VALERIO E. KALAW, PETITIONER, VS. MA.

ELENA FERNANDEZ,
RESPONDENT. [G.R. No. 166357, September 19, 2011]

(ARTICLE 36)
Researched by: HENNESSY D. MUGA, LLB-1

FACTS
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973.  They
maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four
children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay). Shortly
after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who
gave birth to a son in March 1983. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws)
and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more
children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four
children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.
The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick.  Also, in
accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends. In 1994, the two elder
children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyn's permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation.  Malyn acceded
only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to the
Philippines and chose to live with Malyn. Meanwhile, Tyrone  and Jocelyn's family returned  to the Philippines
and resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay.  According to Malyn, from that
time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their
father.

On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue
Whether petitioner (Tyrone) has sufficiently proved that respondent (Malyn) suffers from psychological
incapacity

TYRONE’S version
He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological
incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during
their co-habitation, as shown by Malyn's following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;
2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.
During trial, Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyn's alleged infidelity. Tyrone presented a psychologist,
Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on
Malyn's psychological incapacity.

MALYN’’S version
‘1. Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated. While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing
as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She always had Tyrone's permission and would often bring the children and
their respective yayas with her. She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother and wife.
‘2. Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She explained that she did so only to escape her
physically abusive husband. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyn's head and proceeded to lock the
bedroom doors. Malyn explained that she applied for work because she wanted to be self-sufficient.  Her
resolve came from her discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with
Jocelyn.
‘3. Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel
for her because she was so drunk after partying with friends.  She admitted finding her brother Ronald and
Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at that time.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The regional trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code. The court's Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.  The parties entered into a marriage without
as much as understanding what it entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential obligations:  the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
their children to become responsible individuals. Parties' psychological incapacity is grave, and serious such
that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.  The incapacity has been
clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable. The trial court then declared the
parties' marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Malyn appealed the trial court's Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the trial court's ruling because it is not
supported by the facts on record.  Both parties' allegations and incriminations against each other do not
support a finding of psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity.
He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner's allegations, which served as the
bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent
presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for
legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CA's reversal of the trial court's ruling that there was psychological
incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them
from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.  The Court of Appeals' May 27, 2004
Decision.
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.
Moreno vs. Kahn (2018), et. Al., GR No. 217744, July 30, 2018

(ARTICLE 151)
Researched by: HENNESSY D. MUGA, LLB-1

Petitioner Respondents
: JOSE Z. MORENO : RENE M. KAHN, CONSUELO MORENO KAHN-HAIRE, RENE LUIS PIERRE
KAHN, PHILIPPE KAHN, MA. CLAUDINE KAHN MCMAHON, AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MUNTINLUPA CITY
FACTS
: Jose alleged that since May 1998 and in their capacity as lessees, he and his family have been occupying two
(2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 181516 and 181517 (subject lands) co-
owned by his full-blooded sister, respondent Consuelo Moreno Kahn Haire (Consuelo) and his nephews and
nieces (Consuelo's children), respondents Rene M. Kahn (Rene), Rene Luis Pierre Kahn (Luis), Philippe Kahn
(Philippe), and Ma. Claudine Kahn-McMahon (Claudine; collectively, respondents).  Around April or May
2003, through numerous electronic mails (emails) and letters, respondents offered to sell to Jose the subject
lands for the amount of US$200,000.00 (US$120,000.00 to be received by Consuelo and US$20,000.00
each to be received by her children), which Jose accepted. Notably, the agreement was made verbally and was
not immediately reduced into writing, but the parties had the intention to eventually memorialize the same via
a written document. Over the next few years, Jose made partial payments to respondents by paying off the
shares of Rene, Luis, Philippe and Claudine, leaving a remaining balance of US$120,000.00 payable to
Consuelo. However, in July 2010, Consuelo decided to "cancel" their agreement, and thereafter, informed Jose
of her intent to convert the earlier partial payments as rental payments instead. In response, Jose expressed
his disapproval to Consuelo's plan and demanded that respondents proceed with the sale, which the latter
ignored. He then claimed that on July 26, 2011, without his consent, Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine
sold their shares over the subject lands to Rene, thereby consolidating full ownership of the subject lands to
him. Consequently, TCT Nos. 181516 and 181517 were cancelled and new TCTs, i.e., TCT Nos. 148026 and
148027, were issued in Rene's name. Upon learning of such sale, Jose sent a demand letter to Rene, and later
on to Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine, asserting his right to the subject lands under the previous sale
agreed upon. As his demands went unheeded, Jose brought the matter to the barangay lupon for
reconciliation proceedings between him and Rene only, since Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine are all
living abroad. As no settlement was agreed upon, Jose was constrained to file the subject complaint for
specific performance and cancellation of titles with damages. In an Order dated January 18, 2012, the RTC
motu proprio ordered the dismissal of Jose's complaint for failure to allege compliance with the provision of
Article 151 of the Family Code which requires earnest efforts to be made first before suits may be tiled between
family members. In an Order dated October 11, 2012, the RTC denied Jose's motion, ruling, inter alia, that
Article 151 of the Family Code applies, despite the fact that Consuelo had other co-defendants (i.e., her
children) in the suit, as the dispute, which led to the filing of the case, was mainly due to the disagreement
between full-blooded siblings, Jose and Consuelo.  Aggrieved, Jose filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. However, the CA affirmed.

ISSUE
Whether or Not the Court of Appeal correctly affirmed the RTC's motu proprio dismissal of Jose's complaint.

RULINGS
: The SC ruled that the RTC and CA made a mistake in dismissing the complaint on the ground of failure to
comply with the earnest effort requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code. The Court held in that
noncompliance with the earnest effort requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is not a jurisdictional
defect which would authorize the courts to dismiss suits filed before them motu proprio. Rather, it merely
partakes of a condition precedent such that the non-compliance therewith constitutes a ground for dismissal
of a suit should the same be invoked by the opposing party at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer. Otherwise, such ground is deemed waived. Even assuming arguendo that
respondents invoked the foregoing ground at the earliest opportunity, the Court nevertheless finds Article 151
of the Family Code inapplicable to this case. For Article 151 of the Family Code to apply, the suit must be
exclusively between or among "members of the same family." Once a stranger becomes a party to such suit,
the earnest effort requirement is no longer a condition precedent before the action can prosper.
In this relation, Article 150 of the Family Code reads: Art. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between
husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and descendants: and (4)
Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. In this light, case law states that Article 151 of
the Family Code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule. Hence, any person
having a collateral familial relation with the plaintiff other than what is enumerated in Article 150 of the
Family Code is considered a stranger who, if included in a suit between and among family members, would
render unnecessary the earnest efforts requirement under Article 151. The express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. While it was the disagreement between Jose and Consuelo that
directly resulted in the filing of the suit, the fact remains that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine were
rightfully impleaded as codefendants in Jose’s complaint as they are co-owners of the subject lands in dispute. In
view of the inclusion “strangers" to the suit between Jose and Consuelo who are full-blooded siblings, the Court
concludesthat the suit is beyond the ambit of Article 151 of the Family Code. Therefore, the courts a quo
gravely made a mistake in dismissing Jose's complaint due to non-compliance with the earnest effort
requirement therein.
NORMA DEL SOCORRO V. WILSEM
DEL SOCORRO VS. WILSEM      G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

Researched by: HENNESSY D. MUGA, LLB-1

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent
remarried again a Filipina and resides again in the Philippines, particularly in Cebu where the petitioner also
resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien.

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not
obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is
not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that
the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be
applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to
the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here in the
Philippines and committed the offense here.