Rule 103 Change of Name

Valid Grounds

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CA & MAXIMO WONG

G.R. No. 97906. May 21, 1992

FACTS:
Maximo Wong petitioned for the change of his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. whichwas his name prior to his
adoption by Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong
embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry
when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase
any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname,
thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to
revert to his former surname.

RTC: Ruled in favor with Maximo (having complied with the necessary requisites)
OSG appealed the decision. Maximo's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were
unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change of name, rather for Maximo to cast aside the
name of his adoptive father is ingratitude to the memory of the latter.

CA: affirmed RTC’s decision

ISSUE: WON Maximo Wong may legally change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr.

HELD:YES. Maximo Wong may legally change his name.

Change of name is a privilege, given the proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason. It bears stressing
at this point that to justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c) When the change will avoid confusion;
d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien
parentage;
e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and
f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

Here, Maximo used a valid ground. Thus, he should be allowed to change his name as prescribed by law.
Morever, In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause
is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court
and not all the best evidence available. Summarizing, in special proceedings for change of name, what is
involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent
results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged
in the courts.

A change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and
duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is altered is
only the name.
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio v. Republic
October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

FACTS: Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex
from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex
reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a
female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of
justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is
no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied.

ISSUE: WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD: No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right.

It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or
write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the
change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law
allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court
denied the petition.

Republic v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC,
Laguna; such that, her name be changed to “Jeff” and her gender to “male”.

She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name “Jennifer Cagandahan”.
While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where
the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have
clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that for all interests
and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.

ISSUE: WON the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.

HELD: Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex
as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that where a person is
biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. The respondent
here thinks of himself as a male considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones. There is
preponderant biological support for considering him as a male.

Procedure
Republic v Aquino (1979)

Facts: John Li Kan Wan filed a petition for change of his name to John Sotto alleging (a) change of status
from Chinese to Filipino after he elected Filipino citizenship and (b) the confusion caused by his use of the
name John Sotto since childhood despite being registered as John Li Kan Wan.
Court issued order giving notice to all interested parties to appear before the court and state their
objections, and directed the publication of the order in a newspaper of general circulation in Nueva Ecija.
The Republic, through OSG, filed an opposition. Despite this, the court granted the petition.

Republic filed a petition for review citing the court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear the petition for omission in
the title of the petition of the new name asked for.

Issue: Is the Republic’s contention correct?

Held: Yes.

Under Section 2, Rule 103 of the New Rules of Court, the petition for change shall set forth inter alia, the
name asked for. The requirement is mandatory and compliance therewith is essential, for it is by such
means that the court acquires jurisdiction. Failure to include the name-sought to be adopted in the title of
the petition, and consequently in the notices published in newspapers is a substantial jurisdictional
infirmity. For publication to be effective, it must give a correct information. To inform, the publication
should recite, among others, the following facts: (a) the name or names of applicant; (b) the cause for
which the change of name is sought; and (c) the new name asked for.

Notices in the newspaper, like the one under consideration, usually appears in the back pages. The reader
as is to be expected, merely glances at the title of the petition. It is only after he has satisfied himself that
the title interests him that he proceeds to read down further. The purpose of which the publication is
made, that is, to inform, may thus be served.

Republic v Marcos (1990)

Facts: Pang Cha Quen filed a petition for the change of name of her minor daughter May Sia, alias Manman
Huang, also known as Mary Pang to Mary Pang dela Cruz. She explained that she caused her daughter to
be registered as an alien under the name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname because the
child’s father, his previous husband, had abandoned them; that her daughter has always used the name
Mary Pang; that her daughter has grown to love his stepfather Alfredo dela Cruz, to whom Pang Cha Quen
is currently married; and that Alfredo gave his conformity to and signed the petition.

After due notice and with no opposition, the court granted the petition. Republic, through OSG, appealed
to the Supreme Court raising (i) lack of jurisdiction over the case and (2) petition’s failure to adduce proper
and reasonable cause for change of name.

Issue: Is the Republic correct?

Held: Yes, on both issues.

1. The title of the petition failed to include the name Mary Pang as one of the names that the minor has
been allegedly using. This omission is fatal to the petition even if such other aliases are mentioned in
the body of the petition. In Republic vs. Zosa, G.R. No. 48762, September 12, 1988, this Court
explained the reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted and the
other names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of the published
order. It is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the
title of the petition in a special proceeding for a change of name. Only if the caption or the title strikes
him because one or all of the names mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to read the
contents of the order. The probability is great that he will not notice the other names or aliases of the
applicant if they are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition.
 In view of the defect, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the special proceedings.

2. The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name:
a. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b. when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c. when the change will avoid confusion;
d. having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his
alien parentage; or
e. a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
not to prejudice anybody.

The reason cited by petitioner are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a
change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another
where none actually exists. Our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a
person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their mother’s husband, who is not
their father, can result in confusion of their paternity.

Moreover, the Rules require that the petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to
change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this case,
however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia. Only May Sia herself, alias Manman
Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the age of majority, may file the petition to change
her name. The decision to change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new name and
surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal decision. No one else may make it for her.
The reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she may not want to use her stepfather’s
surname, nor any of the aliases chosen for her by her mother.

The State has an interest in the name borne by each individual for purposes of identification and
the same should not be changed for trivial reasons like the instant case. A change of name is a mere
privilege and not a matter of right.

RA 9255: An act allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father

In Re: Petition of Julian Wang (2005)

Facts: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor child born in Cebu, assisted by his mother, filed a petition for
change of name. The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in
Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a
person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his
current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether
they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s
Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these
reasons that the name of the minor Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin
Wang, thus dropping his middle name.

The court denied the petition for lack of valid reason for dropping the change of name. Petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari, asking the court to determine whether or not dropping the middle name
of a minor child is contrary to law (citing Article 174 of the Family Code).

Issue: Should the petition for change of name be granted?

Held: No. The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience.
However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion
and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice
him in his rights under our laws.

Notes: In addition to the five reasons for change of name cited in Republic v Marcos, a person may be
allowed to change his name when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.

Name is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating
the identity of persons. The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name,
and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth
or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the
family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by
the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual
from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name.
(3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause
and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and
intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.

Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father
recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given
name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle
name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
Republic v Capote (2007)
Facts: Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovani
Nadores. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and
Diosdado Gallamaso. He was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as
such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them;
and [Giovanni] has been known by that name since birth. His father never took up his responsibilities as
such. Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname
changed to that of his mother’s surname. Further, Goivanni’s mother might eventually petition him to join
her in the US and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso may complicate his status as natural child.

Upon order of the court, publication of the petition was made. Court also directed that the local civil
registrar and the OSG be sent a copy of the petition and order. After reception of evidence, the trial court
granted the petition. OSG appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in granting the petition in a
summary proceeding.

Issue: Is the OSG’s contention correct?

Held: No. While OSG is correct in its stance that proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, it
cannot void the proceedings on account of its own failure to participate therein. The trial court complied
with publication proceedings. Despite notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition, including the
OSG.

Further, the law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy,
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence
presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil
Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother
has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever
recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to
have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother
and son.

Note: The Court cited here the case of Julian Wang. Check niyo ung Notes dun sa case digest na un, guys.

RA 9048 &10172 Clerical Error Law

BATBATAN VS. OFFICE OF LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR

FACTS: Petitioner Eligia Batbatan is the mother of two minor children, Jorge Batbatan Ang and Delia
Batbatan Luy. The surnames were taken from then name and alias of their father, Ang Kiu Chuy, alias
Sioma Luy. Petitioner and Sioma Luy were never married, and Sioma Luy is married to another woman.
Petitioner filed the petition to remove the name of the father so that the son would be Jorge Batbatan and
the daughter would be Delia Batbatan. The petition was denied by the trial court on the grounds that the
records show that it was the petitioner who supplied the information in the birth certificate of her son and
daughter, and that the entries in the records of birth are correctable only if the effect would not change
status, citizenship, or any substantial alterations. Such changes must be decided in the appropriate
proceeding.
ISSUE: WoN the trial court is correct.
RULING: No.
The changes sought by petitioner would not affect the status of the children because they are illegitimate
in the first place. The law requires that illegitimate children should carry the surname of their mothers and
that is precisely what the petitioner was trying to achieve here.
A clerical error implies mistakes by the clerk in copying or writing, the making of wrong entries in the public
records contrary to existing facts. An error is not clerical if it affects substantial matters, if its correction will
bring about a substantial change.

LEE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The respondents are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng
(Legitimate Children).
The petitioners are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan (Illegitimate Children).
The legitimate children filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in
the records of birth of the Illegitimate Children. Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false
and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein
the name of “Keh Shiok Cheng” as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name “Tiu Chuan,”
who is allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is
improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the
petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to
impugn has already prescribed.

ISSUE #1: WoN resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is proper
HELD #1: Yes. The proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right. Stated
differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of
certain events which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of
rights.

The petitions filed by the Legitimate Children for the correction of entries in the Illegitimate Childrens’
records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for
Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to them as shown in their birth records. Contrary to the
Illegitimate children’s contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to
impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that they are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok
Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter’s children. There is nothing to impugn as there is
no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and the Illegitimate Children.

ISSUE #2. Whether or not the private respondent’s suits amounted to a collateral attack against
petitioner’s legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding
HELD #2: No.
In the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia, Although recognizing that the changes or corrections sought to
be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held
therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. In
the said case, we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in
the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an
appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied
with. (specifically, Sections 3,4 & 5)
“Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is ‘appropriate.”
“If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and / or cancellation of entries in the record
of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as “summary.”
There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or
claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and for corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the
proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.”
Appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding:
“If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order
for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are
substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy,
and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove
the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted, x x x.”

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy granted upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the statute
expressly provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to take a look at the
procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per
se. Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks (Sec. 4). The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any person in interest
are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may make
orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue
an order granting the same (Sec. 7).

[Here, the court explained Art. 412 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 and the reasons of flip-
flopping decisions of SC in previous cases]
ART. 412: does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections
or changes must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure
contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature. Thus, it is important to note that
Article 412 uses both the terms “corrected” and “changed.” In its ordinary sense, to correct means “to
make or set right”; “to remove the faults or errors from” while to change means “to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.
The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on
the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all
entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412.
RA 9048: Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and
changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The
obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries
of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and
corrections in entries of the civil register.
RA 9048 is Congress’ response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is
that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as
distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind.
For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we
have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that
summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at
bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application.

ISSUE #3: WoN the action has already prescribed.

HELD #3: No.Inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding
under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil
Code that applies:
“Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the
time the right of action accrues.”
The right of action accrues when there exist a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements,
namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and
c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.
It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has
arisen. It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause of
action, that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners’ birth records, occurred more
than thirty (30) years ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents’ right of
action or right to sue accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in
1989 that private respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who
continue to use said falsified birth records.

Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to
establish the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners’ true mother, and their real status, simply because
they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date.
This is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their father’s legitimate children, did not
have any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their
sole right to inherit from their mother’s (Keh Shiok Cheng’s) estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that
private respondents’ suspicions were aroused and confirmed. From that time until 1992 and 1993, less
than five (5) years had lapsed. Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the
date of the registration of the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date
private respondents had discovered the false entries in petitioners’ birth records in 1989. Petitioners base
their position on the fact that birth records are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the
right of action available to the private respondents started to run from the time of the registration of their
birth certificates in the Civil Registry. We cannot agree with petitioners’ thinking on that point. It is true
that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents and
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. Petitioners liken their birth records to land
titles, public documents that serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for the petitioners, this
analogy does not hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person’s parentage cannot be acquired by
prescription. One is either born of a particular mother or not. It is that simple.

REPUBLIC VS. KHO

FACTS: Respondent Carlito and his siblings filed petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of
Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of
his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
Correction sought:
1. the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese,"
2. deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because his parents,
Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally married.
3. with respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the date of his and his wife’s
marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage
certificate.
4. Carlito’s second name of "John" be deleted from his record of birth
5. name and citizenship of Carlito’s father in his (Carlito’s) marriage certificate be corrected from "John
Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
6. In the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, correction that the first name of their mother be rectified
from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
Carlito et al presented documentary evidence showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of
the petition and testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his mother, Epifania.
The OSG argued the ff:
1. failure of Carlito et al to implead the minors’ mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer
sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the questioned “married” status of Carlito
and his siblings’ parents, and the latter’s citizenship.
2. the trial court erred in ordering the change of the name of “Carlito John Kho” to “Carlito Kho” despite
non-compliance with jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE #1: Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents rendered the trial short of the
required adversary proceeding and the trial court’s judgment void.
HELD #2: No.
The correction/changes sought by Carlito et al involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.
This Court in Republic v. Benemerito, observed that the obvious effect of RA 9048 is to make possible the
administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries
in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in
appropriate adversarial proceedings. When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus
followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of
the civil register is satisfied.
Also, this court held in Barco vs CA, that the publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108
cured the failure to implead an indispensable party.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under
Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x x x x x
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The
decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has
for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
ISSUE #2: Whether the trial court erred in ordering the change of the name of “Carlito John Kho” to
“Carlito Kho” despite non-compliance with jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court.
HELD #2: No.
With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name from “Carlito John” to “Carlito,” the
same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the
cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name falls under letter “o” of Section 2 of Rule
108
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for change of name)
were not complied with, observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought
for.

KILOSBAYAN VS. ONG

FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, announced an
appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the
vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
The appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacañang in view of the question relating to
the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong.
There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the Office of the President.
Respondent Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still there except that the validation of the
issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)."
Kilosbayan Foundation contend that the appointment is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Kilosbayan Foundation claim that Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that
his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. The birth certificate reveals that at the time of
respondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after Ong’s birth his father was finally
granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the
appointment issued to Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
Ong’s Comment: Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen; that when respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was
naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the naturalization.
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an
identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution,
since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
Kilosbayan’s Reply: reiterated that Ong’s birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-
summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states,
namely, that Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor would
not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.
ISSUE: WoN Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
HELD: No.

He is still required to submit evidentiary documents. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar,
docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, Ong
alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino
citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was
naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby
became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his birth
certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese
citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han
Seng, was also a Chinese citizen. It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted
evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend
the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with
his father.

Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil

register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a
substantial change. Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative
proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in
nationality. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry
should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by
various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper
judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence
would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to
what still appears in the records of this Court.
Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-
line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court
as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from
doing so.
Rule 108 - Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

Braza v. Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental

G.R. No. 181174 4 December 2009

Facts:

Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a vehicular accident. During the
wake, Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the wife
and son, respectively, of Pablo. Cristina made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth
certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of
Patrick having acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue
of the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza.
Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married in
1998.

Cristina and legitimate children with Pablo filed before the RTC of Negros a petition to correct the entries
in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick could not
have been legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said
marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage between she and Pablo. Cristina and
her children also prayed for the court to direct to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation

The trial court dismissed the petition holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court,
which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA
test, and that the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Issue:

Whether the court may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar

Ruling:

No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiations.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry
in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be
used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A
clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or
a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is
clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious
alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded
and due process is properly observed.

Cristina’s cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being
bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on 15 March 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively;
hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to
emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the
petition filed before the court a quo.

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 186571 11 August 2010

Facts:

Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on
November 2000. On 18 January 2005, he married a Filipina named Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after their wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise her wife but was shocked to discover that Daisylyn was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce which was granted.

Two years later, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. In his desire to marry his new Filipina fiancée,
Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on their
marriage certificate. Despite its registration, an NSO official informed Gerbert that their marriage still exists
under Philippine Law; and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must be judicially recognized by a
Philippine court.

Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested for the same prayer.

RTC denied Gerbert’s petition contending that Art. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos and not to aliens.

Issue:

Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly made.

Ruling:

No, the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil
registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been
met in the present case, the petition filed by Gerbert with the RTC cannot be considered as one filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

This ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign
divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.