Ting v.

Velez-Ting, GR No 166562 (2009)

Facts

Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in medical school in 1972. They were married
on 1975 and later had six children. In 1993, after being married for more than 18 years, Carmen
filed a petition before the RTC of Cebu to have their marriage declared null under Article 36
of the Family Code, claiming that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the
time of the celebration of their marriage.

She said that Benjamin was an occasional gambler, a drunkard, and would even force Carmen
to have sex with him. She also claimed that Benjamin failed to provide for financial support for
their children, facts which Benjamin denied. He claims to have taken care of their children,
saying that it was Carmen who would often play mahjong with her friends and that he would
only get angry at Carmen for lavishly spending his hard-earned money.

Carmen presented Dr. Oates, who looked at deposition notes, to corroborate the
psychological incapacity as during the time of the trial, Benjamin was already working as
an anaesthesiologist in South Africa. Dr. Obra presented Benjamin’s side, saying that he saw
nothing wrong with Benjamin’s personality and track record as a doctor.

The RTC granted the annulment, declaring the marriage void ab initio.

Upon appeal to the CA, the decision was reversed, with the court saying that there was no
proof to adduce that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated. The court cited that the
conclusion was not in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Santos v. CA and Republic
v. Molina.

Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, stating that the Molina guidelines do not apply,
as it was only promulgated in February 1997, five years after her RTC petition and would run
counter to the principle of stare decisis. The CA later granted the motion, reversing affirming
the decision of the RTC. Benjamin asked for reconsideration, and later petitioned for
certiorari.

ISSUE

Did the CA violate the principle of stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines in Santos
and Molina?

Did the CA correctly rule that the requirement for proof of psychological incapacity has been
liberalized?

Did the CA nullify the marriage in accordance with law and jurisprudence?
HELD
1. No. In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by
courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only
when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on
the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar
rule of lex prospicit, non respicit
a. In determining w/n a court should decide based on stare decisis, it should:
i. (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no
more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts
have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old
rule of significant application or justification. (Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
cited by J. Puno in Lambino v. COMELEC)
2. No, the court did not abandon the Molina Doctrine. Each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee
on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
3. No. The totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner
is psychologically unfit. Respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present
at the time of the celebration of their marriage.