COUNTERINSURGENC
Some Antecedentsfor Success
~leutenant Colonel WWliam F. Long, Jr., United states
A~~~~~~~
the United States is
mot ivated by a Western revolutionary
spirit and democratic idealism, it may
face many of the challenges and dis­
abilities of European colonial powers
when directIy engaging in counterin­
surgency in the colored world of Asia
and Africa. Lessons that can be
learned from European experience
may be valuable in the future for the
United States..
In an attempt to discover common
denominators of insurgency and ante­
cedents for counterinsurgency. succeee,
four cases were investigated-tfeliber­
ately selected to include direct Com­
munist participation in some but not
in others.
90
&rwg
The southeast Asian sekctions—
Malaya and Indochina—involved Eu­
ropean powers with Communist-di­
rected insurgency: in Malaya, the
Communists were defeated; in Indo­
china, the Vietminh won over fiance.
Tbe African cases included two suc­
cesses—Madagascar and Kenya—in
which direct Communist participation
has not been proved.
Tbe Philippine anti-Huk experience,
an attractive success model, was ruled
out becauee of its limited value for
studying outsid~r third power—
participation. Further, the defeat of
the Communist Huk movement was
almost a personal triumph for Ramon
Magsaysay. A disturbing observation
MilitaryJtwlew
arising from all o,f the” case studies is
that men of kfagsaysay’s caliber have
also been on the other side.
some Common Denominators
In all four cases, insurgent leaders
took advantage of education and in­
stitutions, provided by the colonial
power, to further and mature their
schemes. In most cases, native leaders
—Communist a n d non-Communist
alike-had traveled, lived, and even
been politically active in Europe. They
knew the Western World and the atti­
tudes, strengths, and weaknesses of
their political masters. In addition,
every insurgent movement had polit­
ical support in the metropolitan coun­
try. This ranged from strong French
Communist eupport for the Vietminh
and the Madagascar revolutionaries
down to moral support from English
liberals for Kenyatta in Kenya and
the impact of British recognition of
Red China early in the Malayan emer­
gency.
In every case, the revolutionary
leadership judged the time propitious
for revolt. There were immediate, real
grievances to exploit—social discrim­
ination, economic exploitation (espe­
cially with regard to alienation of
land ), social disintegration, and re­
ligious issues. During World War 11
Lieutenant Colonel William F. Long,
Jr., is assigned to tILe US Army Ele­
ment, Military Assistance Advisory
Group in Vietnam. He served with
the .?d Infantry Division during the
Korean War, was with Headquarters
7th Array in German~, and was as­
signed to the Oj,fice of the De@y
Chief of Staff for Personnel. He at­
tended the U. S. Arm~ Command and
General Staff College, is a graduate
of the Armed Forces Staff College a~d
the Naval War College, and recesked
his Master’s degree f r o m George
Washington University.
October1963
(and, to a Ieseer extent, World War
I) European weaknesses had been ex­
posed. Native troops had traveled ex­
tensively and valuable guerrilla traip­
ing had been provided to a hard core
native group. In Madagascar, for ex­
ample, come guerrilla leaders had
learned their trade in the French Re­
eietance fighting Germans. Starting
in the French Army in the Z’iraitlerws
Mafagaches, a few reached high rank
in tbe maquis.
Other Factors
Qther factors alsd favored insur­
gency: the development of a colonial
bureaucracy; the passing of the early
face-to-face leader-adminietrator wbo
worked closely with, and understood,
the native peoples; and World War H
administrative degradation, At tbe
same time, settlers with vested in­
terests complicated the social and ad­
ministrative problems and frequently
blocked ameliorating, pronative re­
forms. On the international scene, an­
ticolonialism and socioeconomic hu­
manitarianism in the United Nations
strengthened revolutionary expecta­
tions of support and success.
In every case, insurgent leaders
“telegraphed” their intentions, but
preoccupation with metropolitan prob­
lems and poor intelligence resulted in
the government being surprised by the
actual outbreak of hostilities. Fight­
ing generally started with terrorist
acts, and terror was used as a policy
lever to control or neutralize the popu­
lation in favor of the insurgents.
Direct Communiet assistance was
present in two cases—Malaya and In­
dochina—but only in the support of
the Vietminh in Indochina was it mas­
sive and effective.
Traneborder sanctuary and support
figures in Indochina, and, to a lesser
extent, in Malaya. But the most sig­
91
nificant fact is that the insurgents trol is more important than the con.

succeeded in bringing about an effec- t.inuation or rapid restoration of civil

tive degree of independence, either di- institutions and agencies.

rectly or as a result of reform and In Malaya the British staffed den.

, —.

French Air Force planes evacnate Tai tribesmen and their families from a guerrilla
threatened area in August 1953.Despite limited successes, the French were never able
to match the Vietminh in developing a psychological or spiritual rapport with tbe
people.

concessions by the colonial powers, re­ ger points with administrative officers
gardless of the outcome of military in depth to ensure continuity of gov­
operations. ernmental operations and control. Ef­
Antecedents for Success fective administration was alao con­
In the paragraphs which follow, the tinued in Kenya. In both cases, atrin.
major antecedent factors are deline­ gent, even petty, control measures
ated for the cases investigated. It is were used to discipline, and reward,
well to keep in mind that, while these selected villages or administrative
factors are aeparate~ treated, they, units, A sense of responsibility, no
too, are inseparably related. matter how irksome, was impressed
General Political Approach upon native political Ieadera and the
Governments menaced by insur­ populace.
gency strive to achieve and maintain In both cases, unity of organization
effective control of their populations and effort was achieved with civil au­
and territories. No one aspect of con­ thority paramount at all levels. Even

92 Military Review
though a state of emergency was de­
clared, the situqtion was never mili­
tarized. Takin,g into account the dif­
ferences in type actione and the du­
ration of operations, the same general
approach obtained in Madagascar
where martial control was estahliehed
only for the duration of a relatively
short military campaign.
In Indochina the political situation
could not be managed and French mil­
ita$y resources were insufficient for
occupation of the land to control tbe
people and, at the same time, to pro­
vide mobile troops in the numbers
needed to gain the initiative. The
French-eupported, native civil admin­
istrative officers frequefitly appeared
inept, even to their own sponsors.
Population Support lta8e
In Malaya and Kenya, British set­
tlers constituted a broad hut thin base
for consolidating government control.
Arming the planters was a neceseary
risk, but their restraint was generally
commendable and t h e r e was littie
alienation of the native population
through indiscriminate retaliatory
violence.
In Malaya the Communists were al­
most exclusive y Chinese. Therefore,
the Malayan ethnic group furnished a
broad base for developing effective
popular control and eupport. In Kenya
non-Kikuyu Africans, Christian Kiku­
YUS,and “Old” Kikuyus, true to their
traditions and religion, formed a sim­
ilar structure. This was also true in
Madagascar where the non-Merina
tribes—well over half the population
—feared the return of Merina domi­
nance.
In Iudochina the French had no ini­
tial chance to develop a native base of
support. World War II developments
forced French forces to return in the
role of a reconquering army, plus the
October 1963
handicap of being denied the custom­
ary right of an invading army to treat
the population as enemy people and to
control them accordingly.
PoIiticai A8pecte of Securitg
Security meaaures to protect tbe
loyal and passive elements of the pop­
ulation were an initial part of the
counterinsurgency concept in Malaya
and Kenya. Arms control and strin­
gent population control measures were
effective in isolating the insurgents
logistically and increasing the positive
separation of the activists from the
people.
In Madagascar military operations
drove the rebels into remote regions
and localized fighting. This permitted
the restoration of civil administrat­
ion, in most places, in relatlve safety
within about a year after the begin­
ning of the emergency. The final mop-
UP phase was not long in securing the
entire island.
Domq8tic Unitu
The quality of home government
support was a major factor in the four
counterinsurgency cases investigated.
This support was generally good in
Kenya and, with the exception of rec­
ognizing Red China, in Malaya. The
elimination of Communists from the
French Cabinet was a decisive factor
in the Madagascar revolt.
The length of the Indochina war
and the multiplication of difficulties
and differences between the major fac­
tions in France militated against a
consistent policy or adequate support
of the military effort. The lack of po­
litical leadership and decisiveness con­
demned the French Army to psycho­
logical wounds and frustrations that
were to rend. the entire political fabric
of France during the Algerian war,
and beyond.
Metropolitan colonial administra­
93
COUNTERINSURGENCY ,,

tion was sensitive to world opinion, as gave way to French-granted independ.

well as to domestic ~ublic opinion. The ence. Any meaningful reforms of this
revolutionary nature of nOn-Western nature were beyond the French in In.
European world opinion tended to ag­ dochina.
gravate the difficulties facing colonial An excellent example in microcosm
governments when vested interests of the effects of economic betterment
and national pride ruled domestic
opinion.
In each of the cases, successful
counterinsurgency included political
reforms. Even the failures included
the recognition of the need for re­
forms. The differentiating factor is
the timing of the reform measures
and the effectiveness of implementa­
tion. This placee a premium upon
timely, enlightened, positive, and uni­
fied government reform policies and
programs.
Social and Ecenomic Mea8ures
It is unlikely that real counterin­
surgency success could have heen
achieved without social and economic
reforms. One universal element which
has emerged from the study of revo­
lutions is land reform.
The pervasiveness of the need for Security measures designed to protect
an enlightened land policy is remark­ the loyal and passive elements of the
population are an important initial aspect
able. Writing in 1948, when his words
of counterinsurgency operations
were timety as well as important,
Gerald F. Winfield stated that the and social welfare on political loyalty
Red Chinese land policy was the ma­ was furnished by the British csm­
jor tool used to gain and hold power paign to win the jungle aborigines
in the countryside. * away from the control of Malayan
In Malaya there was a social and Communists. Openhanded, sensitive,
economic integration of the Chinese and humane treatment, combined with
minority along with land reforms. The imaginative provision of light aircraft
Africans in Kenya, having gained a to haul native artifacts to a ready
greater political position, “are now market, led to unprecedented native
openly dedicated to social and eco­ economic gains. This, in turn, had a
nomic reforms which will give them salutary effect upon the character of
the equality—perhape superiority— these primitive people and upon the
they desire. Similar changes in Mad­ quality of the support their loyalty
agascar were started by the French, provided.
and have accelerated as colonial status The integrating influence of suc­
* Gerald F Wi.fiefd. Cfimm i%. Lm’d a*’dN~hI
cessful counterinsurgency is seen in
People, W,lliam Shxne As%ocmtes. Inc., the development of tranetribal polit-
York, 194b, P 398.

94 MititaryReview
ical parties in Kenya and Madagas­
car. The importance of integrating the
Chinese intO Malayan political life is
another case in point. The future of
the white minority in all areas pf
colored independence remains to be
seen. However, this appears to be a
problem in direct ratio to numbers
and privileges, and the attitudes of the
whites, themselves, may be decisive.
Psychological Phenomena
Psychological approaches were var­
ied, and it was in this field that the
French appeared to be defeated most
decisively in Indochina. They found
nothing to say or do that matched the
Vietrninb in developing a psycholog­
ical or spiritual rapport with the peo­
ple. That is not to say that they had
no local successes, but it was the over­
all psychological bankruptcy that was
deadly. This even eroded the morale of
their own gallant men.
Tbe Madagascar revolt had a com­
plex psychological background. It is an
oversimplification to say that it was
merely an attempt by the Merina to
reestablish their hegemony. In many
respects, the Merina, as the clerical
class, continued their position of su­
periority under the French. Their as­
pirations and activities, plus the past
remembrance of Merina rule, alien­
ated the other tribes who fared better
under the French.
There were religious complications,
but English Protestant missionaries
supported the French. One reported
that the French were generally re­
strained, and their treatment of cap­
tured rebels so generous that they re­
ceived local criticism for being too
lenient.
Too, the isolaticm of the world’s
fourth largest island permitted the
French to handle the rebellion with a
minimum of outaide influence. In con­
October1963
traat with Indochina and Algeria, the
results tend to prove that the French
have the capacity for successfully
managing revohrtiona.
The British won a tremendous psy­
chological victory over a diabolically
designed psychological maaterpiece­
the Mau Mau. The success of the gov­
ernment-sponsored deoathing program
prevented the Mau Mau from captur­
ing or neutralizing a sufficiently large
Kikuyu population base to reach stage
one in the Mao Tse-tung revolutionary
pattern.
It would be impossible to overvalue
tie contributions of a few English­
men in Kenya whose complete knowl­
edge of the K]kuyu language and psy­
chology made the victory possible, In
situations where settlers with a sur­
face acquaintance with the natives and
selfish financial interests could he
counterproductive and dangerous, the
real specialists were indispensable.
Their conversion of terrorists to pro-
government operations is an example
of psychological warfare at its peak.
Tbe Malayan experience proves that
Communist zealots can also be reha­
bilitated and converted to anti-Com­
munist programs, and the propriety
and restraint of the British approach
deserves more attention. Winning the
loyalty of the jungle aborigines, re­
habilitating terrorists, and resettle­
ment have received wide operational
emphasis. The psychology behind these
operations and the character of the
responsible personnel need further
appreciation.
Militarg 0peration8
Counterinsurgency experience in
the investigated cases proves that peo­
ple’s wars require military leadership
of unusual imagination, dedication,
and reetraint. Unity of command is
critical, and the complete integration
95
 COUNTERINSURGENCY
of military operations into the over-all
pofitical scheme requires organization
and definition of objectives to an un-
precedented degree.
It is in this respect that US counter-
insurgency involvement faces the crit-
.-. . . .
..­ -­ ‘—
_.* --­
—­ --­
-­ --­
-—
-.
\-­
Counterinsurgency experience proves that people’s wara require military leadership of
unusual imagination, dedication, and restraint
ical obstacle:. military power resides
with the United States, but it is, of
necessity, tied to the @iticaI fortunes
of indigenous leadership and bas no
legitimate means of either leadership
or separate expression of goals.
The one admonition growing out of
a study of people’s wars is: Don’t fight
the people. When revolutionary ac-
tivists are integrated with the popu-
lace, frustrations and 10SSof patience
lead to the temptation to fight the en-
tire population. The key to winning
ia separating the zealots from the pop-
96
ulation, destroying or converting the
few, and controlling or protecting the
many. This was done to a successful
degree in Malaya, Kenya, and Mada-
gaacar.
Transborder sanctnary and supply
.-. .
,,
8 ‘\’.­
US Amv Photo8
have a great influence upon iusurgent
strength and operations. But closing
international borders to insurgents
has represented political, rather than
military accomplishments.
Closing an extensive border is a mil-
itary undertaking of enormous dimen­
sions and may not be feasible in close
country. Closing the Thai border to
Malayan insurgents, as the result of
a political agreement, was a major
step toward victory-especially when
joint Thai-British police actions de­
stroyed tranaborder Communist bases.
& MilitaryReview
The Red Chinese victory over the
Kuomintang, which opened up Indo­
china for Communist logistical and
training support, was a military ca­
tastrophe for the French. In reverse,
the geographic isolation of Madagas­
car was a great military and political
advantage for the French.
Trust and Control
In the final analysis, ordinary trust
may be the sine qua non of successful
counterinsurgency, especially where
foreigners are involved. The over-all
impact of British behavior in Malaya
and Kenya achieved a degree of trust
that permitted British participation
iu, and channeling of, the revolution.
The same is true o? the French in
Madagascar.
The French were not trusted hy the
masses in Indochina, and the behavior
of Freneh administrators during the
occupation, and the militarizing of the
French position after tlik war, were
critical in this respect.
The Communists, who aim at termi­
nal control of rather than continual de­
pendence npon the majority, have a
two-edged advantage. They have in­
vested heavily in locating and train­
ing native revolutionary leaders, and
they front their subversion with these
native Ieaders operating inside native
movements. They need to achieve a
short period of trust, just long enough
to gain power. Then, the Communists
establish a control system in which.
the consent or trust of the people is .
not implicit as it is in the democratic
system.
Critical Stage
The Communists have politicized
war and militarized society. The West
must understand the need to fight Po-
Iitital revolution with timely political,
social, and economic reforms, regard­
less of their role in the counterinsur­
gency situation.
Stage one, the winning of an effec­
tive degree of population support, is
the critical stage. In Kenya, Malaya,
and Madagascar, needed reforms and
resolute political and military action
stopped the insurgency before stage
one was completed. It is doubtful that
an outside power can be effective in
a people’s war once stage one consoli­
dation is accomplished by the insur­
gents. We can only recall that a por­
tion of Indochina went all the way.

We, and our friends who have deslt with subversive insurgency, have
come to realize that the key to overcoming the threat lies in winning over
the peoplein isolating tbe insnrgent from the source of his food, his re­
placements, and his intelligence.

kfajor General William B. Rosson

October1963 97