PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.

NLRC
222 SCRA 831

In November, 1987, while holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary,

Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City,
Manuel S. Pineda decided to run for councilor of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the local
elections scheduled in January, 1988, and filed the corresponding certificate of candidacy for the
position. Objection to Pineda’s being a candidate while retaining his job in the PNOC-EDC was
shortly thereafter registered by Mayor Arturo Cornejos of Kananga, Leyte.

Section 66 of the Election Code provides among others that officers and employees of GOCCs are
considered as ipso facto resigned upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy.

It was the argument of Pineda that PNOC-EDC was not created through a special law, it is not
covered by the Civil Service Law and, therefore, not contemplated under Section 66 of the
Election Code.

Issue: Whether or not an employee in a government- owned or controlled corporation without

an original charter falls within the scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.

He also wrote a letter dated October 1, 1988 to the Department of Local Government inquiring
about the status of his employment with PNOC-EDC in relation to his election as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan. He was advised by DLG Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillo, Jr., by letter dated
March 31, 1989, that there was no legal impediment to his continuing in his employment with
PNOC-EDC while holding at the same time the elective position of municipal councilor.

The PNOC-EDC did not, however, share the Undersecretary's views and however executed the
separation of Pineda from the company with just compensation.

Pineda lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal in the Regional Arbitration

After due proceedings, Labor Arbiter Araceli H. Maraya, to whom the case was assigned,
rendered a decision on December 28, 1990,11 declaring Manuel S. Pineda's dismissal from the
service illegal, and ordering his reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority
rights and payment of full back wages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up
to the time of actual reinstatement.

The PNOC-EDC filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission. The latter
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit in a decision dated April 24, 1991.

The Solicitor General expressed agreement with the respondent Commission's holding that
Manuel Pineda had indeed been illegally separated from his employment in the PNOC-EDC
Implicit in the provision is that government-owned or controlled corporations without original
charters — i.e., organized under the general law, the Corporation Code — are not comprehended
within the Civil Service Law.

What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the
general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and
even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words,
Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in
the Labor Code, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated April 24, 1991 and its Resolution dated June 21, 1991 are NULLIFIED
AND SET ASIDE; and the complaint of Manuel S. Pineda is DISMISSED. No costs.

G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR.,
respondents.

Daniel Funtecha was a working student at the Filamer Christian Institute. He was assigned as the
school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the son of the school
president and at the same time he was the school’s jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977
at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa returned to the school to report
and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the students early in the
morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together. Funtecha
had a student driver’s license so Masa let him take the driver’s seat. While Funtecha was driving,
he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed
a criminal case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable for the
tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180 which
provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed the decision
and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR, working scholars are
excluded from the employment coverage hence there is no employer-employee relations
between Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only
attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being the school janitor. The CA
denied Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.
HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time
Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR
was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working conditions,
rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other
laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words,
Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction
hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school
and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an
alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for
injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability
of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor
cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of
the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s
position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the act
of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is beneficial to the school because this
enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact that
Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does
not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was
negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good
father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

UERMMMC-RDU VS. LAGUESMA

GR NOS. 125425-26

Facts:
The resident physicians formed a union called the UERMMC-Resident Doctors Union and filed
the petition for certification so that it will be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of all
the resident physicians in the hospital for purposes of collective bargaining.

The petition for certification was dismissed by the Undersecretary, acting under the authority of
the Secretary of Labor, on the ground that there exist no employer-employee relationship
between the resident doctors and the hospital.

Issue:
WON resident doctors are employees of the hospital.
Held:
The resident doctors are not employees of the hospital. It is clear that physicians undergo
residency training in order to hone their skills and develop or improve their knowledge in a
specialized medical field or discipline. Hence, residency is basically and simply a continuation of
their medical course. However, they are not required or mandated under any law to further
undergo a residence training program. Having passed the medical board examinations, they are
already licensed physicians and could very well engage in the general practice of medicine. It is
for the practice of highly specialized medical disciplines which necessitates further on-the-job
training thereon.

Viewed from this perspective, residency training clearly amounts to a pursuit of further education
on a specific discipline. Thus, the relationship between the teaching/training hospital and the
resident doctor is not one of employer-employee. The training/teaching hospital may simply be
likened to a medical school/university, but in this instance, the emphasis is on the practical
application and training of its students, the resident doctors.

HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
LABOR ARBITER ADRIAN N. PAGALILAUAN and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, public respondents, and ROGELIO A. ABAN,

Facts: Rogelio Aban was hired by petitioner as legal assistant on October 24, 1978. On September
4, 1980 he received a letter from the petitioner informing him that he will be terminated on
October 4, 1970 allegedly for his failure to perform his duties well. Thereafter, Aban filed a case
for illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter which held that there was indeed an illegal dismissal.
This was affirmed by NLRC.

Issue: Whether there is an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Aban.

Held: Yes.
The determination of whether there is an employer-employee relationship depends upon four
standards: 1. the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; 2. the mode of
payment of wages; 3. the presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and, 4. presence or
absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct. The right of control has been
held to be the decisive factor.

The four tests were satisfied by the following facts:

Aban was employed by the petitioner to be its Legal Assistant as evidenced by his appointment
paper. The petitioner paid him a basic salary plus living allowance. Thereafter, Aban was
dismissed on his alleged failure to perform his duties well.
Aban worked solely for the petitioner and dealt only with legal matters involving the said
corporation and its employees. He also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing appointment
papers of employees. This latter duty is not an act of a lawyer in the exercise of his profession
but rather a duty for the benefit of the corporation.

FEATI UNIVERSITY v. BAUTISTA

G.R. No.L-21278

FACTS:
January 14, 1963, the President of Feati University Faculty Club (PAFLU) wrote
a letter to Mrs. Victoria L. Araneta, President of Feati University informing her that it
registered as a labor union. PAFLU sent another letter with 26 demands in relation to
their employment and requesting an answer within 10 days from receipt thereof.
Araneta answered the letters, requesting that she be given at least 30 days to study
thoroughly the different phases of the demands. Meanwhile counsel for Feati, wrote
a letter to the President of PAFLU demanding proof of its majority status and
designation as a bargaining representative. The President of PAFLU rejected the
extension of time and filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor due to Feati’s
refusal to bargain collectively.
Parties were called to the Conciliation Division of the Bureau of Labor but
efforts to conciliate them failed. On February 18, 1963, PAFLU declared a strike and
established picket lines in the premises of Feati resulting in the disruption of classes
in the University.
The President of the Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) the dispute between Feati and PAFLU pursuant to the provisions of Section 10
of Republic Act No. 875.
3 cases were filed with the CIR
41-IPA – PAFLU’s petition to declare in contempt of court since Feati refused to
accept them back to work in violation of the return-to-work order of March 30, 1963
and has employed other professors and/or instructors to take their places. Also
includes the motion to dismiss filed by Feati contending that the CIR has no
jurisdiction over the case.
1183-MC – PAFLU’s petition for certification election praying that it be certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative. This case was later withdrawn
since the Case 41-IPA had already been certified by the President to the CIR and has
absorbed the issues herein.
V-30 – PAFLU’s complaint for indirect contempt of court filed against the
administrative officials of the Feati reiterating Case 41-IPA.
May 10, 1963: Feati filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
writ of preliminary injunction which was issued upon the Feati's filing a bond of
P50,000 (increased from P1,000), ordering CIR Judge Jose S. Bautista to desist and
refrain from further proceeding. On the strength of the presidential certification,
Judge Bautista set the case for hearing. Feati, thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss
the case upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the case, because:
1. the Industrial Peace Act is NOT applicable to the University, it being an
educational institution, nor to the members of the Faculty Club, they being
independent contractors
2. the presidential certification is violative of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace
Act, as the University is not an industrial establishment and there was no
industrial dispute which could be certified to the CIR
Judge Bautista denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the strikers to return
immediately to work and the University to take them back under the last terms and
conditions existing before the dispute arose.
Without the motion for reconsideration having been acted upon by the CIR en banc,
Judge Bautista set the case for hearing on the merits but was cancelled upon Feati’s
petition for certiorari alleging that Judge Jose S. Bautista acted without, or in excess
of, jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in taking cognizance of, and in
issuing the questioned orders in, CIR Cases Nos. 41-IPA 1183-MC and V-30.
Feati claims that it is not an employer within the contemplation of R.A. 875, because
it is not an industrial establishment. It also claims that it is only a lessee of the
services of its professors and/or instructors pursuant to a contract of services
entered into between them because the University does not exercise control over
their work
ISSUES: W/N Feati can be considered an employer and PAFLU as an employee to be
covered by R.A. 875 and have right to unionize
RULING:
YES. Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case G.R.
No. L-21278 is dismissed.
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Based on RA 875 Section 2(c) The term
employer include any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly, but shall not include any labor organization (otherwise than when acting
as an employer) or any one acting in the capacity or agent of such labor
organization.
In this case, the University is operated for profit hence included in the term of
employer. Professors and instructors, who are under contract to teach particular
courses and are paid for their services, are employees under the Industrial Peace
Act.
Professors and instructors are not independent contractors. university controls the

work of the members of its faculty; that a university prescribes the courses or
subjects that professors teach, and when and where to teach; that the professors’
work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration; that
professors are compensated for their services by wages and salaries, rather than by
profits; that the professors and/or instructors cannot substitute others to do their
work without the consent of the university; and that the professors can be laid off if
their work is found not satisfactory. All these indicate that the university has control
over their work; and professors are, therefore, employees and not independent
contractors.
Moreover, even if university professors are considered independent contractors, still
they would be covered by Rep. Act No. 875. Professors, instructors or teachers of
private educational institutions who teach to earn a living are entitled to the
protection of our labor laws — and one such law is Republic Act No. 875.
To certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under
the law, and this Court will not interfere in, much less curtail, the exercise of that
prerogative. The jurisdiction of the CIR in a certified case is exclusive. The parties
involved in the case may appeal to the Supreme Court from the order or orders thus
issued by the CIR.
The return-to-work order cannot be considered as an impairment of the
contract entered into with the replacements. Besides, labor contracts must yield to
the common good and such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor
unions, collective bargaining, strikes and similar subjects.

G.R. No. L-59229 August 22, 1991

HIJOS DE F. ESCAÑO INC., and PIER 8 ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKINGMEN
(NOWM) PSSLU-TUCP and ROLANDO VILLALOBOS, respondents.

Facts: prior to the incorporation, Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. (Pier 8 A&S), two
stevedoring companies had been serving vessels docketing in pier 8. One of which was the Manila
Integrated Services, Inc. (MISI) which was serving Escaño vessels that then was docking in pier 8.
The other was the San Nicolas Stevedoring and Arrastre Services, Inc. (SNSASI) which was serving
Compania Maritama vessels. Pursuant to Philippine Port Authority’s policy of “one pier, one
Arrastre and/or stevedoring company, MISI and SNSASI merged to form Pier 8 Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services, Inc.

But sometime in June 1978, Escaño transferred to pier 16. Pier 8 A&S encountered problems;
business was severely reduced with only Compania Maritama to service. The continuance of
service to Escaño was not possible since there was another company exclusive authorized to
handle and render stevedoring in pier 16. Because of the surplus of employees, Pier 8 A&S altered
the work schedule by rotating them. The scheme was resisted by the stevedores especially those
formerly assigned to service of Escaño vessels. The affected stevedores boycotted Pier 8 leading
to their severance from employment. They continued to refuse to go back to work even after
they were served with a return-to-work order.

On September 8, 1978, National Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM") PSSLU-TUCP, the labor

organization wherein majority of the laborers of petitioner Pier 8 A&S, filed a complaint for unfair
labor practice and illegal dismissal against Pier 8 A&S. On their amendment, they implead to
include Escaño as respondent before the Ministry of Labor and Employment. The complaint for
illegal dismissal was addressed in compulsory arbitration wherein the labor arbiter found through
position papers submitted by parties that Pier 8 A&S and Escaño guilty of committing acts guilty
of unfair labor practice and were ordered to reinstate petitioners and pay them jointly and
severally of full backwages counted from the time they were illegal dismissed. The decision was
appealed by petitioners with NLRC but the same was affirmed. They filed petition with the Court
contending that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion on upholding that the stevedores
were not only employees of Pier 8 A&S but also of Escaño. The stevedores claimed that since
they had long serving Escaño vessels, they should also be considered as employees of Escaño.

Issue: Whether a shipping company engaged with inter-island business has an employee-
employer relationship with stevedores who had been long servicing them with the loading and
unloading of cargo on or from the vessel on port that would make the former liable for illegal
dismissal?

Held: There was no employer-employee relationship between Escaño and the stevedores. It was
not alleged that Escaño or any other shipping company was also engaged in Arrastre and
stevedoring services. Considering that a shipping company is not customarily enagaged in
stevedoring and arrastre activities, Escaño and other shipping companies contracts with other
companies offering those services. In this light, stevedores should not be deemed employees of
the shipping company. Therefore, Escaño cannot be held liable with Pier 8 A&S.

Jardin v. NLRC
G.R. No. 119268
February 23, 2000

NATURE:
 Special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the decision of public respondent in which
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:
1. Petitioners were taxi drivers of private respondent, Philjama International, Inc., a
domestic corporation engaged in the operation of “Goodman Taxi”.
 Petitioners drive the taxicabs ever other day on a 24-hour work schedule
under the boundary system.
 Earns an average of P400.00 daily
2. Private respondents deduct petitioners daily earning by P30.00 for the washing of the taxi
units.
3. Petitioner believes that such action by the PR is illegal so they form a labor union to
protect their rights and interests.
 In effect, PR upon learning their plans refused to let petitioners drive their
taxicabs when they report for work starting Aug. 6, 1991 and on succeeding
days.
4. Petitioners filed with the labor arbiter a complaint against PR for unfair labor, illegal
dismissal and illegal deduction of washing fees>>>DENIED lack of merit.
 Appeal: NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of Labor arbiter. That
petitioners are employees of PR and such dismissal must be for just cause and
after due process.
5. PR 1st motion for recon>>>DENIED.
6. 2nd recon granted: that petitioners and PR have no employer-employee relationship.
7. Petitioners sought reconsideration>>>DENIED. Hence this instant petition.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting 2 nd
reconsideration of private respondents? YES
2. Whether employer-employee relationship exists in boundary system? YES

RULING:
1. Private respondent (corp.) had already exhausted administrative remedy by filing the 1 st
motion for recon (which was denied) in which the labor tribunal had the ample
opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes before rendering decision. When the PR filed for
2nd recon the public respondents should have denied it in accordance with rule 7 Sec.14
of its New Rules of Procedure, which allows only one motion for reconsideration from the
same party.
a. Rationale for 1 motion of recon: to assist the parties in obtaining an expeditious
and inexpensive settlement of labor cases.
2.
 Court used the Four Fold Test:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employees
(2) the payment of wages
(3) the power of dismissal
(4) the power of control the employees conduct (most important)

 The court ruled that owners/operators and drivers have employer-employee relationship
because the former exercise supervision and control over the latter. The management of
the business is in the hands of the owner.
o The owner as the holder of the certificate of public convenience must see to it that
the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules
promulgated as regards its operation.
 The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but only excess in boundary is not
sufficient to withdraw employer-employee relationship.
 Hence, petitioners as employees of PR can only be dismissed for just cause and with due
process.
 Petition is granted. Private respondent were ordered to reinstate petitioners to their
positions and likewise ordered to pay petitioners their full backwages.
SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his
departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of
Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents did not deliver
on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and
was repatriated to the Philippines on May.

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to
March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and
seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding
him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise,
petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the
Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal
dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.

Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of
the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal
dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner filed
a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA
affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment

without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at
the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine
months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the
US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of
US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment
contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00

Issue:
1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-sum salary for the entire
unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a period of three
months?
2.) Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form part of the salary basis in the computation of
his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his
contract?

Held:
1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment
contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month. The subject
clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were
illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were
uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the
enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in
that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local
workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the
computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a
3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but
none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause
singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process,
for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental
purpose. The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire
unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers
like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of
Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other
bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight
hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest days and holidays.

By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and
holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless there is evidence that he performed
work during those periods.

198. G.R. No. 168445 November 11, 2005

People of the Philippines vs. Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao

Facts:
Capt. Florencio was the Crewing Manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency, a licensed
local manning agency, while his nephew Jose Gasacao was the president. As the crewing
manager, appellant’s duties included receiving job applications, interviewing the applicants and
informing them of the agency’s requirement of payment of performance or cash bond prior to
deployment.
 Both Capt. Florencio and Jose Gasacao was charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment
defined under Sec. 6 par. (a) (l) and (m) of RA 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 and penalized under Sec. 7 (b) of the same law before the RTC.
Only appellant was arrested while Jose Gasacao remained at large. Appellant pleaded not
guilty.
Issue:
WON Appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of large scale illegal
recruitment.
Held:
Yes. Appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment.
Although the manning agency was a holder of a valid authority when appellant recruited the
complainants, appellant may still be held liable and guilty of illegal recruitment. Complainants
established that appellant is not a mere employee but it is him who made representations with
them that he can secure overseas employment for them upon payment of cash bond. In People
vs. Cabais, the Court held that an employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal
recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if tit is shown that he
actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process.
To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the
distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such
that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. Appellants act
of promising the private complainants that they will be deployed abroad within 3 months after
he have paid the cash bond clearly shows that he is engaged in illegal recruitment.
In this case, 5 complainants testified against appellants acts of illegal recruitment, thereby
rendering his acts tantamount to economic sabotage.
Definition:
RA 8042, Section 6
Illegal recruitment – any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring,
procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder
or authority contemplated under Article 13 (f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as LC of the Phils. Provided, that such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any
persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than the specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make
a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason a determined by DOLE; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually
take place without the worker’s fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in
large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of 3 or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against 3 or more persons individually or as a group.
License – is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person or entity to operate a private
employment agency, while an authority is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person
or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity.
Even licensee or holders of authority can be held liable for illegal recruitment should they
commit any of the above-mentioned acts.

G. R. No. 170834
August 29, 2008
Third Division, Austria Martinez, J.
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
Antonio Nogra, Accused-Appellant
Sinel, Rachel Ann A. Series No. 5

Facts:
Accused Antonio Nogra is the operations manager of Loran International Overseas Recruitment
Agency, a duly licensed overseas employment agency. He was assigned in the Naga City Branch
office with the added responsibility of handling the advertisement as well. The main office of the
agency is in Libertad Mandaluyong and owned by Lorna Orciga and Kataru Tanaka.

Private complainants all applied at the branch office where Nogra is assigned. They paid the
placement fee but the agencywas unable to deploy them. The agency was also unable to return
the amount paid upon demand, prompting the complainants to institute the criminal case of
illegal recruitment in a large scale against the agency, its owners and petitioner. Nogra was the
only one arraigned as the others still remained at large. Nogra contends is that he is just a mere
employee and that all the money paid was deposited into the account of Lorna Orciga and he did
not retain any portion of the same.

Issue:
Is the complainant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale despite being a mere employee?

Laws Applicable:
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and RA 8042

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed Nogra’s conviction of life imprisonment and penalty of
P500,000.

The Court held that appellant Nogra is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale even if he is a
mere employee. RA 8042 sufficiently broadened the concept of illegal recruitment in adding that
a non-licensee or non-holder along with licensees and holders of authority. The illegal
recruitment has been committed against more than three persons which squarely puts the same
under the ambit of the law defining illegal recruitment in large scale. He is nevertheless guilty of
illegal recruitment in large scale because of the provision of Section 6 of RA 8042 providing that
principals, accomplices and accessories are included in those that may be charged and in case of
juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of the business. In the
case at bar, he is guilty of the same as his job title of Operations Manager, makes him an active
and conscious participant of the recruitment process.

Opinion:
I concur with the Court’s decision. In my opinion, Nogra, being a mere employee in charge of
recruitment and advertisement, is still an active participant of failure to deploy the applicants. As
operations manager, he has the task of overseeing that the applicants will be successfully
deployed to job to which the agency promised them. His duties and responsibilities are not
confined within recruitment alone. His duty extends until the applicants are deployed.
It may be true that the money paid by the applicants were paid to Orciga. His being not able to
profit from such act of failure to deploy the complainant does not exempt him from liability.
Thus, I believe that the Courts rendered the right decision.

204. People vs. Chowdury, 325 SCRA 572, G.R. Nos. 129577-80 February 15, 2000
Facts
Bulu Chowdury was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale by recruiting
Estrella B. Calleja, Melvin C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis for employment in Korea. Evidence shows
that accused –appellant interviewed private complainant in 1994 at Craftrade’s office, and
required them to submit requirements such as passport, NBI clearance, ID pictures, medical
certificate and birth certificate. Chowdury also required them to pay placements fee for a certain
amount. At that time, he was an interviewer of Craftrade which was operating under temporary
authority given by POEA pending the renewal of license. He was charged based on the fact that
he was not registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade and he is not in his personal
capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. The complainants also averred that during their
applications for employment for abroad, the license of Craftrade was already expired.
For his defense Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990 until
1994. His primary duty was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only
followed the instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agency's President
and General Manager, and Mr. UtkalChowdury, the agency's Managing Director.
The trial Court found Chowdury huilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the

commission of the crime charged.

Held
No. The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:
 (1) The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any
prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) He did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; and
(3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) 804219 states who shall be held liable
for the offense, thus: “The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control,
management or direction of their business shall be liable.”
An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held
liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously
participated in illegal recruitment. The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his
knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is shown that
the employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his
acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of
his employer.
In this case, Chowdury merely performed his tasks under the supervision of its president and
managing director. The prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant is conscious and
has an active participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. Moreover,
accused-appellant was not aware of Craftrade's failure to register his name with the POEA and
the prosecution failed to prove that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge.
The obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. A
mere employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its
operation. The accused-appellant carried out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that
the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by his agency to
deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions to his job
description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of the requirements for
deployment but he never received money from them. Chowdury did not knowingly and
intentionally participated in the commission of illegal recruitment being merely performing his
task and unaware of illegality of recruitment.

204. People vs. Chowdury, 325 SCRA 572, G.R. Nos. 129577-80 February 15, 2000
Facts
Bulu Chowdury was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale by
recruiting Estrella B. Calleja, Melvin C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis for employment in Korea.
Evidence shows that accused –appellant interviewed private complainant in 1994 at Craftrade’s
office, and required them to submit requirements such as passport, NBI clearance, ID pictures,
medical certificate and birth certificate. Chowdury also required them to pay placements fee for
a certain amount. At that time, he was an interviewer of Craftrade which was operating under
temporary authority given by POEA pending the renewal of license. He was charged based on the
fact that he was not registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade and he is not in his
personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. The complainants also averred that
during their applications for employment for abroad, the license of Craftrade was already
expired.
For his defense Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990
until 1994. His primary duty was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he
only followed the instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agency's
President and General Manager, and Mr. UtkalChowdury, the agency's Managing Director.
The trial Court found Chowdury huilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the

commission of the crime charged.

Held
No. The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:

(1) The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any
prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) He did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; and
(3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) 804219 states who shall be held liable
for the offense, thus: “The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control,
management or direction of their business shall be liable.”
An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held
liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously
participated in illegal recruitment. The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his
knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is shown that
the employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his
acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of
his employer.
In this case, Chowdury merely performed his tasks under the supervision of its president
and managing director. The prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant is conscious
and has an active participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. Moreover,
accused-appellant was not aware of Craftrade's failure to register his name with the POEA and
the prosecution failed to prove that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge.
The obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. A
mere employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its
operation. The accused-appellant carried out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that
the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by his agency to
deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions to his job
description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of the requirements for
deployment but he never received money from them. Chowdury did not knowingly and
intentionally participated in the commission of illegal recruitment being merely performing his
task and unaware of illegality of recruitment.

G.R. No. 91552-55 March 10, 1994

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FERNANDO MANUNGAS, JR. y GO @ "PERCY", accused-appellant.

Facts of the case:

In 1987, accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. recruited Wilfrey Mabalot, Danilo Ramirez,
Leonardo Estanoco and Crisanto Collado to work as janitors in Saudi-Arabia. In connection with
this, Fernando required the applicants the several amounts for medical, placement and other
fees. The applicants failed to be deployed to Saudi however, and upon verification with POEA,
they found out that Fernando was not a licensed recruiter. Complainants filed complaints of
Estafa and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale against Fernando. Fernando maintained that he
was not illegally recruiting because he was connected with a duly licensed recruitment agency,
and that only because the job openings was subsequently awarded to another recruitment
agency that the applicants he recruited were not able to leave for Saudi.

Issue:

Whether or not Fernando was guilty of Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale, given the
circumstances.
Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Fernando, despite of his being connected with a licensed
recruitment agency, was still guilty of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, because he
performed the acts of recruitment as defined in Article 13 of the Labor Code, by himself. He was
the one who recruited the applicants, and he was the one who required of them the fees he
collected himself. Illegal recruitment was also qualified because he recruited more than three
persons.

3. People vs. SADIOSA

Facts: Arsenia Conse went to Bayombong, Nueva Ecija in early 1992 where she met Cely Navarro,
Marcela Manzano, Erly Tuliao and Benilda Domingo. She enticed the four to apply for overseas
employment informing them that she had a cousin who could send them to Kuwait as domestic
helpers. Apparently convinced by Arsenia Conse, the four went with her on 5 February 1992 to
Manila. Upon arrival, they proceeded to Room 210, Diamond Building, Libertad St., Pasay City
where Arsenia Conse introduced the group to Delia Sadiosa. The four then applied for work as
domestic helpers. On that occasion, Sadiosa assured the four that she could dispatch them to
Kuwait and forthwith demanded P8,000.00 from each of them for processing fee and P1,000.00
for passport (P1,500.00 from Cely Navarro). She assured the group that she would facilitate the
processing of all the necessary documents needed by them. She further promised them that upon
payment of the required fees, they would be able to leave for Kuwait immediately. The four did
give Sadiosa the money demanded although on different dates. The latter issued the
corresponding receipts therefor. Again, she assured them that they could leave for Kuwait on
different dates: Cely Navarro and Erly Tuliao on 17 February 1992 which was rescheduled twice
on 19 February 1992 and on 25 February 1992, and Benilda Domingo and Marcela Manzano on
17 March 1992 which was moved twice on 24 February 1992 and on 17 March 1992. However,
not one of them was able to leave for Kuwait. When they asked for the return of their money,
Sadiosa refused and ignored their demand. Consequently, the four filed the complaint for illegal
recruitment against Sadiosa. The information read: "That on or about and during the period
comprise (sic) from January 1992 to March 1992, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused Delia Sadiosa y
Cabenta, well knowing that she is not a duly licensed job recruiter, by means of false
representations and fraudulent allegations to the effect that she could secure employment as
domestic helpers abroad for Benilda Sabado y Domingo, Marcela Tabernero y Manzano, Erly
Tuliao y Sabado and Cely Navarro y Manzano, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and
feloniously recruit aforesaid persons and collected from them the amount of P8,000.00 each,
which amount were given to the accused by the aforesaid complainants upon receipt of which,
far from complying with her obligation aforestated, accused appropriated for herself the said
amount and failed to deploy complainants abroad. Contrary to law." Upon arraignment, Sadiosa
pleaded "not guilty." The trial court found Sadiosa guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale
defined by Article 38 (b) and penalized under Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended by
Presidential Decree 1920 and 2018, and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00. The court also ordered Sadiosa to indemnify Benilda Sabado y Domingo, the sum
of P8,000.00; Marcela Tabernero y Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00; Erly Tuliao y Sabado, the sum
of P8,000.00 and Cely Navarro y Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00. To pay the costs. Sadiosa
appealed.
Issue: Whether the information was sufficient to allege illegal recruitment, and that said charge
will not be confused with estafa by the facts stated therein.
Held: The information is sufficient where it clearly states the designation of the offense by the
statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, there is
no need to specify or refer to the particular section or subsection of the statute that was violated
by the accused. No law requires that in order that an accused may be convicted, the specific
provision penalizing the act charged should be mentioned in the information. What identifies the
charge is the actual recital of the facts and not that designated by the fiscal in the preamble
thereof. It is not even necessary for the protection of the substantial rights of the accused, nor
the effective preparation of his defense, that the accused be informed of the technical name of
the crime of which he stands charged. He must look to the facts alleged. Herein, the information
filed against Sadiosa sufficiently shows that it is for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale,
as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and penalized in Art. 39 of the same Code although it
is designated as for "illegal recruitment" only. Under the Code, the essential elements of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are as follows: (1) the accused engages in the
recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited
activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused has not complied with the guidelines
issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a
license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and (3)
accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group." All these
elements are to be found in the information. It alleges that Sadiosa, knowing fully well that she
was "not a duly licensed job recruiter," falsely represented that she could "secure employment
as domestic helpers abroad" for the four complainants.
As such, the purpose of the requirement under Sec. 8, Rule 110 to inform and apprise the accused
of the true crime of which she was charged, has been complied with. The main purpose of the
requirement that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting an offense must be stated
in ordinary and concise language is to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged so that he could suitably prepare for his defense. It is also
required so that the trial court could pronounce the proper judgment. This gives substance to
the constitutional guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Herein, Sadiosa was fully accorded the right
to be informed of the charges against her. The fact that she put up the defense of having accepted
the money only in her capacity as an officer of the recruitment agency shows that she fully
understood the nature and cause of the accusation against her.Furthermore, it is incorrect for
Sadiosa to maintain that the information filed against her contained conflicting and irreconcilable
charges of illegal recruitment, estafa under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code and
estafa under the same article but under par. 2 (a) thereof. While on its face the allegations in the
information may constitute estafa, it merely describes how Sadiosa was able to consummate the
act of illegal recruitment — through false and fraudulent representation by pretending that she
was a duly-licensed recruiter who could secure employment for complainants in Kuwait. These
allegations in the information therefore do not render the information defective or
multiplicitous. Sadiosa could have been validly charged separately with estafa under the same
set of facts in the illegal recruitment case, but she was fortunate enough not to have been so
charged. Nevertheless, there is no doubt from a reading of the information, that it accurately and
clearly avers all of the ingredients that constitute illegal recruitment in large scale. The prosecutor
simply captioned the information with the generic name of the offense under the Labor Code —
illegal recruitment. Hence, to avoid misconception and misinterpretation of the information, the
prosecutor should have indicated in its caption, the offense he had clearly alleged in its body,
that the crime charged was for illegal recruitment in large scale. However, such omission or lack
of skill of the prosecutor who crafted the information should not deprive the people of the right
to prosecute a crime with so grave a consequence against the economic life of the aggrieved
parties. What is important is that he did allege in the information the facts sufficient to constitute
the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale.