RULE 128

General Provisions

Section 1. Evidence defined. — Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (1)

Section 2. Scope. — The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as
otherwise provided by law or these rules. (2a)

Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by
the law of these rules. (3a)

Section 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. — Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in
any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. (4a)

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

FACTS:

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice
of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the
complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued
for the arrest of the accused. The accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that
investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty,
upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence
so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law.
The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In
view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence, and the
justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Justice of the Peace court of Masantol committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to grant
the accused's motion to return the record.

HELD:

Evidence is the mode and manner of proving competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to
establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings. It is fundamentally a procedural law. The Supreme Court that
section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. Said section
defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law
restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring
out the truth.

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and denied
even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel
the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
Tantuico v. Republic G.R. No. 89114 December 2, 1991

Facts:

A case was filed by the PCGG vs. the Marcoses & Tantuico, the latter on the theory that he had taken undue
advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his
constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting and aided with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, facilitated in concealing the ill-gotten wealth. Tantuico filed a motion for a bill of particulars. The SolGen
opposed the motion saying that the matters sought by Tantuico are evidentiary in nature & that the complaint was
sufficient as it contains the essential elements of a cause of action. Respondent Sandiganbayan held in favor of the
SolGen’s contention

Petitioner moved for motion of reconsideration, and was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence this
petition.

Issue:

WON the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed resolutions

Held:

YES. A complaint is defined as a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes
of action. Its office or purpose is to inform the defendant clearly & definitely of the claims made vs. him so that he
may be prepared to meet the issues at trial. The complaint should inform the defendant all the material facts on
w/c the plaintiffs rely to support his demand The complaint should inform the defendant of all the material facts
on w/c the plaintiff relies to support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action w/c forms the
bases of the plaintiffs claim of liability. The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the “ultimate
facts”, & the second, the “evidentiary facts.” The term “ultimate facts” as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, means the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.

Nothing is said in the complaint about the petitioner's acts in execution of the alleged "systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth", or which are supposed to constitute "flagrant breach of public trust", "gross and
scandalous abuse of right and power", and "violations of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines". The
complaint does not even allege what duties the petitioner failed to perform, or the particular rights he abused.

In like manner, the allegation that petitioner "took undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit," that he "failed to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman," and acting in concert
with Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, "facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements,
and questionable use of government funds as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, to the grave and irreparable
damage and injury of plaintiff and the entire Filipino

people", are mere conclusions of law. Nowhere in the complaint is there any allegation as to how such duty came
about, or what petitioner's duties were, with respect to the alleged withdrawals and disbursements or how
petitioner facilitated the alleged withdrawals, disbursements, or conversion of public funds and properties, nor an
allegation from where the withdrawals and disbursements came from, except for a general allegation that they
came from the national treasury. On top of that, the complaint does not even contain any factual allegation which
would show that whatever withdrawals, disbursements, or conversions were made, were indeed subject to audit
by the COA.

The Chairman of the COA does not participate or personally audit all disbursements and withdrawals of
government funds, as well as transactions involving government property. The averments in the particular
paragraph of the complaint merely assume that petitioner participated in or personally audited all disbursements
and withdrawals of government funds, and all transactions involving government property. Hence, the alleged
withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds could not have been, as held by
respondent Sandiganbayan, "within the peculiar and intimate knowledge of petitioner as Chairman of the COA."

The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to, pertaining to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they
merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence, without the
particulars prayed for in petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner can not
intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.

Ultimate facts are important & substantial facts w/c either directly form the basis of the primary right & duty, or
w/c directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence by w/c these material elements are to be established. It refers
to principal, determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of w/c, the entire cause of action rests.
“Evidentiary facts” are those facts w/c are necessary for determination of the ultimate facts; they are the premises
upon w/c conclusions of ultimate facts are based.

Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action,
namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, & (3) the act or omission
of the defendant in violation of said legal right, the complaint states a cause of action, otherwise, the complaint
must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground of failure to state a cause of action. However, where the
allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, the proper recourse would be, not a
motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of particulars.

PEOPLE vs. EBIAS G.R. No. 127130 October 12, 2000

Facts:

Ronaldo and Tirso Narez, were shot which resulted to the latter’s death. Ronaldo executed an affidavit in which he
identified the assailant as a certain Boy Marantal. Ronaldo executed another affidavit in which he said that Ernesto
Ebias was the same Boy Marantal who shot him and his cousin.

During the trial, Ronaldo reiterated in open court that Ebias and Boy Marantal were one and the same person. The
TC rendered a decision finding Ebias guilty of the crime of murder with frustrated murder and imposed the penalty
of death.

During his incarceration, Ebias filed a motion seeking the appointment of a counsel de oficio for Leonardo Eliseo,
also a death convict at the NBP, who wrote a letter confessing to the commission of the crime for which Ebias was
held liable. The Court denied Ebias’ motion for lack of merit. Ebias moved for new trail on the ground of newly-
discovered evidence. He averred that new and material evidence had been discovered by the defense, consisting
of a confession made by Eliseo. Such evidence could not have been discovered and produced during his trial
because it was only after his conviction that he came to know of Eliseo’s responsibility for the crime and his
willingness to confess. He asserted that Eliseo’s confession would probably change the judgment if it was
introduced in evidence.

Issue:

WON Eliseo’s confession constitutes newly-discovered evidence warranting a new trial in favor of Ebias.

Held:

Yes. For newly-discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative,
or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, could probably change the judgment.
The uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness is sufficient basis for the conviction of the accused if it is credible,
positive, and constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that the latter is guilty. In this case, the trial court relied
primarily on the positive identification made by Ronaldo in convicting Ebias.

The Court ruled that there is a need for a new trial in order to determine the veracity of Ronaldo Narez’s positive
identification vis-à-vis the alleged confession made by Leonardo Eliseo since no less than a life is at stake. The High
Court recognizes that court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules
by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth.”
Hence, a liberal interpretation of the rule granting a motion for new trial is called for.

Thus, the case is remanded to the RTC for the purpose of allowing the presentation of the testimony of Leonardo
Eliseo and any evidence which the prosecution may wish to present to rebut such testimony.

People vs. Tranca G.R. No. 110357, August 17, 1994 235 SCRA 455 (1994)

Facts:

On 6 May 1991 at 11:00 p.m., a “confidential agent” or informer went to the office of the NCRNU and told them
that the informer had revealed that a certain “Jon-Jon” (later identified as the accused) was selling shabu. Capt.
Miano then formed a buy-bust team with himself as the team leader, Sgt. Latumbo as the poseur-buyer, and the
rest, including the informer, forming the support group. Capt. Miano gave to Sgt. Latumbo a P100 bill with serial
number SN886097 (Exhibit “B”) and which had been dusted with fluorescent powder to be used in the buy-bust
operation. The informer introduced Sgt. Latumbo to the accused and told the latter that his companion was
interested in buying shabu. The informer then asked the accused if he had any for sale. The accused answered in
the affirmative and asked for the quantity to be bought. The accused momentarily left the pair and entered his
house. When the accused emerged, he gave a package to Sgt. Latumbo who in turn handed to the accused the
P100 marked money. Sgt. Latumbo examined the package he received and upon ascertaining that it was really
shabu, gave the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head. Capt. Miano and the rest of the police officers then
closed in on the accused. They introduced themselves as NARCOM agents and arrested the accused. Upon
interrogation by Capt. Miano, the accused voluntarily surrendered one plastic bag of shabu and the P100 marked
money. The accused was handcuffed and taken to the NARCOM headquarters. The accused denied the allegations
against him and contended that he was framed by the police officers. The trial court promulgated its decision
finding the accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P30,000.00. The accused appealed the decision, hence this case.

Issue:

Whether the right of the accused against self-incrimination was violated when he was subjected to examination for
ultraviolet powder that incriminated him in the said crime.

Held:

No, The defense contends that the right of the accused against self-incrimination was violated when he was made
to undergo an ultraviolet ray examination and that the Chief Chemist Teresita Alberto failed to inform the accused
of his right to counsel before subjecting him to the examination are without merit. What is prohibited by the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of physical or moral compulsion to export
communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. Stated
otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant’s own lips, against his
will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of the accused’s body to ultraviolet radiation, in order to
determine the presence of ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation so as to warrant the
presence of counsel.
People v. Yatco 97 Phil 940 (1955)

Facts:

1. Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having
conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos

2. During the progress of the trial on while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo
Xavier of the NBI, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him)
by defendant Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Panganiban interposed a general objection
to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the
other accused Panganiban.

3. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground:
that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Consunji and Panganiban
to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts,
conditions, and circumstances.

4. Court: That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a
confession unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as
required by law. MR denied.

5. This petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Sol Gen, for the review and annulment of the
lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Consunji
and Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

Issue:

WON the lower court erred when it ordered the complete exclusion of the confession made by Consunji

Held:

Yes Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an
accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.

"SEC. 14. Confession.·The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense
charged, may be given in evidence against him."

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against
his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the
conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as
evidence of the declarant's own guilt.

The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec, 12 of Rule 123,
providing that:

"The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration."

Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises
("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the
conspiracy had been brought to an end.

Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as
evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet
even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions),
much less formally offered in evidence

It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the
objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued
motuproprio. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may
waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the
Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence.

We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial
confessions xxx

After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even been formally offered in evidence for any purpose.
Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as
against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the
prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges.

Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance
Co.

“In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the
proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad
faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon
the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later.”

There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of
evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.

Dispositive:

Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled
and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting
Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and
MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of
Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the corporation they form were alleged to committed
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code,” to
which they were served 4 search warrants, directing any peace officer to search petitioners’ persons and/or
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences for: “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”
The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups: (1) those found and seized in the offices of
aforementioned corporations, and (2) those found in petitioners’ residences.

Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents,
books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were

actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of in accordance with law x x x.

Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling: even if the searches and seizures under
consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence
against petitioners herein.

Issue:

Validity of the search warrants.

Held:

The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill et. al. are not the
proper parties to assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation and thus they have no
cause of action (only the officers or board members of said corporation may assail said warrant, and that
corporations have personalities distinct from petitioners’ personalities), the 3 warrants issued to search
petitioners’ residences are hereby declared void. Thus, the searches and seizures made therein are made illegal.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:

(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in
said provision; and

(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

In the case at bar, none of these are met.

The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” As no specific violation has been alleged, it
was impossible for the judges who issued said warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed or
committed violations of the law. In other words, it would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or codes. General warrants are also to be eliminated, as the legality or illegality of
petitioners’ transactions is immaterial to the invalidity of the general warrant that sought these effects to be
searched and seized: “Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”

The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures is, in the language of the Federal Supreme Court: x x x If letters and private documents can
thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of
those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in
the fundamental law of the land.

RULE 129

What Need Not Be Proved

Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols
of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)

Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions. (1a)

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request
of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party,
may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case. (n)

Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)

People v. Tomas Tundag (October 2000)

Facts:

Mary Ann Tundag, alleged that her father, Tomas Tundag, raped her twice. First was on September 5, 1997 and the
other on November 18, 1997. 2 separate criminal cases were filed against her father. Mary Ann Tundag also
alleged that she was 13 years old when she was raped by her father. (However, the prosecution in the case at bar
was not able to show any documents pertaining to Mary Ann’s age at the time of the commission of the rape. The
prosecution then asked the Court to take judicial notice that Mary Ann was under 18 years of age which was
subsequently granted without conducting a hearing.) She narrated that her father used a knife to threaten her not
to shout while he was raping her on both occasions. While raping her, he was even asking her if it felt good. He
was even laughing. (What a bastard!) After the commission of the second rape, Mary Ann went to her neighbor (by
the name of Bebie Cabahug) and told her what happened to her. They reported this to the police and was later
examined by a doctor who concluded that she was not a virgin anymore. The Trial Court convicted Tomas Tundag
on both counts of rape and was sentenced to the penalty of death. On appeal to the CA, Tomas flatly denied that
the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch
repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that
evening. On November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to
have raped his daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired, he went to work and naturally, being
exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such wrongdoings.

Issue:
WON Tomas Tundag is guilty of the crime of rape

Held:

Yes! Tomas Tundag’s defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and
weighty ground for exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private
complainant who testified on affirmative matters, such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an
inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim of the
appellant as the violator of her honor. The victim’s account of the rapes complained of was straightforward,
detailed, and consistent. Her testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that her father
could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court.

Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainants private parts meant a
history of sexual congress on her part. According to her, the lacerations may have been caused by the entry of an
erect male organ into complainants genitals. Bu this does not conclusively and absolutely mean that there was
sexual intercourse or contact because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other things, nonetheless, the
presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private complainants claim that she was raped by appellant.

Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because she had quarreled with
him after he had castigated her for misbehavior. But such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain
the charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughter’s accusation must be taken
seriously. It goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as well as
her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.

Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes imputed to him
considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This argument, however, is impertinent
and immaterial since he was estranged from his wife, and private complainant was the only child who lived with
him.

Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any
way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her testimony that appellant raped her twice.
We note that the victim understood the consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father –
her father’s death.

Issue 2:

WON the penalty of death imposed on him is correct. WON it was correct for the Court to take judicial notice of
Mary Ann’s age without a hearing.

Held:

No. Death penalty should not have been imposed. It was incorrect for the Court to take judicial notice of Mary
Ann’s age without a proper hearing.

Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 penalizes rape of a minor
daughter by her father as qualified rape and a heinous crime. The elements are as follows: (1) sexual congress; (2)
with woman; (3) by force or without her consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of capital punishment,
the additional elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years old at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a
parent of the victim.

In this case, Mary Ann’s age was not properly and sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that
she was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted that she did not know exactly when she
was born because her mother did not tell her.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because
they already know them. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary.
Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts -

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols
of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts -

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.

STATE PROSECUTORS VS. MURO [236 SCRA 505, September 19, 1994]

“the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is
to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and reasonable
doubt on the subject should be resolved in the negative”

Facts:

The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent
Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of
the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank

Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2
newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines
lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported
announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested
the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further
contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such fact a public
knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.

The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters he purported to be
a public knowledge based merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign
exchange restriction. It was also an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the
prosecutors who were already at the stage of presenting evidence thereby depriving the government the right to
be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice on the published statement of
the Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that has not yet been officially in force and effect of the law.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice on the
statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as basis for
dismissing the case?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his
assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the
President’s announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public announcement is absolute and without
qualification and is immediately effective and such matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a
judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days
in a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the President’s statement was published in the
newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature
for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on
the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;

(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact cannot be disputed.
Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does not amount to the
judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial
notice must come from the knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as
true and one that involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the information he obtained from
the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force
and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The
court ordered for the dismissal of the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on
matters that are hearsay and groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the
courts with caution at all times.

CASE: GENER VS. DE LEON G.R. No. 130730 October 19, 2001

“Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such
cases have been tried or pending in the same court, except when with the knowledge of the adverse party reference
is made to these cases and the latter did not object thereto.”

FACTS:

Respondent De Leon filed a forcible entry case against petitioner Gener, alleging that he is the original claimant
and actual possessor in good faith under a bona fide claim of ownership to a certain parcel of agricultural land in
Bulacan. The said land was part of the bed of the Angat River which was formerly adjacent to the boundary of lot
that is covered by the Certificate of Title of De Leon. A flood caused that part of the river to develop and elevated
and dried up land where De Leon extended occupation, planting and cultivating coconuts, bananas and vegetables.
In May 1989, Gener allegedly through force, threat and intimidation unlawfully entered the property and deprived
De Leon possession thereof. De Leon demand Gener to vacate the premises but was ignored. Efforts to settle the
dispute amicably thru the brgy justice system did not prosper prompting De Leon to file an ejectment case against
Gener.

Gener on the other hand denied all allegations of the respondent and claimed to be the real owner of the property
as evidenced by the notarized deed of sale which was executed in October 1988 by Benjamin Joaquin who is the
heir of the former possessor of the land, Proceso Joaquin. The land was declared for taxation purposes in the name
of Gener and declared the land as private. De Leon’s father, in an affidavit, mentioned that P. Joaquin was the
owner the neighboring lot in the east side of their lot.
Gener further attested that it was De Leon who forcibly entered the lot in question as evidenced by two criminal
cases on malicious mischief he filed against the workers of De Deleon who entered the disputed land and
destroyed the planted trees thereon. He also invoked that the right to file an action for ejection already prescribed
after filing the same beyond the 1 year prescription period. Trial ensued where Gener is the only witness to his
defense while De Leon presented oral testimonies of witnesses who stated that he was the owner of the lot in
dispute. Gener presented a deed of sale, a tax declaration of the land in his name and recalled the 2 criminal cases
he filed on malicious mischief against the worker of De Leon. The MTC ruled in favor of De Leon but the decision
was reversed by the RTC and dismissed the forcible entry case against Gener. On appeal, the appellate court
reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC. A motion for reconsideration was then
filed before the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ejectment case may lie against Gener?

HELD:

The court ruled that in the ejectment case the issue to be resolved is who would be entitled to the physical or
material possession of the property in dispute. Respondent De Leon has his claim founded from the presentation
of testimonial evidence of various witnesses while Gener has his claim founded on documentary evidence which
the MTC failed to appreciate during the trial. As against the mere testimonial evidence relied upon by respondents
that they were forcibly ejected from the land by petitioner on May 8, 1989, the documentary evidence of
petitioner’s prior possession, more particularly the evidence of the two (2) criminal charges he filed. Oral
testimony, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence, especially when said documentary evidence is not opposed. The MTC should have taken judicial notice
of the criminal cases presented by Gener. While as a general rule the court is not authorized to take judicial notice
of the contents of the records of other cases even when such case is tried or pending on the same court, the
exception to this rule is that in the absence of objection of the other party, the court may treat such evidence as
part of the original record of the case when it is presented or referred to with the knowledge of the adverse party
who fails to object thereto, the MTC should have taken judicial notice of such fact to resolve the case in an
expedient manner.

It can thus inferred that Gener took possession of the property earlier than Oct 1988 which was the date he first
filed the criminal case on malicious mischief and De Leon filed the petition for forcible entry in April 1990, the
cause of action already prescribed thus the MTC has no jurisdiction to hear the case. The SC dismissed the
complaint on forcible entry without the prejudice to file an appropriate action in the RTC.