PART I

Article I. National Territory

Territorial Sea
Archipelagic Doctrine
Convention on the Law of the Sea

Magalona v. Ermita

Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies

State, Government, Sovereignty

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Key

Political and International Law; Validity of Acts of “De Facto” Government—It is a legal truism in political
and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments
of a de facto government are good and valid.

Kinds of “De Facto” Government—There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or
government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or
usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against
the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament
and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military
forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a
government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine in Maine, which was reduced to British possession
in the war of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the
United States. And the third is that established as an independent government by inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent state, such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in
revolt against the Union during the war of secession.

In re Letter of Associate Justice Puno

Courts; Political Law; The rise of President Corazon C. Aquino to power was by way of resolution—It is
widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it
was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution
had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that
the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s government which was met by little resistance and her control of the
state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the
departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signalled the point
where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to obeyed by the Filipino.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
Constitutional Law; Revolutionary Governments; Bill of Rights; International Law; The resulting
government following the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 was indisputably a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government,
as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.—The EDSA Revolution
took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated
25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.”

Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Constitutional Law; Statutes; Contracts; Words and Phrases; A constitution is a system of fundamental
laws for the governance and administration of a nation—it is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount, and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.—We now
resolve. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective
powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a
law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Tanada v. Angara

Constitutional Law; Constitutional Principles and State Policies; The principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of
which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.—By it very title, Article II of the Constitution is a
“declaration of principles and state policies.” The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is
called the “basic political creed of the nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the
judiciary as aids of as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, the principles and
state principles enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not “self-executing provisions,
the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”

Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,

Constitutional Law; The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right; The right to a balanced
and healthful ecology.—The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right—the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law.

Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel

Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Information on Matters of Public Concern; Court has
recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually
accorded constitutional status.—As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 (1948), the Court has
recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually
accorded constitutional status.

MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

Remedial Law; Mandamus; These government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation,
to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection and
preservation of the Manila Bat.—A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling
statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a
matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to
perform these duties.

Fortun, et. Al. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

In issuing Proclamation No. 1959, President Arroyo exercised the most awesome and powerful among her
graduated Commander-in-Chief powers to suppress a supposed rebellion in Maguindanao, following the
massacre of 57 civilians in the worst election-related violence in the country’s history. Since then, the
government branded the Ampatuans, the alleged masterminds of the massacre, as rebels orchestrating
the overthrow of the Arroyo administration. However, the events before, during, and after the massacre
negate the existence of an armed uprising aimed at bringing down the government, but rather point to a
surfeit of impunity and abuse of power of a political clan closely allied with the Arroyo administration. In
short, Proclamation No. 1959 was issued without an actual rebellion justifying the same.

The Constitution is clear. Only in case of actual invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it, can a
state of martial law be declared or the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be suspended. Proclamation
No. 1959 cannot be justified on the basis of a threatened, imminent, or looming rebellion, which ground
was intentionally deleted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution. Considering the non-existence of an
actual rebellion in Maguindanao, Proclamation No. 1959 is unconstitutional for lack of factual basis as
required under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution for the declaration of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Incorporation Clause

Mejoff v. Director of Prisons

Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a
member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other
fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human
beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights
and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status"
(Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.

Kuroda v. Jalandoni

Constitutional Law; Validity of Executive Order No. 68 establishing a national war crimes office.—Executive
Order No. 68 which was issued by the President of the Philippines in the 29th day of July, 1947, is valid and
constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3 that “The Philippines renounces war
as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the nation.”

Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis

We characterized “generally accepted principles of international law” as norms of general or customary

international law that are binding on all states. We held further: Generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees
those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element
is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it.

Bayan Muna v. Romulo

Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N
BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement. Petitioners’ contention––perhaps
taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargons––is untenable.
One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,
wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international
jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity
with all nations. An exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-governmental agreements,” which
is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections
(Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows: An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine
agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the
exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the
offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats
or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of
its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.

Right to life; protection of the unborn

James M. Imbong, et. Al., v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. Even if not formally
established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of,
or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the
laws of men. In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Article VI. Legislative Department

Legislative Power

Garcia v. COMELEC

There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive
right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode,
let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly
given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. What the
Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by
Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to
enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by
direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this
alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the
difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.

Vera v. Avelino

By examining the provisions of the Constitution, the vulgar notion of the principle of separation of powers
can be shown to be wrong, as there is neither an office nor a department, created or allowed to be created
under the Constitution, that may be considered as effectively separate from the others, as the
misinformed people would have it. As a matter of fact, there is no government power vested exclusively
in any authority, office, or government agency. Section 1 of Article VI vests the legislative power in a
Congress of the Philippines, but this provision does not preclude the President of the Philippines and the
Supreme Court from partaking in the exercise of legislative power. The President has the initiative in the
making of appropriations which may not be increased by Congress except those pertaining to Congress
itself and the judicial department, and the President may veto any bill enacted by Congress (sections 19
and 20, Article VI, of the Constitution). The Supreme Court may declare unconstitutional and, therefore,
nullify a law enacted by Congress and approved by the President of the Philippines (sections 2 and 10,
Article VIII, of the Constitution). The Supreme Court exercises, besides, legislative power in promulgating
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts (section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution)

Separation of Powers

Senate v. Ermita
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom,
as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty.
In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is
"in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in
Arnault.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and
the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the
executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.

KMU v. NEDA Director General

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President
did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces
costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of
current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive
issuance and not an act of legislation.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Reyes

The honor and integrity of the judiciary is measured not only by the fairness and correctness of the
decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved. Thus, judges must perform
their official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. There is
no excuse for mediocrity in the performance of judicial functions. The position of judge exacts nothing
less than faithful observance of the law and the Constitutionin the discharge of official duties.

Belgica et. Al., v. Ochoa, et. Al.,

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental
powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, it
means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." To the legislative branch
of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of
government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers
have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." Thus, "the
legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." The principle of separation
of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of
government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is
hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To
achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are
equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence
would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions
of another or others.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled
in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand
what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor
(Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from
the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from
such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these
two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that
the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators
have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus,
keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013
PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

Non-delegability of legislative power

Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government
but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its
delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated
by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such
occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that
the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

Tatad v. Secretary of Energy

Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that
Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997,
regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and
the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the
question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date
of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the
judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation
to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words “as far as practicable,” “declining” and “stable” should have been
defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn
submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and
cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to
practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a downward direction, and “stable” as meaning firmly
established. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that
will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more
general standards in other cases.

Sema v. Commission on Elections

In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and
Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities
necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM
Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution
mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because
the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as
provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the
ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

Abakada Guro, et al v. Hon. Cesar Purisima

Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as
a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule
on presentment. Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states: Section 1. The legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. Legislative
power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) is vested in Congress which consists of
two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires
the act of both chambers. Corollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor
by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-
chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.

Camid v. Office of the President

EO 107 which established Andong was declared “null and void ab initio in 1965 by the Supreme Court
in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), along with 33 other EOs. The phrase ”ab initio“ means
“from the beginning”. Pelaez was never reversed by the SC but was rather expressly affirmed in the cases
of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong
v. Moya. No subsequent ruling declared Pelaez as overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation has
been passed since 1965 creating the Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason
to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.

Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities yet limited it’s
nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. With the
promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by
executive order but not judicially annulled – Sec. 442(b) of the LGC deemed curative whatever legal
defects to title these municipalities had labored under.
Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm/reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities which
had been previously created by presidential issuances/EOs. The provision only affirms the legal
personalities of those municipalities which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet
were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities
judicially dissolved remain inexistent unless recreated through specific legislative enactments.
The legal effect of the nullification of a municipality in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the
voided town back to their original municipalities.

Vivas v. Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

Composition and Qualifications

Tobias v. Abalos
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board
ABC v. COMELEC
Banat v. COMELEC
Faypon v. Quirino
Coalition of Association of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC

Parliamentary Immunities

Trillantes IV v. Pimentel
Gimenez v. Cabangbang

Inhibitions, Prohibitions, Organizations and Proceedings

Puyat v. De Guzman
Avelino v. Cuenco
Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito
Morales v. Subido

Electoral Tribunal

Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal

Bondoc v. Pineda
Chavez v. COMELEC
Lerias v. House Electoral Tribunal

Commission on Appointments

Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales

Daza v. Singson
Legislative Investigations

Arnault v. Nazareno
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Standard Charter v. Senate