and smuggling of contraband
items. To infiltrate the crime syndicate, they recruited confidential men and "deep penetration
agents" under OPLAN SHARON 887.
SC: 1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of the well-known exceptions to
the valid warrantless search and seizure. To still get a search warrant from a judge would allow the
accused go scot-free.
2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained is admissible as evidence in
any proceeding.

 Hot Logs as a result of PD 905 (Forestry code)

Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
constitutional mandate 34 that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant
issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other
exceptions are (3) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3)
customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search. 35
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4
April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search
warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of
 Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the
said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be
continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one
day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is
still within the ten-day period. 36
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of lumber
without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in the term forest product, the same hardly
merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424. (MUSTANG Lumber vs. CA)

 PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ (341 SCRA)

-fence with fully grown marijuana-residence
Not admissible in order to be a valid search & seizure under PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE, the prohibited
item must have been found in advertently/ accidentally discovered by the authorities.
The “plain view” doctrine, which may justify a search without warrant, APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE
POLICE OFFICER IS NOT SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED, BUT INADVERTENTLY
COMES ACROSS AN INCRIMINATING OBJECT.

 PEOPLE vs BAULA
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute waiver, IT MUST APPEAR THAT THE RIGHT EXISTS; THE
PERSONS INVOLVED HAD KNOWLEDGE, EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, of the existence of such
right. The third condition did not exist in the instant case. Neither was the search incidental to a
valid warrantless arrest. (PEOPLE VS. FIFUEROA, July 6, 2000) An alleged consent to a warrantless
search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty. THE PRESUMPTION BY ITSELF, CANNOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED RIGHTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL, AND ZEAL IN THE PURSUIT OF CRIMINALS CANNOT
ENNOBLE THE USE OF ARBITRARY METHODS THAT THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF ABHORS.

 VEROY vs LAYAGUWE
If the owner of the house allowed the policemen/soldiers to enter his house because they are
searching for rebel soldiers but once inside the house, they instead seized firearms.
SC held: the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that
the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the
subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A
search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the
exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action
against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]).
Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no
need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or
voluntariness there is no crime.

 LOPEZ VS COMMISSIONER
- search in a hotel with consent
SC ruled that there is no valid search for there is no search warrant.
 PEOPLE VS DAMASO
- apartment search- consent with owner of the apartment. Unlicensed firearms were seized and he
was charged for illegal possession of firearms.
There is no valid warrantless search because there is no valid consent. Consent must be given by
the person sent to jail if there are prohibited things found.

 P VS. VELOSO
The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended

 MANALILI VS PEOPLE
The policemen saw several suspicious looking men at dawn who ran when they went near them.
As the policemen wan after them, an unlicensed firearm was confiscated. The search is VALID.

 MALACAT vs CA. Mere suspicions not sufficient to validate warrantless arrest.

 GUAZON vs de VILLA
This is a petition for Prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit military and police officers
from conducting "Areal target zonings" or "saturation drive" in Metro Manila particularly in places
where they suspect that the subversives are hiding. The 41 petitioners claim that the saturation
drives conducted by the military is in violation of their human rights.
The respondents claim that they have legal authority to conduct saturation drives under Art. VII,
Sec. 17 of the Constitution which provides:
Held:
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. But the
remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. A show of force
is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. However, the
remedy of the petitioners is not an original action for prohibition since not one victim complains and
not one violator is properly charged. It is basically for the executive department and the trial courts.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission of Human Rights.
Cruz, Padillla and Sarmiento , dissenting.
The ruling of the majority that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for
inaction. We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where there are
constitutional questions that must be met.
Where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may not be directly injured.
Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him a proper party. It is not only the
owner of a burning house who has the right to call the firemen.
Section 2, Art. III of the constitution is very clear: Unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for whatever purpose is prohibited.
Saturation drives are NOT AMONG THE ACCEPTED INSTANCES WHEN A SEARCH OR AN ARREST
MAY BE MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT. THEY COME UNDER THE CONCEPT OF THE FISHING
EXPEDITIONS STIGMATIZED BY LAW AND DOCTRINE X X X I submit that this court should instead
categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of human rights and
individual liberty and should be stopped immediately. While they may be allowed in the actual
theater of military operations against the insurgents, the Court should also make it clear that Metro
Manila is not such a battleground.
 SAMULDI vs. JUDGE SALVANI
-received the record, read it, found PC but did not issue Warrant of Arrest
-was he correct in not issuing Warrant of Arrest?

SC: What is the purpose of issuing Warrant of Arrest?

- to have jurisdiction over the accused, he will put a bar to assure the court that he will appear
during the scheduled hearing.
- Judge Salvani said that “ I am sure that the accused will appear in my court when the case be
scheduled for hearing so I did not issue warrant of arrest.”
-SC sustained it because that’s his look out if that accused will not appear in court and that’s his
problems. Even if you found PC, you may not issue Warrant of Arrest if you are not sure that the
accused will appear during trial.

 GOZO vs TAC-AN
If the offense committed is a serious one like that obtaining in this case for murder, the Judge
must issue a warrant of arrest after determining the existence of probable cause.

 PRUDENTE vs DAYRIT
"The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held
liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant of a search warrant and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely
reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable." In ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33, it was
held that the following test must be complied with in an application for search warrant or in a
supporting deposition based on personal knowledge or not.

 PRUDENTE vs DAYRIT
"The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held
liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant of a search warrant and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely
reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable." In ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33, it was
held that the following test must be complied with in an application for search warrant or in a
supporting deposition based on personal knowledge or not.

 ALVAREZ vs CFI
When the applicant is basing his knowledge from an informant, the same is not valid.

 ROAN VS. GONZALEZ

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus insufficient. The examining judge
has to take the depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and
attach them to the record.

 MATA VS. BAYONA - Depositions of the applicants and witnesses should be attached to the record
of the case
 PONSICA VS. IGNALAGA - When the statements in the affidavits of witnesses are mere generalities,
mere conclusions of law, and not positive statements of particular acts, the warrant is not valid.

 VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA

The checkpoints are legal as where the survival of the organized government is on the balance, or
where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril. THE SUPREME COURT FURTHER HELD
THAT MILITARY OFFICERS MANNING THE CHECKPOINTS MAY CONDUCT VISUAL SEARCHES ONLY,
NOT BODILY SEARCH.

 PEOPLE vs. CLAUDIO

There is a valid warrantless search when a NARCOM (now PDEA) officer arrests the person who
owns a bag which contains marijuana which he found out when he smelled the same. Here, there is
a probable cause since he has personal knowledge due to his expertise on drugs.

 PEOPLE vs. BURGOS

- arrested without warrant while plowing his field. He was arrested without warrant for the crime of
rebellion.
- His wife pointed out where he kept his firearms.
- The questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in violation of the
accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches. BURGOS was acquitted.

 PEOPLE vs GALVEZ
It is now settled that objection to a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which a court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. The fact that the arrest was illegal does not render the subsequent
proceedings void and deprive the state of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts point to
the culpability of the accused.

 Pirated tapes can be searched without warrant if it is based in violation of PD 1987.

-Videogram Regulatory Board Law/ Optical Media Board Law.
-any tapes (CD, VCD, DVD) without VRB logo in front emanates from an illegal source because the
correct taxes have not been paid.
- THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED is THE MASTER COPY OF THE ALLEGEDLY PIRATED TAPES. (FOX vs CA;
COLUMBIA vs CA)

 PEOPLE vs. MANUSTE

- A cap police-tip- a Caucasian looking was on board of Dangwa bus with bags full of ashes.
SC: Valid, used of motor vehicles no need search warrant.

 GUAZON vs de VILLA
This is a petition for Prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit military and police officers
from conducting "Areal target zonings" or "saturation drive" in Metro Manila particularly in places
where they suspect that the subversives are hiding. The 41 petitioners claim that the saturation
drives conducted by the military is in violation of their human rights.
 The respondents claim that they have legal authority to conduct saturation drives under Art. VII,
Sec. 17 of the Constitution which provides:
Held:
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. But the
remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. A show of force
is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. However, the
remedy of the petitioners is not an original action for prohibition since not one victim complains and
not one violator is properly charged. It is basically for the executive department and the trial courts.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission of Human Rights.
Cruz, Padillla and Sarmiento , dissenting.
The ruling of the majority that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for
inaction. We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where there are
constitutional questions that must be met.
Where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may not be directly injured.
Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him a proper party. It is not only the
owner of a burning house who has the right to call the firemen.
Section 2, Art. III of the constitution is very clear: Unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for whatever purpose is prohibited.
Saturation drives are NOT AMONG THE ACCEPTED INSTANCES WHEN A SEARCH OR AN ARREST
MAY BE MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT. THEY COME UNDER THE CONCEPT OF THE FISHING
EXPEDITIONS STIGMATIZED BY LAW AND DOCTRINE X X X I submit that this court should instead
categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of human rights and
individual liberty and should be stopped immediately. While they may be allowed in the actual
theater of military operations against the insurgents, the Court should also make it clear that Metro
Manila is not such a battleground.

 Under the Human Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law, Republic Act No. 9372, Approved on March 6,
2007 and effective on July 15, 2007, may police authorities the listen to, intercept and record, with
the use of any mode, form or kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or
intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways or means for that
purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words of a
person without violating the right to privacy?

Yes under Sections 7 and 8 of the law which provides:

Section 7. Surveillance of suspects and interception and recording of communications. The

provisions of RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of
Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form or kind or type of
electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use
of any other suitable ways or means for that purpose, any communication, message,
conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared
and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or of any person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.

Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications between lawyers

and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business
correspondence shall not be authorized.
 Section 8. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization.- The written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen, intercept, and record
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words of any
person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism, shall
only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals UPON AN EX-PARTE written
application of a police or law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by
the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex-parte application, and
upon examination under oath and affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses who may
produce to establish:

 That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been committed, or is
being committed, or is about to be committed;
 That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that evidence which is essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected
person for, or to the solution or prevention of any such crimes, will be obtained; and
 That there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such evidence.

Sec. 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. The written order granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the
same, the original application of the applicant, including his application to extend or renew, if
any, and the written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are
hereby declared as classified information: Provided, That the person being surveilled or whose
communications, letters, papers, messages, conversations, discussions, spoken or written words
and effects have been monitored, listened to, bugged or recorded by law enforcement
authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in
the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of the interference before
the Court of Appeals which issued said written order. The written order of the authorizing
division of the court of Appeals shall specify the following:

 The identity, such as name and address, if known, of the charged of suspected persons whose
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be
tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted or recorded and, in case of radio, electronic, or
telephone (whether wireless or otherwise) communications, messages, conversations,
discussions, or spoken or written words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone
numbers to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations
if the person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully
known, such person shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is reasonable
ground to do so;
 The identity (name and address, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the
members of his team judicially authorized to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words;
 The offense or offenses committed, or being committed, or sought to be prevented; and
 The length of time which the authorization shall be used or carried out.
 Section. 10. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. Any authorization granted by the
authorizing division of the court of Appeals…shall only be effective for the length of time
specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not
exceed 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of the
court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official.

The CA may extend or renew the said authorization for another non-extendible period, which
shall not exceed 30 days from the expiration of the original period…The ex-parte application for
renewal has been duly authorized by the Anti-terrorism Council in writing.

 Under the Human Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law, Republic Act No. 9372, Approved on March
6, 2007 and effective on July 15, 2007, may police authorities examine the bank accounts of
individuals without violating their right to privacy?

Yes under Sections 27 and 28 of the said law. It provides:

Section 27. Judicial authorization required to examine bank deposits, accounts and records.
The justices of CA designated as special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after satisfying
themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that:

 A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit

terrorism;
 Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons;
 Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association or group of
persons, may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer and the members of
his team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council to:
1. examine or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records in a bank or financial institution; and
2. gather or cause the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial institution. The bank or financial
institution shall not refuse to allow such examination or to provide the desired information,
when so ordered by and served with the written order of the Court of Appeals.

Sec. 28. Application to examine deposits, accounts and records.

The written order of the CA authorizing the examination of bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records:

 A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit

terrorism;
 Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons;
 Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association or group of
persons, in a bank or financial institution-

-SHALL ONLY BE GRANTED BY THE AUTHORIZING DIVISION OF THE CA UPON AN EX-

PARTE APPLICATION TO THAT EFFECT OF A POLICE OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL who
 has been duly authorized by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file such ex-parte application and
upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses he may
produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining and
freezing the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records:

 Of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit

terrorism;
 Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons;
 Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association or group of
persons.

 THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND

CORRESPONDENCE:
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

This right can be interfered by the government when:

1. There is lawful order of the court.
2. There is a law which involves in furtherance of national security.

 ANTI- TERRORISM ACT:

Sec 7,8,9: Allows the government to intercept and record all your communications if you are a
suspected terrorist. They will record for a period not exceeding 30 days. If after 30 days and no
evidence that you are a terrorist, the police will transcribe all your communications. They will give
the transcript plus the tape to the suspected terrorist otherwise they are liable for a criminal offense
for non- transfer of the tapes to the person for 10 years and 1 day to 12 years.
Note: No one can record a conversation of a lawyer, even if he is communicating to a suspected
terrorist. A lawyer is covered with the privilege communication.

*Bank accounts can also be frozen by the terrorism council and they can over if you are a suspected
terrorist.

CASES:

 ZULEATA vs. CA:

Dr. Zulueta – suspected by his wife to have several girlfriends.
Left BC to attend a conference
 His wife went to his clinic, opened the cabinet and found his diary, cancelled checks and pictures
and she used it in filing a case for legal separation.
are the documents, in her possession be admissible in court?
SC: The evidence obtained by the wife who forcibly opened the drawers at the clinic of her doctor-
husband and took diaries, checks and greeting cards of his alleged paramours is inadmissible as
 evidence. This is so because the intimacies of husband and wife does not justify the breaking of
cabinets to determine marital infidelity.

 OPLE vs. TORRES:

National ID system
EO issued by Ramos was declared unconstitutional for two reasons:
1. Violates sec. 1 of Art. 7
- executive power shall be vested in the Pres. Of the Philippines: Power to implement
laws not the power to make laws.
in the case at bar, Pres. Ramos was making a law requiring a national ID System and using funds of
Malacanang intended for another purpose and will be used for the National ID System (cannot be)

2. Violates the right to privacy

- in so far as the present form of that law- requiring the people to submit so many things.

SC: No safeguard in so far as that EO is concern.

“SC said; We are not saying that a law in National ID System is unconstitutional. There are
advantages of having national ID.” Ex: crime prevention

 BAYAN MUNA vs. EXECVUTIVE SEC. ERMITA AND KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. EXEC. SEC. ERMITA:
Pres. Arroyo issued EO requiring mandatory ID system for government official.
SC: Valid exercise of he power of the President under Sec. 17, Art. 7 that the President shall have
control of all the executive department, bureaus and offices. Laws are faithfully consignated. It is
within the power of the president to require government officials to be wearing ID’s for identity.

 Are government employees entitled to the right privacy?

Chairman Camilo Sabio of PCGG vs. Blue Ribbon Committee Headed by Sen. Gordon.
- PCGG commissioners took over PHILCOMSAT.
-Bought SUV’s, traveled abroad and have cash advances in millions.
- required to appear in court to explain but hey refused questions violate their right to
privacy.
SC: Government official are entitled to a limited right to privacy.

 Effect of Violating the Right to Privacy:

- 2nd paragraph of Sec. 3, Art. 3: all evidence obtained shall be inadmissible in any purpose of any
proceeding.

 FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS, EXPRESSION, ETC.

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

1. Freedom of speech (saying/ telling anybody to the whole world what you want to say)
2. Freedom of Press - writing something in newspaper
3. Freedom of expression - could mean so many things
 4. Right of the people to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for the redress of
their grievances.

 Is the freedom of speech and expression affected by the Human Security Act?
Yes, under Section 26 of the law, it provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism
or conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not
strong—can be: “Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other means of
communications with people outside their residence.”

RULE ON CRITICISMS AGAINST ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

CASES:
 US vs. BUSTOS
A public official should not be too onion-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts.
The interest of the government and the society demands full discussion of public affairs.

 Criticism involving Private Individual (BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER vs. CA and LABO)

The article involving a private individual running for Mayor of Baguio City is still within the mantle of
protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression provided in the Constitution since it is the
public’s right to be informed of the mental, moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office.
This was recognized as early as the case of US VS. SEDANO, 14 Phil. 338 [1909] and the case of NEW
YORK TIMES VS. SULLIVAN, 376 U.S. 254 where the US Supreme Court held:
“…it is of the utmost consequence that the people
should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for
their suffrages. The importance to the State and to society of
such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived so great,
that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of
private persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional
injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public
welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public
benefit from publicity is so great and the chance of injury to
private character so small, that such discussion must be
privileged. “
Clearly, the questioned articles constitute fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt
with the character of the private respondent who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City
at that time.

 “PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE”

 you are a private individual running for public office and therefore if you are already a public
official and you can be criticized what was enunciated in in US vs. BUSTOS.

 PEOPLE vs. PEREZ

Perez said in front of many people in Sorsogon Municipal Hall
 “People of the Philippine should use bolo in cutting of the head of Wood.”
charged of sedition
said he was exercising his freedom of speech:
Speech cannot be justified if it is seditious:
SC: Right to freedom of speech is not absolute if you are trying to incite the people to kill the
president of the Philippines. (not protected by Sec. 4, Art. 3)

 ESPUELAS vs. PEOPLE

pretended to have committed suicide
wrote all the bad things against Roxas to all news papers and sent to important people/
sedition case- can’t invoke freedom of speech because to kill the President or embarrass the
President.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

CASES:
 SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
involves the Law on Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Art. 10 of the constitution: Sec 15 – 19
-congress with in the first 18 months under this court, should enact a law creating the CAR and
autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao.
congress enacted law and it has to be submitted for a plebiscite but the COMELEC issued for a
resolution saying “ Radio Commentators, radio announcements, tv commentators and columnist are
not allowd to comment for or against the CA law in their column, program, radio. They have to go to
COMELEC hour at DZWT otherwise be liable to 6 months in prison.
Atty. Sanidad questioned it because he has a column in the Midand.

SC: The COMELEC cannot prohibit columnists, radio announcers and TV commentator for
commenting for or against any issue during the plebiscite period since they can air their views in a
program sponsored by the COMELEC itself.
Prohibition of the COMELEC would be an undue interference on the freedom of expression. IT IS
STILL A RESTRICTION ON THE COLUMNIST, ANNOUNCER OR COMMENTATOR’S CHOICE OF THE
FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS VIEW. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and
importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a
decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, INCLUDING THE
FORUM. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened
by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.

 ELIZALDE vs GUTIERREZ. In order that any news relating to a judicial proceeding will not be
actionable for being libelous, the same must be (a) true and fair report of the actual proceeding; (b)
must be done in good faith; and (c) no comments nor remarks shall be made by the writer.

 RUBEN POLICARPIO vs. MANILA TIMES

The title of the article of August 11, 1956 — "WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED" — was given prominence
with a 6-column (about 11 inches) banner headline of one-inch types. Admittedly, its sub-title —
"PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO PIO ON FRAUD" — printed in bold one-centimeter types, is not true.
Similarly, the statement in the first paragraph of the article, to the effect that plaintiff "was charged
with malversation and estafa in complaints filed with the city fiscal's office by the Presidential
 Complaint and Action Commission" — otherwise known as PCAC — is untrue, the complaints for said
offenses having been filed by Miss Reyes. Neither is it true that said "criminal action was initiated as
a result of current administrative, investigation", as stated in the second paragraph of the same
article.
SC: LIBELOUS. Manila Times is liable for damages, violated the right of Atty. Policarpio.

 Two things that comes to the mind of reader:

1. Fiscal already found PC – evidence shows that he has committed the crime.
2. If the case already in the RTC that the judge might have already issued a warrant of arrest.

 LOPEZ vs. CA
owner of Manila chronicle and ABS – CBN
in Babuyan Island in Batanes, apparently US air force receive coded message telegram.
“There is a killer in the coast of Batanes and that the people are living in fear.”
relayed to Philippine government and sent a big military plane full of soldiers and journalist.
at the airport, met by Fidel Cruz and said that “ I was just joking, I just need a rife back home
because I miss my wife.”
journalist wrote items in the newspaper entitled hoax of the year” with a pictures of Fidel Cruz,
mayor of Bulacan not the Fidel Cruz who miss his wife.
SC: Manila Times violated the right of Mayor Fidel Cruz.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

CASES:
 ADIONG vs COMELEC. Putting of decals and stickers in one’s car is within the protected freedom of
expression.

 NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs COMELEC. Preventing campaigns through radio, TV and newspapers is
valid in orer to even the playing field between rich and poor candidates.

 IN RE: Attty. EMMANUEL TIPON

charged administratively before the SC of importing playboy magazine using males.
that the magazine is pornographic and prohibited but he said that he was just exercising his
freedom of expression.
SC: Playboy is not an absence publication. He was just exercising his freedom of speech.

 KAPISANAN vs. CAMARA SHOES

lady employee made a mistake, suspended for month without pay.
filed to SC to prove that She did is valid.

SC: She is correct

 Can’t invoked these rights in the ff. instances:

1. If what you are trying to say is right is seditious.
2. If it is libelous.
3. If it has the tendency to degrade, embarrass, ridicule the administration of justice.
4. If it is under sub-justice
 5. If it is obscene or pornographic.

CASES:
 PEOPLE vs. KETTINGER
artist:pictures of women (nude)
arrested
SC: That’s Art, not an obscene material.

 PEOPLE VS GO PIN
Tests whether the material/subject is obscene or not.

1. Whether the average person applying to contemporary community standards would find the
work appeals to prurient interest;
2. Whether the work depicts or describes a patently offensive sexual conduct;
3. Whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary , artistic, political or scientific value.

 MILLER vs. CALIFORNIA:

They test to determine whether an act done is absence/not:
1. Whether the average person applying for temporary community standard finds the work
appears to courier interest.
2. Whether the work describes or seen patently offensive sexual conduct.
-not used at present.
3. Whether the work as a whole lack serous literary, political, artistic or scientific value.
Ex: Toro live show

 ATTY. PITA VS. CA

publisher of PINOY PLAYBOY MAGAZINE
pictures was very nude
Mayor Bagatsing went to the sidewalk, 2500 copies were confiscated, as his defense he was just
exercising his police power.

SC: A City Mayor may not order the warrantless seizure of magazines which he believes to be
obscene; otherwise, he will become the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time. He
should obtain a search warrant from a judge.

 PROCEDURES.
1. Secure a copy of the magazine/ newspaper which you believe to be absence.
2. Apply for search warrant.
3. Convince the judge that the magazine is obscene
4. If the judged is convinced and issued a search warrant, that is the only time that you will return
to the place and confiscate the obscene material.

 PEOPLE vs. BOBI

GRO standing on the table dancing with the music (nude)
SC: That is obscene.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
Or Right to rally.

Requisites:
 Rally in a Private Place – as long as there is permission issued by the owner of the private place,
no need to get a permit from the mayor.

 Rally in Public Places

1. Apply for a rally permit
2. Upon receipt of the rally permit, the mayor must immediately act on it whether there is a
clear and present danger.
3. Deny/ grant the application for rally permit.
4. Immediately inform the applicants of his decision in the fastest way possible.

 AS COPIED IN THE CASE OF BAYAN MUNA VS ERMITA:

The requisites for a valid rally are as follows:

[a] The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will take place.
[b] If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession
is required.
[c] Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant
but at
another public place.
[d] It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present
danger
test be the standard for the decision reached.
[e] If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter.
[f] Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority.

 IBP vs. JOSE ATIENZA Jr. (02/24/10)

IBP offices wanted to rally in Mendiola in front of Malacanang
SC: Not correct because there are as a result of public assembly act of 1985 (3P880)

 BAGUIO/ MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION vs. JUDGE LAGUIO

It was held that “these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers’ duty to
perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.”
 GESITE vs. CA (444 SCRA)
2500 teachers asked the government for the increase of their salaries but the government said
they have no money.
after that all of them filed an application for leave
2500 teachers out of schools, so all the students have no teachers.
Is that equivalent strike?

SC: The case held that “these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike; they
constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the
teachers’ duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.” It is undisputed fact that
there was a work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their demands by
withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the striking
employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, SINCE THE SUBSTANCE OF
THE SITUATION, AND NOT ITS APPEARANCE, WILL BE DEEMED CONTROLLING.

 BANGALISAN VS. CA. The right of government employees to organize IS LIMITED TO THE
FORMATIONS OF UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS ONLY, WITHOUT INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE.

 BAYAN vs. ERMITA

PUBLIC ASSEMBLY ACT
Pres. Arroyo issued an order giving us the test insofar as the policemen should follow in
connection with rallies in any part of the country. ( Calibrated Pre- emptive dispatch)
that even if there is no violence or whatsoever, but if the policemen or the soldier believes that
what the people are saying to the state is seditious/libelous, they are given the power to disperse
the people rallying with the use of water cannons.
that EO was questioned before the SC because it allegedly violates the right to peaceably
assemble.
SC: The calibrated pre- emptive response of the Arroyo administration is unconstitutional. What
should be followed is the Maximum tolerance rule under BP 880.

In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita, the Court

reiterated:

x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably

for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded
the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935
Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of
our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the
opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in
Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of
speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All
these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is
a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine
the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a
limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of
 democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public
interest. (emphasis supplied)

NOTE:
What is the procedure to be followed in the application of rally permits before the City or
Municipal Mayor in accordance with BP Bilang 880?

The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should
be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be
valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the
standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so
minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. (BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), and GABRIELA vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen.
ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief
Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, G.R. No. 169848, May, 2006)

Is BP 880 unconstitutional for being vague (Void for Vagueness Doctrine) and overbroad
(Overbreadth Doctrine)?

No. It is very clear that it deals only on public assemblies that deals with rallies, mass actions
and similar acts and not all kinds of public assemblies. As such, it is not vague.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and
petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils
Congress has the right to prevent.

Is the Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR) of the Arroyo Administration towards rallyists
constitutional?

The Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people,
especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. For this reason, the so-called calibrated
preemptive response policy, the policy of dispersing rallyists through water cannons, has no place in
our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely
confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P.
No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it
merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from
being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The
delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” standard.

 JBL REYES vs. BAGATSING

 Ruling: If the Mayor finds evidence of clear and present danger, he can deny the application, for a
rally permit and immediately inform the applicant of his decision in the fastest way possible thru
personal service.

FREEDOM FROM PRIOR RESTRAINT

 refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication or dissemination.

 NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK vs. HON CEASAR DY (04/02/09)

two groups of radio station
1. Bombo- attacking/ reporting the bad side of DJ’s administration.
2. owned by DY
BOMBO headed by GRACE PADACA
the building of BOMBO is non a lot owned by BOMBO and they fount out that it is an agricultural
land
Mayor Dy ordered Bombo to be pad locked because they are engaging in business bu standing on
a lot which is agricultural.
case dismissed, appealed but dismissed then went to SC.
what is the procedure if you file a motion to dismiss in the lower court and was dismissed and
that
the SC said that the ground of any cause of action is not correct.
1. SC return the case to lower court so that the defendant can file answer, pre – trial, trial.
2. Decision be appealed to CA or SC.
because since Bombo alleged to have loss 10 million income, you have to prove that.

SC: The justification about agricultural. That is very very shallow skim to stop Bombo from operating.
They want to stop that is prior restraint. Therefore it is a clear case of prior restraint.

Since there is grave violation of the right of Bombo on strike under sec. 4, art. 3, we do not return
the case anymore to the lower court. We are deciding it.

This decision is immediately executory. No MR is allowed. The violation is very grave, they just made
use of that allegation of agricultural land as and act of prior restraint.

 BRO. EDDIE SORIANO VS. MTRCB

UNPD program of Bro. Eddie in channel 37 “Ang Dating Daan”
other channel 25 is the program of INK “Ang Tamang Daan” by Bro. Michael Sandoval.
Bro. Eddie on August 10, 2004 in his program Masahol ka pa Putang Babae…..sobrang
kasinungalingan ng taong ito….”
next day, INK filed an administrative case against Eddie at MTRCB.
Bro. Eddie suspended 3 months also with the program for 3 months

 MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN

Revillame making fun of Mahal in Magandang Tanghali Bayan
suspended by MTRCB for 3 months on the air but the program continues.
Bro. Eddie said it is prior restraint.
SC:
Majority said that is not prior restraint that is the subsequent punishment.
 (Read the dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio.)

 Basic Rule: New York Times vs. US

announced that starting Monday, we will be printing a fourth series in connection of the plans of
US government in connection with the Vietnam war.
Philippine government went to RTC Manila to stop the inquirer because it affects national
security.
TRO was issued by the district court of New York.
New York times went to US-SC-TRO was reversed.

SC: US-SC said that any act of the government which constitute prior restraint comes to this court
with heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.

 Test of the Government to interfere with our right under sec. 4:

1. Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rule (whether the words used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that the State has the right to prevent)

2. Dangerous tendency rule (If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the State has
the right to prevent, then such words are punishable)

3. The balancing-of-interest test (When a particular conduct is regulated in the interest of the
public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of
speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the 2 conflicting interests demand
greater protection under the circumstances presented.)

CASES:

 AYER PRODUCTION CASE:

movie:dangerous life during edsa revolution.
Enrile:make a mivie but do not include my name otherwise you’re my right to privacy.

AS between Enrile’s right to privacy and the freedom of expression on the part of the movie
producer, the latter’s right prevail because Enrile’s part in the movie deals solely on his acts as a
public officer then. To exclude him as integral part of the revolution would be a distortion of history.

 LAGUNZAD VS GONZALES
involving a movie in the life story of Moises Bandilla who was murdered
his mother filed TRO to stop the showing of the movie, saying that it violates the right of privacy
of the memory of his son.
other party involving freedom of expression.

SC: As between the right to privacy invoked by the mother and the freedom of expression invoked
by the movie producer, the state shall balance their respective interests. Since the movie producer is
primarily after profits only, the right to privacy shall prevail.
THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF A RELIGION CLAUSE
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.

 Aspects of the RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP

a. Freedom to believe - such freedom is absolute. He may indulge in his own theories about life
and death; worship any god he chooses or none at all. He may not be punished even if he
cannot prove what he believes.
b. Freedom to act. If the individual externalizes what he believes, his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the State. This is so because religious freedom can be exercised
only with due regard to the rights of others. Example: “Go forth and multiply---cannot marry
several times just to comply.

 Congress could not enact a law telling us that we should only have one religion.
Sec. 1, Art. 1 of Spanish Constitution of 1985- there should only be one religion in the state. (Roman
Catholic.

 Ang LADLAD LGBT (Lesbian, gays, bisexual, transgender) PARTY vs COMELEC

applied to COMELEC as party list but was not allowed
Because:
allegedly gays and lesbians are nor marginalized, they are not included in the enumeration laid
down in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC where SC enumerated the marginalized sector
such as women, youth, retires, veterans, urban poor, etc..
there are many gays in the congress.
he should not allow this party list group to be voted upon because they are pouting at illegal
doctrine which is prohibited in the bible as well as in the Koran.
SC: The enumeration of the alleged marginalized sector is not EXCLUSIVE. It does not violate the
belief of religious members. COMELEC already included angy Ladlad to the list.

 ESTRADA vs. ESCRITUR (408 SCRA 1)

Escritur has new lover, they are showy and have a love child.
Estrada filed a case of immoral and gave conduct against Escritur.
 They are Rules and Regulations as a Member of Jehovah executing a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” by the elders of the Congregation.
- after being signed must be approved by the elders of the congregation.
Restrictions:
can be used only once and it can not be done in a country where there is divorce.
SC: ESCRITUR was charged and suspended.

 SCHOOL PRAYER CASE

It is unconstitutional for a school to require the students to recite a prayer composed by the
Board of Regents at the starts of the day’s class. “It is no part of the business of government to
compose official prayers for any group of the American People.”
 SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ABINGTON VS. SCHEMPP
It is unconstitutional for a law to require that at least 10 verses from the Holy Bible be read daily
without comment because the same constitute a religious exercise which violates the non-
establishment clause.

 BOARD OF EDUCATION VS. ALLEN

A law requiring the Board of Education to lend textbooks free of charge to all students from
grades 7-12 of parochial school. This is constitutional since it is not the parochial school which gets
the benefits but the parents.

 EVERSON VS BOARD OF EDUCATION

The law authorizing reimbursement of transportation expenses of school children going to and
from parochial schools is not violative of the non-establishment clause because it will be the parents
who get benefits, not the parochial school.

 PEOPLE vs. LAGMAN:

Commonwealth Act # , just law enacted under 1985 constitution:
National defense act which provides all able bodied Filipino Citizen shall report for training to the
AFP upon reaching the age of 21.
Lagman said “We are Catholic, we believe in the reaching to the RC church.
“DO not Kill”
in contradiction to sec. 3 & 4 of article 2. “Male/ female may be required to render personal
military source because the defense of the state “as the primary consideration.
*Beliefs that contradicting religion is not allowed.

2nd sentence: No religious test shall be……

*Before: there is a law priority soldiers and priest from running for public office because they are
very influential.

SC: Avoiding military duties based on religious grounds is not allowed in the Philippines because of
Section 4, Article II—The state is the protector of the people and it is the prime duty of the people
to defend the State and in the fulfillment of this duty, the State may call all citizens to render
military or civil service.

 IN RE SUMMERS
The act of the Illinois Supreme Court denying admission to the bar because of his refusal to take in
good faith an oath to support the Constitution of the State of Illinois which requires mandatory
service in the military in times of war was reversed by the US Supreme Court stating that this
constitutes a violation of the 1st Amendment which guarantees religious freedom.

 AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA

ordinance of City of Manila requiring the religious group selling books- secure business permit by
paying the required feees.
Ex: selling watch tower- donation
-earnign income
 shall they be required pay license fees?

SC: Yes, they re earning income but they should not be required to pay the license fees otherwise if
they can’t pay they no longer able to propagate their religion, that would be depriving them to their
right of religion. The fact that hey are earning income is merely incidental.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. JUDGE GIRONELLA
rape case in Bangued, Abra
during hearing: the judge observed that the court room was always full of people
private complainant is a member of INK
Judge was no impressed when he decided the case, he not only acquitted the accused but he said
“Itong mga members ng INK are making “GIMIK” that the members are always there if there is a
member who have a case in court to show to the people that INK is the best religion.
INK filed to SC an administration case against the judge.

SC: Sided with INK because word GIMIK hurt sensitivities of the members as if they are not honest.
Judge was dismissed.

 RAMIL vs. TELERON

there was a law before prohibiting priest for running public office.
SC: That law is unconstitutional.
9 said- unconstitutional
3 said- constitutional-won
3 no comment.

The law is constitutional even only 3 voted or it because under 1973 Constitution before you can
declare a law unconstitutional, you should have a vote of 10 justices.

Now. Sec. 3, Art. 8- majority of those who join in the deliberation en banc.
- out of 15 justices-8
5 can declare a law unconstitutional.
The prohibition was already removed under the constitution.

 VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE WORKERS

Involving INK
Application of union security clause(Labor Code)
“If not a member of majority union be dismissed.”
resigned invoking Sec. 5, Art. 3

SC: Right under the Constitution invoked by Victoriano and a right under the Labor being invoked by
the union. The constitutional right with regards to religion shall prevail.

 GERMAN vs. BARANGAN

JAJA (Justice for Aquino, Justice for **
300 members wearing yellow shirts or clothes going to a place besides Malacanang.
all of them are shouting anti- Marcos law “Ibagsak si Marcos”
stopped by Gen. Barangan (head of PSG)
went to SC: saying our religious right under sec. 5, art. 3 of constitution is violated-“do not allow
us to go and pray.”
 SC: NO, invoking religious freedom must be in GOOD FAITH. It must be in solemn act. In the case at
bar, they are shouting just to embarrass the administration.

 GERONA vs.SEC. OF EDUCATION

Jehovah;’s witnesses children do not want to sing the national anthem, salute the flag, etc.
because they believe not to salute any image.
expelled from school.
SC said the flag is not an image it is the symbol of our government, etc..
34 years later- Jehovah’s children refuses again to do those things in Cebu and mere expelled form
school so they went to SC.

SC: Children of Jehovah’s witnesses shall just stand there: Basis- Sec. 5, Art. 3
a law vs. constitution prevail

 EBRALINAG VS THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

The petitioners are high school and grade schools students enrolled in the different public
schools of the Province of Cebu and who belong to the religious group known as the Jehovah's
Witnesses. That they refused to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing by a band or
singing the Philippine National Anthem, saluting the Philippine Flag and reciting the patriotic pledge
because they considered the flag as an image and they should not worship it except GOD. That
because of their refusal to perform the foregoing acts as required by RA 1265 of July 11, 1955 and
by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory
in all educational institutions, they were expelled by the respondent school authorities.
SC: The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite
the patriotic pledge, during flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or be expelled
in school, IS ALIEN TO THE CONSCIENCE OF THE PRESENT GENERATION OF FILIPINOS WHO CUT
THEIR TEETH ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS WHICH GUARANTEES THEIR RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH AND THE
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP (Section 5, Art. III, 1987 Constitution).
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man and his Creator (Chief Justice
Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 530).

 THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL OR RIGHT TO

LOCOMOTION
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

 THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED EXCEPT:

1. Lawful order of the court
2. In the interest of national security as maybe provided for by law.
3. In the interest of public safety as maybe provided for by law.
4. In the interest of public health as may be provided by law.
 (1) LAWFUL ORDER OF THE COURT

When can the court validly impair the right to travel?

If you are facing a criminal case in court, can you travel abroad if you have a case in:
MTC: Does not prevent someone from traveling abroad regardless of the number, because MTC
have no authority to issue hold departure order.
RTC/SB: It depends, if the case is not bailable -not allowed to leave
If bailable- maybe allowed to travel abroad provided the requisites in Manotoc vs. CA are
complied with.

 MANOTOC vs. CA
Petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. has 6 criminal cases for estafa pending against him. In said cases he
was admitted to bail with the FGU Insurance Corporation as surety. He is also involved in a case
pending before the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The SEC requested the Commissioner on Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure pending
disposition of the case involving him. The same was granted by the Commissioner.
Petitioner subsequently filed before the trial courts a motion entitled "motion for permission to
leave the country" stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his
business transactions and opportunities".
The motion was denied by the lower courts and the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals
which also denied the same. Petitioner brings the matter to the S.C. claiming his constitutional right
to travel and also contending that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the
courts which granted him bail nor the SEC would have jurisdiction over his liberty.

SC: THE MANOTOC DOCTRINE.

doctrine involving the right or travel if you are facing a criminal case in court which is bailable
(RTC/SB)
Requisites: Manotoc may be allowed to travel provided that he can:
1. Convince the court of the urgency of your travel.
2. Duration of the travel abroad -more or less 30 days
3. There must ne consent of the surety. -the one that put up the bail

Kinds of Bonds: cash bond; property bond; surety bond; and recognizance.

 (People vs. Uy Tuising

"x x x the result of the obligation assumed by appellee to hold the accused amenable at all times to
the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit the accused from leaving the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and
inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of
the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction."

 You can be impaired to travel abroad in the interest of national security, if it is provided for by law
telling the government that you are deprived of your right to travel:
Ex: Anti- terrorism law

Right to travel is affected by the Human Security Act.

 Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strong—can be:

 Detained under house arrest;

 Restricted from traveling; and/or

Upon application of the prosecutor, the suspect’s right to travel shall be limited to the
municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of
national security and public safety. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the
authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of the
bail which shall then be forfeited as provided in the Rules of Court.

These restrictions shall be terminated upon acquittal of the accused; or the dismissal of the
case filed against him; or earlier upon the discretion of the court or upon motion of the
prosecutor.
*In the Interest of Public Health as may be Provided for by Law:
Ex: afflicted with leprosy – can be prevented from travelling as a long as there is a law enacted.

 LORENZO vs. SECRETARY OF DOH

there is a law which provides that all those who are afflicted with leprosy could be arrested and
be placed in a leprosarium and they shall not be allowed to travel abroad.

 FR. ROBERT REYES vs. SEC. RAUL GANZALEZ (12/03/08)

hold departure order against him because of a criminal case filed before RTC.
went to SC invoking writ of amparo:
Re: violation of civil and political rights.
SC: No. Writ of Amparo applies to only 2 cases: (aspects)
1. Forced disappearances
2. Extra judicial killing

 FERDINAND MARCOS ET. AL vs. SEC MANGLAPUZ OF DFA

left Phil. – 02/25/86 for Hawaii
1000 civil and criminal cases filed against him.
voluntary return to Philippine but the government disagree.
is Marcus entitled to het the travel document in furthermore to his rights to travel under Sec. 6 of
the constitution.

Majority: No, because he could not validly invoke Sec. 6 of the constitution
Sec.6 deals with the right to travel not the right to return.
According to Cortez: The right to travel and the right to return are two different rights. Citing:
universal declaration of human rights.
the right or return ( sec. 13); Right to travel ( sec. 12)

What is provided by the Philippine Constitution is the right to travel and not the right to return.
These two (2) rights are different under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY IS NOT AMONG
THE RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY GUARANTEED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS, WHICH TREATS ONLY OF THE
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL, BUT IT IS OUR WELL-CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE
 RIGHT TO RETURN MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION, IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.

 CAUNCA vs. SALAZAR

young girl was brought by her mother to Baguio to work as a housemaid and received one year
salary.
without completing 12 months- she wants transfer.
Can the young girl be validly stopped from transferring?
No, otherwise it is a violation of her right to travel but a violation of breach of contract maybe
filed.

 VILLAVICENCIO vs. LUKBAN

GRO’s in Ermita, Malate was taken by Manila Police-brought to Davao and was given titled lands
to till and one carabao each.
their parents went to SC.
SC: Regardless of the noble intention of the Mayor of Manila to give them a decent life, they can’t
be forced to go to any place which they do not like. Therefore, their right to locomotion was
violated.

 KWONG vs. PCGG

-re: ill gotten wealth
hold departure order- suspected to be dummies of former Pres. Marcos.
He was allowed- because there is a law EO creating the PCGG that empowers them to issue hold
departure order in the interest of national security
4 years: there is still the hold departure order, they can not go home to Taiwan.
is their right to travel violated?

SC: PCGG could issue a hold departure order but they must filed within the period of 18 months
from the time of the notification of the constitution ( 82/1987)
4 years, no criminal cases filed against them. Therefore they are entitled to leave the Philippines.

 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

 THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN IS NOT ABSOLUTE.

While the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized and
access to official records…shall be afforded the citizen, it must be subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law as well as reasonable conditions imposed by public officials in custody of said
records like the payment of the expenses of reproduction of public documents; the request must be
done during office hours, etc.

CASES:
 PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE
Philippine government and MILF was about to sign the MOA of ancestral domain in Malaysia.
3 days before the signing takes place, Province of NC went to SC to stop the signing
SC immediately issued TRO, because there is already an agreement to be signed by President of
the Philippine and MILD for the creation of “Bank Socoro Juridical Entity”
People of North Cotabato invoked that their right to information was violated.
should the agreement be stopped in signing?
SC: Yes, because there is violation to the right of information on matters of public concern by the
people covered by the Bank Socoro Juridical Entity.

 AKBAYAN vs. UNDER SECRETARY THOMAS AQUINO OF THE BPI

JPEPA treaty (Japan – Phil. Icon. Part. Agreement)
on going agreement involving trade and commerce.
proposals and counter proposals to be part of the JPEPA requesting the executive secretary for a
copy of the proposed treaty.
President Aquino and Prime Minister of Japan already signed the treaty.
AKBAYAN to SC should be annulled, their right to information was violated because no copies
issued for them to submit comments/ positions/ suggestions.

SC: No violation because the treaty is not yet final.

Sec. 31, Art. 7- no treaty shall be valid unless ratified by 2/3 votes of all the members of senate.

The treaty will still to pass thru the senate. They have still the quorum to raise the question. They
can go to senate during the deliberation for the ratification of the treaty.

 SABIO vs GORDON
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution
No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455) “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC)
due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” On May
9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.
SC: The refusal of the petitioners to testify in Congress by virtue of EO No. 1, Section 4 [b] violates
the constitutional provision on information on matters of public concern Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1
which was invoked by the petitioners in support of their refusal to testify in the Senate limits the
power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
Such provision of EO No. 1 is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional provision
ensuring the people’s access to information on matters of public.

 VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE

On June 4, 1986, petitioner Valmonte wrote the respondent asking the latter to furnish him copies
of former members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a "clean loan" from the GSIS
prior to the February 7, 1986 elections;
On June 17, 1986, respondent through counsel refused to give the petitioner a list of said lawmakers
who obtained "clean loans" from the GSIS on the ground that there is a confidential relationship
 between the GSIS and its borrowers and it would be proper for them to preserve the same; On July
19, 1986, the petitioners filed this instant petition.
GSIS DEFENSE: ts confidential

SC: The subject matter is a public fund, the money of the people, the premium of which is paid by
them, this is a matter of public concern. They must be informed where their money is being spent/
invested by the GSIS. They should not consider it confidential.

Requisites to get Loan Copies:

1. Make the request during a reasonable time of a day.
2. You must be responsible for the expenses of reproducing those documents.

 DRILON VS ERMITA
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued E.O. 464, “ENSURING OBSERVANCE
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID
OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” which, pursuant to
Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
Drilon claims that his constitutional right is violated. His rights such as right to life; power of the
Congress to conduct inquiries,; all transactions involving public interest shall be known; and Art XI,
Sec. 1.

SC: Such would violate the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is only
through said investigations that the people will be informed of the workings of the different
departments of the government.
Any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is
presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information
which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions
which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through
the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.

 LEGASPI vs. CSC

Cebu City
3 new young ladies- appointed and given permanent appointment in City Hall of Cebu.
went to CSC and asked for their rating
CSC: ratings are confidential

SC: It is a matter of public concern. We should be furnished in order to verify when these people
actually passed. Legazpi must have to be given copies.

 TANADA vs. TUVERA

 SC directed Malacanang to publish all PD’s issued by Marcos. “It is the right of the people to be
informed of the laws enacted by the President.”

Requirements of treaties under Art. 18:

it is not enough that is was signed by the Philippines government, by the President and ratified by
2/3 votes of the senate and it must be recognized at a treaty by the other contracting parties.

 BANTAY REPUBLIC VS. COMELEC

The COMELEC can compel the publication of the names of the nominees of the different party-list
groups for the May 14, 2007 elections despite the prohibition on such publication as embodied by
the Party-List Act. Such prohibition violates the right to information on matters of public concern on
the part of the citizen.

 BALDOZA vs. DIMAANO

Taal, Batangas
Mun. Councelor wrote the Judge and said “Please furnish me copies of all criminal records before
the MTC of Taal because I want to author an ordinance which could possibly reduce the criminality
of this town. Please wait for me after 5 pm.”

SC: Have the right to be furnished but he can’t compel the Judge to wait him till 5 pm.

 HAZEL ANTOLIN vs ATTY. ABELARDO DOMONDON, et al

Hazel took the 1987 CPA Board. The result showed that she did not pass 3 subjects while she passed
4 subjects. Because of doubt on the result, she then asked the Board of Examiners to furnish her a
copy of the test question, the answer key and a copy of her test paper. (She did not ask for the
recorrection of her paper – this was already a case decided by the Court which disallowed the
recorrection of testpaper). The Board refused Hazel’s request on the ground that those are
confidential matters. While the case is pending by 1988, she took the CPA Board exam again in
which she passed with flying colors. The defendant in the case assailed that the case should be
dismissed because it is already moot and academic.

SC: RTC should hear the case even Hazel is already a CPA. This is to clear doubts if there were
mistakes in the checking of her paper.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FORM AND JOIN ASSOCIATIONS

Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

CASES:

 IN RE: ATTY. EDILLON

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On
November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
 membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due
notice.chanroblesvir

SC: The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative
of his constitutional freedom to associate.

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. law library

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers. virtual la library

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.

 Reinforced by Section 2(5) Article IX-B and Sec. 3 par 2 Article XIII. While the provisions expressly
guarantees the right to form unions in public and private sectors, members of the civil service may
not declare a strike to enforce demands. As held in Bangalisan vs CA, x x x the ability t strike is not
essential to the right of association x x x the right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work
stoppages by public employees was clearly recognized at common law; thus, it has been frequently
declared that modern rules which prohibit strikes, either by statute or by judicial decisions, simply
incorporate or reassert the common law rules.

 PEOPLE vs FERRER
It was held that the Anti-Subversion Act does not violate this provision because the purpose of
the statute was to outlaw only those organizations aimed at the violent overthrow of the
government, and that the government has a right to protect itself against subversion is a
proposition too plain to require elaboration.
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN or EXPROPRIATION
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

 REQUISITES BEFORE AN EXPROPRIATOR MAY VALIDLY OBTAIN A WRIT OF POSSESSION TO TAKE

OVER POSSESSION OF THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY

WHO IS EXPROPRIATING/ THE REQUISITES

EXPROPRIATION IS FOR.
If the expropriation is for a “National
government projects” or “national
infrastructure projects”, like those
covered by the “Build-Operate-
Transfer”, RA 8974 shall be followed.
In ordinary expropriation cases, the
rule is:
PURSUANT TO SECTION 2, RULE 67 OF
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN
THE ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CASE,
THE ONLY REQUISITES FOR THE
IMMEDIATE ENTRY BY THE
GOVERNMENT IN EXPROPRIATION
CASES ARE:
[1] Complaint for expropriation which is sufficient in form
and in substance;
[2] the 100% of the market value of the property sought to be
expropriated must first be paid to the owner of the property.
(REP VS GINGOYON)
[1] the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and substance; and
[2] the making of a deposit equivalent to the ASSESSED
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EXPROPRIATION.
(BIGLANG-AWA VS BACALLA)

If the expropriation is being done by a [1] the complaint for expropriation filed in court is sufficient
Local Government Unit, the following in form and substance; and
shall be complied with: [2] the expropriator must deposit the amount equivalent to
15% of the fair market value of the property to be
expropriated based on its current tax declaration.
(THE CITY OF ILOILO vs JUDGE LEGAZPI)

CASES:
 AGAN VS. PIATCO, 402 SCRA 612
It was held that the CONCESSION AGREEMENT FOR THE BUILD OPERATE TRANSFER ARRANGEMENT
OF THE NINOY AQUINO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PASSENGER TERMINAL II between the Philippine
Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) as well as the
amendments thereto is void for being contrary to law and public policy. On Motion for
Reconsideration (420 SCRA 420), the Supreme Court held that:

“This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III
facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the
government to take over the said facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS
BUILDER OF THE SAID STRUCTURES. THE COMPENSATION MUST BE JUST AND IN ACCORDANCE
 WITH LAW AND EQUITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT CAN NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICH ITSELF AT THE
EXPENSE OF PIATCO AND ITS INVESTORS.”

 REP VS GINGOYON
On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Pasay
City seeking a writ of possession authorizing to take immediate possession and control over NAIA 3
facilities and deposited the amount of P3.0B in cash with Land Bank of the Philippines representing
the assessed value of the terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes.

On the same day, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to
the government to “take or enter upon the possession of the NAIA 3 facilities”. It held that it is the
ministerial duty of the government to issue writ of possession upon deposit of the assessed value of
the property subject of expropriation.

However, on January 4, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued another Order supplementing the December
21, 2004 Order. It pointed out that the earlier orders to the amount to be deposited by the
government was based on Section 2, Rule 67 when what should be applicable is RA 8974 and
therefore ordered that the amount of US$62,343,175.77 be released to PIATCO instead of the
amount in the December 21, 2004 Order.

On January 7, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued another Order directing the appointment of three (3)
Commissioners to determine just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex.

Both Orders were questioned by the government as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.

ISSUES:
1. What law is applicable in this expropriation case: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or RA 8974?
2. If RA 8974 will be used, may the court used the provision of Rule 67 on the 3 commissioners
to determine just compensation.

HELD:

1. Application of Rule 67 would violate the AGAN Doctrine which provides that “for the government
to take over the said NAIA 3 facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF
THE SAID STRUCTURES”. If Section 2, Rule 67 will be applied, PIATCO would be enjoined from
receiving the just compensation even if the government takes over the NAIA 3 facility. It is sufficient
that the government deposits the amount equal to the assessed value of the facilities. It would
violate the proscription in the AGAN Decision that the government must pay first the just
compensation before taking over the facilities.
So when shall Rule 67 be used in expropriation cases and when shall RA 8974 be used?

In all “National government projects” or “national infrastructure projects”, like those covered by
the “Build-Operate-Transfer”, RA 8974 shall be followed. The rest, Rule 67 shall apply.

Upon issuance of the writ in favor of the government, however, it could already exercise acts of
ownership over the NAIA 3 facilities.
 2. The just compensation to be paid by the government shall be determined within 60 days from the
finality of the decision based on Section 4, RA 8974. Rule 67 on the appointment of three (3)
commissioners to determine just compensation may be used since RA 8974 does not provide for
such procedure.

Differences between the two laws on expropriation:

RULE 67
1. the government “merely deposits” the
assessed value of the property subject of
expropriation and can have a writ of possession
over the same
2. can be writ of possession even if the owner of
the property has not received a single centavo
3. for ordinary expropriation
RA 8974
1. the scheme of immediate payment (100%)
shall be followed
2. Writ of Possession may not be issued in favor
of the government UNTIL ACTUAL RECEIPT by
PIATCO of the preferred value of just
compensation
3. the expropriation is for national government
infrastructure or project

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

On 29 December 2000, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Toll Regulatory
Board (TRB), filed with the RTC a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners
whose properties would be affected by the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the North
Luzon Expressway. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 869-M-2000 and raffled to Branch 85,
Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one
of the affected landowners.
Now the Republic is withdrawing the P20M deposited with its accrued interest. The RTC allowed
the release of the principal amount together with the interest to the respondent but on Motion for
Reconsideration of the TRB, it disallowed the withdrawal of the interest reasoning out that the said
issue will be included in the second stage of expropriation, that is, the determination of just
compensation. This was questioned by respondent.

SC: When the herein petitioner deposited the money as advance payment for the expropriated
property with an authorized government depositary bank for purposes of obtaining a writ of
possession, it is deemed to be a “constructive delivery” of the amount corresponding to the 100%
zonal valuation of the expropriated property. Since [HTRDC] is entitled thereto and indisputably the
owner of the principal amount deposited by herein petitioner conversely, the interest yield, as
accession, in a bank deposit should likewise pertain to the owner of the money deposited.
Since the Court of Appeals found that the HTRDC is the owner of the deposited amount, then
the latter should also be entitled to the interest which accrued thereon.

 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS VS CA

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. Market value is that
 sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore.
The just compensation is determined as of the date of taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, WHICHEVER COMES FIRST.

 GABATIN VS LAND BANK

What is the basis of the just compensation for expropriation proceedings in connection with the
agrarian reform program of the government?

The taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program of the government partakes of the
nature of an expropriation proceedings. As such, in computing the just compensation, it is the value
of the land at the time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of the judgment, which
should be taken into consideration.

 Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the proerty sought to be expropriated
(Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 378). The measure is
not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the
owner but also to the taker.

To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the
property, to which should be added the consequential benefits which may arise from the
expropriation.

The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by the parties willing but
not compelled to enter into a contract of sale.

 MANOTOK VS CA
Just compensation (Rule 67) - is not what the land owner wants to be paid and not what the
government wants but the value determined by the court and the Commissioner during the trial.
It is a judicial function with the assistance or recommendation of the court-appointed
commissioners.

 BERKENKOTTER INC.VS. CA
- SC enumerated the factors that the court as well as the Commissioners shall follow or the
guidelines in determining Just Compensation:
1. Cost of Acquisition (How much did he obtain the property)
2. Actual or potential uses (Why was it given a high market value)
3. Particular case of lands (whether agricultural, residential, industrial,commercial)
4. Their size, shape, location
5. The current value
6. Tax declarations

 REPUBLIC VS. SANTOS. The market value as recommended by the board of commissioners
appointed by the court were at best only ADVISORY AND PERSUASIVE AND BY NO MEANS FINAL
OR BINDING.
 SUMULONG vs GUERERRO. Public use – open for the use of the public.

 REP. VS. CASTELLVI

REQUISITES OF TAKING:
a. the expropriator must enter the property;
b. the entrance must not be for just a momentary period;
c. the entry must be under warrant of color or title;
d. the property must be devoted for public use; and
e. the owner must be ousted from beneficial use of his land.

 City of Manila vs Chinese Community. You cannot devote a private party used for public use to
expropriated for another public use.

 DE KNECHT VS BAUTISTA – EDSA

Whether or not the legislature could still pass a law expropriating the lots of the private
respondents despite the existence of a final decision of the Supreme Court which held that choice
of their lot to be used as an extension of EDSA is arbitrary.

SC: It is true that there is already a final decision of the Supreme Court to the effect that the
choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
However, it is equally true that the Constitution and our laws may expropriate private properties
after the payment of just compensation. When on February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa
passed BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose, IT APPEARS THAT THE SAME
WAS BASED ON SUPERVENING EVENTS THAT OCCURRED after the decision of the SC in De Knecht
vs. Bautista in 1980. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension
has disappeared because of the fact that the residents of the area have been relocated and duly
compensated and only DE KNECHT now is left while her property is only about 5% of the area to be
expropriated. The Republic could continue it expropriation proceedings considering the supervening
events after the decision was rendered.

BP Bilang 340 THEREFORE EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDED THE AFORESAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT. X x x THE COURT AGREES IN THE WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF
ENACTING BP 340. THUS THE ANTERIOR DECISION OF THIS COURT MUST YIELD TO THIS
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE FIAT.

 Barangay are allowed to expropriate. There must be resolution of the Sangguniang barangay and to
be approved by the President.

 MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. LOZADA (Feb. 25, 2010)
- involves the expropriation of more than 20 hectares beside Lahug airport in Cebu City by the
government to expand the Lahug airport to become an international airport. Suddenly, the
government changed its mind but they constructed that big airport in Mactan Island known as
the Mactan International airport located in Lapu-lapu City. After more than 15 years, the former
owners of those expropriated lands (Lozada Co.) learned that the government is now selling to
 Ayala Land for a construction of a very big Ayala Court outside Metro Manila. The former
landowners went to court asking for “reversion”. They want their land to be return because
their lands was bought by the government for public purpose. If that public purpose was not
used or the purpose for which it was intended, are they entitled to reversion?

SC: Yes. Even after more than 20 years if a land was expropriated by the government but it was
not use for the purpose for which it was intended, the land owner are entitled to reversion.
There are four requisites in order that the land owners will get back their property or obligations
of the land owner:
1. Return the just compensation that was paid/ received before.
2. Legal interest of that amount received from the government.
3. Pay the government for the expenses in the administration of the property.
(ex. Realty taxes paid by the government)
4. Pay the government the amount equivalent to pecuniary benefits that will be
derived as a result that the property was administered by the government.
“We now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s
exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be
devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular
purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the
former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of
the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent
domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. “

 RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

1. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one
will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or
may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;

2. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, , he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or
after a valid waiver has been made;

3. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means---telephone, radio, letter or messenger---with his lawyer
(either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family; or any medical doctor,
priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or
be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-governmental
organization. IT SHALL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICER TO ENSURE THAT THIS IS
ACCOMPLISHED;

4. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
 5. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it
must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;

6. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time
or state of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with the warning that once he
makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced,
or the interrogation has begun;

7. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any other time during
the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
information or statements;

8. He must be informed that any statement OR EVIDENCE, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, SHALL
BE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

Mahinay Doctrine is the 11 rights during custodial investigation same with the Expanded
Miranda Doctrine. The Miranda Doctrine is only the 3 rights.

 RIGHTS OF A PERSON UNDER CUSTODIAL DETENTION FOR ONE SUSPECTED OR ARRESTED AS A

TERRORIST:

The rights are embodied under Section 21 thereof which states:

Section 21. Rights of a person under custodial detention.- The moment a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is apprehended
or arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be informed by the arresting police or law enforcement
officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought, of his or her right:

1. to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel of his or her choice, the police or law enforcement officers concerned shall
immediately contact the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the Public attorney’s office
(PAO). It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO’s thus contacted
to immediately visit the person detained and provide him with legal assistance. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of choice;
2. informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal counsel;
3. allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel and to confer with them at any time
without restriction;
4. allowed to communicate freely and privately without restrictions with the members of his family
or with his nearest relatives and be visited by them; and
5. allowed freely to avail of the services of a physician or physicians of choice.

WHEN IS A PERSON CONSIDERED UNDER “CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION”?

 ESCOBIDO VS. ILLINOIS (378 US 478)
 Escobido was inside the Chicago Police Station, already inside the investigation room. The SC says
that if the questions being asked are no longer general inquiry but questions trying to point to
that person as the suspect as the person who committed the crime then he is already under
custodial investigation.

 PEOPLE VS. BARIQUIT

Bariquit is a suspect in the killing of another person, 50meters from the police station. The
policemen went to his house to invite him to the police station. His house was only a short distance
from the police station so he walked towards the station. While walking, the policemen were
already asking questions in connection with the commission of the crime but he has not yet
informed of his 11 rights. Bariquit already answered their questions. When they reached the police
station, they went to the investigation room, sat down and inform him of his rights and continued
asking questions. During the trial, the policemen testified according to his confession while he was
walking towards the police station. Admissible? The solicitor general said it was admissible because
the custodial investigation starts only when they are inside the police station.

SC: No. The place and time of questioning is not determinative on whether or not custodial
investigation has commenced but the tone and manner of questioning. Tone and manner is
definitely inquisitory already, they are already pointing to him as the suspect and therefore he
should have been informed of his rights during custodial investigation.

 Informing him of his right – Ex: if an accused is a retired SC Justice. Can you tell him to remain
silent?
 Yes for two reasons:
1. Sec. 12, 1st paragraph uses the word ”any person”. No distinction whether he is a justice or
judge.
2. Escobido vs. Illinois case: That the investigator is ready and willing to respect your right. (The
fact that the investigator is telling the suspect his right- there is a need to make the suspect
free from being feared.)

 PEOPLE VS DANO
However, spontaneous statements voluntarily given, as where appellant orally admitted killing the
victim before the barangay captain (who is neither a police officer nor a law enforcement agent), do
not fall under custodial investigation. Such admission, even without the assistance of a lawyer, does
not violate appellant’s constitutional rights AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

An extrajudicial confession is admissible as evidence when it is:

(i) voluntary;
(ii) made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(iii) express; and
(iv) in writing.

A suspect’s confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel,
without a valid waiver of such assistance, regardless of the absence of coercion or the fact that it
 had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if appellant’s confession were gospel
truth.

 Effect if the investigator fail to tell the accused his right:

 Any profession or admission – inadmissible to evidence

 PEOPLE VS. GALIT

Galit was the suspect in killing a neighbor. The police could not locate the body of the alleged victim.
Invited Galit to the police station and investigated for 36 hours from the very experienced police
investigator. When he refused to confess, the policemen used the 1st test, his head was immersed in
a drum of water for a minute where he could hardly breath but never admitted it. The next test is
electrocute but still never admitted it. A new policeman invited Galit and went to the comfort room
and then submerged the mouth of Galit in the toilet bowl, Galit in less than one minute confessed
and said everything about where the body is, the weapon he used and to where he stabbed the
victim where the police were now able to locate the victim exactly where and what he described. He
spoke of “Gospel truth”. Admissible? Admitted by the Trial judge and was sentence to death.

SC: There is no other evidence except his confession and therefore zero evidence against him. He is
acquitted because of the third paragraph of section 12.

 PEOPLE VS. ROMULLO FELIXMINIA (March 20, 2002)

It happened in Urdaneta City. One morning at about 10 o’clock. Felixminia was seen drinking gin in
front of one of the store in Urdaneta. At about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, he was seen with a
beautiful young girl struggling against Felixminia. At about 4.30 in the afternoon, someone seen him
again with the girl going towards the forested area of the Makalong River in Urdaneta. At about 6
o’clock in the evening, another man saw Felixminia coming out of the wooden area without the
young girl. At 9 o’clock in the evening the parents of the girl were looking after her. The parents
informed the Brgy. Captain and on their way they met the one who saw Felixminia with the girl, so
they call a policeman and went to the house of Felixminia at about 9.30 in the evening. When
Felixminia saw them, he jumped from the second floor of his house and run towards the forested
area, the policemen ran after him and was able to arrest him after 10 hours. The police conducted
custodial investigation without informing him of his right, maltreated him and no lawyer appeared.
He executed an extra judicial confession. (same with Galit case) Felixminia was convicted and
sentenced to death. On appeal, he cited the case of Galit, that should be an inadmissible evidence
and shall be acquitted. Was it admissible in evidence?

SC: Inadmissible in evidence. Felixminia shall not be acquitted because there is such a thing as
“circumstantial evidence”. In the case at bar, there were 4 circumstances. In the 4th circumstance
where he ran after seeing the police the presumption is Flight is a form of guilt”.

 WHEN IS THERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND WHEN CAN BE A BASIS FOR CONVICTION?
Circumstantial evidence is enough for conviction if the following requisites are present:
1. If there are more than one circumstance.
2. If you connect all together the circumstances, it will result into only one conclusion.
(that is when he committed the crime)
 Even when the extrajudicial confession was declared inadmissible, still could be validly convicted
by the court.
Instances where the accused was not able to be informed of his constitutional right and his
confession is admissible:

 PEOPLE VS. TAYLARAN (96 SCRA 624)

-Happened in Samar where Taylaran killed his mother in law because he suspected him to be a
“barang”. Holding the bolo, he went to the police station and said” I killed my mother in law
because she is a barang” and later on he was informed of his rights. During the trial the
policemen whom he first approached testified but the lawyer refused or vigorously objected
because at that time when he admit of killing his mother he was not yet informed of his right
during custodial investigation.

SC: Voluntary and Spontaneous confession makes admissible evidence because the police
authorities do not know that the accused have committed a crime. If the accused is willing to
voluntarily confess that is not your problem.

 Who are those mandated to conduct custodial investigation:

1. Police investigators
2. CIDG
3. NBI
4. ISAF

 PEOPLE VS. ANDAN

Andan was the last man killed by lethal injection in the year 2000. He allegedly rape and killed a
cousin. Investigated by the police but no confession was made. The Mayor in Meycauayan, Bulacan
instructed the police to bring Andang to his office. So he was brought to the office of the Mayor and
in that office there are TV crews waiting. Mayor investigated him infront of a TV crew or and all of a
sudden Andang admitted the crime on video. The mayor never informed him of his right. Is it
admissible, the video tape confession?

SC: Admissible because the Mayor is not one of those allowed by law to conduct custodial
investigation. He is a public official but he is not tasked or it is not one of his duties to conduct
investigation for the commission of a crime.

 How about a Barangay captain?

SC said Barangay Captains and Barangay Tanods are not officers allowed by law to conduct custodial
investigations. If the Barangay Captain will investigate you and you confess, is that admissible?

SC: YES and you can refuse to answer it because there is no reason in refusing to answer it. (The
policemen cannot do that because they have to inform him of his right)

 PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO LAUGA (March 15, 2010)

Confession made before the members of “Bantay Bayan” in Visayas. There was a complaint, went to
the house of Antonio, invited him and took him in the office of “Bantay Bayan”. Bantay Bayan
investigated Antonio without informing him of his 11 right, he gave a confession. Is the confession
admissible in evidence?
 SC: Since “Bantay Bayan” is a police auxiliary and policemen are mandated to inform of your right
then this extension or auxiliary of the PNP are duty bound to inform you of your 11 rights. Bantay
Bayan is similar to the Tanod. Bantay Bayan is a Police Auxiliary, the people in the Barangay
appointed by the policemen and to help them enforce peace and order in that particular barangay.
Barangay Tanod, it is the Barangay Captain having jurisdiction over them. (Appointed by the Brgy.
Captain)

 PEOPLE VS JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, RTC Branch 6, Baguio City (175 SCRA 216)
Case involving the Philippine Airline Cashier here in Baguio City wherein he was caught to have
pocketed more than half million of his collections. Instead of filing a case against him, the lawyer of
PAL came up to Baguio City. He was investigated, convinced him to admit and signed an extrajudicial
confession. He will not be dismissed from his work, he will continue to work at PAL so that they will
just deduct from his salary the amount he has stolen because of those promises he signed an
extrajudicial confession. But later on, he was dismissed and charged of Estafa. They use the
confession before the PAL lawyer even if he was not informed of his right. Admissible? Judge Ayson
said “No, because he was not informed of his right.”

SC: Admissible because the provision under article 3 as a rule is to be applied only against the
government. In this case it was a private individual who conducted the “custodial investigation” and
therefore the lawyer of PAL is not bound to inform him of his right.

 KIMPO VS. CA (232 SCRA 53)

Case involving a private individual who attended and investigated the accused with some form of
harassment or threat or intimidation.

SC: Admissible in evidence because that private individual is not bound or not mandated to
eventually inform him of his rights.

 PEOPLE VS. ORDONO (334 SCRA 673)

In this case, the one who questioned the accused is a Radio Announcer. Thru the questioning of the
radio announcer, he made admissions about the commission of the offense. He was never informed
of his rights.

SC: Admissible in evidence because a radio announcer is a private individual and he is not bound to
tell him his rights.

 PEOPLE VS. ZUELA (323 SCRA 589)

A person arrested he is behind bars and a TV journalist asking him questions why did he commit the
crime, why did he steal, why did he commit the robbery and then he is actually giving him the
reason why. Those (his answers) are admissions without even being informed of his rights.

SC: Admissible in evidence. A TV journalist is a private individual and he is not bound to tell him his
rights.

 PEOPLE VS. ENDINO (353 SCRA 307)

A Newsman questioned an accused, the accused gave answers. He was not informed of his rights.
 SC: Admissible in evidence because only those government authorities or officials mandated by law
and have such rights to follow; If they fail to comply with the requisites provided in “Mahinay”,
Inadmissible.

 Cases involving Police line-up:

A suspect appears before the police station, he mentioned of about having witnessed the
commission of the crime. A suspect is arrested and he will be placed behind a One Way Mirror
together with about nine other individuals, similar height or built and complexion and then that
witness together with the investigator will sit at the opposite side of the mirror and he will be asked
who among those ten the person who stabbed the victim was.
Importance: If you will be able to point the correct suspect there, you’re identification is very good.
During the cross examination, you will be able to start a vigorous questions on cross examination
and you’re very sure that the suspect is the offender.
Is the suspect entitled to a lawyer or be informed of his right?

 PEOPLE VS. USMAN HASSAN (157 SCRA 261)

No, because Police line-up is not yet a custodial investigation. He is just there to stand up. No
question is asked. No answer is required. Since no incriminatory answer is about to be given by him
no need to inform him of his rights or lawyer.

 GAMBOA VS. JUDGE CRUZ (162 SCRA 642)

Is the suspect entitled to inform him of his rights and assistance of his lawyer?

SC: Yes because “to prevent improper suggestion by the investigator. “

Ex: In police line-up, when the witness is not sure of the suspect the police will suggest
Saying “ No, look at # 4...that person had so many cases....” then the witness will say
“ S’ya nga”...

In order to prevent improper suggestion, there shall be a lawyer representing him during custodial
investigation. The lawyer will be there standing together with the police investigator and the
witness so that there will be no improper suggestion.

 PEOPLE VS. HATTON

SC reverted to the original decision that there is no need for a lawyer because there is no question
being ask anyway, therefore there could be no inculpatory admissions.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

 Which of this is not a right during Criminal Proceedings?

Right to be presumed innocent

Right to have a competent and independent counsel of his own choice

Right to inform the cause and nature of the action against him
Right to speedy trial
 During custodial investigation, it is not only the right to counsel that the suspect is entitled TO but
the right to have a competent and independent lawyer preferably his own choice. But on criminal
proceedings, the accused has the right to counsel but not the competent and independent counsel
of his own choice.
RULE: You must have a competent and independent counsel of your own choice in custodial
investigation.

2009 Bar Question in Political Law:

 PEOPLE VS. JUANERIO (267 SCRA 608)
A was arrested by the NBI, he was brought to the NBI headquarters in Taft Avenue. Before
questioning him, he was asked “Do you have a lawyer of your own choice? He said Yes, Atty. Y. So,
Atty. Y brought in and custodial investigation started, at the middle of the investigation an
experienced investigator said that Atty. Y is not familiar with custodial investigation. So, she pointed
a lady lawyer and said she is a very good lawyer and she is very competent. So the custodial
investigation was continued by the lady lawyer pointed to by the investigator, he made admission,
the admission was admitted and was convicted. In SC, he questioned the validity of that extrajudicial
confession. Is the confession admissible?
Section 12 speaks of a competent and independent counsel of his own choice. In the case at bar,
Atty. Y appears to be independent. The lady was a very competent lawyer but not independent and
she was just there at the NBI to file an application to be an investigator.

SC: If from the beginning the one who assisted him should have been the lady lawyer applying in
the NBI, it is not admissible because in this case, it turned out that two days later she was admitted
as a member of the NBI and she became an investigator. Therefore, her loyalty is with the NBI. She’s
not independent. In the case at bar, he was represented by a lawyer who is an investigator at the
NBI, therefore, inadmissible.

Two suggested answers given by the UP Law center:

- Admissible
-Inadmissible because the Constitution requires two requisite, not only competent but he must also
be independent.

 PEOPE VS. PATUNGAN (354 SCRA 413)

He was investigated for 72 hours. At the end of 72 hours or three days, he confessed without a
lawyer without being informed of his rights. When the extrajudicial confession was admitted, he was
brought to the Justice Hall at the IBP Office and a lawyer there asked him “Are these correct? Are
these voluntary? He said YES and he signed it. The lawyer who saw him for the first time signed it
also. Admissible?

SC: We are inclined to believe that when he was brought to the IBP Office, his body and his will were
in no position to raise any objection much less to complaint to the IBP lawyer about what he has
gone through. In fact, the IBP lawyer was working on an appeal in another case while the
extrajudicial confession was being taken.
The mere presence of a lawyer is not sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement of
assistance of counsel. Assistance of counsel must be effective, vigilant and independent. A lawyer
who could just hear the investigation going on while working on another case hardly satisfies the
 minimum requirements of effective assistance of counsel. Not only was the accused subjected to
custodial investigation without counsel, he was likewise denied effective assistance of counsel
during the taking of his extra-judicial confession.

 PEOPLE VS. OBRERO (332 SCRA 190)

Obrero was arrested. He was brought to the office of the Western Police District in Manila. He was
investigated. The investigator asked him “Do you have a lawyer?” None. I am giving you a very good
lawyer who is Atty. Delos Angeles, the Chief of the Western Police District. The one who will conduct
an investigation is a PO1 and the one who will represent the accused is his boss, a colonel but also a
lawyer. Obrero gave an extrajudicial confession. Admissible?

SC: No because he could not have been a competent and independent counsel. He might be
competent but could not be independent because being the head of that police office he wants the
crime to be solved.

 PEOPLE VS. MATOS-VIDUAYA (September 11, 1990)

He was arrested. He was brought to the police station, 12 midnight he was asked “ Do you have a
lawyer of your own choice?” And he said there is no need because “ andyan naman si Fiscal,
kumpare ko s’ya” So he was examined, he gave his answers, he confessed. Valid?

SC: No because even though the fiscal is his “kumpadre” the fiscal is representing an adverse
interest. The complainant or the people of the Philippines is what he represents. He is not lawyering
for the suspect. As if the investigation was conducted without a lawyer, therefore it violates section
12.

In every police station, there is an inquest fiscal assigned there every night because when there is a
person arrested, he will determine whether that person be put to jail or to sign a promise to appear
and to return in the morning with his lawyer.

 PEOPLE VS. MARCOS JIMENEZ (GR # 82604)

Marcos Jimenez is the suspect in the killing of his father. He is charged of Parricide. They could not
find the body of the father. But there are two witnesses who saw him washing his t-shirt full of
blood. So, he was the prime suspect. He was brought to the police station and an investigation was
supposed to be conducted. First, the police is aware of his rights so they asked “ Do you have a
lawyer?” and he said Yes, who is a retired Judge but he was in another table inside the police station
assisting another accused who is also under custodial investigation. The police investigator said “OK
nandito na pala ang abogado mo, let’s start.” So, they started asking questions. On the 6 th question,
the lawyer now transferred to his table. So he has now a lawyer. And then he confessed, he signed it
and signed by the lawyer. Admissible?

SC: The right to counsel must be complied with from the time that first question was asked. Even if
the questions asked are only ordinary questions, it is immaterial. The right to counsel under section
12, article 3 must be complied when the first question will be asked.

The lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should be of the latter's own
choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigators or other parties. In this case, the former
judge whose assistance was requested by the police was evidently not of Marcos Jimenez' own
 choice; she was the police officers' own choice; she did not ask Marcos if was is willing to have her
represent him. This is not the mode of solicitation of legal assistance contemplated by the
constitution.

Non-compliance or Partial compliance makes the confession inadmissible in evidence.

 PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO REYES (March 17, 2009)

Involves the kidnapping of two very young children of a very rich Chinese businessman in San
Francisco, Del Monte, Bulacan. The parents received a call from the kidnappers telling them “if you
want to see your children, bring 5 million in Del Monte, Quezon City. Do not inform the police about
it, or else you will not see your children alive.” The father went there with the ransom but the
children were already dead. They were strangled. (Because the wife informed the PAOCTF about it).
No suspects arrested but Reyes could no longer hold his conscience so he surrendered and said “We
did it, there are 10 of us.” Then one by one, the perpetrators were arrested and they are at the
PAOCTF headquarters facing the investigation by Cesar Mangcau and Michael Rey Aquino. Mangcau
asked them “Do you have lawyers? None. I will give you two very good lawyers, they are Atty. Roxas
and Atty. Uminga, thats why we took them as our lawyers at PAOCTF. So they were given two
lawyers of the PAOCTF to represents them. They were informed of their rights and then even
though the investigation took for several hours or almost 10 hours, the two lawyers allegedly were
there protecting their rights. They made confessions, they were convicted and that was used as
evidence against them. Admissible? (Should have been inadmissible)

SC: Admissible. We should not give too much emphasis to the right to counsel because when we
require the presence of a lawyer during custodial investigation the purpose of the presence of the
lawyer is to see to it that there will be no coerced confession because the lawyer should not prevent
his client from telling the truth. The lawyer should not prevent the client from admitting having
committed the crime.

Even if the lawyer was not of your own choice, confession still admissible in evidence if you did
not do any of the following:
1. The accused did not present any credible evidence to show that his confession was obtained
thru duress, threat, violence and intimidation.
-the case is all about: they are complaining only of the right to counsel when they were
convicted, they did not question in the trial court the fact that the lawyer given to them was not
their own choice unless they could prove that the confession was obtained by force or duress
then it is admissible in evidence.
2. If the accused did not complain to the authority to whom he administered the oath.
-confession must be signed and subscribed under oath to a judge or a fiscal where you will
swear.
3. Failure to file a criminal, civil, or administrative case against the police man or investigator who
maltreated you. (If no complain, the presumption is that there was no compulsion of duress or
force)
4. You should have shown the marks of violence in your person at an earliest possible opportunity.
(Inform your relatives and tell the court about your marks of violence.)
5. There should have been a competent physician who testifies attesting to the fact that there are
marks of violence in your person.
 -Without doing any of the above, extrajudicial confession is admissible. You should not be
allowed to complain only after you are convicted, no more marks of violence. You have to
complain immediately after the violation of your right.

 The right of an accused to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. Such right contemplates effective communication
which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed
 Never use People vs. Domingo Reyes to justify the admission of an extrajudicial confession unless
the facts are exactly the same. The better rule is the right to counsel of a competent and
independent counsel of his own choice, so how can they be independent if they are also lawyers of
the PAOCTF.
 Under the rules of evidence: “Truth is spontaneous”
 Even though your confession is “Gospel Truth” but there was no compliance of the 11 rights, still
inadmissible.
 Gospel Truth but obtained through the second paragraph of section 12, there was force,
intimidation like in “Galit Case” still inadmissible.
 Two Kinds of Coerced Confession:
1. Thru force- it is true, the result is inadmissible.
2. If still considered coerced even if it is true, if you were not informed of your right, the result
would inadmissible in evidence.

OTHER CASES.
 PEOPLE vs JOSE TING LAN UY
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation intended for the
purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), the accused-appellants were
charged of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents After trial, all accused were
convicted by the Sandiganbayan.
While the Information charged the accused of willful and intentional commission of the acts
complained of while the Decision found the accused guilty of inexcusable negligence.
Accused Ochoa interposed an appeal and claimed that his conviction was based on his alleged
sworn statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with an NPC
personnel and the report of the NBI. He maintains that he signed the sworn statement while
confined at the Philippine heart center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him.
He was not assisted by counsel nor he was apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed
the affidavit. He likewise claimed that his constitutional rights to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against and due process were violated.

Held:
Even if the information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence
may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense.

The claim that his affidavit is inadmissible in evidence in accordance with section 12 [1] of the Bill of
Rights is not tenable. The “investigation” under said provision refers to “custodial investigation
 where a suspect has already been taken into police custody and that the investigating officers begin
to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect.

Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular person
as a suspect (People vs. Duenas, Jr., 426 SCRA 666). Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the
accused are not available BEFORE GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORS ENTER THE PICTURE. The
protective mantle of section 12, article III does not apply to
a) administrative investigations (People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216);
b) confession to a private individual (Kimpo vs. CA, 232 SCRA 53);
c) verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not a part of the investigation (People
vs.
Ordono, 334 SCRA 673); or
d) even to a Mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity (People
vs.
Zuela, 323 SCRA 589).
e) even a videotaped interview where the accused willingly admit his guilt in the presence of
newsmen is not covered by the said provision though the trial courts were warned by the
supreme
Court to take extreme caution in admitting similar confessions because of the distinct possibility
that
the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize
coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an
accused
admit an offense on television (People vs. Endino, 353 SCRA 307).

Clearly, the confession of the accused was obtained during an administrative investigation by
NPC and therefore, the same was not covered by Section 12, Art. III of the Constitution.

(NOTE: In People vs. Andam, the confession made before a Municipal Mayor was held
admissible as evidence).

 PEOPLE VS. FIGUEROA

Under Art. III, Section 12 [1] of the Constitution, a suspect in custodial investigation must be:

1. informed of his right to remain silent;

2. warned that anything he says can be and will be used against him;
3. told that he has the right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him.

In this case, accused-appellant was given no more than a perfunctory recitation of his rights,
signifying nothing more than a feigned compliance with the constitutional requirements. (People vs.
Samolde, July 31, 2000)

It is always incumbent on the prosecution to prove at the trial that, prior to in-custody
questioning, the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The presumption of regularity
of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Hence, in the
 absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with the above constitutional safeguards,
extrajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during the custodial
investigation, are inadmissible not only against the DECLARANT but with more so against 3rd
persons. THIS IS SO EVEN IF SUCH STATEMENTS ARE GOSPEL TRUTH AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN.

Such statements are useless EXCEPT AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE VERY POLICE AUTHORITIES WHO
VIOLATED THE SUSPECT’S RIGHTS.

 PEOPLE VS TUNIACO
The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey
Datulayta, and Alex Aleman with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City
in Criminal Case 8370.
Based on the findings of the RTC, in the morning of June 13, 1992 some police officers from the
Lagao Police Sub-Station requested police officer Jaime Tabucon of the Central Police Station of
General Santos City homicide division to take the statement of accused Alex Aleman regarding the
slaying of a certain Dondon Cortez. On his arrival at the sub-station, Tabucon noted the presence of
Atty. Ruperto Besinga, Jr. of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) who was conversing with those taken
into custody for the offense. When queried if the suspects would be willing to give their statements,
Atty. Besinga said that they were.
Some other police officer first took the statement of accused Jeffrey Datulayta. Officer Tabucon
next took the statement of accused Aleman, whom he observed to be in good physical shape.
Before anything else, officer Tabucon informed accused Aleman in Cebuano of his constitutional
right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel of his own choice and asked him if he was
willing to give a statement. Aleman answered in the affirmative. When asked if he had any
complaint to make, Aleman said that he had none. When Aleman said that he had no lawyer,
Tabucon pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that he was assisting all the suspects in the case.
Tabucon warned Aleman that anything he would say may be used against him later in court.
Afterwards, the police officer started taking down Aleman’s statement.
After taking down the statement, Tabucon explained the substance of it to accused Aleman who
then signed it in the presence of Atty. Besinga.

SC: Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent
and independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing. These requirements were met here.

 PEOPLE VS PIA
The Supreme Court enumerated the following as evidence of voluntariness in the extrajudicial
confession of a suspect:
Their physical examination reports certify that no external signs of physical injury or any
form of trauma were noted during their examination. In People v. Pia, we held that the following
factors indicate voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession:
(1) where the accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion or duress or
violence
on their persons;
(2) where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths;
(3) where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged
intimidators for maltreatment;
(4) where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and
 (5) where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress
their
claim.

It should also be noted that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores
are replete with details on the manner in which the kidnapping was committed, thereby ruling out
the possibility that these were involuntarily made. Their extra-judicial confessions clearly state how
appellants and their cohorts planned the kidnapping as well as the sequence of events before,
during and after its occurrence. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language
if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused.

With respect to appellant Reyes’s claim that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and
Flores cannot be used in evidence against him, we have ruled that although an extra-judicial
confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as
corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. In People v.
Alvarez, we ruled that where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of participation by the co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against a
co-accused.

 PEOPLE VS. JEREZ, 285 SCRA 393

A lawyer provided by the investigators to the accused during the custodial investigation is
deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former’s
appointment during the course of the investigation AND THE ACCUSED THEREAFTER SUBSCRIBES TO
THE VERACITY OF HIS STATEMENT BEFORE THE SWEARING OFFICER.

 P. VS. ALEGRIA
Could the Fiscal also represent the accused during custodial investigation to satisfy the
requirement of the Constitution that the accused is assisted by counsel?

No. The Fiscal is the counsel for the State, not the accused or the suspect.

 PEOPLE VS. PANFILO CABILES; PEOPLE VS. TAN

Even if the confession of the accused speaks of the truth, if it was made without the assistance
of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it was
voluntarily given.

In order that a confession is admissible, the following requisites must be present:

a. the confession must be voluntary;

b. the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel;
c. the confession must be express; and
d. the confession must be in writing.

The above requirements, however, are not applicable when the suspect makes an spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, BUT GIVEN IN AN ORDINARY
MANNER WHEREBY THE ACCUSED ORALLY ADMITTED HAVING COMMITTED THE CRIME. This was
the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of PEOPLE VS. ANDAN, March 3, 1997 when the
 accused made a voluntary and verbal confession to the Municipal Mayor that he committed the
crime imputed to him. As such, his uncounselled confession is admissible in evidence.

 PEOPLE VS VILLARINO

On May 2, 1995, the police brought appellant to Calbayog City for medical examination since he had
scratches and abrasions on his body. While waiting for a boat ride at 4:00 o’clock in the morning,
the police team took a coffee break. SPO4 Genoguin was momentarily left alone to guard the
appellant. During this short period, the appellant voluntarily admitted to SPO4 Genoguin that he
committed the crime charged. He also told SPO4 Genoguin that he could keep the pendant and
bracelet if he would retrieve the t-shirt and throw it into the sea. SPO4 Genoguin rejected the
appellant’s offer and reminded him of his right to a counsel and that everything the appellant said
could be used against him in court. Unperturbed, the appellant reiterated his offer.
When they boarded the motorboat, the appellant repeatedly offered to give SPO4 Genoguin
P20,000.00 if he would throw the sando into the sea. However, the police officer ignored the offer
and instead reported the matter to the Chief of Police of Almagro, SPO4 Basilio M. Yabao. Later, the
appellant’s mother, Felicidad Mabute y Legaspi, asked him not to testify against her son.
The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Rape with Homicide
and sentenced to Death.
Is accused-appellant’s voluntary confession to SPO4 Genoguin admissible in evidence?
HELD:

In the instant case, appellant voluntarily confessed to raping and killing “AAA” to SPO4 Genoguin.
He even offered to give the pieces of jewelry to the latter if his sando is thrown into the sea. The
appellant did not deny this accusation nor assail its truthfulness.
When appellant confessed to the crime, he was alone with SPO4 Genoguin, and no force or
intimidation was employed against him. The confession was spontaneously made and not elicited
through questioning. The trial court did not, therefore, err in holding that compliance with the
constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.

In People v. Dy, we held that:

Contrary to the defense contention, the oral confession made by the Accused to Pat. Padilla that “he
had shot a tourist” and that the gun he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he
wanted surrendered to the Chief of Police (t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 6-9), is competent evidence
against him. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be
given in evidence against him (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). It may in a sense be also regarded
as part of the res gestae. The rule is that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard
the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and
understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be
given in substance (23 C.J.S. 196, cited in People v. Tawat, G.R. No. 62871, May 25, 1985, 129 SCRA
431).

What was told by the Accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through
questioning, but given in an ordinary manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in
evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. (People v. Taylaran, G.R. No. L-19149, October
31, 1981, 108 SCRA 373). The Trial Court, therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that
compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the
instant case, as the defense alleges in its Error VII.
 In PEOPLE VS. ROLANDO FELIXMINIA y CAMACHO, GR No. 125333, March 20, 2002, the Supreme
Court held that though the extrajudicial confession of the accused was declared inadmissible for
violation of his right to counsel, if there are evidence sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, like circumstantial evidence, then he can still be convicted of the crime charged. This is so
because [1] the compromising circumstances were duly proven which were consistent with each
other and which lead with moral certainty to the conclusion that he was guilty of the crime charged;
and [2] the totality of such circumstances eliminated beyond doubt the possibility of his innocence.
In People vs. Mahinay, it was held that conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided
the following requisites are present: [a] there is more than one circumstance; [b] the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
  RIGHT TO BAIL
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Correlate with: Rules on CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

 BAIL is a security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions
hereinafter specified. Bay may be given in the form of corporation surety, property bond, cash
deposit or recognizance.(Section 1, Rule 114)
 Section 10, Rule 114 of Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Kinds of Bonds:
1. Cash Bond – the best and easiest bond, pay the amount of cash to the Clerk of court and
your client be released as long as you have the picture and so on.
2. Property Bond – deposit the title of your real property with an assessed value equal or more
than the bond recommended. That will be annotated. If the accused will jump bail that will
be forfeited by the government.
3. Surety Bond – ex. Homicide – 200,000. Then an insurance company to undertake to allow
your release ( insurance company will be the one assuring your presence, if the accused will
jump bail the surety company will pay the government 200,000)then you will only pay the
surety company 30%.(5% is always set aside to the lawyer)
 Has a life time of one year.
4. Recognizance – person in the community can convinced the Judge that he will release the
accused thru him, he will be the one to present the accused then there is no need to pay a
single centavo.

 TWO KINDS OF RIGHT UNDER SECTION 13:

1. AS A MATTER OF RIGHT - Those which are not capital offense
2. AS A MATTER OF DISCRETION ( on the part of the judge) - Punished by capital offense and
evidence of guilt is strong

 2008 BAR QUESTION:

A was charged of murder. Is he entitled to bail?
Answer: It depends. If the evidence of guilt is strong, then he is not entitled to bail as a matter of
right. But if the evidence of guilt is not strong, he is entitled to bail.

 2002,2003,2006 BAR QUESTION:

When is bail a matter of right and when is bail a matter of discretion?
Answer: If it is not a capital offense even though you have so many criminal cases, you are entitled
to bail. If you are charged with capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong, then you are not
entitled to bail as a matter of right while trial is going on. (Trial is going on – you are presumed
 innocent) Under the rules on summary procedure bail is a matter of discretion when evidence of
guilt is strong, you are entitled to bail. But under the Rules on Criminal procedure bail is a matter of
discretion after you are convicted in the RTC of a crime punishable by more than 6 years
imprisonment.

Ex. Homicide – 6 years and 1 day to 14 years. Can the court refuse to grant you bail when you are
appealing in the CA? YES, if the condition under Rule 114 are present, because presumption of
innocent was already overturned. It is the discretion of the RTC judge whether to allow you on bail
or not during appeal. It is already as a matter of discretion if you are already convicted of an offense
of more than 6 years imprisonment.

 The basis of discretion on the part of the Judge under the Rules on Summary procedure and in the
case of VILLASENOR VS. ABANIO:
There are ten factors to be considered in granting bail.
1. Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
2. Nature and circumstances of the offense;
3. Penalty of the offense charged;
4. Character and reputation of the accused;
5. Age and health of the accused;
6. The weight of the evidence against the accused;
7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial;
8. Forfeiture of other bonds;
9. The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
10. The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.

 If charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong, entitled to bail as a matter of
discretion. Discretion lies on justifying it using the 10 factors enumerated in the case of “Villasenor
vs. Abanio”.

 GOVERNOR LEVISTE CASE

He was charged of murdering his long time assistant and the evidence of guilt is allegedly strong. He
was allowed to bail. Is that allowed?

SC: The factors that Gov. Leviste used to be out of Makati City Jail: 68 years old and suffering 3rd
degree hypertension. Putting him in the Makati City Jail, that is equal to Death Penalty because he
will die there. Valid? YES

 MARCOS VS. JUDGE CRUZ (67 PHIL); PEOPLE VS. MARCOS (70 PHIL)
Marcos was Charged with the murder of the Congressman of 1st district of Ilocos Norte. The man
who beat his father three times for Congressman. The witness is the driver (Calixto Aguinaldo) said
“I was present when Marcos and his father and his uncle plan the crime and I accompanied
Ferdinand Marcos that night when he shot Alundasan.” Then Marcos said, that might be true but I
want to be out on bail so that I can take the Bar Exam. He was allowed, took the BAR, he top the
 BAR and broke all existing records. That did not stop Judge Cruz of convicting him. He was sentenced
to death. He is the one lawyering himself in the SC.

SC: Despite an eye witness account, (they will not believe you if you are the driver for only six days
then they allow you to listen with their conversation to kill a Congressman, is unbelievable)

As a rule: Positive identification of eye witness account prevails over alibi or denial if the testimony
is unbelievable and contrary to common human experience. We did not believe that story.

 ALMEDA VS. JUDGE VILLALUZ

Almeda had so many criminal cases before the pending before the sala of Judge Villaluz, Circuit
Criminal Court of Rizal. A new case for car napping was filed and the bond recommended is 100,000.
The Judge said “I will allow you to be out on bail provided purely cash bond.” Almeda went to SC. Is
the order of the Judge valid?

SC: No because the rules provided four modes. If all Judges will require cash bond, what will happen
to insurance companies? They have to close shop because there are no more clients for them.

 PEOPLE VS. IAC

The SC reversed a decision of the IAC /CA allowing bail on a ground not one of the ten
enumerated in Villasenor vs Abanio.

EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED

 DE LA CAMARA VS. ENAGE (41 SCRA 1)

He “ran a mock”, he fired a gun, 10 killed, 11 seriously injured. Assuming that you are charged with
11 counts of homicide and 10 counts of frustrated homicide. The bail recommended for homicide is
200,000 and 100,000 for frustrated. Then the judge said “OK, you have the right to bail.” I am
setting out the amount of 3 million for your bail.

SC: Even though it is bailable but the judge is setting an excessive amount that is tantamount to
denial to the right to bail because the bail is only put up to assure his presence in court to require
him to put up 3M for example is already excessive.

 Procedure that must be followed by a lawyer if a client who is charged of capital offense
(ex:murder) insist that he should be allowed to bail:
File a petition for bail and the only reason to be put in the petition for bail is that “We are asking of
bail because the evidence of guilt against the client is not strong.” The procedure will be: You will
not be the one to prove that the evidence of guilt is not strong because your client is presumed
innocent. It should be the government or the prosecutor to present evidence to prove the strength
of his evidence.

 PEOPLE VS. SAN DIEGO

Case involving the murder of the late actor Jess Lapid. The accused is now asking for bail. The judge
asked the fiscal “How many witnesses are you going to present?” 6 witnesses are provided to prove
that evidence of guilt is strong. After the 5th witness was presented, the judge issued an order
 granting bail because his appreciation of the testimonies of the 5 witnesses shows that the
evidence of guilt is not strong. So, the P vs. SC, was there a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Judge?

SC: Yes, the right of the state to due process was violated on the part of the prosecution because
the court has not heard the testimony of the last witness.

 Sequence of presenting Witnesses: (Ex: you are prosecuting a murder case- 4 witnesses)
1. An eye witness to the murder
2. The wife who will testify as to the damages, atty.’s fees, loss income
3. The doctor at the receiving section of the hospital who tried to revive the victim but died
4. The doctor who conducted the autopsy
- There is no rule of who shall be presented first.

 ATTY. ADALIM-WHITE VS. JUDGE BAGTAS (475 SCRA 175)

A case on recognizance. Macaporo was charged of frustrated murder. After trial, he was convicted
by the RTC. Appealed to the CA, it affirmed the conviction. Went to SC, SC affirmed the conviction.
(Penalty for frustrated murder – more than 14 years in prison). After the finality of the decision of
the SC, (you have to go to jail) but Judge Bagtas said “I am taking him into my recognizance”. So, he
did not go to jail because Judge Bagtas said that “there are 4 ways that you can escape for not
going to jail, you have cash, property, surety and recognizance.”I am taking him in my
recognizance. Is he Correct?

SC: He is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and he is being fine 40,000 pesos because the four
kinds of bail apply only during trial before conviction or final conviction. After final conviction, you
are sentenced to one year imprisonment and you did not avail of probation then you have to serve
one year. Even if you are willing to put up 1M cash bond, that will no longer be able to help you
because bond is no longer allowed after finality of the decision against you.

It is patently erroneous to release a convict on recognizance. Section 24, Rule 114 provides that
there shall no bail for a convict after final judgment. The only exception is when the convict applies
for Probation before he commences to serve his sentence and that the offense and the penalty for
the offense is within the purview of the Probation Law.

Sections 5 and 16 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (on the different kinds of bail) APPLIES ONLY
TO AN ACCUSED UNDERGOING PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT DURING TRIAL OR ON APPEAL.
THEY DO NOT APPLY TO A PERSON CONVICTED BY FINAL JUSGMENT AND ALREADY SERVING
SENTENCE.

BAIL IN EXTRADITION CASES

 US GOVERNMENT VS. JUDGE PURGANAN

Case involving Mark Jimenez who was charged of illegal gambling and contribution, insurance fraud,
mail fraud in the US. But before he was arrested, he was able to run here in the Phil. And became a
Congressman in the 6th district of Manila. US Government filed an extradition case thru the Sec. Of
Justice. A case was filed before the RTC of Manila. While the extradition case is pending, can Mark
 Jimenez be allowed to put up bail, because the cases pending in the US are very minor one’s. It was
later found out, he served 21 months. He will be allowed to put up bail in the US. So here in the
Philippines, Is he entitled to bail because the criminal cases he is facing in the US are all bailable?

SC: No, because section 13 of article 3 applies only to criminal cases. Extradition cases are not
criminal cases and therefore bail is not allowed.

 Why is bail not allowed to extradition cases even to the crime committed in other country are
not that serious:
 Because after our court find out that you should be extradited to the US, you are not
under detention. While the extradition case is pending, you have to stay in jail because
extradition cases should not only for humans because we never discuss if guilty or not.
The issue in extradition cases is only to determine whether the crime you are charged in
another country, is one of the crimes enumerated in the Extradition Treaty.

 GOVERNEMNT OF HONGKONG VS. JUDGE OLALIA (521 SCRA 470)

Mr. Alberto committed a crime in Hongkong but before he could be arrested, he was able to ride the
first flight out of Hongkong so he was able to return to the Phil. The Government of Hongkong
requested for extradition and an extradition case was filed against Mr. Alberto. He was arrested. 2
and a half years in jail, there is no resolution yet of his extradition case. He went to SC and asked
that he be allowed to put up bail citing the case of “Mejof vs. Director of Prison” – A case involving
deportation. It is not a case involving extradition but Mr. Alberto says “These are analogous”. Under
section 2 of article 2, Mejof, a Russian national was brought to the Philippines by the Japanese
during the Second World War. After the war, Phil. Armed Forces found Mejof for extradition but
there was no Russian ship to get him out of the country. As an undesirable alien, he was placed in
the New Bilibid Prison. But5 years, still no Russian ship or plane wants to take him out of the Phil. He
went to the SC and said “My continued detention viola.tes my rights under the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.” SC said “You have to release him because his right was violated”. That what is
now cited by Alberto wherein bail is allowed therefore he can also be allowed to bail in his case of
extradition. (Bail is a matter of right in extradition cases)

SC: That’s wrong. SC provides some requisite before we could allow a person who was in
detention for extradition cases to put up bail. That person must comply with the two requisites:
1. He must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk.
2. He must promise to the court that he will comply or obey the writs and practices of the
extradite court.

 Three kinds of evidences:

1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt - almost 100% of certainty
2. Preponderance of evidence – need substantial evidence
3. Clear and convincing evidence – it is an evidence more than preponderance of evidence
but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt
  DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

RIGHTS WHEN IN COURT FACING A CRIMINAL CASE: (11 rights)

1. RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

 PEOPLE VS. TERROBIAS (103 SCRA 321)

He was charged of rape. Monday, Terrobias was arraigned. Tuesday, rape victim testified.
Wednesday, the doctor examined her private organ and testified. Thursday, the accused terrobias
testified. Friday, His corroborating witness supporting his alibi testified. Next Monday, the Judge
promulgated a decision convicting him and sentenced him to Reclusion Perpetua. He went to the SC
and said his right to due process was violated. What the Judge did was not speedy trial but speedy
conviction. He was so fast in deciding the case and there are no transcript yet of the testimonies of
the witnesses and yet he was able to decide the case. Under the Constitution, he has 90 days to
decide but he decide it in 2 days. Was his right to due process violated?

SC: Re: Requisites provided in the case of “Espanol vs. Palanca”. All four requisites are present.
Therefore, there was no violation of the right to due process.

2. THE RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT

Rule: “The accused is entitled nothing less than the call neutrality of an impartial judge.” He should
not be allowed to make decisions until he was able to hear all evidences. There shall be no pre-
judgment.

CASES:
 ALEJANDRO VS PEPITO (96 SCRA 322)
He was charged of homicide. During pre-trial he was asked by the judge, “What is your defense? Self
Defense. Since you admitted having committed the crime, you present your evidence first, evidence
of self defense, if “m convinced, I will immediately acquit you to shorten the proceedings. Anyway
you have already admitted having committed it subject to self defense. He refused. Can the accused
be compelled to present his evidence first?

SC: It violates the right to be presumed innocent. Under the Rules of Evidence, in criminal cases: the
prosecution shall present its evidence, the accused will present his evidence, the prosecution shall
present rebuttal of evidence, the accused shall present sub-rebuttal evidence if it so desired. The
 Constitution presumed that you are innocent. If you are required to present your evidence first, you
are presumed guilty and you have to testify in order to prove your innocence. Rule 119: Demurer to
Evidence, after the prosecution presented its evidence, you can file a demurrer to evidence or
motion to dismiss on the ground that the evidence presented was not able to prove your guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. There is no rule that requires the accused to testify.

On July 1, 1985, SC amended the Rules on Criminal procedure and said that if the accused interposes
self defense, the court may reversed the order of trial if the accused consents thereto.

 SACAY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (July 10, 1986)

A police man responded to a ramble. He fired a gun to stop them but they did not stop. When he
went near them, it appears that they are even trying to attack him so he fired at them. In the
Sandiganbayan, he was asked, “What is your defense? Self Defense. Present your evidence first. He
was convicted and he was complaining in the SC citing the case of “Alejandro vs. Pepito”. Was there
violation of his right?

SC: No because he consented thereto.

Three grounds in invoking the right to be presumed innocent entitled to acquittal:

1. Inconsistent testimonies of the witnesses against your client
2. The testimonies are unbelievable and in contrary to common human experience, you are
entitled to acquittal.
3. When the prosecution presents his evidence, before the first witness be asked to testify you
should asked the court that all witnesses for the prosecution shall be sent out of the court
room so that they will not be able to hear the testimony of the witness.

The case of Alejandro vs. Pepito is not applicable inasmuch as the accused in the case at bar did
not object to the procedure followed. In fact in the said Alejandro case, the Court also stated:

"It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Gaoiran, 17 Phil. 404 (l910), relied upon by the
prosecution and the trial Court, the defense has produced its proofs before the prosecution
presented its case, and it was held that no substantial rights of the accused were prejudiced. There
is one radical difference, however, since in that case no objection was entered in the Court below to
the procedure followed in the presentation of proof. In this case, the change in the order of trial
made by respondent Judge was promptly and timely objected to by the defense."

In fact it should be noted that under the newly adopted 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sec.
3e), Rule 119)the said procedure is now expressly sanctioned. Thus:
"However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly."

 AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE (April 30, 2008)

In Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, there is a complaint that Eli Agustin using a 38 calibre revolver robbed a
person in the amount of 500,000 pesos. The police men applied for a search warrant for the 38
calibre revolver to be implemented at the house of Eli Agustin. A search warrant was issued. There
were 5 policemen who implemented the search warrant. They were able to find the 38 Calibre. The
first policeman testifies, SPO4 Baytan. He was asked, “How many policemen went to the house of
 Mr. Agustin?” Five. “How many went inside the room to conduct the search?” Four. “How about the
5th policeman?” he stayed downstairs to look for possible escape of Mr. Agustin. “How many look
for the gun inside the master’s bedroom?” Four. Second witness, PO1 Jara testified, ”How many
witnesses went to implement the search warrant?” Five. “How many went inside the master’s
bedroom to look for the gun?” Three. “How about the two?” They stayed outside downstairs to look
for a possible escape of Mr. Agustin.

SC: Since there was no one to believe, as if there was no evidence you have to acquit the accused.
That is the effect of inconsistent testimonies in connection with the right to be presumed innocent.
You cannot sent to jail a person base on a testimony which is not entitled to believe.

 PEOPLE VS. LOPEZ (74 SCRA 205)

One day when he found out that the parents of Alma were not at their resident, without knocking at
the door he went at the neighbor’s house to the second floor and found out that Alma was just
wearing her panties. He sat beside her and touched her, she did not complain. Then they had sex.
Six months later her tummy is getting bigger. Her father noticed and asked who the culprit is and
she said Lopez. So, Lopez was charged of rape.

SC: Based on presumption of innocence, we cannot believe that. A person whose right was violated
will immediately complain. It should have been with her consent because she never raised a howl
during the first five months.

 PEOPLE VS. QUIASON (78 SCRA 634)

One day Robert Quiason was on board the Baliwag Transit Bus. While the Bus was traversing the
North Express way going to San Jose City, he was awaken because there was a head on his shoulder.
When he looked, a girl was smiling at him and then he started the conversation until they reached
San Jose City in Nueva Ecija and he asked the girl “Can I visit you in your residence? And the girl said
“we just see each other infront of the market in San Jose City tomorrow”. So next day, they met at
the city market Quiaso invited her to their house to have lunch, she agreed. When they arrived at his
house, he introduced her to his parents. After they had lunch, Quiason invited her to his room, she
agreed and they had three sexual intercourse up to 5 o’clock. That was repeated several times, she
was returning there. Until one day when they were at the city market, the woman get away from
him, she ran and Quiason does not know the reason. Later on , she was arrested based on a
complain for rape by the woman. Convicted and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua by the trial court.

SC: That is unbelievable because there was no howl raised during the time that she was raped at
the city market because there are so many people. She never questions. So based on presumption
of innocence, he should be acquitted.

 PEOPLE VS. POBLADOR (76 SCRA 634)

Poblador was a 24 years old bachelor, handsome and a son of a very rich family in Iloilo City. One
night, he and his cousin went to a far flung barangay in Iloilo City to visit a friend. At about 9:30 in
the evening his owner type jitney was not functioning so they knocked at a nearby house and asked
if they could passed the night. The next day, Poblador was arrested because he allegedly raped the
wife while his cousin was pointing the gun in the presence of the husband and in the presence of the
5 children. The fifth child is 4 months old. The woman is 45 years old. Poblador was convicted.

SC: Reversed the decision invoking presumption of innocence because that is highly unbelievable:
 1. If the one who was raped at gun point, the husband was looking at the commission of the rape
why is it that the next morning he was happily asking the neighbours to help his visitors.
2. They could not believe the story of the woman. If it is unbelievable and contrary to common
human experience, presumption of innocence dictates that he should be acquitted.

“ Poblador should not have insulted himself by having sexual intercourse with a woman older than
his mother”.

 PEOPLE VS PAILANO(January 31, 1989)

The accused is 69 years old and the alleged victim is 15 years old and she complained of rape only
after two and a half months.

SC: The accused is entitled to acquittal because of two grounds: Presumption of Innocence and
Presumption of Impotent if the accused is already 69 years old and coupled with the fact that the
complainant reported the alleged rape only after 2 and a half months. It will reduce the credibility of
that complainant because through instantaneous if your right is violated, you must have
immediately complained.

 PEOPLE VS. JOSE (37 SCRA)

Maggie Dela Riva rape case. Maggie was a young actress at the time rape was committed on her.
One early morning at 1:30, while going home her car was blocked by a very big car also and then
she’s “mataray”, she went out from her car then she was taken by the four men and then she was
brought to a hotel in Pasay. At the hotel, she was at first requested to dance naked without music
on top of a table. She refused but she was threatened with an acid on her face while the four men
were sitted watching her. While she was dancing, the 4 accused removed their clothes because
according to them that it was hot. Then they had a “jack and Poy” who will have the first round on
her, Jaime Jose was the lucky one. While raping her the 3 others were holding her thigh, that was
alternately done twice. After she was raped, they brought her back and dropped her in one waiting
shed and gave her 500 pesos for her taxi. When she arrived home, she informed her parent about
him and went directly to her room to clean her private organ. They went to the NBI. The medico-
legal said “negative from spermatozoa”. During trial, their first defense is that based on
presumption of innocence, we are entitled to acquittal because we are charged of allegedly having
sexual intercourse with her 8 times yet the NBI medico legal found not a single trace of
spermatozoa. Their second defense is there is no rape because they were not able to get their
balance of 500 pesos (conflicting defenses). So each one had a chance to have sexual intercourse
with her twice that they were charged of 8 counts of rape. After trial, they were all convicted.

SC: That line of defense was unbelievable. Eight death penalties be imposed to show the gravity of
the crime they committed because the act of one is the act of all. Each of them twice had sexual
intercourse with her so they have to suffer 8 death penalties.

Rule in rape cases: Ejaculation is not a requisite in the penetration. Even if the man will not
ejaculate inside the private organ of the woman.
 CASES ON PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN DRUGS CASES:
Section 21 of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Law): Failure to comply with just one of
the requisite, entitled the accused to acquittal based on his presumption of innocence. They must
be complied because of the gravity of the penalty imposed by the act.
The obligations of the arresting officers under Section 21 of RA 9165:
1. They have to mark the seized prohibited drugs immediately after the search conducted. (not
in the police station)
2. Inventory: During inventory, the people who are required to be present
a. The inventory must be done in the presence of the accused and his lawyer.
b. There must be a representative of the DOJ.
c. There must be a representative of the media.
d. There must be an elected official from the place where the search and seizure was
made.
e. There must be pictures taken to show that these people are indeed present during the
inventory.

CASES:
 BONDAD VS. PEOPLE (December 10, 2008)
Bondad was caught selling shabu, several grams of shabu, convicted by the RTC. He was acquitted
by the SC. Their defense was there were no pictures during the inventory. He has to be acquitted.

Clearly then, the apprehending police officers failed to comply with the above-quoted provision of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

People v. Pringas holds, however:

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there
is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-
compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. (Citation omitted, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The Court’s pronouncement in Pringas is based on the provision of Section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, viz:

x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, by PO2 Dano’s claim, he immediately marked the seized items which were
brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. By his admission, however, he did not conduct
 an inventory of the items seized. Worse, no photograph of the items was taken. There was thus
failure to faithfully follow the requirements of the law.

Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, the defense in the present case questioned early on, during the
cross examination of PO2 Dano, the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the
inventory and photographing requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, despite PO2 Dano’s
awareness of such requirements.
IN FINE, as the failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the
identity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against
appellant, his acquittal is in order.

 PEOPLE VS. KIMURA AND KIZAKI (April 27, 2004)

A case that deals with the failure of the police man to affix their signature just after the buy bus
operation had taken place. They said that at the place where the buy bus operation took place, it
was done so they just affixed their signature when they reach the police station.

SC: That is not enough excuse. That does violate section 21 and the right to be presumed innocent
on the part of the accused. And therefore he is entitled to acquittal.

 PEOPLE VS. PAJARIN (January 12, 2011)

They did not sign at the place where the search warrant was made. Results to acquittal.

 PEOPLE VS. LORENZO (April 23, 2010)

There is no picture taken. Result to acquittal.

 PEOPLE VS. SAPIA ANDONGAN (June 29, 2010)

Sapia is allegedly caught selling shabu at the corner of Carlos Street and Taft avenue in Manila, near
la sale. Manila police plan an entrapment operation to buy one sachet of shabu for 500 pesos. They
were able allegedly to conduct a buy-bus operation, one sachet of shabu was taken or were sold to
them by Sapia and paid 500 pesos. After that, they arrested her and freeze her for more shabu.
Sapia said that shabu was planted. Two version: She is an allegedly big time shabu dealer while
according to her that was planted.
SC: The one which is Constitutional in nature, that is the constitutional presumption of innocence. It
is unbelievable that a person who is actually selling big time yet she only have one sachet of shabu
and it is contrary to common human experience. We cannot believe that.

 PEOPLE vs DE GUZMAN
De Guzman elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on Petition for Review after the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that the police
officers complied with the mandatory procedures under R.A. No. 9165. In particular, he points to
the fact that the seized items were not marked immediately after his arrest; that the police officers
failed to make an inventory of the seized items in his presence or in the presence of his counsel and
of a representative from the media and from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and that no
photographs were taken of the seized items and of appellant. Appellant also claims that the
unbroken chain of custody of the evidence was not established. Further, appellant contends that the
failure of the police officers to enter the buy-bust operation in the police blotter before the said
 operation, the lack of coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and the
failure to observe the requirements of R.A. No. 9165 have effectively overturned the presumption
of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ duties.

SC: Presumption of innocence prevails over the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties of the police authorities and Presumption of innocence resulting in acquittal as a
result on conflicting and inconsistent testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses:
Non-compliance of Section 21, Republic Act No. 9165, violates the presumption of innocence on the
part of the accused and therefore, he should be acquitted.

 PEOPLE vs OMIBRANIS
Appellant interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals in which he reiterated that the
prosecution was unable to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt in view of the failure to
establish the chain of custody of the illegal drugs and that it was likewise unable to establish the
consummation of the alleged sale of drugs.
Velasco, the leader of the raiding team, himself admitted that as soon as appellant was arrested,
Cinco had taken custody of the plastic sachet of shabu, placed it in his pocket and brought the same
together with appellant to the police station. It was at the police station—and not at the place
where the item was seized from appellant—where according to him (Velasco), Cinco had placed the
initials “SOO” on the specimen. Velasco never even mentioned that the identifying mark on the
specimen was placed in appellant’s presence; he could not even remember whether or not the
specimen had been properly inventoried and photographed at least in appellant’s presence. Even
more telling is the fact that, as elicited from Velasco himself during his cross-examination, no
evidence custodian had been designated by the raiding team to safeguard the identity and integrity
of the evidence supposedly seized from appellant.
Reasonable safeguards are provided for in our drugs laws to protect the identity and integrity of
narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders. Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165 materially requires the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs to, [1] immediately after seizure and confiscation, [2] physically inventory and [3]
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who [4] shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The same requirements are also found in
Section 2 of its implementing rules as well as in Section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 1, series of 2002.
These guidelines, however, were not shown to have been complied with by the members of the
buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply
with the statutory requirements in handling the evidence.

 MALILIN vs PEOPLE
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the
sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with
the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the
identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated
sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly handed
over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court to
establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind
 might then ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very
same objects laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence?
The prosecution’s evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it was
Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm
whether the exhibits were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure
and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who could
have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the items
from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her possession until before she
delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in
the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind
reliance by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct
of police duty is manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just that—a mere
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be
regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the
present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from
petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under
police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.

 PEOPLE vs CERVANTES
In this case, no physical inventory was made and no photograph taken nor markings made on the
seized articles at the crime scene.
SC: If the inculpatory testimony is capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the
innocence of the accused persons and the other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

But even if we were to cast aside the foregoing equipoise rule, a reversal of the appealed decision is
indicated on another but more compelling ground. We refer to the postulate that the prosecution,
having failed to positively and convincingly prove the identity of the seized regulated substance, is
deemed to have also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant’s guilt.
Just as clear is the fact that the exacting chain of custody rule was not observed. Withal, there is
no reasonable assurance that no tampering or substitution occurred between the time the police
seized the black bag in P. Ocampo St. in Manila until its contents were tested in the laboratory of the
PNP R-IV headquarters in Canlubang, Laguna. In net effect, a heavy cloud of doubt hangs over the
integrity and necessarily the evidentiary value of the seized items. The prosecution cannot, thus,
rightfully assert that the six sachets seized from Arguson were the very same objects tested by C/I
Geronimo and offered in court in proving the corpus delicti.
Adding a negative dimension to the prosecution’s case is the non-presentation of C/I Geronimo
and the presentation in her stead of Inspector Tria to testify on the chemical report C/I Geronimo
prepared. While Inspector Tria can plausibly testify on the fact that C/I Geronimo prepared the
chemical report in the regular course of her duties, she, Inspector Tria, was incompetent to state that
the specimen her former colleague analyzed was in fact shabu and was the same specimen delivered
to the laboratory for chemical analysis.

 “Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals x x x from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory
to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
 seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the
seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody [was] made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

 In People v. Bandang, has held that the non-presentation of the forensic chemist in illegal drug
cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. In it, the accused persons were convicted of illegal sale of
shabu even if the forensic chemist who prepared the corresponding laboratory report was not
presented.

 But a final consideration. The Court is cognizant of the campaign of the police and other drug
enforcement agencies against the growing drug menace in the country. Unfortunately, their best
efforts, particularly successful honest-to-goodness buy-bust operations, sometimes still end up in
the acquittal of illegal drug manufacturers, distributors, pushers and/or lesser players, even when
nabbed in flagrante, simply because drug enforcement operatives tend to compromise the integrity
and evidentiary worth of the seized illegal items. This aberration is oftentimes in turn attributable to
the unfamiliarity of police operatives of extant rules and procedures governing the custody, control,
and handling of seized drugs. This is, thus, an opportune time to remind all concerned about these
rules and procedures and the guiding jurisprudence. And to put things in the proper perspective,
non-compliance with the legal prescriptions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, is, as we
made abundantly clear in People v. Sanchez, not necessarily fatal to the prosecution of drug-related
cases; that police procedures may still have some lapses. These lapses, however, must be
recognized, addressed, and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.

To be forewarned is to be forearmed. (PEOPLE VS CERVANTES)

 PEOPLE VS. MALBOG (October 13, 2000)

A rape case in Dagupan City. Salvador Badilla was a young police man from Pozorobio, Pangasinan,
21 years old. His girlfriend Stella, daughter of a very rich Chinese businessman. One morning
(January 20, 1990), Stella boarded the Fernandez bus line and later Bandilla boarded also then they
alighted in Dagupan City in front of the PNB Branch facing the City hall. When they arrived there,
Salvador said “Date na lang tayo” so Stella replied “date tayo pero angamoy galawan” because
according to her she will have her monthly physical examination at school. They went to Innawa
Lodge in Calasiao, Pangasinan. They make love then Salvador kept his promise not to have sex with
her. But her skirt was stained with sperm. So, Salvador went to Dagupan to buy a dress and took him
45 minutes but when he was waiting for a ride, he was arrested by Pozorobio Police because he
allegedly raped Stella. He was charged of rape together with the driver forcible abduction with rape.

SC: Accused is entitled to acquittal based on presumption of innocence, because if Stella was raped
she must have taken the earliest time to get out of the lodge not to wait for Salvador to return.
Stella was more interested on her looks. Therefore, there was no rape done because she is a willing
participant. SC cited a phrase “It is better to acquit ten accused who are found guilty of the crime
being charged of than to convict one who would be innocent of the crime he was charged of”.

 PEOPLE VS. SATURNO (355 SCRA 578)

 Saturno was charged of allegedly killing four men. One midnight four men were drinking at their
yard and suddenly a man appeared and shot of all them to death. The witness is the wife of one of
the victim who owns the house. Police men arrived and asked her “Were you be able to identify the
gunman?” No. After she was able to get a lawyer, she now executes an affidavit saying that it was
Saturno who fired the gun at her husband and his drinking companions. Is that believable? Saturno
was known to her because they are neighbors.

SC: That is unbelievable because when she was asked after the shooting incident, she said that she
does not know who fired the gun.

 THE EQUIPOSE RULE

If the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence
tilts the scale of justice in favor of the accused and he should be acquitted from the crime charged.
Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction
because of the accused’s constitutional presumption of innocence.(PEOPLE VS. DE LOS SANTOS, 355
SCRA 415)

CASES:
 PEOPLE VS. DELOS SANTOS (355 SCRA 415)
Fun run case,more than 100 men applying for the PNP that as part of their training they were
required to jog from Bukidnon up to Cagayan De Oro City. It was raining, and at about 3 o’clock in
the morning they were bumped by an elf truck driven by Delos Santos, 12 died and more than 20
seriously injured. He was charged of murder using a motor vehicle and was convicted by the trial
court. In the SC, he does not question the fact that he caused the death of the victims but based on
the Constitutional presumption of innocence, there are two kinds of crime he must have been
possibly committed: murder with the use of motor vehicle or reckless imprudence resulting to
multiple homicide. Based on that presumption of evidence, which of the two, the graver one or the
minor one.

SC: The minor one of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide. He caused the death of
the victim but you cannot say that it was intentional. Presumption of innocence entails that instead
of murder it should be the lesser grave felony.

 DUMLAO VS. COMELEC, supra

During martial law COMELEC enacted a law saying that if a person is facing a criminal case in court
whose penalty of 6 years and 1 day or more, you are not allowed to file your certificate of candidacy
for any local or national elective position. Valid?

SC: Based on presumption of innocence, you could be charged of so many cases but you could be
acquitted. In this case, the presumption of innocence dictates that you should be allowed to run.

 LEJANO VS. PEOPLE &PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ( December 14, 2010)
 Visconde Massacre case. At June 30, 1991, Hubert and Carmela had an agreement to see each other
where she will just open the door at the kitchen where Hubert will pass. But the evidence shows
that the window at the kitchen was broken as the point of entry of those who killed the Visconde’s.
Is it believable? Then Jessica Amparo makes his statement 5 years later after two sets of accused
were already acquitted.

SC: Unbelievable. Jessica’s credibility was damaged when he only makes her statement 5 years
after.
The only basis for acquittal is the presumption of evidence based on inconsistency of testimony of
the alleged eye witness and the testimony is contrary to common human experience.

 PEOPLE VS. OPIDA (June 13, 1986)

In connection of the presumption of innocence, It is the Judge who conducted the cross
examination.

3. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
“The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of
an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with
the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company”..

CASES:
 HILARIO vs PEOPLE
Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on him for the
latter's defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary relationship between
counsel-client and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced; that this breach of trust cannot
easily be concocted in this situation considering that it was a counsel de oficio, a lawyer from PAO,
who broke the fiduciary relationship; that the assailed CA Resolutions both harped on technicalities
to uphold the dismissal by the RTC of his petition for relief; that reliance on technicalities to the
prejudice of petitioner who is serving 14 years imprisonment for a crime he did not commit is an
affront to the policy promulgated by this Court that dismissal purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon especially if it will result to unfairness; and that it would have been for the best
interest of justice for the CA to have directed the petitioner to complete the records instead of
dismissing the petition outright.

SC: A litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected to know the rules of procedure. In fact, even the
most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. We have held in a civil case that to
demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would
turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his
property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to
establish such right.. This finds application specially if the liberty of a person is at stake. As we held
in Telan v. Court of Appeals:

“The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, especially so when as a
consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.”
 In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is
immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment
had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity
to be heard by himself and counsel.
Even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused
afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.

 BARNES vs PADILLA
While as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within the
15-day reglementary period fixed by law rendered the resolution final and executory, we have
on some occasions relaxed this rule. Thus, in Barnes v. Padilla we held:

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.

 CASTRO V. COURT OF APPEALS

An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are advised to proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every party-
litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. While this right is statutory, once it is
granted by law, however, its suppression would be a violation of due process, a right
guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the importance of finding out whether petitioner's loss
of the right to appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at all attributed to
petitioner.

 DELGADO VS. CA (145 SCRA 357)

The Accused(Emma Delgado) was assisted by Atty. Ico. It turned out that he is not a lawyer.
Therefore the conviction must be nullified and we have to have a new trial because from beginning
to end she was represented by a non lawyer.

 CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE (February 12, 2009)

During the first half of the trial when the prosecution presented its evidence. Consulta was
represented by Atty. Jocelyn Reyes. It turned out that there is no such Atty. Jocelyn Reyes. So when
he presented his evidence, he is now presented by a real lawyer and he was still convicted. Went to
SC and invoked the Emma Delgado Doctrine.

SC: No, because the most important part of the trial in a case is when the accused is given the
opportunity to be heard that is when he testify. When he testify he must be represented by a
lawyer. You should be represented by a lawyer when you testify but you should not be allowed to
complain now.

 PEOPLE VS. NADERA (324 SCRA 490)

 Nadera was charged with incestuous rape of his daughter Mylene. During trial, Mylene testified and
she described how she was raped by her father. After that, the judge asked the lawyer of the
accused for cross examination and he said “No-cross your honor”. The younger sister testify and said
“I saw and I felt the hand of my father when he is on top of my sister”. “Judge asked the lawyer of
accused for cross examination and he said “No cross your honor”. It is now the turn of the accused
to present his evidence but when the judge asked the lawyer he said “No evidence to present your
honor. We are submitting the case your honor, I will no longer present evidence in favor of the
accused.”

SC: Castigated the lawyer because he violated his oath as a lawyer for believing that the accused is
guilty. The Obligation of the lawyers regardless of the opinion that your client is guilty is that you
have to give the best defense possible not necessarily to acquit him because the evidence of guilt is
strong but to have the best possible defenses and the most number of mitigating circumstances you
could get. Therefore, the accused will naturally be convicted.

 PEOPLE VS. YAMBOT

In this case, the non-appearance of counsel for the accused on the scheduled hearing was not
construed as waiver by the accused of his right to present evidence for his defense. Denial of due
process can be successfully invoked where no valid waiver of rights had been made as in this case.

In another case, the accused-appellant validly waived his right to present evidence. This is in
consonance with the doctrine that everyone has a right to waive the advantage of a law or rule
made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be
dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the
community at large.

4. RIGHT TO BE PRESENT DURING TRIAL

Absolute right. No one can compel anyone to be present every time there is a trial of his case.
He must have to be present.
If you do not want to be there at the trial: (1) Inform the court that you are waiving your right
to be present and (2) you must state to the court that whenever your name is mentioned by
many witnesses, you admit that he/she is referring to you.

CASES:
 AQUINO VS. MILITARY COMMISSION (63 SCRA 546)
During Martial Law, Ninoy Aquino was arrested charged by Marcos of allegedly planning to
assassinate him. Ninoy said, “I will not want to appear, I will not dignify the accusation, I do not want
to participate in a “Moro-moro”. Can he be induced to attend?

SC: No because in criminal cases the accused must be identified. There can be never a conviction
without identification.

His right to be present is absolute but if he does not want because he feels that he would be
embarrass in court if he will be identified. The SC provides:
 How to escape the embarrassment of being pointed to by the witnesses in court (waiving right to
be present) :
1. Inform the court that you are waiving your right to be present.
2. You must state to the court that whenever your name is mentioned by many witnesses, you
admit that he/she is referring to you.

 INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE PAMINTUAN (403 SCRA)

The client of Atty. Agranzamendez just bailed and during the promulgation, Judge Pamintuan asked
the Dean to stand. So, he was made to stand while the clerk of court read the 33 page decision for
almost an hour. After that, the Dean filed and administrative case with oppression because of the
manner that he was treated.

SC: Pamintuan was found guilty and was sentenced to one year suspension.

 Three Instances that the Accused must be present during the trial:
1. During arraignment – asked the accused whether he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty
2. When the Promulgation shall take place
3. When the accused is to be identified, because no one can be convicted of any crime even if
his name will be mentioned many times by the witnesses unless that person was pointed to
in court as the accused in that case. (Identification is a must in criminal cases)

 PEOPLE VS PRESIDING JUDGE ROMEO BROWNER OF BRANCH 45, RTC, URDANETA PANGASINAN
Murder Case involving Rodolfo Valdez before RTC of Urdaneta. After arraignment, the lawyer of
Valdez said “the accused your honor is waiving his right to be present during the hearing that’s why
next hearing, he will not be here in court anymore” which was immediately granted by Judge
Browner as the acting Judge in Urdaneta. Is that valid?

SC: No because if that is allowed, there is no way that Rodolfo Valdez could be convicted while he
cannot be identified in court. Judge Browner misappreciated “Benigno Aquino Jr. Vs. Military
Commission” there is a second requisite: you have to wait and you must state for record that
whenever your name was mentioned by the witness, you must admit that the witness is referring to
you. In this case, Judge Browner’s order was reversed because if that would be allowed, the accused
can never be identified and therefore he cannot be convicted.

5. RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL - In the reverse manner: that right is violated when there is delay.

 What kind of delay must accompany the trial in order that you can validly invoke the right to
speedy trial?
-Vexatious, Capricious and Oppressive Delay.
- If there is vexatious, capricious or oppressive delay, you move for the dismissal of the case
base on speedy trial and the dismissal is equivalent to acquittal, it could not be reinstated
anymore even if the grounds are the fiscal could not locate his witnesses after it was dismissed,
he found it and his name stated. That cannot be because double jeopardy will set in.
 When can we say that the delay is vexatious, capricious or oppressive?

CASES:
 BERNAT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Bernard is a high ranking government official, charged of graft and corruption in 1990 before the
Sandiganbayan. In 1992, the prosecution completed the presentation of evidence against him. He
also presented his evidence and completed it also. By August 1994, the case was submitted for
decision. Sandiganbayan as a trial court should have decided the case within 90 days. At the end of
November, no Decision. 1995 to 2001, no decision. In March of 2002, He received a notice of
promulgation. He went to the Supreme Court to stop the promulgation because his right to speedy
trial was violated, there was vexatious, capricious and or oppressive delay.

SC: In order that you have vexatious, capricious, and or oppressive delays, it must comply with the
four requisites:
1. Length of the delay – 8 years is so long
2. Reason or reasons for the delay – there was valid reason: they checked the records that it
was assigned to 1st justice but he died, it was assigned to 2nd justice but before he could
decide it he retired, assigned to 3rd justice but was promoted to the SC, a court justice was
assigned but he died, then the last is justice Estrada and was able to decide the case in 90
days.
3. Assertion or failure to assert the right to speedy trial – Bernard never asserted his right
meaning he waived to invoke his right to speedy trial.
4. Prejudice caused by the delay – he was not prejudiced because he was enjoying as Mayor for
the last 10 years.

There was no vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delay. You cannot quantify violation of
your right to speedy trial by simply looking on number of days, months or years. The 4
requisites must be complied with.

 Under 1973 Constitution, we only have the right to speedy trial we do not have the right to
speedy disposition of cases before the court and quasi-administrative bodies and quasi-judicial
bodies. Under 1973 Constitution, even if your case had been delayed for so many years but
there is no arraignment yet, there is no violation of your right to speedy trial because trial will
start only after arraignment(start counting after arraignment). But now, even without
arraignment you can invoke your right to speedy disposition of cases:

 As held in the case of DE LA PENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, certain factors shall be considered and
balanced to determine if there is delay, as follows:

 Length of the delay;

 Reasons for the delay;
 Assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
 Prejudiced caused by the delay.
 There is no violation of the right to speedy disposition of his case because petitioner failed to assert
his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. During the 8-year period prior to April 19,
2002, petitioner did not complain about the long delay in deciding his case.

 CORPUZ vs SANDIGANBAYAN
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the
courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial
and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such
right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term
and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

 DANTE TAN vs PEOPLE

Petitioner’s objection to the prosecution’s stand that he gave an implied consent to the separate
trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case. No objection was interposed
by his defense counsel when this matter was discussed during the initial hearing. Petitioner’s
conformity thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the
prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No.
119831-119832. His failure to object to the prosecution’s manifestation that the cases be tried
separately is fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of counsel bind his client, except
only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice. In fact, petitioner’s acquiescence is
evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial presentation of the People’s
evidence in the five BW cases on 27 February 2001

SC: As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830 has
prejudiced petitioner because the witnesses for the defense may no longer be available at this time,
suffice it to say that the burden of proving his guilt rests upon the prosecution. Should the
prosecution fail for any reason to present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, petitioner will be acquitted. It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the
prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.

In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his failure to
invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the
constitutional guarantee. More importantly, in failing to interpose a timely objection to the
prosecution’s manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried separately, one
after the other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto.

For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the
prosecution is guilty of violating petitioner’s right to speedy trial. Grave abuse of discretion defies
exact definition, but generally refers to “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” Any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a
criminal case is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is true in the instant case.

JURISPRUDENCE USED IN DANTE vs TAN (That the right to speedy trial is not vilated)
 In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy
trial and speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the
frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations
in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in
changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting
agencies. The Court also considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack
of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.

In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, the complexity of the issues and the failure of the
accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat for her
claim to the constitutional guarantee.

In Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration’s Administrator, the Court,

considering also the complexity of the cases and the conduct of the parties’ lawyers, held that
the right to speedy disposition was not violated therein.

 TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (159 SCRA 70)

Tatad is the youngest member of Cabinet at the time of Aguinaldo. At 30 he was a secretary of
Public Information during the time of Pres. Marcos. He was the man who read to the Shock nation of
the evening of Sept. 21, 1972 proclamation 1081declaring Martial Law. He was the favorite boy of
Marcos until he contradicts Marcos and Marcos filed several graft cases against him. But for 5 years,
no resolution by the Ombudsman. After 5 years, the case was filed with the Sandiganbayan. Tatad
was supposed to be arrested, he went to the SC and asked the SC to dismiss the case because the
investigation to determine probable cause, too long that his right to speedy disposition of his cases
was violated. Correct?

SC: Correct. Dismiss the case. Even if there is overwhelming evidence against you but if there is
delay in the case, violation of right to speedy disposition of cases was violated.

 DUTERTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (289 SCRA 721)

Mayor Duterte of Davao had the City Hall of Davao City computerized but he did not follow the
procedure under RA 9184 (Public Bidding). He just purchased computers directly for several millions.
He was charged of graft and corruption on February 18, 1992. February 19, 1992 he submitted his
counter affidavit within 10 days, submitted for resolution. But only on February 22, 1996 that the
Ombudsman filed a case against him. It is now in the Sandiganbayan; he will now be arrested and be
charged. He went to the SC and said “My right to speedy disposition of cases was violated”.

SC: Yes. Dismiss the case. There is incompetence on the part of the Ombudsman.

 ANGCHANGCO VS. OMBUDSMAN (269 SCRA 301)

Angchangco is a sheriff of the NLRC in Davao City. He was enforcing a writ of execution, instead of
collecting several million to the employer he allegedly asked “I will not yet implement this writ, you
will just give me money”. So he was charged criminally and administratively before the office of the
Ombudsman. He was already 63 years old and retired at the age of 65. He never received a single
 centavo of his retirement because he could not submit to the GSIS Ombudsman clearance. At the
age of 67, he went to the SC and asks that the Ombudsman be ordered to dismiss the case because
4 years is a violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases.

SC: Ordered the Ombudsman to dismiss the case.

 ROQUERO VS. CHANCELLOR OF UP MANILA (March 09, 2010)

Charged administratively by the Chancellor of UP Manila. He starts immediately the presentation of
evidence against him by the complainant. The complainant presented evidence against him. The
complainant failed to file his formal offer of evidence for 5 years. He has not even presented his
evidence. You have to close the evidence for the complainant before there is further presentation of
evidence. He also went to SC invoking that his right to speedy disposition of cases was violated.

SC: Dismiss the case. Regardless of the illegal act he committed he will be able to escape because
there is failure on the part of complainant or Chancellor of UP Manila to comply with the
requirement or the rules and therefore there is violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases.

 SUMBANG VS. GEN. COURT MARTIAL

Speedy Disposition of Cases.

(i) The determination of whether an accused had been denied the right to speedy trial depends on
the surrounding circumstances of each case. Although it took about 8 years before the trial of this
case was resumed, such delay did not amount to violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial
considering that such delay was not by attributable to the prosecution.

Factors to consider in determining whether or not such right has been violated:
 length of delay,
 reasons for such delay, and
 assertion or failure to assert such rights by the accused; and
 the prejudice caused by the delay.

(ii) Speedy Trial Act of 1998. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates even after an information has already been filed in court does not present an
irreconcilable conflict with the 30-day period prescribed in Sec. 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.

6. RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL

- Entitled to the Call Neutrality of an Impartial Judge. RULE: The Judge must not only look
impartial but must act impartial.

CASES:
 PEOPLE VS. OPIDA (June 13, 1986)
The judge who conducted the cross-examination instead of the fiscal. He was asking insulting
questions. He even showed his partiality by saying “After ending this questions, do you want me to
dictate the decision now?”
 SC: Justice Cruz said even if the evidence appears to be strong against the accused, we cannot allow
him to stay in jail a minute longer, we are ordering his release from prison.

 IGNACIO MATEO JR. VS. VILLALUZ (90 SCRA 16)

Case involving the Provincial treasurer of Rizal who allegedly malversed about 5M from the treasury
of the Province of Rizal. He was charged of malversation before the circuit criminal court of the Rizal
presided by Judge Villaluz. During trial, the office of the Provincial office of Rizal was burned to the
ground. So the evidence against could not have been located at present. So Judge Villaluz suspended
the hearing of the malversation case but there are witnesses who allegedly saw Ignacio was the one
who burned the capitol. Arson was again filed against him and it went also to the sala of Judge
Villaluz. Arson
case was tried speedily and convicted Ignacio. The Judge said “this salamagan burned the capitol in
order to removed the evidence against him in the malversation case”. Ignacio overlooked in
destroying the evidence by burning the Provincial Office because the evidences have a duplicate and
triplicate copies from other agencies. Two months later, the fiscal filed a petition letter saying “We
can now proceed with the malversation case because we have already secured the duplicate and
triplicate copies”. Villaluz said “OK let’s proceed”. But Ignacio is now adamant saying “No your
honor, even if we proceed it should not be you to try the case because you have already project the
case”. Ignacio went to SC.

SC: Castigated the Judge with his action he can no longer decide the case impartially because of
what he said of burning the capitol to removed the evidences.

 PEOPLE VS.SENDAYDIEGO (81 SCRA 120)

Sendaydiego is the Provincial Treasurer of Pangasinan who also committed exactly the same act as
Ignacio. His case was preliminarily investigated by the CFI, Branch 1 of Pangasinan then found
probable cause to charged him of malversation. They returned it to the fiscal, fiscal decided the
information and it is now in court. There are 4 branches of CFI in Pangasinan, one who tried the case
when they raffled among the 4 branches of CFI to try the case. Sendaydiego said “you cannot be the
one to decide the case because you pre-judge it already. You said there is probable cause”. Is there
violation of the right to impartial trial?

SC: No because what Branch 1 said is base on the probable cause which can be overturned by the
presentation of evidence so you cannot say that he has already pre-judged the case.

SECOND ASPECT of Sendaydiego: What happened was when convicted by the CFI of Pangasinan
while his case was pending before the SC, he died. The case be continued to determine whether he
is guilty or not so that his estate should be liable for the amount that he has stolen from the
government. Only as to the civil aspect not to imprison him because he’s already dead.

 Who are allowed to conduct Physical Investigation during this time? (re: Decemeber 1, 2004 of
Rules on Summary Procedure where only fiscal are allowed)
- Fiscal
- MTC’s
- CFI
 GACAYAN VS. PAMINTUAN (314 SCRA 682)
Noel Sarol was charged of Homicide before RTC 3, Baguio City. The case was then heard by Judge
Costales. Trial proceeded. Fiscal Carrantes presented 7 witnesses but not a single witness testified of
having seen the accused. There was also no circumstantial evidence, so after the offer of evidence.
Atty. Gacayan moved a motion to file demurer to evidence. The Judge said you filed your demurer
of evidence. Judge Carrantes did not oppose because he admit that he was not able to prove the
guilt of the accused. Before Judge Costales had decided the case, Judge Pamintuan arrived and
showed his appointment signed March 9, 1998, last day that the President could appoint.
Pamintuan set the case for hearing and set “What? You filed a demurer of evidence for homicide in
my sala, you want me to acquit your client without him testifying that cannot be done”.One week
later, Atty. Gacayan saw that the 7 witnesses were lined-up before the sala of Pamintuan, there was
no notice to him that there was a hearing, no notice to the fiscal. Pamintuan was trying to convince
the witnesses. Gacayan entered and said that “your honor, it seems that what you’re trying to do is
unprocedural”. Gacayan went to SC.

SC: His act violated the right of the accused to impartial trial because by his very act it is very clear
that he wanted to convict the accused. Aside from that, the procedure he followed is against the law
and therefore he was found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law.

 UP STAFF CASE
This case involves the trial of civilians before military courts who were charged of allegedly
attempting to assassinate Pres. Marcos, members of his family and members of his cabinet.
Similar case to “Benigno Aquino Jr. vs. Military Commission” where SC held that civilians can be tried
by military tribunal even if the complainant was Marcos. It was allowed by SC during Martial law.

SC: Civilians could not be tried by Military Commissions because these military commissions should
only decide cases involving civilians.

 CLAVER VS. SEC. COMMISSION

The complainant was Pres. Ramos and the one trying the case is the military commission created by
the Generals or appointed advocate Judge Generals appointed by Marcos. In this case there is
violation of the right to impartial trial.

SC: Even all cases decided by the military commission, during Martial Law involving civilians, all
decisions involving convictions are automatically vacated because since military commission have no
jurisdiction over civilians, whatever decision, whatever proceedings that took place is void from the
very beginning. Military Commissions do not have jurisdictions over civilians and therefore even
those cases decided during Martial law are automatically considered void and the accused are to be
released from detention.

7. RIGHT TO PUBLIC TRIAL

CASES:
 GARCIA VS.DOMINGO (July 25, 1973)
Manila policemen charged of criminal offenses, during hearing they are not informed because they
are busy manning the traffic in the city of Manila. So the agreement entered into by the prosecution
and their lawyers that they will conduct hearings on Saturday. On Saturday, they had hearings but
not inside the courtroom but on the air conditioned chamber of the judge. There were no people
watching, only their lawyers, court stenographer and the fiscal. That was done for several weeks
until the case was submitted for decision. When the police men received a notice of promulgation of
the decision so they went to SC to stop the promulgation because their right to public trial was
violated and therefore the entire proceeding void. Was their right to public trial violated?

SC: Yes because the hearings took place inside the air conditioned chambers without third persons
watching except only for the prosecution and the defense plus court personnel. No one complain
that he wants to watch the trial and he was not allowed. Therefore, no violation of the right to
public trial. The trial is valid and the court could validly promulgate the decision.

What is meant by public trial?

Chief Justice Fernandez said “public trial is a trial open to the public”.

RULE: As long as there is no one who complains that he wants to watch the proceeding and was
barred from watching it then there is no violation of right to public trial.

 PEOPLE VS. TAMPUS (March 28, 1980)

After stabbing another inmate while they were eating inside the New Bilibid Prison. When he came
out and said “Bumawi lang ako, pinatay nila ang kasama naming”. Since he was already serving
sentence, it was the judge of RTC Muntinlupa together with the fiscal and court personnel who
went inside the Prison and had the trial be held inside. After he was convicted, he raised that his
right to public trial was violated because limited number of people could enter Muntinlupa.(No third
persons who watch the proceeding) Is that violation of the right to public trial?

SC: No because no one came forward and complains that he wanted to watch the proceeding, the
criminal case of Tampu and he/she was prevented from doing so. Since there was no one barred
watching the proceeding, it means that the trial was open to the public.

8. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THE

ACCUSED

CASES:
 PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO (April 8, 2008)
Sometimes on January 1990 up to December 6, 1998 in Barangay Kudon, Municipality of San Andres,
Catanduanes by force intimidation Bernard had sexual intercourse with the complainant “X”
without her consent and they had sexual intercourse once. Bernard was convicted and said “My
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against me was violated because the
 period covered by the information was very long, I cannot intelligently prepare for my defense”.
Was there violation of his right as the result of 8 years period covered by the information?

SC: No violation for two reasons:

1. The date when the rape was committed is not an element in rape cases. (Date and time is not an
element of crime)
2. The fact that the date is too long, The SC said “you have no one to blame but yourself and your
lawyer. (The lawyer should have question the information, he should have asked for the bill of
particulars that before allowing the client to enter a plea you should have asked the
prosecution to tell the exact date otherwise we cannot prepare for an intelligent defense.)

“You slumbered on your right and you awaken too late.” You cannot question that now.

 Any questions regarding the information, you have to raise it before your client enters his plea.

 DELA CRUZ vs PEOPLE

It is true that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. The Constitution uses the word “shall,” hence, the same is mandatory.
A violation of this right prevents the conviction of the accused with the crime charged in the
Information.

The constitutional guaranty has a three-fold purpose:

First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against
a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that
it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction.

 PEOPLE VS. RESAVAGA (159 SCRA 426)

Resavaga was charged of homicide. The title is “People vs Resavaga for Homicide”. He was convicted
and went to SC and said “My right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against
me was violated that the title of my case is for homicide you cannot convict me of murder”. Can he
be convicted of murder?

SC: The caption was homicide but the aggravation of treachery and evident premeditation; if the
fiscal were able to prove those then you can be convicted of murder. There was no violation of his
right because the caption stated in the title is not important. What is important are the material
allegations in the body of the information not the case for violation of sec 5 of RA 9165. In this case,
there were allegations of treachery and intimidation therefore he could be validly convicted of
murder. It was the fault of the lawyer.

 If you are charged of rape, you can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness or seduction.
 Seduction – maybe below 18 years old even if there was consent, you are still liable for
seduction or before the allegation was raised no consent but during the trial it was proven that
 there was consent but since the girl is below 17 the man will still be liable criminally not rape
but seduction because seduction is necessarily included in the crime of rape.
 If you are charged of murder, you can be convicted of homicide because it is a crime necessarily
included in murder.

 KO BU LIN VS. CA (118 SCRA 578)

He was charged of Estafa under Article 315, 1st par., letter C. After trial he was convicted. When he
appealed to the CA, the CA said that Ko Bu Lin is not liable under article 315 – 1 (c), he is liable under
article 315-2 (a). Is there violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations
against him?

SC: No. Not because the information states that for violation of article 315-1( c),that is not
controlling. You have to read the material allegations and it actually charges 315- 2a.

 SALES VS. CA; P VS. CRISOLOGO

The failure of the court to have a sign language expert to inform the accused who is a deaf-mute of
the contents of the criminal information is fatal to the validity of the proceedings because the
accused was denied of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. As such, the entire proceedings is null and void and another trial be conducted in the presence
of a sign language expert to inform the accused of the proceedings.

9. RIGHT TO MEET WITNESSES FACE TO FACE/ RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION/ RIGHT TO CROSS

EXAMINATION
Importance: This is a chance to destroy the testimony or credibility of the witnesses against your client.
CASES:
 PEOPLE VS. VALERO (112 SCRA 661)
A deaf-mute was charged of murder who was allegedly giving poison bread to three small children.
After eating, all the three young children died. The person who allegedly saw Valero gave the poison
bread is no longer in the country. But a neighbor testify who allegedly obtained the information
from the witness, that witness who is no longer in the Phil. Allegedly told him that he saw Valero.
Valero was convicted.

SC: No because that is hearsay. The testimony of the person who has no personal knowledge is
hearsay because how can the accused cross examine the person who allegedly relayed to him the
information. It is unfair, it is unfair to allow hearsay evidence.

 Third kind of Estafa under Article 315: If you steal a part of court record – Estafa, not theft.

 PEOPLE VS. BUNDALIAN (117 SCRA 718)

Bundalian was charged by the late Sen. Gaudencio Antonino of libel for an article published in a
national newspaper. Three days before the election in November 1987, he has not testified in court.
His helicopter crashed, he died. Can the accused asked for the dismissal of the criminal case because
he could no longer confront the private complainant in a libel case?
 SC: No because in a libel case it is not what the private complainant will testify in court. The
evidence to determine whether there was a libel or not is the published item in the newspaper. He
could be convicted of libel even though the late Gaudencio Antonino could not testify but he could
no longer be held liable for moral damages.

 ORTIGAS JR. VS. LUFTHANSA (64 SCRA 610)

Ortigas, a son of a very rich family in Pasig, he was on board of the Lufthansa from Germany to
Manila, Business class. When he reached Bangkok, the Regional manager for operation of Lufthansa
went to him and said “You transfer in the economy”. He said “No, I had business class ticket from
Germany to Manila”. When he returned for the third time and he said “I don’t like”, the Regional
Manager said “I will throw you out of the window. So he ran to the economy section. After returning
to the Phil. He filed a multimillion damage to lufhtan. The only witness for Lufthansa was that man
in Bangkok or the regional manager for Asian Operation of Lufthansa. He was asked to return for his
testimony by the lawyer of Ortigas. He never returned because he was promoted as the Regional
Manager for North America Operations. Two hearings were scheduled, he never returns. His
testimony was stricken out of the record, it was considered hearsay and it should not be taken into
the account of the resolution of the case. Is that correct?

SC: Yes because there was violation of the right to confrontation or the right to cross examination
or the right to meet witnesses face to face insofar as Ortigas is concerned. It is unfair that the
testimony will be stay on the record even though you are not able to cross examine him because if
there is no cross examination as if his testimony will be Gospel truth why you were not able to
question or confront him with any portion of the testimony showing that it is false. No cross
examination, the testimony will be considered hearsay and cannot be used as evidence.

 PEOPLE VS. JUDGE SENERIS (99 SCRA 92)

Case involving a very young woman married to a very old man but very rich businessman. She has a
new boyfriend, she could not wait for the natural death of her husband. So she engaged the services
of a gun man who killed the old husband. She thinks that there was perfect crime, unfortunately the
gun man surrendered and both of them was charged of parricide and murder. It is the gunman who
testified against the woman and then after the direct testimony, Judge Seneris asked the lawyer of
the woman to cross examine so he asked questions jumping from one topic to another. During the
next hearing, when the judge asked the jail warden where is the witness? He was killed early this
morning when trying to escape. She’s now asking for the dismissal of the case citing the Lufthansa
Case because there is violation of her right to confrontation. Is that correct?

SC: No because in Lufthansa, there was complete absence of cross examination. Here, her lawyer
asked questions jumping from one issue to another and when the SC scrutinize the report, her
lawyer asked almost or covered almost all questions in setting price and reward. So she can still be
convicted of parricide but without the aggravating circumstance of price or reward.

 DELA CRUZ VS. PAPA (December 8, 2010)

The witness for the plaintiff insofar as the sale of land which involves of millions was sick. So upon
request by the lawyer of the plaintiff. The sick witness was brought to court. After the direct
 testimony, he was required to return for cross examination but his health deteriorated until he died
without cross examination. What happens to his testimony?

SC: Citing Lufthansa Case, unfortunately we cannot take into consideration his direct testimony; it
will be unfair to the defendant. Even though the non- cross examination was not the fault of the
court, the defendant or the plaintiff it was the failing health of the witness.

10. TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

 Three requisites before trial in absentia should be allowed:
1. That the accused was validly arraigned
2. He was duly notified
3. His absence is unjustifiable

CASES:
 BORJA VS. MENDOZA (77 SCRA 420)
Borja was charged of physical injuries, he was notified for arraignment he did not appear. Second
notice of arraignment, he did not appear. Third notice of arraignment, he did not appear and the
judge allowed the prosecution to present its evidence. After presentation of the evidence, the
accused was again notified. The judge gave the accused the chance to present evidence but he did
not appear. So the judge decided it, he was found guilty. It was appealed but he was found guilty
because the evidence was unrebutted, it was never denied. Is the decision valid?

SC: No because the first requisite was not present, there was no arraignment.

 PEOPLE VS.SALAS, BRANCH 5, RTC OF CEBU CITY (143 SCRA 163)

Four men were accused of murder, no bail recommended. They were all arrested; they were
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. After presentation of evidence by the prosecution, the
judge said “I am allowing you 250,000 pesos each as bail”. The four posted bail. The fiscal
complained and filed a MR saying “Your honor, you review the evidence. The evidence of guilt is
strong insofar as the evidence that I presented” The judge agreed that the evidence of guilt is strong
so he cancelled the bond and a new warrant of arrest was issued against the four. Only three were
arrested, no bail. Trial proceeded, evidence presented and all witnesses pointed to the four. After
trial, the judge decided that the three appears to have committed the crime but rendered decision
as to the three only because trial was not held to the fourth accused. The fourth will be tried again
after his arrest. Was there valid trial in absentia insofar as the fourth accused is concern?

SC: Yes because he was arraigned. In paying bonds, it must be signed with address indicated
therein.
1. Address must be specified.
2. If I will change my address, I will inform the court about it.
3. Since you are presumed notified, your absence is deemed unjustifiable.
In this case, he never changed his address, therefore he is duly notified (Constructive Notice).
He should be included in the conviction of the three accused, the prosecution should not be
required the fiscal to present its evidences all over again after arrest.
11. RIGHT TO SECURE WITNESSES AND PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE

CASES:
 CAVILI VS. HON. FLORENDO ;FAJARDO VS. GARCIA
Rumble cases in Olongapo City. Cavili and Fajardo their opponent were able to file before the fiscal
to who accept and said “I was the aggrieved party, all of my injuries on my body are all at the back, I
was the one who was attacked it’s not the person who filed the complaint”. Unfortunately, the
other person were able to file a case ahead the fiscal’s office. He is now the accused. But during the
trial, he was still to prove that “I was the offended party and that can be proven by the admitting
physician of Olongapo Hospital that my injuries are at the back. Unfortunately, when he requested
for a subpoena for the doctor, the doctor resigned and was already in New York. So he questioned
the court and said that if he will not testify my right to secure witnesses and production of evidence
will be violated. He went to SC. Can you compel the judge to issue a subpoena to a doctor already in
New York? (Writs and processes are only within the four corners of the Philippines) Will his right to
secure evidence violated?

SC: No because the record when you were admitted at the emergency of the Olongapo general
Hospital is still there at the record section of the hospital.

 In criminal cases, even though the witness is 100 kilometers away, you can asked for his presence. In
civil cases, if the witness resides more than 50 kilometers from the court, you cannot forced him
unless you paid your kilometric fee.

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

CASES:
 CHAVEZ VS. CA (24 SCRA 663)
Chavez was charged of serious illegal detention (kidnapping). Prosecution presented the accused as
his witness. He testified and was represented by the fiscal. After the fiscal conducted a direct
examination. There was no cross examination. He was convicted of Reclusion Perpetua. On appeal.

SC: That is not allowed because the court violated his right against self incrimination.
 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. PDEA (November 3, 2008); LASERNA VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

The provision in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act being questioned in the case of Social
Justice and Laserna :

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x
x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x
The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and

tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in
the school’s student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and employees
of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to
undergo a random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to
the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;

xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense
having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one
(1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. PDEA (November 3, 2008)

There is a provision of 9165 allowing the authorities to go to high school and colleges and conduct
random drug testing. Is that violative to the right against self incrimination?

SC: No because even if you are found to be positive of dangerous drug if you are high school or
college student, you will not be charge criminally but that will be a basis for the government to put
you in a rehabilitation center. It is not penal in nature but it will rehabilitate you. That is a way of
protecting the youth.
 LASERNA VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
Provision that if you are arrested of a crime punishable by more than 6 years imprisonment.
9165 provides that you are charged of a crime punishable by more than 6 years imprisonment, the
first thing that the arresting officer will do is to bring you to a drug testing center. And if it turned
out that you are positive of prohibited drugs, they will charge you for violation of 9165. Ex. Arrested
with estafa – 6 yrs. 1 day to 8 yrs. But if the result of the drug test shows that you are a user, you can
be in jail for 12 years for a second crime. Is it a violation to the right of self incrimination?

SC: Definitely it is unconstitutional.

 PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT; PEOPLE VS. CONTINENTE

The essence of this right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion or the giving of
evidence against oneself through a testimonial act. Hence, an accused may be compelled to submit
to physical examination and have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from a disease that was contracted by his victim without violating this
right.

 PIMENTEL VS. COMELEC

There is a provision of 9165 which provides that “Before any candidate could validly file a certificate
of candidacy it must be accompanied by any certification from any national drug testing agency that
is not positive of any prohibited drugs.”

SC: Not allowed because as if you are now adding a sixth qualification except the five under section
3 for senators and section 6 for congressmen. (natural born, able to read and write,.....) If you
imposed the drug testing certificate, you are now adding a sixth one. As if you are already amending
the Constitution.

 GALMAN VS. PAMARAN (138 SCRA 294)

After the murder of Sen. Aquino. Marcos created the Agrava Fact Finding Commission that “No one
is allowed to refuse to testify because there is no criminal case filed against any person yet. Agrava
Fact Finding commission is to determine or to make a recommendation of whom should be
charged. All soldiers involved was made to testify. Based on their testimony, the soldiers were
charged of double murder in connection with the killing of Sen. Aquino and Galman. During the trial,
can the prosecution present the testimonies before the Agrava Fact finding Commission, an
evidence against them? No, because there is an immunity provision in the PD creating the Agrava
fact Finding Commission. The last immunity status found in the Philippines? Immunity status
granting Chavit Singson immunity for prosecution in connection with his association with Pres.
Estrada. The 2 cases filed against Estrada was graft and corruption(collecting jueteng money from
Ilocos Norte) and Plunder (divided the 200M tobacco fund). He now has immunity. Testified to
SandiganBayan. How about if during his testimony in the Plunder and the graft and corruption case,
he had slip of the tongue and says that “in fact, kami rin ni Erap ang nagpapatay kay Dacer at ng
kanyang driver”. Can he be charged of those two murders? Definitely he cannot be charged insofar
as to the graft and corruption and plunder case. But during his testimony in this two criminal case,
he mentioned of a third crime that they committed. Can he be charged?
 SC: It depends what kind of immunity was given to him. If you are given immunity only for plunder
and graft and corruption, you can be charged of a third crime (Transactional immunity). If it is use
immunity, anything under the sun that is covered.
If you are given use immunity, all crimes you will be free from or immune from prosecution. If
transactional, you are only secure or immune insofar as the crime specifically mentioned in the
immunity clause.

 TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY:

1. Use immunity – broader than transactional immunity
2. Transactional immunity

 VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS (41 PHIL 62)

A case where the wife was found out by the husband as already pregnant and that the neighbor is
the culprit. He charged them of adultery. So the best evidence to show that she committed adultery
is that she is already pregnant. So he asked the court to issue an order requiring her to undergo
pregnancy test to give a sample of her urine. The wife objected saying “If I will give a sample of my
urine and then after examination be found out that I am pregnant, as if I was the one who gave the
evidence against me. That is violative of my right against self incrimination.

SC: The right against self-incrimination maybe invoke only when it involves Testimonial
Compulsion. Not all compulsion applies on a person against the right to self incrimination. The
compulsion must be testimonial. You must be required to talk and your verbal answer will turn out
to be the evidence against you.

 BELTRAN VS. SAMSON (50 PHIL 570)

A person was charged of Estafa thru falsification of Public Document because he falsified the
signature of several employees in the Capitol of Nueva Ecija in order to receive their salaries from
the payroll master. During the trial, he was asked to give a sample of his hand writing after he
denied that those handwriting was his because his handwriting was better. So the judge asked him
to take down notes, was given a sheet of paper and a ballpen “Please take this down”. He answered
“No I refused to takedown notes of what you are telling me because I will be furnishing evidence
against me, I will be incriminating myself because you can use it to compare with those handwriting
in the payroll. The judge said “You cannot invoke the right against self incrimination because the SC
held in “Villaflor vs. Summers that the right against self incrimination applies only to testimonial
compulsion. In the case at bar, we do not require you to utter a single word just right it down.

SC: Two instances where you can invoke the right against self incrimination:
1. Testimonial Compulsion
2. Like in Beltran vs. Samson, if the one required of you to be perform is not a mechanical act but
one which involves the use of your intelligence then the right against self incrimination maybe
invoked.

 US VS. TANG TENG (23 PHIL 145)

If you are charged of rape and the victim said after he raped me, I found out that I am now suffering
of Gonorrhea. Can the accused be required to give a sample of his urine to determine whether he is
afflicted of Gonorrhea or not. If the findings of the physician will show that she is really afflicted of
Gonorrhea that will strengthen the testimony of the rape victim. So the accused can be convicted
out of the urine sample that he gave. Using the two tests, no testimonial compulsion and the SC said
 that giving of urine sample is a mechanical act. Therefore his right against self incrimination is not
violated.

 In criminal cases, you cannot present the accused (Absolute – prosecution cannot present the
accused) even just to take the witness stand. In civil and administrative cases, The plaintiff cannot
present the defendant to take the witness stand, he cannot object and cannot refuse to take the
witness stand because under the Rules of Evidence, Rule 132: Leading questions can be asked in the
following instances:
1. When you are presenting the witness who is a child
2. If the witness you are presenting is the adverse party (You can present your opponent in a
civil case as your own witness).
3. Unwilling witness
 While he can refuse to take the witness stand, he can also refuse to answer questions provided it is
very obviously incriminating.

 Does the right against self-incrimination applicable to civil and administrative cases also?

Yes but unlike in criminal cases where the accused could not be presented by the prosecution
and his right not to take the witness stand is absolute, an adverse party in a civil or administrative
cases may be presented by the other party but could refuse to answer only if the question
propounded calls for an incriminatory answer.

 THE RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

SECTION 18: (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted.

 CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR, supra

A Housemaid received her salary for one year and wants to leave her employer and transfer to the
neighbor. Can the employer stop her from doing that? It violates two rights: the right to travel and
right to involuntary servitude.

 ACLARACION VS. GATMAITAN (64 SCRA 131)

This case involves a court stenographer. Today stenographer is the one assigned to take down notes
in all the cases in RTC 5. Ex. There was a criminal case and you was the one who took down
stenographic notes, at the end of the month you will resign from the court and work in a private
sector which give a salary twice your present salary. Later on the judge will asked you “Give me the
stenographic notes that you took down on July 12, 2011. No I already resigned from the court and if
you forced me to do that that will be a violation of my right against involuntary servitude. Correct?

SC: Not correct because that stenographic notes were taken today when you were still and
employee of the court you are paid, your salary today. So it is your obligation to transcribe your
notes. It will not be considered violation of your right to involuntary servitude if you will be forced to
 do that. In this case, the stenographer was cited for contempt she was imprisoned and to be
released only after giving the transcript.

 THE RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

SECTION 19: (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress here after provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner
or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions
shall be dealt with by law.

 Is the death penalty cruel, unusual?

LEO ECHEGARAY VS SEC. OF JUSTICE

- The SC said death penalty or lethal injection is not cruel or unusual, it is the most humane way
of imposing death penalty.

 Is the Death Penalty abolished?

The SC in cases in 1987, 1988, 1989 said it was abolished in the Constitution: [ PEOPLE VS
GAVARRA;
PEOPLE VS. MASANGKAY ; PEOPLE VS ATENCIO ; PEOPLE VS. INTINO].
HOWEVER HELD IN PEOPLE VS. MUNOZ , it was merely suspended.

 Capital offense for murder is reclusion temporal to death. They divided the penalty of
reclusion perpetua (40 years) into 3, even considering the fact that it is indivisible. SC held
that since death penalty was already abolished, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua in
its maximum period.

 Was the Death Penalty abolished?

-No for two reasons:
1. Section 19 , ARTICLE III
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner
or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law

2. Section 5 (2)(a), Article VIII

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
 (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

 PEOPLE VS. ESTOISTA: When is a penalty considered a cruel and unusual?

A penalty is cruel or unusual if it is disproportionate to the crime committed and it shocks the
conscience of the community.

 Imposing a penalty not covered by our laws, considered cruel and unusual.

SECTION 20: No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

 DOUBLE JEOPARDY
SECTION 21: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.

 TWO KINDS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY:

1. No person shall be twice put in double jeopardy for the act he committed.
2. When an act is furnished by a law or an ordinance, the acquittal and conviction shall
either may bar the prosecution on the other.

 REQUISITES OF A DOUBLE JEOPARDY:

1. There must be a valid complaint or information
2. Filed in a court of competent jurisdiction
3. Accused was validly arraigned
4. Accused was:
 Convicted
 acquitted
 Case was dismissed against him without his consent

CASES:
 PEOPLE VS. JUDGE RELOVA (148 SCRA 292)
Happened in Batangas City. The electricians of the Batangas Electric Cooperative caught that
Batangas Ice Plant was using jumper. Board of Directors and members were charged of theft of
electricity. In Batangas City, they have a separate ordinance for theft of electricity. The accused were
arraigned. Before trial could proceed, the judge called the attention of the fiscal and said “Fiscal will
you look at the affidavit complaint or information, they were filed on the 62 days from the time the
act was discovered. The judge dismiss the case because it has prescribed. The fiscal who was
insulted filed another information for theft of electricity based on Article 308 of the RPC against the
accused. They refused to enter a plea. They said that double jeopardy has set in. Correct?
 SC: Yes because when an act is punished by law in an ordinance, acquittal or conviction shall bar the
prosecution in the other. You cannot be charged of the violation of RPC because you were already
acquitted for violation of an ordinance.

 CUDIA VS CA (284 SCRA 173)

Cudia was arrested for an unlicensed firearm in Mabalacat, Pampanga. He was charged of illegal
possession of firearm. Cudia was arrested in mabalacat but the information was signed by the City
Prosecutor of Angeles and it was filed in Pampanga. He was arraigned. Trial proceeded. At the
middle of the trial, the judge discovered that the information was signed by the City Prosecutor of
Angeles and said “Whether you like it or not, I will dismiss the case.” Cudia said “No, I have already
paid my lawyer, they had already conducted trials for several months and then it will be dismissed
and be repeated all over again, I object”. Despite objection of Cudia, RTC Judge of Pampanga dismiss
the case. Now, he invokes double jeopardy when another information was filed signed by the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. He now objects and said Double Jeopardy has set in.

SC: There was no valid complaint or information because the crime was committed in
Mabalacat. The City Prosecutor of Angeles has no jurisdiction or power to sign the
information it should be the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. First requisite was not
present, therefore there is no double jeopardy.

 PEOPLE VS GALANO (75 SCRA 193)

Galano was charged before the CFI of Batangas (RTC). He was arraigned. Trial proceeded when the
private complainant was in the witness stand for cross examination. It was found out that the
elements of Estafa subject of that case took place in Manila. So she is from Batangas, she filed a case
against the accused in Batangas for convenience. So the Judge in Batangas dismissed the case. That
fiscal of Manila filed a new information for Estafa against Galano and filed in the RTC of Manila. Can
he be tried again or can he be validly invoke double jeopardy?

SC: The information was not filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The second requisite
was not present therefore, no double jeopardy.

 PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN (17 SCRA 1119)

Balisacan was charged of Homicide. When he was arraigned, he entered a plea of guilty and asked
for chance to present his evidence of incomplete self defense. Can he be allowed to present his
evidence first? Yes because we can reverse the order of trial if the accused consents thereto. After
presenting his defense, the judge said “your evidence is a complete self defense, I am not acquitting
you, you are free.” The people of the Philippines complained that they want to present their
evidence and the accused said double jeopardy set in the moment that the court says that’s the end.
Can the case be reinstated or has double jeopardy set in?

SC: There was no valid arraignment and therefore you can try the case all over again. The
accused should have been re-arraigned, when the evidence shows that there was complete
self defense he should have shown to be re-arraigned so that he should have entered the
plea of not guilty. Double jeopardy has not set in.

 PEOPLE VS. CITY COURT OF SILAY (74 SCRA 247)

 A was charged of grave coercion in the City of Silay.He was arraigned, he entered a plea of not
guilty. Before the prosecution could present evidence, They call the fiscal and said “fiscal will you
look on your BP 129: Grave coercion should be filed before the RTC. So the fiscal moved for the
dismissal of the case so that he can file a new information of grave coercion against A in the RTC of
Silay. Based on the motion of the fiscal, it was dismissed. Second Case: People vs A for grave
coercion before the RTC odf Silay. A was again brought to the RTC. At the RTC, the RTC judge said to
the fiscal “Fiscal will you read this one, there is a new decision of the SC clarifying BP 129: grave
coercion cases should be filed before the MTC. The RTC judge dismisses again the case for grave
coercion. So the fiscal now file “People vs A” criminal case #3 for grave coercion with the MTC. MTC
said arraigned the accused, but the accused said “Your honor you cannot do that, double jeopardy
has set in. Correct?

SC: All the requisites are present. You cannot charge him again of grave coercion.

 PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL and PEOPLE VS. LEVISTE

The SC reversed the dismissal of the criminal case by the trial court based on “speedy trial” since
the same was not predicated “on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial.” It is only when there
is a clear violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial that the dismissal results in double jeopardy.

 JOSEPH SERESO VS PEOPLE

Joseph is a private complainant in a case of libel filed against A,B & C before the RTC of QC. They
were arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. They filed a motion for re-investigation and re –
evaluation of the evidence on the part of the fiscal. The RTC judge gave the prosecutor’s office 30
days to re-investigate. After 30 days, the QC fiscal’s office submitted the resolution saying “We
found no probable cause and joined the motion to dismiss of the accused. The court dismiss the
case. He appealed the resolution of the City prosecutor of QC to the Sec. of Justice because he is the
immediate superior of the city prosecutor. The sec. of justice reversed and said “there is probable
cause, you return the case to the RTC, Quezon City. The case was return to RTC, they are called for
trial but they said you cannot do that because double jeopardy has set in. The judge said no double
jeopardy. Went to CA and CA said there is double jeopardy. Private complainant went to SC insisting
that there is no double jeopardy.

SC: The four requisites are not present therefore double jeopardy has not set in.

 IVLER VS JUDGE EDRO

Ivler was driving recklessly, bumped the pajero of deputy executive secretary who died but the wife
suffered only minor physical injuries. Two information was filed: reckless imprudence resulting to
slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and damage of property. He
was arraigned and entered a plea of guilty. The penalty imposed was reprimand. The judge said
arraigned him for the second case then Ivler said “you cannot do that your honor, double jeopardy
has set in. Ivler went to SC.

SC: Ivler is correct. In cases involving reckless imprudence, you cannot divide these into
several cases because it was based on the single act so it has to be complex. You can
 complex a crime only if it involves grave or less grave and which was done with intent not
with mala in se or mala prohibita.

 PEOPLE vs MOLERO
Molero was charged for having raped his daughter. The original complaint was dated March 22,
1977, the complainant charged Molero of having raped her on the "13th day of February 1976".
Molero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty". The Fiscal filed a motion for leave to amend the
complaint. The motion was granted but was subsequently reconsidered. The lower court in its order
dismissed the original complaint, but ordered the Fiscal to cause the filing of a new complaint
charging the proper offense of rape committed on or before February 5, 1976. A new complaint was
therefore filed dated March 30, 1978
Molero claims that the new complaint places him in double jeopardy.

SC: There is no double jeopardy.

a. Dismissal of the first case contemplated by the rule against double jeopardy presupposes a
definite and unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.(Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452; People vs.
Manlapas, 5 SCRA 883; People vs. Mogol, 131 SCRA 296) and "for dismissal to be a bar under the
jeopardy clause of the Constitution, it must have the effect of acquittal.(People vs. Agoncillo, 40 SCRA
579);
b. It is quite clear that the order of the trial court dismissal the original complaint was without
prejudice to the filing of a new complaint and/or information charging Molero with the proper
offense. The said dismissal did not therefore amount to an acquittal.
c. In fact there was no need for the trial court to have adopted such a cumbersome procedure.
It could have merely ordered an amendment of the complaint. Sec. 12, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Court applies.

d. The precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of the offense of
rape. The amendment of the complaint changing the date of the commission of the crime of rape
from February 13, 1976 to February 5, 1976 , a difference of 8 days was only a matter of form under
the facts of this case and did not prejudice the rights of the accused.
e. The reliance of the accused on the case of People vs. Opemia, 98 Phil. 698 is not well-taken.
In the said case the proposed amendment was the changing of the date of the commission of the
crime from June 18, 1952 to July 1947, or a difference of 5 years. The S.C. held that the amendment
that would change the date of the commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a
matter of form.
f. The dismissal of the first complaint did not amount to the appellant's acquittal. In effect, the
order of dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. (People vs.
Bocar, 138 SCRA 166)

 PEOPLE VS. HON. VELASCO,

May the government appeal a judgment of acquittal or for the increase of the penalty
imposed?

No.As mandated by the Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court of a judgment
of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding
of mistrial, as in Galman vs. Sandiganbayan.
 PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO
Appellant Jesus Domingo assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April 2008 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 30511, modifying the Decision dated 13 November 2006 of Branch 13 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, attempted murder and frustrated murder in several cases.
On 7 September 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, was arraigned and he entered
separate pleas of “Not Guilty” to the crimes charged. Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held, and
trial ensued accordingly.
The accused was convicted of Homicide, instead of Murder. On Appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the CA held that the crime proven by the prosecution is Murder and therefore increased the penalty
from Homicide to Murder.

May the appellate court of the Supreme Court increase the penalty imposed by the trial court
on appeal by the accused? Yes.
Is increase in the penalty valid?

SC: Yes because it was the accused who interposed the appeal making the court review the
evidence. And it finds the evidence sufficient for conviction of the crime of Murder, it could increase
the penalty.

 GALMAN vs PAMARAN
This case is about the assassination of Sen. Aquni and Galman. There were 11 accused. They were
acquitted. During Cory Aquino’s administration, the case was reopened charging again the 11
acquitted on the same offense. The accused defense was double jeopardy.

SC: There is no double jeopardy because it was not filed in a court with competent jurisdiction. The
Court came out with an interpretation of competent court, they came out with an interpretation –
“whether the people sitting in the court is competent. Thi s is in relation to Section 8, Article VIII of
the Constitution which requires that a member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence. The members were not competent as viewed by
SC thus there is no competent court that heard the case.

 PEOPLE vs HURBERT WEBB

SC cannot convict them for the seond time. Galman doctrine cannot be applied. Double jeopardy
has set in.

 ESMENA vs JUDGE POGOY

SC: The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not
prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal
equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.

 MAZO vs MTC
After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution, the defendant filed a demurrer to
evidence.
 SC: The case is dismissed based on demurrer of evidence filed by accused which is equivalent to
acquittal that bar any charge against the defendant of the same offense.

 PEOPLE vs HERNANDO
On March 20, 1979, the three private respondents and two others were charged with the crime of
Frustrated Murder for having stabbed with a pointed bladed weapon one Romeo Dukinal, inflicting
upon him a stab wound, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of Murder as a consequence were it not for the timely medical attendance rendered to said
victim, which prevented his death.
The judge convicted the accused. The latter filed a motion for new trial because there newly
discovered evidence that can acquit them. In the amended decision, the accused were acquitted.

SC: The judgment of acquittal in favor of an accused necessarily ends the case in which he is
prosecuted and the same cannot be appealed nor reopened because of the doctrine that nobody
may be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Respondents have been formally acquitted by
respondent Court, albeit erroneously. That judgment of acquittal is a final verdict. Errors or
irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of antrefois
acquit. The proceedings in the Court below were not an absolute nullity as to render the judgment
of acquittal null and void. The prosecution was not without the opportunity to present its evidence
or even to rebut the testimony of Leonico Talingdan, the witness on new trial. It cannot be justifiably
claimed, therefore, that the prosecution was deprived of its day in Court and denied due process of
law, which would have rendered the judgment of acquittal a nullity and beyond the pale of a claim
of double jeopardy. What was committed by respondent Judge was a reversible error but which did
not render the proceedings an absolute nullity.

Although respondent Judge had committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering his Amended
Decision acquitting the accused, relief herein is barred by the fundamental principle of double
jeopardy.ch

 JEFFREY RESO DAYAP vs. PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG,; GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE
DURAN

The case had its origins in the filing of an Information on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the
crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to
Property.
The MTC granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at
bar, is “filed after the prosecution had rested its case,” and when the same is granted, it calls “for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction
beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused. Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may
not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. But while the
dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still
reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
 liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
A scrutiny of the MTC’s decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the
findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that
petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioner’s civil liability has
been extinguished by his acquittal.

 RUBEN MANIAGO vs CA
You have to reserve the civil action. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring
an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing
of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same party. Any award made
against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from
the accused.

But a new jurisprudence held that NO NEED TO RESERVE THE CIVIL ACTION.

 SUPERVENING FACT DOCTRINE

- It is the simple application of the Doctrine of Criminal Law that “He who is the cause of the cause is
the cause of the evil cause”. You are liable for the consequences of your act.

- Under rules on criminal procedure, if after trial for a lesser offense, a more serious offense happens as
a result of your earlier act, you can be charge of the graver offense. (Supervene – something that will
happen in the future after the first case, you should still be answerable to the consequences of your
act.)

CASES:
 PEOPLE VS TARUC (73PHIL 260)
A boxed B resulting to Serious Physical injuries. B was hospitalized, A was arrested. Fiscal filed
information for Serious Physical Injuries against him. He entered a plea of guilty and sentenced to
three months imprisonment. Several days later, B dies. Can he be charged again of homicide?

SC: No, double jeopardy has set in.

 PEOPLE VS. BULING (107 PHIL 712)

Same facts. Can he be charged again of homicide after he pleaded guilty to serious physical injuries?

SC: Yes, but deduct the penalty for the lesser offense.

 MELO VS. PEOPLE (85 PHIL 766)

Same facts. SC said “No, you cannot charge him of the graver offense.
 SC: Double jeopardy has set in.”

 PEOPLE VS CITY COURT OF MANILA (121 SCRA 637)

In November 18, 1983 the accused was driving his passenger jeepney in Manila in a reckless manner
and bumped “B”. B was hospitalized. On November 19, 1983, the city prosecutor filed information
for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. November 20, 1983, he was arraigned
and entered a plea of guilty. On November 21, 1983, the fiscal of manila filed another information
for reckless imprudence resulting to homici.de while it turned out that at the night of November 19,
the victim had died but he was arraigned only on November 20. He immediately said guilty because
it is only reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. Can he be charge again of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide? (In fact RTC said “yes” but deduct the lesser penalty.)

SC: No, double jeopardy has set in. You cannot charge him again because double jeopardy has set in
Except: you can charge him again of the graver offense if you can prove that he was already aware
on November 20 that the victim has died.

 Three months after the decision has rendered, the SC amended Rules on Criminal Procedure
on July 1, 1985 and they now include the supervening fact doctrine.

RIGHT AGAINST EX-POST FACTO LAW, BILL OF ATTAINDER, etc.

Section 22: No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be passed.

REQUISITES OF EX POST FACTO LAW

1. It applies only to penal or criminal laws
2. It is given retroactive effect
3. It is prejudicial to the rights of the accused.

Seven Kinds of Ex Post facto Law: (PANFILO LACSON VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, January 20, 1999)
In order that a law is an ex post facto law, the same must be one:
1. Which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent
when committed, and punishes such action;
2. Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed;
3. Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
to the crime when it was committed;
4. Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant;
5. Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a
person to his disadvantage;
6. That which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies but in effect imposes a penalty
or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
7. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.
 2008 BAR Question:
In 2005, X a Filipino computer hacked the computers of Pentagon. In 2006, The Philippines and
United States amended the RP-US Extradition Treaty and they now include computer hacking. In
2007 the US requested the DOJ for extradition of X. Can he raise the defense of violation of his right
against ex post facto law? No, because the extradition treaty is not a penal law.

BILL OF ATTAINDER – a legislative act that inflicts punishment without judicial trial