G.R. No.

171042 June 30, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LYNNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

From the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, Branch 24 nullifying the marriage of respondent, Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio (Lynnette),
to Martini Dico Baguio (Martini), the Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General filed
the present petition for review.

Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage on August 12, 1997. Less than three years later or
on October 12, 2000, Lynnette filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a
complaint1 for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 25700, on the
ground of Martini’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital duties and
obligations under Articles 68-702 of the Family Code.

Despite service of summons upon Martini, he never filed any responsive pleading to the
complaint.3 No collusion was established between the parties.4 Upon the authority of the
Solicitor General, the provincial prosecutor of Cebu City appeared in the case under the
former’s supervision and control.5

From the deposition of Lynnette taken before Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Monalila S. Tecson
on January 10, 2001,6 the following are gathered:

Lynnette and Martini, a seaman working overseas, became pen pals in 1995.

In 1996, the two met in person during Martini’s vacation after the expiration of his contract on
board an ocean-going vessel.

On August 12, 1997, Martini, then 32, and Lynnette, then 34, contracted marriage,7 following
which they moved to the house of Lynnette’s parents at 33-B La Guardia Extension, Lahug,
Cebu City. Martini, however, stayed there only on weekends, and during weekdays he stayed
with his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City. While Lynnette suggested that the two of them stay in
the house of Martini’s parents, Martini disagreed, claiming that there were many already living
with his parents.

1
Lynnette noticed that every time she conversed with Martini, he always mentioned his mother
and his family, and she soon realized that he was a "mama’s boy." And she noticed too that
when she would call up Martini at his parent’s house and his mother was the one who
answered the call, she would deny that he was around.

In 1998, after Martini again returned following an almost 10-month contract overseas,8 he
stayed with Lynnette. When in 1999 Martini again disembarked, he stayed with his parents.

On the insistence of his mother, Martini’s monetary allotment was shared equally between
her and Lynnette.

Lynnette had since January 1999 not heard from Martini. And since April 1999, Lynnette
stopped receiving her share of the allotment, drawing her to inquire from Martini’s employer
who informed her that he had already disembarked on even month. She soon found out that
Martini was in Alabang, Muntinlupa.

When Lynnette and Martini finally met in Cebu City, he told her that they are not compatible
and should just part ways.

The last time the couple talked was on October 14, 1999 when Martini was at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) about to depart for abroad. Since then, Martini never
communicated with Lynnette. On investigation, Lynnette learned that Martini declared in his
employment records that he was "single" and named his mother as principal allottee.9

Hence, Lynnette’s filing of the complaint for declaration of nullification of marriage.

Aside from her deposition,10 Lynnette presented her Certificate of Marriage,11 Martini’s
undated Seafarer Information Sheet,12 the letter of clinical psychologist Dr. Andres S. Gerong
(Dr. Gerong) to Martini requesting for a personal interview,13 Dr. Gerong’s testimony,14 and
the Psychological Evaluation Report15 prepared by Dr. Gerong after his interview of Lynnette
and her sister Dr. Rosemarie Sistoza.16

In the Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Gerong noted as follows:

1. The couples [sic] were married on August 12, 1997 in Danao City, Cebu[;]

2. After the wedding the couple stayed at the petitioner’s residence, but the defendant
would always go home to his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City;

3. Defendant did not show any directions to establish their home, [is] happy-go-lucky,
and would just see the plaintiff for his physical and sexual needs;

2
 4. Plaintiff felt being used, exploited, uncared for, taken for granted, abandoned;

5. Defendant’s parents appeared to control the son to the extent of meddling [with] the
finances coming from the income as a seaman;

6. Defendant never showed respect for his parents-in-law;

7. Parents of the defendant insisted [on] a co-allot[ment without] any protestations

from the plaintiff who has been generous all the time;

8. Defendant remained immature, could not stand by his wife and would still depend
upon the decisions of his parents and without any personal directions as to what to do
with his family;

9. Strictly speaking, the couple never really live[d] together as husband and wife like any
ordinary couple17 (underscoring supplied),

and concluded that

Defendant shows immature personality disorder, dependency patterns, and self-

centered motives. Th[ese are] the core personality dysfunctions noted and have been
exaggeratedly expressed which are detrimental to the familial well-being;

The situation is serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period, and
incurable because personality and character are stable whether or not it is normal and
adaptive.

xxxx

The defendant is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations

in marriage and family.18 (Underscoring supplied)

Expounding on his findings, Dr. Gerong testified, thus:

ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)

Q: In gist, what were your findings as to the psychological capacity or incapacity of

defendant Martini Dico Baguio?

A: x x x [T]o sum it up, the synopsis of the findings, the defendant husband appeared to
be [a] dependent person to his family and unable to [sever . . .] the connection being a
married man and to establish a domicile for his family and to support his family.

3
 xxxx

ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)

Q: Dr. Gerong, how grave or serious is the psychological incapacity of the defendant?

A: Being, I would say in our popular parlance, "mama’s boy" as alleged, that will
endanger the integrity of the marriage because instead of establishing a permanent
conjugal relationship with the wife the husband-defendant would remain dependent on
his family.

xxxx

ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)

Q: Okay, in terms of the chances that this incapacity will be cured, what are the chances,
if any?

A: As to curability, since I am using a clinical term ["]personality or character disorder or

dysfunction["] and as I have said many times that the personality is stable and pervasive
over time. And if it is established as early as adolescent period and up to the present it
has remained persistent thru the years and therefore it’s a permanent trait of the
defendant-husband, therefore it’s incurable.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Decision20 of January 2, 2002, Branch 24 of the Cebu City RTC found Martini psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, and that the same
incapacity existed "at the time the couple exchanged their marriage vows."

The Solicitor General, via appeal,21 challenged before the Court of Appeals the trial court’s
decision

. . . DECLARING THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANTS MARTINI DICO
BAGUIO’S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.22

By Decision23 of January 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Addressing the Solicitor General’s argument that Dr. Gerong’s testimony failed to establish the
cause of Martini’s psychological incapacity and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage,24 the Court of Appeals held:

x x x [I]n contradiction of the Republic’s contention and its supporting above-cited

doctrine, this Court cites the more recent jurisprudence laid down in the case of Marcos
v. Marcos,25 in which the High Tribunal has foregone with the requirement that the
4
 defendant should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a conditio sine qua non
for declaration of nullity of marriage. It held thus:

"The x x x guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be

declared psychologically incapacitated x x x – [w]hat is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition, [f]or
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination for the person
concerned need not be resorted to."26

Therefore, the oral deposition [of Lynette] and the Psychological Evaluation Report by
Dr. Andres S. Gerong, Ph.D. as Clinical Psychologist declaring the defendant
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations in marriage and
family life was sufficient for US to believe that undeniably the defendant suffers
psychological incapacity.27 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On the Solicitor General’s contention that Martini’s abandonment of Lynnette is a ground for
legal separation and not for declaration of nullity of marriage,28 and that Martini’s alleged
personality traits are not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code,29 the
Court of Appeals declared:

x x x WE note that it was not the abandonment which was the ground relied upon by the
plaintiff-appellee but the defendant’s being a mama’s boy.30

xxxx

Being a Mama’s Boy, his uncaring attitude towards his wife, declaring himself single
and naming his mother as the beneficiary, spending more time with his family and less
with his wife and ultimately, abandoning her manifested defendant’s psychological
incapacity. These, to sum it all, to US are manifestations of severe psychological disorder
rather than a mere obstinate refusal to comply with his marital obligations.31 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The Solicitor General’s Motion for Reconsideration32 having been denied by the Court of
Appeals,33 the present petition34 was filed, faulting the appellate court to have gravely erred:

. . . IN RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR.

ANDRES GERONG THAT DEFENDANT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED HAVE LEGAL
BASIS.

5
 II

. . . IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT ABANDONMENT BY ONE’S SPOUSE

IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION AND NOT FOR THE DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

III

. . . IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT’S BEING A MAMA’S BOY IS A MANIFESTATION OF A

PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER.35 (Italics in the original)

The Solicitor General’s arguments persuade.

The Solicitor General argued as follows:

Dr. Gerong merely testified that defendant’s alleged psychological incapacity (being a mama’s
boy) began in his adolescent stage and has remained persistent through the years (p. 20,
Brief). Dr. Gerong did not detail this finding. He made no effort to look into and testify on
defendant’s past life, attitudes, habits and character to explain defendant’s alleged
psychological incapacity as required by this Honorable Court in the case of Republic vs. Court
of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1998).

Again, while it is true that Dr. Gerong testified that defendant’s alleged defect is incurable, he
failed to explain why it is clinically or medically permanent. His only basis for saying that it is
incurable is his finding that defendant has been a mama’s boy since his adolescence (p. 7, TSN,
June 19, 2001). During the trial, Dr. Gerong also failed to explain in detail why the defendant’s
alleged psychological incapacity is grave and to discuss what kind of disorder defendant is
suffering from.36 (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)

On the doctor’s findings in his Report, the Solicitor General argued:

The said findings reveal nothing in defendant’s past life and acts that shows a behavior
pattern that would prove his alleged psychological incapacity. Dr. Gerong’s finding that
defendant’s parents are too controlling because they were made co-allottees of the
remittances sent by their son does not prove the alleged psychological incapacity of
defendant. The report likewise failed to explain the gravity of the alleged psychological
incapacity of defendant and state whether or not it incapacitates defendant from
carrying out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family. There is likewise no
explanation by Dr. Gerong why he found defendant’s incapacity to be incurable. This
Honorable Court has held that such illness must be shown to be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligation of the marriage. Such

6
 incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable and
grave [Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra]. These Dr. Gerong failed to do.

Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination of the
defendant by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the totality of evidence
presented during trial by private respondent must still prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity (Marcos v.
Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 [2000]; Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 [1995]).
(Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)

In fine, the Solicitor General concluded that there was no showing that Martini’s alleged
personality traits are of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code and the
rulings of this Court in the cited cases,37 and that Martini’s abandonment of Lynnette
constitutes only a ground for legal separation but not for declaration of nullity of marriage.38

Article 36 of the Family Code on which Lynnette anchors her complaint provides that "[a]
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the other articles in the Family Code, specifically
Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 which provide different grounds to render a marriage void ab initio,
as well as Article 45 which dwell on voidable marriages, and Article 55 on legal separation.39
Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not to be applied
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.40

And Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment, and the like.41

"Psychological incapacity" has been elucidated on as follows:

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies,
or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly a

7
 doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. x x x
[T]he root cause must be identified as a psychological illness, and its incapacitating
nature must be fully explained x x x.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does not
constitute psychological incapacity.43 Nor does failure of the parties to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons.

It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of

meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some psychological (not physical) illness,44
which insensitivity or incapacity should have been existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage even if it becomes manifest only after its solemnization.45

In fine, for psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio, it must be

characterized by

(a) Gravity – It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved. 46

Dr. Gerong found that Martini’s "personality disorders" including his being a "mama’s boy" are
"serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period and incurable" and concluded
that Martini "appeared" to be dependent upon his family and unable "to establish a domicile
for his family and to support his family."

The doctor’s findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette and her
sister and Lynnette’s deposition. From Lynnette’s deposition, however, it is gathered that
Martini’s failure to establish a common life with her stems from his refusal, not incapacity, to
do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,47 which
renders a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. In another vein, how the
doctor arrived at the conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and considering her deposition,
that any such personality disorders of Martini have been existing since Martini’s adolescent
years has not been explained. It bears recalling that Martini and Lynnette became pen pals in
1995 and contracted marriage in 1997 when Martini was already 32 years old, far removed
from adolescent years.
8
Dr. Gerong’s citing of Martini’s appointment of his mother as a beneficiary and his
representing himself as single in his Seafarer Information Sheet, without more, as indications
of Martini’s dependence on his family amounting to his incapacity to fulfill his duties as a
married man does not logically follow, especially given that the Seafarer’s Information Sheet is
not even dated48 and, therefore, there is no certainty that it was prepared after Martini
contracted marriage.

While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her psychological

incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be "medically or clinically
identified." There must thus be evidence to adequately establish the same. There is none such
in the case at bar, however.

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.49 Marriage, an inviolable institution
protected by the State,50 cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties.51 In petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on
the plaintiff.52 Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.53

As reflected above, Lynnette failed to discharge the onus probandi. While the Court
sympathizes with her predicament, its first and foremost duty is to apply the law.54 Dura lex
sed lex.

Lynnette’s marriage with Martini may have failed then, but it cannot be declared void ab initio
on the ground of psychological incapacity in light of the insufficient evidence presented.55

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 13,
2005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. CEB 25700 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 24, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010

RICARDO P. TORING, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

9
 DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P. Toring from the May 31, 2004 decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The CA reversed the August 10, 2001
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-
36662,2 nullifying Ricardo's marriage with respondent Teresita M. Toring on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

THE FACTS

Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunt’s house in Cebu. Teresita was then his
cousin’s teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunt’s house. Despite
their slight difference in age (of five years), the younger Ricardo found the dance teacher
attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita and they became sweethearts after
three months of courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend,
already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.

Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City
Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for
annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to
the celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to declare his marriage to Teresita null
and void.

At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation
and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr.
Albaran’s respective testimonies. Teresita did not file any answer or opposition to the petition,
nor did she testify to refute the allegations against her.3

Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an adulteress
and a squanderer. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife to
cover the family’s living expenses and their children’s tuition. Teresita, however, was not
adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances. Many times, Ricardo would come
home and be welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle these to avoid
embarrassment.

Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, Teresita likewise failed to
remit amounts she collected as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. She left
10
the family’s utility bills and their children’s tuition fees unpaid. She also missed paying the rent
and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired for the family, so their children had
to live in a small rented room and eventually had to be taken in by Ricardo’s parents. When
confronted by Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the excuse that she spent the funds
Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for their children.

Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with
another man’s child. During one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita’s stomach
was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she refused.
Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo
alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with
Teresita were characterized by "withdrawals"; other than these, no other sexual contacts with
his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with
Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to others
as single, and went out on dates with other men when he was not around.

Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding
person, who mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very
averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most unsupportive,
critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their family;
and was most painfully unmindful of him.4 He believed that their marriage had broken down
beyond repair and that they both have lost their mutual trust and love for one another.5

Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the
marriage was Teresita’s Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations. To quote Dr. Albaran:

Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest the following pervasive pattern of
behaviors: a sense of entitlement as she expected favorable treatment and automatic
compliance to her wishes, being interpersonally exploitative as on several occasions she took
advantage of him to achieve her own ends, lack of empathy as she was unwilling to recognize
her partners [sic] feelings and needs[,] taking into consideration her own feelings and needs
only, her haughty and arrogant behavior and attitude and her proneness to blame others for
her failures and shortcomings. These patterns of behavior speaks [sic] of a Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, which started to manifest in early adulthood. The disorder is considered
to be grave and incurable based on the fact that individuals do not recognize the symptoms as
it is ego syntonic and they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Because of that[,] they remain
unmotivated for treatment and impervious to recovery.6

She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on
Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresita’s eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did
11
not personally observe and examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a personally-delivered notice
for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation, but the notice remained unanswered.

In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended
that there was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the
psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague
and general conclusion on these parties’ personality traits but not on Teresita’s psychological
makeup. The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify and
sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the
evidence indicate that the alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of
marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave and incurable.

The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. In short, the RTC believed
Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation and testimony and, on the totality of Ricardo’s
evidence, found Teresita to be psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA.

The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial court’s findings did not satisfy the
rules and guidelines set by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.7 The RTC
failed to specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused Teresita’s psychological
incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of
celebration of marriage.

The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation do not appear
to have been drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay
statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardo’s allegations on Teresita’s
overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations, even if true, could only
effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge for adultery.

THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, particularly the
expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court – in declaring the nullity of
the marriage – fully complied with Molina.

In its Comment,8 the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTC’s decision, particularly
in its conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with this Court’s guidelines for the proper
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Reiterating its earlier
arguments below, the OSG asserts that the evidence adduced before the trial court failed to
show the gravity, juridical antecedence, or incurability of the psychological incapacity of

12
Teresita, and failed as well to identify and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise,
failed to show that Teresita was completely unable to discharge her marital obligations due to
her alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

Ricardo’s Reply9 reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the root cause of
Teresita’s psychological incapacity and identified it as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He
claimed that sufficient proof had been adduced by the psychiatrist whose expertise on the
subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo further argued that alleging the root cause in
a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary, citing
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.10

These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the parties filed.

THE COURT’S RULING

We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error when it set aside
the RTC’s decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,11 we held that psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological
incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."12

We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the
basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability established in the Santos
case, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

13
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may
be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
14
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.13

Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying

factual situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. In so far as the
present factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading and applying our
established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family
Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in
the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the
marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must
have been there from the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the
concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply
recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction – already
then existing – was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had
assumed.14

In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioner’s
evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform
her duties as a wife. As already mentioned, the evidence presented consisted of the
testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latter’s psychological evaluation of Ricardo
and Richardson from where she derived a psychological evaluation of Teresita.

a. Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation and testimony

Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to assume essential
marital obligations. To support her findings and conclusion, she banked on the statements told
to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in her evaluation. Apparently relying on
the same basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresita’s disorder manifested during her early
adulthood and is grave and incurable.

To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and evaluation that, in this
case, became the basis for the conclusion that no marriage really took place because of the
psychological incapacity of one of the parties at the time of marriage.

We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and
Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo,
without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical in
15
considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided
sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.

In So v. Valera,15 the Court considered the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions to be

insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the finding of respondent’s psychological
incapacity because the facts, on which the conclusions were based, were all derived from the
petitioner’s statements whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be discounted. In another case,
Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,16 the Court declared that while the various tests administered
on the petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological
condition, this same statement could not be made with respect to the respondent-husband’s
psychological condition. To our mind, conclusions and generalizations about Teresita’s
psychological condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in
kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.17

To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated
spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non
for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.18 This
recognition, however, does not signify that the evidence, we shall favorably appreciate, should
be any less than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its nature, requires.

Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity outlined in Santos and Molina
need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still
essential – although from sources other than the respondent spouse – to show his or her
personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of the inability
to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and
incurability of the condition.

Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to
them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on
the allegedly incapacitated spouse’s condition at or about the time of marriage, or to
subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the
time of marriage.

In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give
statements for purposes of Teresita’s psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses’
eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because he
could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected
to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth.

16
We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the summary of Richardson’s
interview with the pyschologist: Richardson’s statement occupied a mere one paragraph
(comprising eleven sentences) in the psychological evaluation and merely recited isolated
instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of their house, his father’s alleged
womanizing, and their differences in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while Teresita is a
Mormon).19

We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate that Teresita suffered
from some psychological disorder as far back as the time of her marriage to Ricardo, nor do we
find these fights to be indicative of problems traceable to any basic psychological disorder
existing at the time of marriage. For one, these points of dispute are not uncommon in a
marriage and relate essentially to the usual roots of marital problems – finances, fidelity and
religion. The psychologist, too, never delved into the relationship between mother and son
except to observe their estranged relationship due to a previous argument – a money problem
involving Ricardo’s financial remittances to the family. To state the obvious, the psychologist’s
evaluation never explained how the recited incidents, made by one who was not even born at
the time of the spouses’ marriage, showed a debilitating psychological incapacity already
existing at that time.

Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardo’s cause, is the failure of Dr. Albaran’s
psychological evaluation to fully explain the details – i.e., the what, how, when, where and
since when – of Teresita’s alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. It seems to us that, with
hardly any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply stated out of the blue that
Teresita’s personality disorder manifested itself in early adulthood, presuming thereby that
the incapacity should have been there when the marriage was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never
explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresita’s alleged personality disorder, and how it
related to the essential marital obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did the good
doctor adequately explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and incurable was
Teresita’s psychological disorder.

Dr. Albaran’s testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for Ricardo, as it
still failed to provide the required insights that would have remedied the evidentiary gaps in
her written psychological evaluation. In fact, Dr. Albaran’s cross-examination only made the
evidentiary situation worse when she admitted that she had difficulty pinpointing the root
cause of Teresita’s personality disorder, due to the limited information she gathered from
Ricardo and Richardson regarding Teresita’s personal and family history. To directly quote
from the records, Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation when she said that "[t]he only data that
I have is that, the respondent seem [sic] to have grown from a tumultuous family and this
could be perhaps the [sic] contributory to the development of the personality disorder."20 Dr.
Albaran’s obvious uncertainty in her assessment only proves our point that a complete

17
personality profile of the spouse, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, could not be
determined from meager information coming only from a biased source.

b. Ricardo’s testimony

Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not,
however, find Ricardo’s characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty,"
"refusal, or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the
spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness.21

Ricardo’s testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in managing the
family’s finances by not paying their rent, utility bills and other financial obligations. Teresita’s
spendthrift attitude, according to Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the house and lot
intended to be their family residence. This kind of irresponsibility, however, does not rise to
the level of a psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most,
Teresita’s mismanagement of the family’s finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal or
neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the family’s financial
support.

Teresita’s alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological
incapacity, the respondent’s unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a
disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state;22 there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to be faithful to
her spouse.23

In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that Teresita suffered from a
disordered personality of this kind. Even Ricardo’s added testimony, relating to rumors of
Teresita’s dates with other men and her pregnancy by another man, would not fill in the
deficiencies we have observed, given the absence of an adverse integral element and link to
Teresita’s allegedly disordered personality.

Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresita’s alleged character traits already existed at the
inception of their marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological
incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.24 In the absence of this element, a marriage
cannot be annulled under Article 36.
18
Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for annulment
under Article 36 of the Family Code

Citing Barcelona,25 Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the root cause in a
petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary. We find this
argument completely at variance with Ricardo’s main argument against the assailed CA
decision – i.e., that the RTC, in its decision, discussed thoroughly the root cause of Teresita’s
psychological incapacity as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. These conflicting positions,
notwithstanding, we see the need to address this issue to further clarify our statement in
Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted and misinterpreted to support his present petition that
"since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the
psychological incapacity."26

In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state the "root
cause" of the respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. The Court resolved this issue,
ruling that the petition sufficiently stated a cause of action because the petitioner – instead of
stating a specific root cause – clearly described the physical manifestations indicative of the
psychological incapacity. This, the Court found to be sufficiently compliant with the first
requirement in the Molina case – that the "root cause" of the psychological incapacity be
alleged in an Article 36 petition.

Thus, contrary to Ricardo’s position, Barcelona does not do away with the "root cause"
requirement. The ruling simply means that the statement of the root cause does not need to
be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the root causes of many psychological
disorders are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the physical
manifestations constituting the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Section 2,
paragraph (d) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (Rules)27 in fact provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

xxxx

(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

19
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.

As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code was not dispensed with by the adoption of the
Rules. What the Rules really eliminated was the need for an expert opinion to prove the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further held that the Rules, being procedural
in nature, apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.1avvphi1

To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered from
psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely
established that Teresita had been remiss in her duties as a wife for being irresponsible in
taking care of their family’s finances – a fault or deficiency that does not amount to the
psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We reiterate that
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity, as the same may only be due to a person’s difficulty, refusal or neglect to
undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that
Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.28

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162049 April 13, 2007

NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the Decision1 dated January 8, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
65677, reversing the Regional Trial Court’s declaration of nullity of the marriage of petitioner
and respondent. Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated February 4, 2004
denying reconsideration.
20
In Civil Case No. 94-70727, filed by petitioner Narciso Navarro, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 37, he sought the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent.

As culled from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner and respondent were college sweethearts. At the time they got married, both in
civil and church ceremonies, they were awaiting their first child. Since petitioner was still a
medical student, while respondent was a student of pharmacy, they lived with petitioner’s
parents, on whom they were financially dependent. Eventually, their union bore four children.

Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he didn’t have time for her; and
that she constantly quarreled with him even before marriage when he could not give her the
things she wanted. He added that she was not supportive of his career. Even marriage
counseling did not work. Petitioner stated that when they quarreled, she refused to have sex
with him and even told him to look for other women. He filed the petition for nullification of
their marriage when he found out their eldest daughter had been made pregnant by a man
whom respondent hired to follow him.

Abdona T. de Castro, a marriage counselor duly accredited by the Department of Social

Welfare and Development, testified that when petitioner saw her on April 6, 1994, he was
distraught, harassed, and unhappy. She concluded from meetings with the petitioner that the
marriage was dysfunctional, destructive, and reconciliation was out of the question since he
claims he would go insane if he were to go back to his wife. Relying on the view of another
expert, one Dr. Gerardo Velasco, witness de Castro opined that professionals are per se
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage because they spend a lot of
time in the pursuit of their profession and have very little time to spend with their family. She
concluded that respondent was also psychologically incapacitated to perform the marital
obligations because she knew, from the start, that her husband was going to be a doctor, yet
she did not give him the support and understanding that was expected of a doctor’s wife.

Lilia Tayco, the housemaid of petitioner’s parents also testified that petitioner and respondent
were always quarreling because respondent was always jealous of petitioner’s classmates.

A psychologist, Dr. Natividad Dayan, who conducted a psychiatric test on petitioner, testified
that tests showed that petitioner was a perfectionist, short-tempered, critical, argumentative
and irritable when people do not meet his expectations. He married Cynthia only after he got
her pregnant. He had depressions and tended to escapism when beset with problems. He was
vocal about his marital problems. He believed that the lack of communication, absence of
quality time, inadequacy in problem-solving, and many problems caused the failure of the
marriage.

21
For her part, respondent refused to submit to the psychiatric examination asked by the
petitioner, but said she would do so only when her defense requires it. She averred that she
had no marital problems, not until petitioner had an illicit affair with a certain Dr. Lucila
Posadas. Petitioner denied the affair. Respondent narrated that early 1984, she caught
petitioner and Lucila inside the Harana Motel in Sta. Mesa where a confrontation ensued.
After the incident, petitioner seldom went home until he permanently left his family sometime
in 1986. Respondent claimed petitioner and Lucila continued to see each other and had gone
abroad together several times. She explained that she uttered she would not make love with
her husband and dared him to look for other women only out of frustration and anger upon
discovery of the affair. She admitted hiring someone to spy on petitioner, but added that she
still loved her husband.

Cynthia’s friend since high school, Miraflor Respicio testified that Cynthia was a good, stable,
and mature person; that she was a loving and caring mother who gave up her career to take
care of her children; and that petitioner and respondent were happy during the early days of
the marriage.

On August 21, 1998, the trial court held that petitioner and respondent were both
psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations. The dispositive portion of
the court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the marriage between the parties is (sic) dated June 2, 1973 is hereby declared
null and void with the following effects:

1. The Plaintiff is hereby directed to support his children with the Defendant in the
amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) a month, which sum shall be payable on
or before the 5th day of each month, effective September, 1998;

2. The parties are hereby disqualified from inheriting from each other by way of testate
or intestate succession;

3. Either of the parties may revoke the designation of the other as beneficiary in a life
insurance policy;

4. The parties’ children are hereby declared legitimate, and the custody of the parties’
minor children is hereby awarded to the Defendant with the Plaintiff exercising his right
to visit them at least once a week;

5. The properties in the name of the parties consisting of a house and lot located at 15
Bronze Street, Filinvest, Quezon City are hereby deemed as their advance legitime to
their children.

22
SO ORDERED.2

Respondent appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. She averred that the trial court erred
when it annulled their marriage instead of decreeing their legal separation, with the ruling that
petitioner was the guilty spouse.

In a Decision dated January 8, 2003, the Court of Appeals held that the constant arguments,
bickerings and conflicts between the spouses did not constitute psychological incapacity. It
ruled that petitioner failed to show that any psychological incapacity in either of the two
parties existed at the time of the celebration of marriage. The appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared that the marriage still subsists.

Petitioner now comes before us raising the following as issues:

(1) Are the decision and resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals proper subject for
review by the Honorable Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure?

(2) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals – that the lower court (RTC)
erred in finding the parties (petitioner and respondent) both psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36 of The Family Code – correct or not?

(3) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals – that the evidence failed to
show that the parties (petitioner and respondent) were completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of marriage – correct or not? and

(4) Which is more in accord with existing law and settled jurisprudence, the decision of
the Court of Appeals or the decision of the trial court?3

Simply stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is void on the ground of the parties’
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner contends that the decision of the trial court was well-founded, based on the
evidence indicating that the marriage was beyond reconciliation, and allowing the marriage to
subsist would only prolong the spouses’ agony. Respondent counters that petitioner failed to
prove psychological incapacity, and that their psychological incapacities existed as early as the
time of the celebration of their marriage.

We shall now resolve the issue.1a\^/phi1.net

Article 36 of the Family Code states:

23
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In addition, as early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,4 we categorically said that

psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
These include the obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.5

We likewise have repeatedly reminded that the intention of the law is to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.6 In Republic v. Court of Appeals,7 the Court gave the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 which are as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity...

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision...

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable...

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage...

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

24
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts...

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition...8

In the present case, the spouses’ frequent squabbles and respondent’s refusal to sleep with
petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute psychological incapacity. The records
show that petitioner and respondent were living in harmony in the first few years of their
marriage, which bore them four children. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations,9 it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness10 existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

It will be noted that respondent did not undergo psychological tests. Witness de Castro’s
diagnosis was based solely on petitioner’s avowals and not on personal knowledge of the
spouses’ relationship. Hence, de Castro’s diagnosis is based on hearsay and has no probative
value.11

Further, de Castro’s statement that professionals are per se incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage because their profession allows them little time for family life
is highly debatable.

Lastly, petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity, on the part of both
spouses, existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Their bickerings and
arguments even before their marriage and respondent’s scandalous outbursts in public, at
most, show their immaturity, and immaturity does not constitute psychological incapacity.12
Thus so far, both petitioner and respondent have not shown proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor, an adverse integral element in their personality structure that effectively
incapacitates them from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.13

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 8, 2003 and
the Resolution dated February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 65677 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

25
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in
specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure
in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to
lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May
14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the
marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina
of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially,
the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San
Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a
father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;

26
that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a
very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them;
that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual
who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best
interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer
live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of
friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties
such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of
St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was
born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
Hence, the present recourse.
27
 The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of
the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding
that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in
the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing
and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision
Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our
civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a

broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul
for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to
leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason
to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect
by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . .
. and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
28
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing
Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison
testified:8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on

your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are

psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

29
 The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While
some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and
blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case
vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court
decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial
(Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee.
The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up
with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological —
not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
30
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist
and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

31
 The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally —
subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other —
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition.
Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

32
VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the
Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"),
brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its
application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine
Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On
20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G.
Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived
with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia
gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did
not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by
Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start
a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989,
Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a
chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately
tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the
Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

33
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint
and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was
ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully,
by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor
submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91,
which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia

Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A
wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a
period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during
the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can,
however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration.
34
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes
suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa
preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes
proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is
lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make
the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment
is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make
the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa
suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,

was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason
of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in
the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7),
but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration
or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the
appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable
marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very
essence of marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally"
be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to
retain the word "mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological

impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-)
Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting
the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice
Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon
35
Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the
reason why they should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be
cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void
ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and
there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of
consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if
he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a

ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really
understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make
excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for
divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason
of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in
consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for
the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.

36
 xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not
consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really
removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately,
consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not
principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the
lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations
attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because
they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but
in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity
is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable
marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there
should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been
cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been
really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the
action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although
one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is
brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of
marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense?
In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and
cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser

degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert
on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity
is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of
marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in
insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the
consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the
ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at
the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the
grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the
37
impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with
respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is
incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different
meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity"
can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show
that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital
obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since
in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however,
stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the
marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is
cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to
allow him to remarry.6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the
other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one
to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed
out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which
are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that

38
mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological
incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:

"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would
rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge .
. ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity"
refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided
not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a
lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a
special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of
marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile
with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in
Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect
that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of
psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or

prospective in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to
the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the
Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned
about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee
approved.
39
 The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio
were for retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years
within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in
court. The Committee approved the suggestion.7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis
(G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila

matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the

40
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at
least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph
of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage

because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) .

. . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf.
SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term
anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to
assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt,

Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to
the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of
personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in
41
 legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render
what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer
to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b)
this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota,
Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the
moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1),
who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly,
the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the

42
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to
be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate
nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists,
and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded

that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in
Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman

entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family
life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

43
 Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on
marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself
can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,

vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of
the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004,
respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error.

On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision1
denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The
trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity
44
under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove
infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001
where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial
court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already
present at the inception of the marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's
testimony failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she
failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed
personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or
supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that
effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital
obligations.5

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition
for review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied
for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.

Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix
Ferraris to file comment8 but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the
opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2,
2006.

After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to
deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the
function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of
such factual determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the
issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when
there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the instant case.

45
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.

As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:

Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment
cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's
psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do
not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing
that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those
are incurable.

Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that
respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a
manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological
malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and even during their
brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short
period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of
respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and
loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting
respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women
that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his
so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of trust
in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent
could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.

xxxx

At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent
has a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and
46
 avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed
personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems
to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that
respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably,
when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr.
Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can
be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a history of
respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the
supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came from petitioner. Nor
did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening
disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to
prove that respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before
the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that
upon her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the
marital vinculum.16

We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude

whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity,
the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band
mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with
his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that
the psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological, not physical, illness.

Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a
marriage void based on psychological incapacity.

While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
47
ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage.19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of
the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read
in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that
would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525
that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied
so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves.27 Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated
June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH
FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

48