RULE 75

Probate Proceedings in Rem

1. In re Johnson (G.R. No. L-12767, November 16, 1918)

Ebba Johnson (child from 1st wife) alleges that at the time of the publication, the probate court has
knowledge that she was living in the US. She argues that the court should have appointed a date for the
probate of the will sufficiently far in the future to permit the her to be present either in person or by
representation; and it is said that the failure of the court to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an
infringement of that provision which declared that property shall not be taken without due process of law.

ISSUE: W/N the proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction

HELD: YES. The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.

The proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the
state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the
world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where
a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due process of law, the
proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice
prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short.

There was no denial of due process.

Ebba could have applied, at any time within six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing that she
had been precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings by conditions over which she had no control
and that the order admitting the will to probate had been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or
upon a supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been authorized to set the probate
aside and grant a rehearing. It is no doubt true that 6 months was a very short period of time within which
to expect Ebba to appear and be prepared to contest the probate with the proof which she might have
desired to collect from remote countries. Nevertheless, although the time allowed for the making of such
application was inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in this
case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her attorneys and
excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.
2. Manahan v Manahan (GR No. 38050, September 22, 1933)

1 year and 7 months after the will was admitted to probate, Engracia file a motion for reconsideration and
a new trial praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will
declared null and void ab initio, on the ground, among others, that she was an interested party in the
testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the
will.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Engracia should be notified of the probate of the will

HELD: NO. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the right to
expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for
the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not
confer on her the right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the
appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any
successional right.

2. Whether Engracia can still question the validity of the will on the ground that the external formalities
prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the execution thereof
HELD: NO. Once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity
thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due
execution thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud,
in any separate or independent action or proceedings.
In addition, as the proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting
the will to probate was effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the provisions of section
306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:
SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition
or relation of a particular person the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will
or administration, or the condition or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate; . . . .

Note: Once the court admit the will to probate, it should be accepted and respected by all. The probate of
the will constitutes res judicata as to the questions of validity and sufficiency of the execution of the will
in question.
3. Alaban v CA (GR No. 156021, September 23, 2005)
On May 30, 2001, the lower court allowed the probate of the will of the decedent and directed the issuance
of letters testamentary to Francisco. More than 4 months later, Alaban, et al. filed a motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings. They also filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the
decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate
heirs of the decedent.
Alaban claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the
correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. The RTC denied the
motion. Alaban filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA. They claimed
that Francisco already entered into a compromise agreement with them after the death of the decedent and
that they learnt of the probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of which they filed their motion
to reopen the proceedings and admit their opposition to the probate of the will only on 4 October 2001.
They argued that the RTC Decision should be annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.
ISSUE: W/N Alaban, et al. became a party to the probate proceedings
HELD: YES.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested
in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have
the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a
proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the
petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the
estate of the decedent.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for
probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of
hearing.
NOTES:
1. As parties to the probate proceedings, Alaban, et al. could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or
reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said
remedies available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they
would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.
2. Alaban, et al., as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be
notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the
petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
3. Assuming arguendo that Alaban, et al. are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of
the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.
4. The non-inclusion of Alaban, et al.’s names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the
proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented
from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.