MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K.
LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl
EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and
HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Manila
and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG
in their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG,
JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and THOMAS
K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, respondents.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 28,
1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 317862 . The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals upheld the Orders issued by
respondents Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion 3 and Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy4 taking cognizance of two (2)
separate petitions filed by private respondents before their respective salas for the cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
FACTS: This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2)
different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful
wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his
concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong,
Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee
(hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen
Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992,
the petition against all petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 5 and later assigned to Branch 47 presided over by
respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. On February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed
before the RTC of Kalookan and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 6 and assigned to the sala of respondent
Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth
of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by
substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners' true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate children
of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in 1931. Except
for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private respondents herein were all born and raised in the
Philippines.
1
named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far from
becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek Sheng's mistress. As a result of their illicit
relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the
petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by
making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners. They
all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in. All was well,
therefore, before private respondents' discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee
Tek Sheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all
his children, including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's death that
was to be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private respondents'
curiosity, if not suspicion.
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI
prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners,
specifically the following.
1. As per Birth Certificate MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1), their father, LEE TEK SHENG made it appear that he is the
12th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK CHENG, but upon investigation, it was found out that her Hospital Records, the
mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had given birth for the 1st time, as per diagnosis of the attending
physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was "GRAVIDA I, PARA I" which means "first pregnancy, first live birth delivery" (refer
to: MASTER PATIENT'S RECORDS SUMMARY — Annex I). Also, the age of the mother when she gave birth to
MARCELO LEE as per record was only 17 years old, when in fact and in truth, KEH SHIOK CHENG's age was then
already 38 years old. The address used by their father in the Master Patient record was also the same as the
Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (2425 Rizal Avenue, Manila). The name of MARCELO LEE was recorded under
Hospital No. 221768, page 73.
2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it was made to appear that ALBINA LEE was the third
child which is without any rationality, because the 3rd child of KEH SHIOK CHENG is MELODY LEE TEK SHENG
(Annex E-2). Note also, that the age of the mother as per Hospital Records jump (sic) from 17 to 22 years old,
but the only age gap of MARCELO LEE and ALBINA LEE is only 2 years.
3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it was made to appear that MARIANO LEE was the 5th
child, but the truth is, KEH SHIOK CHENG's 5th child is LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4). As per Hospital
Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23 years old, while the actual age of KEH SHIOK CHENG, was
then already 40 years old.
4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was made to appear that PABLO LEE was the 16th child
of KEH SHIOK CHENG which is impossible to be true, considering the fact that KEH SHIOK CHENG have stopped
conceiving after her 11th child. Also as per Hospital Record, the age of the mother was omitted in the records.
If PABLO LEE is the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, it would only mean that she have (sic) given birth to her
first born child at the age of 8 to 9 years, which is impossible to be true.
Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23 years old.
Two years after PABLO LEE was born in 1955, the difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible for PABLO LEE to
be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it will only mean that she have (sic) given birth at that impossible
age.
5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to appear that she is the 6th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth Certificate of JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true 6th child of KEH SHIOK
CHENG. Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is only 28 years old, while KEH SHIOK CHENG'S true age at that
time was 45 years old.
6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainant's allegation, she was born at their
house, and was later admitted at Chinese General Hospital.
7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to appear that he is the 14th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from 28 years old at
the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957 to 38 years old at the birth of CATALINO LEE on 22 April 1959.
8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH SHIOK CHENG, the age of the mother is
48 years old. However, as per Hospital Record, the age of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, then was only 39 years old.
Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELO's birth on 11 May 1950. KEH SHIOK CHENG's age is 38 years
old and at the time of EUSEBIO's birth, she is already 48 years old, it is already impossible that she could have
given birth to 8 children in a span of only 10 years at her age. As per diagnosis, the alleged mother registered
on EUSEBIO's birth indicate that she had undergone CEASARIAN SECTION, which Dr. RITA K. LEE said is not
true.
In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:
10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very obvious that the mother of these
8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon
further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH
SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate
children, consequently elevating the status of his 2nd family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that
2
this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his 2nd family kept on insisting that the
8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG. 8
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in petitioners' records of birth with the lower courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions — SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674
— on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the
legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was
filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed. 9
On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 for
failure of the herein petitioners (defendants in the lower court) to appear at the hearing of the said motion.
Then on February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion issued an Order, the pertinent portion of which, reads as
follows:
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby given due course. Let this
petition be set for hearing on March 29, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning before this Court located at the 5th Floor
of the City Hall of Manila.
Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition should file on or before the date of
hearing his opposition thereto with a statement of the grounds therefor.
Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be served upon the Office of the Solicitor
General, and the respondents, and be posted on the Bulletin Board of this Court, also at the expense of the
petitioners. SO ORDERED.
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April 15, 1993 taking cognizance of SP.
PROC. No. C-1674, to wit: It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the
petitioners that the Order of the Court setting the case for hearing was published in "Media Update" once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks, that is on February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993 as evidenced by the
Affidavit of Publication and the clippings attached to the affidavit, and by the copies of the "Media Update"
published on the aforementioned dates; further, copy of the order setting the case for hearing together with
copy of the petition had been served upon the Solicitor General, City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, Civil
Registrar of Kalookan City and the private respondents, the Court holds that the petitioners have complied
with the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to take cognizance of this case. SO ORDERED.
Petitioners' attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders of Judge Veneracion and
Judge Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners averred that respondents judges had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders allowing the petitions for the cancellation and/or correction
of entries in petitioners' records of birth to prosper in the lower courts.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following arguments: (1) Rule 108 is
inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) Respondents judges are sanctioning a
collateral attack against the filiation and legitimacy of children; (3) Respondents judges are allowing private
respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite the fact that their undisputed
common father is still alive; (4) Respondents judges are entertaining petitions which are already time-barred;
and (5) The petitions below are part of a forum-shopping spree.
Finding no merit in petitioners' arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition in a Decision dated
October 28, 1994.14 Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision was also denied by the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution dated December 19, 1994. 15
Hence, this petition.
1. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper since private
respondents seek to have the entry for the name of petitioners' mother changed from "Keh Shiok Cheng" to
"Tiu Chuan" who is a completely different person. What private respondents therefore seek is not merely a
correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Sheng's legitimate wife, Keh
Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a "bastardization of petitioners." Petitioners thus label
private respondents' suits before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of
a Rule 108 proceeding.
Debunking petitioners' above contention, the Court of Appeals observed: As correctly pointed out by the
private respondents in their comment . . . , the proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact,
status and/or right. Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth
regarding the occurrence of certain events which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise
deprived said persons of rights.
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. 18 The petitions filed by private
respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for
physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to
the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before
the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's
children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and
petitioners.19
3
Further sanctioning private respondents' resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals adverted to our ruling in the
leading case of Republic vs. Valencia20 where we affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioner's minor
children as stated in their records of birth from "Chinese" to "Filipino", and "legitimate" to "illegitimate",
respectively. Although recognizing that the changes or corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical
errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors
in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. In the said case, we also laid down the rule that a
proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be
summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the
procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with. Thus we held:
"Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is 'appropriate.'
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:
'SECTION 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties
to the proceeding.'
'SECTION 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named
in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.'
'SECTION 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.'
"Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register are — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to — (1) issue an
order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having
or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
"If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no
longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either
by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or
corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings."
To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or correction
of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.
We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth was filed by private
respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order setting
the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the order setting
the case for hearing in "Media Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases notices of
the orders were ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and Kalookan and
upon the petitioners herein. Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars and the
other respondents in the case below to file their oppositions to the said petitions. A motion to dismiss was
consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, all surnamed
Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts below by way
of a special proceeding cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the requisite parties,
notices and publications could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action .23 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts the license
to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the
New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature. 24 The petitioners point to the case
of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,25 which is of a later date than Republic vs. Valencia,26 where this Court reverted
to the doctrine laid down in earlier cases, 27 starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic,28 prohibiting the extension of
the application of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as
held in Go, et al. vs. Civil Registrar,29 allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule
unconstitutional as the same would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,30 the reason we
declared null and void the portion of the lower court's order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe's civil status
and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the latter's record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was
inappropriate to effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowe's petition before the lower court failed to
implead all indispensable parties to the case.
4
We explained in this wise: "x x x An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties
should be made parties to the case as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
"In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken,
which is summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought.
Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made
respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the
paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons
who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented.
"The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would
be changed from 'legitimate' to 'illegitimate'. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that
the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof
was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority
under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules 'shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes
or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would
thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This
situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code.”
Far from petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic32 does not exclude recourse to
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil
register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as
contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding. Thus:
"If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to
correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding,  the court may, under a
summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed,
changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon
the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial
in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in
controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and
evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x
x."33 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy
granted upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly
provides.34 Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure
outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108
requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4).
The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their
opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it
is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,35 that Rule 108, when all the
procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. Valencia36 there continues to be a seesawing of
opinion on the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil register may be effected by
means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The more recent cases  of Leonor vs. Court
of Appeals37 and Republic vs. Labrador38 do seem to signal a reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited
the scope of application of Article 412 to clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register.
In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive
rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:
"This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals. In that case, Respondent Mauricio Leonor filed a
petition before the trial court seeking the cancellation of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner Virginia
Leonor. He alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal vows arising from the "non-observance of the legal
requirements for a valid marriage." In debunking the trial court's ruling granting such petition, the Court held
as follows:
'On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding "marriages" in the civil
registry for any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as simple as
it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be canceled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or
clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. A clerical error is one
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake
in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous change
such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent
(Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).'
'Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from
legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial x x x .'
5
'Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Article 412 of
the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia's civil status from married to single and of
their three children from legitimate to illegitimate x x x '
"Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a person from
"legitimate to "illegitimate," as in Sarah Zita's case, the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings." 39
It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in conflict
with each other, and perhaps, in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same substantial
issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is
unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic40 that first delineated the extent or
scope of the matters that may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The
Supreme Court ruled in this case that:
"x x x After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated therein are mere
corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the
nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the petition is merely a clerical error then
the court may issue an order in order that the error or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial
change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action
depending upon the nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at random in our substantive and
remedial laws the implementation of which will naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances that
might arise affecting the interested parties. This opinion is predicated upon the theory that the procedure
contemplated in article 412 is summary in nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial issues." 41
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republic42 where the Court said that:
"From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules
of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial
authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant to
Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure
which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of
correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of the
Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not diminish or increase or modify substantive rights.'
If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are
visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial
alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108
would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which
changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code."43 (Italics supplied).
We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the
interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively
excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect
nationality, status, filiation and the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does
not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is
summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have
merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without, however, shedding light on the matter.
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:
"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order."
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes
must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated
for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected" and "changed". In its
ordinary sense, to correct means to make or set right"; "to remove the faults or errors from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute".45 The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it
distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude
that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the
civil register? We need not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register."
"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children;
(10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination
of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name."
It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but
also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters
that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the effect of isolating
Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the
rule of statutory construction that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular
6
meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject
treated.46
Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended
Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname . — No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations."
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be
corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors
in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes
and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other
cases of its genre had said, perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress' response to the confusion wrought by the
failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a
harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or
corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to
an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is.
Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary
proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which
has prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding treatise.
II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases below as
Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his
children only after his death.
Article 171 provides:
"The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding
article only in the following cases:
"(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;
"(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
"(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."
Petitioner's contention is without merit.
In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,49 we upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the
judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the birth certificate of one Teofista Guinto as null and void
ab initio, and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the same from the Registry of Live Births.
We ruled therein that private respondent Presentacion Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariñosa, had the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista
Babiera, another alleged child of the same spouses because she is the one who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 50
We likewise held therein that: Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close
reading of the provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his
wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother.
The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer
therein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former
is not the latter's child at all.
Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals 52 that: "Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained.
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant
case, where a child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under
Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless
then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case
at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.
Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in  Cabatbat-Lim
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
'Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well taken.
This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance
as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted
7
child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a
legal heir of the deceased. "'53
III. Petitioners claim that private respondents' cause of action had already prescribed as more than five (5)
years had lapsed between the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of
the actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993. 54
We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically
prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New
Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil Code that applies:
"Art. 1149. other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five
years from the time the right of action accrues."
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an
obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can
be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. 55
It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause of action, that
is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners' birth records, occurred more than thirty (30)
years ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents' right of action or right to sue
accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that private
respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to use said
falsified birth records.
Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to establish
the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners' true mother, and their real status, simply because they had
discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date. This is
especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their father's legitimate children, did not have any
reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to
inherit from their mother's (Keh Shiok Cheng's) estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents'
suspicions were aroused and confirmed. From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had
lapsed.
Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration of the last
birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private respondents had discovered the
false entries in petitioners' birth records in 1989. Petitioners base their position on the fact that birth records
are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right of action available to the private
respondents started to run from the time of the registration of their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.
We cannot agree with petitioners' thinking on that point.
It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents
and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. 56 Petitioners liken their birth records to land
titles, public documents that serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for the petitioners, this
analogy does not hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person's parentage cannot be acquired by
prescription. One is either born of a particular mother or not. It is that simple.
IV. Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum shopping. They enumerate the other actions filed
by private respondents against them prior to the filing of their Rule 108 petitions in the lower courts, as
follows:
(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth certificates filed against their father as principal
and against defendants as alleged accessories;
(2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of their father, Lee Tek Sheng; and
(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate. 57
According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions above-mentioned, as well as the Rule 108 petitions,
subject of the case before us, raise the common issue of whether petitioners are the natural children of Keh
Shiok Cheng or Tiu Chuan. They contend that in all these cases, the judge or hearing officer would have to
resolve this issue in order to determine whether or not to grant the relief prayed for.
Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes
of action and reliefs sought.59 Even a cursory examination of the pleadings filed by private respondents in their
various cases against petitioners would reveal that at the very least there is no identity of rights or causes of
action and reliefs prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2) petitions filed under Rule 108, the
purpose of which is to correct and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners' birth records. Suffice it to state, the
cause of action in these Rule 108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are very different from those in the
criminal complaint against petitioners and their father which has for its cause of action, the commission of a
crime as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the
accused; or the action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng naturalization certificate which has for its cause of
action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for
that matter, the action for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate which has for its cause of action the private
respondents' right under the New Civil Code to inherit from their mother's estate.
We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum shopping to speak of in the
concept that this is described and contemplated in Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court. WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 is
AFFIRMED.
8
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, respondents.
Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners are people’s and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes aimed at
protecting the people’s rights to self-governance and justice.
Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of releasing
presidential appointments including those of Supreme Court Justices.
Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in this Court.
FACTS: Petitioners allege that: On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the
Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily
publications.
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in
abeyance" by Malacañang in view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong.
There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the Office of the President.
On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent Executive Secretary stated that the
appointment is "still there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC)."
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive
Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his
own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as
Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s
birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution: Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No
person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship." 1
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong’s birth his father was
finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
Petitioners further argue that respondent Ong’s birth certificate speaks for itself and it states his nationality as
"Chinese" at birth. They invoke the Civil Code:
Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained."  Therefore, the entry in Ong’s birth
certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact that Ong’s citizenship at birth
is Chinese.
Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order." Thus, as long as Ong’s birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the Judicial
& Bar Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is stated in his birth certificate. 2
This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ong’s new Identification Certificate issued by
the Bureau of Immigration dated October 16, 1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino and over the
opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that he is a natural-born Filipino. They maintain that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have the power or authority to alter entries in a birth certificate; that
respondent Ong’s old Identification Certificate did not declare that he is a natural-born Filipino; and that
respondent Ong’s remedy is an action to correct his citizenship as it appears in his birth certificate.
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to respondent
Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and
restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent
and restrain respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of
this Court.
The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition. Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly
filed his Comment, essentially stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this
Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section
9 of the Constitution, thus:
SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
9
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed respondent Ong from among the list of
nominees who were duly screened by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8
of the Constitution. Said respondent further stated: "The appointment, however, was not released, but
instead, referred to the JBC for validation of respondent Ong’s citizenship." 3 To date, however, the JBC has not
received the referral.
Supporting the President’s action and respondent Ong’s qualifications, respondent Executive Secretary
submits that:
1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed a person, duly nominated by the JBC,
which passed upon the appointee’s qualifications.
2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by
the Department of Justice, which have the authority and jurisdiction to make determination on matters of
citizenship.
3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen.
4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order. 4
Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be
addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of those it recommends
to judicial posts. Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed to include the President who is an
indispensable party as the one who extended the appointment.
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born
on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen 5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that
these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria Santos
reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also
became a Filipino citizen;6 that respondent Ong’s mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan
Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927; that, therefore, respondent’s mother
was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng,
thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong
Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the
naturalization.
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an
identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution,
since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
Summarizing, his arguments are as follows:
I. PETITIONERS’ LACK OF STANDING AND INABILITY TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY WHOSE OFFICIAL
ACTION IS THE VERY ACT SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED CONSTITUTE INSUPERABLE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND SHOULD PREVENT THIS CASE FROM PROCEEDING FURTHER FOR
DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER MARRIAGE TO EUGENIO; and
B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 OF A FILIPINO MOTHER AND WHO ELECTED FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP UPON REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, RESPONDENT ONG MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER
ARTICLE IV, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG AS PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS CAN, IN NO WAY, WITHOUT
MORE, ESTABLISH WITH FINALITY THAT HE IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR DISPROVE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE IS,
IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, DESCENDED FROM "INDIOS."
IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONG TO RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER RULE 108 OF THE
RULES OF COURT FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM AND ENJOY HIS RIGHTFUL STATUS AS A NATURAL-BORN
FILIPINO.
V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE
JURIDICTION TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT ONG, AND UPON
SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A
DECLARATION (I.E., IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO. 113878) RECOGNIZING THAT RESPONDENT ONG IS A
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY RENDERING NONEXISTENT ANY CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM
TO ASSUME THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT. 7
Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their standing to file this suit on the
strength of previous decisions of this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona 8 and Kilosbayan,
Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is one of transcendental importance. They claim that the
President’s appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is,
therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they
reiterate that respondent Ong’s birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary
proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that
respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not
make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.
The petition has merit. First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as people’s
organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional
10
importance, namely, the qualification – nay, the citizenship – of a person to be appointed a member of this
Court. Standing has been accorded and recognized in similar instances. 10
Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary party. This is not necessary since the suit
impleads the Executive Secretary who is the alter ego of the President and he has in fact spoken for her in his
Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from extending the appointment but only
the Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong from accepting the same.
Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ong’s qualification for memberhip of this
Court. This case is a matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As
the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution, 11 the Court
is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so.
Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case – is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?
On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ong’s petition to be admitted to the
Philippine bar.
In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979,
under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the
Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a
minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of
his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth
certificate12 states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese
citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
Specifically, the following appears in the records:
PETITION
COMES now the undersigned petitioner and to this Honorable Court respectfully states:
1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino citizen and 26 years of age, having been born on May 25,
1953, at SAN JUAN RIZAL, to spouses Eugenio Ong Han Seng and Dy Guiok Santos who are citizens of the
Philippines, as evidenced by the attached copy of his birth certificate marked as Annex A (if born outside of
wedlock, state so; or if Filipino citizen other than natural born, state how and when citizenship was acquired
and attach the necessary proofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio Ong Han Seng (Father) See Attached
documents Annex B, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4.
VERIFICATION
Republic of the Philippines )City of Manila ) S.S.
I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, depose and state: that I am the petitioner in the foregoing Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register
petition; that the same was prepared by me and/or at my instance and that the allegations contained therein can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change.
are true to my knowledge. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,14 this Court held that:

(Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be
threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the
Affiant
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28 th day of August, 1979, City of Manila, Philippines, affiant allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted. 15
exhibiting his/her Residence Certificate No. A-___________, issued at ________________, on
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical
__________________, 19__.
or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections
to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through
(Sgd.) a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1979 The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by
PTR No. 3114917 various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper
January 19, 1979, Pasig, MM judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence
would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what
Doc. No. 98; still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged
Page No. 10; ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. 17 Until this is done,
Book No. VIII; respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution.
Series of 1979.13 For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, wrote respondent Ong a letter dated
October 3, 1979 stating that in connection with his Petition for Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he
has to submit:
1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and
2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the Office of the Solicitor General.
Respondent Ong complied with these requirements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is
hereby ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or
assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed
all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.
FRANCLER P. ONDE, Petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PIÑAS
CITY, Respondent.

It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court
allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The
alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot
amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along
with his father.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orders 1 dated October 7, 2010 and March 1, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 201, Las Piñas City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The RTC
dismissed the case filed by petitioner Francler P. Onde for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth.
FACTS: The antecedent facts follow: Petitioner filed a petition 2 for correction of entries in his certificate of live
birth before the RTC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pinas City as sole
respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC
Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his

11
mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on his birth
certificate be corrected as follows:
Entry From To
1) Date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 - Bicol Not Married
2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler
In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the ground
thatit is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial since the first
correction is substantial in nature and would affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It was further held
that the correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the
ConsulGeneral to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or
Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and
412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In its Order dated March 1, 2011,the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, as it found no proof
that petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23, 1983.
Essentially, the petition raises fourissues: (1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the first
name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2) whether the
RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on
December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings; (3)
whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries; and (4) whether the RTC erred in
ruling that there is no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23, 1983.
Petitioner argues that Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court allows a substantial correction of entries in the civil
registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, 3 the case cited by the RTC, we have
actually ruled that substantial changes in the civil registry are now allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. He likewise adds that proof that his parents were not married will be presented during the trial, not
during the filing of the petition for correction of entries.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC correctly dismissed the petition
for correction of entries. It points out that the first names of petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru
administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate
that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction
12
affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are
impleaded.
We deny the petition.
On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as appearing in his
birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that petitioner no
longer contested the RTC’s ruling on this point. 4 Indeed, under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or
typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by
the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No.
10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or correctedwithout a judicial order, except for clerical
or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the dateof birth or sex of
a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry,
which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipalcivil registraror consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Silverio v. Republic,6 we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name
are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan, 7 we said that under R.A.No.
9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules ofCourt
the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for
the correction of his and his mother’s first name.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial
correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and
convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, 8 we held that corrections of
entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacyof paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage,involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversaryproceedings.9
On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for correction of entries. As
mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling that the correction he sought on his and his
mother’s first name can be done by the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are constrained to
deny his prayer that the petition for correction of entries before the RTC bereinstated since the same petition
includes the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name.
We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without prejudice. As we said, petitioner can avail ofthe
administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first name.1âwphi1 He can also file a new
petition before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his parents were
married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City: 10
x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciawhere we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court]provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x
xxxx
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or
harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and
Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are
now allowed under Rule 108in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciaprovided that the
appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must implead as
parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for
correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Eleosida,11 we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as the procedural
requirements laid down by the Court to make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In Republic v.
Uy,12 we have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is
mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties since
the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last issue as petitioner will have
his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents were not married on December 23, 1983 when he files the
new petition for the purpose.
13
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated October 7, 2010 and March 1, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las Pifias City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The dismissal
ordered by the Regional Trial Court is, however, declared to be without prejudice.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LORENA OMAPAS SALI, Respondent.
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to annul and set aside
the February 11, 2013 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03442, which affirmed in
toto the February 23, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte, granting
the Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 of the Rules filed by respondent Lorena Omapas Sali (Sali).
The CA narrated the undisputed factual antecedents.
Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Verified Petition, dated November 26, 2008, for Correction of Entry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court before the RTC with the following material averments:
1. Petitioner is a Filipino, of legal age, single and a resident [of] 941 D. Veloso St.[,] Baybay, Leyte;
2. The respondent is located in Baybay City, Leyte and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court where it
can be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Court;
3. All parties herein have the capacity to sue and be sued;
4. Petitioner is the daughter of Spouses Vedasto A. Omapas and Almarina A. Albay who was born on April 24,
1968 in Baybay, Leyte. A copy of the Baptismal Certificate issued by the Parish of the Sacred Heart, Sta. Mesa,
Manila is hereunto attached as Annex "A";
5. Unfortunately, in recording the facts of her birth, the personnel of the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay,
Leyte[,] thru inadvertence and mistake[,] erroneously entered in the records the following: Firstly, the first
name of the petitioner as "DOROTHY" instead of "LORENA" and Secondly, the date of birth of the petitioner as
"June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968." A copy of the Certificate of Live Birth of Dorothy A. Omapas issued
by the National Statistics Office (NSO) and Certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte are
hereunto attached as Annex "B" and Annex "C" respectively.
6. The petitioner has been using the name "Lorena A. Omapas["] and her date of birth as "April 24, 1968" for
as long as she (sic) since she could remember and is known to the community in general as such;
7. To sustain petitioner's claim that the entries in her Certificate of Live Birth pertaining to her first name and
date of birth should be corrected so that it will now read as "LORENA A. OMAPAS" and "April 24, 1968"
respectively, attached hereto are: the Certificate of Marriage of Morsalyn [D.] Sali and Lorena A. Omapas, and
a photocopy of the Postal Identity Card of the petitioner as Annex "D" and Annex "E" respectively; [and]

8. This petition is intended neither for the petitioner to escape criminal and/or civil liability, nor affect the
hereditary succession of any person whomsoever but solely for the purpose of setting the records of herein
petitioner straight.
[Sali] then prayed for the issuance of an order correcting her first name from "Dorothy" to "Lorena" and the
date of her birth from "June 24, 1968" to ["]April 24, 1968."
After [Sali] proved her compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, reception of evidence followed. The
Clerk of Court was then appointed as a commissioner to receive the evidence in support of the petition.
Subsequently, she rendered a Report relative thereto.
On February 23, 2010, the trial court issued the assailed Decision in favor of [Sali], the dispositive portion of
which reads: WHEREFORE, this Court, hereby resolves to GRANT this petition for correction of the erroneous
entries in the Birth Certificate of Lorena A. Omapas-Sali, specifically her first name from "DOROTHY" to
"LORENA" and her date of birth from "JUNE 24, 1968" to "APRIL 24, 1968", and ordering the Local Civil
Registrar of Baybay City, Leyte, and the National Statistics Office to effect the foregoing correction in the birth
record of Lorena A. Omapas-Sali, upon finality of this decision, and upon payment of the proper legal fees
relative thereto.
Furnish copy of this decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay City,
Leyte, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the petitioner and her counsel.
On March 24, 2010, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC Decision
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo because the title of the petition and the order setting the
petition for hearing did not contain Sali's aliases.
The CA denied the appeal, ruling that: (1) the records are bereft of any indication that Sali is known by a name
other than "Lorena," hence, it would be absurd to compel her to indicate any other alias that she does not
have; (2) Sali not only complied with the mandatory requirements for an appropriate adversarial proceeding
under Rule 108 of the Rules but also gave the Republic an opportunity to timely contest the purported
defective petition; and (3) the change in the first name of Sali will certainly avoid further confusion as to her
identity and there is no showing that it was sought for a fraudulent purpose or that it would prejudice public
interest.
Now before Us, the grounds of the petition are as follows:
I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT APPLIED RULE 108 INSTEAD OF RULE 103,
THEREBY DISPENSING WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF STATING THE RESPONDENT'S ALIASES IN THE TITLE OF THE
PETITION.
14
II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT FAILED
TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.3
The Republic argues that although Sali's petition is entitled: "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN THE CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH OF DOROTHY A. OMAPAS," it is actually a petition
for a change of name. The first name being sought to be changed does not involve the correction of a simple
clerical, typographical or innocuous error such as a patently misspelled name, but a substantial change in Sali's
first name. This considering, the applicable rule is Rule 103, which requires that the applicant's names and
aliases must be stated in the title of the petition and the order setting it for hearing, and that the petition can
be granted only on specific grounds provided by law. Further, assuming that a petition for correction of entries
under Rule 108 is the appropriate remedy, the petition should not have been granted for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies provided for under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048.
The petition is partially granted. Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of
the Rules but for correction of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which
were committed in the recording of her name and birth date. This Court has held that not all alterations
allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors may be set right
under Rule 108.4 The evidence5 presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has been using the name
"Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to change her name. What she seeks is simply
the removal of the clerical fault or error in her first name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name
she grew up with.6
Nevertheless, at the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect. 7 Section 1 of the law
states:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. - No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis ours)
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has been
habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that first name in
the community.8 The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary jurisdiction to
entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil
registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court. 9 We stressed in Silverio v. Republic of
the Philippines:10
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy
and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. 11
Recently, the Court again said in Onde v. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City:12
In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name
is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the change
of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan, we said that under R.A. No. 9048, the
correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the
correction of his and his mother's first name.13
In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within the RTC's
primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should have been administrative,  i.e., filing of the
petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should
have dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name.
On the other hand, anent Sali's petition to correct her birth date from "June 24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968," R.A.
No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on August 15, 2012 that R.A. No. 10172 was signed into law amending R.A.
No. 9048.14 As modified, Section 1 now includes the day and month in the date of birth and sex of a person,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. - No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a
person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis ours)
Considering that Sali filed her petition in 2008, Rule 108 15 is the appropriate remedy in seeking to correct her
date of birth in the civil registry. Under the Rules, the following must be observed:
Sec. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
15
proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
The Republic did not question the petition to correct Sali's birth date from "June 24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968."
In fact, it did not contest the CA ruling that the requirements for an appropriate adversarial proceeding were
satisfactorily complied with. The appellate court found:
Here, [Sail] filed with the court a quo a verified petition for the correction of her first name from "Dorothy" to
"Lorena" as well as the date of her birth from "June 24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968." In the petition, she aptly
impleaded the Civil Registrar of Baybay City, Leyte as respondent. Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order
fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition. The Order for hearing was then published once a
week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province to notify the persons
having or claiming any interest therein. Moreover, said Order was posted in four public and conspicuous
places within the locality. Subsequently, the Civil Registrar, Solicitor General and Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor were furnished copies of the Petition and Order to give them the opportunity to file their
respective oppositions thereto. x x x.16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The February 11, 2013 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03442, which affirmed in toto the February 23, 2010 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Petition for
Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Dorothy A. Omapas with respect to her first name
is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to its filing with the local civil registrar concerned.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO, Respondent
Names are labels for one's identity. They facilitate social interaction, including the allocation of rights and
determination of liabilities. It is for this reason that the State has an interest in one's name.
The name through which one is known is generally, however, not chosen by the individual who bears it.
Rather, it is chosen by one's parents. In this sense, the choice of one's name is not a product of the exercise of
autonomy of the individual to whom it refers.
In view of the State's interest in names as markers of one's identity, the law requires that these labels be
registered. Understandably, in some cases, the names so registered or other aspects of one's identity that
pertain to one's name are not reflected with accuracy in the Certificate of Live Birth  filed with the civil
registrar.
Changes to one's name, therefore, can be the result of either one of two (2) motives. The first, as an exercise
of one's autonomy, is to change the appellation that one was given for various reasons. The other is not an
exercise to change the label that was given to a person; it is simply to correct the data as it was recorded in
the Civil Registry.
This is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 assailing the April 29, 2013 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 96358, which denied the Republic of the Philippines' appeal 3 from the Regional Trial Court
December 7, 2010 Order4 granting herein respondent Michelle Soriano Gallo's (Gallo) Petition for Correction of
Entry of her Certificate of Live Birth.
To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan City,
Isabela in Special Proc. No. 2155 5 for the correction of her name from "Michael" to "Michelle" and of her
biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 108 6 of the Rules of Court.7
In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"·' her mother's middle name,
"Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her
Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded. 8
As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official transcript of records,
medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage certificate. 9
The Regional Trial Court, having found Gallo's petition sufficient in form and substance, set a hearing on
August 2, 2010. It also ordered the publication of the Notice of Hearing once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Isabela. 10
The Office of the Solicitor General authorized the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear on its
behalf. 11 Trial then ensued.
During trial, Gallo testified on her allegations. She showed that her college diploma, voter's certification, and
transcript indicated that her name was "Michelle Soriano Gallo." The doctor who examined her also certified
that she was female. 12 On cross-examination, Gallo explained that she never undertook any gender-
reassignment surgery and that she filed the petition not to evade any civil or criminal liability, but to obtain a
passport. 13
The Regional Trial Court, in its December 7, 20 I 0 Order, granted the petition. 14 It lent credence to the
documents Gallo presented and found that the corrections she sought were "harmless and innocuous." 15 It
concluded that there was a necessity to correct Gallo's Certificate of Live Birth and applied Rule I 08 of the
Rules of Court, 16 citing Republic v. Cagandahan. 17 Thus:
16
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, an order is hereby issued directing the Civil Registrar General, NSO
through the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ilagan, Isabela to correct the entries in the Birth Certificate of the
petitioner as well as in the National Statistics Office Authenticated copy particularly her first name "MICHAEL"
to "MICHELLE", gender from "MALE" to "FEMALE'', middle name of petitioner to be entered as "SORIANO",
middle names of petitioner's parents to be properly supplied as "ANGANGAN" for the mother and
"BALINGAO" for the father, as well as date of marriage of petitioner's parents to be recorded as "MAY 23,
1981 ", after payment of legal fees if there be any.
SO ORDERED.18
The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court for Petitions for Change of Name. 19 It argued that Gallo did not comply with the jurisdictional
requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the published Order did not state her official
name, "Michael Gallo."20 Furthermore, the published Order was also defective for not stating the cause of the
change of name.21
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed April 29, 2013 Decision, denied the Office of the Solicitor General's
appeal.22 It found that Gallo availed of the proper remedy under Rule 108 as the corrections sought were
clerical, harmless, and innocuous. 23 It further clarified that Rule 108 is limited to the implementation of Article
412 of the Civil Code 24 and that the proceedings which stem from it can "either be summary, if the correction
sought is clerical, or adversary . . . if [it] affects . . . civil status, citizenship or nationality ... which are deemed
substantial corrections."25
The Court of Appeals discussed that Rule 103, on the other hand, "governs the proceeding for changing the
given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register." 26
Jurisprudence has recognized the following grounds as sufficient to warrant a change of name, to wit: (a) when
the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results
as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; ( c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.27
The Court of Appeals also stated that Republic Act No. 10172, "the present law on the matter, classifies a
change in the first name or nickname, or sex of a person as clerical error that may be corrected without a
judicial order."28 It applied this ruling on the inclusion of Gallo's middle name, her parents' middle names, and
the latter's date of marriage, as they do not involve substantial corrections. 29
As the petition merely involved the correction of clerical errors, the Court of Appeals held that a summary
proceeding would have sufficed. With this determination, the Regional Trial Court's more rigid and stringent
adversarial proceeding was more than enough to satisfy the procedural requirements under Rule 108. 30
However, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, believes otherwise. For it, Gallo wants to
change the name that she was given. Thus, it filed the present Petition via Rule 45 under the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Petition raises procedural errors made by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals in finding for Gallo.31
Citing Republic v. Mercadera,32 petitioner argues that "only clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised" in petitions for correction under Rule 108. 33 Thus, the
correction must only be for a patently misspelled name. 34 As "Michael" could not have been the result of
misspelling "Michelle," petitioner contends that the case should fall under Rule 103 for it contemplates a
substantial change. 35
Petitioner holds that since the applicable rule is Rule 103, Gallo was not able to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements for a change of name under Section 2 of this Rule. 36 It also argues that the use of a different
name is not a reasonable ground to change name under Rule 103. 37
Finally, petitioner insists that Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction38 as Republic Act No. 9048 allegedly now governs the change of first name, superseding
the civil registrar's jurisdiction over the matter.39
To support its claim, it cited Silverio v. Republic, 40 which held that "[t]he intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 ... and 108 ... of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied." 41
Respondent Gallo, in her Comment, 42 counters that the issue of whether or not the petitioned corrections are
innocuous or clerical is a factual issue, which is improper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45.43 In any case, she argues that the corrections are clerical; hence, the applicable rule is Rule 108 and not
Rule 103, with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding properly satisfied. 44 Lastly, she contends that
petitioner has waived its right to invoke the doctrines of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and
primary jurisdiction when it failed to file a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only raised
these issues before this Court. 45
Petitioner filed its Reply.46 The case was then submitted for resolution after the parties filed their respective
Memoranda.47
The issues for this Court's resolution are:
First, whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in alleging that the change sought
by Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and not a mere correction of error;
17
Second, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a substantive change under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court instead of mere correction of clerical errors; and
Finally, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.1âwphi1
This Court finds for the respondent.1âwphi1 Hers was a Petition to correct the entry in the Civil Registry.
I
In assailing the Court of Appeals' ruling that the change sought by Gallo was a mere correction of error,
petitioner raises a question of fact not proper under a Rule 45 Petition, which should only raise questions of
law.
Time and again, it has been held that this Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, its functions do not include
weighing and analyzing evidence adduced from the lower courts all over again.
In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co.48:
The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions
filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by  certiorari. It is not this
Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.
Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes distinguished a question of law from a question of fact:
Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the issue
raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether the
supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it
is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it
is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the
question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if
the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual. 49 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of evidence as determining whether
or not the change sought is a typographical error or a substantive change requires looking into the party's
records, supporting documents, testimonies, and other evidence.
On changes of first name, Republic Act No. 10172, which amended Republic Act No. 9048, is helpful in
identifying the nature of the determination sought.
Republic Act No. 1017250 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded mistake, "which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding." Thus:
Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
....
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the date of birth or the
sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected
or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age, or status of the petitioner. 51
Likewise, Republic Act No. 904852 states:
Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
....
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner.53
By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination made after reference to and
evaluation of existing documents presented.
Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the
understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used.
This Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court's determination, concurred in by the Court of Appeals, that this
case involves the correction of a mere error. As these are findings of fact, this Court is bound by the lower
courts' findings.
II.A
In any case, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the entry of Gallo's
biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while Republic Act No. 9048 applies to all other
corrections sought.
18
Under Article 407 of the Civil Code, the books in the Civil Register include "acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons,"54 which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated there.55
Entries in the register include births, marriages, deaths, legal separations, annulments of marriage, judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning, legitimations, adoptions, acknowledgments of natural children,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation, voluntary
emancipation of a minor, and changes of name.56
As stated, the governing law on changes of first name is currently Republic Act No. 10172, which amended
Republic Act No. 9048. Prior to these laws, the controlling provisions on changes or corrections of name were
Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code.
Article 376 states the need for judicial authority before any person can change his or her name. 57 On the other
hand, Article 412 provides that judicial authority is also necessary before any entry in the civil register may be
changed or corrected. 58
Under the old rules, a person would have to file an action in court under Rule 103 for substantial changes in
the given name or surname provided they fall under any of the valid reasons recognized by law, or Rule 108
for corrections of clerical errors.
This requirement for judicial authorization was justified to prevent fraud and allow other parties, who may be
affected by the change of name, to oppose the matter, as decisions in these proceedings bind the whole
world.59
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to
Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court
to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with
regard to, the rest of the community. In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the
"designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known." When
granted, a person's identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the
convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him." Judicial
permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a
court decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order issued by the
court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with, the
decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to
indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one's existing family relations or in the
rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. However, "there could
be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname
desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the
existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind." Hence, in requests for a change of
name, "what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious
evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced ... mindful of the consequent results
in the event of its grant ... "60 (Citations omitted)
Applying Article 412 of the Civil Code, a person desiring to change his or her name altogether must file a
petition under Rule 103 with the Regional Trial Court, which will then issue an order setting a hearing date and
directing the order's publication in a newspaper of general circulation. 61
After finding that there is proper and reasonable cause to change his or her name, the Regional Trial Court
may grant the petition and order its entry in the civi1 register. 62
On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and innocuous mistakes in
his or her documents with the civil register. 63 It also governs the correction of substantial errors in the entry of
the information enumerated in Section 2 of this Rule 64 and those affecting the civil status, citizenship, and
nationality of a person.65 The proceedings under this rule may either be summary, if the correction pertains to
clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to substantial errors. 66
As explained in Republic v. Mercadera:67
Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above[-]stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as even substantial
errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established, provided the parties
aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is merely
to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may,
under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly
construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are
substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings
depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a
party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of
the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary
admitted .... " "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only
correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law
embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution." 68 (Emphasis in the original)
Following the procedure in Rule 103, Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial
Court. The trial court then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a newspaper of general
19
circulation in the province.69 After the hearing, the trial court may grant or dismiss the petition and serve a
copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar. 70
Mercadera clarified the applications of Article 376 and Rule 103, and of Article 412 and Rule 108, thus:
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412
and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In
order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change
and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the
sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry
may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the
correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in
one's name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in
civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority
for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using
Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to
ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein." 71 (Citations omitted)
However, Republic Act No. 9048 72 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively removing clerical
errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them under the jurisdiction of the
civil registrar. 73
In Silverio v. Republic:74
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) . . .
....
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy
and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.75 (Citations omitted)
In Republic v. Cagandahan: 76
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to
the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies
only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 77 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
78
In Republic v. Sali:
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has been
habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that first name in
the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary jurisdiction to
entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil
registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court. 79 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Republic Act No. 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or
typographical mistakes in the civil register or changes in first names or nicknames. 80
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.  - No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.81
Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name through
administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative petition has been filed and later
denied.
82
In 2012, Republic Act No. 9048 was amended by Republic Act No. 10172.
20
In addition to the change of the first name, the day and month of birth, and the sex of a person may now be
changed without judicial proceedings. Republic Act No. 10172 clarifies that these changes may now be
administratively corrected where it is patently clear that there is a clerical or typographical mistake in the
entry. It may be changed by filing a subscribed and sworn affidavit with the local civil registry office of the city
or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept. 83
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.- No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a
person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry,  which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. 84 (Emphasis supplied)
However, Republic Act No. 10172 does not apply in the case at bar as it was only enacted on August 15, 2012-
more than two (2) years after Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010. 85 Hence,
Republic Act No. 9048 governs.
II.B
As to the issue of which between Rules 103 and 108 applies, it is necessary to determine the nature of the
correction sought by Gallo.
Petitioner maintains that Rule 103 applies as the changes were substantive while respondent contends that it
is Rule 108 which governs as the changes pertain only to corrections of clerical errors.
Upon scrutiny of the records in this case, this Court rules that Gallo's
Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors.
A clerical or typographical error pertains to a
[M]istake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in
the civil register that is harmless and innocuous ... which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding,
and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records[.] 86
However, corrections which involve a change in nationality, age, or status are not considered clerical or
typographical. 87
Jurisprudence is replete with cases determining what constitutes a clerical or typographical error in names
with the civil register.
In Republic v. Mercadera, 88 Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) sought to correct her name from "Marilyn" to
"Merlyn." 89 She alleged that "she had been known as MERLYN ever since" and she prayed that the trial court
correct her recorded given name "Marilyn" "to conform to the one she grew up to." 90 The Office of the
Solicitor General argued that this change was substantial which must comply with the procedure under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court.91 However, this Court ruled that Rule 103 did not apply because the petition merely
sought to correct a misspelled given name:
In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what appears
as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn'' is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled. The
similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix-up that blemished Mercadera's
Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same.
The [Court of Appeals] did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction
of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember. 92
Mercadera also cited similar cases in which this Court determined what constitutes harmless errors that need
not go through the proceedings under Rule 103:
Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercadera's case which recognize the same a
harmless error. In Yu v. Republic it was held that "to change 'Sincio' to 'Sencio' which merely involves the
substitution of the first vowel 'i' in the first name into the vowel 'e' amounts merely to the righting of a clerical
error." In LabayoRowe v. Republic, it was held that the change of petitioner's name from "Beatriz
Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo" was a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary
proceeding was appropriate. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto, the
correction involved the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as
given name would read "Michael." In the latter case, this Court, with the agreement of the Solicitor General,
ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such that, "changing the name of the child from 'Midael C. Mazon' to
'Michael C. Mazon' cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced
with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig).93 (Citations omitted)
Likewise, in Republic v. Sali,94 Lorena Omapas Sali (Sali) sought to correct her Certificate of Live Birth, alleging
that her first name was erroneously entered as "Dorothy" instead of "Lorena," and her date of birth as "June
24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968." She alleged that she had been using the name "Lorena" and the birth
date "April 24, 1968" ever since. She also averred that she had always been known as "Lorena" in her
community. She claimed that the petition was just to correct the error and not to evade any criminal or civil
liability, or to affect any succession of another person. 95
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Republic, argued against Sali's claim, alleging
that the petition was for a change of name under Rule 103 and not for the correction of a simple clerical error.
It averred that there must be a valid ground for the name change, and the applicant's names and aliases must
be stated in the title of the petition and the order setting it for hearing. It also contended that assuming Rule
108 was the proper remedy, Sali failed to exhaust her remedies when she did not file an affidavit under
Republic Act No. 9048.96
21
In Sali, this Court held that Rule 103 did not apply because the petition was not for a change of name, but a
petition for correction of errors in the recording of Sali's name and birth date. Sali had been using the name
"Lorena" since birth, and she merely sought to have her records conform to the name she had been using as
her true name. She had no intention of changing her name altogether. Thus, her prayer for the correction of
her misspelled name is not contemplated by Rule 103. 97
In the case at bar, petitioner, raising the same arguments as that in Sali, claims that the change sought by Gallo
is substantial, covered by Rule 103 because the two (2) names are allegedly entirely different from each other.
It argues that "Michael" could not have been the result of a misspelling of "Michelle." 98
On the other hand, Gallo argues that the corrections are clerical which fall under Rule 108, with the
requirements of an adversarial proceeding properly complied. 99
Considering that Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not to change the name by which she is
commonly known, this Court rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. Gallo is not filing the petition
to change her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her name.
Correcting and changing have been differentiated, thus:
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. 100
Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her given
name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as "Michael," especially since the first four (4) letters of these two
(2) names are exactly the same. The differences only pertain to an additional letter "a" in "Michael," and "le"
at the end of "Michelle." "Michelle" and "Michael" may also be vocalized similarly, considering the possibility
of different accents or intonations of different people. In any case, Gallo does not seek to be known by a
different appellation. The lower courts have determined that she has been known as "Michelle" all throughout
her life. She is merely seeking to correct her records to conform to her true given name.
However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either.
As stated, Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010. 101 The current law, Republic Act No.
10172, does not apply because it was enacted only on August 19, 2012. 102
The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No. 9048. 103
To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9048 was enacted on March 22, 2001 and removed the correction of clerical or
typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108. It also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in
case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register, or changes of first name or nickname. Thus:
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.  - No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations. 104
Therefore, it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the Regional Trial
Court. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can the Regional Trial Court
take cognizance of her case. In Republic v. Sali, 105
Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules but for correction of
entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which were committed in the
recording of her name and birth date. This Court has held that not all alterations allowed in one's name are
confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108. The evidence
presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has been using the name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she
never had any intention to change her name. What she seeks is simply the removal of the clerical fault or error
in her first name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name she grew up with.
Nevertheless, at the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect . . .
....
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has been
habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that first name in
the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary jurisdiction to
entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil
registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court . . .
....
In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within the RTC's
primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should have been administrative, i.e., filing of the
petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should
have dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name. 106
Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the middle names of her parents as Angangan
for her mother and Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents' marriage as May 23, 1981 fall under
clerical or typographical errors as mentioned in Republic Act No. 9048.
Under Section 2(3) of Republic Act No. 9048:
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
22
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner. 107
These corrections may be done by referring to existing records in the civil register. None of it involves any
change in Gallo's nationality, age, status, or sex.
Moreover, errors "visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding" 108 fall within the coverage of clerical
mistakes not deemed substantial. If it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof that the
name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used, the correction may be made.
Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them administratively before filing a petition
under Rule 108.
However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as this was a
substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic Act No. 9048. 109
This was affirmed in Republic v. Cagandahan: 110
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error.
It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.  111 (Citation
omitted)
It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries as to biological
sex may be administratively corrected, provided that they involve a typographical or clerical error. 112
However, this is not true for all cases as corrections in entries of biological sex may still be considered a
substantive matter.
In Cagandahan, 113 this Court ruled that a party who seeks a change of name and biological sex in his or her
Certificate of Live Birth after a gender reassignment surgery has to file a petition under Rule 108. 114 In that
case, it was held that the change did not involve a mere correction of an error in recording but a petition for a
change of records because the sex change was initiated by the petitioner. 115
IV
Considering that Gallo did not first file an administrative case in the civil register before proceeding to the
courts, petitioner contends that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9048. 116
On the other hand, respondent argues that petitioner has waived its right to invoke these doctrines because it
failed to file a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only raised these issues before this
Court. 117
This Court rules in favor of Gallo.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all administrative
processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative officer concerned must be
given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative
remedies affects the party's cause of action as these remedies refer to a precedent condition which must be
complied with prior to filing a case in court. 118
However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the court's
jurisdiction.119 Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v. Jareno: 120
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of noncompliance with this
rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not
invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case
and try it. 121 (Citation omitted)
Meanwhile, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, if an administrative tribunal has
jurisdiction over a controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be within its proper
jurisdiction. This is especially true when the question involves its sound discretion requiring special knowledge,
experience, and services to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. 122
In Republic v. Lacap: 123
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that
is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.  124 (Citation
omitted)
Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to take
cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot
be waived.
However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled that failure to raise
the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at an opportune time may
bar a subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way of laches. 125
In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy:126
True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law,
and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be
23
raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case -
which shall forthwith be set forth - We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by  laches from
invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its
active participation . . .
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we
speak of estoppels in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction ... In
the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because
the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as
an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated- obviously for reasons of public
policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court ... And in
Littleton vs. Burgess, ... the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty. 127 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, where a party participated in the proceedings and the issue of non-compliance was raised only as an
afterthought at the final stage of appeal, the party invoking it may be estopped from doing so.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There
are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;  ( d)
where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; ( e) where the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot; G) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public
interest is involved; and, (1) in quo warranto proceedings . . 128 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Petitioner does not deny that the issue of non-compliance with these two (2) doctrines was only raised in this
Court. Thus, in failing to invoke these contentions before the Regional Trial Court, it is estopped from invoking
these doctrines as grounds for dismissal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The April 29, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 96358 is AFFIRMED. The Petition for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of
Michelle Soriano Gallo is GRANTED. This Court directs that the Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle Soriano
Gallo be corrected as follows:
1) Correct her first name from "Michael" to "Michelle";
2) Correct her biological sex from "Male" to "Female";
3) Enter her middle name as "Soriano";
4) Enter the middle name of her mother as "Angangan";
5) Enter the middle name of her father as "Balingao"; and
6) Enter the date of her parents' marriage as "May 23, 1981."
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF AN ENTRY
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA,  Petitioners, vs.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR
BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, Respondents.
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as "Pablito Sicad
Braza," were married1 on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef 2 and Janelle
Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo 4 on June 4, 1980.
Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille)
began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma.
Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate 6 from the
Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:
24
Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR
Date of Birth : 01 January 1996
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular
Father : Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the Local January 13, 1997
Civil Registrar :
Annotation : "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"
Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22,
1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy 7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on
April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition 8 to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the
Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo,
said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo,
petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation,
the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon,
Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing  to
determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in
his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order 9 of September 6, 2007,
dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the
court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul
the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA
test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 10 of November 29, 2007, they filed the
present petition for review.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy
even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar. Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of
Appeals12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they contend that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be
corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108. 14
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy
and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code 15 charts the procedure by which an entry in
the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used
only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is
one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a
mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of
a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. 16
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in
connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records 17 and
that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not
by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 18 of the Family
Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said
Code.1avvphi1
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such
as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cariño v. Cariño  was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the
death benefits received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage
25
with the husband while the latter’s marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity
of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein
petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that
they are not the latter’s children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all
between
the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok
Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother.
Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated
under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their
respective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not
Chinese, because their parents were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be
made were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be
adversarial in nature, upheld the lower court’s grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present
case.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,vs.DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch
11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of
the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage
as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not
the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the
provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino
spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
26
Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case,
as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void 15 and voidable16 marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at
the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for
cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, 19 enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law
this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused
to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between
the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital
bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of
the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.
No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that
already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national
law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
27
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the
title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party
with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment.
In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. 27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, 30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time,
will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper
basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded
the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees
that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all
his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own
will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status
that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the
registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
28
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books,
in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of
the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in
relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone
of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 – both of
which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For
being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition
is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for
the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It
also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings; 39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent.
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of
Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live
birth1 shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez
Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR  CHANGE OF
NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM
COSETENG."
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that
his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage." 2 Respondent also
submitted his academic records from elementary up to college 3 showing that he carried the surname
"Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. 4 In the 1998, 2001
and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name
"JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."5
29
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, 6 respondent amended his petition by alleging therein
compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.7
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside
in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. 8 And a copy
of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court
which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. 9
By Decision of January 8, 2009,10 the trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar
of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein
respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]… (emphasis
and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court
by Order of July 2, 2009, 11 hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure
question of law.
The Republic assails the decision in this wise:
I. . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME…INVOLVES THE CHANGE OF [RESPONDENT’S] CIVIL STATUS FROM
LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL
PROCEEDINGS…
II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT DIRECTED THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF
RESPONDENT’S FATHER FROM HIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE.12 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of respondent’s
parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. 13
The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondent’s parents’ date of marriage and the name of
respondent’s father from the entries in respondent’s birth certificate, 14 the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction,
such order not being in accord with respondent’s prayer reading:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court issue an
order allowing the change of name of petitioner from JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that the Honorable Court order the Local Civil
Registrar and all other relevant government agencies to reflect the said change of name in their records.
Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the premises. 15 (underscoring supplied)
Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in nature. He cites the serving
of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the
OSG; the posting of copies of the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before the
hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the Republic;
the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and
the fact that no oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing. 16
The petition is impressed with merit.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds
including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when
the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.17 Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to,
recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. 18 In Alfon, the Court
allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in
order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname
of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was
lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough
to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his
parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant
respondent’s supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic19 categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate
to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings . . ."
30
Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,  Rule 108 applies. It
reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties
to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in
which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was
registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the
RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote 20 in support of his claim that his change of name was
effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Republic v. Belmonte,21 illuminates, however:
The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the
other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules
of Court allowing the change of one’s name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon
meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies,
respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside
from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents
in the case.
Republic v. Labrador22 mandates that "a petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil
registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have
any interest that would be affected thereby." It cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:
to his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
23
Labayo-Rowe  highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a petition which involves place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
substantial and controversial alterations. In that case, the therein petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
(Emperatriz) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that her name
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
appearing in the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz; and her
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
civil status appearing in the birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as "married" on "1953 Bulan" are
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
erroneous because she was not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who furnished the data in said
birth certificate. A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to
different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the
The trial court found merit in Emperatriz’s petition and accordingly directed the local civil registrar to change
second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
her name appearing in her children’s birth certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct her civil
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are
status in Victoria’s birth certificate from "married" to "single" and the date and place of marriage to "no
mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted,
marriage."
which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition
On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of the trial court involved a (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).
question of law, the Court nullified the trial court’s order directing the change of Emperatriz’ civil status and
This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals. 25 In that case, Nadina Maravilla (Nadina)
the filiation of her child Victoria in light of the following observations:
filed a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of her daughter June from June Salvacion
x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been Maravilla to June Salvacion "Gustilo," Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her daughter’s real father.
made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court a "CONSTANCIA" wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter. The
the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other trial court granted the petition.
persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained
After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the
under an adversary system of justice.
Order of the trial court granting the change of June’s family name to Gustilo.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would
Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann Gustilo, filed before the
be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter.  The fact that
trial court’s Order as Mary Joy was, by Barco’s claim, also fathered by Gustilo.
the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof
was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in-intervention.
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority
under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules "shall not diminish, On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in Nadina’s petition for correction
increase or modify substantive rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But since a petitioner, like Nadina, is not expected to
changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to exhaustively identify all the affected parties, the subsequent publication of the notice cured the omission of
comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or Barco as a party to the case. Thus the Court explained:
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. 1awphi1 Her interest was
would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive
affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando
rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code. 24 (emphasis, italics and
would affect her ward’s share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of
underscoring supplied)
31
Mary Joy’s existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to
whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the
granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or
illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section
3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. x x x x.26 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho, 27 Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the civil registrar as the sole
respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of entries in their respective birth certificates in the civil
registry of Butuan City, and correction of entries in the birth certificates of Carlito’s minor children. Carlito and
his siblings requested the correction in their birth certificates of the citizenship of their mother Epifania to
"Filipino," instead of "Chinese," and the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage
of parents" because their parents ─ Juan and Epifania ─ were not married. And Carlito requested the
correction in the birth certificates of their children of his and his wife’s date of marriage to reflect the actual
date of their marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course of the hearing of the petition,
Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his wife from Maribel to "Marivel."
The Khos’ mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she was not married to Juan who
died before the filing of the Khos’ petition.
The trial court granted the petition.
On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos’ parents rendered the trial of the petition
short of the required adversary proceedings and the trial court’s judgment void, this Court held that when all
the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the notice of hearing cures the
failure to implead an indispensable party. In so ruling, the Court noted that the affected parties were already
notified of the proceedings in the case since the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones who initiated the
petition respecting their prayer for correction of their citizenship, and Carlito respecting the actual date of his
marriage to his wife; and, with respect to the Khos’ petition for change of their civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, their mother Epifania herself took the witness stand declaring that she was not married to their
father.
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil
registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or
cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or
is not established to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually
participates in the proceeding is notified through publication.
32
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The January 8, 2009 Decision of
Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and natural guardian, Armi A. Alba, and ARMI A. ALBA,
in her personal capacity, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSENDO C. HERRERA, Respondents.
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the February 27, 2004 decision 2 and the May 14, 2004 resolution 3 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883, which dismissed petitioner’s original action for annulment of
judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, and denied the motion for reconsideration,
respectively.
The antecedent facts show that on October 21, 1996, private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a
petition5 for cancellation of the following entries in the birth certificate of "Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.", to wit:
(1) the surname "Herrera" as appended to the name of said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as
the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to the child’s
mother, Armi A. Alba (Armi) on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He claimed that the challenged entries
are false and that it was only sometime in September 1996 that he learned of the existence of said birth
certificate.
Private respondent alleged that he married only once, i.e., on June 28, 1965 with Ezperanza C. Santos and
never contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr. In support thereof, he presented
certifications from the Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City 6 and the National Statistics Office,7 both stating that
they have no record of marriage between private respondent and Armi.
On November 12, 1996, private respondent filed an amended petition, 8 impleading Armi and "all the persons
who have or claim any interest in th[e] petition." 9
On November 27, 1996, the trial court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing on January 24, 1997,
and directed the publication and service of said order to Armi at her address appearing in the birth certificate
which is No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, and to the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the Solicitor
General. The full text of the order, reads:
In a verified Amended Petition for Correction of Entry, the Petitioner prays, inter alia, that the following
entries appearing in the subject Certificate of Live Birth be deleted:
1. All informations having reference to him as the father of the child mentioned therein;
2. The surname "Herrera" appended to the child’s name;
3. His alleged marriage with the natural mother of the child.
Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the Petition be set for hearing on January 24,
1997 at nine o’clock in the morning before this Branch at Rooms 447-449, Fourth Floor, Manila City Hall. All
interested parties are hereby notified of the said hearing and are ordered to show cause why the Petition
should not be granted.
Let a copy of this Order be published at the expense of the Petitioner, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila, and raffled pursuant to P.D. 1079.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the City of Manila with
copies of the Petition and of this Order.
Let the same be likewise furnished the Private Respondent Armi Alba Herrera at the address indicated in the
subject Certificate of Live Birth.
SO ORDERED.10
On January 13, 1997, before the scheduled January 24, 1997 hearing, the trial court issued an Amended
Order11 with substantially the same contents, except that the hearing was re-scheduled to February 26, 1997.
A copy of said Amended Order was published in "Today", a newspaper of general circulation in Manila in its
January 20, 27, and February 3, 1997 issues. Copies thereof were also sent to Armi at No. 418 Arquiza St.,
Ermita, Manila, on January 17, 1997, the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Solicitor General.
At the scheduled hearing on February 26, 1997, the counsel from the Office of the Solicitor General appeared
but filed no opposition to the petition. Armi, on the other hand was not present. The return of the notice sent
to her had the following notation:
This is to certify that on January 17, 1997, the undersigned [process server] personally served a copy of the
Amended Order in Sp. Proc. No. 96-80512 dated January 13, 1997 to the private respondent, Armi Alba
Herrera at … 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, but failed and unavailing for reason that (sic), private respondent
is no longer residing at said given address.12
On April 1, 1997, the court a quo rendered a decision which became final and executory on June 2, 1997. 13 The
dispositive portion thereof, states:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the
entry under the name of the child, the surname Herrera, Jr.[,] is ordered deleted, and the child shall be known
as ROSENDO ALBA; and that the entry under the date and place of marriage, the date August 4, 1982,
Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered deleted or cancelled.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila for proper correction and entry.
33
SO ORDERED.14
Private respondent filed a motion 15 for amendment of the decretal portion of the decision to include the
cancellation of all entries having reference to him as the father of petitioner minor. This was granted in the
August 11, 1997 order of the trial court as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the
entries under the name of the child, the surname Herrera, Jr., and the name of the father Rosendo Caparas
Herrera are ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as ROSENDO ALBA; and the entry under the date
and place of marriage, the date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered deleted or cancelled.
SO ORDERED.16
On November 24, 2000, Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court
of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over their person. She allegedly came to
know of the decision of the trial court only on February 26, 1998, when San Beda College, where her son was
enrolled as a high school student, was furnished by private respondent with a copy of a court order directing
the change of petitioner minor’s surname from Herrera to Alba.
Armi averred that private respondent was aware that her address is at Unit 302 Plaza Towers Condominium,
1175 Lorenzo Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, because such was her residence when she and private respondent
cohabited as husband and wife from 1982 to 1988; and her abode when petitioner minor was born on March
8, 1985. Even after their separation, private respondent continued to give support to their son until 1998; and
that Unit 302 was conveyed to her by private respondent on June 14, 1991 as part of his support to petitioner
minor. According to Armi, her address i.e., No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, as appearing in the birth
certificate of their son, was entered in said certificate through the erroneous information given by her sister,
Corazon Espiritu. She stressed that private respondent knew all along that No. 418 Arquiza St., is the residence
of her sister and that he deliberately caused the service of notice therein to prevent her from opposing the
petition.
In his answer, private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his purported cohabitation with
Armi. He branded the allegations of the latter as "false statements coming from a polluted source." 17
On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding, among others, that petitioner
failed to prove that private respondent employed fraud and purposely deprived them of their day in court. It
further held that as an illegitimate child, petitioner minor should bear the surname of his mother. 18 Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments
may be annulled on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud. 19
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and her minor child depends
on the nature of private respondent’s action, that is, in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. An action in
personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing
itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to
subject that person’s interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. 20
Hence, petitions directed against the "thing" itself or the res,21 which concerns the status of a person, 22 like a
petition for adoption,23 annulment of marriage,24 or correction of entries in the birth certificate, 25 as in the
instant case, are actions in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try
and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the  res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective. 26 The service of summons or notice to the defendant is
not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.27
In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested the latter jurisdiction
over the res.  Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry records affecting the status or
legitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court. 28 Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner is therefore not required in the present case. It is enough that the trial court is
vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the publication thereof in a newspaper of
general circulation in Manila, sufficiently complied with the requirement of due process, the essence of which
is an opportunity to be heard. Said address appeared in the birth certificate of petitioner minor as the
residence of Armi. Considering that the Certificate of Birth bears her signature, the entries appearing therein
are presumed to have been entered with her approval. Moreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all
indispensable parties, including Armi and petitioner minor, which binds the whole world to the judgment that
may be rendered in the petition. An  in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. 29 The
absence of personal service of the order to Armi was therefore cured by the trial court’s compliance with
Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
34
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, the trial court granted a petition for correction/change of entries in a minor’s
birth certificate to reflect the name of the minor’s real father as well as to effect the corresponding change of
her surname. In seeking to annul said decision, the other children of the alleged father claimed that they are
indispensable parties to the petition for correction, hence, the failure to implead them is a ground to annul the
decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals denied the petition which was sustained by this Court on the
ground, inter alia, that while petitioner is indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured
by the publication of the order of hearing. Thus –
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the
petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her
ward’s share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joy’s existence
at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner
under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For
example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her
spouse or paramour. The fact that Nadina amended her petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates
earnest effort on her part to comply with Section 3 as quoted above.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the
defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
Section 4. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section
3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. The Court of Appeals correctly noted:
The publication being ordered was in compliance with, and borne out by the Order of January 7, 1985. The
actual publication of the September 22, 1983 Order, conferred jurisdiction upon the respondent court to try
and decide the case. While "nobody appeared to oppose the instant petition" during the December 6, 1984
hearing, that did not divest the court from its jurisdiction over the case and of its authority to continue trying
the case. For, the rule is well-settled, that jurisdiction, once acquired continues until termination of the case.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person.  The
decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for
its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought
to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and
vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 30
Furthermore, extrinsic fraud, which was private respondent’s alleged concealment of Armi’s present address,
was not proven. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside
of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by
fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Here, Armi contended that private respondent is
aware of her present address because they lived together as husband and wife in the condominium unit from
1982 to 1988 and because private respondent continued to give support to their son until 1998. To prove her
claim, she presented (1) private respondent’s title over the condominium unit; (2) receipts allegedly issued to
private respondent for payment of homeowner’s or association dues; (2) a photocopy of a January 14, 1991
deed of sale of the subject unit in favor of Armi; and (3) the subsequent title issued to the latter. However,
these documents only tend to prove private respondent’s previous ownership of the unit and the subsequent
transfer thereof to Armi, but not the claimed live-in relationship of the parties. Neither does the sale prove
that the conveyance of the unit was part of private respondent’s support to petitioner minor. Indeed, intimate
relationships and family relations cannot be inferred from what appears to be an ordinary business
transaction.
Although the January 14, 1991 deed of sale 31 stated that Armi resides at 1175 L. Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila,
the same is not sufficient to prove that private respondent has knowledge of Armi’s address because the
former objected to the offer of the deed for being a mere photocopy. 32 The counsel for petitioners even
admitted that they do not have the original of the deed and that per certification of the Clerk of Court, the
Notary Public who notarized the deed of sale did not submit a copy of the notarized document as required by
the rules.33 The deed cannot thus be the basis of ascribing knowledge of Armi’s address to private respondent
inasmuch as the authenticity thereof was neither admitted by private respondent nor proven by petitioners.
While Armi presented the alleged love letters/notes from private respondent, they were only attached as
annexes to the petition and not formally offered as evidence before the Court of Appeals. More importantly,
said letters/notes do not have probative value because they were mere photocopies and never proven to be
an authentic writing of private respondent. In the same vein, the affidavits 34 of Armi and her sister, Corazon
Espiritu, are of no evidentiary weight. The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are
placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay.
Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the
trial for cross-examination.35 Inasmuch as Armi and her sister were not presented before the Court of Appeals
to affirm the veracity of their affidavits, the same are considered hearsay and without probative value.
Ei incumbit probotio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. 36 Armi’s claim
that private respondent is aware of her present address is anchored on the assertion of a live-in relationship
and support to her son. Since the evidence presented by Armi is not sufficient to prove the purported
cohabitation and support, it follows that private respondent’s knowledge of Armi’s address was likewise not
proven. Thus, private respondent could not have deliberately concealed from the court that which was not
shown to be known to him. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed the petition for annulment of
judgment on the ground of failure to establish extrinsic fraud.
35
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals in an action to annul a judgment
of a Regional Trial Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, where only questions of law may be raised. The resort of petitioner to the instant civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is therefore erroneous. The special civil action of certiorari will not be allowed as a
substitute for failure to timely file a petition for review under Rule 45, which should be instituted within 15
days37 from receipt of the assailed decision or resolution. The wrong choice of remedy thus provides another
reason to dismiss this petition.38
Finally, petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the trial court’s decision. In an action
for annulment of judgment, the petitioner must convince the court that something may indeed be achieved
should the assailed decision be annulled.39 Under Article 17640 of the Family Code as amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 9255, which took effect on March 19, 2004, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father’s surname.
In Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar,41 it was held that an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
father, bears only a given name and his mother’s surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
identifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may use his father’s surname, reflecting
his status as an acknowledged illegitimate child.
In the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is an illegitimate child because
she was never married to private respondent. Considering that the latter strongly asserts that he is not the
father of petitioner minor, the latter is therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the
surname of his mother.
In sum, the substantive and procedural aspects of the instant controversy do not warrant the annulment of
the trial court’s decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The February 27, 2004 decision and the May 14, 2004 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883 are AFFIRMED.
PLATON AND LIBRADA CERUILA, Petitioners,vs.ROSILYN DELANTAR, represented by her guardian,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT, Respondent.
Petitioners-spouses Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila (Ceruilas) filed an action with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-818932, for the annulment and cancellation of the birth
certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Rosilyn), the child-victim in the rape case involving Romeo
Jaloslos.1 The RTC granted the Ceruilas’ petition in its decision dated April 11, 1997 2 which was nullified,
however, by the Court of Appeals (CA) on June 10, 1999. 3 The CA denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.4 Hence the present petition.
The antecedents are as follows:
Sometime in 1996, Rosilyn complained against her father, Simplicio Delantar (Simplicio) for child abuse,
particularly prostitution. Simplicio was incarcerated at the Pasay City Jail starting August 22, 1996 which
prompted the filing of a petition for involuntary commitment of Rosilyn in favor of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), as the whereabouts of the mother, Librada Ceruila, was unknown. The
petition was granted by the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 119 on November 9, 1996 and Simplicio’s motion to
vacate said judgment was denied by said court on January 20, 1997. 5
On February 3, 1997, the Ceruilas filed a petition before the RTC of Manila, entitled "IN THE MATTER OF
CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR," praying
that the birth certificate of Rosilyn be canceled and declared null and void for the reasons that said birth
certificate was made an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and
it falsified all material entries therein, as follows:
a. The name of her mother which should not be petitioner Librada A. Telin;
b. The signature of informant referring to ‘Librada T. Delantar’ being a forgery;
c. The name of Simplicio Delantar as the biological father, considering that, as already mentioned, he is merely
the foster father and co-guardian in fact of Maria Rosilyn and the name of the natural father in (sic) unknown;
d. The date of marriage of the supposed parents, since the parents reflected in said certificate were (sic)
actually full blood brother and sister and therefore marriage between the two is virtually impossible;
e. The status of Maria Rosilyn as a legitimate child as the same (sic) is actually not legitimate;
f. The date of actual birth of Marial (sic) Rosilyn, since the known father merely made it appear that she was
born at the time the informations for the birth certificate were supplied by him to the civil registrar or (sic)
proper recording;
g. The name of the physician who allegedly attended at the time of birth of Maria Rosilyn, being a fictitious ‘Dr.
Santos’.6
On February 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing on March 19, 1997 and directed the
publication of said order once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. The
Order also stated that any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his/her comment or
opposition thereto on or before the scheduled hearing. 7
Summons was sent to the Civil Register of Manila. 8 However, no representative appeared during the scheduled
hearing.9
On April 11, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition of the Ceruilas as follows:
36
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. DECLARING the certificate of live birth of the Minor Maria
Rosilyn Telin Delantar as registered under the Local Civil Registry No. 85-27325 of the office of the City Civil
Registrar of Manila as null and void ab initio: and
2. ORDERING the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the National Statistics Office, Manila, to expunge from their
respective marriage registers the entry of the birth of said minor and such other documents pertaining
thereto, if any.
The RTC explained in its Decision thus: During the initial trial, the petition was read aloud in open court to find
out if there is any opposition thereto. There being none, the petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Goering G.C.
Paderanga, then established the jurisdictional requirements (Exhibits "A" to "E"). 11 Thereafter, petitioner
husband Platon Ceruila was placed on the stand as the lone witness for the petitioner and after he completed
his testimony, Atty. Paderanga formally offered his evidence and rested his case.
The evidence on record reveals the following: On May 11, 1985, a child was born at the Dr. Jose Fabella
Memorial Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The name of the child was entered in her birth certificate as Maria
Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Exhibit "I"). In the said birth certificate the name of the child’s mother appear as
Librada A. Telin (Entry No. 6) while that of her father as Simplicio R. Delantar (Entry No. 9). The birth certificate
likewise shows that the parents of the child, Simplicio R. Delantar and Librada A. Telin, were married on
February 14, 1977 in Manila (Entry No. 12). Likewise, in Entry No. 21 of the same document, it is made to
appear that the mother of the child was 27 years old when the child was born and that she was attended in
her delivery thereof by Dr. Santos (Entry No. 13). The birth certificate was signed by one Librada T. delos
Santos as the informant and mother of the child with her given address as 2165 P. Burgos St., Pasay City (Entry
No. 14). This is the very certificate of live birth that is being seriously impugned by the herein petitioners.
In support of their petition, the petitioners submitted the baptismal certificates of Simplicio Delantar (Exhibit
"J") and Librada Delantar (Exhibit "K") to prove that they are full blood brother and sister and could not have
been possible for them to have sired Rosilyn (sic). In the said baptismal certificates, the names of the parents
of Simplicio and Librada are similarly entered as Juan Delantar and Carila Telen (Exhibit "J-1" and "K-1"). The
Court is inclined to concur with the observation of the petitioner that it is highly unlikely that the alleged
parents of Rosilyn would commit an incestuous act and proclaim to the whole world that they are the parents
of the herein minor. The court has also observed that in the baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar, it is
entered therein that she was born on January 8, 1940 in Tubod, Manglanilla, Cebu (Exhibit "K-2"). Such being
the case, then Librada must have been 45 years of age at the time of the birth of Rosilyn in stark contrast to
her age appearing in Entry No. 27 (sic) of the birth certificate of the latter which shows that Librada was 27
years old at the time of her delivery. The presentation of the baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar as
secondary evidence of her birth certificate was resorted to after the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Minglanilla, Cebu gave a certification to the effect that the records of birth on file with the office for the period
January, 1940 to April, 1945 were all destroyed by WORLD WAR II (Exhibit "L"). And going for the jugular, so to
speak, the signature of the person named Librada T. delos Santos in the birth certificate (Exhibit "I") purporting
to be that of the petitioner wife and the signature of the latter appearing in the verification of the petitioner
(sic) (Exhibit "A-6") are so strikingly dissimilar that they could not have but proceeded from two different
hands. For it does not require the trained eye of an expert calligrapher to discern such discrepancy in the
writing style.
In fine, there being an abundance of evidence to support the petitioner’s claim that the birth certificate is
indeed a falsified document, the Court is left with no other alternative but to grant the relief prayed for in the
petition. To let the birth certificate reamin (sic) as it is would adversely affect the rights and interests of the
herein petitioners.12
On July 15, 1997, Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the DSWD, filed, with the CA, a petition for the
annulment of judgment in the petition for cancellation of entry of her birth certificate. 13 She claimed that she
and her guardian were not notified of the petition and the subsequent judgment and learned about the same
only from the news on May 16, 1997.14 She argued that the RTC decision was issued without jurisdiction and in
violation of her right to due process; that the Judge did not have authority to declare her to be illegitimate;
and that mere correction of entries, not cancellation of the entire certificate, is the appropriate remedy. 15
Rosilyn further argued that: granting, without admitting that Librada is not her mother, still it was erroneous
to cancel or annul her entire birth certificate; Librada is not an interested party concerning the issue of
whether Simplicio is the father, the date of actual birth, and the name of the physician who attended to the
birth;16 Librada’s allegations are also contradicted by (a) the "Records Based on Cord Dressing Room Book …
dated April 13-May 29, 1985," issued by Emelita H. Avinante, Head of the Medical Records Section and
Admitting Unit of the Fabella Hospital, which is attached to the petition for annulment as Annex "E" and which
states that Maria Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 at the Fabella Hospital and that her parents are
Librada Telin and Simplicio Delantar; 17 and (b) the admission of Simplicio in his Motion to Vacate Judgment 18 in
Sp. Proc. No. 96-41919 regarding the custody of Rosilyn, which is attached to the petition to annul as Annex "F,"
where he stated that he, as the rightful parent of Rosilyn, should not be deprived of his parental authority. 20
On June 10, 1999, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING NULL and VOID the decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court
dated April 11, 1997 in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893.
The CA reasoned that: As shown in the caption of the petition in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893 entitled "In
the Matter of Cancellation and Annulment of the Birth Certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar", herein
petitioner Rosilyn Delantar represented by her legal guardian, DSWD, was not made a party-respondent
therein,…contrary to the mandatory provision of Section 3 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court …
In the said Special Proceeding No. 97-81893, petitioners therein, Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila, sought
not only a cancellation or correction of an entry in the birth certificate of Rosilyn Telin Delantar but in effect
37
sought to annul, cancel or expunge from the Civil Register the subject birth certificate. With more reasons,
therefore, that all parties, particularly Rosilyn Telin Delantar, or thru her legal guardian, the DSWD, whose
birth certificate was sought to be annulled or cancelled from the Civil Register must not only be notified but
must be made a party in the said petition.
Petitioner and her guardian are undoubtedly persons who have interest which would be affected by the
petition for the obvious reason that it is the entry of her birth which is being sought to be annulled and
cancelled.
In a similar case, the Supreme Court ruled that corrections of substantial entries in the certificate other than
mere clerical errors, should be passed upon in an appropriate adversary proceedings with all the persons
interested are made parties therein… Republic vs. Valencia (141 SCRA 462; 468-469; 470-474).
The proceedings undertaken in said Special Proceedings No. 97-81893 is indeed wanting of the required notice
to all the parties having claim or interest which would be affected thereby, and of the adversarial proceedings,
as disclosed in the decision dated April 11, 1997
With the foregoing disquisitions, We find that the decision dated April 11, 1997 null and void for want of
jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner Rosilyn Delantar and the DSWD as her legal guardian and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the said decision. Also, the said decision
dated April 11, 1997 is considered null and void for lack of due process there being no adversarial proceedings
(was) conducted by the public respondent Regional Trial Court.
And, even if the same judgment had already become final and executory, and had in fact been executed, as in
the instant case, still the execution thereof produces no legal effects. 22
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. 23 Hence, the present petition raising the
following issues:
I.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 38 DATED APRIL 11, 1997 IN SPEC. PROCEEDING NO. 97-81893
ENTITLED: IN THE MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA
ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR
II.WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED ITS PEREMPTORY
POWER TO DECLARE THE SUBJECT BIRTH CERTIFICATE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. 24
As to the first issue, petitioners argue that: since the falsification of the entries in the birth certificate of
Rosilyn renders the same void ab initio, the case should be liberally construed as an ordinary civil action for
declaration of nullity of falsified documents based on Article 5 of the Civil Code 25 and Section 15, Rule 6 of the
Rules of Court26 and not as a special proceeding; petitioners were only constrained to utilize the provisions of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on the Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry since Article 5 of
the Civil Code provides no procedure for the nullification of void documents which happens to be a birth
certificate in this case; since the present case involves an ordinary civil action, the cases relied upon by the CA
which are applicable only to special proceedings should not be applied herein; the civil registrar, which is an
indispensable party, was duly served summons by mail; respondent, meanwhile, is not an indispensable party
and granting that she is, she was deemed duly impleaded as her name was clearly stated in the caption of the
case; respondent’s location could not be determined as she was reported to have ran away from the custody
of Simplicio, thus the publication of the petition and the order of the RTC setting the case for hearing once a
week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation should be considered substantial
notice and the requirements of due process deemed substantially complied with; there was no adversarial
proceeding in court because the parties were declared in general default thus, just like an ordinary civil case,
the court should receive evidence ex parte.27
As to the second issue, petitioners claim that: the CA should have exercised its peremptory power to declare
the birth certificate of Rosilyn as null and void ab initio  following the doctrine that where an instrument is
void ab initio for being contrary to law, no amount of technicalities could correct its inherent nullity;
otherwise, there will be multiplicity of actions as the parties will have to file cases anew to annul respondent’s
birth certificate.28
They then pray that the CA decision dated June 10, 1999 be reversed and that the RTC judgment dated April
11, 1997 be reinstated.29
Anent the first issue, the Solicitor General, for the respondent, contends that: since the petitioners chose to
file a petition under Rule 108 they cannot in the present action turn around and claim that their case is not a
special proceeding; in any case, due process was not complied with rendering the proceedings a
quo annullable; petitioners sought to establish Librada Ceruila’s status, i.e., whether or not she is the mother
of respondent, thus, the action falls within the ambit of Sec. 3(c), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court; 30 petitioners did
not allege that they are bringing the suit to enforce or protect their right or to prevent or redress a wrong, for
their case to be categorized as an ordinary civil action; Art. 5 of the Civil Code which is being invoked by
petitioners is a general provision, while entries of record of birth in the civil register are governed by Republic
Act No. 3753 (Civil Registry Law) as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 651; since the law provides for a
remedy when an entry in a record found in the civil registry is erroneous or falsified, petitioners cannot, by
their mere allegation, transport their case from the realm of the rules on special proceedings for the
correction of entry to that of an ordinary civil case for annulment of a falsified document; in Republic vs.
Valencia,31 it was held that the parties who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation
or correction of an entry in the civil register are the civil registrar and all persons who have or who are claiming
interests who would be affected thereby; respondent, being a person whose interests would be adversely
affected by the petition, is an indispensable party to the case; publication cannot be substituted for notice;
respondent cannot be declared in default since she was not properly notified. 32
38
Anent the second issue, respondent contends that the CA has no authority to rule on the merits of the case
since in a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, its authority is limited to
ruling on whether or not the petitioner was denied due process of law; that if the CA were to rule on the
merits of the case, it would have deprived respondent of due process; and that in any case, respondent’s
record of birth is not void as Librada was only able to prove that she is not the mother of respondent. 33
Preliminarily, this Court notes that while the petition states that it is one for review on  certiorari, it claimed at
the same time that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, which is
properly a ground for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not for a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Considering however the substance of the issues raised herein, we shall treat the
present petition, as it claims, to be a petition for review on certiorari.34
Is the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn an ordinary civil action or a
special proceeding? Considering that the petition, based on its allegations, does not question the fact of birth
of Rosilyn, all matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth certificate properly, including the date
of birth, fall under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which governs cancellation or correction of entries in the
Civil Registry. Thus, the petition filed by the Ceruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as having been
falsified, is properly considered as a special proceeding pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 1 and Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
Did the Ceruilas comply with the requirements of Rule 108? We answer in the negative.
Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that:
SEC. 3. Parties. --- When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
by a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made parties
thereto.35 As enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito,36 unless all possible indispensable parties were duly
notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the
rules.37
Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of Rosilyn’s birth certificate than
Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth are at stake.
Petitioners claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a party to the proceeding, it is enough that her
name was included in the caption of the petition. Such reasoning is without merit.
As we pronounced in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic38 where the mother sought changes in the entries of her two
children’s birth certificates:
…since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal,
representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary
in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office
of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not
only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any,  as
their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the
change should be notified or represented . . .. 39 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons, who, however, did not participate
in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not sufficient to comply with the requirements laid down by the rules.
Petitioners further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by the publication of the order of the
trial court setting the case for hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
We do not agree. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but
to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process. 40 This is but proper, to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect her interest if she so chooses.
Indeed, there were instances when we ruled that even though an interested party was not impleaded in the
petition, such defect was cured by compliance with Sec. 4, Rule 108 on publication. In said cases, however,
earnest efforts were made by the petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. 41
Such is not the case at bar. Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the proceedings seeking the cancellation
of her birth certificate. Neither did petitioners make any effort to summon the Solicitor General.
It does not take much to deduce the real motive of petitioners in seeking the cancellation of Rosilyn’s birth
certificate and in not making her, her guardian, the DSWD, and the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, parties to the petition. Rosilyn was involved in the rape case against Romeo Jalosjos, where
her father, as appearing in the birth certificate, was said to have pimped her into prostitution. In the criminal
case, the defense contended that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial
court to prove Rosilyn’s age and thus find basis for statutory rape, as said birth certificate has been cancelled
by the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, in the special proceeding antecedent to this petition. Their efforts in this
regard, however, were thwarted when the CA overturned Branch 38’s decision, and the Court, in G.R. Nos.
132875-7642 considered other evidence as proof of Rosilyn’s age at the time of the commission of the crime.
There is also no merit in the contention of petitioners that because of the false entries in the birth certificate
of Rosilyn, the same is void ab initio, hence should be nullified under Art. 5 of the Civil Code, or should be
nullified by the CA in exercise of its peremptory power to declare null and void the said certificate.
The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, is not to replace the
trial court’s decision sought to be annulled. The action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said Rule, to wit:
39
Section. 1. Coverage. --- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. --- The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for
new trial or petition for relief.
Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. --- A judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order
or resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the
proper court. However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been
granted therein.
is merely for the annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, nothing
more. The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the petition for the amendment and cancellation
of the birth certificate of Rosilyn or to substitute its own findings thereon.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,vs. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals
(CA)1 Decision2 dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution 3 dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN. The
assailed decision dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines and, consequently,
affirmed in toto the June 28, 2004 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Gingoog City in Special
Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by
respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live
Birth.5 Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on
February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay 6 Her Certificate of Live
Birth7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as
"Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
Board of Medicine Certificate, 8 and passport9 bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is
an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her
mother.10 She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the
surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos. 11
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly
granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition
before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order 13 finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and
setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office for their information and guidance. 14 Pursuant to
the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
GINGOOG CITY, or any person acting in his behalf is directed and ordered to effect the correction or change of
the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner’s name and citizenship so that the entries would be:
a) As to petitioner’s name :
First Name : NORMA
Middle Name : SY
Last Name : LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioner’s nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third party. It
also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person, especially
since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that respondent has
continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the
RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion. 16
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondent’s failure to implead
other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the
40
Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office. 17 As to whether the petition is a collateral attack
on respondent’s filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering that her parents were not legally
married and that her siblings’ birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their
citizenship is Filipino.18 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to implead
indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting
the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. 19
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to
her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has
been known for since childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and professional
records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay"
instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not
mere clerical as they touch on respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which
is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her
status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects
her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia 20 that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. 21 The pronouncement of the Court in that case is
illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial
as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is
also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy
is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and
the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. x x x
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black’s Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding"
as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Excludes an adoption proceeding.22
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court’s conclusion in Republic v. Kho, 23 Alba v. Court of
Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals, 25 that the failure to implead indispensable parties was cured by the
publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v.
Kho,26 petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for correction of entries despite
respondents’ failure to implead the minor’s mother as an indispensable party. The Court, however, did not
strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was highly improbable that the mother was
unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s birth certificates especially since the
notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with them. 27
In Alba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial court’s decision granting the
petition for correction of entries filed by respondent although the proceedings was not actually known by
41
petitioner. In that case, petitioner’s mother and guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of
entries, and notices were sent to her address appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the notice
was returned unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly learned of the
granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of judgment which the Court denied. Considering that the
petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held that acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner is, therefore, not required and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial
court’s compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. 29
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court acquired jurisdiction
over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the petition for correction of entries despite the failure to
implead them in said case. While recognizing that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to
implead her was cured by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. In so
ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition for correction cannot be presumed to be aware
of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It emphasized that the
petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of
the notice of hearing was considered to have cured the failure to implead indispensable parties.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the
petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by
respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case. Aside from Kho, Alba
and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 31 Ceruila v. Delantar,32 and
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent therein
filed a petition to change his name from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in
his birth certificate to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for
hearing was published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of general default
and eventually granted respondent’s petition deleting the entry on the date and place of marriage of parties;
correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng"; deleting the entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and
deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his father. The Republic of the Philippines,
through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that the corrections made on respondent’s birth
certificate had the effect of changing the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected
through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the RTC decision for respondent’s failure to
comply strictly with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the wrong remedy
availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
assuming that he filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition still failed
because of improper venue and failure to implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as
respondents in the case.
In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of the birth certificate
of respondent on the ground that the same was made as an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and,
therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein. The RTC issued an order setting the
case for hearing with a directive that the same be published and that any person who is interested in the
petition may interpose his comment or opposition on or before the scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise
sent to the Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court granted the petition and nullified respondent’s
birth certificate. Few months after, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that
she and her guardian were not notified of the petition and the trial court’s decision, hence, the latter was
issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The Court annulled the trial court’s
decision for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 108, especially the non-impleading of respondent
herself whose birth certificate was nullified.1âwphi1
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of
her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her
civil status from "married" to "single," and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No
marriage." The Court modified the trial court’s decision by nullifying the portion thereof which directs the
change of petitioner’s civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it was the OSG only that was
made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in nature which is short of what is required in
cases where substantial alterations are sought.
petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. 40 Such failure was likewise excused where the
interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; 41 when there is no actual or presumptive
awareness of the existence of the interested parties; 42 or when a party is inadvertently left out. 43
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is mandated.44 If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of
which might be detrimental and far reaching. 45
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No.
230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma
S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.

Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a
legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her
first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to
"Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her
parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections
respondent wanted to make.

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was
served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. 37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential
oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. 38 Summons must,
therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his
interest if he so chooses.39

While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by
42