ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY

Ateneo Law School

CRIMINAL LAW I

MIDTERM MAMINATION Attyo Lorenzo Uo Padilla

SECTION l‐ E August l,2013,3:00 - 5:00 PoM.

cH00SE THE BEST ANSWERSi2 POINTS EACH)

B 1. In the development of crilnes,the acts constituting thc c五
me included
between the act Which beglrls the conllnission of the crime and the last act perforlned
i:よ
「 :轟 」‰ 窯 :1群 T吼 ぶ 路
塁 鼈 v:瞥 等 騰 鮮 高 鶴 ∬ 壽 」常 よぎ ‖ ∬ 譜
acts;ld)OVert actS.

C 2. Can a loCal goveminent deflnc

蕊ぶ 濡 :ll霊 鷲rFlttpttl出
猟轟轟∴常1∫:糀篤n留1臓 I

;盤 eぶ
B
』1壺嵯
藤ぶ f憚硫 11。 lぎ I[織∬蹴菅 鸞
proposale

A
criminal liability is personal and a "manager" cannot be held liable for acts done
by the "author, editor, or proprietot".

_B 6. Intent to perpetrate the act alone is relevant, instead of criminal intent,

when: (af the act is punishable by a special penal statute; lbf the language of the
legal provision, whether of a special penal law or of the RPC, is plain and
positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon the positive, willful intent
and purpose; (cf when the act is not punishable under the RFC; ldf whenever the
act ls not committed by means of crtlpa-

_A 7. Would Philippine courts have jurisdiction over an offense punishable

under the RPC committed, on board a foreign merchant ship, by the master thereoP
(al Yes if the act or omission constituting an offense under the RPC, although it
may have begun at a foreign poft, continues during the time the foreign
melchant ship is already within the territorial waters of the Philippines; (bf No,
because the lrovislons of the RPC has extra-territorial only if the offense is
committed on board a Philippine ship or airship, as provided in Art. 2(U' RPC; (c|
No, because under the Onglish Rule, which is followed in this Jurisdiction,
matters happening on board a foreign merchant ship are justiciable only by the
court of the .oorlry to which the vessel belongs; (df No, because, the offense
having begun in a ioreign port, it necessarily follows that not every essential
element constituting thI ofr.o"" could be considered as having existing during
the voyage across the Philippine territorial waters'
B 8. At early dawn, a policeman who was patrolling his beat caught X in the
goods' At
act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap X had
-that time the owner of the store, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman'
andin unfastening another from the wall, when
ffi ",r"""eded. in breaking one board
ure poticeman showed up. X was instantly arrested and placedrobbery; under custody'
Under the facts, X cqn only be prosecuteh: (af for attempted Fl for
offense; (df for unJust
attempted trespass to dwefu.gt ("1 fot an inieterminate
vexation.
Y physical
_C g. X, a quack d,octor, was prosecutgd for having inflicted uponwas
that the injury caused
injuries. It can not be established in a conclusive manner for ulcers until he or his
maliciously. X, however, admitted that he treated the victimpetroleum he used in the
d.aughters burned the patient, or that the action of
the
them to spread, j-udging from the extent
treatment irritated the said ulcers and caused (af Yes,.without criminal
of the scars. Absent proof of malice, should X be ac-quiGaa
depends, since felonies may
intent, no person can be convicted of a crime; (bl Itculpa, then exclusion of dolo
be committed Uy *"arrs of doto or by means oifelony committed by means of
does not necessarily negate the exist-ence of a to cause an evil' but were
culpa;(cf No, gt"itiitg that X's acts were not intended guilty of imprudence under the
rather applied ." . ,i*"dy, he was nonetheless -criminal intent prevents his
circumstances; (dl Yes, Uecause- .b""""" of dolo, while the facts given are
conviction for a felony commitled by means of culpa'
insufficient to establis-h a felony committed by means of
A 10. Negligence without deliberate intent; (bl both
'delibeiate but (cl simply involuntary, therefore
is: (a|.voluntary
"*ithout intent;
involuntary .rr-a
-necessarily without deliberat" iiieit; {dl simply without deliberate intent and'
for that reason' involuntary'
B 11. X was incensed at Y for having charged him--crimitflt" with rape and
qierido of Y's mother and was living
with being the cause of her pr"grtt r"y. X was--th e and struck her from behind'
-with her as suctr at that time. x t;h"d upon Y_suddenlygash in the lumbar region and
in part at least, ;th ; sharp uoro, proarr"i"*:longfrightful
and t'ito inctres deep' severing all of
slightly to the side eight tnd orre-t alf inches y.n"a been killed' X threw her body
the muscles and tissues of that p*i. baieving declaring he had killed Y' Unknown
into the bushes. He gave himseffi, J"t**a"",
2
to X at that time, Y actually survived the attack. Assuming that X is guilty of murder,
its stage of execution under the facts is: (al consummated; (bl frustrated; (cf
attempted; {dl indeterminate.
C L2. X, a customs inspector, abstracted a leatfrer belt valued at P0.80, from
the baggage of a Japanese, a:ld secreted the belt in his desk in the Custom House,
where it was found by other customs employees. X was really under observation by
other customs employees during the entire transaction; hence, he was in fact not able
to get the merchandise out of the Customs House. Under the circumstances, X
should be convicted: (af only of frustrated theft; (bf only of attempted theft; (cf of
consummated theft; (dl of an indeterminate offense.

C 13. X and Y were convicted of a violation of a special penal statute designed

to ensure the safety and purity of food and drugs. X alone appealed, arguing that the
trial court erred in holding him criminally responsible, in the same way as his agent,
Y, notwithstanding the fact that he had never had any knowledge of the acts
performed by the Y, in sale of adulterated coffee or of any kind of coffee. Record
discloses tJrat Y, while in charge of X's tienda (store) and acting as his agent and
employee, sold, in the ordinary course of business coffee which had been adulterated
by the admixture of peanuts and other extraneous substances. Should X's conviction
be sustained? (af No, because a conviction under the said special penal statute
cannot be sustained where it appears that the sale of adulterated food products
charged in the information was made trtthout guiltg knowlcdge of the fact of
adulteratlon, and ulthout conscious lntent to alolate the statute; (bl Yes,
because a violation of a special penal statute does not require proof of criminal
intent; hence, guilty knowledge is irrelevant; (cf It depends, because whether or
not the existence of guitty knowledge and criminal or evil intent, that is to say,
the conscious intent or will to violate the statute, must also appear in order to
sustain a judgment of conviction is a question which must be determined in
each case by reference to the language of the statute defining the offense; (dl
Yes, a special penal statute (as distinguished from the RPtCf always defines a
crime that is ma.lum prohlbltttrr\ irL relation to which, good faith or absence of
guilty knowledge, is not a defense.
B L4. X attempted to get certain bundles of merchandise at the station, by
means of ttre presentation of the tag sent to the consignee in a letter which must have
been taken from the mail, it not having been proven by whom or how it came to X. X
did, not attain his object, because the bundles had been withdrawn two or three days
before by the consignee. X should be: (af convicted of attempted estafa; (bl
convicted of frustrated estafa; (cl convicted of consummated estafa; (dl
convicted of an impossible crime.
B 15. Discernment connotes: (af intent; (bl intelligence; (cf consciousness;
(dl guilty knowlege.

D 16. Rape sought to be perpetrated upon a child of the age of 3 years and 11
months, by reason of whose tender age, it has been suggested lhat penetration was
impossible, atttrougtr physical evidence from an examination of the victim's private
part clearly indicated iepeated efforts to do so, is: (a| frustrated rape; (bf attempted
rape; (cf an impossible crime; (d) consummated raPe.

C L7. That legal cause that acting first and producing the injury, either
irnmediately or by s-etting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chaintf events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the {inal event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
^and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
p"r"o.r responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
i"r"orr, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
ittjrrty to some person mi[nt probably result therefrom, is called: (af remote cause; (bf
immediate cause; (cf proximate cause; (df efftcient cause'
3
 D 18. Given that an accused acted under a mistake of fact in committing a
crime, it necessarily follows that: (af he should be acquitted because such a mistake
exempts him from any criminal llability; (bf he can be acquitted upon a showing
that, additionally, his act and intention were lawful; (cf he should be acquitted
because such a mistake shows good faith, thereby negating criminal intent; (dl
he can be acquitted if he establishes that, aside from there being no negligence
or imprudence, both his acts and intent were lawful.
B 19. Should a person otherwise qualified but who admits having violated a
city ordinance on jaywalking and another ordinance requiring a cochero to occupy only
the seat intended for a cochero in a calesa be disqualified for appointment to the
Quezon City Police Force, as one having had criminal records? (af Yes, because the
term "criminal record" governing qualifications for appointments is intended by
the legislature to automatically cover every violation of a municipal or city
ordinance carrying a sanction, even of a nominal fine, to enforce it ; {bf No,
because a violation of a municipal ordinance to qualify as a "crime" must involve
at least a certain degree of evil doing, immoral conduct, cornrption, malice, or
want of principles reasonably related to the requirements of the public office; (cf
Yes, because a penalty imposed for the breach of a municipal regulation
represents an exercise of the sovereign authority to define crimes and provide
foi their punishment, delegated to a local government; (df No, because the facts
indicate that he only violated the ordinances and not that he has been convicted
of such violations; simply stated, without convlctions there can be no "criminal
record" to speak of.

_B 20. Falsification of document requires a specific intent to make a document

.*tr,rtnntl: (af therefore, there neither exists, nor can there exist, any such crime
as falsiflcation of a public document by reason of reckless negligence; (bl^
nevertheless, the classification of falsification of documents by reason of
reckless negligence is perfectly legal, taking into account the nature and
circumstances surrounding the act which is the subject of the prosecution; (cf
therefore, falsification of document, tike perjury, cannot be^committed by
negligence; (df therefore, it is enough to negate the existence of falsiflcation of
document to show absence of criminal intent.

_B 2t. Dolo means: (af deceit; (bt malice; (cf negligence or impnrdence; (df
voluntary.

_B 22. Where a police officer, pressed for time to arrive at the truth regarding a
mysterious massacr" of ,rr entire ramity in Laguna on account of a deadline set by his
sriperiors who were, in turn, given 24 hours to solve the case by their superiors'
struck an "invited" suspect whom he merely intended to maltreat, by slightly hitting
the ,,invited" suspect with the butt his gun, as a consequence of which, the suspect
died after a few moments, the crime "ottt*itt"d is: (af reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide; (bl homicide; (cf maltreatment of prisoner; (df torture'

_A 29. The provision of Atticle 22, RPC: {al is applicable to appeals and
proceedings for tir. pro*"cution of crimes, such as prescription of crimes
and
penalties because id cannot be denied that the provisions relative to the
irescription of crimes and of penalties are penal laws or form part thereof; lbf is
-proceedings
not applicable to appeals and for the prosecution of crimes' such as
fr"""iiption of criirls and penalties belause the term penal laws embrace only
and providing for their punishment; (cl is not
iiovisiins defining crimespro.u"dirrgs
applicable to appeals and foittre- prosecution of crimes' such as
pii".ription of ciimes and penaltiesr-because the such appeals and proceedings
are matters of criminal procedure, not substantive a statute law;
criminal ldl not
declaring the
applicable to prescriptlon of crimes and penalties because
Prescription of the crime has no other object and purpose than to prevent or
annul the prosecution ofthe offender.
B 24. A presumption of criminal intent arises: (af when an act is voluntarily
executed; (bf when the act executed, which is presumed to be voluntary,
-constitutes a crime; (cl when no negligence or imprudence is shown; (df when
motive to commit a crime ls proved.

C 25. The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, declaring the
retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to the defendant in a criminal
-action for a felony: {af applies only to acts or omissions made punishable under
the RPC, including its amendments, as limited by the use of the term "felony";
(bf does not apply to acts or omissions penalized. by special laws, considering in
particular that, under Article 1O of the Revised Penal Code, offenses punishable
under special penal laws are not subJect to the provisions of the said Code; (cf
applies to acts or omissions penalized, by special laws, considering in particular
that, under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be
supplementary to such special penal laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary; (df applies exclusively to acts or omissions becoming
punishable under any amendment to the RPC.

_B 26. XX, a minor (14 years old) at the time he committed the crime (July 28,
2OO1), is found guilty of robbery with use of force upon things where the value of the
property taken exceeds P250.00 and the offender does not carry arms, without any
.tt".taing mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Republic Act No. 9344 took effect
only on ZO lttiy 2OOO, under which XX should be exempt from criminal liability and
should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6
and,2Q of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as The Juuenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006, being barely 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime. Can
-93++,
nepubtc Act No. otherwise known as The Juuenile Justice and Welfare Act of
ZObO, be given retroactive effect in favor of XX? (af No, the crime was committed on
28 Juty dOOt and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006 and
the law does not expressly provide for its retroactive application; (bl Yes, the
said law should be given ritioactive effect in favor of XX who was not shown to
be a habitual criminal, based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code; (c) No'
since )O( was no longer of the age exempt from criminal liability at the time
Republic Act No. gg14 took effect on 20 May 2OO6; (df No, because XX was
alriady convicted by the trial court of the crime charged at the time Republic
Act No. 9344 took effect.

_C 27. Convicted of illegal possession of firearms, PS insists that he is a

confrdential agent of the Armed F-orces of the Philippines (AFP.), and it was in that
capacity that he received. the subject firearm and ammunitions from the AFP' As said
firearm and ammunitions afe government property duly licensed to the Intelligence
Security Group (ISG) of the AFP, the samJ could not be licensed under his name;
instead, what he obtained were a Memorandum Receipt and a Mission order whereby
ISG entrusted to him the subject firearm and irmmunitions and authorized him to
c,,.ry the same around Bacolod. City. PS further argues that he merely acted in good
faith when he relied on the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order for authority to
carry said firearm and ammunitions; thus, it would be a grave rnjustice if he were to
by
be iunished for the deficiency of said documents. Conceding good faith reliance of
him on the said Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order, should PS be acquitted
the charge of unlicensed possession of firearm: (af Yes, because such good faitha
"criminal
negates intent; lbf Yes, based on PeopLe as' Maco;rarydang' where
of firearms;
confid.ential agent was acquitted of the charge of illegal possesslonwithout
(ct No, because illegal possession of firearms ii penalizid as a crime
need
Receipt and Mlssion Order
of proving criminal inlent; (df Yes, said Memorandum
constituted legal authority io' po**u=s the subject firearm and ammunition'

_A 28. In a prosecution for parricide (where it was shown that X, husband,

5
killed Y, wife), is it fatal to the prosecution's case or to the accused husband's
conviction if his motive for killing his wife has not been proved? (af I[o, because
motive is not an element of the crime; (bl Yes, because the crime may be
something else, given the particular motive involved; (c) Yes, because absence of
motive may negate criminal intent and, therefore, mean that the crime is not
intentional but accidental; (df Yes, because motive completes the proof of crime.

_A 29. AR, under a claim of ownership, who had wanted the properties taken
out from VL's house. AR had asked his neighbors, DG among them, to assist him in
recovering these properties. Among the properties taken was a wooden bench, which
was found in DG's house. Owing to the prodmity of DG's house to that of VL's, AR
had asked DG that the bench be temporarily left in DG's house until he could transfer
it. Unfortunately, before AR could remove it, VL had already filed a complaint against
them for robbery with the use of force upon things. Under the circumstances, may DG
raise the defense of absence of criminal intent and that he was merely helping AR,
whom he honestly believed to be the owner, take out the properties from VL's home?
(af Yes, his acts were consistent with his assertion that he was merely helping
ii, whom he honestly believed to be the owner, take out the properties from
VL's home and, therefore, DG should not be held answerable for the act charged
absent a felonious intent; (b) No, DG should have known that the bench, being at
VLts home, cannot be taken by them without VL's consent; (cf No, the taking of
the bench was unlawful per se and, therefore, unlawful or criminal intent is
presumed; (df No, he shouid have Iirst verified who actually owned the bench and
is liable for being negligent in failing to do so.

_B gO. In a prosecution for Rape, all that the victimintercourse

said when she testified
with her, the
b.for. the trial cor]rt was that, in arr effort to have sexual
accused's penis "touched her organ but did not penetrate it." What was the crime
committedi 1af acts of lasciviousness; (bf attempted rape; (cf consummated raPe;
(df unjust vexation.

B 31. Section 27(bl of Republic Act No. 6646 provides-: "sEtc' 27' Election
Offenses. - In addition tj the piohibited acts and election offenses
enumerated in
-sections 261 and. 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 887, as amended, the follouing shall be
or
guil.ty of an election o16n"., x x x (b) Ang member o{the board of election inspectors
decreases the uotes receiued bA a
board of canuassers--utho tampers,-arla incleases, or board who refuses, afier proper
candid.ite in ang election or member of the
uotes. x x x'"
ilerificotion and heaing, to credit the correct uotes or deduct suchtampered
Isaviolationof SectiJn 27lblof Rep.ActNo.6646, classifiedunder maluminseor
malum prohibitum? (af It is prohibitwn since the crime is defined in a
^ ^oiu^
penal law; (bf the acts prohifited in- Section 27lbl ate mo,la dn se' for
"p""i.f
otherqrise, even and misiakes committed due to overqrork and fatigUe
would be punishable, "tioo and it could not be the intent of the law to punish
unintentional election canvass errors, while intentionally increasing or
is inherently immoral,
decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate punishable
since it is done with malice and intent to inJure another; (cf crimes
penal Code ate mo;La in se, while those puni.'rhable elsewhere
under the Revised of Act
are m6rla prohlbtta, hence, the acts prohibited-in Section 27pl Republic
(df the'acts prohibited in Section2Tlbl of Republic
No.6646
^r. ^n,tiprohibli.a,
Act No. 6646 raU wittrin the category of mala.prohiblta since the law does not
crimes'
expressly require the element of ciiminat intent in defining said
C 92. The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence
Article 308,
to
in
under
constitute the erements of the crite-of qualified theft defined of personal
-relation to Article 310, both of tft" Revised Penal Code: (Ll the taking
propertg - as shown by the fact that petitioner,- as collector
for Mega Foam' did not
appropriated it for
remit the customer,s check payment to trer employer and, instead, to Baby Aquino' as
herself; (2) said propertg belonged to another - the check belonged
done uith intent to gain
it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking utas shown by the fact that
further
- this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and
6
the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-1aw; {4) it uas
done uithout the ouner's consent - petitioner hid the fact that she had received the
check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to the
company; (5) it uas accompli.shed uittnut the use of uiolence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things - the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by
the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it utas done
with graue abuse of confidence - petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection
of payments from customers. Is the accused guilty of qualified theft? (af Yes, but only
in the attempted stage; (bf Yes, but clearly, it was fnrstrated; (cf Yes' the theft
was consummated and qualifted by abuse of confidence; (df No, he is only guilty
of an impossible crime.

_B 33. Where the offender was apprehended afier setting fire to some rags and
jute sacks soaked in kerosene oil and placed near the partition of an inhabited house,
Lnough to start fire in said partition, and the fire is immediately put out, what is the
stagJof execution of the c.i*" (of arson)? (af the crime would only be attempted
since no part of the house itself had begun to burn when the offender is
"tson
apprehended and the fire is immediately put out; (bf the crime committed is
frustrated arson, the offender having performed all the steps conducive to the
burning of the house, but, notwithstanding these acts, he did not accomplish the
crlminal act which he had intended to consummate by reason of causes
independent of his will; (cf the crime of arson was already consummated, since
the frre has, at least started and burned some rags and jute sacks; (dl he is guilty
of an impossible crime, his timely apprehension having rendered arson legally
impossible of accomPlishment.

_C 94. Is it correct to say that crimes punishable under special penal laws may
be classified, according to their stage of exlcution, as consummated, frustratedare or
attempted? (af Yes, b"ecause the lrovisions
-clefined of the Revised Penal Code
applicable suppletorily to crimes under special penaf statutes; (bf No,
crimes under special- laws have no stages of execution; (cl punishableIt dependsr t-he
under
controlling consideration aPpears to be whether or not offenses no' Art'
special laws would admit apptication of such classification; (df Definitely
punished under
6 of the Rev. pen. Code hatng been held inapplicable to offenses
special laws in People os. Fet7tg1ndo Gonzalesr 32 Phil. 3O7, and in the earlier
case of tlnited Stcrtes as. Ba"sa' 8 Phil' 89'

D 35. One who raises a weapon against another as if about to strike'

at the
same time announcing his intentiott to fru tft" latter, but voluntarily
desists It9*
-going further by the Lmely appearance of a policeman and the teaJttzation of the
-
certainty of apprehension "tto.tia he continue to execute the (cf is
act (al grtlq
is of light-ol
guilty of homicide; guilty
attemptea nomicide; (bl is frust-rated
light
threats, the act of threatening another with a weaPon being a folm of other
to
threats; {dl is guilty of grave threats, because the wrong threatened
be
committed constitutes a crime'
D 36. One who merely conspires with another to commit the crime of estafa but
direct actsin its execution - (af is not himself
does not actually participat" orr.iUy Uy
-liable for the crime of estafa cbmmitted by his co-conspirator[sl because the
exist under the
crime of conspiracy as known to the common law does not to
that conspiracy
system embodied tn ttre Revised Penal code, which provides law specially makes
commit a crime is punishatre onrv ir, ."""" in which the
them so; (bl is also guilty of eJtafa, in exactly the same way as his co-
is the act of all; (cf is
conspirator[st, because in conspiracy, the act of one because his knowledge'
definitely guilty as principal in thJ crime ofinestafa,
conspiracy, despite absence of
acquiescence or approval of the act, as implied to constitute one a
actual cooperation or agreement to cooplrate, is enough co-conspirators if
party to a conspiracy; (df is nonethel""" guitty of estafa as hisbut not doing more
he is the mastermind; otherwise, merely ilining a conspiracy
is not Punishable.
j
_D 37. Y, a policem€rn patrolling his beat, saw a person, Z, acting suspiciously
inside the premises of owned by X. Y covered himself behind a concrete wall and
watched Z as he was picking some valuable property inside the premises. The
policeman saw the Z carrying away the property and when he was out of the premises,
Y stopped and placed him under arrest. Is Z liable for consummated theft? (af No,
since Y saw him even before he began to take the property, he should not be held
liable for theft the policeman could have prevented the crime; (bf No, he should
be charged, if at all, only with attempted or frustrated theft, considering that,
under the circumstances, with the policeman around and watching his every
move, there was no way for him to have accomplished the purpose being
imputed to him; (cf No, theft was impossible of accompllshment because with the
policeman around and watching his every move, there was no way for him to
have accomplished the purpose being imputed to him; ld) Yes, Z has performed
all of the acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment of the crime of
theft and the fact that the defendant was under obsenration during the entire
transaction and that he was unable to get the merchandise out of the place of its
commission is not decisive.

_D 38. Where the decision in a criminal case had long become final when a new
law was enacted, under whose provisions the penalty for the crime of which the
accused was convicted was lowered, then - (af such decision may no longer be
altered or modified, by way of exception to the nrle on retroactivity of penal laws
when favorable to the accused; (bl the convict, if not a habitual criminal, may be
released on petition for holbeas cofpus, (cf the convict would be entitled to
release even if ne is a habitual delinquent; {df the convict should be released
after undergoing imprisonment properly imposable under new law provided he is
not a habitual delinquent.

_B 99. In crimes committed by several persons - (a) the liability is always

collective such that the act of one is considered the act of all; (bl criminal
liability is personal and individual, unless consplracy is proven; (cf the accused
shouldbe separately judged by their individual acts, each being responsible only
for the consequencel oi what he did personally; (df criminal guilt is simply
determined bY association.

_D 40. Where the only fact proven is that the accused shot another person with a
firearm, while the latter does not complain of having suffered any injury' the criminal
liabitty of the accused should - ("i be fimited to attempted physical injury'
obviously because no injury was inflicted nor uras intent to kill indicated; (bl be
for atteipted homicide as intent to kill may be inferred frominthe fact that a
pefson sh-ot another with a firearm, albeit he 4id not succeed inflicting any
injury; (cf be liable only for alarm and scandal; (df be liable for the crime of
discharge of firearm.

_C 4L. Where peace officers, assigned toexpected,

catch a notorious criminal and finding a
criminal wa" sleeping with his back towards
ffior at a place where thehim while thus asleep, without even pausing to ascertain
said peace officers, Iires at
his identity - (af the police oftlcers committed no crime, having acted in
fulfillment of their lawful duty when they committed a would mistake' which is
be guilty of
excusable under the circumstairces; {bf the police oflicers to ascertain
murder by negligence, having killed a person-by mistake by failing
guilty of murder'
the identity of their target; (cf the p6U." offiters would beof their target; (dl
whether or not they .o--*tit.d a miJtake as to the identltyof mistake of fact'
the police oflicers should be acquitted, if charged, by reason
B 42. A felony punishable by a fine of PHP2OO is -- (af no longer a light felony
a fine as a correctional
because Art. 26 0r trr. Revised Penal Code classifies such the law punishes
-penaltyn while Art. 9 defines less grave felonies as those which
(bf a light felony
with penalties which in their -"*i-o* period are correctional;
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because Art. 9 includes in the classilication of light felonies those infractions of
law for the commission of which a penalty of Iine not exceeding 2OO pesos is
imposed; (cf a borderHne felony because it is on the one hand, light, and on the
other hand, less grave; (dl an indeterminate felony.
B 43. An offender who fraudulently assumes authority to demand payment of
electric bills but the demand is simply not paid because of the victim's inability to pay,
-(af is guilty of frustrated estafa; ltl ts guilty of attempted estafa; (cf is guitty of
an impossible crime; (df is not guilty of any crime.

A 44. When, to be precise, is proof of criminal intent necessarlr? (af in crimes

committed by means of dolo; (bf in crimes cl,assified as ma.la ln se; (cl in crimes
-committed by means of ulpq (df in violations of special penal [aws.
B 45. Where the purpose of the offender is thwarted by a foreign force or
agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has
-performed all the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which act it
is his intention to perform, the crime is - (al fnrstrated; (bl attempted; (cl
impossible; (df indeterminate.

_C 46. Not a requisite for an impossible crime: (af that the act performed
would be an offense against persons or propert$ (bl that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either lnadequate or
ineffectual; (c) that there be damage to persons or inJury to property; (dl that the
act was done with evil intent.

_A 47. The wound inflicted, treacherously, by X on Y was not the kind which
could have caused her death as, in fact, she was confined at the Medicare Hospital for
only one (1) day. Can it be argued that X should be convicted of frustrated, not merely
attempted, murder? (a) No, the crime of murder ls undoubtedly only in the
attempted stage, no fatal wound having been inflicted on Y; lbf Yes, because
murder, after all, was in the heart of X, only he failed to accomplish it; (cl Yes, if
the wound was inflicted by means which would have caused death' even lf death
did not in fact result; (df Yes, because of treachery.

_C 48. When is theft considered to have gone beyond the attempted stage? (a)
when the offender is placed ln a posltlon to dispose of the thing taken, even lf
only momentarily; (bf ;when the offender, after the taking, becomes entirely free
to enJoy the thing taken; (cf when the offender obtained physlcal possession of
the thing taken, such taking being motivated by intent to gain; (d| when' after
the taking the thing, the offender has carrled it away.

_B 49. In a disco pub, full of civilians, SPO2 X, who was then together with R,
accosted the victim, SGT Y, why he had in his possession a firearm. SGT Y identified
himself saying "I am MIG' and when SGT Y was about to get his wallet on his back
pocket for his ID, SPO2 X anticipated that the victim was drawing his firearm on his
waist prompting said policeman to shoot the victim. SGT Y died as a consequence of
the bullet wound he sustained. Can SPO2 X be absolved from criminal liability on the
ground of mistake of fact? (af Yes, although SGT Y was, in fact' just about to get
his wallet on his back pocket for hls ID, SPO2 X anticipated that he was drawing
his firearm on his waist, prompting him to shoot the victim by mistake; {b) No'
those circunstances blone would not lead a reasonable and prudent person to
believe that SPO2 X's life was in peril and, thus, his act of shooting SGT Y
constitutes clear negligence; (cl Yes, SGT Y's actions were aggressive enough to
appear that he was going for his gun and, therefore, SPO2 X could not be faulted
f6r responding in defonse of himself; (df Yes, the situation must be seen from the
way itlppeared to SPIO2 X, who clearly felt his life was ln danger as the person
he was talking to was reachlng for his waist where he had his firearm.
 C 50. While a dance party was going on, the victim, FC got hold of the
microphone and announced a special dance number for some persons. The special
-dance number did not push through because MS, who was then the barangay captain
of Kabulukan, prevented the music from being played and said over the microphone
that the announcement made by the victim, who incidentally was his lanmpadre, is
foolish, then punched the victim on the face. Instead of retaliating, the victim just
uttered, " Pare, whg do ute haue to quarrel this?" Again, MS threw another punch at the
victim. Thereupon, MS's son, BS, struck the victim with a kamagong cane, hitting the
latter on the forehead which caused him to feel dizzy and to fall down. With the victim
already down, MS, using a hunting knife, his other son RS, using a pinuti, and his two
(2) other sons, BS and RB, both using kamagong canes, took turns in striking the
victim. Thereupon, MS stabbed FC thrice while both BS and RS stabbed FC once,
using tlre weapon called pinuti. Can conspiracy be inferred from the acts of MS, BS,
RB and RS? (af Yes, conspiracy may be inferred where the apparently separate
acts are linked together, and the separate isolated acts can well conjure to a
common design geared towards a common criminal purpose; (bf Yes, the very
essence of conspiracy is that it exists where the separate acts committed, taken
collectively, emanate from a concerted and associated action, albeit each
circumstance, if considered separately, may not show confabulatlon; (cf No, the
Iiast sequence of unexpected events leading to the killing of the victim elicited
the spontaneous, though erroneous reactions of the three; (dl It depends on
whether their apparently separate acts were triggered by prior or evident
deliberatlon and carrled out in futtherance of a common design.
+++THANK YOU― NOTHING FOLLOWS+++

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