MMDA VS.

BEL AIR

FACTS: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision
in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting
respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice reads: Court

"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic

"Dear President Lindo , "Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924 which requires
the Authority to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons, Neptune Street
shall be opened to vehicular traffic effective January 2, 1996.

"In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the points of entry and exit on said street."Thank you for your
cooperation and whatever assistance that may be extended by your association to the MMDA personnel who will be directing traffic
in the area."Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of the President on the matter. "Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA Chairman"

On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue
would be demolished. On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136,
Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a
temporary restraining order the following day.

On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction.[2] Respondent questioned the denial
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street [3] and on
February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDAs proposed action.[4]

On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to
order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the
authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on
September 28, 1998. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET
TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?

HELD: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative in nature. The powers
of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power.

The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their
respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner
MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.

The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its
charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any
legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.

GANZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof
(G.R. No. 93746), respectively. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary
of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence
Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by
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the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and
remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by
the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly
excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in
contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two
terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration law
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it
cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the
power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however
overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.

LIMBONA VS. MANGELIN

FACTS: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of
Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a
consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through
the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated
from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the
Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling
petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some
members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-
government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree
of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and
the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts
are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines
are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
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examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never
meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if
we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as
Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the
clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and
the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the
Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But
while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the
petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered
by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also,
assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances,
we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

MATHAY VS. CA

FACTS: In November 1972, Presidential Decree No. 51 was signed into law. PD 51 created a Civil Service Unit (CSU) office in cities.
Pursuant to said law, then Quezon City mayor Brigido Simon appointed officers in the QC-CSU. Meanwhile, an ordinance in QC was
passed providing, among others, that the personnel of the CSU shall be automatically absorbed into the QC Department of Public
Order and Safety (QC-DPOS). During the term of the next mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr., it was determined that PD 51 never became a law
because it was never published. Mathay then did not renew the contracts of the QC-CSU personnel, at the same time, they were not
reappointed to the QC-DPOS. Mathay was then sued by the QC-CSU personnel before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Eventually,
the CSC Commissioner ruled that based on the QC ordinance, Mathay should reinstate the CSU-personnel to QC-DPOS.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CSC Commissioner is correct.

HELD: No. The ordinance is invalid for when it provided for automatic absorption of the QC-CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS, it divested
the mayor the power to choose as to who should fill said office. Just like in the national government, the local sanggunian can only
create an office, it cannot choose the personnel who should fill such office – that is a power vested in the local chief executive (mayor).
This is also clearly provided for in the Local Government Code. The power to appoint is vested in the local chief executive. The power
of the city council or sanggunian, on the other hand, is limited to creating, consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions
supported by local funds. The city council has no power to appoint. Had Congress intended to grant the power to appoint to both the
city council and the local chief executive, it would have said so in no uncertain terms.

On the other hand, the CSC Commissioner cannot order the mayor to reinstate the QC-CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS. Such would be
an encroachment of the mayor’s right to choose as to who should be appointed. Further, the CSU never came into existence for it has
no legal basis to speak of. It created no right hence the QC-CSU cannot invoke any. It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is
not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.

SOLICITOR GENERAL VS. METRO MANILA

FACTS:In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court held that the confiscation of the
license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing
the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly
prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged that Traffic
Enforces continued with the confiscation of driver’s licenses and removal of license plates. Dir General Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP
assured the Court that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.

Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued
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a resolution requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in light of the contradiction
between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the power
conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance
was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it
violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety
of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.

Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC

Held: No. Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that
the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) The completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2)
the presence of a sufficient standard.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts
of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before
us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and
6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they
do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of
the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition
of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators
only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of
license plates directly imposed by thedecree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof
expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality
of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere
agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely
local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. To sustain the ordinance would be to
open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances
could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of
vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise
of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra
vires. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not
allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law. We here
emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general
authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the
country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were
enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in
Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it
must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit
practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is
a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits,
they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for Congress to determine,
in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating
authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective
and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of
driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
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METROPOLITAN TRAFFIC VS. GONONG

FACTS: The original complaint was filed with the said court on August 10, 1989, by Dante S. David, a lawyer, who claimed that the rear
license plate, of his car was removed by the Metropolitan Traffic Command while the vehicle was parked on Escolta. He questioned
the petitioner's act on the ground not only that the car was not illegally parked but, more importantly, that there was no ordinance or
law authorizing such removal. He asked that the practice be permanently enjoined and that in the meantime a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued.

Judge Arsenio M. Gonong issued a temporary restraining order on August 14, 1989, and hearings on the writ of preliminary injunction
were held on August 18, 23, and 25, 1989. The writ was granted on this last date. The parties also agreed to submit the case for
resolution on the sole issue of whether there was a law or ordinance authorizing the removal of the license plates of illegally parked
vehicles. The parties then submitted simultaneous memoranda in support of their respective positions, following which the
respondent judge rendered the assailed decision.

In ruling for the complainant, Judge Gonong held that LOI 43, which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it "to detach, remove
and confiscate vehicle plates of motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended as in the case at bar. It merely authorizes the removal
of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways." At any rate, he said, the
LOI had been repealed by PD 1605. Moreover, the defendant had not been able to point to any MMC rule or regulation or to any city
ordinance to justify the questioned act.

ISSUE:

HELD: A careful reading of the above decree will show that removal and confiscation of the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle
is not among the specified penalties. Moreover, although the Metropolitan Manila Commission is authorized by the decree to
"otherwise discipline" and "impose higher penalties" on traffic violators, whatever sanctions it may impose must be "in such amounts
and under such penalties as are herein prescribed." The petitioner has not pointed to any such additional sanctions, relying instead
on its argument that the applicable authority for the questioned act is LOI 43.

It would appear that what the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense.
A violation imports an intentional breach or disregard of a rule, as where a driver leaves his vehicle in a no-parking area against a
known and usually visible prohibition. Contrary to the common impression, LOI 43 does not punish illegal parking per se but parking
of stalled vehicles, i.e., those that involuntarily stop on the road due to some unexpected trouble such as engine defect, lack of
gasoline, punctured tires, or other similar cause. The vehicle is deemed illegally parked because it obstructs the flow of traffic, but
only because it has stalled. The obstruction is not deliberate. In fact, even the petitioner recognizes that "there is a world of difference
between a stalled vehicle and an illegally parked and unattended one" and suggests a different treatment for either. "The first means
one which stopped unnecessarily or broke down while the second means one which stopped to accomplish something, including
temporary rest.

LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles "that stall on the streets and highways' and not those that are intentionally parked in a public place
in violation of a traffic law or regulation. The purpose of the LOI evidently is to discipline the motorist into keeping his vehicle in good
condition before going out into the streets so as not to cause inconvenience to the public when the car breaks down and blocks other
vehicles. That is why, for the first offense, the stalled vehicle is immediately towed at the owner's expense to clear the street of the
traffic obstruction. Where it appears that the owner has not learned from his first experience because the vehicle has stalled again,
presumably due to his failure to repair it, the penalty shall be confiscation of the license plate and cancellation of the certificate of
registration petition.

It is worth noting that it is not the driver's license that is confiscated and canceled when the vehicle stalls on a public street. The LOI
goes against the vehicle itself. The object of the measure is to ensure that only motor vehicles in good condition may use the public
streets, and this is effected by confiscating the license plates and canceling the certificates of registration of those vehicles that are
not roadworthy.

In the case of the private respondent, it is not alleged or shown that his vehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the
flow of traffic. The charge against him is that he purposely parked his vehicle in a no parking area (although this is disputed by him).iThe
act, if true, is a traffic violation that may not be punished under LOI 43. The applicable law is PD 1605, which does not include removal
and confiscation of the license plate of the vehicle among the imposable penalties.

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Indeed, even if LOI 43 were applicable, the penalty of confiscation would still not be justified as it has not been alleged, much less
shown, that the illegal parking was a second or subsequent offense. That circumstance must be established at a trial before a court of
justice where the vehicle owner shall have a right to be heard in his defense. The second or subsequent offense cannot be simply
pronounced by the traffic authorities without hearing and without proof. Confiscation of the registry plate without a judicial finding
that the offense charge is a second or subsequent one would, unless the owner concedes this point, be invalid.

While it is true that the license plate is strictly speaking not a property right, it does not follow that it may be removed or confiscated
without lawful cause. Due process is a guaranty against all forms of official arbitrariness. Under the principle that ours is a government
of laws and not of men, every official must act by and within the authority of a valid law and cannot justify the lack of it on the pretext
alone of good intentions. It is recalled that more than seventy years ago, the mayor of Manila deported one hundred seventy
prostitutes to Davao for the protection of the morals and health of the city. This Court acknowledged his praiseworthy purpose but
just the same annulled his unauthorized act, holding that no one could take the law into his own hands. 3 We can rule no less in the
case before us.

We find that there is no inconsistency between LOI 43 and PD 1605, whichever is considered the special law either because of its
subject or its territorial application. The former deals with motor vehicles that have stalled on a public road while the latter deals with
motor vehicles that have been deliberately parked in a no-parking area; and while both cover illegal parking of motor vehicles, the
offense is accidental under the first measure and intentional under the second. This explains why the sanctions are different. The
purpose of the LOI is to discourage the use of the public streets by motor vehicles that are likely to break down while that of the decree
is to penalize the driver for his defiance of the traffic laws.

As it has not been shown that the private respondent's motor vehicle had stalled because of an engine defect or some other accidental
cause and, no less importantly, that it had stalled on the road for a second or subsequent time, confiscation of the license plate cannot
be justified under LOI 43. And neither can that sanction be sustained under PD 1605, which clearly provides that "in case of traffic
violations, (even) the driver's license shall not be confiscated," let alone the license plate of the motor vehicle. If at all, the private
respondent may be held liable for illegal parking only and subjected to any of the specific penalties mentioned in Section 3 of the
decree.

We recognize the problem of the traffic policeman who comes upon an illegally parked and unattended vehicle and is unable to serve
a citation on the offending driver who is nowhere in sight. But that problem is not addressed to the courts; it is for the legislative and
administrative authorities to solve. What is clear to the Court is that the difficulty cannot be avoided by the removal of the license
plate of the offending vehicle because the petitioner has not shown that this penalty is authorized by a valid law or ordinance.

It is claimed that the removal of the license plates of illegally parked motor vehicles in Metro Manila has become a veritable gold mine
for some police officers. To be sure, we do not have hard, provable facts at hand but only vague and unsubstantiated rumors that
could be no more than malicious and invented charges. Nevertheless, these accusations have become too prevalent and apparently
too persuasive that they cannot be simply swept under the rug.

The widespread report is that civilian "agents," mostly street urchins under the control and direction of certain policemen, remove
these license plates from illegally parked vehicles and later discreetly suggest to the owners that these may be retrieved for an
unofficial fee. This ranges from P50.00 to P200.00, depending on the type of vehicle. If the owner agrees, payment is usually made
and the license plate returned at a private rendezvous. No official receipt is issued. Everything is done quietly. The owners, it is said,
prefer this kind of fast settlement to the inconvenience of an official proceeding that may entail not only the payment of a higher fine
but also other administrative impositions, like attendance at a traffic seminar.

The Court is not saying that these reports are true nor is it stigmatizing the entire police force on the basis of these unsubstantiated charges. But it
does believe and stress that the proper authorities should take official notice of these reports instead of blandly dismissing them as mere canards
that do not deserve their attention and concern. An inquiry is in our view indicated. The old adage that where there's smoke there's fire is not
necessarily true and can hardly be the rationale of a judicial conclusion; but the Court feels just the same that serious steps should be taken, especially
because of the persistence of these charges, to determine the source of the smoke.

We realize the seriousness of our traffic problems, particularly in Metro Manila, and commend the earnest efforts of the police to effect a smoother
flow of vehicles in the public thoroughfares for the comfort and convenience of the people. But we must add, as a reminder that must be made, that
such efforts must be authorized by a valid law, which must clearly define the offenses proscribed and as clearly specify the penalties prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court holds that LOI 43 is valid but may be applied only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the
public streets due to some involuntary cause and not those that have been intentionally parked in violation of the traffic laws.

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