1. Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization vs. Philippine BloomingMills Co., Inc.

and Court
of Industrial Relations (1973) 51 SCRA 189
Facts
–
Union officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc. (PBM) were dismissed for allegedly violating the no
strike-no lockout provision of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) after staging a mass demonstration at
Malacañang.PBMEO was set to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969 against abuses
of the Pasig police, where employees on the first, regular, and third shifts will participate. PBMEO informed
company two days before the said demonstration and asked to excuse all the workers participating. But a day
before the demonstration, PBM said the rally should not prejudice normal office operations, thus employees
without prior filing of a leave of absence who fail to report for the first and regular shifts on March 4 shall be
dismissed for violating their CBA.

However, union officers said there was no violation because the demonstration was against the Pasig police and
not the company. They added that the rally was an exercise of their freedom of speech.In a decision penned by
Judge Joaquin Salvador of the Court of Industrial Relations, eight of the Philippine Blooming Mills Employment
Organization (PBMEO) officers were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and were thus removed as
employees of PBM. PBMEO filed a motion for reconsideration, which CIR dismissed the motion for passing two
days late from the 10-day deadline the court allowed.

Issue
–
Whether or not CIR and PBM Co. Inc. violated PBMEO’s freedom of expression and assembly on the grounds
that PBM Co. illegally dismissed its employees for participating in a mass demonstration.

Held
–
VIOLATED. The rally was not against the company and therefore there is noviolation of the “no strike-no lockout”
provision of their CBA. To charge PBMEO of bargaining in bad faith extends the jurisdiction of the CBA and
inhibits freedom ofspeech. The company failed to protect its employees from the Pasig police’s abuse of power,
went to the extent of dismissing their employees, and instead prioritized material losses. Moreover, CIR could
have easily accepted the motion forreconsideration. Procedural rules do not supersede the Constitution and may
beoverruled in a bid to achieve justice, especially in cases of free speech.

2. PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic
and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order
does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in
violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes
Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE
submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the
court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement
with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics
working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed.
There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not
import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:
 Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

That they are germane to the purpose of the law

They are not confined to existing conditions

They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair
the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as
the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by
law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined
as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

3. [G.R. No. 107723. July 24, 1997]

EMS MANPOWER AND PLACEMENT SERVICES,
petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LUISA G. MANUEL,

respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO,
J
.:
This petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary
restraining order seeks the nullification of the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dated November 29, 1991, awarding private respondent her salary for the unexpired
portion of her employment contract and attorney’s fees, as well as its resolution of October 28,1992, denying her
motion for reconsideration of said decision.

Private respondent Luisa G. Manuel was hired as a domestic helper in Hong Kong by Deborah Li Siu Yee on
April 13, 1989, for a period of two years from the time of her arrival. Under her employment contract, secured
through the efforts of petitioner placement agency (EMS), she would receive HK$2,500.00 per month during the
term of her contract. Luisa worked for her Chinese employer in Hong Kong from August 2, 1989, until October 1,
1989, when she was dismissed and repatriated to the Philippines after she made repeated demands for her
weekly rest day, of which she was denied from the start of her service, in violation of Clause 6(a) of the
employment contract. She also complained that she was not allowed to meet or see fellow Filipinos. By the time
she left, she had only received a separation pay of HK$2,500.00 and her return flight ticket. On October 23,
1989, Luisa filed a complaint before the Adjudication Department of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for illegal dismissal and illegal exaction against Yee, EMS and its surety, Paramount
Insurance Corporation. In a decision dated February 18, 1991, POEA Administrator Jose N. Sarmiento
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The only reasons he advanced were that Luisa was given her
separation pay in lieu of notice of her termination in compliance with clause 12(a) of the employment contract,
and Yee actually paid her repatriation expenses as provided in clause 12(e) of said contract and as required by
POEA Rules and Regulations. Thus, he concluded that “under the circumstances, respondent (Yee) has
complied with the law and with complainant’s contract of employment and her consequential repatriation cannot
be termed illegal.

In this regard, complainant cannot lay claim over the salaries for the unexpired portion of her contract nor can
this Office award the same.”
On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside POEA Administrator Sarmiento’s decision after finding no evidence
clear and convincing enough to support the POEA’s finding that Luisa was “not illegally dismissed,” and after
concluding that there was no just cause for her dismissal. Hence, on November 29, 1991, it rendered its assailed
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DECISION appealed from is reversed and set aside, and another one
is hereby rendered ordering respondent
EMS Manpower and Placement Services to pay complainant the peso equivalent at the time of actual payment
of the following:
1. FIFTY-FIVE THOUSAND HONG KONG DOLLARS (HK$55,000.00) as her salaries for the unexpired portion
of her contract;
2. Five (5%) per centum of the total award, as and by way of attorney’s fees.

The claims for moral and exemplary damages are hereby dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.”

4. EMPLOYERS CONFED vs. NATIONAL WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION

EMPLOYERS CONFEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NATIONAL WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 96169 September 24, 1991

Facts:

On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No. NCR-01,
increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region. The Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (TUCP) moved for reconsideration; so did the Personnel Management Association of the Philippines
(PMAP). ECOP opposed.

On October 23, 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No. NCR01-A, amending Wage Order No. NCR-01. It
provides that all workers and employees in the private sector in the National Capital Region already receiving
wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to one hundred and twenty-five pesos (P125.00) per day
shall also receive an increase of seventeen pesos (P17.00) per day.

ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity Commission contending that the board's grant of an
"across-the-board" wage increase to workers already being paid more than existing minimum wage rates (up to
P125.00 a day) as an alleged excess of authority. ECOP further alleges that under the Republic Act No. 6727,
the boards may only prescribe "minimum wages," not determine "salary ceilings." ECOP likewise claims that
Republic Act No. 6727 is meant to promote collective bargaining as the primary mode of settling wages, and in
its opinion, the boards can not preempt collective bargaining agreements by establishing ceilings.

On November 6, 1990, the Commission promulgated an Order, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. On
November 14, 1990, the Commission denied reconsideration. ECOP then, elevated the case via petition for
review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

The main issue in this case is whether Wage Order No. NCR-01-A providing for new wage rates, as well as
authorizing various Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards to prescribe minimum wage rates for all
workers in the various regions, and for a National Wages and Productivity Commission to review, among other
functions, wage levels determined by the boards is valid.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the National Wages and Productivity Commission and Regional Tripartite
Wages and Productivity Board-NCR, Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and denied the petition of ECOP.
The Supreme Court held that Republic Act No. 6727 was intended to rationalize wages, first, by providing for full-
time boards to police wages round-the-clock, and second, by giving the boards enough powers to achieve this
objective. The Court is of the opinion that Congress meant the boards to be creative in resolving the annual
question of wages without labor and management knocking on the legislature's door at every turn.
.
The Court's opinion is that if Republic No. 6727 intended the boards alone to set floor wages, the Act would have
no need for a board but an accountant to keep track of the latest consumer price index, or better, would have
Congress done it as the need arises, as the legislature, prior to the Act, has done so for years. The fact of the
matter is that the Act sought a "thinking" group of men and women bound by statutory standards. The Court is
not convinced that the Regional Board of the National Capital Region, in decreeing an across-the-board hike,
performed an unlawful act of legislation. It is true that wage-firing, like rate-fixing, constitutes an act Congress; it
is also true, however, that Congress may delegate the power to fix rates provided that, as in all delegations
cases, Congress leaves sufficient standards. As this Court has indicated, it is impressed that the above-quoted
standards are sufficient, and in the light of the floor-wage method's failure, the Court believes that the
Commission correctly upheld the Regional Board of the National Capital Region.

5. International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, 333 SCRA 13

FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution
established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree
authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or
abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of
employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two:
(1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary
rate 25% more than local-hires.

When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the
collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included
in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the
DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:

NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of
work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but
include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18,
Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate
the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body
of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights
and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with
local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that
these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of
tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires,
foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-
hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with
local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.

6. Reno Foods Inc. vs. NLM-Katipuan et. al.

G.R. No. 164016, March 15, 2010

Facts: Petitioner Corporation terminated Nenita Capor after she was caught sneaking out cans of RENO
productsduring a standard operating procedure of searching the belongings of employees upon leaving company
premises conducted by the guards. Capor alleged that the goods in her bag were not pilfered and that it may
have just been planted by the company to avoid paying separation pay as she was already about to retire.
RENO filed a case of qualified theft against Capor. While NLM-Katipunan filed in behalf of Capor, a case of
illegal dismissal and money claims against RENO before the Head Arbitration Office of the NLRC, praying that
Capor be awarded backwages and moral and exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter found Capor guilty of
grave misconduct which was just cause for termination. Further, that Capor is not entitled to reinstatement,
backwages, moral and exemplary damages. On appeal, the NLRC modified the ruling by awarding separation
pay to Capor as financial assistance. Petitioner appealed before the CA, which affirmed the ruling of NLRC.
Meanwhile, Capor was acquitted of qualified theft charges.

Issue: Is an employee terminated for just cause entitled to financial assistance?

Ruling: No. Separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee’s
fault, , such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal
in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause, such
as serious misconduct.

The Court awards financial assistance to employees who were terminated for just causes, on grounds of equity
and social justice. We recognized the harsh realities faced by employees that forced them, despite their good
intentions, to violate company policies, for which the employer can rightfully terminate their employment. BUT
the award of financial assistance shall not be given to validly terminated employees, whose offenses are
iniquitous or reflective of some depravity in their moral character. When the employee commits an act of
dishonesty, depravity, or iniquity, the grant of financial assistance is misplaced compassion. It is tantamount not
only to condoning a patently illegal or dishonest act, but an endorsement thereof. It will be an insult to all the
laborers who, despite their economic difficulties, strive to maintain good values and moral conduct.

Further, an employee’s acquittal in a criminal case, especially one that is grounded on the existence of
reasonable doubt, will not preclude a determination in a labor case that he is guilty of acts inimical to the
employer’s interests. Criminal cases require proof beyond reasonable doubt while labor disputes require only
substantial evidence. Since the Labor tribunals found substantial evidence to conclude that Capor had been
validly dismissed for dishonesty or serious misconduct there is no compelling reason to doubt the common
findings of these reviewing bodies.

On Capor’s allegation that her length of service and previously clean employment record should be considered
in awarding her separation pay, the Court ruled that it cannot simply erase the gravity of the betrayal exhibited by
a malfeasant employee. Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against the
employer. After all, an employer-employee relationship is symbiotic where both parties benefit from mutual
loyalty and dedicated service. If an employer had treated his employee well, has accorded him fairness and
adequate compensation as determined by law, it is only fair to expect a long-time employee to return such
fairness with at least some respect and honesty. Betrayal by a long-time employee is more insulting and odious
for a fair employer.

8. Sagales v Rustan’s Commercial Corporation, GR No. 166554 November 27, 2008

In October 1970, Julito Sagales was employed by Rustan’s Commercial Corporation as chief cook in one of
Rustan’s restaurants. He was an excellent employee receiving numerous awards. However, in June 2001,
Sagales was caught stealing a bag of squid heads worth P50.00. Sagales was not able to produce a receipt for
the said squid heads at that time. In the same month, Sagales underwent inquest proceedings for qualified theft
in the local fiscal’s office. In the said proceeding, Sagales was able to produce the receipt for the said squid
heads. He also averred that the squid heads are actually scraps of the restaurant and are not fit to be served to
customers; so if indeed he really wanted to steal and profit, he would have stolen better quality squid heads. The
fiscal dismissed the case against Sagales for lack of evidence.
But at the end of the same month, the legal division of Rustan conducted its own investigation where Sagales
and his lawyer appeared. The security guards testified against Sagales. The chief cashier also testified that the
squid heads were unpaid. In July 2001, after investigation by Rustan, Sagales was terminated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sagales’s termination is valid.

HELD: No. Termination is too harsh in this case. The Supreme Court took into consideration the various
circumstances attendant to the case. Sagales has worked for Rustan for almost 31 years; (2) his tireless and
faithful service is attested by the numerous awards he has received; (3) the incident in June 2001 was his first
offense in his long years of service; (4) the value of the squid heads worth P50.00 is negligible; (5) Rustan
practically did not lose anything as the squid heads were considered scrap goods and usually thrown away in the
wastebasket; (6) the ignominy and shame undergone by Sagales in being imprisoned, however momentary, is
punishment in itself; and (7) Sagales was already preventively suspended for one month, which is already a
commensurate punishment for the infraction committed. Truly, Sagales has more than paid his due.
Nevertheless, it is useless to reinstate Sagales because he should have been retired already at the time of this
decision. So instead of reinstatement, Sagales was awarded separation pay computed at one-month salary for
every year of service; backwages were also awarded.
The Supreme Court also emphasized: the right of every employee to security of tenure is all the more secured
by the Labor Code by providing that “the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a
just cause or when authorized” by law. However, the employer, in exercising its right to terminate employees for
just and authorized causes must impose a penalty commensurate with the act, conduct, or omission imputed to
the employee.