Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission

on Elections
558 SCRA 700 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – Creation of LGUs by Autonomous
Regions (ARMM) – Population Requirement
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in
a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to
create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM
Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which
comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of
Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1 st district is now
only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that
status quo should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district
should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive
declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan
with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a
separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting
(probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won).
She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that
province automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes
Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S.
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly
LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not
conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution
for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established
in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that
a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further
that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said
district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is
untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan
without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the
creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create
are barangays not cities and provinces.
League of Cities v. Comelec

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of
Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood
Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took
effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
“the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities
filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective,
not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a
city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort
to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage
of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government
Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.

Navarro v. EA
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, (D)
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

FACTS:

 October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355
(An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
 December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory
plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC). The
plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people
from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
 November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds.
Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
 Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for
being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would
perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a
large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area.
They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers
only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and
of Section 461 of the LGC.
 May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above
Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending
Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province
consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area
requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
 July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and
that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
 September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19
of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that,
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case.
 October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this
case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 valid.

HELD:
 Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged
province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with
respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect,
pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island
Province of Dinagat.
 The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual
income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.
Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli
circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen
from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be
instrumental in stunting such capacity.
 Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according
to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and
that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that
which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of
the law and its legislators.

MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
Posted by kaye lee on 12:46 PM

G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999

FACTS:

1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component
city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted
and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city
to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the
law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of
Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any “creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,” therefore, a plebiscite
of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and
argued that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:

Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it
involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a
law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.

Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City,
Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in
the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted
by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as
unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instru-mentality of the Government.

Samson v. Aguirre
MOISES S. SAMSON (PETITIONER) VS. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET (RESPONDENTS)
SEPTEMBER 22, 1999
J. QUISUMBING
creation of municipal corporations
SUMMARY: Samson, a councilor in Quezon City, assailed RA 8535 which created the City of Novaliches. According to him,
the RA failed to conform to the requirements of the LGC as to certifications in income, population, and land area. It has not
been proved that the mother city would not suffer adverse effects from the creation of Novaliches. Court held against him.
The presence and oral declarations of the government officials armed with records during the public deliberations and
hearings are more effective certifications than mere certificates which are routinely signed. The representatives all
declared that Novaliches exceeded the requirements. The QC mayor was also present, and his conformity implies that
there is no damage done to QC. The non-receipt of copies is too insubstantial to sustain invalidity of a statute. Samson
failed to overturn the presumption of constitutionality accorded legislative acts.
FACTS:
President Ramos signed into law RA 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Samson,
incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City, challenged the constitutionality of the RA. He sought to enjoin its
implementation, holding of the plebiscite, and disbursement of funds as RA 8535 failed to conform to the criteria in the
LGC as to income, population, land area, seat of government, having no adverse effect to its mother city, and furnishing a
copy of the barangay resolution. Also, he said the law would amend the Constitution.
In answer, the respondents claimed Samson failed to substantiate said allegations with convincing proof. He had the
burden of proof to overcome the legal presumption that Congress considered all the legal requirements under the Local
Government Code of 1991 in passing R.A. 8535. Further, there is no document supporting the unconstitutionality claim.
ISSUE: Was RA 8535 unconstitutional? NO.
 There is a presumption of constitutionality in favor of a statute. One who attacks a statute must prove its invalidity
beyond a reasonable doubt. Samson has failed to discharge the burden.
1. Samson did not present any proof, only allegations, that no certifications were submitted to the House Committee
on Local Government—as such certifications attesting compliance with the LGC and its IRR is
required. Allegations cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law passed by Congress
complied with all the requisites.
a. The representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated the combined average
annual income of the 13 barangays for 2 years to be around P27M. Under the Local Government Code, a
proposed city must have an average annual income of only at least P20,000,000.00 for the immediately
preceding two years.
b. The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would comprise the
proposed City of Novaliches to be around 350,000. This figure is more than the 150,000 required by the
Implementing Rules.
c. There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the Local Government Code,
the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income and population or land area. Other
than the income requirement, the proposed city must have the requisite number of inhabitants or land
area. Compliance with either requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial notice may also
be taken that Novaliches is now highly urbanized.
2. Samson averred that oral manifestations are not enough certification. But in the hearings, the DBM, DILG, and
Finance Officials were present along with other officers armed with official statistics and reference materials. In
their official capacity, they spoke and shed light on population, land area and income of the proposed city. Their
official statements could serve the same purpose contemplated by law requiring certificates. Their affirmation as
 well as their oath as witnesses in open session of either the Senate or the House of Representatives give even
greater solemnity than a certification submitted to either chamber routinely.
3. Samson failed to show that the representatives did not also submit written certifications. Under the IRR, written
certifications are required to be attached to the petition for the creation of a city, to be submitted by interested
municipalities or barangays to Congress in the form of a resolution. Samson did not present a copy to prove that
it was without the written certifications attached as required by law. It is presumed that these requirements were
met appropriately in the passage of the assailed legislative act.

 Samson argued that the RA failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed City of Novaliches as required.
However, this omission is not as fatal to the validity. Under Section 12 of the Local Government Code, the City of
Novaliches can still establish a seat of government after its creation. While Section 12 speaks of the site of
government centers, such site can very well also be the seat of government, “from where governmental and
corporate service shall be delivered.”
 Samson failed to present any concrete evidence on the adverse effect to Quezon City. Quezon City Mayor Mathay was
present during the deliberations and made no mention of anything concerning such. As chief executive, he would be
the first person to protest any development that might prove detrimental to Quezon City. This is indicative of the
non-existence of such negative issues. Moreover, in the plebiscite, all persons concerned will obviously have the
opportunity to raise those issues even before they vote on the principal question of the cityhood of Novaliches.
 That the Quezon City Council was not furnished a copy of the petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation
of the City of Novaliches, if true, will also not render invalid the RA. The evident purpose of this requirement, found
in the Implementing Rules, is to inform the City Council of the move to create another city and to enable it to
formulate its comments and recommendations on said petition. The Quezon City Council members are obviously
aware of the petition. The matter has been widely publicized in the mass media. Surely members of the Council
could not now be heard to claim they have not known of the contents of the barangays’ petition to create the City of
Novaliches.
 The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited amendment of the
Constitution. The ordinance appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall
forever be composed of only 17 cities and municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the
ordinance in or appendix of the Constitution will only result in its erroneous interpretation.

Heherson Alvarez vs Teofisto

Guingona, Jr.
June 23, 2011
252 SCRA 695 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – LGU Requirement – Income –
Inclusion of IRAs
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House
of Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was
introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate
conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same
with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the
ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of
Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it
to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97,
the IRA was included which should not be.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGU’s income.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further,
the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and
3rdreading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month
after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s average annual
income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form
part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and
automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the
local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can
invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify
the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning
all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from
special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support from the
national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 118577, March 7,

1995
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An

Act Converting The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.

Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative

district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following
the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the
1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati

is unconstitutional

Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a

special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides
that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA
7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to
hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment
law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government
unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of
a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census,
the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city
with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000,
its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of 250,000.

Cawaling vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001

Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001

Facts: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which
created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.

On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The
City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and
submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking
the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:

A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A.
8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and

B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign
in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.

Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional ,contending, in
essence, that:

1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and

2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
 Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by
converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has
done.

Issue: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.

(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create
the City of Sorsogon

(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution

(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional

Held: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality
or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by
which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to
create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. the creation
of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is
recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements
prescribed by the Code.

(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In
Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the
political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical.”

3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon.
The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger
is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical,
natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested
are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a
becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the
Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however,
may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds for nullity must
be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.

Aquino III v. Comelec [April 7, 2010]

24 SEP

Aquino III V. Comelec

Apr. 7, 2010

Issue:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and
second legislative districts of the province.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among
four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for
the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao,
and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to
form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province?

Held:
We deny the petition.

Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion
than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of
the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. –

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an

alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

TAN vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code

Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province
in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of
Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986.
Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and
not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the
new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq.
km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.

Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which
states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit
or units affected”? NO.

Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries,
“the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and
alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the
parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other
affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute
the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent.
Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more
municipalities if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the
boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently
argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.