Professional Documents
Culture Documents
L-25532 February 28, 1969 premeditated scheme or design to use the partnership
as a business conduit to dodge the to laws.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
Regularity, not otherwise, is presumed. The limited
REVENUE, petitioner,
partnership is taxable on its income and to require
vs.
that income to be included in the indiviual tax return of
WILLIAM J. SUTER and THE COURT OF TAX
respondent is to overstretch the letter and intent of the
APPEALS, respondents.
law.
Partnership; Where respondent company in the case
Same; Same; Members and not firm are taxable in
at bar is considered a particular partnership and not
case of compañias colectivas.—In fact, it would even
universal.—The respondent company was not a
conflict with what it specifically provides in its Section
universal partnership, but a particular one. As appears
24: for the appellant’s stand results in equal
f rom Articles 1674 and 1675 of the Spanish Civil
treatment, taxwise, of a general copartnership
Code of 1889 (law in force when firm organized in
(compania colectiva) and a limited partnership, when
1947), a universal partnership requires either that the
the code plainly differentiates the two. Thus, the code
object of the association be all the present property of
taxes the latter on its income, but not the former,
the partners, as contributed by them to the common
because it is in the case of compañias colectivas that
fund, or else “all that the partners may acquire by their
the members, and not the firm, are taxable in their
industry or work during the existence of the
individual capacities for any dividend or share of the
partnership.” Respondent company was not such a
profit derived from the duly registered general
universal partnership, since the contributions of the
partnership (Section 26, N.I.R.C.; Arañas, Anno. &
partners were fixed sums of money and neither one of
Juris on the N.I.R.C., As Amended, Vol. 1, pp. 88–89).
them was an industrial partner. It follows that
respondent company was not a partnership that Same; Same; Income of limited partnership forming
spouses were forbidden to enter by Article 1677 of the part of the conjugal partnership is not wholly correct.
Civil Code of 1889. Nor could the subsequent —That the income of the limited partnership is
marriage of the partners operate to dissolve it, such actually or constructively the income of the spouses
marriage not being one of the causes provided for that and forms part of the conjugal partnership of gains is
purpose either by the Spanish Civil Code or the Code not wholly correct. The fruits of the wife’s paraphernal
of Commerce. become conjugal only when no longer needed to
defray ,the expenses for the administration and
Same; Where marriage of partners does not make the
preservation of the paraphernal capital of the wife.
company a single proprietorship.—The capital
Then again, the appellant’s argument erroneously
contributions of respondents-partners were separately
conf ines itself to the question of the legal personality
owned and contributed by them before their marriage;
of the limited partnership since the law taxes the
and after they were joined in wedlock, such
income of ‘even joint accounts that have no
contributions remained their respective separate
personality of their own. (Agapito v. Molo, 59 Phil.
property under the Spanish Civil Code.
779; People’s Bank v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 60
Same; Partnership has distinct and separate Phil. 167; V. Evangelista v. Collector of Internal
personality from that of its partners; Section 24 of Revenue, 102 Phil. 140; Collector v. Batangas
Internal Revenue Code is exception to the rule.—The Transportation Co., 102 Phil. 822.)
basic tenet of ,the Spanish and Philippine law is that
Same; Same; What is taxable is income of both
the partnership has a juridical personality of its own,
spouses, not the conjugal partnership.—Appellant is,
distinct and separate from that of its partners, the
likewise, mistaken in that it assumes that the conjugal
bypassing of the existence of the limited partnership
partnership of gains is a taxable unit, which it is not.
as a taxpayer can only be done by ignoring or
What is taxable is the “income of both spouses”
disregarding clear statutory mandates and basic
(Section 45 [d]) in their individual capacities. Though
principles of our law. The limited partnership’s
the amount of income (income of the conjugal
separate individuality makes it impossible to equate
partnernership vis-a-vis the joint income of husband
its income with that of the component members. True,
and wife) may be the same for a given taxable year,
section 24 of the Internal Revenue Code merges
their consequences would ,be different, as their
registered general copartnerships with the personality
contributions in the business partnership are not .the
of the individual partners for income tax purposes. But
same.
this rule is exceptional in its disregard of a cardinal
tenet of our partnership laws, and can not be Same; Same; Revenue code does not authorize
extended by mere implication to limited partnerships. consolidation of income of limited partnership and
income of spouses.—The diff erence in tax rates
Same; Taxation; Change in membership does not
between the income of the limited partnership being
remove partnership from coverage of section 24.—
consolidated with, and when split from the income of
The limited partnership is not a mere business conduit
the spouses, is not a justification for requiring
of the partner-spouses; it was organized for legitimate
consolidation; the revenue code, as it presently
business purposes; it conducted its own- dealings
stands, does not authorize it, and even bars it by
with its customers prior to appellee’s marriage, and
requiring the limited partnership .to pay tax on its own
had been filing its own income tax returns as such
income. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Suter,
independent entity. The change in its membership,
27 SCRA 152, No. L-25532 February 28, 1969
brought about by the marriage of the partners and
their subsequent acquisition of all interest therein. is
no ground for withdrawing the partnership from the
coverage of Section 24 of the tax code, requiring it to
pay income tax. As far as the records show, the
partners did not enter into matrimony and thereafter
buy the interests of the remaining partner with the
A limited partnership, named "William J. Suter Section 45 (d) of the National Internal Revenue Code,
'Morcoin' Co., Ltd.," was formed on 30 September which provides as follows:
1947 by herein respondent William J. Suter as the
(d) Husband and wife. — In the case of
general partner, and Julia Spirig and Gustav Carlson,
married persons, whether citizens, residents
as the limited partners. The partners contributed,
or non-residents, only one consolidated return
respectively, P20,000.00, P18,000.00 and P2,000.00
for the taxable year shall be filed by either
to the partnership. On 1 October 1947, the limited
spouse to cover the income of both
partnership was registered with the Securities and
spouses; ....
Exchange Commission. The firm engaged, among
other activities, in the importation, marketing, In refutation of the foregoing, respondent Suter
distribution and operation of automatic phonographs, maintains, as the Court of Tax Appeals held, that his
radios, television sets and amusement machines, marriage with limited partner Spirig and their
their parts and accessories. It had an office and held acquisition of Carlson's interests in the partnership in
itself out as a limited partnership, handling and 1948 is not a ground for dissolution of the partnership,
carrying merchandise, using invoices, bills and either in the Code of Commerce or in the New Civil
letterheads bearing its trade-name, maintaining its Code, and that since its juridical personality had not
own books of accounts and bank accounts, and had a been affected and since, as a limited partnership, as
quota allocation with the Central Bank. contra distinguished from a duly registered general
partnership, it is taxable on its income similarly with
In 1948, however, general partner Suter and limited
corporations, Suter was not bound to include in his
partner Spirig got married and, thereafter, on 18
individual return the income of the limited partnership.
December 1948, limited partner Carlson sold his
share in the partnership to Suter and his wife. The We find the Commissioner's appeal unmeritorious.
sale was duly recorded with the Securities and
The thesis that the limited partnership, William J.
Exchange Commission on 20 December 1948.
Suter "Morcoin" Co., Ltd., has been dissolved by
The limited partnership had been filing its income tax operation of law because of the marriage of the only
returns as a corporation, without objection by the general partner, William J. Suter to the originally
herein petitioner, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, limited partner, Julia Spirig one year after the
until in 1959 when the latter, in an assessment, partnership was organized is rested by the appellant
consolidated the income of the firm and the individual upon the opinion of now Senator Tolentino in
incomes of the partners-spouses Suter and Spirig Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Commercial
resulting in a determination of a deficiency income tax Laws of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th Ed., page 58, that
against respondent Suter in the amount of P2,678.06 reads as follows:
for 1954 and P4,567.00 for 1955.
A husband and a wife may not enter into a
Respondent Suter protested the assessment, and contract of general copartnership, because
requested its cancellation and withdrawal, as not in under the Civil Code, which applies in the
accordance with law, but his request was denied. absence of express provision in the Code of
Unable to secure a reconsideration, he appealed to Commerce, persons prohibited from making
the Court of Tax Appeals, which court, after trial, donations to each other are prohibited from
rendered a decision, on 11 November 1965, reversing entering into universal partnerships. (2
that of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Echaverri 196) It follows that the marriage of
partners necessarily brings about the
The present case is a petition for review, filed by the
dissolution of a pre-existing partnership. (1
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, of the tax court's
Guy de Montella 58)
aforesaid decision. It raises these issues:
The petitioner-appellant has evidently failed to
(a) Whether or not the corporate personality of the
observe the fact that William J. Suter "Morcoin" Co.,
William J. Suter "Morcoin" Co., Ltd. should be
Ltd. was not a universal partnership, but a particular
disregarded for income tax purposes, considering that
one. As appears from Articles 1674 and 1675 of the
respondent William J. Suter and his wife, Julia Spirig
Spanish Civil Code, of 1889 (which was the law in
Suter actually formed a single taxable unit; and
force when the subject firm was organized in 1947),
(b) Whether or not the partnership was dissolved after a universal partnership requires either that the object
the marriage of the partners, respondent William J. of the association be all the present property of the
Suter and Julia Spirig Suter and the subsequent sale partners, as contributed by them to the common fund,
to them by the remaining partner, Gustav Carlson, of or else "all that the partners may acquire by
his participation of P2,000.00 in the partnership for a their industry or work during the existence of the
nominal amount of P1.00. partnership". William J. Suter "Morcoin" Co., Ltd. was
not such a universal partnership, since the
The theory of the petitioner, Commissioner of Internal
contributions of the partners were fixed sums of
Revenue, is that the marriage of Suter and Spirig and
money, P20,000.00 by William Suter and P18,000.00
their subsequent acquisition of the interests of
by Julia Spirig and neither one of them was an
remaining partner Carlson in the partnership dissolved
industrial partner. It follows that William J. Suter
the limited partnership, and if they did not, the fiction
"Morcoin" Co., Ltd. was not a partnership that
of juridical personality of the partnership should be
spouses were forbidden to enter by Article 1677 of the
disregarded for income tax purposes because the
Civil Code of 1889.
spouses have exclusive ownership and control of the
business; consequently the income tax return of The former Chief Justice of the Spanish Supreme
respondent Suter for the years in question should Court, D. Jose Casan, in his Derecho Civil, 7th
have included his and his wife's individual incomes Edition, 1952, Volume 4, page 546, footnote 1, says
and that of the limited partnership, in accordance with with regard to the prohibition contained in the
aforesaid Article 1677:
The spouses, according to this, can not their corporate personalities for tax purposes. This is
celebrate the universal society contract with not true in the present case. Here, the limited
each other, but can they constitute a private partnership is not a mere business conduit of the
company? Although the point has been much partner-spouses; it was organized for legitimate
debated, we tend to the permissive thesis of business purposes; it conducted its own dealings with
private partnership contracts between its customers prior to appellee's marriage, and had
spouses, since no provision of our Code been filing its own income tax returns as such
prohibits them, and we must be to the general independent entity. The change in its membership,
rule according to which everyone is able to brought about by the marriage of the partners and
hire as long as it is not declared incapable by their subsequent acquisition of all interest therein, is
law. The jurisprudence of the Direction of the no ground for withdrawing the partnership from the
Records was favorable to this same thesis in coverage of Section 24 of the tax code, requiring it to
its resolution of February 3, 1936, but seems pay income tax. As far as the records show, the
to change course in the March 9, 1943. partners did not enter into matrimony and thereafter
buy the interests of the remaining partner with the
Nor could the subsequent marriage of the partners
premeditated scheme or design to use the partnership
operate to dissolve it, such marriage not being one of
as a business conduit to dodge the tax laws.
the causes provided for that purpose either by the
Regularity, not otherwise, is presumed.
Spanish Civil Code or the Code of Commerce.
As the limited partnership under consideration is
The appellant's view, that by the marriage of both
taxable on its income, to require that income to be
partners the company became a single proprietorship,
included in the individual tax return of respondent
is equally erroneous. The capital contributions of
Suter is to overstretch the letter and intent of the law.
partners William J. Suter and Julia Spirig were
In fact, it would even conflict with what it specifically
separately owned and contributed by
provides in its Section 24: for the appellant
them before their marriage; and after they were joined
Commissioner's stand results in equal treatment, tax
in wedlock, such contributions remained their
wise, of a general copartnership (compañia colectiva)
respective separate property under the Spanish Civil
and a limited partnership, when the code plainly
Code (Article 1396):
differentiates the two. Thus, the code taxes the latter
The following shall be the exclusive property on its income, but not the former, because it is in the
of each spouse: case of compañias colectivas that the members, and
not the firm, are taxable in their individual capacities
(a) That which is brought to the marriage as
for any dividend or share of the profit derived from the
his or her own; ....
duly registered general partnership (Section 26,
Thus, the individual interest of each consort in William N.I.R.C.; Arañas, Anno. & Juris. on the N.I.R.C., As
J. Suter "Morcoin" Co., Ltd. did not become common Amended, Vol. 1, pp. 88-89). lawphi1 .nêt
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The civil law and the
common law alike point to a difference between the
rights of the partners who have failed to comply with
Islands, divided into five shares of P6,000 as
follows:
Go Tayco . . . . . .. 6,000.00
That the social reason be called "Teck Seing & The shareholder Mr. Lim Yogsing will be in
Co., Ltd." and will have its main domicile at charge, jointly with Mr. Vicente Jocson Jo, the
Calle Magallanes No. 94, of the City of Cebu, administration of the Company, who will be
Province of Cebu, Philippine Islands. That the able to use the social signature indistinctly,
capital stock will be thirty thousand pesos and therefore amobs are authorized to do on
(P30,000) legal currency of the Philippine behalf of it all transactions, business and
mercantile speculations, practicing judicial and Firnando en presencia de:
extra-judicialment as many acts are required (Fdos.) "ATILANO LEYSON
for the good of the company, appoint "JULIO DIAZ
attorneys or attorneys for claims and
collection of credits and propose the lawsuits, "ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERCA
agreements, transactions and exceptions "ISLAS FILIPINAS
procdentes. In the event of absence, illness or "PROVINCIA DE CEBU
any other impediment of the managing
shareholder Mr. Lim Yogsing, he may confer
general or special power to the shareholder In the Municipality of Cebu, of the
he deems appropriate so that together with aforementioned Province, IF, today October
the assistant administrator Mr. Vicente Jocson 31, 1919, AD, before me, a Notary Public who
Jo, both could conveniently manage the subscribes, personally understood Santiago
business of the society. That the Jo Chung Cang, Go Tayco, Yap Gueco, Lim
administrators could have the necessary Yogsing and Jo Ybec, represented by the
employees for the best that these employees latter by Ho Seng Sian, as authorized in a
should perceive for services rendered to telegram dated September 27, 1919 that has
society. been presented to me in this same act, of
which I attest that I know them because they
That both administrators could have one are the same persons who granted the pre-
thousand pesos (P1,200) Philippine currency, document document, ratifying ant emi its
annually, for their private expenses, said content and claiming to be the same an act of
amount being P1,200 corresponding to each its free and voluntary bestowal. Mr. Santiago
of said administrators, as emoluments or Jo Chung Cang showed me his personal
salaries that are assigned to one, for his work cedula issued in Cebu, Cebu, I.F. On
in the management of society. Understanding September 19, 1919 under No. H77742, Go
that, the shareholders will be able to dispose Tayco also showed me his issued in Cebu,
at each end of the year the gratification that Cebu, IF, on October 9, 1919 under No.
will be granted to each manager, if the G2042490, Yap Gueco also showed me his
business of the year is buoyant and justify the issued in Cebu, Cebu, IF On January 20,
granting of a special gratification, apart from 1919 under No. F1452296, Lim Yogsing also
the salary here provided and specified. exhibited his issued in Cebu, Cebu, IF, on
February 26, 1919 under No. F1455662, and
After the expiration of six years, and it is for Ho Seng Sian representative of Jo Ybec, He
the convenience of the shareholders the showed me his personal cedula issued in
continuation of the business of this company, Cebu, Cebu, If on February 4, 1919 under No.
said term will be extended for the same F1453733.
number of years, without needing the granting
of further deeds, remaining in force until the Ante mi,
end. arranged by all the shareholders.
Proceeding by process of elimination, it is self-evident The remaining possibility is the revised contention of
that Teck Seing & Co., Ltd., is not a corporation. counsel for the petitioners to the effect that Teck
Neither is it contended by any one that Teck Seing & Seing & Co., Ltd., is "una sociedad mercantil "de
Co., Ltd., is accidental partnership facto" solamente" (only a de facto commercial
denominated cuenta en participacion (joint account association), and that the decision of the Supreme
association). court in the case of Hung-Man-Yoc vs. Kieng-Chiong-
Seng [1906], 6 Phil., 498), is controlling. It was this
argument which convinced the trial judge, who gave
Counsel for the petitioner and appellee described his
effect to his understanding of the case last cited and
client in once place in his opposition to the motion of which here must be given serious attention.
the creditors as "una verdadera sociedad anonima" (a
true anonymous society). The provisions of the Code The decision in Hung-Man-Yoc vs. Kieng-Chiong-
of Commerce relating to sociedades anonimas were, Seng, supra, discloses that the firm Kieng-Chiong-
however, repealed by section 191 of the Corporation Seng was not organized by means of any public
Law (Act No. 1459), with the exceptions document; that the partnership had not been recorded
the sociedades anonimas lawfully organized at the in the mercantile registry; and that Kieng-Chiong-
time of the passage of the Corporation Law were Seng was not proven to be the firm name, but rather
recognized, which is not our case. the designation of the partnership. The conclusion
then was, that the partnership in question was
The document providing for the partnership purported merely de facto and that, therefore, giving effect to the
to form "a limited commercial partnership," and provisions of article 120 of the Code of Commerce,
counsel for the petitioner's first contention was that the right of action was against the persons in charge
Teck Seing & Co., Ltd., was not "a collective regular of the management of the association.
partnership, not even a limited partnership, but a
partnership limited commercial. " Let us see if the Laying the facts of the case of Hung-Man-Yoc vs.
partnership contract created a "limited partnership," Kieng-Chiong-Seng, supra, side by side with the facts
or, as it is known in English, and will hereafter be before us, a marked difference is at once disclosed. In
spoken of, "a limited partnership." the cited case, the organization of the partnership was
not evidenced by any public document; here, it is by a
To establish a limited partnership there must be, at public document. In the cited case, the partnership
least, one general partner and the name of the least naturally could not present a public instrument for
one of the general partners must appear in the firm record in the mercantile registry; here, the contract of
name. (Code of Commerce, arts. 122 [2], 146, 148.) partnership has been duly registered. But the two
But neither of these requirements have been fulfilled. cases are similar in that the firm name failed to
The general rule is, that those who seek to avail include the name of any of the partners.
themselves of the protection of laws permitting the
creation of limited partnerships must show a We come then to the ultimate question, which is,
substantially full compliance with such laws. A limited whether we should follow the decision in Hung-Man-
partnership that has not complied with the law of its Yoc vs. Kieng-Chiong-Seng, supra, or whether we
creation is not considered a limited partnership at all, should differentiate the two cases, holding Teck Seing
but a general partnership in which all the members & Co., Ltd., a general copartnership, notwithstanding
are liable. (Mechem, Elements of Partnership, p. 412; the failure of the firm name to include the name of one
Gilmore, Partnership, pp. 499, 595; 20 R C. L. 1064.) of the partners. Let us now notice this decisive point in
the case.
The contention of the creditors and appellants is that
the partnership contract established a general Article 119 of the Code of Commerce requires every
partnership. commercial association before beginning its business
to state its article, agreements, and conditions in a
Article 125 of the Code of Commerce provides that public instrument, which shall be presented for record
the articles of general copartnership must estate the in the mercantile registry. Article 120, next following,
names, surnames, and domiciles of the partners; the provides that the persons in charge of the
firm name; the names, and surnames of the partners management of the association who violate the
to whom the management of the firm and the use of provisions of the foregoing article shall be
its signature is instrusted; the capital which each responsible in solidum to the persons not members of
partner contributes in cash, credits, or property, the association with whom they may have transacted
stating the value given the latter or the basis on which business in the name of the association. Applied to
their appraisement is to be made; the duration of the the facts before us, it would seem that Teck Seing &
copartnership; and the amounts which, in a proper Co., Ltd. has fulfilled the provisions of article 119.
case, are to be given to each managing partner Moreover, to permit the creditors only to look to the
annually for his private expenses, while the person in charge of the management of the
succeeding article of the Code provides that the
association, the partner Lim Yogsing, would not prove The general rule is well settled that, where
very helpful to them. statutes enacted to protect the public against
fraud or imposition, or to safeguard the public
What is said in article 126 of the Code of Commerce health or morals, contain a prohibition and
relating to the general copartnership transacting impose a penalty, all contracts in violation
business under the name of all its members or of thereof are void. . . .
several of them or of one only, is wisely included in
our commercial law. It would appear, however, that As this act involves purely business
this provision was inserted more for the protection of transactions, and affects only money
the creditors than of the partners themselves. A interests, we think it should be construed as
distinction could well be drawn between the right of rendering contracts made in violation of it
the alleged partnership to institute action when failing unlawful and unforceable at the instance of
to live up to the provisions of the law, or even the the offending party only, but not as designed
rights of the partners as among themselves, and the to take away the rights of innocent parties
right of a third person to hold responsible a general who may have dealt with the offenders in
copartnership which merely lacks a legal firm name in ignorance of their having violated the statute.
order to make it a partnership de jure. (Cashin vs. Pliter [1912], 168 Mich., 386; Ann.
Cas. [1913-C, 697.)
The civil law and the common law alike seem to point
to a difference between the rights of the partners who The early decision of our Supreme Court in the case
have failed to comply with the law and the rights of of Prautch Scholes & Co. vs. Hernandez [1903], 1
third persons who have dealt with the partnership. Phil., 705), contains the following pertinent
observations:
The supreme court of Spain has repeatedly held that
notwithstanding the obligation of the members to Another case may be supposed. A partnership
register the articles of association in the commercial is organized for commercial purposes. It fails
registry, agreements containing all the essential to comply with the requirements of article 119.
requisites are valid as between the contracting A creditor sues the partnership for a debt
parties, whatever the form adopted, and that, while contracted by it, claiming to hold the
the failure to register in the commercial registry partners severally. They answer that their
necessarily precludes the members from enforcing failure to comply with the Code of Commerce
rights acquired by them against third persons, such makes them a civil partnership and that they
failure cannot prejudice the rights of third persons. are in accordance with article 1698 of the Civil
(See decisions of December 6, 1887, January 25, Code only liable jointly. To allow such liberty of
1888, November 10, 1890, and January 26, 1900.) action would be to permit the parties by a
The same reasoning would be applicable to the less violation of the Code to escape a liability
formal requisite pertaining to the firm name. which the law has seen fit to impose upon
persons who organized commercial
The common law is to the same effect. The State of partnership; "Because it would be contrary to
Michigan had a statute prohibiting the transaction of all legal principles that the nonperformance of
business under an assumed name or any other than a duty should redound to the benefit of the
the real name of the individual conducting the same, person in default either intentional or
unless such person shall file with the county clerk a unintentional." (Mercantile Law, Eixala, fourth
certificate setting forth the name under which the ed., p. 145.)" (See also Lichauco vs. Lichauco
business is to be conducted and the real name of [1916], 33 Phil., 350, 360.)
each of the partners, with their residences and post-
office addresses, and making a violation thereof a Dr. Jose de Echavarri y Vivanco, in his Codigo de
misdemeanor. The supreme Court of Michigan said: Comercio, includes the following comment after
articles 121 and 126 of the Code:
The one object of the act is manifestly to
protect the public against imposition and From the decisions cited in this and in the
fraud, prohibiting persons from concealing previous comments, the following is deduced:
their identity by doing business under an 1st. Defects in the organization cannot affect
assumed name, making it unlawful to use relations with third persons. 2d. Members who
other than their real names in transacting contract with other persons before the
business without a public record of who they association is lawfully organized are liable to
are, available for use in courts, and to punish these persons. 3d. The intention to form an
those who violate the prohibition. The object association is necessary, so that if the
of this act is not limited to facilitating the intention of mutual participation in the profits
collection of debts, or the protection of those and losses in a particular business is proved,
giving credit to persons doing business under and there are no articles of association, there
an assumed name. It is not unilateral in its is no association. 4th. An association, the
application. It applies to debtor and creditor, articles of which have not been registered, is
contractor and contractee, alike. Parties doing valid in favor of third persons. 5th. The private
business with those acting under an assumed pact or agreement to form a commercial
name, whether they buy or sell, have a right, association is governed not by the commercial
under the law, to know who they are, and who law but by the civil law. 6th. Secret
to hold responsible, in case the question of stipulations expressed in a public instrument,
damages for failure to perform or breach of but not inserted in the articles of association,
warranty should arise. do not affect third persons, but are binding on
the parties themselves. 7th. An agreement especially if the other requisites are present
made in a public instrument, other than the and the requisite regarding registration of the
articles of association, by means of which one articles of association in the Commercial
of the partners guarantees to another certain Registry has been complied with, as in the
profits or secures him from losses, is valid present case. I do not believe that the
between them, without affecting the adoption of a wrong name is a material fact to
association. 8th. Contracts entered into by be taken into consideration in this case; first,
commercial associations defectively because the mere fact that a person uses a
organized are valid when they are voluntarily name not his own does not prevent him from
executed by the parties, if the only being bound in a contract or an obligation he
controversy relates to whether or not they voluntarily entered into; second, because such
complied with the agreement. a requirement of the law is merely a formal
and not necessarily an essential one to the
xxx xxx xxx existence of the partnership, and as long as
the name adopted sufficiently identity the firm
The name of the collective merchant is called or partnership intended to use it, the acts and
firm name. By this name, the new being is contracts done and entered into under such a
distinguished from others, its sphere of action name bind the firm to third persons; and third,
fixed, and the juridical personality better because the failure of the partners herein to
determined, without constituting an exclusive adopt the correct name prescribed by law
character of the general partnership to such cannot shield them from their personal
an extent as to serve the purpose of giving a liabilities, as neither law nor equity will permit
definition of said kind of a mercantile them to utilize their own mistake in order to
partnership, as is the case in our Code. put the blame on third persons, and much
less, on the firm creditors in order to avoid
their personal possibility.
Having in mind that these partnerships are
prevailingly of a personal character, article
126 says that they must transact business The legal intention deducible from the acts of the
under the name of all its members, of some of parties controls in determining the existence of a
them, or of one only, the words "and partnership. If they intend to do a thing which in law
company" to be added in the latter two cases. constitutes a partnership, they are partners, although
their purpose was to avoid the creation of such
relation. Here, the intention of the persons making up
It is rendered impossible for the general
Teck Seing & co., Ltd. was to establish a partnership
partnership to adopt a firm name appropriate
which they erroneously denominated a limited
to its commercial object; the law wants to link,
partnership. If this was their purpose, all subterfuges
and does link, the solidary and unlimited
resorted to in order to evade liability for possible
responsibility of the members of this
losses, while assuming their enjoyment of the
partnership with the formation of its name, and
advantages to be derived from the relation, must be
imposes a limitation upon personal liberty in
disregarded. The partners who have disguised their
its selection, not only by prescribing the
identity under a designation distinct from that of any of
requisites, but also by prohibiting persons not
the members of the firm should be penalized, and not
members of the company from including their
the creditors who presumably have dealt with the
names in its firm name under penalty of civil
partnership in good faith.
solidary responsibility.
Articles 127 and 237 of the Code of Commerce make
Of course, the form required by the Code for
all the members of the general copartnership liable
the adoption of the firm name does not
personally and in solidum with all their property for the
prevent the addition thereto of any other title
results of the transactions made in the name and for
connected with the commercial purpose of the
the account of the partnership. Section 51 of the
association. The reader may see our
Insolvency Law, likewise, makes all the property of the
commentaries on the mercantile registry about
partnership and also all the separate property of each
the business names and firm names of
of the partners liable. In other words, if a firm be
associations, but it is proper to establish here
insolvent, but one or more partners thereof are
that, while the business name may be
solvent, the creditors may proceed both against the
alienated by any of the means admitted by the
firm and against the solvent partner or partners, first
law, it seems impossible to separate the firm
exhausting the assets of the firm before seizing the
names of general partnerships from the
property of the partners. (Brandenburg of
juridical entity for the creation of which it was
Bankcruptcy, sec. 108; De los Reyes vs. Lukban and
formed. (Vol. 2, pp. 197, 213.)
Borja [1916], 35 Phil., 757; Involuntary Insolvency of
Campos Rueda & Co. vs. Pacific Commercial Co.
On the question of whether the fact that the firm name [1922], 44 Phil., 916).
"Teck Seing & Co., Ltd." does not contain the name of
all or any of the partners as prescribed by the Code of
We reach the conclusion that the contract of
Commerce prevents the creation of a general
partnership found in the document hereinbefore
partnership, Professor Jose A. Espiritu, as amicus
quoted established a general partnership or, to be
curiæ, states:
more exact, a partnership as this word is used in the
Insolvency Law.
My opinion is that such a fact alone cannot
and will not be a sufficient cause of preventing
the formation of a general partnership,
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and omission to register the resolutions or acts of a
the record shall be returned to the court of origin for mercantile association which modify or alter the
further proceedings pursuant to the motion presented conditions of the recorded articles of association.
by the creditors, in conformity with the provisions of
the Insolvency Law. Without special findings as to the 5.ID.; ID.; CASE OVERRULED.—The case of Tan
costs in this instance, it is ordered. Senguan & Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue (55
Phil., 439), insofar as it may be in conflict with this
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, decision, is to be considered overruled. APPEAL from
Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur. a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Mapa, J.
Yu Yiong P137,500.00
Faustino Ang Chong Jua 57, 750.00
Uy Quioco 99,000.00
Uy Piu Ki alias Uy Piuco 44,000.00
Tan Guioc Beng 41,250.00
Gaw Chay Lay 27,500.00
BUTTE, J.:
Lim Sieng alias Lim Siengco 22,000.00
Suit was brought in the Court of First Instance of Lim Sang King 16,500.00
Manila by Tec Bi & Company, Inc., against the
Collector of Internal Revenue to recover the sum of Lim Chiw 5,500.00
P4,387.75 paid under protest as income taxes by Yu
Yiong & Co. (the predecessor of the said corporation) Total 451,000.00
for the calendar years 1921, 1923, 1924, 1926 and
1927. Judgment was rendered requiring the collector
to refund the taxes paid for the years 1921, 1923 and
1924 only. Both parties have appealed to this court. 4. That by the 1920s or 1921 Heng Shiu Nian
filed a lawsuit against Yu Yiong and other
The cause was submitted and must be determined on brothers of this (Civil No. 19578 of the Court
the following agreed statement of facts: of First Instance of Manila) reciting the
inheritance rights that corresponded to him as
1. That on September 30, 1910, a regular participation of the late Yu Hiang Co within of
the social reason Yu Yiong and Company, and
collective mercantile society called "Tec Bi y
this matter was compromised by a stipulation
Compañia" was organized in this city of submitted by the parties to the Court on
Manila, of which the deceased Yu Hiang Co November 1, 1921, which was approved by
was one of the collective partners and whose this on the same date, which agreed to
company was duly registered in the transfer in favor of plaintiff Heng Shiu Hian a
Commercial Registry of this City. share worth p9,500 that the defendants had in
the company Yu Yiong and company.
2. That having died during the social period
the partner Yu Hiang Co., in accordance with 5. That on the same date, November 1, 1921
the terms of paragraph XVII of the Yu Yiong transferred in favor of his brother
aforementioned social deed, which reads: Tee Huan aka Yu Siong a share in the sum of
P9,011.23 in the relict capital by his late father
in the company Yu Yiong and Company,
"XVII In the event that a member dies whose deed was ratified before the public
in China or in another territory that is notary Mr. Salvador Zaragoza.
not included within the jurisdiction of
the Philippine Islands, his legal heirs 6. That on February 21, 1924, the partners of
must, within a month after the death of Yu Yiong y Compañia in public deed granted
the deceased member, direct a letter before the notary public Antonio Alfonso,
to the Society stating that its cause, registered as document 161, on page 69,
partner of this Society has passed Book III of the notarial register of said notary,
away and authorizing any of his heirs recognized and admitted to the referred ones
to succeed him in the rights and Tee Huan alias Yu Siong and to the
actions of the deceased. " And having denominated Heng Shiu Nian alias Ang Shiu
duly notified the company of this fact, Lian like partners of the company Yu Yiong
it recognized Yu Yiong as successor of and Company with a capital of P19,011.23
the late Yu Hiang Co in the and P9,500, respectively.
aforementioned company called Tec Bi
y Compañia. 7. In view of the fact that on said date
February 21, 1924 the aforementioned Heng
3. That on November 9 of the year 1920, the Shiu Nian aka Ang Shiu Lian was absent from
aforementioned company was reorganized the Philippine Islands and could not therefore
sign the above document, said Heng Shiu Under sections 10 (a) and 8 (e) of the Income Tax
Nian alias Ang Shiu Lian dated 27 of Law (Act No. 2833 as amended by Acts Nos. 2926
December of 1924 and in document granted and 3605) a registered general copartnership is
before the notary Lorenzo Sunico, registered exempted from the payment of income tax but an
with the No. 211 in the page 79, Book IV, of unregistered general copartnership is subject to the
the notarial registry of said notary, I lend its payment of income tax. It is admitted by the
conformity to the writing of that it is mentioned defendant-appellant, the Collector of Internal
previously. Revenue, that Yu Yiong and Company was a duly
registered general copartnership, its articles of
8. That the aforementioned documents were association having been registered in the Mercantile
not submitted to the mercantile registry for Register on November 12, 1920. But it is argued that
registration until July 7, 1927 and were not the association Yu Yiong and Company ceased to be
registered until the 11th of the same month. a registered general copartnership during the years
1921 to 1927 inclusive for the purposes of the income
9. That by virtue of the transfers mentioned in tax law because the copartnership failed to register
the paragraphs prior to the aforementioned Yu until July 11, 1927, the transfers made on November
Siong Heng Shiu Nian, the corresponding 1, 1921, by Yu Yiong and Company of the following
dividends were credited to the Company's interests in the association: P9,500 to Heng Shiu Nian
books since 1921 in relation to the capital and P9,022.23 to Tee Huan as set out in the above
recognized to them. agreed statement of facts. It is to be noted, however,
that these transfers were not recognized by the
association until February 21, 1924, when Yu Yiong
10. That on November 12, 1927, for
and Company, by a notarial document, admitted the
consideration of value, Yu Siong sold his
said assignees as new partners. Having regard to the
participation in the firm Yu Yiong y Compañia
requirements of the articles of association and the
in favor of Uy Quioco and this sale was only
provisions of article 143 of the Code of Commerce, it
registered in the Mercantile Registry on June
is clear that the transfers made on November 1, 1921,
9, 1928.
as aforesaid, had no effect as regards the partnership
until February 21, 1924, and we think that the trial
11. That on October 27, 1928 the Internal court was correct in so holding, regardless of the
Revenue Collector demanded that Yu Yiong y incidental fact that by agreement of the parties the
Compañia pay the internal income tax assignees received the accumulated dividends upon
corresponding to the years 1921, 1923, 1924, their respective shares since November 1, 1921.
1926 and 1927, which represent the sums
detailed below, namely:
We come now to the principal question of the case,
namely: Did the failure of the association to record
Año these transfers in the Mercantile Register until July 11,
1927, have the legal effect of converting the
1921 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P119.66
registered association of Yu Yiong and Company into
1923 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283.32 an unregistered association? or, stated differently: Did
the admission of Yu Siong, Heng Shiu Nian and Uy
1924 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,763.40 Quioco as additional partners in the firm under the
1926 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968.14 circumstances mentioned, have the effect of
dissolving the duly registered general partnership of
1927 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967.86 Yu Yiong and Company and of creating a new
unregistered copartnership for the interval between
February 21, 1924, and July 11, 1927?
plus the sum of P285.37 in interest and
surcharges, making a total of p4,387.75 that
the plaintiff paid under protest on September We have come to the conclusion that it did not have
24, 1931 and whose protest was later that effect for the following reasons: First, there is no
dismissed by the demanded Collector of provision in the Code of Commerce that such a
Revenue. conversion should take place. Second, there is no
provision in the Code of Commerce that the
registration of the transfers in the Mercantile Register
12. That dated January 15, 1932 and in a
on July 11, 1927, should have the effect of reviving or
public document issued in the City of Manila,
recreating the alleged extinct registered general
Quirino Uy quico in its concept of liquidator of
copartnership of Yu Yiong and Company; in other
the company Yu Yiong y Compañia whose
words, the Code of Commerce does not recognize the
period of social existence had expired sold all
existence of a hiatus such as the Government argues
the ASSETS and LIABILITIES of the same in
in this case. Third, articles 24 and 25 of the Code of
favor of Tec Bi & Co. another domestic
Commerce, construed together, plainly contemplate
corporation organized in accordance with the
the continued existence of the association in the
laws of the Philippine Islands.
manner and form in which it appears in the Mercantile
Register regardless of the unregistered changes
13. That one of the items of the ASSETS thus therein. Article 25 specifically provides in its last
transferred is the right to recover from the paragraph the consequences of the omission to
Collector of Revenue the aforementioned sum register the resolutions or acts of a mercantile
of P4,387.75. association which modify or alter the conditions of the
recorded articles of association; that is to say, any
Manila, 25 de septiembre de 1933. changes not so registered are binding between the
members of the association but shall not prejudice
third persons, who, on the other hand, may avail Dealing with partnerships are on the faith of
themselves thereof insofar as it may be advantageous appearances.
to them. Fourth, uncertainties and confusion in trade
and commerce would necessarily arise if the public It is true that when a partner borrows from a
could not rely upon the Mercantile Register to firm, he does not necessarily decrease his
ascertain the status of a registered commercial share of the capital. But there may be an
partnership. agreement among the partners that he does.
The best evidence of this agreement is the
There is not the slightest indication that the transfers book. When the book shows a partner has
in question were dishonest or fraudulent, or, that the withdrawn all of his capital, he can not
delay in registering them has caused loss or thenceforth be a partner unless he is an
disadvantage to the Government or any one else. industrial one — and that fact should appear
in the registry.
The case of Tan Senguan & Co. vs. Collector of
Internal Revenue (55 Phil., 439), insofar as it may be When a new partner is introduced into a firm,
in conflict with this decision, is to be considered persons dealing with it have the right to know
overruled. it and to decide whether they wish to continue
dealing.
The judgment appealed from must be modified in the
sense that the . . . It can not be said that the imposition of the
defendant-appellant Collector of Internal Revenue be additional income tax and penalties is cruel or
adjudged and required to refund to the plaintiff- inhuman. The law is clear that unregistered
appellant Tec Bi & Company, Inc. the sum of concerns must pay income taxes as entities,
P4,387.75 income tax and charges paid under protest while registered ones do not. The law was
as set out in paragraph 11 of the agreed statement of adopted for the very purpose of encouraging
facts, without special pronouncement as to costs in registration of partnerships. The courts would
this instance. So ordered. render poor service to the business
community if they did not strictly enforce the
Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., law.
concur.
I certify that Justice Villa-Real voted with the majority. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, and
— MALCOLM, Acting C.J. the decision is found in volume 55, page 439, with the
result that the decision of the trial court was affirmed.
Separate Opinions The trial judge in the instant case has only
endeavoured to give application to the decision in
MALCOLM and VICKERS, JJ., dissenting: the Tan Senguan & Co. vs. Collector of Internal
Revenue case, or otherwise stated, has simply given
application to a doctrine now found in our mercantile
With so much of the majority decision as overrules the
and tax laws.
appeal by the Government, we are in agreement; but
with so much of the majority decision as conforms to
the appeal by the plaintiff, we are not in agreement. Much more might be said about the appeals, but
Possibly the last statement needs one modification, inasmuch as it is desirable to have the decision
for when the majority decision states that promulgated without delay, we will confine final
"uncertainties and confusion in trade and commerce comment to the statement that in our opinion the
would necessarily arise if the public could not rely judgment appealed from should be affirmed without
upon the Mercantile Register to ascertain the status of change.
a registered commercial partnership," that is
substantially our stand. In other words, we believe
that, since an unregistered general copartnership is
subject to payment of the income tax, while a
registered general copartnership is exempt, when,
secretly or otherwise, the partnership changes its form
without the transfers being recorded in the Mercantile
Register, the partnership must suffer the
consequences. Public policy demands that those
constituting a partnership deal openly and not secretly
so as not to nullify the purpose of the law.
DECISION
suit with the filing of their 3 August 1998 Complaint
against Josefina, her husband, Ike Realubit (Ike), and
their alleged dummies, for specific performance,
accounting, examination, audit and inventory of
assets and properties, dissolution of the joint venture,
appointment of a receiver and damages. Docketed as
Civil Case No. 98-0331 before respondent Branch
257 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque
City, said complaint alleged, among other matters,
that the Spouses Realubit had no gainful occupation
or business prior to their joint venture with Biondo;
that with the income of the business which earned not
less than ₱3,000.00 per day, they were, however, able
to acquire the two-storey building as well as the land
on which the joint venture’s ice plant stands, another
building which they used as their office and/or
residence and six (6) delivery vans; and, that aside
from appropriating for themselves the income of the
business, the Spouses Realubit have fraudulently
concealed the funds and assets thereof thru their
relatives, associates or dummies.8
PEREZ, J.:
Served with summons, the Spouses Realubit filed
their Answer dated 21 October 1998, specifically
The validity as well as the consequences of an denying the material allegations of the foregoing
assignment of rights in a joint venture are at issue in complaint. Claiming that they have been engaged in
this petition for review filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the the tube ice trading business under a single
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,1 assailing the 30 April proprietorship even before their dealings with Biondo,
2007 Decision2rendered by the Court of Appeals’ (CA) the Spouses Realubit, in turn, averred that their said
then Twelfth Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 73861,3 the business partner had left the country in May 1997 and
dispositive portion of which states: could not have executed the Deed of Assignment
which bears a signature markedly different from that
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET which he affixed on their Joint Venture Agreement;
ASIDE and we order the dissolution of the joint that they refused the Spouses Jaso’s demand in view
venture between defendant-appellant Josefina of the dubious circumstances surrounding their
Realubit and Francis Eric Amaury Biondo and the acquisition of Biondo’s share in the business which
subsequent conduct of accounting, liquidation of was established at Don Antonio Heights,
assets and division of shares of the joint venture Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City; that said
business. business had already stopped operations on 13
January 1996 when its plant shut down after its power
Let a copy hereof and the records of the case be supply was disconnected by MERALCO for non-
remanded to the trial court for appropriate payment of utility bills; and, that it was their own tube
proceedings.4 ice trading business which had been moved to 66-C
Cenacle Drive, Sanville Subdivision, Project 6,
The Facts Quezon City that the Spouses Jaso mistook for the
ice manufacturing business established in partnership
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Josefina Realubit with Biondo.9
(Josefina) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
with Francis Eric Amaury Biondo (Biondo), a French The issues thus joined and the mandatory pre-trial
national, for the operation of an ice manufacturing conference subsequently terminated, the RTC went
business. With Josefina as the industrial partner and on to try the case on its merits and, thereafter, to
Biondo as the capitalist partner, the parties agreed render its Decision dated 17 September 2001,
that they would each receive 40% of the net profit, discounting the existence of sufficient evidence from
with the remaining 20% to be used for the payment of which the income, assets and the supposed
the ice making machine which was purchased for the dissolution of the joint venture can be adequately
business.5 For and in consideration of the sum of reckoned. Upon the finding, however, that the
₱500,000.00, however, Biondo subsequently Spouses Jaso had been nevertheless subrogated to
executed a Deed of Assignment dated 27 June 1997, Biondo’s rights in the business in view of their valid
transferring all his rights and interests in the business acquisition of the latter’s share as capitalist
in favor of respondent Eden Jaso (Eden), the wife of partner,10 the RTC disposed of the case in the
respondent Prosencio Jaso.6 With Biondo’s eventual following wise:
departure from the country, the Spouses Jaso caused
their lawyer to send Josefina a letter dated 19 WHEREFORE, defendants are ordered to submit to
February 1998, apprising her of their acquisition of plaintiffs a complete accounting and inventory of the
said Frenchman’s share in the business and formally assets and liabilities of the joint venture from its
demanding an accounting and inventory thereof as inception to the present, to allow plaintiffs access to
well as the remittance of their portion of its profits.7 the books and accounting records of the joint venture,
to deliver to plaintiffs their share in the profits, if any,
Faulting Josefina with unjustified failure to heed their and to pay the plaintiffs the amount of ₱20,000. for
demand, the Spouses Jaso commenced the instant
moral damages. The claims for exemplary damages confer validity on said deed, since it is still entirely
and attorney’s fees are denied for lack of basis.11 possible that Biondo did not execute said deed or, for
that matter, appear before said notary public.15 The
On appeal before the CA, the foregoing decision was dearth of merit in the Spouses Realubit’s position is,
set aside in the herein assailed Decision dated 30 however, immediately evident from the settled rule
April 2007, upon the following findings and that documents acknowledged before notaries public
conclusions: (a) the Spouses Jaso validly acquired are public documents which are admissible in
Biondo’s share in the business which had been evidence without necessity of preliminary proof as to
transferred to and continued its operations at 66-C their authenticity and due execution.16
Cenacle Drive, Sanville Subdivision, Project 6,
Quezon City and not dissolved as claimed by the It cannot be gainsaid that, as a public document, the
Spouses Realubit; (b) absent showing of Josefina’s Deed of Assignment Biondo executed in favor of Eden
knowledge and consent to the transfer of Biondo’s not only enjoys a presumption of regularity17 but is
share, Eden cannot be considered as a partner in the also considered prima facie evidence of the facts
business, pursuant to Article 1813 of the Civil Code of therein stated.18 A party assailing the authenticity and
the Philippines; (c) while entitled to Biondo’s share in due execution of a notarized document is,
the profits of the business, Eden cannot, however, consequently, required to present evidence that is
interfere with the management of the partnership, clear, convincing and more than merely
require information or account of its transactions and preponderant.19 In view of the Spouses Realubit’s
inspect its books; (d) the partnership should first be failure to discharge this onus, we find that both the
dissolved before Eden can seek an accounting of its RTC and the CA correctly upheld the authenticity and
transactions and demand Biondo’s share in the validity of said Deed of Assignment upon the
business; and, (e) the evidence adduced before the combined strength of the above-discussed disputable
RTC do not support the award of moral damages in presumptions and the testimonies elicited from
favor of the Spouses Jaso.12 Eden20 and Notary Public Rolando Diaz.21 As for the
Spouses’ Realubit’s bare assertion that Biondo’s
The Spouses Realubit’s motion for reconsideration of signature on the same document appears to be
the foregoing decision was denied for lack of merit in forged, suffice it to say that, like fraud,22 forgery is
the CA’s 28 June 2007 Resolution,13 hence, this never presumed and must likewise be proved by clear
petition. and convincing evidence by the party alleging the
same.23 Aside from not being borne out by a
The Issues comparison of Biondo’s signatures on the Joint
Venture Agreement24 and the Deed of
Assignment,25 said forgery is, moreover debunked by
The Spouses Realubit urge the reversal of the
Biondo’s duly authenticated certification dated 17
assailed decision upon the negative of the following
November 1998, confirming the transfer of his interest
issues, to wit:
in the business in favor of Eden.26
A. WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID
Generally understood to mean an organization formed
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS TO THE JOINT
for some temporary purpose, a joint venture is likened
VENTURE.
to a particular partnership or one which "has for its
object determinate things, their use or fruits, or a
B. WHETHER THE COURT MAY ORDER specific undertaking, or the exercise of a profession or
PETITIONER [JOSEFINA REALUBIT] AS vocation."27 The rule is settled that joint ventures are
PARTNER IN THE JOINT VENTURE TO governed by the law on partnerships28 which are, in
RENDER [A]N ACCOUNTING TO ONE WHO turn, based on mutual agency or delectus
IS NOT A PARTNER IN SAID JOINT personae.29 Insofar as a partner’s conveyance of the
VENTURE. entirety of his interest in the partnership is concerned,
Article 1813 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
C. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES JASO] HAVE ANY RIGHT IN THE Art. 1813. A conveyance by a partner of his whole
JOINT VENTURE AND IN THE SEPARATE interest in the partnership does not itself dissolve the
ICE BUSINESS OF PETITIONER[S].14 partnership, or, as against the other partners in the
absence of agreement, entitle the assignee, during
The Court’s Ruling the continuance of the partnership, to interfere in the
management or administration of the partnership
We find the petition bereft of merit. business or affairs, or to require any information or
account of partnership transactions, or to inspect the
The Spouses Realubit argue that, in upholding its partnership books; but it merely entitles the assignee
validity, both the RTC and the CA inordinately gave to receive in accordance with his contracts the profits
premium to the notarization of the 27 June 1997 Deed to which the assigning partners would otherwise be
of Assignment executed by Biondo in favor of the entitled. However, in case of fraud in the management
Spouses Jaso. Calling attention to the latter’s failure of the partnership, the assignee may avail himself of
to present before the RTC said assignor or, at the the usual remedies.
very least, the witnesses to said document, the
Spouses Realubit maintain that the testimony of In the case of a dissolution of the partnership, the
Rolando Diaz, the Notary Public before whom the assignee is entitled to receive his assignor’s interest
same was acknowledged, did not suffice to establish and may require an account from the date only of the
its authenticity and/or validity. They insist that last account agreed to by all the partners.
notarization did not automatically and conclusively
From the foregoing provision, it is evident that "(t)he (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised
transfer by a partner of his partnership interest does on the supposed absence of evidence and
not make the assignee of such interest a partner of contradicted by the evidence on record.40Unfortunately
the firm, nor entitle the assignee to interfere in the for the Spouses Realubit’s cause, not one of the
management of the partnership business or to receive foregoing exceptions applies to the case.
anything except the assignee’s profits. The
assignment does not purport to transfer an interest in WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
the partnership, but only a future contingent right to a merit and the assailed CA Decision dated 30 April
portion of the ultimate residue as the assignor may 2007 is, accordingly, AFFIRMED in toto.
become entitled to receive by virtue of his
proportionate interest in the capital."30 Since a SO ORDERED.
partner’s interest in the partnership includes his share
in the profits,31 we find that the CA committed no
Footnotes
reversible error in ruling that the Spouses Jaso are
entitled to Biondo’s share in the profits, despite
Juanita’s lack of consent to the assignment of said
27
Art. 1783, Civil Code of the Philippines.
Frenchman’s interest in the joint venture. Although
Eden did not, moreover, become a partner as a
31
Art. 1812, Civil Code of the Philippines.
consequence of the assignment and/or acquire the
right to require an accounting of the partnership 32
Art. 1831. On application by or for a partner,
business, the CA correctly granted her prayer for the court shall decree a dissolution x x x
dissolution of the joint venture conformably with the
right granted to the purchaser of a partner’s interest xxx
under Article 1831 of the Civil Code.32 1âwphi1
G.R. No. 195580 April 21, 2014 Same; Same; Corporate Layering; “Corporate
layering” is admittedly allowed by the Foreign
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT Investments Act (FIA); but if it is used to circumvent
CORP., TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT, the Constitution and pertinent laws, then it becomes
INC., and MCARTHUR MINING, INC., Petitioners, illegal.—“Corporate layering” is admittedly allowed by
vs. the FIA; but if it is used to circumvent the Constitution
REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES and pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal. Further,
CORP., Respondent. the pronouncement of petitioners that the grandfather
rule has already been abandoned must be discredited
for lack of basis. Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the Constitution
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Moot and Academic; provides: Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain,
A case is said to be moot and/or academic when it waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
“ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
would be of no practical use or value.”—Basically, a resources are owned by the State. With the exception
case is said to be moot and/or academic when it of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
“ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
would be of no practical use or value.” Thus, the control and supervision of the State. The State may
courts “generally decline jurisdiction over the case or directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
dismiss it on the ground of mootness.” The co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
“mootness” principle, however, does accept certain agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
exceptions and the mere raising of an issue of associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
“mootness” will not deter the courts from trying a case is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
when there is a valid reason to do so. In David v. for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
Macapagal-Arroyo (David), 489 SCRA 160 renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided
Mercantile Law; Corporations; Control Test; by law.
Grandfather Rule; Basically, there are two
acknowledged tests in determining the nationality of a Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction;
corporation: the control test and the grandfather rule. Elementary in statutory construction is when there is
—Basically, there are two acknowledged tests in conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the
determining the nationality of a corporation: the Constitution will prevail.—Elementary in statutory
control test and the grandfather rule. Paragraph 7 of construction is when there is conflict between the
DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution will prevail.
1967 SEC Rules which implemented the requirement In this instance, specifically pertaining to the
of the Constitution and other laws pertaining to the provisions under Art. XII of the Constitution on
controlling interests in enterprises engaged in the National Economy and Patrimony, Sec. 3 of the FIA
exploitation of natural resources owned by Filipino will have no place of application. As decreed by the
citizens, provides: Shares belonging to corporations honorable framers of our Constitution, the grandfather
or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is rule prevails and must be applied.
owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of
Philippine nationality, but if the percentage of Filipino
ownership in the corporation or partnership is less Partnership; Words and Phrases; A partnership is
than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding defined as two or more persons who bind themselves
to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine to contribute money, property, or industry to a
nationality. Thus, if 100,000 shares are registered in common fund with the intention of dividing the profits
the name of a corporation or partnership at least 60% among themselves.—A partnership is defined as two
of the capital stock or capital, respectively, of which or more persons who bind themselves to contribute
belong to Filipino citizens, all of the shares shall be money, property, or industry to a common fund with
the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. mining areas (b) Disputes involving mineral
On the other hand, joint ventures have been deemed agreements or permits.
to be “akin” to partnerships since it is difficult to
distinguish between joint ventures and partnerships. Same; Same; Same; It is clear that the Panel of
Thus: [T]he relations of the parties to a joint venture Arbitrators (POA) has exclusive and original
and the nature of their association are so similar and jurisdiction over any and all disputes involving rights
closely akin to a partnership that it is ordinarily held to mining areas.—It is clear that POA has exclusive
that their rights, duties, and liabilities are to be tested and original jurisdiction over any and all disputes
by rules which are closely analogous to and involving rights to mining areas. One such dispute is
substantially the same, if not exactly the same, as an MPSA application to which an adverse claim,
those which govern partnership. In fact, it has been protest or opposition is filed by another interested
said that the trend in the law has been to blur the applicant. In the case at bar, the dispute arose or
distinctions between a partnership and a joint venture, originated from MPSA applications where petitioners
very little law being found applicable to one that does are asserting their rights to mining areas subject of
not apply to the other. their respective MPSA applications. Since respondent
filed 3 separate petitions for the denial of said
Mercantile Law; Corporations; Pseudo-Partnerships; applications, then a controversy has developed
As a rule, corporations are prohibited from entering between the parties and it is POA’s jurisdiction to
into partnership agreements; consequently, resolve said disputes. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the
corporations enter into joint venture agreements with RTC involves civil actions while what petitioners filed
other corporations or partnerships for certain with the DENR Regional Office or any concerned
transactions in order to form “pseudo partnerships.”— DENRE or CENRO are MPSA applications. Thus POA
Though some claim that partnerships and joint has jurisdiction. Furthermore, the POA has jurisdiction
ventures are totally different animals, there are very over the MPSA applications under the doctrine of
few rules that differentiate one from the other; thus, primary jurisdiction. Euro-med Laboratories v.
joint ventures are deemed “akin” or similar to a Province of Batangas, 495 SCRA 301 (2006),
partnership. In fact, in joint venture agreements, rules elucidates: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds
and legal incidents governing partnerships are that if a case is such that its determination requires
applied. Accordingly, culled from the incidents and the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of
records of this case, it can be assumed that the an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in
relationships entered between and among petitioners an administrative proceeding before resort to the
and MBMI are no simple “joint venture agreements.” courts is had even if the matter may well be within
As a rule, corporations are prohibited from entering their proper jurisdiction.
into partnership agreements; consequently,
corporations enter into joint venture agreements with Mercantile Law; Corporations; Control Test; The
other corporations or partnerships for certain “control test” is still the prevailing mode of determining
transactions in order to form “pseudo partnerships.” whether or not a corporation is a Filipino corporation,
Obviously, as the intricate web of “ventures” entered within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987
into by and among petitioners and MBMI was Constitution, entitled to undertake the exploration,
executed to circumvent the legal prohibition against development and utilization of the natural resources of
corporations entering into partnerships, then the the Philippines.—The “control test” is still the
relationship created should be deemed as prevailing mode of determining whether or not a
“partnerships,” and the laws on partnership should be corporation is a Filipino corporation, within the ambit
applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between and of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, entitled to
among corporations may be seen as similar to undertake the exploration, development and utilization
partnerships since the elements of partnership are of the natural resources of the Philippines. When in
present. Considering that the relationships found the mind of the Court there is doubt, based on the
between petitioners and MBMI are considered to be attendant facts and circumstances of the case, in the
partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying Sec. 60-40 Filipino-equity ownership in the corporation,
29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that “by entering then it may apply the “grandfather rule.”
into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest” with
Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. Leonen, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Mines and Mining; Panel of Arbitrators; Jurisdiction; Mines and Mining; Grandfather Rule; View that the
The Panel of Arbitrators (POA) has jurisdiction to so-called “Grandfather Rule” has no statutory basis. It
settle disputes over rights to mining areas.—We affirm is the Control Test that governs in determining Filipino
the ruling of the CA in declaring that the POA has equity in corporations.—The so-called “Grandfather
jurisdiction over the instant case. The POA has Rule” has no statutory basis. It is the Control Test that
jurisdiction to settle disputes over rights to mining governs in determining Filipino equity in corporations.
areas which definitely involve the petitions filed by It is this test that is provided in statute and by our
Redmont against petitioners Narra, McArthur and most recent jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Panel of
Tesoro. Redmont, by filing its petition against Arbitrators created by the Philippine Mining Act is not
petitioners, is asserting the right of Filipinos over a court of law. It cannot decide judicial questions with
mining areas in the Philippines against alleged finality. This includes the determination of whether the
foreign-owned mining corporations. Such claim capital of a corporation is owned or controlled by
constitutes a “dispute” found in Sec. 77 of RA 7942: Filipino citizens. The Panel of Arbitrators renders
Within thirty (30) days, after the submission of the arbitral awards. There is no dispute and, therefore, no
case by the parties for the decision, the panel shall competence for arbitration, if one of the parties does
have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and not have a mining claim but simply wishes to ask for a
decide the following: (a) Disputes involving rights to declaration that a corporation is not qualified to hold a
mining agreement. Respondent here did not claim a Same; Same; Mineral Agreements; View that a
better right to a mining agreement. By forum shopping mineral agreement shall grant to the contractor the
through multiple actions, it sought to disqualify exclusive right to conduct mining operations and to
petitioners. The decision of the majority rewards such extract all mineral resources found in the contract
actions. area.—In Section 26 of the Mining Act, “[a] mineral
agreement shall grant to the contractor the exclusive
Same; View that mining is an environmentally right to conduct mining operations and to extract all
sensitive activity that entails the exploration, mineral resources found in the contract area.” There
development, and utilization of inalienable natural are three (3) forms of mineral agreements: 1. Mineral
resources.—Mining is an environmentally sensitive production sharing agreement (MPSA) “where the
activity that entails the exploration, development, and Government grants to the contractor the exclusive
utilization of inalienable natural resources. It falls right to conduct mining operations within a contract
within the broad ambit of Article XII, Section 2 as well area and shares in the gross output [with the]
as other sections of the 1987 Constitution which contractor x x x provid[ing] the financing, technology,
refers to ancestral domains and the environment. management and personnel necessary for the
More specifically, Republic Act No. 7942 or the implementation of [the MPSA]”; 2. Co-production
Philippine Mining Act, its implementing rules and agreement (CA) “wherein the Government shall
regulations, other administrative issuances as well as provide inputs to the mining operations other than the
jurisprudence govern the application for mining rights mineral resource”; and 3. Joint-venture agreement
among others. Small-scale mining is governed by (JVA) “where a joint-venture company is organized by
Republic Act No. 7076, the People’s Small-scale the Government and the contractor with both parties
Mining Act of 1991. Apart from these, other statutes having equity shares. Aside from earnings in equity,
such as Republic Act No. 8371, the Indigenous the Government shall be entitled to a share in the
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and Republic Act gross output.”
No. 7160, the Local Government Code (LGC) contain
provisions which delimit the conduct of mining Same; View that the purpose of the sixty per centum
activities. Republic Act No. 7042, as amended by requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations
Republic Act No. 8179, the Foreign Investments Act or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or
(FIA) is significant with respect to the participation of to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by
foreign investors in nationalized economic activities Filipinos.—The rationale for nationalizing the
such as mining. In the 2012 resolution ruling on the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
motion for reconsideration in Gamboa v. Teves, 682 resources was explained by this court in Register of
SCRA 397 (2012), this court stated that “The FIA is Deeds of Rizal v. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58
the basic law governing foreign investments in the (1955), as follows: The purpose of the sixty per
Philippines, irrespective of the nature of business and centum requirement is obviously to ensure that
area of investment.” Commonwealth Act No. 108, as corporations or associations allowed to acquire
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Dummy Law, agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall
penalizes those who “allow [their] name or citizenship be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the
to be used for the purpose of evading” “constitutional Constitution demands that in the absence of capital
or legal provisions requir[ing] Philippine or any other stock, the controlling membership should be
specific citizenship as a requisite for the exercise or composed of Filipino citizens.
enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.” Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68, the Corporation Code, is the Same; Grandfather Rule; View that the conclusion
general law that “provide[s] for the formation, that the Grandfather Rule “applies only when the 60-
organization, [and] regulation of private corporations.” 40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt” is
The conduct of activities relating to securities, such as borne by that opinion’s consideration of an earlier
shares of stock, is regulated by Republic Act No. Department of Justice (DOJ) opinion (i.e., DOJ
8799, the Securities Regulation Code (SRC). Opinion No. 18, Series of 1989).—The conclusion that
the Grandfather Rule “applies only when the 60-40
Same; Philippine Mining Act (R.A. No. 7942); Panel of Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt” is borne
Arbitrators; View that nowhere in Section 77 of the by that opinion’s consideration of an earlier DOJ
Republic Act No. 7942 is there a grant of jurisdiction opinion (i.e., DOJ Opinion No. 18, Series of 1989).
to the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) over the DOJ Opinion No. 20, Series of 2005’s quotation of
determination of the qualification of applicants.— DOJ Opinion No. 18, Series of 1989, reads: x x x. It is
Nowhere in Section 77 of the Republic Act No. 7942 is quite clear x x x that the “Grandfather Rule,” which
there a grant of jurisdiction to the Panel of Arbitrators was evolved and applied by the SEC in several cases,
over the determination of the qualification of will not apply in cases where the 60-40 Filipino-alien
applicants. The Philippine Mining Act clearly requires equity ownership in a particular natural resource
the existence of a “dispute” over a mining area, a corporation is not in doubt.
mining agreement, with a surface owner, or those
pending with the Bureau or the Department upon the Same; Foreign Investments Act; Philippine Nationals;
law’s promulgation. The existence of a “dispute” View that the Foreign Investments Act (FIA) Lists the
presupposes that the party bringing the suit has a Persons Included in the term “Philippine National.”—
colorable or putative claim more superior than that of Under the Foreign Investments Act, a “Philippine
the respondent in the arbitration proceedings. After all, national” is any of the following: 1. a citizen of the
the Panel of Arbitrators is supposed to provide binding Philippines; 2. a domestic partnership or association
arbitration which should result in a binding award wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; 3. a
either in favor of the petitioner or the respondent. corporation organized under the laws of the
Thus, the Panel of Arbitrators is a qualified quasi- Philippines, of which at least 60% of the capital stock
judicial agency. It does not perform all judicial outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by
functions in lieu of courts of law.
citizens of the Philippines; 4. a corporation organized Same; Foreign Investments Act; Philippine Nationals;
abroad and registered as doing business in the Words and Phrases; View that Section 3(a) of the
Philippines under the Corporation Code, of which Foreign Investments Act (FIA) defines a “Philippine
100% of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to national” as including “a corporation organized under
vote is wholly owned by Filipinos; or 5. a trustee of the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty per
funds for pension or other employee retirement or cent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and
separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the
national and at least 60% of the fund will accrue to the Philippines.”—Section 3(a) of the Foreign Investments
benefit of Philippine nationals. Act defines a “Philippine national” as including “a
corporation organized under the laws of the
Same; Same; Same; Control Test; View that the Philippines of which at least sixty per cent (60%) of
Foreign Investments Act’s (FIA’s) implementing rules the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is
and regulations are clear and unequivocal in declaring owned and held by citizens of the Philippines.” This is
that the Control Test shall be applied to determine the a definition that is consistent with the first part of
nationality of a corporation in which another paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules, which, as
corporation owns stocks.—The Foreign Investments proffered by DOJ Opinion No. 20, Series of 2005,
Act’s implementing rules and regulations are clear articulates the Control Test: “[s]hares belonging to
and unequivocal in declaring that the Control Test corporations or partnerships at least 60 per cent of the
shall be applied to determine the nationality of a capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be
corporation in which another corporation owns stocks. considered as of Philippine nationality.”
From around the time of the issuance of the SEC’s
May 30, 1990 opinion addressed to Mr. Johnny M. Same; Same; Same; Control Test; View that it is a
Araneta where the SEC stated that it “decided to do matter of transitivity that if Filipino stockholders control
away with the strict application/computation of the so- a corporation which, in turn, controls another
called ‘Grandfather Rule’ x x x, and instead appl[y] the corporation, then the Filipino stockholders control the
so-called ‘Control Test,’” the SEC “has consistently latter corporation, albeit indirectly or through the
applied the control test.” former corporation.—The application of the Control
Test is by no means antithetical to the avowed policy
Same; Same; Same; Grandfather Rule; View that the of a “national economy effectively controlled by
Foreign Investments Act (FIA) and its implementing Filipinos.” The Control Test promotes this policy. It is a
rules notwithstanding, the Department of Justice matter of transitivity that if Filipino stockholders control
(DOJ), in DOJ Opinion No. 20, Series of 2005, still a corporation which, in turn, controls another
posited that the Grandfather Rule is still applicable, corporation, then the Filipino stockholders control the
“only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership latter corporation, albeit indirectly or through the
is in doubt.”—The Foreign Investments Act and its former corporation.
implementing rules notwithstanding, the Department
of Justice, in DOJ Opinion No. 20, series of 2005, still Same; Same; Same; Same; View that as against
posited that the Grandfather Rule is still applicable, each other, it is the Control Test, rather than the
albeit “only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity Grandfather Rule, which better serves to ensure that
ownership is in doubt.” Anchoring itself on DOJ Philippine Nationals control a corporation.—As
Opinion No. 20, series of 2005, the SEC En Banc against each other, it is the Control Test, rather than
found the Grandfather Rule applicable in its March 25, the Grandfather Rule, which better serves to ensure
2010 decision in Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. that Philippine Nationals control a corporation. As is
v. McArthur Mining Corp. (subject of the petition in illustrated by the SEC’s September 21, 1990 opinion
G.R. No. 205513). It asserted that there was “doubt” addressed to Carag, Caballes, Jamora, Rodriguez
in the compliance with the requisite 60-40 Filipino- and Somera Law Offices, the application of the
foreign equity ownership: Such doubt, we believe, Grandfather Rule does not guarantee control by
exists in the instant case because the foreign investor, Filipino stockholders. In certain instances, the
MBMI, provided practically all the funds of the application of the Grandfather Rule actually
remaining appellee-corporations. undermines the rationale (i.e., control) for the
nationalization of certain economic activities.
Same; View that the 1987 Constitution is silent on the
precise means through which foreign equity in a Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Section 3(aq)
corporation shall be determined for the purpose of of the Mining Act deems as a qualified person (for
complying with nationalization requirements in each purposes of a mineral agreement) a “corporation, at
industry.—The 1987 Constitution is silent on the least sixty per centum (60%) of the capital of which is
precise means through which foreign equity in a owned by citizens of the Philippines.”—The Foreign
corporation shall be determined for the purpose of Investments Act’s reckoning of a Philippine national
complying with nationalization requirements in each on the basis of control and the requisite application of
industry. If at all, it militates against the supposed the Control Test are reinforced by the Mining Act.
preference for the Grandfather Rule that, its mention Section 3(aq) of the Mining Act deems as a qualified
in the Constitutional Commission’s deliberations person (for purposes of a mineral agreement) a
notwithstanding, the 1987 Constitution was, ultimately, “corporation, x x x at least sixty per centum (60%) of
inarticulate on adopting a specific test or means. The the capital of which is owned by citizens of the
1987 Constitution is categorical in its omission. Its Philippines.” Insofar as the controlling equity
meaning is clear. That is to say, by its silence, it chose requirement is concerned, this is practically a
to not manifest a preference. Had there been any restatement of Section 3(a) of the Foreign
such preference, the Constitution could very well have Investments Act.
said it.
Same; Same; Same; Grandfather Rule; View that the
Grandfather Rule may be used as a supplement to
the Control Test, that is, as a further check to ensure
that control and beneficial ownership of a corporation
is in fact lodged in Filipinos.—In Gamboa, “[f]ull
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding
capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting
rights, is required.” With this in mind, the Grandfather
Rule may be used as a supplement to the Control
Test, that is, as a further check to ensure that control
and beneficial ownership of a corporation is in fact
lodged in Filipinos.
NOTE:
IVB-08 for Tesoro and AFTA-IVB-07 for Narra, which application was converted to AFTA-IVB-08 on May13
are granted to foreign-owned corporations. 28, 2007, and Narra’s FTAA was converted to AFTA-
Nevertheless, they claimed that the issue on IVB-07 on March 30, 2006.
14
40% of the shares of PLMC (which owns 5,997 Commission (SEC), seeking the revocation of the
shares of Narra), 40% of the shares of MMC (which
3
certificates for registration of petitioners on the ground
owns 5,997 shares of McArthur) and 40% of the
4
that they are foreign-owned or controlled corporations
shares of SLMC (which, in turn, owns 5,997 shares of engaged in mining in violation of Philippine laws.
Tesoro), the shares of MBMI will not make it the
5
Thereafter, Redmont filed on September 1, 2008 a
owner of at least 60% of the capital stock of each of Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceeding
petitioners. They added that the best tool used in before the MAB praying for the suspension of the
determining the nationality of a corporation is the proceedings on the appeals filed by McArthur, Tesoro
"control test," embodied in Sec. 3 of RA 7042 or the and Narra.
Foreign Investments Act of 1991. They also claimed
that the POA of DENR did not have jurisdiction over Subsequently, on September 8, 2008, Redmont filed
the issues in Redmont’s petition since they are not before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
enumerated in Sec. 77 of RA 7942. Finally, they Branch 92 (RTC) a Complaint for injunction with
16
stressed that Redmont has no personality to sue them application for issuance of a temporary restraining
because it has no pending claim or application over order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
the areas applied for by petitioners. docketed as Civil Case No. 08-63379. Redmont
prayed for the deferral of the MAB proceedings
On December 14, 2007, the POA issued a Resolution pending the resolution of the Complaint before the
disqualifying petitioners from gaining MPSAs. It held: SEC.
[I]t is clearly established that respondents are not But before the RTC can resolve Redmont’s Complaint
qualified applicants to engage in mining activities. On and applications for injunctive reliefs, the MAB issued
the other hand, [Redmont] having filed its own an Order on September 10, 2008, finding the appeal
applications for an EPA over the areas earlier covered meritorious. It held:
by the MPSA application of respondents may be
considered if and when they are qualified under the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Mines
law. The violation of the requirements for the issuance Adjudication Board hereby REVERSES and SETS
and/or grant of permits over mining areas is clearly ASIDE the Resolution dated 14 December 2007 of the
established thus, there is reason to believe that the Panel of Arbitrators of Region IV-B (MIMAROPA) in
cancellation and/or revocation of permits already POA-DENR Case Nos. 2001-01, 2007-02 and 2007-
issued under the premises is in order and open the 03, and its Order dated 07 February 2008 denying the
areas covered to other qualified applicants. Motions for Reconsideration of the Appellants. The
Petition filed by Redmont Consolidated Mines
xxxx Corporation on 02 January 2007 is hereby ordered
DISMISSED. 17
Development Corp. as, DISQUALIFIED for being setting the case for hearing the prayer for the
considered as Foreign Corporations. Their Mineral issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) are hereby x x September 19, 2008.
x DECLARED NULL AND VOID. 6
corporations being "effectively controlled" by MBMI, a 2008 Order of the MAB. Subsequently, it filed a
100% Canadian company and declared their MPSAs Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on 20
null and void. In the same Resolution, it gave due September 29, 2008.
course to Redmont’s EPAs. Thereafter, on February 7,
2008, the POA issued an Order denying the Motion
7
Before the MAB could resolve Redmont’s Motion for
for Reconsideration filed by petitioners. Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, Redmont filed before the RTC a
Aggrieved by the Resolution and Order of the POA, Supplemental Complaint in Civil Case No. 08-63379.
21
the CA, assailing the Orders issued by the MAB. On petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are also in
October 1, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision, the partnership with, or privies-in-interest of, MBMI.
dispositive of which reads:
Furthermore, the CA viewed the conversion of the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. MPSA applications of petitioners into FTAA
The assailed Orders, dated September 10, 2008 and applications suspicious in nature and, as a
July 1, 2009 of the Mining Adjudication Board are consequence, it recommended the rejection of
reversed and set aside. The findings of the Panel of petitioners’ MPSA applications by the Secretary of the
Arbitrators of the Department of Environment and DENR.
Natural Resources that respondents McArthur, Tesoro
and Narra are foreign corporations is upheld and, With regard to the settlement of disputes over rights to
therefore, the rejection of their applications for Mineral mining areas, the CA pointed out that the POA has
Product Sharing Agreement should be recommended jurisdiction over them and that it also has the power to
to the Secretary of the DENR. determine the of nationality of petitioners as a
prerequisite of the Constitution prior the conferring of
With respect to the applications of respondents rights to "co-production, joint venture or production-
McArthur, Tesoro and Narra for Financial or Technical sharing agreements" of the state to mining rights.
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) or conversion of their However, it also stated that the POA’s jurisdiction is
MPSA applications to FTAA, the matter for its limited only to the resolution of the dispute and not on
rejection or approval is left for determination by the the approval or rejection of the MPSAs. It stipulated
Secretary of the DENR and the President of the that only the Secretary of the DENR is vested with the
Republic of the Philippines. power to approve or reject applications for MPSA.
paragraph 7 of Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion April 6, 2011, wherein it canceled and revoked
No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the 1967 SEC petitioners’ FTAAs for violating and circumventing the
Rules which implemented the requirement of the "Constitution x x x[,] the Small Scale Mining Law and
Constitution and other laws pertaining to the Environmental Compliance Certificate as well as
exploitation of natural resources, the CA used the Sections 3 and 8 of the Foreign Investment Act and
"grandfather rule" to determine the nationality of E.O. 584." The OP, in affirming the cancellation of
27
petitioners. It provided: the issued FTAAs, agreed with Redmont stating that
petitioners committed violations against the
abovementioned laws and failed to submit evidence to
Shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at
negate them. The Decision further quoted the
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino
December 14, 2007 Order of the POA focusing on the
citizens shall be considered as of Philippine
alleged misrepresentation and claims made by
nationality, but if the percentage of Filipino ownership
petitioners of being domestic or Filipino corporations
in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%,
and the admitted continued mining operation of
only the number of shares corresponding to such
PMDC using their locally secured Small Scale Mining
percentage shall be counted as of Philippine
Permit inside the area earlier applied for an MPSA
nationality. Thus, if 100,000 shares are registered in
application which was eventually transferred to Narra.
the name of a corporation or partnership at least 60%
It also agreed with the POA’s estimation that the filing
of the capital stock or capital, respectively, of which
of the FTAA applications by petitioners is a clear
belong to Filipino citizens, all of the shares shall be
admission that they are "not capable of conducting a
recorded as owned by Filipinos. But if less than 60%,
large scale mining operation and that they need the
or say, 50% of the capital stock or capital of the
financial and technical assistance of a foreign entity in
corporation or partnership, respectively, belongs to
their operation, that is why they sought the VI.
participation of MBMI Resources, Inc." The Decision
28
amended, and the FIA Rules. capable of repetition yet evading review, since the
Canadian company, MBMI, can keep on utilizing
V. dummy Filipino corporations through various schemes
of corporate layering and conversion of applications to
The Court of Appeals erred when it applied skirt the constitutional prohibition against foreign
the exceptions to the res inter alios acta rule. mining in Philippine soil.
Conversion of MPSA applications to FTAA conducting operation only through their local
applications counterparts. 36
We shall discuss the first error in conjunction with the On October 1, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision
sixth error presented by petitioners since both involve which partially granted the petition, reversing and
the conversion of MPSA applications to FTAA setting aside the September 10, 2008 and July 1,
applications. Petitioners propound that the CA erred in 2009 Orders of the MAB. In the said Decision, the CA
ruling against them since the questioned MPSA upheld the findings of the POA of the DENR that the
applications were already converted into FTAA herein petitioners are in fact foreign corporations thus
applications; thus, the issue on the prohibition relating a recommendation of the rejection of their MPSA
to MPSA applications of foreign mining corporations is applications were recommended to the Secretary of
academic. Also, petitioners would want us to correct the DENR. With respect to the FTAA applications or
the CA’s finding which deemed the aforementioned conversion of the MPSA applications to FTAAs, the
conversions of applications as suspicious in nature, CA deferred the matter for the determination of the
since it is based on mere conjectures and surmises Secretary of the DENR and the President of the
and not supported with evidence. Republic of the Philippines. 37
challenging their citizenship and to have the case affirmed the ruling that petitioners are, in fact, foreign
dismissed against them for being "moot"? It is quite corporations. On April 5, 2011, petitioners elevated
obvious that it is petitioners’ strategy to have the case the case to us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari
dismissed against them for being "moot." under Rule 45, questioning the Decision of the CA.
Interestingly, the OP rendered a Decision dated April
Consider the history of this case and how petitioners 6, 2011, a day after this petition for review was filed,
responded to every action done by the court or cancelling and revoking the FTAAs, quoting the Order
appropriate government agency: on January 2, 2007, of the POA and stating that petitioners are foreign
Redmont filed three separate petitions for denial of corporations since they needed the financial strength
the MPSA applications of petitioners before the POA. of MBMI, Inc. in order to conduct large scale mining
On June 15, 2007, petitioners filed a conversion of operations. The OP Decision also based the
their MPSA applications to FTAAs. The POA, in its cancellation on the misrepresentation of facts and the
December 14, 2007 Resolution, observed this suspect violation of the "Small Scale Mining Law and
change of applications while the case was pending Environmental Compliance Certificate as well as
before it and held: Sections 3 and 8 of the Foreign Investment Act and
E.O. 584." On July 6, 2011, the OP issued a
39
same and not the Filipino stockholders who only have asserted that the present petition is moot since, in a
a less substantial financial stake in the corporation. remarkable turn of events, MBMI was able to
sell/assign all its shares/interest in the "holding
companies" to DMCI Mining Corporation (DMCI), a
xxxx
Filipino corporation and, in effect, making their
respective corporations fully-Filipino owned.
x x x The filing of the FTAA application on June 15,
2007, during the pendency of the case only
Again, it is quite evident that petitioners have been
demonstrate the violations and lack of qualification of
trying to have this case dismissed for being "moot."
the respondent corporations to engage in mining. The
Their final act, wherein MBMI was able to allegedly
filing of the FTAA application conversion which is
sell/assign all its shares and interest in the petitioner
allowed foreign corporation of the earlier MPSA is an
"holding companies" to DMCI, only proves that they
admission that indeed the respondent is not Filipino
were in fact not Filipino corporations from the start.
but rather of foreign nationality who is disqualified
The recent divesting of interest by MBMI will not
under the laws. Corporate documents of MBMI
change the stand of this Court with respect to the
Resources, Inc. furnished its stockholders in their
nationality of petitioners prior the suspicious change in
head office in Canada suggest that they are
their corporate structures. The new documents filed
by petitioners are factual evidence that this Court has test" under RA 7042, as amended by RA 8179,
no power to verify. otherwise known as the Foreign Investments Act
(FIA), rather than using the stricter grandfather rule.
The only thing clear and proved in this Court is the The pertinent provision under Sec. 3 of the FIA
fact that the OP declared that petitioner corporations provides:
have violated several mining laws and made
misrepresentations and falsehood in their applications SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:
for FTAA which lead to the revocation of the said
FTAAs, demonstrating that petitioners are not beyond a.) The term Philippine national shall mean a citizen of
going against or around the law using shifty actions the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or
and strategies. Thus, in this instance, we can say that association wholly owned by the citizens of the
their claim of mootness is moot in itself because their Philippines; a corporation organized under the laws of
defense of conversion of MPSAs to FTAAs has been the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of
discredited by the OP Decision. the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is
wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for
Grandfather test pension or other employee retirement or separation
benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and
The main issue in this case is centered on the issue of at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to
petitioners’ nationality, whether Filipino or foreign. In the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That
their previous petitions, they had been adamant in were a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders
insisting that they were Filipino corporations, until they own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission
submitted their Manifestation and Submission dated (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty percent
October 19, 2012 where they stated the alleged (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to
change of corporate ownership to reflect their Filipino vote of each of both corporations must be owned and
ownership. Thus, there is a need to determine the held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty
nationality of petitioner corporations. percent (60%) of the members of the Board of
Directors, in order that the corporation shall be
Basically, there are two acknowledged tests in considered a Philippine national. (emphasis supplied)
determining the nationality of a corporation: the
control test and the grandfather rule. Paragraph 7 of The grandfather rule, petitioners reasoned, has no leg
DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the to stand on in the instant case since the definition of a
1967 SEC Rules which implemented the requirement "Philippine National" under Sec. 3 of the FIA does not
of the Constitution and other laws pertaining to the provide for it. They further claim that the grandfather
controlling interests in enterprises engaged in the rule "has been abandoned and is no longer the
exploitation of natural resources owned by Filipino applicable rule." They also opined that the last
41
The President may enter into agreements with MR. NOLLEDO: In teaching law, we are always faced
Foreign-owned corporations involving either technical with the question: ‘Where do we base the equity
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, requirement, is it on the authorized capital stock, on
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, the subscribed capital stock, or on the paid-up capital
and other mineral oils according to the general terms stock of a corporation’? Will the Committee please
and conditions provided by law, based on real enlighten me on this?
contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State MR. VILLEGAS: We have just had a long discussion
shall promote the development and use of local with the members of the team from the UP Law
scientific and technical resources. (emphasis Center who provided us with a draft. The phrase that
supplied) is contained here which we adopted from the UP draft
is ‘60 percent of the voting stock.’
The emphasized portion of Sec. 2 which focuses on
the State entering into different types of agreements MR. NOLLEDO: That must be based on the
for the exploration, development, and utilization of subscribed capital stock, because unless declared
natural resources with entities who are deemed delinquent, unpaid capital stock shall be entitled to
Filipino due to 60 percent ownership of capital is vote.
pertinent to this case, since the issues are centered
on the utilization of our country’s natural resources or MR. VILLEGAS: That is right.
specifically, mining. Thus, there is a need to ascertain
the nationality of petitioners since, as the Constitution
MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you.
so provides, such agreements are only allowed
corporations or associations "at least 60 percent of
such capital is owned by such citizens." The With respect to an investment by one corporation in
deliberations in the Records of the 1986 Constitutional another corporation, say, a corporation with 60-40
Commission shed light on how a citizenship of a percent equity invests in another corporation which is
corporation will be determined: permitted by the Corporation Code, does the
Committee adopt the grandfather rule?
Mr. BENNAGEN: Did I hear right that the Chairman’s
interpretation of an independent national economy is MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, that is the understanding of the
freedom from undue foreign control? What is the Committee.
meaning of undue foreign control?
MR. NOLLEDO: Therefore, we need additional
MR. VILLEGAS: Undue foreign control is foreign Filipino capital?
control which sacrifices national sovereignty and the
welfare of the Filipino in the economic sphere. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes. (emphasis supplied)
42
MR. BENNAGEN: Why does it have to be qualified It is apparent that it is the intention of the framers of
still with the word "undue"? Why not simply freedom the Constitution to apply the grandfather rule in cases
from foreign control? I think that is the meaning of where corporate layering is present.
independence, because as phrased, it still allows for
foreign control. Elementary in statutory construction is when there is
conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the
MR. VILLEGAS: It will now depend on the Constitution will prevail. In this instance, specifically
interpretation because if, for example, we retain the pertaining to the provisions under Art. XII of the
60/40 possibility in the cultivation of natural resources, Constitution on National Economy and Patrimony,
40 percent involves some control; not total control, but Sec. 3 of the FIA will have no place of application. As
some control. decreed by the honorable framers of our Constitution,
the grandfather rule prevails and must be applied.
MR. BENNAGEN: In any case, I think in due time we
will propose some amendments. Likewise, paragraph 7, DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series
of 2005 provides:
MR. VILLEGAS: Yes. But we will be open to
improvement of the phraseology. The above-quoted SEC Rules provide for the manner
of calculating the Filipino interest in a corporation for
Mr. BENNAGEN: Yes. purposes, among others, of determining compliance
with nationality requirements (the ‘Investee
Corporation’). Such manner of computation is
Thank you, Mr. Vice-President.
necessary since the shares in the Investee
Corporation may be owned both by individual
xxxx stockholders (‘Investing Individuals’) and by
corporations and partnerships (‘Investing
MR. NOLLEDO: In Sections 3, 9 and 15, the Corporation’). The said rules thus provide for the
Committee stated local or Filipino equity and foreign determination of nationality depending on the
ownership of the Investee Corporation and, in certain to the instances where the stockholdings of non-
instances, the Investing Corporation. Filipino stockholders are more than 40% of the total
stockholdings in a corporation. The corporations
Under the above-quoted SEC Rules, there are two interested in circumventing our laws would clearly
cases in determining the nationality of the Investee strive to have "60% Filipino Ownership" at face value.
Corporation. The first case is the ‘liberal rule’, later It would be senseless for these applying corporations
coined by the SEC as the Control Test in its 30 May to state in their respective articles of incorporation that
1990 Opinion, and pertains to the portion in said they have less than 60% Filipino stockholders since
Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, the applications will be denied instantly. Thus, various
‘(s)hares belonging to corporations or partnerships at corporate schemes and layerings are utilized to
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino circumvent the application of the Constitution.
citizens shall be considered as of Philippine
nationality.’ Under the liberal Control Test, there is no Obviously, the instant case presents a situation which
need to further trace the ownership of the 60% (or exhibits a scheme employed by stockholders to
more) Filipino stockholdings of the Investing circumvent the law, creating a cloud of doubt in the
Corporation since a corporation which is at least 60% Court’s mind. To determine, therefore, the actual
Filipino-owned is considered as Filipino. participation, direct or indirect, of MBMI, the
grandfather rule must be used.
The second case is the Strict Rule or the Grandfather
Rule Proper and pertains to the portion in said McArthur Mining, Inc.
Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states,
"but if the percentage of Filipino ownership in the To establish the actual ownership, interest or
corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the participation of MBMI in each of petitioners’ corporate
number of shares corresponding to such percentage structure, they have to be "grandfathered."
shall be counted as of Philippine nationality." Under
the Strict Rule or Grandfather Rule Proper, the As previously discussed, McArthur acquired its MPSA
combined totals in the Investing Corporation and the application from MMC, which acquired its application
Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., from SMMI. McArthur has a capital stock of ten million
"grandfathered") to determine the total percentage of pesos (PhP 10,000,000) divided into 10,000 common
Filipino ownership. shares at one thousand pesos (PhP 1,000) per share,
subscribed to by the following: 44
After a scrutiny of the evidence extant on record, the Fernando Filipin 1 PhP PhP
Court finds that this case calls for the application of B. o 1,000 1,000.00
the grandfather rule since, as ruled by the POA and Esguerra .00
affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails and persists in the Manuel A. Filipin 1 PhP PhP
corporate ownership of petitioners. Also, as found by Agcaoili o 1,000 1,000.00
the CA, doubt is present in the 60-40 Filipino equity .00
ownership of petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro,
since their common investor, the 100% Canadian Michael T. Ameri 1 PhP PhP
corporation––MBMI, funded them. However, Mason can 1,000 1,000.00
petitioners also claim that there is "doubt" only when .00
the stockholdings of Filipinos are less than 60%. 43
supplied)
Michael T. American 1 PhP PhP
Mason 1,000 1,000.00 Concluding from the above-stated facts, it is quite
.00 safe to say that petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and
Kenneth Canadian 1 PhP PhP Narra are not Filipino since MBMI, a 100% Canadian
Cawkell 1,000 1,000.00 corporation, owns 60% or more of their equity
.00 interests. Such conclusion is derived from
grandfathering petitioners’ corporate owners, namely:
Total 10,000 PhP PhP MMI, SMMI and PLMDC. Going further and adding to
10,00 2,708,174 the picture, MBMI’s Summary of Significant
0,000 .60 Accounting Policies statement– –regarding the "joint
.00 (emphasis venture" agreements that it entered into with the
supplied) "Olympic" and "Alpha" groups––involves SMMI,
Tesoro, PLMDC and Narra. Noticeably, the ownership
of the "layered" corporations boils down to MBMI,
Yet again, the usual players in petitioners’ corporate
Olympic or corporations under the "Alpha" group
structures are present. Similarly, the amount of money
wherein MBMI has joint venture agreements with,
paid by the 2nd tier majority stock holder, in this case,
practically exercising majority control over the
Palawan Alpha South Resources and Development
corporations mentioned. In effect, whether looking at
Corp. (PASRDC), is zero.
the capital structure or the underlying relationships
between and among the corporations, petitioners are
Studying MBMI’s Summary of Significant Accounting NOT Filipino nationals and must be considered
Policies dated October 31, 2005 explains the reason foreign since 60% or more of their capital stocks or
behind the intricate corporate layering that MBMI equity interests are owned by MBMI.
immersed itself in:
Application of the res inter alios acta rule
JOINT VENTURES The Company’s ownership
interests in various mining ventures engaged in the
Petitioners question the CA’s use of the exception of
acquisition, exploration and development of mineral
the res inter alios acta or the "admission by co-partner
properties in the Philippines is described as follows:
or agent" rule and "admission by privies" under the
Rules of Court in the instant case, by pointing out that
(a) Olympic Group statements made by MBMI should not be admitted in
this case since it is not a party to the case and that it
The Philippine companies holding the Olympic is not a "partner" of petitioners.
Property, and the ownership and interests therein, are
as follows: Secs. 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court provide:
Olympic- Philippines (the "Olympic Group")
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent.- The act or
Sara Marie Mining Properties Ltd. ("Sara Marie") declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the
33.3% scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence
Tesoro Mining & Development, Inc. (Tesoro) 60.0% against such party after the partnership or agency is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration
Pursuant to the Olympic joint venture agreement the itself. The same rule applies to the act or declaration
Company holds directly and indirectly an effective of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly
equity interest in the Olympic Property of 60.0%. interested with the party.
Pursuant to a shareholders’ agreement, the Company
exercises joint control over the companies in the Sec. 31. Admission by privies.- Where one derives
Olympic Group. title to property from another, the act, declaration, or
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation
(b) Alpha Group to the property, is evidence against the former.
The Philippine companies holding the Alpha Property, Petitioners claim that before the above-mentioned
and the ownership interests therein, are as follows: Rule can be applied to a case, "the partnership
relation must be shown, and that proof of the fact
Alpha- Philippines (the "Alpha Group") must be made by evidence other than the admission
itself." Thus, petitioners assert that the CA erred in
49
Patricia Louise Mining Development Inc. ("Patricia") finding that a partnership relationship exists between
34.0% them and MBMI because, in fact, no such partnership
exists.
Narra Nickel Mining & Development Corporation
(Narra) 60.4% Partnerships vs. joint venture agreements
Under a joint venture agreement the Company holds Petitioners claim that the CA erred in applying Sec.
directly and indirectly an effective equity interest in the 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by entering
Alpha Property of 60.4%. Pursuant to a shareholders’ into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with
Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. They challenged the Panel of Arbitrators’ jurisdiction
conclusion of the CA which pertains to the close
characteristics of We affirm the ruling of the CA in declaring that the
POA has jurisdiction over the instant case. The POA
"partnerships" and "joint venture agreements." has jurisdiction to settle disputes over rights to mining
Further, they asserted that before this particular areas which definitely involve the petitions filed by
partnership can be formed, it should have been Redmont against petitioners Narra, McArthur and
formally reduced into writing since the capital involved Tesoro. Redmont, by filing its petition against
is more than three thousand pesos (PhP 3,000). petitioners, is asserting the right of Filipinos over
Being that there is no evidence of written agreement mining areas in the Philippines against alleged
to form a partnership between petitioners and MBMI, foreign-owned mining corporations. Such claim
no partnership was created. constitutes a "dispute" found in Sec. 77 of RA 7942:
[T]he relations of the parties to a joint venture and the We held in Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration
nature of their association are so similar and closely Corporation v. Macroasia Corp.: 53
of the POA to resolve any adverse claim, opposition, the case at bar, the dispute arose or originated from
or protest relative to mining rights under Sec. 77(a) of MPSA applications where petitioners are asserting
RA 7942 is confined only to adverse claims, conflicts their rights to mining areas subject of their respective
and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of MPSA applications. Since respondent filed 3 separate
mineral rights. petitions for the denial of said applications, then a
controversy has developed between the parties and it
POA’s jurisdiction is confined only to resolutions of is POA’s jurisdiction to resolve said disputes.
such adverse claims, conflicts and oppositions and it
has no authority to approve or reject said applications. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the RTC involves civil
Such power is vested in the DENR Secretary upon actions while what petitioners filed with the DENR
recommendation of the MGB Director. Clearly, POA’s Regional Office or any concerned DENRE or CENRO
jurisdiction over "disputes involving rights to mining are MPSA applications. Thus POA has jurisdiction.
areas" has nothing to do with the cancellation of
existing mineral agreements. (emphasis ours) Furthermore, the POA has jurisdiction over the MPSA
applications under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Accordingly, as we enunciated in Celestial, the POA Euro-med Laboratories v. Province of
unquestionably has jurisdiction to resolve disputes Batangas elucidates:
55
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, in his Dissent, Whatever may be the decision of the POA will
asserts that it is the regular courts, not the POA, that eventually reach the court system via a resort to the
has jurisdiction over the MPSA applications of CA and to this Court as a last recourse.
petitioners.
Selling of MBMI’s shares to DMCI
This postulation is incorrect.
As stated before, petitioners’ Manifestation and
It is basic that the jurisdiction of the court is Submission dated October 19, 2012 would want us to
determined by the statute in force at the time of the declare the instant petition moot and academic due to
commencement of the action. 54
the transfer and conveyance of all the shareholdings
and interests of MBMI to DMCI, a corporation duly
Sec. 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or "The Judiciary organized and existing under Philippine laws and is at
Reorganization least 60% Philippine-owned. Petitioners reasoned
56
The Case
The Facts
The project did not push through, and the land was
subsequently foreclosed by the bank.
CA.
The pertinent portions of the Joint Venture Agreement
Hence, this Petition. 6
read as follows:
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held This AGREEMENT, is made and entered into at
that petitioners and respondent had formed a Cebu City, Philippines, this 5th day of March,
partnership for the development of the subdivision. 1969, by and between MR. MANUEL R.
Thus, they must bear the loss suffered by the TORRES, . . . the FIRST PARTY, likewise,
partnership in the same proportion as their share in MRS. ANTONIA B. TORRES, and MISS
the profits stipulated in the contract. Disagreeing with EMETERIA BARING, . . . the SECOND PARTY:
the trial court's pronouncement that losses as well as
profits in a joint venture should be distributed WITNESSETH:
equally, the CA invoked Article 1797 of the Civil Code
7
That this AGREEMENT shall be binding and Courts are not authorized to extricate parties from the
obligatory to the parties who executed same necessary consequences of their acts, and the fact
freely and voluntarily for the uses and purposes that the contractual stipulations may turn out to be
therein stated.10
financially disadvantageous will not relieve parties
thereto of their obligations. They cannot now disavow
A reading of the terms embodied in the Agreement the relationship formed from such agreement due to
indubitably shows the existence of a partnership their supposed misunderstanding of its terms.
pursuant to Article 1767 of the Civil Code, which
provides: Alleged Nullity of the
there is no inventory of the property contributed, was respondent responsible therefor. In imputing the
17
because without its designation and description, they blame solely to him, petitioners failed to give any
cannot be subject to inscription in the Registry of reason why we should disregard the factual findings
Property, and their contribution cannot prejudice third of the appellate court relieving him of fault. Verily,
persons. This will result in fraud to those who contract factual issues cannot be resolved in a petition for
with the partnership in the belief [in] the efficacy of the review under Rule 45, as in this case. Petitioners
guaranty in which the immovables may consist. Thus, have not alleged, not to say shown, that their Petition
the contract is declared void by the law when no such constitutes one of the exceptions to this
inventory is made." The case at bar does not involve doctrine. Accordingly, we find no reversible error in
18
third parties who may be prejudiced. the CA's ruling that petitioners are not entitled to
damages.
Second, petitioners themselves invoke the allegedly
void contract as basis for their claim that respondent WHEREFORE, the Perition is hereby DENIED and
should pay them 60 percent of the value of the the challenged Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
property. They cannot in one breath deny the
13
petitioners.
contract and in another recognize it, depending on
what momentarily suits their purpose. Parties cannot SO ORDERED
adopt inconsistent positions in regard to a contract
and courts will not tolerate, much less approve, such Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,
practice. concur.
This argument is puerile. The Joint Venture 6 The case was deemed submitted for
Agreement clearly states that the consideration for the resolution on September 15, 1999, upon
sale was the expectation of profits from the receipt by the Court of the respective
subdivision project. Its first stipulation states that Memoranda of the respondent and the
petitioners did not actually receive payment for the petitioners.
parcel of land sold to respondent. Consideration,
more properly denominated as cause, can take 7 CA Decision, p. 32; rollo, p. 46.
different forms, such as the prestation or promise of a
thing or service by another. 15 8 Petition, p. 2; rollo, p. 10.
In this case, the cause of the contract of sale 9 Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp.
consisted not in the stated peso value of the land, but 82-83.
in the expectation of profits from the subdivision
project, for which the land was intended to be used. 10 CA Decision, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 19-20.
As explained by the trial court, "the land was in effect
given to the partnership as [petitioner's] participation 11 Jo Chung Cang v. Pacific Commercial Co.,
therein. . . . There was therefore a consideration for 45 Phil. 142, September 6, 1923.
the sale, the [petitioners] acting in the expectation
that, should the venture come into fruition, they 12 Art. 1771. A partnership may be constituted
[would] get sixty percent of the net profits." in any form, except where immovable property
or real rights are contributed thereto, in which
Liability of the Parties case a public instrument shall be necessary.
Claiming that rerpondent was solely responsible for 13 Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 6-7; rollo,
the failure of the subdivision project, petitioners pp. 82-83.
maintain that he should be made to pay damages
equivalent to 60 percent of the value of the property, 14 Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct
which was their share in the profits under the Joint result of a previous illegal contract, is also
Venture Agreement. void and inexistent.
15 Art. 1350. In onerous contracts the cause COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
is understood to be, for each contracting party, REVENUE, respondent.
the prestation or promise of a thing or service
by the other; in remuneratory ones, the Partnership; Joint Ventures; Under a contract of
service or benefit which is remunerated; and partnership, two or more persons bind themselves to
in contracts of pure beneficence, the mere contribute money, property, or industry to a common
liberality of the benefactor. fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among
themselves; While a corporation, like petitioner,
cannot generally enter into a contract of partnership
unless authorized by law or its charter, it has been
held that it may enter into a joint venture which is akin
to a particular partnership.—An examination of the
“Power of Attorney” reveals that a partnership or joint
venture was indeed intended by the parties. Under a
contract of partnership, two or more persons bind
themselves to contribute money, property, or industry
to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the
profits among themselves. While a corporation, like
petitioner, cannot generally enter into a contract of
partnership unless authorized by law or its charter, it
has been held that it may enter into a joint venture
which is akin to a particular partnership: The legal
concept of a joint venture is of common law origin. It
has no precise legal definition, but it has been
generally understood to mean an organization formed
for some temporary purpose. x x x It is in fact hardly
distinguishable from the partnership, since their
elements are similar—community of interest in the
business, sharing of profits and losses, and a mutual
right of control. x x x The main distinction cited by
most opinions in common law jurisdictions is that the
partnership contemplates a general business with
some degree of continuity, while the joint venture is
formed for the execution of a single transaction, and is
thus of a temporary nature. x x x This observation is
not entirely accurate in this jurisdiction, since under
the Civil Code, a partnership may be particular or
universal, and a particular partnership may have for
its object a specific undertaking. x x x It would seem
therefore that under Philippine law, a joint venture is a
form of partnership and should be governed by the
law of partnerships. The Supreme Court has however
recognized a distinction between these two business
forms, and has held that although a corporation
cannot enter into a partnership contract, it may
however engage in a joint venture with others. x x x
(Citations omitted)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
An examination of the "Power of Attorney" reveals that However, petitioner asserts that it could not have
a partnership or joint venture was indeed intended by entered into a partnership agreement with Baguio
the parties. Under a contract of partnership, two or Gold because it did not "bind" itself to contribute
more persons bind themselves to contribute money, money or property to the project; that under
property, or industry to a common fund, with the paragraph 5 of the agreement, it was only optional for
intention of dividing the profits among petitioner to transfer funds or property to the Sto. Niño
themselves.15 While a corporation, like petitioner, project "(w)henever the MANAGERS shall deem it
cannot generally enter into a contract of partnership necessary and convenient in connection with the
unless authorized by law or its charter, it has been MANAGEMENT of the STO. NIÑO MINE."18
held that it may enter into a joint venture which is akin
to a particular partnership: The wording of the parties’ agreement as to
petitioner’s contribution to the common fund does not
The legal concept of a joint venture is of detract from the fact that petitioner transferred its
common law origin. It has no precise legal funds and property to the project as specified in
definition, but it has been generally paragraph 5, thus rendering effective the other
understood to mean an organization formed stipulations of the contract, particularly paragraph 5(c)
for some temporary purpose. x x x It is in fact which prohibits petitioner from withdrawing the
hardly distinguishable from the partnership, advances until termination of the parties’ business
since their elements are similar – community relations. As can be seen, petitioner became bound
of interest in the business, sharing of profits by its contributions once the transfers were made.
and losses, and a mutual right of control. x x x The contributions acquired an obligatory nature as
The main distinction cited by most opinions in soon as petitioner had chosen to exercise its option
common law jurisdictions is that the under paragraph 5.
partnership contemplates a general business
with some degree of continuity, while the joint There is no merit to petitioner’s claim that the
venture is formed for the execution of a single prohibition in paragraph 5(c) against withdrawal of
transaction, and is thus of a temporary nature. advances should not be taken as an indication that it
x x x This observation is not entirely accurate had entered into a partnership with Baguio Gold; that
in this jurisdiction, since under the Civil Code, the stipulation only showed that what the parties
a partnership may be particular or universal, entered into was actually a contract of agency
and a particular partnership may have for its coupled with an interest which is not revocable at will
object a specific undertaking. x x x It would and not a partnership.
seem therefore that under Philippine law, a
joint venture is a form of partnership and In an agency coupled with interest, it is
should be governed by the law of the agency that cannot be revoked or withdrawn by
partnerships. The Supreme Court has the principal due to an interest of a third party that
however recognized a distinction between depends upon it, or the mutual interest of both
these two business forms, and has held that principal and agent.19 In this case, the non-revocation
although a corporation cannot enter into a or non-withdrawal under paragraph 5(c) applies to
partnership contract, it may however engage the advances made by petitioner who is supposedly
in a joint venture with others. x x x (Citations the agent and not the principal under the contract.
omitted) 16 Thus, it cannot be inferred from the stipulation that the
parties’ relation under the agreement is one of agency
Perusal of the agreement denominated as the "Power coupled with an interest and not a partnership.
of Attorney" indicates that the parties had intended to
create a partnership and establish a common fund for Neither can paragraph 16 of the agreement be taken
the purpose. They also had a joint interest in the as an indication that the relationship of the parties
profits of the business as shown by a 50-50 sharing in was one of agency and not a partnership. Although
the income of the mine. the said provision states that "this Agency shall be
irrevocable while any obligation of the PRINCIPAL in
Under the "Power of Attorney", petitioner and Baguio favor of the MANAGERS is outstanding, inclusive of
Gold undertook to contribute money, property and the MANAGERS’ account," it does not necessarily
industry to the common fund known as the Sto. Niño follow that the parties entered into an agency contract
mine.17 In this regard, we note that there is a coupled with an interest that cannot be withdrawn by
substantive equivalence in the respective Baguio Gold.
contributions of the parties to the development and
operation of the mine. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 It should be stressed that the main object of the
of the agreement, petitioner and Baguio Gold were to "Power of Attorney" was not to confer a power in favor
contribute equally to the joint venture assets under of petitioner to contract with third persons on behalf of
their respective accounts. Baguio Gold would Baguio Gold but to create a business relationship
contribute P11M under its owner’s account plus any of between petitioner and Baguio Gold, in which the
its income that is left in the project, in addition to former was to manage and operate the latter’s mine
its actual mining claim. Meanwhile, petitioner’s through the parties’ mutual contribution of material
contribution would consist of its expertise in the resources and industry. The essence of an agency,
management and operation of mines, as well as the even one that is coupled with interest, is the agent’s
manager’s account which is comprised of P11M in ability to represent his principal and bring about
business relations between the latter and third inevitable conclusion that the advances were not
persons.20 Where representation for and in behalf of loans but capital contributions to a partnership.
the principal is merely incidental or necessary for the
proper discharge of one’s paramount undertaking The strongest indication that petitioner was a partner
under a contract, the latter may not necessarily be a in the Sto Niño mine is the fact that it would receive
contract of agency, but some other agreement 50% of the net profits as "compensation" under
depending on the ultimate undertaking of the parties. 21 paragraph 12 of the agreement. The entirety of the
parties’ contractual stipulations simply leads to no
In this case, the totality of the circumstances and the other conclusion than that petitioner’s "compensation"
stipulations in the parties’ agreement indubitably lead is actually its share in the income of the joint venture.
to the conclusion that a partnership was formed
between petitioner and Baguio Gold. Article 1769 (4) of the Civil Code explicitly provides
that the "receipt by a person of a share in the profits
First, it does not appear that Baguio Gold was of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a
unconditionally obligated to return the advances made partner in the business." Petitioner asserts, however,
by petitioner under the agreement. Paragraph 5 (d) that no such inference can be drawn against it since
thereof provides that upon termination of the parties’ its share in the profits of the Sto Niño project was in
business relations, "the ratio which the MANAGER’S the nature of compensation or "wages of an
account has to the owner’s account will be employee", under the exception provided in Article
determined, and the corresponding proportion of the 1769 (4) (b).24
entire assets of the STO. NINO MINE, excluding the
claims" shall be transferred to petitioner.22 As pointed On this score, the tax court correctly noted that
out by the Court of Tax Appeals, petitioner was merely petitioner was not an employee of Baguio Gold who
entitled to a proportionate return of the mine’s assets will be paid "wages" pursuant to an employer-
upon dissolution of the parties’ business relations. employee relationship. To begin with, petitioner was
There was nothing in the agreement that would the manager of the project and had put substantial
require Baguio Gold to make payments of the sums into the venture in order to ensure its viability
advances to petitioner as would be recognized as an and profitability. By pegging its compensation to
item of obligation or "accounts payable" for Baguio profits, petitioner also stood not to be remunerated in
Gold. case the mine had no income. It is hard to believe that
petitioner would take the risk of not being paid at all
Thus, the tax court correctly concluded that the for its services, if it were truly just an ordinary
agreement provided for a distribution of assets of the employee.
Sto. Niño mine upon termination, a provision that is
more consistent with a partnership than a creditor- Consequently, we find that petitioner’s
debtor relationship. It should be pointed out that in a "compensation" under paragraph 12 of the agreement
contract of loan, a person who receives a loan or actually constitutes its share in the net profits of the
money or any fungible thing acquires ownership partnership. Indeed, petitioner would not be entitled to
thereof and is bound to pay the creditor an equal an equal share in the income of the mine if it were just
amount of the same kind and quality.23 In this case, an employee of Baguio Gold.25 It is not surprising that
however, there was no stipulation for Baguio Gold to petitioner was to receive a 50% share in the net
actually repay petitioner the cash and property that it profits, considering that the "Power of Attorney" also
had advanced, but only the return of an amount provided for an almost equal contribution of the
pegged at a ratio which the manager’s account had to parties to the St. Nino mine. The "compensation"
the owner’s account. agreed upon only serves to reinforce the notion that
the parties’ relations were indeed of partners and not
In this connection, we find no contractual basis for the employer-employee.
execution of the two compromise agreements in
which Baguio Gold recognized a debt in favor of All told, the lower courts did not err in treating
petitioner, which supposedly arose from the petitioner’s advances as investments in a partnership
termination of their business relations over the Sto. known as the Sto. Nino mine. The advances were not
Nino mine. The "Power of Attorney" clearly provides "debts" of Baguio Gold to petitioner inasmuch as the
that petitioner would only be entitled to the return of a latter was under no unconditional obligation to return
proportionate share of the mine assets to be the same to the former under the "Power of Attorney".
computed at a ratio that the manager’s account had to As for the amounts that petitioner paid as guarantor to
the owner’s account. Except to provide a basis for Baguio Gold’s creditors, we find no reason to depart
claiming the advances as a bad debt deduction, there from the tax court’s factual finding that Baguio Gold’s
is no reason for Baguio Gold to hold itself liable to debts were not yet due and demandable at the time
petitioner under the compromise agreements, for any that petitioner paid the same. Verily, petitioner pre-
amount over and above the proportion agreed upon in paid Baguio Gold’s outstanding loans to its bank
the "Power of Attorney". creditors and this conclusion is supported by the
evidence on record.26
Next, the tax court correctly observed that it was
unlikely for a business corporation to lend hundreds of In sum, petitioner cannot claim the advances as a bad
millions of pesos to another corporation with neither debt deduction from its gross income. Deductions for
security, or collateral, nor a specific deed evidencing income tax purposes partake of the nature of tax
the terms and conditions of such loans. The parties exemptions and are strictly construed against the
also did not provide a specific maturity date for the taxpayer, who must prove by convincing evidence that
advances to become due and demandable, and the he is entitled to the deduction claimed.27 In this case,
manner of payment was unclear. All these point to the petitioner failed to substantiate its assertion that the
advances were subsisting debts of Baguio Gold that G.R. No. 164205 September 3, 2009
could be deducted from its gross income.
Consequently, it could not claim the advances as a OLDARICO S. TRAVEÑO, ROVEL A. GENELSA,
valid bad debt deduction. RUEL U. VILLARMENTE, ALFREDO A.
PANILAGAO, CARMEN P. DANILA, ELIZABETH B.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision MACALINO, RAMIL P. ALBITO, REYNALDO A.
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49385 LADRILLO, LUCAS G. TAMAYO, DIOSDADO A.
dated June 30, 2000, which affirmed the decision of AMORIN, RODINO C. VASQUEZ, GLORIA A.
the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 5200 FELICANO, NOLE E. FERMILAN, JOSELITO B.
is AFFIRMED. Petitioner Philex Mining Corporation RENDON, CRISTETA D. CAÑA, EVELYN D.
is ORDERED to PAY the deficiency tax on its 1982 ARCENAL and JEORGE M. NONO, Petitioners,
income in the amount of P62,811,161.31, with 20% vs.
delinquency interest computed from February 10, BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS MULTI-
1995, which is the due date given for the payment of PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, TIMOG
the deficiency income tax, up to the actual date of AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION, DIAMOND
payment. FARMS, INC., and DOLE ASIA
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Guidelines
respecting non-compliance with the requirements on,
or submission of defective, verification and
Footnotes certification against forum shopping.—Respecting the
appellate court’s dismissal of petitioners’ appeal due
to the failure of some of them to sign the therein
15
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1767.
accompanying verification and certification against
forum-shopping, the Court’s guidelines for the bench
19
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1927. An agency cannot and bar in Altres v. Empleo (573 SCRA 583 [2008]),
be revoked if a bilateral contract depends which were culled “from jurisprudential
upon it, or if it is the means of fulfilling an pronouncements,” are instructive: For the guidance of
obligation already contracted, or if a partner is the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form
appointed manager of a partnership in the the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected
contract of partnership and his removal from above respecting non-compliance with the
the management is unjustifiable. requirements on, or submission of defective,
verification and certification against forum shopping:
Partnership, Agency and Trusts, 1996 Ed.,
20
1) A distinction must be made between non-
De Leon and De Leon, Jr., p. 330. compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective verification, and non-compliance with the
23
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1953. requirement on or submission of defective certification
against forum shopping. 2) As to verification, non-
24
Article 1769 (4) (b) of the Civil Code states: compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The
Art. 1769. In determining whether a court may order its submission or correction or act on
partnership exists, these rules shall the pleading if the attending circumstances are such
apply: that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served
xxxx thereby. 3) Verification is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
(4) The receipt by a person of a share petition signs the verification, and when matters
of the profits of a business is prima alleged in the petition have been made in good faith
facie evidence that he is a partner in or are true and correct. 4) As to certification against
the business, but no such inference forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect
shall be drawn if such profits were therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable
received in payment: by its subsequent submission or correction thereof,
unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground
xxxx of “substantial compliance” or presence of “special
circumstances or compelling reasons.” 5) The
(b) As wages of an employee or rent certification against forum shopping must be signed
to a landlord; by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise,
those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to
xxxx the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6)
Finally, the certification against forum shopping must
be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel.
If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a
Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of Same; Social Justice; The social justice policy of labor
record to sign on his behalf. laws and the Constitution is not meant to be
oppressive of capital.—While the Court commiserates
Labor Law; Cooperatives; Job Contracting; Words with petitioners on their loss of employment,
and Phrases; Job contracting or subcontracting refers especially now that the Cooperative is no longer a
to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to farm going concern, it cannot simply, by default, hold the
out with a contractor or subcontractor the Cooperative’s co-respondents liable for their claims
performance of a specific job, work or service within a without any factual and legal justification therefor. The
definite or predetermined period, regardless of social justice policy of labor laws and the Constitution
whether such job, work or service is to be performed is not meant to be oppressive of capital. Traveño vs.
or completed within or outside the premises of the Bobongan Banana Growers Multi-Purpose
principal.—The matter of whether the Cooperative is Cooperative, 598 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 164205
an independent contractor or a labor-only contractor September 3, 2009
may not be used to predicate a ruling in this case. Job
contracting or subcontracting refers to an
arrangement whereby a principal agrees to farm out
with a contractor or subcontractor the performance of
a specific job, work or service within a definite or
predetermined period, regardless of whether such job,
work or service is to be performed or completed within
or outside the premises of the principal. The present
case does not involve such an arrangement.
Respecting the appellate court’s dismissal of The foregoing restated pronouncements were lost in
petitioners’ appeal due to the failure of some of them the challenged Resolutions of the appellate court.
to sign the therein accompanying verification and Petitioners’ contention that the appellate court should
certification against forum-shopping, the Court’s have dismissed the petition only as to the non-signing
guidelines for the bench and bar in Altres v. petitioners or merely dropped them as parties to the
Empleo,20 which were culled "from jurisprudential case is thus in order.
pronouncements," are instructive:
Instead of remanding the case to the appellate court,
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the however, the Court deems it more practical to decide
Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential the substantive issue raised in this petition so as not
pronouncements already reflected above respecting to further delay the disposition of this case.21 And it
non-compliance with the requirements on, or thus resolves to deviate as well from the general rule
submission of defective, verification and certification that factual questions are not entertained in petitions
against forum shopping: for review on certiorari of the appellate court’s
decisions in order to write finis to this protracted
1) A distinction must be made between non- litigation.
compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and non- The sole issue is whether DFI (with which TACOR
compliance with the requirement on or had been merged) and DPI should be held solidarily
submission of defective certification against liable with the Cooperative for petitioners’ illegal
forum shopping. dismissal and money claims.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith The Labor Code and its Implementing Rules empower
or a defect therein does not necessarily the Labor Arbiter to be the trier of facts in labor
render the pleading fatally defective. The court cases.22Much reliance is thus placed on the Arbiter’s
may order its submission or correction or act findings of fact, having had the opportunity to discuss
on the pleading if the attending circumstances with the parties and their witnesses the factual
are such that strict compliance with the Rule matters of the case during the conciliation
may be dispensed with in order that the ends phase.23 Just the same, a review of the records of the
of justice may be served thereby. present case does not warrant a conclusion different
from the Arbiter’s, as affirmed by the NLRC, that the
3) Verification is deemed substantially Cooperative is the employer of petitioners.
complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the To be sure, the matter of whether the Cooperative is
allegations in the complaint or petition signs an independent contractor or a labor-only contractor
the verification, and when matters alleged in may not be used to predicate a ruling in this case. Job
the petition have been made in good faith or contracting or subcontracting refers to an
are true and correct. arrangement whereby a principal agrees to farm out
with a contractor or subcontractor the performance of
4) As to certification against forum shopping, a specific job, work or service within a definite or
non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, predetermined period, regardless of whether such job,
unlike in verification, is generally not curable work or service is to be performed or completed within
by its subsequent submission or correction or outside the premises of the principal.24 The present
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the case does not involve such an arrangement.
Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special DFI did not farm out to the Cooperative the
circumstances or compelling reasons." performance of a specific job, work, or service.
Instead, it entered into a Banana Production and
5) The certification against forum shopping Purchase Agreement25 (Contract) with the
must be signed by all the plaintiffs or Cooperative, under which the Cooperative would
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did handle and fund the production of bananas and
not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. operation of the plantation covering lands owned by
Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, its members in consideration of DFI’s commitment to
however, as when all the plaintiffs or provide financial and technical assistance as needed,
petitioners share a common interest and including the supply of information and equipment in
invoke a common cause of action or defense, growing, packing, and shipping bananas. The
the signature of only one of them in the Cooperative would hire its own workers and pay their
wages and benefits, and sell exclusively to DFI all
export quality bananas produced that meet the There being no employer-employee relationship
specifications agreed upon. between petitioners and the Cooperative’s co-
respondents, the latter are not solidarily liable with the
To the Court, the Contract between the Cooperative Cooperative for petitioners’ illegal dismissal and
and DFI, far from being a job contracting money claims.
arrangement, is in essence a business partnership
that partakes of the nature of a joint venture.26 The While the Court commiserates with petitioners on their
rules on job contracting are, therefore, inapposite. The loss of employment, especially now that the
Court may not alter the intention of the contracting Cooperative is no longer a going concern, it cannot
parties as gleaned from their stipulations without simply, by default, hold the Cooperative’s co-
violating the autonomy of contracts principle under respondents liable for their claims without any factual
Article 1306 of the Civil Code which gives the and legal justification therefor. The social justice policy
contracting parties the utmost liberality and freedom of labor laws and the Constitution is not meant to be
to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and oppressive of capital.
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good custom, En passant, petitioners are not precluded from
public order or public policy. pursuing any available remedies against the former
members of the defunct Cooperative as their
Petitioners’ claim of employment relationship with the individual circumstances may warrant.
Cooperative’s herein co-respondents must be
assessed on the basis of four standards, viz: (a) the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
manner of their selection and engagement; (b) the
mode of payment of their wages; (c) the presence or
absence of the power of dismissal; and (d) the
presence or absence of control over their conduct.
Most determinative among these factors is the so-
called "control test."27
SO ORDERED.
b.) Secure and pay for all the licenses, permits Primelink submitted to the Lazatins its Projection of
and clearances needed for the projects; the Sales-Income-Cost of the project:
8. To pay the costs of this suit. Defendants thereafter interposed an appeal to the CA
assailing the Order declaring them in default, as well
Other reliefs and remedies as are just and equitable as the Order denying their motion to set aside the
are likewise being prayed for.16 order of default, alleging that these were contrary to
facts of the case, the law and jurisprudence.31 On
September 16, 1999, the appellate court issued a
Defendants opposed plaintiffs’ plea for a writ of
Resolution32 dismissing the appeal on the ground that
preliminary injunction on the ground that plaintiffs’
the Orders appealed from were interlocutory in
complaint was premature, due to their failure to refer
character and, therefore, not appealable. No motion
their complaint to a Voluntary Arbitrator pursuant to
for reconsideration of the Order of the dismissal was
the JVA in relation to Section 2 of Republic Act No.
filed by defendants.
876 before filing their complaint in the RTC. They
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint under
Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court: In the meantime, plaintiffs adduced ex parte their
testimonial and documentary evidence. On April 17,
2000, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that an Order
part of which reads:
be issued:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
a) dismissing the Complaint on the basis of
of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:
Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the aforecited Rules of
Court, or, in the alternative,
1. Ordering the rescission of the Joint Venture
Agreement as of the date of filing of this
b) requiring the plaintiffs to make initiatory
complaint;
step for arbitration by filing the demand to
arbitrate, and then asking the parties to
resolve their controversies, pursuant to the 2. Ordering the defendants to return
Arbitration Law, or in the alternative; possession, including all improvements
therein, of the real estate property belonging
to the plaintiffs which is described in, and
c) staying or suspending the proceedings in
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
captioned case until the completion of the
10848 of the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay
arbitration, and
City, and located in Barangay Anulin, City of
Tagaytay;
d) denying the plaintiffs’ prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or
3. Ordering the defendants to turn over all
writ of preliminary injunction.
documents, records or papers that have been
executed, prepared and retained in
Other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the connection with any contract to sell or deed of
premises are prayed for.17 sale of all lots/units sold during the effectivity
of the joint venture agreement;
In the meantime, before the expiration of the
reglementary period to answer the complaint, 4. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs
defendants, invoking their counsel’s heavy workload, the sum of P1,041,524.26 representing their
prayed for a 15-day extension18 within which to file share of the net income of the P2,603,810.64
their answer. The additional time prayed for was as of September 30, 1995, as stipulated in the
granted by the RTC.19 However, instead of filing their joint venture agreement;
answer, defendants prayed for a series of 15-day
extensions in eight (8) successive motions for
5. Ordering the defendants to pay the
extensions on the same justification.20 The RTC again
plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees in the amount
granted the additional time prayed for, but in granting
of P104,152.40;
the last extension, it warned against further
extension.21 Despite the admonition, defendants again
moved for another 15-day extension,22 which, this 6. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs.
time, the RTC denied. No answer having been filed,
plaintiffs moved to declare the defendants in SO ORDERED.33
The trial court anchored its decision on the following Defendants appealed the decision to the CA on the
findings: following assignment of errors:
The legal concept of a joint venture is of common law In reply, petitioners assert that it is unjust and
origin. It has no precise legal definition, but it has inequitable for respondents to retain the
been generally understood to mean an organization improvements even if their share in the P1,041,524.26
formed for some temporary purpose. (Gates v. of the net income of the property and the sale of the
Megargel, 266 Fed. 811 [1920]) It is, in fact, hardly land were to be deducted from the value of the
distinguishable from the partnership, since elements improvements, plus administrative and marketing
are similar – community of interest in the business, expenses in the total amount of P40,000,000.00.
sharing of profits and losses, and a mutual right of Petitioners will still be entitled to an accounting from
control. (Blackner v. McDermott, 176 F.2d 498 [1949]; respondents. Respondents cannot deny the existence
Carboneau v. Peterson, 95 P.2d 1043 [1939]; Buckley and nature of said improvements as they are visible to
v. Chadwick, 45 Cal.2d 183, 288 P.2d 12, 289 P.2d the naked eye.
242 [1955]) The main distinction cited by most
The threshold issues are the following: (1) whether the assets of the partnership for the purpose of
respondents are entitled to the possession of the terminating the business and discharging the
parcels of land covered by the JVA and the obligations of the partnership.
improvements thereon introduced by petitioners as
their contribution to the JVA; (2) whether petitioners The transfer of the possession of the parcels of land
are entitled to reimbursement for the value of the and the improvements thereon to respondents was
improvements on the parcels of land. only for a specific purpose: the winding up of
partnership affairs, and the partition and distribution of
The petition has no merit. the net partnership assets as provided by law.57 After
all, Article 1836 of the New Civil Code provides that
On the first issue, we agree with petitioners that unless otherwise agreed by the parties in their JVA,
respondents did not specifically pray in their complaint respondents have the right to wind up the partnership
below that possession of the improvements on the affairs:
parcels of land which they contributed to the JVA be
transferred to them. Respondents made a specific Art. 1836. Unless otherwise agreed, the partners who
prayer in their complaint that, upon the rescission of have not wrongfully dissolved the partnership or the
the JVA, they be placed in possession of the parcels legal representative of the last surviving partner, not
of land subject of the agreement, and for other "reliefs insolvent, has the right to wind up the partnership
and such other remedies as are just and equitable in affairs, provided, however, that any partner, his legal
the premises." However, the trial court was not representative or his assignee, upon cause shown,
precluded from awarding possession of the may obtain winding up by the court.
improvements on the parcels of land to respondents
in its decision. Section 2(c), Rule 7 of the Rules of It must be stressed, too, that although respondents
Court provides that a pleading shall specify the relief acquired possession of the lands and the
sought but it may add as general prayer for such improvements thereon, the said lands and
further or other relief as may be deemed just and improvements remained partnership property, subject
equitable. Even without the prayer for a specific to the rights and obligations of the parties, inter se, of
remedy, proper relief may be granted by the court if the creditors and of third parties under Articles 1837
the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence and 1838 of the New Civil Code, and subject to the
introduced so warrant.50 The court shall grant relief outcome of the settlement of the accounts between
warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no the parties as provided in Article 1839 of the New Civil
such relief is prayed for.51 The prayer in the complaint Code, absent any agreement of the parties in their
for other reliefs equitable and just in the premises JVA to the contrary.58 Until the partnership accounts
justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically are determined, it cannot be ascertained how much
prayed for.52 any of the parties is entitled to, if at all.
The trial court was not proscribed from placing It was thus premature for petitioner Primelink to be
respondents in possession of the parcels of land and demanding that it be indemnified for the value of the
the improvements on the said parcels of land. It bears improvements on the parcels of land owned by the
stressing that the parcels of land, as well as the joint venture/partnership. Notably, the JVA of the
improvements made thereon, were contributed by the parties does not contain any provision designating
parties to the joint venture under the JVA, hence, any party to wind up the affairs of the partnership.
formed part of the assets of the joint venture.53 The
trial court declared that respondents were entitled to Thus, under Article 1837 of the New Civil Code, the
the possession not only of the parcels of land but also rights of the parties when dissolution is caused in
of the improvements thereon as a consequence of its contravention of the partnership agreement are as
finding that petitioners breached their agreement and follows:
defrauded respondents of the net income under the
JVA.
(1) Each partner who has not caused
dissolution wrongfully shall have:
On the second issue, we agree with the CA ruling that
petitioner Primelink and respondents entered into a
(a) All the rights specified in the first
joint venture as evidenced by their JVA which, under
paragraph of this article, and
the Court’s ruling in Aurbach, is a form of partnership,
and as such is to be governed by the laws on
partnership. (b) The right, as against each partner
who has caused the dissolution
wrongfully, to damages for breach of
When the RTC rescinded the JVA on complaint of
the agreement.
respondents based on the evidence on record that
petitioners willfully and persistently committed a
breach of the JVA, the court thereby (2) The partners who have not caused the
dissolved/cancelled the partnership.54With the dissolution wrongfully, if they all desire to
rescission of the JVA on account of petitioners’ continue the business in the same name
fraudulent acts, all authority of any partner to act for either by themselves or jointly with others,
the partnership is terminated except so far as may be may do so, during the agreed term for the
necessary to wind up the partnership affairs or to partnership and for that purpose may possess
complete transactions begun but not yet finished.55 On the partnership property, provided they secure
dissolution, the partnership is not terminated but the payment by bond approved by the court,
continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is or pay to any partner who has caused the
completed.56 Winding up means the administration of dissolution wrongfully, the value of his interest
in the partnership at the dissolution, less any (b) The contributions of the partners
damages recoverable under the second necessary for the payment of all the
paragraph, No. 1(b) of this article, and in like liabilities specified in No. 2.
manner indemnify him against all present or
future partnership liabilities. (2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank
in order of payment, as follows:
(3) A partner who has caused the dissolution
wrongfully shall have: (a) Those owing to creditors other than
partners,
(a) If the business is not continued
under the provisions of the second (b) Those owing to partners other than
paragraph, No. 2, all the rights of a for capital and profits,
partner under the first paragraph,
subject to liability for damages in the (c) Those owing to partners in respect
second paragraph, No. 1(b), of this of capital,
article.
(d) Those owing to partners in respect
(b) If the business is continued under of profits.
the second paragraph, No. 2, of this
article, the right as against his co-
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order of
partners and all claiming through them
their declaration in No. 1 of this article to the
in respect of their interests in the
satisfaction of the liabilities.
partnership, to have the value of his
interest in the partnership, less any
damage caused to his co-partners by (4) The partners shall contribute, as provided
the dissolution, ascertained and paid by article 1797, the amount necessary to
to him in cash, or the payment satisfy the liabilities.
secured by a bond approved by the
court, and to be released from all (5) An assignee for the benefit of creditors or
existing liabilities of the partnership; any person appointed by the court shall have
but in ascertaining the value of the the right to enforce the contributions specified
partner’s interest the value of the in the preceding number.
good-will of the business shall not be
considered. (6) Any partner or his legal representative
shall have the right to enforce the
And under Article 1838 of the New Civil Code, the contributions specified in No. 4, to the extent
party entitled to rescind is, without prejudice to any of the amount which he has paid in excess of
other right, entitled: his share of the liability.
(1) To a lien on, or right of retention of, the (7) The individual property of a deceased
surplus of the partnership property after partner shall be liable for the contributions
satisfying the partnership liabilities to third specified in No. 4.
persons for any sum of money paid by him for
the purchase of an interest in the partnership (8) When partnership property and the
and for any capital or advances contributed by individual properties of the partners are in
him; possession of a court for distribution,
partnership creditors shall have priority on
(2) To stand, after all liabilities to third persons partnership property and separate creditors on
have been satisfied, in the place of the individual property, saving the rights of lien or
creditors of the partnership for any payments secured creditors.
made by him in respect of the partnership
liabilities; and (9) Where a partner has become insolvent or
his estate is insolvent, the claims against his
(3) To be indemnified by the person guilty of separate property shall rank in the following
the fraud or making the representation against order:
all debts and liabilities of the partnership.
(a) Those owing to separate creditors;
The accounts between the parties after dissolution
have to be settled as provided in Article 1839 of the (b) Those owing to partnership
New Civil Code: creditors;
Art. 1839. In settling accounts between the partners (c) Those owing to partners by way of
after dissolution, the following rules shall be observed, contribution.
subject to any agreement to the contrary:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
(1) The assets of the partnership are: DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69200 are
(a) The partnership property, AFFIRMED insofar as they conform to this Decision of
the Court.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
thereof shall be unenforceable by action, unless the cases C.A. G.R. Sp. No. 76987 and C.A. G.R. SP. No
same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in 78774 and its Resolution dated December 07,
writing and subscribed by the party charged.—It is at 2004, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
2
can be proved unless the requirement exacted by the eventually raffled to Branch 68 of the court, Aurelio
4
statute of frauds is complied with. alleged that, since June 1973, he and Eduardo are
into a joint venture/partnership arrangement in the
Same; Same; Same; Same; A complaint for delivery Odeon Theater business which had expanded thru
and accounting of partnership property based on such investment in Cineplex, Inc., LCM Theatrical
void or legally non-existent actionable document is Enterprises, Odeon Realty Corporation (operator of
dismissible for failure to state a cause of action.—Per Odeon I and II theatres), Avenue Realty, Inc., owner
the Court’s own count, petitioner used in his complaint of lands and buildings, among other corporations.
the mixed words “joint venture/partnership” nineteen Yang is described in the complaint as petitioner’s and
(19) times and the term “partner” four (4) times. He Eduardo’s partner in their Odeon Theater
made reference to the “law of joint venture/partnership investment. The same complaint also contained the
5
5.05 What is worse, [Aurelio] has reasonable cause to For his part, Yang - who was served with summons
believe that Eduardo and/or the corporate defendants long after the other defendants submitted their answer
as well as Bobby [Yang], are transferring . . . various – moved to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that, as
real properties of the corporations belonging to the to him, petitioner has no cause of action and the
joint venture/partnership to other parties in fraud of complaint does not state any. Petitioner opposed this
8
You have now your own life to live after having been In another Omnibus Order of April 2, 2003, the same
married. …. court denied the motion of Eduardo, et al., for
reconsideration and Yang’s motion to dismiss. The
12
I am trying my best to mold you the way I work so you following then transpired insofar as Yang is
can follow the pattern …. You will be the only one left concerned:
with the company, among us brothers and I will ask
you to stay as I want you to run this office every time I 1. On April 14, 2003, Yang filed his ANSWER, but
am away. I want you to run it the way I am trying to expressly reserved the right to seek reconsideration of
run it because I will be all alone and I will depend the April 2, 2003 Omnibus Order and to pursue his
entirely to you (sic). My sons will not be ready to help failed motion to dismiss to its full resolution.
13
the nature of petitioner’s contribution, if any, to the what has repeatedly been articulated, an inventory to
supposed partnership. be signed by the parties and attached to the public
instrument is also indispensable to the validity of the
The CA, addressing the foregoing query, correctly partnership whenever immovable property is
stated that petitioner’s contribution consisted of contributed to it.
immovables and real rights. Wrote that court:
Given the foregoing perspective, what the appellate
A further examination of the allegations in the court wrote in its assailed Decision about the
26
complaint would show that [petitioner’s] contribution to probative value and legal effect of Annex "A-
the so-called "partnership/joint venture" was his 1" commends itself for concurrence:
supposed share in the family business that is
consisting of movie theaters, shipping and land Considering that the allegations in the complaint
development under paragraph 3.02 of the complaint. showed that [petitioner] contributed immovable
In other words, his contribution as a partner in the properties to the alleged partnership, the
alleged partnership/joint venture consisted of "Memorandum" (Annex "A" of the complaint) which
immovable properties and real rights. …. 23
purports to establish the said "partnership/joint
venture" is NOT a public instrument and there was
Significantly enough, petitioner matter-of-factly NO inventory of the immovable property duly signed
concurred with the appellate court’s observation that, by the parties. As such, the said "Memorandum" … is
prescinding from what he himself alleged in his basic null and void for purposes of establishing the
complaint, his contribution to the partnership existence of a valid contract of partnership. Indeed,
consisted of his share in the Litonjua family because of the failure to comply with the essential
businesses which owned variable immovable formalities of a valid contract, the purported
properties. Petitioner’s assertion in his motion for "partnership/joint venture" is legally inexistent and it
reconsideration of the CA’s decision, that "what was
24 produces no effect whatsoever. Necessarily, a void or
to be contributed to the business [of the partnership] legally inexistent contract cannot be the source of any
was [petitioner’s] industry and his share in the family contractual or legal right. Accordingly, the allegations
[theatre and land development] business" leaves no in the complaint, including the actionable document
room for speculation as to what petitioner contributed attached thereto, clearly demonstrates that [petitioner]
to the perceived partnership. has NO valid contractual or legal right which could be
violated by the [individual respondents] herein. As a
Lest it be overlooked, the contract-validating inventory consequence, [petitioner’s] complaint does NOT state
requirement under Article 1773 of the Civil Code a valid cause of action because NOT all the essential
applies as long real property or real rights are initially elements of a cause of action are
brought into the partnership. In short, it is really of no present. (Underscoring and words in bracket added.)
moment which of the partners, or, in this case, who
between petitioner and his brother Eduardo, Likewise well-taken are the following complementary
contributed immovables. In context, the more excerpts from the CA’s equally assailed Resolution of
important consideration is that real property was December 7, 2004 denying petitioner’s motion for
27
43. Contrariwise, this actionable document, especially xxx You will be the only one left with the company,
its above-quoted provisions, established an actionable among us brothers and I will ask you to stay as I want
contract even though it may not be a partnership. This you to run this office everytime I am away. I want you
actionable contract is what is known as an innominate to run it the way I am trying to run it because I will be
contract (Civil Code, Article 1307). alone and I will depend entirely to you, My sons will
not be ready to help me yet until about maybe 15/20
44. It may not be a contract of loan, or a mortgage or years from now. Whatever is left in the corporation, I
whatever, but surely the contract does create rights will make sure that you get ONE MILLION PESOS
and obligations of the parties and which rights and (P1,000,000.00) or ten percent (10%) equity,
obligations may be enforceable and demandable. Just whichever is greater. (Underscoring added)
because the relationship created by the agreement
cannot be specifically labeled or pigeonholed into a It is at once apparent that what respondent Eduardo
category of nominate contract does not mean it is void imposed upon himself under the above passage, if he
or unenforceable. indeed wrote Annex "A-1", is a promise which is not to
be performed within one year from "contract"
Petitioner has thus thrusted the notion of an execution on June 22, 1973. Accordingly, the
innominate contract on this Court - and earlier on the agreement embodied in Annex "A-1" is covered by the
CA after he experienced a reversal of fortune thereat - Statute of Frauds and ergounenforceable for non-
as an afterthought. The appellate court, however, compliance therewith. By force of the statute of
30
cannot really be faulted for not yielding to petitioner’s frauds, an agreement that by its terms is not to be
dubious stratagem of altering his theory of joint performed within a year from the making thereof shall
venture/partnership to an innominate contract. For, at be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some
bottom, the appellate court’s certiorari jurisdiction was note or memorandum thereof, be in writing
circumscribed by what was alleged to have been the and subscribed by the party charged. Corollarily, no
order/s issued by the trial court in grave abuse of action can be proved unless the requirement exacted
discretion. As respondent Yang pointedly by the statute of frauds is complied with.31
well-defined, that of petitioner being that the Lest it be overlooked, petitioner is the intended
actionable document established a partnership/joint beneficiary of the P1 Million or 10% equity of the
venture, it is on those positions that the appellate family businesses supposedly promised by Eduardo
court exercised its certiorari jurisdiction. Petitioner’s to give in the near future. Any suggestion that the
act of changing his original theory is an impermissible stated amount or the equity component of the promise
practice and constitutes, as the CA aptly declared, an was intended to go to a common fund would be to
admission of the untenability of such theory in the first read something not written in Annex"A-1". Thus,
place. even this angle alone argues against the very idea of
a partnership, the creation of which requires two or
[Petitioner] is now humming a different tune . . . . In a more contracting minds mutually agreeing to
sudden twist of stance, he has now contended that contribute money, property or industry to a common
the actionable instrument may be considered fund with the intention of dividing the profits between
an innominate contract. xxx Verily, this now changes or among themselves. 32
contractual relation was created between [petitioner] rationale, an issue which was neither averred in the
and …Yang. More importantly, however, the foregoing complaint cannot be raised for the first time on
ruling of this Court that the purported partnership appeal. It is not difficult, therefore, to agree with the
40
between [Eduardo] is void and legally inexistent CA when it made short shrift of petitioner’s innominate
directly affects said claim against …Yang. Since contract theory on the basis of the foregoing basic
[petitioner] is trying to establish his claim against … reasons.
Yang by linking him to the legally inexistent
partnership . . . such attempt had become futile Petitioner’s protestation that his act of introducing the
because there was NOTHING that would contractually concept of innominate contract was not a case of
connect [petitioner] and … Yang. To establish a valid changing theories but of supporting his pleaded cause
cause of action, the complaint should have a of action – that of the existence of a partnership - by
statement of fact upon which to connect [respondent] another legal perspective/argument, strikes the Court
Yang to the alleged partnership between [petitioner] as a strained attempt to rationalize an untenable
and respondent [Eduardo], including their alleged position. Paragraph 12 of his motion for
reconsideration of the CA’s decision virtually relegates
partnership as a fall-back theory. Two paragraphs
later, in the same notion, petitioner faults the appellate
court for reading, with myopic eyes, the actionable
document solely as establishing a partnership/joint
venture. Verily, the cited paragraphs are a study of a
party hedging on whether or not to pursue the original
cause of action or altogether abandoning the same,
thus:
SYLLABUS
The two petitions were consolidated and tried jointly On the other hand, the petitioners in G.R. No. 75951
by a hearing officer who rendered a decision contend that:
upholding the election of the Lagdameo Group and
dismissing the quo warranto petition of Salazar and
I
Chamsay. The ASI Group and Salazar appealed the
decision to the SEC en banc which affirmed the
hearing officer's decision. THE AMENDED DECISION OF THE
RESPONDENT COURT, WHILE
RECOGNIZING THAT THE STOCKHOLDERS
The SEC decision led to the filing of two separate
OF SANIWARES ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO
appeals with the Intermediate Appellate Court by
BLOCKS, FAILS TO FULLY ENFORCE THE
Wolfgang Aurbach, John Griffin, David Whittingham
BASIC INTENT OF THE AGREEMENT AND
and Charles Chamsay (docketed as AC-G.R. SP No.
THE LAW.
05604) and by Luciano E. Salazar (docketed as AC-
G.R. SP No. 05617). The petitions were consolidated
and the appellate court in its decision ordered the II
remand of the case to the Securities and Exchange
Commission with the directive that a new THE AMENDED DECISION DOES NOT
stockholders' meeting of Saniwares be ordered CATEGORICALLY RULE THAT PRIVATE
convoked as soon as possible, under the supervision PETITIONERS HEREIN WERE THE DULY
of the Commission. ELECTED DIRECTORS DURING THE 8
MARCH 1983 ANNUAL STOCKHOLDERS
Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the MEETING OF SANTWARES. (P. 24, Rollo-
appellees Lagdameo Group) the appellate court 75951)
(Court of Appeals) rendered the questioned amended
decision. Petitioners Wolfgang Aurbach, John Griffin, The issues raised in the petitions are interrelated,
David P. Whittingham and Charles Chamsay in G.R. hence, they are discussed jointly.
No. 75875 assign the following errors:
The main issue hinges on who were the duly elected
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN EFFECT, directors of Saniwares for the year 1983 during its
UPHELD THE ALLEGED ELECTION OF annual stockholders' meeting held on March 8, 1983.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS MEMBERS OF To answer this question the following factors should
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF be determined: (1) the nature of the business
SANIWARES WHEN IN FACT THERE WAS established by the parties whether it was a joint
NO ELECTION AT ALL. venture or a corporation and (2) whether or not the
ASI Group may vote their additional 10% equity
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROHIBITS THE during elections of Saniwares' board of directors.
STOCKHOLDERS FROM EXERCISING THEIR
FULL VOTING RIGHTS REPRESENTED BY The rule is that whether the parties to a particular
THE NUMBER OF SHARES IN SANIWARES, contract have thereby established among themselves
THUS DEPRIVING PETITIONERS AND THE a joint venture or some other relation depends upon
CORPORATION THEY REPRESENT OF their actual intention which is determined in
THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE accordance with the rules governing the interpretation
PROCESS OF LAW. and construction of contracts. (Terminal Shares, Inc.
v. Chicago, B. and Q.R. Co. (DC MO) 65 F Supp 678;
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPOSES Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co. 20
CONDITIONS AND READS PROVISIONS Cal. 2nd 751, 128 P 2nd 668)
INTO THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
The ASI Group and petitioner Salazar (G.R. Nos. former (Art. 1370, New Civil Code). The various
75975-76) contend that the actual intention of the stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted
parties should be viewed strictly on the "Agreement" together attributing to the doubtful ones that
dated August 15,1962 wherein it is clearly stated that sense which may result from all of them taken
the parties' intention was to form a corporation and jointly (Art. 1374, New Civil Code). Moreover, in
not a joint venture. order to judge the intention of the contracting
parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent
They specifically mention number 16 acts shall be principally considered. (Art. 1371,
under Miscellaneous Provisions which states: New Civil Code). (Part I, Original Records, SEC
Case No. 2417)
xxx xxx xxx
It has been ruled:
c) nothing herein contained shall be construed
to constitute any of the parties hereto partners In an action at law, where there is evidence
or joint venturers in respect of any transaction tending to prove that the parties joined their
hereunder. (At P. 66, Rollo-GR No. 75875) efforts in furtherance of an enterprise for their
joint profit, the question whether they intended
They object to the admission of other evidence which by their agreement to create a joint adventure,
tends to show that the parties' agreement was to or to assume some other relation is a question
establish a joint venture presented by the Lagdameo of fact for the jury. (Binder v. Kessler v 200 App.
and Young Group on the ground that it contravenes Div. 40,192 N Y S 653; Pyroa v. Brownfield (Tex.
the parol evidence rule under section 7, Rule 130 of Civ. A.) 238 SW 725; Hoge v. George, 27 Wyo,
the Revised Rules of Court. According to them, the 423, 200 P 96 33 C.J. p. 871)
Lagdameo and Young Group never pleaded in their
pleading that the "Agreement" failed to express the In the instant cases, our examination of important
true intent of the parties. provisions of the Agreement as well as the testimonial
evidence presented by the Lagdameo and Young
The parol evidence Rule under Rule 130 provides: Group shows that the parties agreed to establish a
joint venture and not a corporation. The history of the
organization of Saniwares and the unusual
Evidence of written agreements-When the
arrangements which govern its policy making body
terms of an agreement have been reduced to
are all consistent with a joint venture and not with an
writing, it is to be considered as containing all
ordinary corporation. As stated by the SEC:
such terms, and therefore, there can be,
between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of the terms of the According to the unrebutted testimony of Mr.
agreement other than the contents of the Baldwin Young, he negotiated the Agreement
writing, except in the following cases: with ASI in behalf of the Philippine nationals. He
testified that ASI agreed to accept the role of
minority vis-a-vis the Philippine National group
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the
of investors, on the condition that the
writing, or its failure to express the true intent
Agreement should contain provisions to protect
and agreement of the parties or the validity of
ASI as the minority.
the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings.
An examination of the Agreement shows that
(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the
certain provisions were included to protect the
writing.
interests of ASI as the minority. For example,
the vote of 7 out of 9 directors is required in
Contrary to ASI Group's stand, the Lagdameo and certain enumerated corporate acts [Sec. 3 (b)
Young Group pleaded in their Reply and Answer to (ii) (a) of the Agreement]. ASI is contractually
Counterclaim in SEC Case No. 2417 that the entitled to designate a member of the Executive
Agreement failed to express the true intent of the Committee and the vote of this member is
parties, to wit: required for certain transactions [Sec. 3 (b) (i)].
Quite often, Filipino entrepreneurs in their desire to Secondly, even assuming that Saniwares is
develop the industrial and manufacturing capacities of technically not a close corporation because it
a local firm are constrained to seek the technology has more than 20 stockholders, the undeniable
and marketing assistance of huge multinational fact is that it is a close-held corporation. Surely,
corporations of the developed world. Arrangements appellants cannot honestly claim that
are formalized where a foreign group becomes a Saniwares is a public issue or a widely held
minority owner of a firm in exchange for its corporation.
manufacturing expertise, use of its brand names, and
other such assistance. However, there is always a In the United States, many courts have taken a
danger from such arrangements. The foreign group realistic approach to joint venture corporations
may, from the start, intend to establish its own sole or and have not rigidly applied principles of
monopolistic operations and merely uses the joint corporation law designed primarily for public
venture arrangement to gain a foothold or test the issue corporations. These courts have indicated
Philippine waters, so to speak. Or the covetousness that express arrangements between corporate
may come later. As the Philippine firm enlarges its joint ventures should be construed with less
operations and becomes profitable, the foreign group emphasis on the ordinary rules of law usually
undermines the local majority ownership and actively applied to corporate entities and with more
tries to completely or predominantly take over the consideration given to the nature of the
entire company. This undermining of joint ventures is agreement between the joint venturers (Please
not consistent with fair dealing to say the least. To the see Wabash Ry v. American Refrigerator Transit
extent that such subversive actions can be lawfully Co., 7 F 2d 335; Chicago, M & St. P. Ry v. Des
prevented, the courts should extend protection Moines Union Ry; 254 Ass'n. 247 US. 490';
especially in industries where constitutional and legal Seaboard Airline Ry v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry;
requirements reserve controlling ownership to Filipino 240 N.C. 495,.82 S.E. 2d 771; Deboy v. Harris,
citizens. 207 Md., 212,113 A 2d 903; Hathway v. Porter
Royalty Pool, Inc., 296 Mich. 90, 90, 295 N.W.
The Lagdameo Group stated in their appellees' brief 571; Beardsley v. Beardsley, 138 U.S. 262;
in the Court of Appeal "The Legal Status of Joint Venture
Corporations", 11 Vand Law Rev. p. 680,1958). Agreement's signatories to vote for directors,
These American cases dealt with legal such contractual provision, as correctly held by
questions as to the extent to which the the SEC, is valid and binding upon the
requirements arising from the corporate form of signatories thereto, which include appellants.
joint venture corporations should control, and (Rollo No. 75951, pp. 90-94)
the courts ruled that substantial justice lay with
those litigants who relied on the joint venture In regard to the question as to whether or not the ASI
agreement rather than the litigants who relied group may vote their additional equity during elections
on the orthodox principles of corporation law. of Saniwares' board of directors, the Court of Appeals
correctly stated:
As correctly held by the SEC Hearing Officer:
As in other joint venture companies, the extent
It is said that participants in a joint venture, in of ASI's participation in the management of the
organizing the joint venture deviate from the corporation is spelled out in the Agreement.
traditional pattern of corporation management. Section 5(a) hereof says that three of the nine
A noted authority has pointed out that just as in directors shall be designated by ASI and the
close corporations, shareholders' agreements in remaining six by the other stockholders, i.e., the
joint venture corporations often contain Filipino stockholders. This allocation of board
provisions which do one or more of the seats is obviously in consonance with the
following: (1) require greater than majority vote minority position of ASI.
for shareholder and director action; (2) give
certain shareholders or groups of shareholders Having entered into a well-defined contractual
power to select a specified number of directors; relationship, it is imperative that the parties
(3) give to the shareholders control over the should honor and adhere to their respective
selection and retention of employees; and (4) rights and obligations thereunder. Appellants
set up a procedure for the settlement of seem to contend that any allocation of board
disputes by arbitration (See I O' Neal, Close seats, even in joint venture corporations, are
Corporations, 1971 ed., Section 1.06a, pp. 15- null and void to the extent that such may
16) (Decision of SEC Hearing Officer, P. 16) interfere with the stockholder's rights to
cumulative voting as provided in Section 24 of
Thirdly paragraph 2 of Sec. 100 of the the Corporation Code. This Court should not be
Corporation Code does not necessarily imply prepared to hold that any agreement which
that agreements regarding the exercise of curtails in any way cumulative voting should be
voting rights are allowed only in close struck down, even if such agreement has been
corporations. As Campos and Lopez-Campos freely entered into by experienced businessmen
explain: and do not prejudice those who are not parties
thereto. It may well be that it would be more
Paragraph 2 refers to pooling and voting cogent to hold, as the Securities and Exchange
agreements in particular. Does this provision Commission has held in the decision appealed
necessarily imply that these agreements can be from, that cumulative voting rights may be
valid only in close corporations as defined by voluntarily waived by stockholders who enter
the Code? Suppose that a corporation has into special relationships with each other to
twenty five stockholders, and therefore cannot pursue and implement specific purposes, as in
qualify as a close corporation under section 96, joint venture relationships between foreign and
can some of them enter into an agreement to local stockholders, so long as such agreements
vote as a unit in the election of directors? It is do not adversely affect third parties.
submitted that there is no reason for denying
stockholders of corporations other than close In any event, it is believed that we are not here
ones the right to enter into not voting or pooling called upon to make a general rule on this
agreements to protect their interests, as long as question. Rather, all that needs to be done is to
they do not intend to commit any wrong, or give life and effect to the particular contractual
fraud on the other stockholders not parties to rights and obligations which the parties have
the agreement. Of course, voting or pooling assumed for themselves.
agreements are perhaps more useful and more
often resorted to in close corporations. But they On the one hand, the clearly established
may also be found necessary even in widely minority position of ASI and the contractual
held corporations. Moreover, since the Code allocation of board seats Cannot be
limits the legal meaning of close corporations to disregarded. On the other hand, the rights of
those which comply with the requisites laid the stockholders to cumulative voting should
down by section 96, it is entirely possible that a also be protected.
corporation which is in fact a close corporation
will not come within the definition. In such case, In our decision sought to be reconsidered, we
its stockholders should not be precluded from opted to uphold the second over the first. Upon
entering into contracts like voting agreements if further reflection, we feel that the proper and
these are otherwise valid. (Campos & Lopez- just solution to give due consideration to both
Campos, op cit, p. 405) factors suggests itself quite clearly. This Court
should recognize and uphold the division of the
In short, even assuming that sec. 5(a) of the stockholders into two groups, and at the same
Agreement relating to the designation or time uphold the right of the stockholders within
nomination of directors restricts the right of the each group to cumulative voting in the process
of determining who the group's nominees would most opinions in common law jurisdictions is
be. In practical terms, as suggested by that the partnership contemplates a general
appellant Luciano E. Salazar himself, this business with some degree of continuity, while
means that if the Filipino stockholders cannot the joint venture is formed for the execution of a
agree who their six nominees will be, a vote single transaction, and is thus of a temporary
would have to be taken among the Filipino nature. (Tufts v. Mann 116 Cal. App. 170, 2 P.
stockholders only. During this voting, each 2d. 500 [1931]; Harmon v. Martin, 395 111. 595,
Filipino stockholder can cumulate his votes. 71 NE 2d. 74 [1947]; Gates v. Megargel 266
ASI, however, should not be allowed to interfere Fed. 811 [1920]). This observation is not entirely
in the voting within the Filipino group. accurate in this jurisdiction, since under the Civil
Otherwise, ASI would be able to designate Code, a partnership may be particular or
more than the three directors it is allowed to universal, and a particular partnership may
designate under the Agreement, and may even have for its object a specific undertaking. (Art.
be able to get a majority of the board seats, a 1783, Civil Code). It would seem therefore that
result which is clearly contrary to the contractual under Philippine law, a joint venture is a form of
intent of the parties. partnership and should thus be governed by the
law of partnerships. The Supreme Court has
Such a ruling will give effect to both the however recognized a distinction between these
allocation of the board seats and the two business forms, and has held that although
stockholder's right to cumulative voting. a corporation cannot enter into a partnership
Moreover, this ruling will also give due contract, it may however engage in a joint
consideration to the issue raised by the venture with others. (At p. 12, Tuazon v.
appellees on possible violation or circumvention Bolanos, 95 Phil. 906 [1954]) (Campos and
of the Anti-Dummy Law (Com. Act No. 108, as Lopez-Campos Comments, Notes and Selected
amended) and the nationalization requirements Cases, Corporation Code 1981)
of the Constitution and the laws if ASI is allowed
to nominate more than three directors. (Rollo- Moreover, the usual rules as regards the construction
75875, pp. 38-39) and operations of contracts generally apply to a
contract of joint venture. (O' Hara v. Harman 14 App.
The ASI Group and petitioner Salazar, now reiterate Dev. (167) 43 NYS 556).
their theory that the ASI Group has the right to vote
their additional equity pursuant to Section 24 of the Bearing these principles in mind, the correct view
Corporation Code which gives the stockholders of a would be that the resolution of the question of whether
corporation the right to cumulate their votes in electing or not the ASI Group may vote their additional equity
directors. Petitioner Salazar adds that this right if lies in the agreement of the parties.
granted to the ASI Group would not necessarily mean
a violation of the Anti-Dummy Act (Commonwealth Act Necessarily, the appellate court was correct in
108, as amended). He cites section 2-a thereof which upholding the agreement of the parties as regards the
provides: allocation of director seats under Section 5 (a) of the
"Agreement," and the right of each group of
And provided finally that the election of aliens stockholders to cumulative voting in the process of
as members of the board of directors or determining who the group's nominees would be
governing body of corporations or associations under Section 3 (a) (1) of the "Agreement." As pointed
engaging in partially nationalized activities shall out by SEC, Section 5 (a) of the Agreement relates to
be allowed in proportion to their allowable the manner of nominating the members of the board
participation or share in the capital of such of directors while Section 3 (a) (1) relates to the
entities. (amendments introduced by manner of voting for these nominees.
Presidential Decree 715, section 1,
promulgated May 28, 1975) This is the proper interpretation of the Agreement of
the parties as regards the election of members of the
The ASI Group's argument is correct within the board of directors.
context of Section 24 of the Corporation Code. The
point of query, however, is whether or not that To allow the ASI Group to vote their additional equity
provision is applicable to a joint venture with clearly to help elect even a Filipino director who would be
defined agreements: beholden to them would obliterate their minority status
as agreed upon by the parties. As aptly stated by the
The legal concept of ajoint venture is of appellate court:
common law origin. It has no precise legal
definition but it has been generally understood ... ASI, however, should not be allowed to
to mean an organization formed for some interfere in the voting within the Filipino group.
temporary purpose. (Gates v. Megargel, 266 Otherwise, ASI would be able to designate
Fed. 811 [1920]) It is in fact hardly more than the three directors it is allowed to
distinguishable from the partnership, since their designate under the Agreement, and may even
elements are similar community of interest in be able to get a majority of the board seats, a
the business, sharing of profits and losses, and result which is clearly contrary to the contractual
a mutual right of control. Blackner v. Mc intent of the parties.
Dermott, 176 F. 2d. 498, [1949]; Carboneau v.
Peterson, 95 P. 2d., 1043 [1939]; Buckley v. Such a ruling will give effect to both the
Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d. 183, 288 P. 2d. 12 289 P. allocation of the board seats and the
2d. 242 [1955]). The main distinction cited by stockholder's right to cumulative voting.
Moreover, this ruling will also give due The insinuation that the ASI Group may be able to
consideration to the issue raised by the control the enterprise under the cumulative voting
appellees on possible violation or circumvention procedure cannot, however, be ignored. The validity
of the Anti-Dummy Law (Com. Act No. 108, as of the cumulative voting procedure is dependent on
amended) and the nationalization requirements the directors thus elected being genuine members of
of the Constitution and the laws if ASI is allowed the Filipino group, not voters whose interest is to
to nominate more than three directors. (At p. 39, increase the ASI share in the management of
Rollo, 75875) Saniwares. The joint venture character of the
enterprise must always be taken into account, so long
Equally important as the consideration of the as the company exists under its original agreement.
contractual intent of the parties is the consideration as Cumulative voting may not be used as a device to
regards the possible domination by the foreign enable ASI to achieve stealthily or indirectly what they
investors of the enterprise in violation of the cannot accomplish openly. There are substantial
nationalization requirements enshrined in the safeguards in the Agreement which are intended to
Constitution and circumvention of the Anti-Dummy preserve the majority status of the Filipino investors
Act. In this regard, petitioner Salazar's position is that as well as to maintain the minority status of the
the Anti-Dummy Act allows the ASI group to elect foreign investors group as earlier discussed. They
board directors in proportion to their share in the should be maintained.
capital of the entity. It is to be noted, however, that the
same law also limits the election of aliens as WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 75975-76
members of the board of directors in proportion to and G.R. No. 75875 are DISMISSED and the petition
their allowance participation of said entity. In the in G.R. No. 75951 is partly GRANTED. The amended
instant case, the foreign Group ASI was limited to decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that
designate three directors. This is the allowable Messrs. Wolfgang Aurbach John Griffin, David
participation of the ASI Group. Hence, in future Whittingham Emesto V. Lagdameo, Baldwin Young,
dealings, this limitation of six to three board seats Raul A. Boncan, Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr., Enrique
should always be maintained as long as the joint Lagdameo, and George F. Lee are declared as the
venture agreement exists considering that in limiting 3 duly elected directors of Saniwares at the March
board seats in the 9-man board of directors there are 8,1983 annual stockholders' meeting. In all other
provisions already agreed upon and embodied in the respects, the questioned decision is AFFIRMED.
parties' Agreement to protect the interests arising from Costs against the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 75975-76
the minority status of the foreign investors. and G.R. No. 75875.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
I. Facts
On November 25, 1986, NIDC transferred all its 6.0 The highest qualified bid will be submitted to the
rights, title and interest in PHILSECO to the Philippine APT Board of Trustees at its regular meeting following
National Bank (PNB). Such interests were the bidding, for the purpose of determining whether or
subsequently transferred to the National Government not it should be endorsed by the APT Board of
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14. On Trustees to the COP, and the latter approves the
December 8, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino same. The APT shall advise Kawasaki Heavy
issued Proclamation No. 50 establishing the Industries, Inc. and/or its nominee, [PHILYARDS]
Committee on Privatization (COP) and the Asset Holdings, Inc., that the highest bid is acceptable to the
Privatization Trust (APT) to take title to, and National Government. Kawasaki Heavy Industries,
possession of, conserve, manage and dispose of non- Inc. and/or [PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc. shall then
performing assets of the National Government. have a period of thirty (30) calendar days from the
Thereafter, on February 27, 1987, a trust agreement date of receipt of such advice from APT within which
was entered into between the National Government to exercise their "Option to Top the Highest Bid" by
and the APT wherein the latter was named the trustee offering a bid equivalent to the highest bid plus five
of the National Government's share in PHILSECO. In (5%) percent thereof.
1989, as a result of a quasi-reorganization of
PHILSECO to settle its huge obligations to PNB, the 6.1 Should Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or
National Government's shareholdings in PHILSECO [PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc. exercise their "Option to
increased to 97.41% thereby reducing KAWASAKI's Top the Highest Bid," they shall so notify the APT
shareholdings to 2.59%. about such exercise of their option and deposit with
APT the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
In the interest of the national economy and the the highest bid plus five percent (5%) thereof within
government, the COP and the APT deemed it best to the thirty (30)-day period mentioned in paragraph 6.0
sell the National Government's share in PHILSECO to above. APT will then serve notice upon Kawasaki
private entities. After a series of negotiations between Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or [PHILYARDS] Holdings,
the APT and KAWASAKI, they agreed that the latter's Inc. declaring them as the preferred bidder and they
right of first refusal under the JVA be "exchanged" for shall have a period of ninety (90) days from the
the right to top by five percent (5%) the highest bid for receipt of the APT's notice within which to pay the
the said shares. They further agreed that KAWASAKI balance of their bid price.
would be entitled to name a company in which it was
a stockholder, which could exercise the right to top. 6.2 Should Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or
On September 7, 1990, KAWASAKI informed APT [PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc. fail to exercise their
that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI)1 would exercise its "Option to Top the Highest Bid" within the thirty (30)-
right to top. day period, APT will declare the highest bidder as the
winning bidder.
At the pre-bidding conference held on September 18,
1993, interested bidders were given copies of the JVA xxx xxx xxx
between NIDC and KAWASAKI, and of the Asset
Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) drafted for the
12.0 The bidder shall be solely responsible for
National Government's 87.6% equity share in
examining with appropriate care these rules, the
PHILSECO. The provisions of the ASBR were
official bid forms, including any addenda or
explained to the interested bidders who were notified
amendments thereto issued during the bidding period.
that the bidding would be held on December 2, 1993.
The bidder shall likewise be responsible for informing
A portion of the ASBR reads:
itself with respect to any and all conditions concerning
the PHILSECO Shares which may, in any manner,
1.0 The subject of this Asset Privatization Trust (APT) affect the bidder's proposal. Failure on the part of the
sale through public bidding is the National bidder to so examine and inform itself shall be its sole
Government's equity in PHILSECO consisting of risk and no relief for error or omission will be given by
896,869,942 shares of stock (representing 87.67% of APT or COP. . . .
PHILSECO's outstanding capital stock), which will be
sold as a whole block in accordance with the rules
At the public bidding on the said date, petitioner J.G.
herein enumerated.
Summit Holdings, Inc.2 submitted a bid of Two Billion
and Thirty Million Pesos (₱2,030,000,000.00) with an
xxx xxx xxx acknowledgment of KAWASAKI/[PHILYARDS'] right to
top, viz:
2.0 The highest bid, as well as the buyer, shall be
subject to the final approval of both the APT Board of 4. I/We understand that the Committee on
Trustees and the Committee on Privatization (COP). Privatization (COP) has up to thirty (30) days to act on
APT's recommendation based on the result of this
2.1 APT reserves the right in its sole discretion, to bidding. Should the COP approve the highest bid,
reject any or all bids. APT shall advise Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc.
and/or its nominee, [PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc. that
the highest bid is acceptable to the National be sixty percent (60%) Filipino-owned. Consequently,
Government. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or the right to top granted to KAWASAKI under the Asset
[PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc. shall then have a period Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) drafted for the sale of
of thirty (30) calendar days from the date of receipt of the 87.67% equity of the National Government in
such advice from APT within which to exercise their PHILSECO is illegal — not only because it violates
"Option to Top the Highest Bid" by offering a bid the rules on competitive bidding — but more so,
equivalent to the highest bid plus five (5%) percent because it allows foreign corporations to own more
thereof. than 40% equity in the shipyard. It also held that
"although the petitioner had the opportunity to
As petitioner was declared the highest bidder, the examine the ASBR before it participated in the
COP approved the sale on December 3, 1993 bidding, it cannot be estopped from questioning the
"subject to the right of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, unconstitutional, illegal and inequitable provisions
Inc./[PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc. to top JGSMI's bid thereof." Thus, this Court voided the transfer of the
by 5% as specified in the bidding rules." national government's 87.67% share in PHILSECO to
Philyard[s] Holdings, Inc., and upheld the right of JG
On December 29, 1993, petitioner informed APT that Summit, as the highest bidder, to take title to the said
it was protesting the offer of PHI to top its bid on the shares, viz:
grounds that: (a) the KAWASAKI/PHI consortium
composed of KAWASAKI, [PHILYARDS], Mitsui, WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
Keppel, SM Group, ICTSI and Insular Life violated the certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
ASBR because the last four (4) companies were the Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
losing bidders thereby circumventing the law and and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered to pay to APT
prejudicing the weak winning bidder; (b) only its bid price of Two Billion Thirty Million Pesos
KAWASAKI could exercise the right to top; (c) giving (₱2,030,000,000.00), less its bid deposit plus interests
the same option to top to PHI constituted unwarranted upon the finality of this Decision. In turn, APT is
benefit to a third party; (d) no right of first refusal can ordered to:
be exercised in a public bidding or auction sale; and
(e) the JG Summit consortium was not estopped from (a) accept the said amount of
questioning the proceedings. ₱2,030,000,000.00 less bid deposit and
interests from petitioner;
On February 2, 1994, petitioner was notified that PHI
had fully paid the balance of the purchase price of the (b) execute a Stock Purchase Agreement with
subject bidding. On February 7, 1994, the APT petitioner;
notified petitioner that PHI had exercised its option to
top the highest bid and that the COP had approved (c) cause the issuance in favor of petitioner of
the same on January 6, 1994. On February 24, 1994, the certificates of stocks representing 87.6%
the APT and PHI executed a Stock Purchase of PHILSECO's total capitalization;
Agreement. Consequently, petitioner filed with this
Court a Petition for Mandamus under G.R. No. (d) return to private respondent PHGI the
114057. On May 11, 1994, said petition was referred amount of Two Billion One Hundred Thirty-
to the Court of Appeals. On July 18, 1995, the Court One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
of Appeals denied the same for lack of merit. It ruled (₱2,131,500,000.00); and
that the petition for mandamus was not the proper
remedy to question the constitutionality or legality of
(e) cause the cancellation of the stock
the right of first refusal and the right to top that was
certificates issued to PHI.
exercised by KAWASAKI/PHI, and that the matter
must be brought "by the proper party in the proper
forum at the proper time and threshed out in a full SO ORDERED.
blown trial." The Court of Appeals further ruled that
the right of first refusal and the right to top are prima In separate Motions for Reconsideration, respondents
facie legal and that the petitioner, "by participating in submit[ted] three basic issues for x x x resolution: (1)
the public bidding, with full knowledge of the right to Whether PHILSECO is a public utility; (2) Whether
top granted to KAWASAKI/[PHILYARDS] is… under the 1977 JVA, KAWASAKI can exercise its right
estopped from questioning the validity of the award of first refusal only up to 40% of the total capitalization
given to [PHILYARDS] after the latter exercised the of PHILSECO; and (3) Whether the right to top
right to top and had paid in full the purchase price of granted to KAWASAKI violates the principles of
the subject shares, pursuant to the ASBR." Petitioner competitive bidding.3 (citations omitted)
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Decision
which was denied on March 15, 1996. Petitioner thus In a Resolution dated September 24, 2003, this Court
filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court alleging ruled in favor of the respondents. On the first issue,
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate we held that Philippine Shipyard and Engineering
court. Corporation (PHILSECO) is not a public utility, as by
nature, a shipyard is not a public utility4 and that no
On November 20, 2000, this Court rendered x x x [a] law declares a shipyard to be a public utility.5 On the
Decision ruling among others that the Court of second issue, we found nothing in the 1977 Joint
Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition on the Venture Agreement (JVA) which prevents Kawasaki
sole ground of the impropriety of the special civil Heavy Industries, Ltd. of Kobe, Japan (KAWASAKI)
action of mandamus because the petition was also from acquiring more than 40% of PHILSECO’s total
one of certiorari. It further ruled that a shipyard like capitalization.6 On the final issue, we held that the
PHILSECO is a public utility whose capitalization must right to top granted to KAWASAKI in exchange for its
right of first refusal did not violate the principles of divisions may be appealed citing Supreme Court
competitive bidding.7 Circular No. 2-89 dated February 7,
1989.13 PHILYARDS also alleges that there is no novel
On October 20, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for question of law involved in the present case as the
Reconsideration8 and a Motion to Elevate This Case assailed Resolution was based on well-settled
to the Court En Banc.9 Public respondents Committee jurisprudence. Likewise, PHILYARDS stresses that
on Privatization (COP) and Asset Privatization Trust the Resolution was merely an outcome of the motions
(APT), and private respondent Philyards Holdings, for reconsideration filed by it and the COP and APT
Inc. (PHILYARDS) filed their Comments on J.G. and is "consistent with the inherent power of courts to
Summit Holdings, Inc.’s (JG Summit’s) Motion for ‘amend and control its process and orders so as to
Reconsideration and Motion to Elevate This Case to make them conformable to law and justice.’ (Rule
the Court En Banc on January 29, 2004 and February 135, sec. 5)"14 Private respondent belittles the
3, 2004, respectively. petitioner’s allegations regarding the change in
ponente and the alleged executive interference as
II. Issues shown by former Secretary of Finance Jose Isidro
Camacho’s memorandum dated November 5, 2001
arguing that these do not justify a referral of the
Based on the foregoing, the relevant issues to resolve
present case to the Court en banc.
to end this litigation are the following:
In insisting that its Motion to Elevate This Case to the
1. Whether there are sufficient bases to
Court En Banc should be granted, J.G. Summit further
elevate the case at bar to the Court en banc.
argued that: its Opposition to the Office of the Solicitor
General’s Motion to Refer is different from its own
2. Whether the motion for reconsideration Motion to Elevate; different grounds are invoked by
raises any new matter or cogent reason to the two motions; there was unwarranted "executive
warrant a reconsideration of this Court’s interference"; and the change in ponente is merely
Resolution of September 24, 2003. noted in asserting that this case should be decided by
the Court en banc.15
Motion to Elevate this Case to the
We find no merit in petitioner’s contention that the
Court En Banc propriety of the bidding process involved in the
present case has been confused with the policy issue
The petitioner prays for the elevation of the case to of the fate of the shipping industry which, petitioner
the Court en banc on the following grounds: maintains, has never been an issue that is
determinative of this case. The Court’s Resolution of
1. The main issue of the propriety of the September 24, 2003 reveals a clear and definitive
bidding process involved in the present case ruling on the propriety of the bidding process. In
has been confused with the policy issue of the discussing whether the right to top granted to
supposed fate of the shipping industry which KAWASAKI in exchange for its right of first refusal
has never been an issue that is determinative violates the principles of competitive bidding, we
of this case.10 made an exhaustive discourse on the rules and
principles of public bidding and whether they were
2. The present case may be considered under complied with in the case at bar.16This Court
the Supreme Court Resolution dated February categorically ruled on the petitioner’s argument that
23, 1984 which included among en PHILSECO, as a shipyard, is a public utility which
banc cases those involving a novel question should maintain a 60%-40% Filipino-foreign equity
of law and those where a doctrine or principle ratio, as it was a pivotal issue. In doing so, we
laid down by the Court en banc or in division recognized the impact of our ruling on the shipbuilding
may be modified or reversed.11 industry which was beyond avoidance.17
3. There was clear executive interference in We reject petitioner’s argument that the present case
the judicial functions of the Court when the may be considered under the Supreme Court
Honorable Jose Isidro Camacho, Secretary of Resolution dated February 23, 1984 which included
Finance, forwarded to Chief Justice Davide, a among en banc cases those involving a novel
memorandum dated November 5, 2001, question of law and those where a doctrine or
attaching a copy of the Foreign Chambers principle laid down by the court en banc or in division
Report dated October 17, 2001, which matter may be modified or reversed. The case was resolved
was placed in the agenda of the Court and based on basic principles of the right of first refusal in
noted by it in a formal resolution dated commercial law and estoppel in civil law. Contractual
November 28, 2001.12 obligations arising from rights of first refusal are not
new in this jurisdiction and have been recognized in
Opposing J.G. Summit’s motion to elevate the numerous cases.18 Estoppel is too known a civil law
case en banc, PHILYARDS points out the petitioner’s concept to require an elongated discussion.
inconsistency in previously opposing PHILYARDS’ Fundamental principles on public bidding were
Motion to Refer the Case to the Court En likewise used to resolve the issues raised by the
Banc. PHILYARDS contends that J.G. Summit should petitioner. To be sure, petitioner leans on the right to
now be estopped from asking that the case be top in a public bidding in arguing that the case at bar
referred to the Court en banc. PHILYARDS further involves a novel issue. We are not swayed. The right
contends that the Supreme Court en banc is not an to top was merely a condition or a reservation made in
appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of its the bidding rules which was fully disclosed to all
bidding parties. In Bureau Veritas, represented by Like the condition in the Bureau Veritas case, the
Theodor H. Hunermann v. Office of the President, right to top was a condition imposed by the
et al., 19 we dealt with this conditionality, viz: government in the bidding rules which was made
known to all parties. It was a condition imposed on
x x x It must be stressed, as held in the case of A.C. all bidders equally, based on the APT’s exercise of
Esguerra & Sons v. Aytona, et al., (L-18751, 28 April its discretion in deciding on how best to privatize
1962, 4 SCRA 1245), that in an "invitation to bid, there the government’s shares in PHILSECO. It was not a
is a condition imposed upon the bidders to the whimsical or arbitrary condition plucked from the ether
effect that the bidding shall be subject to the right and inserted in the bidding rules but a condition which
of the government to reject any and all bids the APT approved as the best way the government
subject to its discretion. In the case at bar, the could comply with its contractual obligations to
government has made its choice and unless an KAWASAKI under the JVA and its mandate of getting
unfairness or injustice is shown, the losing the most advantageous deal for the government. The
bidders have no cause to complain nor right to right to top had its history in the mutual right of first
dispute that choice. This is a well-settled doctrine refusal in the JVA and was reached by agreement of
in this jurisdiction and elsewhere." the government and KAWASAKI.
The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award Further, there is no "executive interference" in the
contracts is vested in the Government agencies functions of this Court by the mere filing of a
entrusted with that function. The discretion given to memorandum by Secretary of Finance Jose Isidro
the authorities on this matter is of such wide latitude Camacho. The memorandum was merely "noted" to
that the Courts will not interfere therewith, unless it is acknowledge its filing. It had no further legal
apparent that it is used as a shield to a fraudulent significance. Notably too, the assailed Resolution
award (Jalandoni v. NARRA, 108 Phil. 486 [1960]). x x dated September 24, 2003 was decided
x The exercise of this discretion is a policy decision unanimously by the Special First Division in favor
that necessitates prior inquiry, investigation, of the respondents.
comparison, evaluation, and deliberation. This task
can best be discharged by the Government agencies Again, we emphasize that a decision or resolution of a
concerned, not by the Courts. The role of the Courts Division is that of the Supreme Court20 and the
is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of Court en banc is not an appellate court to which
the Government has transgressed its constitutional decisions or resolutions of a Division may be
boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with appealed.21
executive or legislative discretion exercised within
those boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm For all the foregoing reasons, we find no basis to
of policy decision-making. elevate this case to the Court en banc.
6. Petitioner’s motion to elevate the case to J.G. Summit’s insistence that the right to top cannot
the Court en banc is baseless and would only be sourced from the right of first refusal is not new
delay the termination of this case.33 and we have already ruled on the issue in our
Resolution of September 24, 2003. We upheld the
In a Consolidated Comment dated March 8, 2004, mutual right of first refusal in the JVA.34 We also ruled
J.G. Summit countered the arguments of the public that nothing in the JVA prevents KAWASAKI from
and private respondents in this wise: acquiring more than 40% of PHILSECO’s total
capitalization.35 Likewise, nothing in the JVA or ASBR
1. The award by the APT of 87.67% shares of bars the conversion of the right of first refusal to the
PHILSECO to PHILYARDS with losing bidders right to top. In sum, nothing new and of significance in
through the exercise of a right to top, which is
the petitioner’s pleading warrants a reconsideration of exercise of the right of first refusal. In the case at bar,
our ruling. respondents assert that since the right of first refusal
was validly converted into a right to top, which was
Likewise, we already disposed of the argument that exercised not by KAWASAKI, but by PHILYARDS
neither the right of first refusal nor the right to top can which is a Filipino corporation (i.e., 60% of its shares
legally be exercised by the consortium which is not are owned by Filipinos), then there is no violation of
the proper party granted such right under either the the Constitution.40 At first, it would seem that
JVA or the ASBR. Thus, we held: questions of fact beyond cognizance by this Court
were involved in the issue. However, the records
The fact that the losing bidder, Keppel Consortium show that PHILYARDS admits it had owned land up
(composed of Keppel, SM Group, Insular Life until the time of the bidding.41 Hence, the only
Assurance, Mitsui and ICTSI), has joined PHILYARDS issue is whether KAWASAKI had a valid right of
in the latter's effort to raise ₱2.131 billion necessary in first refusal over PHILSECO shares under the JVA
exercising the right to top is not contrary to law, public considering that PHILSECO owned land until the
policy or public morals. There is nothing in the ASBR time of the bidding and KAWASAKI already held
that bars the losing bidders from joining either the 40% of PHILSECO’s equity.
winning bidder (should the right to top is not
exercised) or KAWASAKI/PHI (should it exercise its We uphold the validity of the mutual rights of first
right to top as it did), to raise the purchase price. The refusal under the JVA between KAWASAKI and NIDC.
petitioner did not allege, nor was it shown by First of all, the right of first refusal is a property right of
competent evidence, that the participation of the PHILSECO shareholders, KAWASAKI and NIDC,
losing bidders in the public bidding was done with under the terms of their JVA. This right allows them to
fraudulent intent. Absent any proof of fraud, the purchase the shares of their co-shareholder before
formation by [PHILYARDS] of a consortium is they are offered to a third party. The agreement of
legitimate in a free enterprise system. The appellate co-shareholders to mutually grant this right to
court is thus correct in holding the petitioner estopped each other, by itself, does not constitute a
from questioning the validity of the transfer of the violation of the provisions of the Constitution
National Government's shares in PHILSECO to limiting land ownership to Filipinos and Filipino
respondent.36 corporations. As PHILYARDS correctly puts it, if
PHILSECO still owns land, the right of first refusal can
Further, we see no inherent illegality on PHILYARDS’ be validly assigned to a qualified Filipino entity in
act in seeking funding from parties who were losing order to maintain the 60%-40% ratio. This transfer, by
bidders. This is a purely commercial decision over itself, does not amount to a violation of the Anti-
which the State should not interfere absent any legal Dummy Laws, absent proof of any fraudulent intent.
infirmity. It is emphasized that the case at bar involves The transfer could be made either to a nominee or
the disposition of shares in a corporation which the such other party which the holder of the right of first
government sought to privatize. As such, the persons refusal feels it can comfortably do business with.
with whom PHILYARDS desired to enter into business Alternatively, PHILSECO may divest of its
with in order to raise funds to purchase the shares are landholdings, in which case KAWASAKI, in exercising
basically its business. This is in contrast to a case its right of first refusal, can exceed 40% of
involving a contract for the operation of or PHILSECO’s equity. In fact, it can even be said that
construction of a government infrastructure where the if the foreign shareholdings of a landholding
identity of the buyer/bidder or financier constitutes an corporation exceeds 40%, it is not the foreign
important consideration. In such cases, the stockholders’ ownership of the shares which is
government would have to take utmost precaution to adversely affected but the capacity of the
protect public interest by ensuring that the parties with corporation to own land – that is, the corporation
which it is contracting have the ability to satisfactorily becomes disqualified to own land. This finds support
construct or operate the infrastructure. under the basic corporate law principle that the
corporation and its stockholders are separate juridical
entities. In this vein, the right of first refusal over
On the landholding issue, J.G. Summit submits that
shares pertains to the shareholders whereas the
since PHILSECO is a landholding company,
capacity to own land pertains to the corporation.
KAWASAKI could exercise its right of first refusal only
Hence, the fact that PHILSECO owns land cannot
up to 40% of the shares of PHILSECO due to the
deprive stockholders of their right of first refusal. No
constitutional prohibition on landholding by
law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares
corporations with more than 40% foreign-owned
in a landholding corporation even if the latter will
equity. It further argues that since KAWASAKI already
exceed the allowed foreign equity, what the law
held at least 40% equity in PHILSECO, the right of
disqualifies is the corporation from owning land.
first refusal was inutile and as such, could not
This is the clear import of the following provisions in
subsequently be converted into the right to
the Constitution:
top. 37 Petitioner also asserts that, at present,
PHILSECO continues to violate the constitutional
provision on landholdings as its shares are more than Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters,
40% foreign-owned.38 PHILYARDS admits that it may minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
have previously held land but had already divested forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
such landholdings.39 It contends, however, that even if wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
PHILSECO owned land, this would not affect the right are owned by the State. With the exception of
of first refusal but only the exercise thereof. If the land agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
is retained, the right of first refusal, being a property be alienated. The exploration, development, and
right, could be assigned to a qualified party. In the utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
alternative, the land could be divested before the control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing In Lui She, the option to buy was invalidated because
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations it amounted to a virtual transfer of ownership as the
or associations at least sixty per centum of whose owner could not sell or dispose of his properties. The
capital is owned by such citizens. Such contract in Lui She prohibited the owner of the land
agreements may be for a period not exceeding from selling, donating, mortgaging, or encumbering
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than the property during the 50-year period of the option to
twenty-five years, and under such terms and buy. This is not so in the case at bar where the mutual
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of right of first refusal in favor of NIDC and KAWASAKI
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or does not amount to a virtual transfer of land to a non-
industrial uses other than the development of water Filipino. In fact, the case at bar involves a right of
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of first refusal over shares of stock while the Lui
the grant. She case involves an option to buy the land itself.
As discussed earlier, there is a distinction between the
xxx xxx xxx shareholder’s ownership of shares and the
corporation’s ownership of land arising from the
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no separate juridical personalities of the corporation and
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed its shareholders.
except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of We note that in its Motion for Reconsideration, J.G.
the public domain.42(emphases supplied) Summit alleges that PHILSECO continues to violate
the Constitution as its foreign equity is above 40%
The petitioner further argues that "an option to buy and yet owns long-term leasehold rights which are
land is void in itself (Philippine Banking Corporation v. real rights.45It cites Article 415 of the Civil Code which
Lui She, 21 SCRA 52 [1967]). The right of first refusal includes in the definition of immovable property,
granted to KAWASAKI, a Japanese corporation, is "contracts for public works, and servitudes and other
similarly void. Hence, the right to top, sourced from real rights over immovable property."46 Any existing
the right of first refusal, is also void."43 Contrary to the landholding, however, is denied by PHILYARDS citing
contention of petitioner, the case of Lui She did not its recent financial statements.47 First, these are
that say "an option to buy land is void in itself," for we questions of fact, the veracity of which would require
ruled as follows: introduction of evidence. The Court needs to validate
these factual allegations based on competent and
reliable evidence. As such, the Court cannot resolve
x x x To be sure, a lease to an alien for a
the questions they pose. Second, J.G. Summit
reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving
misreads the provisions of the Constitution cited in its
an alien the right to buy real property on condition
own pleadings, to wit:
that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As this
Court said in Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds:
29.2 Petitioner has consistently pointed out in the past
that private respondent is not a 60%-40% corporation,
[A]liens are not completely excluded by the
and this violates the Constitution x x x The violation
Constitution from the use of lands for residential
continues to this day because under the law, it
purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is
continues to own real property…
temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such
as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here xxx xxx xxx
forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes,
Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire. 32. To review the constitutional provisions involved,
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (the
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also JVA was signed in 1977), provided:
an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of
which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
divests himself in stages not only of the right to
enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus 32.1 This provision is the same as Section 7, Article
fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to XII of the 1987 Constitution.
dispose of it (jus disponendi) — rights the sum
total of which make up ownership. It is just as if 32.2 Under the Public Land Act, corporations qualified
today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, to acquire or hold lands of the public domain are
the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, corporations at least 60% of which is owned by
until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is Filipino citizens (Sec. 22, Commonwealth Act 141, as
made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is amended). (emphases supplied)
just exactly what the parties in this case did within this
pace of one year, with the result that Justina As correctly observed by the public respondents, the
Santos'[s] ownership of her property was reduced to a prohibition in the Constitution applies only to
hollow concept. If this can be done, then the ownership of land.48 It does not extend to
Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the immovable or real property as defined under
Philippines, as announced in Krivenko vs. Register Article 415 of the Civil Code.Otherwise, we would
of Deeds, is indeed in grave peril.44 (emphases have a strange situation where the ownership of
supplied; Citations omitted) immovable property such as trees, plants and growing
fruit attached to the land49 would be limited to Filipinos
and Filipino corporations only.
III.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
13
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of
the Court, when concurred in by a majority of
its Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in a case and
voted thereon, and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three of such
Members, is a decision or resolution of the G.R. No. 124293 November 20, 2000
Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987
Constitution). JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
3. The Court en banc is not an COURT OF APPEALS, COMMITTEE ON
Appellate Court to which decisions or PRIVATIZATION, its Chairman and Members;
resolutions of a Division may be ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST and PHILYARDS
appealed. HOLDINGS, INC., respondents.
Exercising their discretion, the COP and the APT On December 29, 1993, petitioner informed the APT
deemed it in the best interest of the national economy that it was protesting the offer of PHI to top its bid on
and the government to privatize PHILSECO by selling the grounds that: (a) the Kawasaki/PHI consortium
87.67% of its total outstanding capital stock to private composed of Kawasaki, Philyards, Mitsui, Keppel, SM
entities. After a series of negotiations between the Group, ICTSI and Insular Life violated the ASBR
APT and Kasawaki, they agreed that the latter’s right because the last four (4) companies were the losing
of first refusal under the JVA be "exchanged" for the bidders (for P1.528 billion) thereby circumventing the
right to top by five percent (5%) the highest bid for law and prejudicing the weak winning bidder; (b) only
said shares. They further agreed that Kawasaki would Kawasaki could exercise the right to top; (c) giving the
be entitled to name a company in which it was a same option to top to PHI constituted unwarranted
stockholder, which could exercise the right to top. On benefit to a third party; (d) no right of first refusal can
September 7, 1990, Kawasaki informed APT that be exercised in a public bidding or auction sale, and
Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI) would exercise its right (e) the JG Summit Consortium was not estopped from
to top by 5%. questioning the proceedings.
At the pre-bidding conference held on September 28, On February 2, 1994, petitioner was notified that PHI
1993, interested bidders were given copies of the JVA had fully paid the balance of the purchase price of the
between NIDC and Kawasaki, and of the Asset subject bidding. On February 7, 1994, the APT
Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) drafted for the 87.67% notified petitioner that PHI had exercised its option to
equity (sic) in PHILSECO of the National
1
top the highest bid and that the COP had approved
Government. Salient provisions of the ASBR state: the same on January 6, 1994. On February 24, 1994,
the APT and PHI executed a Stock Purchase
"1.0. The subject of this Asset Privatization Trust Agreement.
(APT) sale through public bidding is the National
Government’s equity in PHILSECO consisting of Consequently, petitioner filed with this Court a petition
896,869,942 shares of stock (representing 87.67% of for mandamus under G.R. No. 114057. On May
PHILSECO’s oustanding capital stock), which will 11,1994, said petition was referred to the Court of
be sold as a whole block in accordance with the rules Appeals ---
herein enumerated.
"x x x for proper determination and disposition,
xxx xxx xxx pursuant to Section 9, paragraph 1 of B.P. 129,
granting the Court of Appeals ‘original jurisdiction to
3.0. This public bidding shall be on an Indicative Price issue writs of mandamus x x x and auxiliary writs or
Bidding basis. The Indicative price set for the National processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
Government’s 87.67% equity in PHILSECO jurisdiction,’ which jurisdiction is concurrent with this
is PESOS: ONE BILLION THREE HUNDRED Court, there being no special and important reason for
MILLION (P1,300,000,000.00). this Court to assume jurisdiction over the case in the
first instance."
2
official bid forms, including any addenda or remedy to "compel the undoing of an act already done
amendments thereto issued during the bidding period. or the correction of a wrong already perpetuated,
The bidder shall likewise be responsible for informing even though the action taken was clearly illegal." It
itself with respect to any and all conditions concerning was further ruled that it was not the proper forum for a
the PHILSECO Shares which may, in any manner, "mere petition for mandamus" that aimed to question
affect the bidder’s proposal. Failure on the part of the the constitutionality or legality of the right of first
bidder to so examine and inform itself shall be its sole refusal and the right to top that was exercised by
risk and no relief for error or omission will be given by Kawasaki/PHI and that the matter must be brought
APT or COP. x x x." "by the proper party in the proper forum at the proper
time and threshed out in a full blown trial."
The provisions of the ASBR were explained to the
interested bidders who were notified that bidding After ruling that the right of first refusal and the right to
would be held on December 2, 1993. top are prima facie legal, the Court of Appeals found
petitioner to be in estoppel for the following reasons:
"5. If petitioner found the right to top to be illegal, it (B) THE RIGHT TO TOP WAS
should not have participated in the public bidding; or it GRANTED TO THE JAPANESE
should have questioned the legality of the rules before CORPORATION AT A TIME WHEN IT
the courts or filed a petition for declaratory relief (Rule MERELY HELD 2.6% EQUITY IN
64, Rules of Court) before the public bidding could PHILSECO.
have taken place.
(C) THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL
By participating in the public bidding, with full GRANTED TO THE JAPANESE
knowledge of the right to top granted to CORPORATION OVER SHARES OF
Kawasaki/Philyards, petitioner is estopped from STOCK IS CONTRARY TO THE
questioning the validity of the award given to CORPORATION CODE.
Philyards after the latter exercised the right to top and
had paid in full the purchase price of the subject (D) THE RIGHT TO TOP IS
shares, pursuant to the ASBR. CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY AS
IT IS ANATHEMA TO COMPETITIVE
6. The fact that the losing bidder, Keppel Consortium PUBLIC BIDDING FOR BEING
(composed of Keppel, SM Group, Insular Life UNDULY RESTRICTIVE THEREOF,
Assurance, Mitsui and ICTSI) appears to have joined AND, MOREOVER, IS CONTRARY
Philyards in the latter’s effort to raise P2.131 billion TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS IT IS
necessary in exercising the right to top by 5% is a AGAINST THE BASIC RUDIMENTS
valid activity in free enterprise that is not contrary to OF FAIR PLAY.
law, public policy or public morals. It should not be a
cause of grievance for petitioner as it is the very (E) THE GRANT OF THE RIGHT TO
essence of free competition in the business world. TOP IS A CRIMINAL VIOLATION OF
Astute businessmen involved in the public bidding in THE ANTI-GRAFT LAW AS IT GIVES
question knew what they were up against. And when A CLEARLY UNWARRANTED
they participated in the public bidding with prior BENEFIT IN FAVOR OF PHILYARDS
knowledge of the right to top, they did so, with full AS SHOWN BY CLEAR AND
knowledge of the eventuality that the highest bidder UNDISPUTED DOCUMENTARY
may still be topped by Kawasaki/Philyards by 5%. It is EVIDENCE.
admitted by petitioner that it likewise represents a
consortium composed of JG Summit, Sembawang II.
Singapore and Jurong of Malaysia. Why should
petitioner then expect Philyards to limit itself to its own
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
resources when the latter can enter into agreements
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MANDAMUS IS
with other entities to help it raise the money it needed
NOT A PROPER REMEDY IN THIS CASE.
to pay the full purchase price as in fact it had already
paid the National Government in the amount of
P2.131 billion as required under the ASBR?" 4 III.
Petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of said FOLLOWING ITS OWN FINDINGS, THE
Decision which was denied on March 15, 1996. COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition for review (A) IN NOT DIRECTING THAT TRIAL BE
on certiorari, raising the following arguments: HELD ON ALLEGED ISSUES OF FACT AND
(B) IN NOT APPOINTING AN AMICUS
CURIAE FROM AMONG THE LAWYERS IN
I.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT TO
DETERMINE THE APPLICABILITY OF ITS
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY REQUIREMENTS TO THE TRANSACTIONS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER JG IN THIS CASE. 5
Public respondents also contend that petitioner has caption should not negate the fact that the petition
no standing to question the legality of a provision of charged public respondent with grave abuse of
the JVA in which it is not a party. However, as this
10
discretion in awarding the sale to private respondent.
Court held in Kilosbayan v. Morato, there is a
11
Well-settled is the rule that it is not the caption of the
difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest pleading but the allegations therein that determine the
and the rule on standing, as the latter has nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief
constitutional underpinnings. In the case at bar, warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no
petitioner has sufficiently alleged constitutional such relief is prayed for.19
bidder has personality to initiate proceedings to shipyards are no longer public utilities by express
prevent setting at naught his right; otherwise, his right provision of Presidential Decree No. 666, which
to due process would be violated. As such winning
12
provided incentives to the shipbuilding and ship repair
bidder, petitioner has "a present substantial interest," industry.
or such interest in the subject matter of action as will
entitle it, under substantive law, to recover if the Indeed, P.D. No. 666 dated March 5, 1975 explicitly
evidence is sufficient.13
stated that a "shipyard" was not a "public utility."
Section 1 thereof provide as follows:
With respect to the propriety of the remedy availed by
petitioner, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the "d) Registration required but not as Public
special civil action of mandamus is not the proper Utility. – The business of constructing and repairing
remedy to question the legality of the exercise of the vessels or parts thereof shall not be considered a
right to top by private respondent. It does not lie to public utility and no Certificate of Public Convenience
compel the award of a contract subject of bidding to shall be required therefor. However, no shipyard,
an unsuccessful bidder. Mandamus applies as a
14
graving dock, marine railway or marine repair shop
remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded clearly and no person or enterprise shall engage in the
in law and not when it is doubtful. Thus:
15
construction and/or repair of any vessel, or any phase
or part thereof, without a valid Certificate of
"In order that a writ of mandamus may issue, it is Registration and license for this purpose from the
essential that the person petitioning for the same has Maritime Industry Authority, except those owned or
a clear legal right to the thing demanded and that it is operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines or by
the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the foreign governments pursuant to a treaty or
act required. It neither confers powers nor imposes agreement." (Underscoring supplied.)
duties and is never issued in doubtful cases. It is
simply a command to exercise a power already However, Section 1 of P.D. No. 666 was expressly
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed." 16
repealed by Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 391,
the Investment Incentive Policy Act of
The Court of Appeals cannot declare petitioner as the 1983. Subsequently, Executive Order No. 226, the
21
winning bidder in this case and direct the COP/APT to Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, was issued and
award the sale to it without first determining the Section 85 thereof expressly repealed B.P. Blg. 391. 22
general public. The participation of foreign investors requirement as far as corporations and partnerships
in the governing body of any public utility enterprise are concerned. However, Section 2.3.1 (a) of its
shall be limited to their proportionate share in its Memorandum Circular No. 95, Series of 1994, setting30
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of out the Revised Implementing Guidelines on the
such corporation or association shall be citizens of Licensing of Shipbuilders, Ship Repairers, Afloat
the Philippines." (Italics supplied.) Repairers, Boatbuilders and Shipbreakers, seems to
exempt joint ventures registered with the SEC, the
The progenitor of this constitutional provision, Article BOI and the EPZA from the 60% requirement of
XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution, required the Filipino ownership. The said provision states:
31
venture is governed by the laws on contracts and on It is well settled that the role of courts is to ascertain
partnership. The joint venture created between NIDC whether a branch or instrumentality of Government
and Kawasaki falls within the purview of an has transgressed its constitutional or statutory
boundaries. The courts, must examine those This rule is fraught with dangerous implications. It
boundaries in the light of provisions of the law. allows a completely foreign corporation to participate
Otherwise, it would stray into the realm of policy in the public bidding of more than 60% of the total
decision-making. 33
shares of a public utility corporation without setting a
period within which the foreign bidder should name its
Proclamation No. 50, creating the COP and the APT, nominee. As it is, the rule allows a totally foreign
was issued by President Corazon C. Aquino pursuant investor to engage in the business of operating a
to her legislative powers under the Provisional public utility for an unlimited period of time in total
Constitution of 1986. Section 12 of said Proclamation disregard of the constitutional proscription on the
vested the APT with the following powers: percentage of Filipino ownership of corporations
engaged therein. Paragraph 15.0 of the ASBR is thus
(1) To formulate and, after approval by the directly and openly repugnant to the Constitution
Committee, implement a program for the considering that it allows foreign corporations to
disposition of assets transferred to it under operate a public utility for an unlimited period of time.
this Proclamation, such program to be
completed within a period of five years from In carrying out its objective of disposing of
the date of the issuance of this Proclamation; government property, the APT should take into
account the pertinent laws. Since the method of
(2) Subject to its having received the prior disposing the PHILSECO that the APT had adopted
written approval of the Committee to sell such was through public bidding, it was duty-bound to
asset at a price and on terms of payment and follow the rules and regulations on competitive public
to a party disclosed to the Committee, to sell bidding, in order to uphold the elementary rule on
each asset referred to it by the Committee to fairness in such disposition. As this Court once said:
such party and on such terms as in its
discretion are in the best interest of the "x x x. A competitive public bidding aims to protect the
National Government, and for such purpose to public interest by giving the public the best possible
execute and deliver, on behalf and in the advantages through open competition. It is a
name of the National Government, such mechanism that enables the government agency to
deeds of sale, contracts and other instruments avoid or preclude anomalies in the execution of public
as may be necessary or appropriate to convey contracts."36
to adopt, alter and use a seal which shall be supplies, materials and equipment for official business
judicially noticed; to enter into contracts; to or public use, or for public works or repair. The three
39
sue and be sued; principles in public bidding are: the offer to the public;
an opportunity for competition; and a basis for exact
comparison of bids. The distinctive character of the
xxx xxx x x x"
system is destroyed and the purpose of its adoption is
thwarted when a regulation thereon excludes any of
Pursuant to these provisions, the APT drafted the these principles. Public bidding of government
40
ASBR. Since the APT’s rule-making authority is contracts and for the disposition of government assets
merely delegated, the ASBR should be measured by should have the same principles and objectives. Their
the standard set by said proclamation. Notably, the
34
only difference, if at all, is that in the public bidding for
discretion granted by the proclamation to the APT for public contracts, the award is generally given to the
the sale of government property is circumscribed only lowest bidder while in the disposition of government
by the "best interest of the National Government." assets, the award is to the highest bidder. The term
41
be granted a franchise should thus be deemed a sales, the presence of a Commission on Audit (COA)
paramount consideration in drafting the ASBR. In this representative who shall see to the proper
regard, worth noting is paragraph 15.0 of the ASBR, observance of auditing rules is imperative. In this
44
"Per information received from our Auditor at APT, no In drafting the ASBR, the APT should have noted the
prior approval was issued by their Office regarding fact that foreign investors were competing in the
said preferential option. We have instructed our bidding. While it is true that foreign investment should
Auditor thereat to advise this Office of the result of the be encouraged in this country, however, the ASBR
review of the Corporation’s procedures for the sale of provision on the right to top is unfair to all competitors,
the assets including the review of the bidding be they foreign or local, in the public auction of
documents pertaining to the subject public bidding 87.67% of PHILSECO shares as it provided for a
pursuant to the provisions of the Commission on Audit method that would set at naught the entire public
Circular No. 89-296 dated January 27, 1989." 45
bidding.
In according the KHI/PHI the right to top, the APT It was thus error for the Court of Appeals to conclude
violated the rule on competitive public bidding, under that petitioner was estopped from contesting the
which the highest bidder is declared the winner validity of the ASBR and the bidding procedure
entitled to the award of the subject of the auction sale. conducted pursuant to it. It is clear from the provisions
In effect, the grant to KHI/PHI of the right to top can of the ASBR itself that the basic rules on fair
be likened to a second bidding, which, however, is competition in public biddings have been disregarded.
allowed only if there is a failure of bidding, such as Although petitioner had the opportunity to examine the
when there is only one bidder or none at all. By
46
ASBR before it participated in the bidding, it cannot be
placing KHI/PHI in the advantageous position of estopped from questioning the unconstitutional, illegal
topping the highest bidder, the APT set aside the and inequitable provisions thereof. Estoppel is
basic rule in public bidding that there be an unavailing in this case; otherwise, it would stamp
opportunity for competition. validity to an act that is prohibited by law or against
public policy.
49
reason, therefore, for the petitioner to complain that person that now or hereafter may own,
operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, 3) Presidential Decree No. 218
for hire or compensation, with general or
limited clientele, whether permanent, 4) Presidential Decree No. 1419
occasional or accidental, and done for general
business purposes, any common carrier, 5) Presidential Decree No. 1623, as
railroad, street railway, traction railway, sub- amended
way motor vehicle, either for freight or
passenger, or both with or without fixed route
6) Presidential Decree No. 1789
and whatever may be its classification, freight
(1981)
or carrier service of any class, express
service, steamboat, or steamship line,
pontines, ferries, and water craft, engaged in 7) Presidential Decree No. 2032
the transportation of passengers or freight or
both, shipyard, marine railway, marine repair 8) Executive Order No. 815
shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration
plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric 9) Executive Order No. 1945 (1985)
light, heat and power, water supply and power,
petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless All other laws, decrees, executive
communications system, wire or wireless orders, administrative orders, rules
broadcasting stations and other similar public and regulations or parts thereof which
services x x x. (Emphasis supplied) are inconsistent with the provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed,
21
The repealing clause states: amended or modified accordingly."
"Sec. 20. The following provisions are Chapter II, Book II of Executive Order No.
31
1) Section 53, P.D. 463 (Mineral ART. 46. Permitted Investments. – (1)
Resources Development Decree); Without need of prior authority, anyone
not a Philippine national as that term
2) Section 1, P. D. 666 (Shipbuilding is defined in Article 15 of this Code,
and Ship Repair Industry); and not otherwise disqualified by law,
may invest:
3) Section 6, P. D. 1101 (Radioactive
Minerals); (a) In any enterprise registered under
Book One hereof, to the extent that
4) LOI 508 extending P.D. 791 and the total investment of non-Philippine
P.D. 924 (Sugar); and nationals therein would not affect its
status as a registered enterprise under
the law;
5) The following articles of Presidential
Decree 1789: 2, 18, 19, 22, 28, 30, 39,
49(d), 62, and 77. Articles 45, 46 and (b) In an enterprise not registered
48 are hereby amended only with under Book One hereof, to the extent
respect to domestic and export that the total investment of non-
producers. Philippine nationals herein shall not
exceed forty percent (40%) of the
outstanding capital of that enterprise,
All other laws, decrees, executive
unless existing law forbids any non-
orders, administrative orders, rules
Philippine ownership in the enterprise
and regulations or parts thereof which
or limits ownership by non-Philippine
are inconsistent with the provisions of
national to a percentage smaller than
this Act are hereby repealed,
forty percent (40%).
amended or modified accordingly.
(2) Within thirty (30) days after notice
All other incentive systems which are
of the investment is received by it, the
not in any way affected by the
enterprise in which any investment is
provisions of this Act may be
made by a non-Philippine national
restructured by the President so as to
shall register the same with the Board
render them cost-efficient and to make
of Investments for purposes of record.
them conform with the other policy
Investments made in the form of
guidelines in the declaration of policy
foreign exchange or other assets
provided in Section 2 of this Act."
actually transferred to the Philippines
shall also be registered with the
"ART. 85. Repealing Clause. – The following
22
Central Bank. The Board shall assess
provisions or laws are hereby repealed: and appraise the value of such assets
other than foreign exchange.
1) Batas Pambansa 44
There is no record showing that the joint
32
2) Batas Pambansa 391 (1983) venture between NIDC and Kawasaki was
registered with the SEC, the Board of
Investments and/or Export Processing Zone
Authorities.
89-296 states:
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
3.0 This public bidding shall be on an 4. I/We understand that the Committee on
Indicative Price Bidding basis. The Indicative Privatization (COP) has up to thirty (30) days to act on
price set for the National Government’s APT’s recommendation based on the result of this
87.67% equity in PHILSECO is PESOS: ONE bidding. Should the COP approve the highest bid,
BILLION THREE HUNDRED MILLION APT shall advise Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc.
(₱1,300,000,000.00). and/or its nominee, Philyards Holdings, Inc. that the
highest bid is acceptable to the National Government. Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) drafted for the sale of
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or Philyards the 87.67% equity of the National Government in
Holdings, Inc. shall then have a period of thirty (30) PHILSECO is illegal---not only because it violates the
calendar days from the date of receipt of such advice rules on competitive bidding--- but more so, because
from APT within which to exercise their "Option to Top it allows foreign corporations to own more than 40%
the Highest Bid" by offering a bid equivalent to the equity in the shipyard. It also held that "although the
14
"subject to the right of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, voided the transfer of the national government’s
Inc./Philyards Holdings, Inc. to top JGSMI’s bid by 5% 87.67% share in PHILSECO to Philyard Holdings,
as specified in the bidding rules."8 Inc., and upheld the right of JG Summit, as the
highest bidder, to take title to the said shares, viz:
On December 29, 1993, petitioner informed APT that
it was protesting the offer of PHI to top its bid on the Wherefore, the instant petition for review on certiorari
grounds that: (a) the KAWASAKI/PHI consortium is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution
composed of Kawasaki, Philyards, Mitsui, Keppel, SM of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
Group, ICTSI and Insular Life violated the ASBR ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered to pay to APT its bid
because the last four (4) companies were the losing price of Two Billion Thirty Million Pesos
bidders thereby circumventing the law and prejudicing (₱2,030,000,000.00 ), less its bid deposit plus
the weak winning bidder; (b) only KAWASAKI could interests upon the finality of this Decision. In turn, APT
exercise the right to top; (c) giving the same option to is ordered to:
top to PHI constituted unwarranted benefit to a third
party; (d) no right of first refusal can be exercised in a (a) accept the said amount of
public bidding or auction sale; and (e) the JG Summit ₱2,030,000,000.00 less bid deposit and
consortium was not estopped from questioning the interests from petitioner;
proceedings. 9
the right of first refusal and the right to top are prima issues for our resolution: (1) Whether PHILSECO is a
facie legal and that the petitioner, "by participating in public utility; (2) Whether under the 1977 JVA,
the public bidding, with full knowledge of the right to KAWASAKI can exercise its right of first refusal only
top granted to KASAWASAKI/Philyards is . . up to 40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO;
.estopped from questioning the validity of the award and (3) Whether the right to top granted to
given to Philyards after the latter exercised the right to KAWASAKI violates the principles of competitive
top and had paid in full the purchase price of the bidding.
subject shares, pursuant to the ASBR." Petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of said Decision which I.
was denied on March 15, 1996. Petitioner thus filed a Whether PHILSECO is a Public Utility.
Petition for Certiorari with this Court alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court. 11
After carefully reviewing the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, we hold that PHILSECO is not a public
On November 20, 2000, this Court rendered the now utility for the following reasons:
assailed Decision ruling among others that the Court
of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition on the First. By nature, a shipyard is not a public utility.
sole ground of the impropriety of the special civil
action of mandamus because the petition was also A "public utility" is "a business or service engaged in
one of certiorari. It further ruled that a shipyard like
12
regularly supplying the public with some commodity or
PHILSECO is a public utility whose capitalization must service of public consequence such as electricity, gas,
be sixty percent (60%) Filipino-owned. Consequently,
13
water, transportation, telephone or telegraph
the right to top granted to KAWASAKI under the Asset service." To constitute a public utility, the facility must
18
be necessary for the maintenance of life and public utility which is not in fact such; and a private
occupation of the residents. However, the fact that a business operated under private contracts with
business offers services or goods that promote public selected customers and not devoted to public use
good and serve the interest of the public does not cannot, by legislative fiat or by order of a public
automatically make it a public utility. Public use is not service commission, be declared a public utility, since
synonymous with public interest. As its name that would be taking private property for public use
indicates, the term "public utility" implies public use without just compensation, which cannot be done
and service to the public. The principal determinative consistently with the due process clause. 24
a limited clientele whom it may choose to serve at its Sec. 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form or
discretion. While it offers its facilities to whoever may authorization for the operation of a public utility shall
wish to avail of its services, a shipyard is not legally be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
obliged to render its services indiscriminately to the corporations or other entities organized under the
public. It has no legal obligation to render the services laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital
sought by each and every client. The fact that it of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor
publicly offers its services does not give the public a shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be
legal right to demand that such services be rendered. exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. No franchise or right shall be granted to any
There can be no disagreement that the shipbuilding individual, firm or corporation, except under the
and ship repair industry is imbued with public interest condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
as it involves the maintenance of the seaworthiness of alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when
vessels dedicated to the transportation of either the public interest so requires. (emphasis supplied)
persons or goods. Nevertheless, the fact that a
business is affected with public interest does not imply To accelerate the development of shipbuilding and
that it is under a duty to serve the public. While the ship repair industry, former President Ferdinand E.
business may be regulated for public good, the Marcos issued P.D. No. 666 granting the following
regulation cannot justify the classification of a purely incentives:
private enterprise as a public utility. The legislature
cannot, by its mere declaration, make something a
SECTION 1. Shipbuilding and ship repair yards duly under the Constitution and from the need to
registered with the Maritime Industry Authority shall be obtain Certificate of Public Convenience
entitled to the following incentive benefits: pursuant to section 15 of C.A No. 146. Section
1 (d) of P.D. 666 reads:
(a) Exemption from import duties and taxes.-
The importation of machinery, equipment and (d) Registration required but not as a Public
materials for shipbuilding, ship repair and/or Utility.- The business of constructing and
alteration, including indirect import, as well as repairing vessels or parts thereof shall not
replacement and spare parts for the repair be considered a public utility and no
and overhaul of vessels such as steel plates, Certificate of Public Convenience shall be
electrical machinery and electronic parts, shall required therefor. However, no shipyard,
be exempt from the payment of customs duty graving dock, marine railway or marine repair
and compensating tax: Provided, however, shop and no person or enterprise shall
That the Maritime Industry Authority certifies engage in construction and/or repair of any
that the item or items imported are not vessel, or any phase or part thereof, without a
produced locally in sufficient quantity and valid Certificate of Registration and license for
acceptable quality at reasonable prices, and this purpose from the Maritime Industry
that the importation is directly and actually Authority, except those owned or operated by
needed and will be used exclusively for the the Armed Forces of the Philippines or by
construction, repair, alteration, or overhaul of foreign governments pursuant to a treaty or
merchant vessels, and other watercrafts; agreement. (emphasis supplied)
Provided, further, That if the above machinery,
equipment, materials and spare parts are sold Any law, decree, executive order, or rules and
to non-tax exempt persons or entities, the regulations inconsistent with P.D. No. 666 were
corresponding duties and taxes shall be paid repealed or modified accordingly. Consequently,
28
by the original importer; Provided, finally, That sections 13 (b) and 15 of C.A. No. 146 were repealed
local dealers and/or agents who sell in so far as the former law included shipyards in the
machinery, equipment, materials and list of public utilities and required the certificate of
accessories to shipyards for shipbuilding and public convenience for their operation. Simply stated,
ship repair are entitled to tax credits, subject the repeal was due to irreconcilable inconsistency,
to approval by the total tariff duties and and by definition, this kind of repeal falls under the
compensating tax paid for said machinery, category of an implied repeal. 29
(c) Exemption from contractor’s percentage Sec. 2. Declaration of Investment Policy.- It is the
tax.- The gross receipts derived by policy of the State to encourage private domestic and
shipbuilders and ship repairers from foreign investments in industry, agriculture, mining
shipbuilding and ship repairing activities shall and other sectors of the economy which shall: provide
be exempt from the Contractor’s Tax provided significant employment opportunities relative to the
in Section 91 of the National Internal Revenue amount of the capital being invested; increase
Code during the first ten years from productivity of the land, minerals, forestry, aquatic and
registration with the Maritime Industry other resources of the country, and improve utilization
Authority, provided that such registration is of the products thereof; improve technical skills of the
effected not later than the year 1990; people employed in the enterprise; provide a
Provided, That any and all amounts which foundation for the future development of the economy;
would otherwise have been paid as accelerate development of less developed regions of
contractor’s tax shall be set aside as a the country; and result in increased volume and value
separate fund, to be known as "Shipyard of exports for the economy.
Development Fund", by the contractor for the
purpose of expansion, modernization and/or It is the policy of the State to extend to projects which
improvement of the contractor’s own will significantly contribute to the attainment of these
shipbuilding or ship repairing facilities; objectives, fiscal incentives without which said
Provided, That, for this purpose, the projects may not be established in the locales,
contractor shall submit an annual statement of number and/or pace required for optimum national
its receipts to the Maritime Industry Authority; economic development. Fiscal incentive systems shall
and Provided, further, That any disbursement be devised to compensate for market imperfections,
from such fund for any of the purposes reward performance of making contributions to
hereinabove stated shall be subject to economic development, cost-efficient and be simple
approval by the Maritime Industry Authority. to administer.
In addition, P.D. No. 666 removed the The fiscal incentives shall be extended to stimulate
shipbuilding and ship repair industry from the establishment and assist initial operations of the
list of public utilities, thereby freeing the enterprise, and shall terminate after a period of not
industry from the 60% citizenship requirement
more than 10 years from registration or start-up of shipyards effectively removed from the list of public
operation unless a special period is otherwise stated. utilities. Ergo, with the express repeal of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 391 by E.O. No. 226, the revival of
The foregoing declaration shall apply to all investment sections 13 (b) and 15 of C.A. No. 146 had no more
incentive schemes and in particular will supersede leg to stand on. A law that has been expressly
article 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1789. (emphases repealed ceases to exist and becomes inoperative
supplied) from the moment the repealing law becomes
effective. Hence, there is simply no basis in the
31
With the new investment incentive regime, Batas conclusion that shipyards remain to be a public utility.
Pambansa Blg. 391 repealed the following laws, viz: A repealed statute cannot be the basis for classifying
shipyards as public utilities.
Sec. 20. The following provisions are hereby
repealed: In view of the foregoing, there can be no other
conclusion than to hold that a shipyard is not a pubic
utility. A shipyard has been considered a public utility
1) Section 53, P.D. 463 (Mineral Resources
merely by legislative declaration. Absent this
Development Decree);
declaration, there is no more reason why it should
continuously be regarded as such. The fact that the
2.) Section 1, P.D. 666 (Shipbuilding and legislature did not clearly and unambiguously express
Ship Repair Industry); its intention to include shipyards in the list of public
utilities indicates that that it did not intend to do so.
3) Section 6, P.D. 1101 (Radioactive Thus, a shipyard reverts back to its status as non-
Minerals); public utility prior to the enactment of the Public
Service Law.
4) LOI 508 extending P.D. 791 and P.D. 924
(Sugar); and This interpretation is in accord with the uniform
interpretation placed upon it by the Board of
5) The following articles of Presidential Investments (BOI), which was entrusted by the
Decree 1789: 2, 18, 19, 22, 28, 30, 39, 49 (d), legislature with the preparation of annual Investment
62, and 77. Articles 45, 46 and 48 are hereby Priorities Plan (IPPs). The BOI has consistently
amended only with respect to domestic and classified shipyards as part of the manufacturing
export producers. sector and not of the public utilities sector. The
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 391 did not alter
All other laws, decrees, executive orders, the treatment of the BOI on shipyards. It has been, as
administrative orders, rules and regulations or parts at present, classified as part of the manufacturing and
thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of not of the public utilities sector.
32
affected by the provisions of this Act may be franchise. If we continue to hold that a shipyard is a
restructured by the President so as to render them pubic utility, it is a necessary consequence that all
cost-efficient and to make them conform with the these entities should have obtained a franchise as
other policy guidelines in the declaration of policy was the rule prior to the enactment of P.D. No. 666.
provided in Section 2 of this Act. (emphasis supplied) But MARINA remains without authority, pursuant to
P.D. No. 474 to issue franchises for the operation of
34
From the language of the afore-quoted provision, the shipyards. Surely, the legislature did not intend to
whole of P.D. No. 666, section 1 was expressly and create a vacuum by continuously treating a shipyard
categorically repealed. As a consequence, the as a public utility without giving MARINA the power to
provisions of C.A. No. 146, which were impliedly issue a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) or a
repealed by P.D. No. 666, section 1 were revived. In
30 Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
other words, with the enactment of Batas Pambansa (CPCN) as required by section 15 of C.A. No. 146.
Blg. 391, a shipyard reverted back to its status as a
public utility and as such, requires a CPC for its II.
operation. Whether under the 1977 Joint Venture Agreement,
KAWASAKI can purchase only a maximum of 40%
The crux of the present controversy is the effect of the of PHILSECO’s total capitalization.
express repeal of Batas Pambansa Blg. 391 by
Executive Order No. 226 issued by former President A careful reading of the 1977 Joint Venture Agreement
Corazon C. Aquino under her emergency powers. reveals that there is nothing that prevents KAWASAKI
from acquiring more than 40% of PHILSECO’s total
We rule that the express repeal of Batas Pambansa capitalization. Section 1 of the 1977 JVA states:
Blg. 391 by E.O. No. 226 did not revive Section 1 of
P.D. No. 666. But more importantly, it also put a 1.3 The authorized capital stock of Philseco shall be
period to the existence of sections 13 (b) and 15 of ₱330 million. The parties shall thereafter increase
C.A. No. 146. It bears emphasis that sections 13 (b) their subscription in Philseco as may be necessary
and 15 of C.A. No. 146, as originally written, owed and as called by the Board of Directors, maintaining a
their continued existence to Batas Pambansa Blg. proportion of 60%-40% for NIDC and KAWASAKI
391. Had the latter not repealed P.D. No. 666, the respectively, up to a total subscribed and paid-up
former should have been modified accordingly and capital stock of ₱312 million.
1.4 Neither party shall sell, transfer or assign all or would limit the right of KAWASAKI to purchase
any part of its interest in SNS [renamed PHILSECO] PHILSECO shares only to the extent of its original
to any third party without giving the other under the proportionate contribution of 40% to the total
same terms the right of first refusal. This provision capitalization of the PHILSECO. Taken together with
shall not apply if the transferee is a corporation owned the whole of section 1.4, the phrase "under the same
and controlled by the GOVERMENT [of the terms" means that a partner to the joint venture that
Philippines] or by a Kawasaki affiliate. decides to sell its shares to a third party shall make a
similar offer to the non-selling partner. The selling
1.5 The By-Laws of SNS [PHILSECO] shall grant the partner cannot make a different or a more onerous
parties preemptive rights to unissued shares of SNS offer to the non-selling partner.
[PHILSECO]. 35
competition. We hold that it does not. public bidding does not negate the exercise of the
right of first refusal. In fact, public bidding is an
The essence of competition in public bidding is that essential first step in the exercise of the right of first
the bidders are placed on equal footing. This means refusal because it is only after the public bidding that
that all qualified bidders have an equal chance of the terms upon which the Government may be said to
winning the auction through their bids. In the case at be willing to sell its shares to third parties may be
bar, all of the bidders were exposed to the same risk known. It is only after the public bidding that the
1âwphi1
and were subjected to the same condition, i.e., the Government will have a basis with which to offer
existence of KAWASAKI’s right to top. Under the KAWASAKI the option to buy or forego the shares.
ASBR, the Government expressly reserved the right
to reject any or all bids, and manifested its intention Assuming that the parties did not swap KAWASAKI’s
not to accept the highest bid should KAWASAKI right of first refusal with the right to top, KAWASAKI
decide to exercise its right to top under the ABSR. would have been able to buy the National
This reservation or qualification was made known to Government’s shares in PHILSECO under the same
the bidders in a pre-bidding conference held on terms as offered by the highest bidder. Stated
September 28, 1993. They all expressly accepted this otherwise, by exercising its right of first refusal,
condition in writing without any qualification. KAWASAKI could have bought the shares for only
Furthermore, when the Committee on Privatization ₱2.03 billion and not the higher amount of ₱2.1315
notified petitioner of the approval of the sale of the billion. There is, thus, no basis in the submission that
National Government shares of stock in PHILSECO, it the right to top unfairly favored KAWASAKI. In fact,
specifically stated that such approval was subject to with the right to top, KAWASAKI stands to pay higher
the right of KAWASAKI Heavy Industries, than it should had it settled with its right of first refusal.
Inc./Philyards Holdings, Inc. to top JGSMI’s bid by 5% The obvious beneficiary of the scheme is the National
as specified in the bidding rules. Clearly, the approval Government.
of the sale was a conditional one. Since Philyards
eventually exercised its right to top petitioner’s bid by If at all, the obvious consideration for the exchange of
5%, the sale was not consummated. Parenthetically, it the right of first refusal with the right to top is that
cannot be argued that the existence of the right to top KAWASAKI can name a nominee, which it is a
"set for naught the entire public bidding." Had shareholder, to exercise the right to top. This is a valid
Philyards Holdings, Inc. failed or refused to exercise contractual stipulation; the right to top is an
its right to top, the sale between the petitioner and the assignable right and both parties are aware of the full
National Government would have been legal consequences of its exercise. As aforesaid, all
bidders were aware of the existence of the right to passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine
top, and its possible effects on the result of the public railway, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice
bidding was fully disclosed to them. The petitioner, plant, ice refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation
thus, cannot feign ignorance nor can it be allowed to system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water
repudiate its acts and question the proceedings it had supply and power petroleum, sewerage system,
fully adhered to. 43
wire or wireless communications systems, wire or
wireless broadcasting stations and other similar
The fact that the losing bidder, Keppel Consortium public services. x x x" (Underscoring supplied).
(composed of Keppel, SM Group, Insular Life
Assurance, Mitsui and ICTSI), has joined Philyards in 27
This provision is substantially reproduced in Article
the latter’s effort to raise ₱2.131 billion necessary in XIV, section 5 of the 1973 Constitution and in
exercising the right to top is not contrary to law, public Article XII, section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
policy or public morals. There is nothing in the ASBR
that bars the losing bidders from joining either the 29
A declaration in the statute, usually in its repealing
winning bidder (should the right to top is not clause, that a particular and specific law, identified
exercised) or KAWASAKI/PHI (should it exercise its by its number of title, is repealed is an express
right to top as it did), to raise the purchase price. The repeal; all other repeals are implied repeals. See
petitioner did not allege, nor was it shown by Mecano v.Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 500
competent evidence, that the participation of the (1992) citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 289
losing bidders in the public bidding was done with (1986).
fraudulent intent. Absent any proof of fraud, the
formation by Philyards of a consortium is legitimate in 30
Book I, Chapter 5, section 22 provides: "Revival of
a free enterprise system. The appellate court is thus Law Impliedly Repealed. When a law which
correct in holding the petitioner estopped from impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the
questioning the validity of the transfer of the National prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the
Government’s shares in PHILSECO to respondent. repealing law provides otherwise."
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
25
Act No. 2307 was amended by Act No. 2694. It was
subsequently repealed by Act No. 3108. Later
however, Act No. 3108 was also repealed by
Commonwealth Act No. 146. The series of
amendments and repeals did not alter the
character of shipyards as public utilities. Section
13 (b) of C.A. No. 146 provides that:
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
4.1. Contribution of [Marsman Drysdale]-[Marsman 4.3.9 If any Party agrees to make an advance to the
Drysdale] shall contribute the Property. Project but fails to do so (in whole or in part) the other
party may advance the shortfall and the Party in
The total appraised value of the Property is PESOS: default shall indemnify the Party making the substitute
FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY MILLION advance on demand for all of its losses, costs and
(P420,000,000.00). expenses incurred in so doing. (emphasis supplied;
underscoring in the original)
For this purpose, [Marsman Drysdale] shall deliver the
Property in a buildable condition within ninety (90) Via Technical Services Contract (TSC) dated July 14,
days from signing of this Agreement barring any 1997,2 the joint venture engaged the services of
unforeseen circumstances over which [Marsman Philippine Geoanalytics, Inc. (PGI) to provide
Drysdale] has no control. Buildable condition shall subsurface soil exploration, laboratory testing, seismic
mean that the old building/structure which stands on study and geotechnical engineering for the project.
the Property is demolished and taken to ground level. PGI, was, however, able to drill only four of five
boreholes needed to conduct its subsurface soil
4.2. Contribution of [Gotesco]- [Gotesco] shall exploration and laboratory testing, justifying its failure
contribute the amount of PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED to drill the remaining borehole to the failure on the part
TWENTY MILLION (P420,000,000.00) in cash which of the joint venture partners to clear the area where
shall be payable as follows: the drilling was to be made.3 PGI was able to
complete its seismic study though.
4.2.1. The amount of PESOS: FIFTY MILLION
(P50,000,000.00) upon signing of this Agreement. PGI then billed the joint venture on November 24,
1997 for ₱284,553.50 representing the cost of partial
subsurface soil exploration; and on January 15, 1998
4.2.2. The balance of PESOS: THREE HUNDRED
for ₱250,800 representing the cost of the completed
SEVENTY MILLION (P370,000,000.00) shall be paid
seismic study.4
based on progress billings, relative to the
development and construction of the Building, but
shall in no case exceed ten (10) months from delivery Despite repeated demands from PGI,5 the joint
of the Property in a Buildable condition as defined in venture failed to pay its obligations.
section 4.1.
Meanwhile, due to unfavorable economic conditions
A joint account shall be opened and maintained by at the time, the joint venture was cut short and the
both Parties for handling of said balance, among other planned building project was eventually shelved.6
Project concerns.
PGI subsequently filed on November 11, 1999 a
4.3. Funding and Financing complaint for collection of sum of money and
damages at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City against Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco.
4.3.1 Construction funding for the Project shall be
obtained from the cash contribution of [Gotesco].
In its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim,
Marsman Drysdale passed the responsibility of paying
4.3.2 Subsequent funding shall be obtained from the
PGI to Gotesco which, under the JVA, was solely
pre-selling of units in the Building or, when necessary,
liable for the monetary expenses of the project.7
from loans from various banks or financial institutions.
[Gotesco] shall arrange the required funding from
such banks or financial institutions, under such terms Gotesco, on the other hand, countered that PGI has
and conditions which will provide financing rates no cause of action against it as PGI had yet to
favorable to the Parties. complete the services enumerated in the contract;
and that Marsman Drysdale failed to clear the
property of debris which prevented PGI from
4.3.3 [Marsman Drysdale] shall not be obligated to
completing its work.8
fund the Project as its contribution is limited to the
Property.
By Decision of June 2, 2004,9 Branch 226 of the
Quezon City RTC rendered judgment in favor of PGI,
4.3.4 If the cost of the Project exceeds the cash
disposing as follows:
contribution of [Gotesco], the proceeds obtained from
the pre-selling of units and proceeds from loans, the
Parties shall agree on other sources and terms of WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment
funding such excess as soon as practicable. is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff [PGI].
(3) the sum of P200,000.00 as and for In G.R. No. 183374, Marsman Drysdale imputes error
attorney’s fees; and on the appellate court in
In partly affirming the trial court’s decision, the At all events, the Court is convinced that PGI had
appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the more than sufficiently established its claims against
terms of the JVA, the joint venture cannot avoid the joint venture. In fact, Marsman Drysdale had long
payment of PGI’s claim since "[the JVA] could not recognized PGI’s contractual claims when it (PGI)
affect third persons like [PGI] because of the basic received a Certificate of Payment16 from the joint
civil law principle of relativity of contracts which venture’s project manager17 which was endorsed to
provides that contracts can only bind the parties who Gotesco for processing and payment.18
entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third
person, even if he is aware of such contract and has The core issue to be resolved then is which between
acted with knowledge thereof."11 joint venturers Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco bears
the liability to pay PGI its unpaid claims.
Their motions for partial reconsideration having been
denied,12 Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco filed To Marsman Drysdale, it is Gotesco since, under the
separate petitions for review with the Court which JVA, construction funding for the project was to be
were docketed as G.R. Nos. 183374 and 183376, obtained from Gotesco’s cash contribution, as its
(Marsman Drysdale’s) participation in the venture was his services he has contributed capital, he shall also
limited to the land. receive a share in the profits in proportion to his
capital. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Gotesco maintains, however, that it has no liability to
pay PGI since it was due to the fault of Marsman In the JVA, Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco agreed
Drysdale that PGI was unable to complete its on a 50-50 ratio on the proceeds of the project.21 They
undertaking. did not provide for the splitting of losses, however.
Applying the above-quoted provision of Article 1797
The Court finds Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco then, the same ratio applies in splitting the
jointly liable to PGI. ₱535,353.50 obligation-loss of the joint venture.
PGI executed a technical service contract with the The appellate court’s decision must be modified,
joint venture and was never a party to the JVA. While however. Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco being
the JVA clearly spelled out, inter alia, the capital jointly liable, there is no need for Gotesco to
contributions of Marsman Drysdale (land) and reimburse Marsman Drysdale for "50% of the
Gotesco (cash) as well as the funding and financing aggregate sum due" to PGI.
mechanism for the project, the same cannot be used
to defeat the lawful claim of PGI against the two joint Allowing Marsman Drysdale to recover from Gotesco
venturers-partners. what it paid to PGI would not only be contrary to the
law on partnership on division of losses but would
The TSC clearly listed the joint venturers Marsman partake of a clear case of unjust enrichment at
Drysdale and Gotesco as the beneficial owner of the Gotesco’s expense. The grant by the lower courts of
project,19and all billing invoices indicated the Marsman Drysdale cross-claim against Gotesco was
consortium therein as the client. thus erroneous.
As the appellate court held, Articles 1207 and 1208 of Marsman Drysdale’s supplication for the award of
the Civil Code, which respectively read: attorney’s fees in its favor must be denied. It cannot
claim that it was compelled to litigate or that the civil
Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors action or proceeding against it was clearly unfounded,
or of two or more debtors in one and the same for the JVA provided that, in the event a party
obligation does not imply that each one of the former advances funds for the project, the joint venture shall
has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is repay the advancing party. 22
bound to render, entire compliance with the
prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the
1avvphi1
Marsman Drysdale was thus not precluded from
obligation expressly so states, or when the law or advancing funds to pay for PGI’s contracted services
nature of the obligation requires solidarity. to abate any legal action against the joint venture
itself. It was in fact hardline insistence on Gotesco
Art. 1208. If from the law, or the nature or the wording having sole responsibility to pay for the obligation,
of the obligations to which the preceding article refers despite the fact that PGI’s services redounded to the
the contrary does not appear, the credit or debt shall benefit of the joint venture, that spawned the legal
be presumed to be divided into as many equal shares action against it and Gotesco.
as there are creditors or debtors, the credits or debts
being considered distinct from one another, subject to Finally, an interest of 12% per annum on the
the Rules of Court governing the multiplicity of suits. outstanding obligation must be imposed from the time
(emphasis and underscoring supplied), of demand23 as the delay in payment makes the
obligation one of forbearance of money, conformably
presume that the obligation owing to PGI is joint with this Court’s ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
between Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco. v. Court of Appeals.24 Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco
should bear legal interest on their respective
obligations.
The only time that the JVA may be made to apply in
the present petitions is when the liability of the joint
venturers to each other would set in. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the order for Gotesco to
A joint venture being a form of partnership, it is to be
reimburse Marsman Drysdale is DELETED, and
governed by the laws on partnership.20 Article 1797 of
interest of 12% per annum on the respective
the Civil Code provides:
obligations of Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco is
imposed, computed from the last demand or on
Art. 1797. The losses and profits shall be distributed January 5, 1999 up to the finality of the Decision.
in conformity with the agreement. If only the share of
each partner in the profits has been agreed upon, the
If the adjudged amount and the interest remain unpaid
share of each in the losses shall be in the same
thereafter, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum
proportion.
computed from the time the judgment becomes final
and executory until it is fully satisfied. The appealed
In the absence of stipulation, the share of each in the decision is, in all other respects, affirmed.
profits and losses shall be in proportion to what he
may have contributed, but the industrial partner shall
Costs against petitioners Marsman Drysdale and
not be liable for the losses. As for the profits, the
Gotesco.
industrial partner shall receive such share as may be
just and equitable under the circumstances. If besides
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
19
In the Technical Services Contract’s SC-1
Definitions portion, it was stated that "OWNER
means Marsman-Drysdale Land, Inc./Gotesco
Properties, Inc., a Joint Venture and its
authorized representatives and successors in
interest."
21
I Records, p. 107. Section 8 of the JVA
states that: "x x x x. a) proceeds from the JV
shall be shared equally on a 50:50 ratio
between the Parties unless such ratio is
changed due to additional investments as
provided in Section 4.3; x x x x."
22
I Records, p. 105. The JVA states that: "x x x
x. 4.3.8. All funds advanced by a Party (or by
third parties in substitution for advances from
a Party) shall be repaid by the [joint venture].
x x x x."