G.R. No.

72005 May 29, 1987

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., and DOMINADOR
CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents.

ISSUE: Whether an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the said bond.
In the Resolution of September 25, 1985 2 this Court as prayed for, without necessarily giving due course
to the petition, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order
complaint of.

FACTS:

This was a petition for certiorari of the Resolution granting Sycwin Coating’s MFE pending appeal and
ordering the issuance of the corresponding WOE on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by PBA, Inc.

Sycwin filed for a collection of sum of money against Varian Industrial. During the pendency of the suit,
it managed to attach some of the properties of Varian in a supersedeas bond. Varian managed to post a
counterbond of P1.4M through British Assurance, so the attached properties were released. Judgement
was ruled against Variant. Variant appealed, and Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal
against the properties of Variant which was ordered by the Court. This was not satisfied so Sycwin filed
that surety, PBA be ordered to pay the value of its bond, citing Secs. 5, 12 and 17 of Rule 57 of the Rules
of Court.

HELD: Petition by PBA is DISMISSED. The Order of Execution may be enforced on the counterbond to lift
attachment within the provisions of Section 5, “shall be charged with the payment of ANY JUDGEMENT.
That is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final judgement but also the execution of judgemtn
pending appeal.

STATCON: Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. ( Ubi lex non distinguish
nec nos distinguere debemos)
2. G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991

CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG,
and ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of foreign checks are covered by the provisions of BP 22.

FACTS: Cecilio De Villa was charged with the violation of BP 22 for issuing a Depositor’s Trust Check
worth $2500 equivalent to P50,000. He moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that:

a. Respondent Court had no jurisdiction over the matter;

b. No offense was committed since said check was payable in dollars, so the obligation created is null
and void pursuant to RA 529.

HELD: Offense was committed. Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided
they are either drawn or issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within the
coverage of said law.

It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts should
not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may
not, except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs.
IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]).
G.R. No. 110898 February 20, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE ANTONIO C. EVANGELISTA, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXI, 10th Judicial Region, RTC of
Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, and GRILDO S. TUGONON, respondents.

ISSUE: The issue in this case is whether the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion by granting
private respondent's application for probation despite the fact that he had appealed from the judgment
of his conviction of the trial court.

FACTS: Togonon was charged and found guilty of Frustrated Homicide. He appealed and his sentence
was modified. He eventually filed a petition for probation citing among other reasons for qualifying, the
Santos To v. Pano precedent where the SC upheld the right of the accused to probation notwithstanding
the fact that he had appealed from his conviction by the trial court.

The Chief Probation Officer recommended the denial of his application on the grounds that by
appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he could have applied for probation, he waived his right
to make that application. Tugonon’s case was distinguishable from the Santos case because his original
sentence of 1 year imprisonment was already probationable. But the RTC set aside his recommendation
and granted Tugonon’s application.

HELD: The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. The applicable law for Tugonon was not PD 986,
but PD 1990, which took effect in 1986. Said law amended the grant of probation stating that such
application be made within the period for perfecting an appeal, and that NO application be entertained
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgement of conviction. Tugonon’s argument that
a distinction must be made between meritorious and unmeritorious appeals, but the law does not
distinguish and so neither should the Court.

The ruling of the RTC that "[h]aving not perfected an appeal against the Court of Appeals decision,
[private respondent] is, therefore, not covered by [the amendment in] P.D. 1990" is an obvious
misreading of the law. The perfection of the appeal referred in the law refers to the .appeal taken from
a judgment of conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate court, since under the law an
application for probation is filed with the trial court which can only grant the same "after it shall have
convicted and sentenced [the] defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal.
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995

JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

ISSUE: WON a candidate who, even after withdrawal of his candidacy, is still liable for fines due to his
failure to file his statement of contribution and expenses.

FACTS: Pilar filed for candidacy for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in Isabela, but withdrew his candidacy
three days later. COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for
failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. He contends that since he withdrew his
candidacy, he is no longer required to file the statement and should not be fined.

HELD: Petition is DISMISSED. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the
obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures, it makes no distinction or qualification
as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate"
must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who
withdrew his candidacy.

The law in force uses the word SHALL which implies that it is mandatory. It is not improbable
that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures,
even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
G.R. No. L-14787 January 28, 1961

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ISSUE: WON the Auditor of the Central Bank was correct in refusing to pass the claims on the grounds
that the stabilizers and flavors listed in the exemption of Sec. 2 of the Tax Exchange Law are limited to
those used in food preparation only.

FACTS: Colgate filed a 17% refund for the special excise tax it paid for importation of its materials. It was
denied by the Auditor and Auditor General maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned
in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food
or food products.

HELD: Petition is granted. The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as
used in the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food
and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that "general terms
may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the
specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose."

SC upheld that it is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in
an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at bar, it is true that the term
"stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food
products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the same
classification. Since the law does not distinguish between the use of these products, court is not
authorized to distinguish and must use this terms in their general sense.

STATCON: The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by
particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms
entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken
in connection with other rules of construction.
G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE
LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO
DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S
SUELLO,respondents.

ISSUE: Whether PD No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands.

FACTS:

Separate informations were filed by Fiscal Ello against 16 persons, including Mario Aparici, for squatting
in violation of PD 772. They were alleged to have squatted and occupied through stealth and
strategy,the grazing land owned by Dela Serna, Jr.

The Judge where five of the informations were raffled to, issued an omnibus order dismissing the case
on the reason that the PD decreed that the entry not be through stealth and strategy, but used entered
the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with
the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner", and that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a
grazing land. The information was amended but the LC still ruled that the phrase “for other purposes”
did not cover agricultural lands because the preamble did not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and
makes reference to the affluent class.

HELD: Petition is DISMISSED. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the
trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to
apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is
merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain
G.R. No. 72005 May 29, 1987

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., and DOMINADOR
CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents.

ISSUE: whether an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the
counterbond to lift attachment.

HELD: Yes. Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the counterbond is intended
to secure the payment of "any judgment" that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Under
Section 17 of same rule it provides that when "the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part"
it is only then that "payment of thejudgment shall become charged on such counterbond."

The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed reproduced as part of the
counterbond. In the third paragraph it is also stipulated that the counterbond is to be "applied for the
payment of the judgment." Neither the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond limited its
application to a final and executory judgment. Indeed, it is specified that it applies to the payment
of any judgment that maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that an execution
of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe charged against such a
counterbond.