Political - Political Law 2015 Cases - Cruz (2016) PDF

JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW

Excerpts from the 2015 Decisions of the Supreme Court
Compiled by
PROF. CARLO L. CRUZ
THE CONCEPT OF A STATE
Act of State
… the power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign
power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people… Every sovereign
power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem
proper for its self-preservation or public interest. (Rosas v. Montor, G.R. No. 204105, October 14, 2015)
STATE IMMUNITY
Estoppel
Respondents cannot also find solace in the general rule that the State is not barred by estoppel by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. As jurisprudence elucidates, the doctrine is subject to
exceptions, viz:
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except [in rare] and
unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective
operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and
should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.
Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its
citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations..., the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private
individuals. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116111, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 366, 367)
Clearly, estoppel against the government can be invoked in this case. This is in view of the fact that
despite BCDA‘s repeated assurances that it would respect SMLI‘s rights as an original proponent, and
after putting the latter to considerable trouble and expense, BCDA went back on its word to comply with
its obligations under their agreement and instead ultimately cancelled the same. (SM Land, Inc. v. Bases
Conversion and Development Authority, G. R. No. 203655, March 18, 2015)
However, while petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, was admittedly ornery in the
prosecution of its case, it is nonetheless true that ―[a]s a matter of doctrine, illegal acts of government
agents do not bind the State,‖ and ―the Government is never estopped from questioning the acts of its
officials, more so if they are erroneous, let alone irregular.‖ This principle applies in land registration
cases. Certainly, the State will not be allowed to abdicate its authority over lands of the public domain
just because its agents and officers have been negligent in the performance of their duties. (Republic v.
Sps. Benigno, G.R. No. 205492, March 11, 2015)
SEPARATION OF POWERS
… the filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is "not subject to judicial restraint[.]"
(In The Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) And Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015)
Notes on Political Law by Prof. Carlo L. Cruz for Jurists Bar Review Center™. All rights reserved 2016 by Jurists Review
Center Inc. Unauthorized reproduction, use, or dissemination is strictly prohibited and shall be prosecuted to the full extent of
the law, including administrative complaints with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court. Page 1 of 47
Under the principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by re-enactment, the re-
enactment of a statute, substantially unchanged (as in this case), is persuasive indication of the adoption
by Congress of a prior executive construction. Accordingly, where a statute is susceptible of the meaning
placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency charged with its enforcement and the legislature
thereafter reenacts the provisions without substantial change, such action is to some extent confirmatory
that the ruling carries out the legislative purpose. (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Laigo, G.R. No.
No. 188639, September 2, 2015)
CLT posits that the Court of Appeals violated the time-honored principle of separation of powers when
it took judicial notice of the Senate Report. This contention is baseless… the Senate Report shall not be
conclusive upon the courts, but will be examined and evaluated based on its probative value… That
there is such a document as the Senate Report was all that was conceded by the Court of Appeals. It did
not allow the Senate Report to determine the decision on the case. (CLT Realty Development Corporation v.
Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 160684, September 2, 2015)
The doctrine of ―great breadth of discretion‖ possessed by the Secretary dates back to our earlier rulings
which recognized the broad powers of the former Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), which had
jurisdiction over national interest cases prior to the enactment of the Labor Code… In the Secretary‘s
exercise of such broad discretion, the prevailing rule is that we will not interfere or substitute the
Secretary‘s judgment with our own, unless grave abuse is cogently shown. University of the Immaculate
Conception v. Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, G. R. No. 178085-178086, September 14, 2015)
When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is
exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives, because it does not define,
prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari
jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not
shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional
remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is
both integral and inherent to every court‘s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court‘s consent to the
proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through
an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers
principle. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
Finally, while the drafters of the NBF saw the need for a law to specifically address the concern for
biosafety arising from the use of modem biotechnology, which is deemed necessary to provide more
permanent rules, institutions, and funding to adequately deal with this challenge, the matter is within
the exclusive prerogative of the legislative branch. (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), G.R. 209271, December 8, 2015)
Indeed, the reason behind the legislature's choice of adopting biometrics registration notwithstanding
the experience of foreign countries, the difficulties in its implementation, or its concomitant failure to
address equally pressing election problems, is essentially a policy question and, hence, beyond the pale
of judicial scrutiny. (Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015)
DELEGATION OF POWERS
Administrative Bodies
A priori, having established that the BSP Monetary Board is indeed a quasi-judicial body exercising
quasi-judicial functions, then its decision in MB Resolution No. 1139 cannot be the proper subject of
declaratory relief. (Monetary Board v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 189571, January 21, 2015)
Jurisdiction
The BID‘s jurisdiction over deportation proceedings is not divested by mere claim of citizenship, unless
the claim of citizenship is substantial and supported by conclusive evidence, in which case, courts may
intervene. (Go v. Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 191810, June 22, 2015)
…the revocation of registration of securities and permit to sell them to the public is not an exercise of the
SEC's quasi-judicial power, but of its regulatory power. (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Universal
Rightfield Property Holding, Inc., G.R. No. 181381, July 20, 2015)
… we conclude that Philippine law is the applicable law. Basso, though a US citizen, was a resident here
from the time he was hired by CMI until his death during the pendency of the case. CMI, while a foreign
corporation, has a license to do business in the Philippines and maintains a branch here, where Basso
was hired to work. The contract of employment was negotiated in the Philippines… Clearly, the
Philippines is the state with the most significant relationship to the problem. Thus, we hold that CMI and
Basso intended Philippine law to govern, notwithstanding some references made to US laws and the fact
that this intention was not expressly stated in the contract. (Continental Micronesia, Inc. v. Basso, G.R. No.
178382-83, September 23, 2015)
Section 3 (f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages,
customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective
ICCs/IPs… pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the
same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the
same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the
case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. (Unduran v.
Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284, October 20 2015)
Primary Jurisdiction
… it is the IAC-Tobacco and not the DOH which has the primary jurisdiction to regulate sales promotion
activities as explained in the foregoing discussion. As such, the DOH‘s rulings, including its construction
of RA 9211 (i.e., that it completely banned tobacco advertisements, promotions, and sponsorships, as
promotion is inherent in both advertising and sponsorship), are declared null and void, which, as a
necessary consequence, precludes the Court from further delving on the same. (Department of Health v.
Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc., G.R. No. 202943, March 25, 2015)
The Pre-Need Code recognizes that the jurisdiction over pending claims against the trust funds prior to
its effectivity is vested with the SEC… Therefore, even prior to the transfer to the IC of matters
pertaining to pre-need plans and trust funds, the SEC had authority to regulate, manage, and hear all
claims involving trust fund assets, if in its discretion, public interest so required. Accordingly, all claims
against the trust funds, which have been pending before it, are clearly within the SEC‘s authority to rule
upon. (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Laigo, G.R. No. No. 188639, September 2, 2015)
Prior Resort
… the Republic avers that it is the POEA which has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
all pre-employment cases which are administrative in character involving or arising out of violations of
recruitment regulations, or violations of conditions for the issuance of license to recruit workers, xxx
Notably, however, nothing in EO 247 and the 2002 POEA Rules relied upon by the Republic provides for
the grant to a recruitment agency of an injunctive relief from the immediate execution of penalties for
serious offenses (e.g., cancellation of license to operate, suspension of license for a maximum period of 12
months). Conversely, they do not deprive the courts of the power to entertain injunction petitions to stay
the execution of a POEA order imposing such penalties… the RTC can take cognizance of the injunction
complaint, xxx Actions for injunction and damages lie within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of
the RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA 7691. (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Laigo, G.R.
No. No. 188639, September 2, 2015)
After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both original and amended complaints, the Court notes
that respondents neither alleged therein that the parties are members of ICCs/IPs nor that the case
involves a dispute or controversy over ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IPs. Rather, the allegations in
respondents' original complaint make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an
interest in a real property with an assessed value of P683,760.00, while the allegations in their amended
complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
Court therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the amended complaint based
on allegations therein was within the jurisdiction of the RTC. (Unduran v. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284,
October 20 2015)
While it may be argued that the HLURB should be informed of the financial rehabilitation of a real estate
company, to enable it to intelligently and meaningfully exercise its functions, the law is clear that the
HLURB‘s prior request for the appointment of a receiver of real estate companies, is not a condition sine
qua non before the trial court can give due course to their rehabilitation petition. (Lexber, Inc. v. Dalman,
G.R. No. 183587, April 20, 2015)
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Here, the question raised is purely legal, i.e., what law should be applied in the payment of retirement
benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus, there was no need to exhaust all administrative remedies before a
judicial relief can be sought. (Carolino v. Senga, G.R. No. 189649, April 20, 2015)
Conciliation or mediation is not a pre-requisite to the filing of a criminal case for violation of RA 6938
against petitioner, because such case is not an intra-cooperative dispute. (Assistio v. People, G.R. No.
200465, April 20, 2015)
It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for review,
under Section 50 of MC 19… we agree with the CA‘s conclusion that in filing his petition for review
directly with it from the CSC-CAR Regional Director, petitioner failed to observe the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies renders petitioner‘s CA petition premature and thus dismissible. (Catipon v.
Japson, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015)
The issue on whether non-compliance with the clearance requirement with the HLURB would result to
(sic) the nullification of the entire mortgage contract or only a part of it is purely legal which will have to
be decided ultimately by a regular court of law… Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply,
because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. (United Overseas Bank of the
Philippines v. The Board of Commissioners-HLURB, No. 182133, June 23, 2015)
Appeals in Administrative Proceedings
In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the
OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.
(San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group, Inc. v. Bayang, G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015)
It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a statutory privilege, should be exercised in the manner
prescribed by law… Yet, it is equally true that in proceedings before administrative bodies the general
rule has always been liberality. Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is
not required by law… (Besaga v. Sps. Acosta, G.R. No. 194061, April 20, 2015)
Respondents… contend that the petition must be denied outright because the special civil action for
certiorari cannot be used to assail RR 2-2012 which was issued by the respondents in the exercise of their
quasi-legislative or rule-making powers.… respondents did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity… A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is a
special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions… Respondents do not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. They issued RR 2-2012 in the exercise of their quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers, and not judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Verily, respondents did
not adjudicate or determine the rights of the parties… Revenue Regulation 19-86 was quasi-legislative in
nature because it was issued by the Secretary of Finance in the exercise of his rule-making powers under
Section 244 of the National Internal Revenue Code…while this case is styled as a petition for certiorari,
there is, however, no denying the fact that, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned rule, thus partaking the nature, in reality, of one for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction… although this
Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not
give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. (Clark Investors and Locators Association
v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 200670, July 6, 2015)
Administrative Rules
It is evident from the foregoing provisions that the rates of hazard pay must be at least 25% of the basic
monthly salary of PWHs receiving salary grade 19 and below, and 5% receiving salary grade 20 and
above. As such, RA No. 7305 and its implementing rules noticeably prescribe the minimum rates of
hazard pay due all PHWs in the government, as is clear in the self-explanatory phrase "at least" used in
both the law and the rules. Thus, the following rates embodied in Section 7.2 of DBM-DOH Joint Circular
must be struck down as invalid for being contrary to the mandate of RA No. 7305 and its Revised IRR.
(Cawad v. Abad, G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015)
Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only
disputes and claims between and among members of the same ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the
IPRA, as well as the basic administrative law principle that an administrative rule or regulation must
conform, not contradict the provisions of the enabling law, the Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the
IPRA-IRR, Rule III, Section 5 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules as null and void insofar
as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such disputes where
the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP. (Unduran v. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284, October 20 2015)
Furthermore, considering that it is the NLRC that has interpreted its own rules on this matter, the Court
is inclined to accept such interpretation… "By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment on those matters." (Encinas v. Agustin, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013, 696 SCRA 240, 266-267)
Moreover, the NLRC properly relaxed the rules on appeal bonds. (Smart Communications, Inc. v Solidum,
G.R. No. 197763, December 7, 2015)
… under the current rule, the reckoning of the 120-day period has been withdrawn from the taxpayer by
RMC 54-2014, since it requires him at the time he files his claim to complete his supporting documents
and attest that he will no longer submit any other document to prove his claim. Further, the taxpayer is
barred from submitting additional documents after he has filed his administrative claim… the Court
finds that the foregoing issuance cannot be applied retroactively to the case at bar since it imposes new
obligations upon taxpayers in order to perfect their administrative claim… This should not prejudice
taxpayers who have every right to pursue their claims in the manner provided by existing regulations at
the time it was filed. (Pilipinas Total Gas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G. R. No. 207112, December 8,
2015)
Publication of Administrative Rules

There is really no new obligation or duty imposed by the subject circular for it merely reiterated those
embodied in RA No. 7305 and its Revised IRR. The Joint Circular did not modify, amend nor supplant
the Revised IRR, the validity of which is undisputed. Consequently, whether it was duly published and
filed with the UP Law Center – ONAR is necessarily immaterial to its validity because in view of the
pronouncements above, interpretative regulations, such as the DBM-DOH circular herein, need not be
published nor filed with the UP Law Center – ONAR in order to be effective. Neither is prior hearing or
consultation mandatory. (Cawad v. Abad, G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015)
Contrary to the petitioner‘s contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because
the publication requirement in the ONAR (University of the Philippines Law Center Office of the
National Administrative Register) is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the
Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the Supreme
Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements of the Administrative Code. (Villanueva v.
Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Article II
Incorporation Clause
It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to certain conditions that vary in
different countries. In the Philippines, a judgment or final order of a foreign tribunal cannot be enforced
simply by execution. Such judgment or order merely creates a right of action, and its non-satisfaction is
the cause of action by which a suit can be brought upon for its enforcement. (Bank of the Philippine Islands
v. Guevarra, G.R. No. 167052, March 11, 2015)
We can only recognize and/or enforce a foreign judgment or order after a conclusive and a final finding
by Philippine courts that: (1) the foreign court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the case, (2) the parties
were properly notified, and (3) there was no collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (Republic of
the Philippines v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892, September 8, 2015)
Petitioners also argue that the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail is an assertion of their right to access to justice
as recognized by international law and the 1987 Constitution. They justify the separate filing of the
Motion as a right granted by Article 2, paragraph (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, independent of "the power of the Public Prosecutors to prosecute [a] criminal case." xxx. There is
no need to discuss whether this provision has attained customary status, since under treaty law, the
Philippines, as a State Party, is obligated to comply with its obligations under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. However, petitioners went too far in their interpretation, ignoring
completely the nature of the obligation contemplated by the provision in an attempt to justify their
failure to comply with a domestic procedural rule aimed to protect a human right in a proceeding, albeit
that of the adverse party. xxx. The obligation contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the State
Party to establish a system of accessible and effective remedies through judicial and administrative
mechanisms. xxx. That petitioners chose to act on their own, in total disregard of the mechanism for
criminal proceedings established by this court, should not be tolerated under the guise of a claim to
justice. This is especially in light of petitioners' decision to furnish the accused in the case a copy of her
Motion only during the hearing. Upholding human rights pertaining to access to justice cannot be
eschewed to rectify an important procedural deficiency that was not difficult to comply with. Human
rights are not a monopoly of petitioners. The accused also enjoys the protection of these rights. (Laude v.
Hon. Ginez, G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015)
Social Justice
… while the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working
class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor.
Management also has its rights which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple
fair play. Out of its concern for the less privileged in life, the Court has inclined, more often than not,
toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however,
has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the
light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. (Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation,
Inc., G.R. No. 189255, June 17, 2015)
It is fundamental that in the interpretation of contracts of employment, doubts are generally resolved in
favor of the worker. (Centro Project Manpower Services Corporation v. Naluis, G.R. No. 160123, June 17,
2015)
Even if our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and on the protection
of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. (Hotel
Employees' Union-NFL v. Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao, 645 Phil. 387, 420 (2010)) The law also recognizes
that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair
play… while the Court fully recognizes the special protection which the Constitution, labor laws, and
social legislation accord the workingman, the Court cannot, however, alter or amend the law on
prescription to relieve petitioners of the consequences of their inaction. (Magno v. Philippine National
Construction Corporation, GR. No. 87320, June 6, 1991) (Ilaw Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) Nestle Philippines
Inc. Chapter (Ice Cream and Chilled Products Division) v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 198675, September
23, 2015)
Youth
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her
infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive… Her physical
maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly
banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in
child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis) xxx. (Rosaldes v. People, G.R. No.
173988, October 8, 2014)
… Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18
years of age or more at the time the judgment of conviction was rendered, however, such suspension is
only until the minor reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section 40 of RA No. 9344…The
RTC did not suspend the sentence of appellant Allain pursuant to Section 38 of RA No. 9344. Appellant
is now 34 years old, thus, Section 40 is also no longer applicable. Nonetheless, we have extended the
application of RA No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning to the legislative intent of the
said law… Thus, appellant Allain shall be confined in an agricultural camp or other training facility
pursuant to Section 51 of RA No. 9344. (People v. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015)
Ecology
Writ of Kalikasan
The question then is, can the validity of an ECC be challenged via a writ of kalikasan? We answer in the
affirmative subject to certain qualifications… A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged
defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or
irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the
defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules.
Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum
with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Paje v. Casino, G.R. No.
207257, February 3, 2015)
The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing the normative idea that
governments are obligated to "foresee and forestall" harm to the environment. In the following decades,
the precautionary principle has served as the normative guideline for policymaking by many national
governments. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development… defines the rights of the people
to be involved in the development of their economies, and the responsibilities of human beings to
safeguard the common environment. It states that the long term economic progress is only ensured if it is
linked with the protection of the environment. For the first time, the precautionary approach was codified
under Principle 15, which reads:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
Assessing the evidence on record, as well as the current state of GMO research worldwide, the Court
finds all the three conditions present in this case - uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm and
the possibility of serious harm.
Eggplants (talong) are a staple vegetable in the country and grown by small-scale farmers, majority of
whom are poor and marginalized. While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise farm incomes is
laudable, independent scientific studies revealed uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic benefits from
Bt crops and plants, adverse effects on the environment associated with use of GE technology in
agriculture, and serious health hazards from consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich country
like the Philippines, the natural and unforeseen consequences of contamination and genetic pollution
would be disastrous and irreversible… Adopting the precautionary approach, the Court rules that the
principles of the NBF need to be operationalized first by the coordinated actions of the concerned
departments and agencies before allowing the release into the environment of genetically modified
eggplant. The more prudent course is to immediately enjoin the Bt talong field trials and approval for its
propagation or commercialization until the said government offices shall have performed their
respective mandates to implement the NBF. (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Article VI
Laws
… the primary protection accorded by the Pre-Need Code to the planholders is curative and remedial
and, therefore, can be applied retroactively. The rule is that where the provisions of a statute clarify an
existing law and do not contemplate a change in that law, the statute may be given curative, remedial
and retroactive effect. To review, curative statutes are those enacted to cure defects, abridge
superfluities, and curb certain evils… With the Pre-Need Code having the attribute of a remedial statute,
Legacy and all pre-need providers or their creditors cannot argue that it cannot be retroactively applied.
(Securities and Exchange Commission v. Laigo, G.R. No. No. 188639, September 2, 2015)
Residence
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of the law. The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino… RA No. 9225
treats citizenship independently of residence…
The term ―residence‖ is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to ―dwelling‖ or
―habitation,‖ but rather to ―domicile‖ or legal residence, that is, ―the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).‖ A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is usually the place where the child‘s parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be
said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and
became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country
may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as
permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence,
petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of
choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada
cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment. (Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
209835, September 22, 2015)
Hence, petitioner‘s retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make
him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen
on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is
reckoned from the time he made it as such. (Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835,
September 22, 2015)
Party-Lists
… We reject the Lico Group's argument that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide which of the
feuding groups is to be recognized, and that it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over
intra-corporate controversies. Indeed, the COMELEC's jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership
within the party is well established. This power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership
is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident of its enforcement powers.
That being said, We find the COMELEC to have committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the
Rimas Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the simple reason that the amendments to the
Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop were not registered with the COMELEC. Hence, neither of the
elections held during the Cebu meeting and the Paranaque conference pursuant to the said amendments,
were valid. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015)
The final, and most important question to be addressed is: if neither of the two groups is the legitimate
leadership of Ating Koop, then who is? We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim Central
Committee, whose members remain as such in a hold-over capacity… We have gone through the
Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop and We do not see any provision forbidding, either expressly or
impliedly, the application of the hold-over rule. Thus, in accordance with corporation law, the existing
Interim Central Committee is still a legitimate entity with full authority to bind the corporation and to
carry out powers despite the lapse of the term of its members on 14 November 2011, since no successors
had been validly elected at the time, or since. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505, September
29, 2015)
HRET
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the
House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the
validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview. xxx. What We find to be without
legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of
petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the
disqualification issue. These findings already touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee
to be a bona fide member of the party-list group sought to be represented… the Petition for petitioner
Lico's expulsion from the House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which
necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have been, among others,
a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification…
This is not the first time that this Court has passed upon the issue of HRET jurisdiction over the
requirements for bona fide membership in a party-list organization. In Abayon v. HRET, it was argued that
the petitioners did not belong to the marginalized and under-represented sectors that they should
represent; as such, they could not be properly considered bona fide members of their respective party-list
organizations. The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of
bona fide membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of
the House of Representatives. Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the
validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his qualifications to sit in
Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction correctible by a writ of certiorari;
the COMELEC should not have encroached into the expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do
so. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015)
Our ruling here must be distinguished from Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections… In Reyes,
the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections, and took her oath of office before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. However, the Court ruled on her qualifications since she was
not yet a member of the House of Representatives: petitioner Reyes had yet to assume office, the term of
which would officially start at noon of 30 June 2013, when she filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7
June 2013 assailing the Resolutions ordering the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy. In the
present case, all three requirements of proclamation, oath of office, and assumption of office were
satisfied.
Moreover, in Reyes, the COMELEC En Banc Resolution disqualifying petitioner on grounds of lack of
Filipino citizenship and residency had become final and executory when petitioner elevated it to this
Court… Therefore, there was no longer any pending case on the qualifications of petitioner Reyes to
speak of. Here, the question of whether petitioner Lico remains a member of the House of
Representatives in view of his expulsion from Ating Koop is a subsisting issue.
Finally, in Reyes, We found the question of jurisdiction of the HRET to be a non-issue, since the recourse
of the petitioner to the Court appeared to be a mere attempt to prevent the COMELEC from
implementing a final and executory judgment… In this case, the question on the validity of petitioner
Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is a genuine issue that falls within the jurisdiction of the HRET, as it
unmistakably affects his qualifications as party-list representative. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 205505, September 29, 2015)
Appropriations
… the COA was correct when it held that the provisions of the GAA were not self-executory. This meant
that the execution of the GAA was still subject to a program of expenditure to be approved by the
President, and such approved program of expenditure was the basis for the release of funds… The mere
approval by Congress of the GAA does not instantly make the funds available for spending by the
Executive Department. The funds authorized for disbursement under the GAA are usually still to be
collected during the fiscal year. The revenue collections of the Government, mainly from taxes, may fall
short of the approved budget, as has been the normal occurrence almost every year. Hence, it is
important that the release of funds be duly authorized, identified, or sanctioned to avert putting the
legitimate programs, projects, and activities of the Government in fiscal jeopardy. (Technical Education
and Skills Development Authority v. The Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015)
The requirement of availability of funds before the execution of a government contract, however, has
been modified by R.A. No. 9184… which requires not only the sufficiency of funds at the time of the
signing of the contract, but also upon the commencement of the procurement process… Unless R.A. No.
9184 is amended or repealed, all future government projects must first have a sufficient appropriation
before engaging the procurement activity. (Jacomille v. Abaya, G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)
The issuance of the notice of award ignites the implementation stage of a project, and the procuring
agency must ensure that funds are fully allotted therein. An agency can only issue a notice of award once
the DBM has released a SARO or ABM for the full cost of the project. If the funds are not fully allotted to
the project at the time the notice of award was issued, then MYOA (Multi-Year Obligational Authority)
will guarantee that the DBM commits to recommend to Congress the funding of the project until its
completion. (Jacomille v. Abaya, G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)
… a procuring agency must ensure that it has a sufficient appropriation for the project before
commencing the procurement activity. If the procuring agency believes that the project will not be given
its full appropriation by the time the notice of award is to be issued, then the procuring agency must also
secure the MYOA from the DBM at the start of the procurement process. (Jacomille v. Abaya, G.R. No.
212381, April 22, 2015)
Since there was no appropriation for the purchase of the subject textbooks, the respondent COA had
reason to deny the money claim as Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that: ―No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.‖ (Daraga
Press, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 201042, June 16, 2015)
Transfers of Appropriations
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and
DECLARES the following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National
Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation
of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the
declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings
prior to the end of the fiscal year without complying with the statutory definition of savings
contained in the General Appropriations Acts; and
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of
other offices outside the Executive.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a
certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-
compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts. (Araullo v.
Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
… the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments remain unconstitutional. But then, whether the
withdrawn allotments have actually been reissued to their original programs or projects is a factual
matter determinable by the proper tribunal. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
Also, withdrawals of unobligated allotments pursuant to NBC No. 541 which shortened the availability
of appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays, and those which were transferred to PAPs that were
not determined to be deficient, are still constitutionally infirm and invalid. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, February 3, 2015)
It is to be emphatically indicated that the Decision did not declare the en masse invalidation of the 116
DAP-funded projects… Nonetheless, the Decision did find doubtful those projects that appeared to have
no appropriation cover under the relevant GAAs on the basis that: (1) the DAP funded projects that
originally did not contain any appropriation for some of the expense categories (personnel, MOOE and
capital outlay); and (2) the appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not
correspond with the program specified in the GAA. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3,
2015)
In Belgica v. Ochoa, we said that an item that is the distinct and several part of the appropriation bill, in
line with the item-veto power of the President, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not
be only general provisions xxx. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item"
which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the
particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, the US Supreme Court characterized an item of
appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific

appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill.
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able
to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general
provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February
3, 2015)
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by
singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular
purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with
its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly
veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and
the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would
then be considered as "line-item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it
must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or
values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding
purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly
pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and
budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses),
in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‗s
item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the
constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as
herein discussed. xxx. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose
of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class.
There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of
augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot
exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense
category belongs to. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, we clarified that there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose
or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of
augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a
specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes…
Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in
the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings. Whether or
not the 116 DAP-funded projects had appropriation cover and were validly augmented require factual
determination that is not within the scope of the present consolidated petitions under Rule 65. (Araullo v.
Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
While we maintain the position that aggregate revenue collection must first exceed aggregate revenue
target as a pre-requisite to the use of unprogrammed funds, we clarify the respondents‘ notion that the
release of unprogrammed funds may only occur at the end of the fiscal year. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, February 3, 2015)
Tax Exemptions
The petitioner is an instrumentality of the government; thus, its properties actually, solely and
exclusively used for public purposes, consisting of the airport terminal building, airfield, runway,
taxiway and the lots on which they are situated, are not subject to real property tax and respondent City
is not justified in collecting taxes from petitioner over said properties. (Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. City of Lapu-Lapu, G.R. No. 181756, June 15, 2015)
… a tax amnesty, by nature, is designed to be a general grant of clemency and the only exceptions are
those specifically mentioned. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Puregold Duty Free, Inc., G.R. No.
202789, June 22, 2015)
Laws on the Jurisdiction

of the Supreme Court
xxx the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may
be heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court
on pure questions of law… the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770‘s extremely limited restriction
on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal – which is within the sphere of the rules of
procedure promulgated by this Court – can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower
courts, and not against ―findings‖ of quasi-judicial agencies… Congress cannot interfere with matters of
procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory ―findings‖
issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the
provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the
judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 also increased this Court‘s appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its
consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770
(as above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desierto (Fabian). (Carpio-Morales v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against ―decision or findings‖ of the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 –
attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court‘s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and, perforce,
invalid. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent
with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 petition. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Article VII
Presidential Immunity
Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of
the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the President in suits, ―to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office holder‘s time, also demands undivided attention. Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo
cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this
case. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins,
Porpoises, and other Cetacean Species, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings v. Reyes, G.R. No.
180771, April 21, 2015)
Prohibited Appointments
None of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal letters) have been
issued and (released) before the ban… An appointment can be made only to a vacant office. An
appointment cannot be made to an occupied office… Paragraph (b), Section 1 of EO 2 considered as
midnight appointments those appointments to offices that will only be vacant on or after 11 March 2010
even though the appointments are made prior to 11 March 2010. EO 2 remained faithful to the intent of
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented from continuing to
rule the country indirectly after the end of his term. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
203372, June 16, 2015)
This ponencia and the dissent both agree that the facts in all these cases show that ―none of the petitioners
have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal letters) have been issued (and released)
before the ban.‖ The dates of receipt by the MRO (Malacanang Records Office), which in these cases are
the only reliable evidence of actual transmittal of the appointment papers by President Macapagal-
Arroyo, are dates clearly falling during the appointment ban. Thus, this ponencia and the dissent both
agree that all the appointments in these cases are midnight appointments in violation of Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16,
2015)
Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post is a process that takes several
steps to complete. Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception provided in Section
15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President signing an appointee‘s appointment
paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably through the MRO),
receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee
evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
The President exercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need to differentiate the exercise
of the President‘s appointing power outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. The
Constitution allows the President to exercise the power of appointment during the period not covered by
the appointment ban, and disallows (subject to an exception) the President from exercising the power of
appointment during the period covered by the appointment ban. The concurrence of all steps in the
appointment process is admittedly required for appointments outside the appointment ban. There is no
justification whatsoever to remove acceptance as a requirement in the appointment process for
appointments just before the start of the appointment ban, or during the appointment ban in
appointments falling within the exception. The existence of the appointment ban makes no difference in
the power of the President to appoint; it is still the same power to appoint. In fact, considering the
purpose of the appointment ban, the concurrence of all steps in the appointment process must be strictly
applied on appointments made just before or during the appointment ban. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of
the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as
both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the
authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position
at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment
by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence
of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether
outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should
always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even
one step. And, unlike the dissent‘s proposal, there is no need to further distinguish between an effective
and an ineffective appointment when an appointment is valid. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President,
G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot
prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took
effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment
ban. Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it,
unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the
President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment paper may
be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never left his locked
drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO (Malacanang
Records Office) is an unequivocal act that signifies the President‘s intent of its issuance. (Velicaria-Garafil
v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
The possession of the original appointment paper is not indispensable to authorize an appointee to
assume office. If it were indispensable, then a loss of the original appointment paper, which could be
brought about by negligence, accident, fraud, fire or theft, corresponds to a loss of the office. However,
in case of loss of the original appointment paper, the appointment must be evidenced by a certified true
copy issued by the proper office, in this case the MRO. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
203372, June 16, 2015)
An appointment can be made only to a vacant office. An appointment cannot be made to an occupied
office. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment validly terminated, before one
could be validly installed to succeed him. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June
16, 2015)
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount
to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a
prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372,
June 16, 2015)
The prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It does not apply
to appointments made by local chief executives. Nevertheless, the Civil Service Commission has the
power to promulgate rules and regulations to professionalize the civil service. It may issue rules and
regulations prohibiting local chief executives from making appointments during the last days of their
tenure. Appointments of local chief executives must conform to these civil service rules and regulations
in order to be valid. (The Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015)
Power of Control
As said in Velasco v. Commission on Audit, the grant or regulation of the grant of productivity incentive
allowance or similar benefits are in the exercise of the President‘s power of control over these entities.
Not being under the President‘s power of control, the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group should
be able to determine the allowances or benefits that suit the functions of the office. (Maritime Industry
Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015)
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, we have ruled that the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources can validly order the transfer of a regional office by virtue of the power of the
President to reorganize the national government. In Constantino v. Cuisia, the Court upheld the authority
of the Secretary of Finance to execute debt-relief contracts. The authority emanates from the power of the
President to contract foreign loans under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution. In Angeles v. Gaite,
the Court ruled that there can be no issue with regard to the President's act of limiting his power to
review decisions and orders of the Secretary of Justice, especially since the decision or order was issued
by the secretary, the President's "own alter ego." There can be no question that the act of the secretary is
the act of the President, unless repudiated by the latter. In this case, approval of the ASTOA by the
DOTC Secretary had the same effect as approval by the President. The same would be true even without
the issuance of E.O. 497, in which the President, on 24 January 2006, specifically delegated to the DOTC
Secretary the authority to approve contracts entered into by the TRB. (Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll
Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015)
Preliminary Investigations
The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not
applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere
statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul with the
constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present
procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply, and were never intended to comply, with Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and
obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,
so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a decision against the
respondent in the administrative case. In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of
guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the
quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case
governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the
witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights. (Estrada v. Office
of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015)
Pardoning Power
“WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,…” -
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional. (Risos-Vidal
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore,
does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon
the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon. (Risos-Vidal v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in
fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
206666, January 21, 2015)
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
Probation
… probation is not a right granted to a convicted offender; it is a special privilege granted by the State to
a penitent qualified offender, who does not possess the disqualifications under Section 9 of P.D. No. 968,
as amended. Likewise, the Probation Law is not a penal law for it to be liberally construed to favor the
accused. (Maruhom v. People, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015)
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Article VIII
Jurisdiction
The law is clear that what is prohibited is merely the issuance of provisional orders enjoining the
implementation of a national government project. R.A. 8975 does not bar lower courts from assuming
jurisdiction over complaints that seek the nullification or implementation of a national government
infrastructure project as ultimate relief. (Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293,
February 23, 2015)
Republic Act No. 8975… covers only national government infrastructure projects. This case involves a
local government infrastructure project. For local government infrastructure projects, Regional Trial
Courts may issue provisional injunctive reliefs against government infrastructure projects xxx. (Dynamic
Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Presbiterio, G.R. No. 17202, April 7, 2015)
… the Regional Trial Court can issue injunctive relief against government infrastructure projects, even
those undertaken by local governments, considering that the prohibition in Section 3 of Republic Act No.
8957 only mentions national government projects. (Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. v.
Presbiterio, G.R. No. 17202, April 7, 2015)
… the general rule of prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 does not preclude lower courts from
assuming jurisdiction when the ultimate relief prayed for is to nullify a national government
infrastructure project and its implementation. (Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. v.
Presbiterio, G.R. No. 17202, April 7, 2015)
With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of a collegiate court
with special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 9282. This expanded jurisdiction of the CTA
includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the
RTC in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or
appellate jurisdiction.… No doubt, the injunction case before the RTC is a local tax case. And as earlier
discussed, a certiorari petition questioning an interlocutory order issued in a local tax case falls under the
jurisdiction of the CTA. (CE Casecnan Water and Energy Company, Inc. v. The Province of Nueva Ecija, G.R.
No. 196278, June 17, 2015)
Section 7 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1125, as amended by RA9282, and Section 3, Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, as amended, explicitly provide that the CTA has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the RTC. (Mitsubishi Motors Philippines
Corporation v. Bureau of Customs, G.R. No. 209830, June 17, 2015)
Section 4 of the NIRC confers upon the CIR both: (a) the power to interpret tax laws in the exercise of her
quasi-legislative function; and (b) the power to decide tax cases in the exercise of her quasi-judicial
function. It also delineates the jurisdictional authority to review the validity of the CIR's exercise of the
said powers xxx. The CTA is a court of special jurisdiction, with power to review by appeal decisions
involving tax disputes rendered by either the CIR or the COC. Conversely, it has no jurisdiction to
determine the validity of a ruling issued by the CIR or the COC in the exercise of their quasi-legislative
powers to interpret tax laws… In this case, Petron's tax liability was premised on the COC's issuance of
CMC No. 164-2012, which gave effect to the CIR's June 29, 2012 Letter interpreting Section 148 (e) of the
NIRC as to include alkylate among the articles subject to customs duties, hence, Petron's petition before
the CTA ultimately challenging the legality and constitutionality of the CIR's aforesaid interpretation of
a tax provision. In line with the foregoing discussion, however, the CIR correctly argues that the CTA
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition as its resolution would necessarily involve a
declaration of the validity or constitutionality of the CIR's interpretation of Section 148 (e) of the NIRC,
which is subject to the exclusive review by the Secretary of Finance and ultimately by the regular courts.
In British American Tobacco v. Camacho, the Court ruled that the CTA's jurisdiction to resolve tax disputes
excludes the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of a law, rule or regulation… Verily, the
fact that there is no decision by the COC to appeal from highlights Petron's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies prescribed by law. Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail of all administrative processes afforded him, such that if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be
exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought, otherwise, the premature
resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. While there are exceptions to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, it has not been sufficiently shown that the present case falls
under any of the exceptions. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 207843,
July 15, 2015)
In this case, respondents did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity in their
issuance of the assailed joint circulars… Based on the foregoing, certiorari and prohibition do not lie
against herein respondents‘ issuances… It is likewise beyond the territory of a writ of prohibition since
generally, the purpose of the same is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to
maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. (Cawad v. Abad, G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015)
Concededly, there is no clear statement under R.A. No. 1125, the amendatory R.A. No. 9282, let alone in
the Constitution, that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari. By virtue of Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, vesting judicial power in the Supreme Court and such lower
courts as may be established by law, to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, in relation to Section 5(5),
Article VIII thereof, vesting upon it the power to promulgate rules concerning practice and procedure in
all courts, the Court thus declares that the CA's original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing
the DOJ resolution in a preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily
transferred to the CTA pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282, and that such petition shall be governed
by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Accordingly, it is the CTA, not the CA, which has
jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution of dismissal of the BOC's
complaint-affidavit against private respondents for violation of the TCCP. (Bureau of Customs v.
Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253, September 8, 2015)
… petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of
Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial
Court, in accordance with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, therefore, from the time of such filing that the RTC
of Muntinlupa City acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action.
Unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly raffled to a regular branch, i.e., Branch 276, instead of
being assigned to the sole Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is Branch
256… the Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special
Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure - that is, an incident related to the exercise of
jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had
already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to be
dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing
as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only designated
Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256. Note that the procedure would be different
where the RTC acquiring jurisdiction over the case has multiple special commercial court branches; in
such a scenario, the Executive Judge, after re-docketing the same as a commercial case, should proceed to
order its re-raffling among the said special branches. (Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc., G.R. No. 202664,
November 10, 2015)
… the Ombudsman‘s direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her
failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA, is justified. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015)
The issue being raised here is one purely of law and all the argument, pros and cons were already raised
in and passed upon by public respondent; thus, filing a motion for reconsideration would be an exercise
in futility… Undeniably, the issue is of extreme importance affecting public interest. It involves not just
the right of the State to prosecute criminal offenders but, more importantly, the constitutional right of the
accused to bail. (People v. Valdez, G. R. No. 216007-09, December 8, 2015)
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against ―decision or findings‖ of the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 –
attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court‘s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce,
invalid. xxx. Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the
Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over
the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015)
A distinction must, thus, be made between administrative cases appealed due to inaction and those
dismissed at the administrative level due to the failure of the taxpayer to submit supporting documents.
If an administrative claim was dismissed by the CIR due to the taxpayer's failure to submit complete
documents despite notice/request, then the judicial claim before the CTA would be dismissible, not for
lack of jurisdiction, but for the taxpayer's failure to substantiate the claim at the administrative level.
When a judicial claim for refund or tax credit in the CTA is an appeal of an unsuccessful administrative
claim, the taxpayer has to convince the CTA that the CIR had no reason to deny its claim. It, thus,
becomes imperative for the taxpayer to show the CTA that not only is he entitled under substantive law
to his claim for refund or tax credit, but also that he satisfied all the documentary and evidentiary
requirements for an administrative claim. It is, thus, crucial for a taxpayer in a judicial claim for refund
or tax credit to show that its administrative claim should have been granted in the first place.
Consequently, a taxpayer cannot cure its failure to submit a document requested by the BIR at the
administrative level by filing the said document before the CTA. In the present case, however, Total Gas
filed its judicial claim due to the inaction of the BIR. Considering that the administrative claim was never
acted upon; there was no decision for the CTA to review on appeal per se. Consequently, the CTA may
give credence to all evidence presented by Total Gas, including those that may not have been submitted
to the CIR as the case is being essentially decided in the first instance. The Total Gas must prove every
minute aspect of its case by presenting and formally offering its evidence to the CTA, which must
necessarily include whatever is required for the successful prosecution of an administrative claim.
(Pilipinas Total Gas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G. R. No. 207112, December 8, 2015)
… the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions… However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that
the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC‘s constitutional mandate,
a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
The doctrine with respect to hierarchy of courts was designed so that this court will have more time to
focus on its constitutional tasks without the need to deal with causes that also fall within the lower
courts‘ competence. This court acts on petitions for extraordinary writs under Rule 65 ―only when
absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.‖
Consistent with these rules and doctrines, the remedy contemplated by Article XVII, Section 58 of
Republic Act No. 9184 is either an action under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court or the proper
action filed before this court. However, direct resort to this court can prosper only when the requisites
for direct invocation of this court‘s original jurisdiction are present. (Dynamic Builders & Construction Co.
(Phil.), Inc. v. Presbiterio, G.R. No. 17202, April 7, 2015)
… the Court stressed in The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015) that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule, and that it has full discretionary
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari filed directly
with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and
specifically raised in the petition. Recognized exceptions to the said doctrine are as follows: (a) when
there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (b)
when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (c) cases of first impression where no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on the matter; (d) the constitutional issues raised
are better decided by the Court; (e) where exigency in certain situations necessitate urgency in the
resolution of the cases; (f) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (g) when petitioners
rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents‘ acts in violation of their right to freedom
of expression; and (h) the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained
of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.
Since the present case includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, as well as to avoid multiplicity of suits and
further delay in its disposition, the Court shall directly resolve the petition for certiorari, instead of
referring it to the CTA. (Bureau of Customs v. Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253, September 8, 2015)
It must first be emphasized that trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor
by the Court… (Barroso v. Omelio, G.R. No. 194767, October 14, 2015)
Much has already been said of the "compelling significance and the transcending public importance" of
the primordial issue underpinning petitions that assail election automation contracts: the success -- and
the far-reaching grim implications of the failure- of the nationwide automation project. So it is that the
Court, in the growing number of cases concerning government procurement of election paraphernalia
and services, has consistently exhibited leniency and dispensed of (sic) procedural requirements for
petitioners to successfully lodge certiorari petitions. Technicalities should not stand in the way of
resolving the substantive issues petitioners raised herein. On this same ground of transcendental
importance, the Court may opt to treat the instant petition as one for certiorari under, not merely in
relation to, Rule 65. (Querubin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015)
Actual Case
… petitioner is asking this court to stop Congress from passing laws that will abolish the Judiciary
Development Fund. This court has explained that the filing of bills is within the legislative power of
Congress and is "not subject to judicial restraint[.]" A proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is
passed into law. Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate
on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule
on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination. The petition, therefore, does
not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this court‘s determination. Petitioner has no
legal standing. (In The Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy
Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) And Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143,
January 21, 2015)
The Court agrees with the OSG that the present controversy has been rendered moot by the passage of
GAA 2014. The essence of petitioner's case is that MVPSP was not sufficiently funded under GAA 2013.
Because of GAA 2014, however, the amount of P4,843,753,000.00 had been appropriated by Congress to
MVPSP before the contract was entered into on February 21, 2014… Verily, the Court cannot question
the wisdom of the legislative department in appropriating the full budget of MVPSP in GAA 2014. Thus,
it is settled that MVPSP was adequately funded before the contract was signed by the parties… In the
case at bench, the issues presented must still be passed upon because paramount public interest is
involved and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. MVPSP is a nationwide project which
affects new and old registrants of motor vehicles and it involves P3,851,6.00,100.00 of the taxpayers'
money. Also, the act complained of is capable of repetition because the procurement process under R.A.
No. 9184 is regularly made by various government agencies. Hence, it is but prudent for the Court to
rule on the substantial merits of the case. (Jacomille v. Abaya, G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)
However, the Court agrees with the Republic that while the case has indeed been rendered moot, it can
still pass upon the main issue for the guidance of both bar and bench. It is settled that courts will decide
a question otherwise moot and academic if the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (Republic
v. Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 198426, September 2, 2015)
Any resolution of the petitions to annul the Memorandum dated November 17, 2006 and Letter Order
No. 758, to restrain the Special General Court Martial and to order the release of the petitioners from
confinement would be of no practical value since as early as 2009, Special General Court Martial No. 2
already absolved the petitioners of the charges under the Articles of War, Special General Court Martial
No. 2 has long been dissolved and the petitioners were already released from confinement. (De Leon v.
Esperon, G.R. No. 176394, October 21, 2015)
While it may be that the project proponents of Bt talong have terminated the subject field trials, it is not
certain if they have actually completed the field trial stage for the purpose of data gathering… Hence,
not only does this case fall under the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the
mootness principle, the human and environmental health hazards posed by the introduction of a
genetically modified plant, a very popular staple vegetable among Filipinos, is an issue of paramount
public interest. (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Philippines), G.R. 209271, December 8, 2015)
Locus Standi
… the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an
environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons
whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.
(West Tower Condominium Corporation v. First Philippine Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 194239, June 16,
2015)
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, ―claim‖ that they have the legal standing to file
this action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit… The issue of whether
or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing in actions before courts of law is
not new in the field of animal rights and environmental law… It had been suggested by animal rights
advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons should be given legal
standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-
in-interests, to bring actions in representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason,
many environmental cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would
be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in
environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach… Recently, the Court passed the
landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a ―citizen suit,‖ and permit any
Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to
manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected barangays copies of said order. Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A.
No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-
Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the
habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this
petition. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins,
Porpoises, and other Cetacean Species, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings v. Reyes, G.R. No.
180771, April 21, 2015)
It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the filing of the
petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly put by the CA,
not measured by the number of persons who signified their assent thereto, but on the existence of a prima
facie case of a massive environmental disaster. (West Tower Condominium Corporation v. First Philippine
Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015)
… the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an
environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons
whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.
(West Tower Condominium Corporation v. First Philippine Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 194239, June 16,
2015)
We have held that legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any
official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. (Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the
Executive Secretary, 501 Phil. 303) In this case, there was no allegation of usurpation of legislative function
as petitioner is suing in his capacity as Chairperson of the Committee created pursuant to Section 62 of
R.A. No. 9136. Such position by itself is not sufficient to vest petitioner with standing to institute the
present suit. Notably, the enumerated functions of the Committee under the aforesaid provision are
basically ―in aid of legislation.‖
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that ―the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.‖ When the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
The privatization of power plants in a manner that ensures the reliability and affordability of electricity
in our country pursuant to the EPIRA is an issue of paramount public interest. Petitioner has
underscored the effect of the right to top provision in preventing a competitive public bidding for the
NPPC. While the alleged detrimental result referred to the severe power shortage that occurred in only
one region, PSALM had admitted that the right to top provisions are also found in several other land
lease agreements.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, we hold that petitioner possesses the requisite legal standing
to file this case. (Osmena v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No. 212686,
September 28, 2015)
As in the prior case of Roque v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 188456, September IO, 2009, 599 SCRA 69), which
similarly dealt with COMELEC procurement of OMRs the Court held that only a losing bidder would be
aggrieved by, and ergo would have the personality to challenge, the head of the procuring entity's ruling
in the protest. (Querubin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015)
The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules
"collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards
of nature," and aims to "further encourage the protection of the environment."
There is therefore no dispute on the standing of respondents to file before this Court their petition for
writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus. (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Constitutional Challenges
The constitutionality of an official act may be the subject of judicial review, provided the matter is not
raised collaterally. xxx. The constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement is not the lis mota of this
Petition. xxx. First, this Petition is not the proper venue to rule on the issue of whether the Visiting
Forces Agreement transgresses the judicial authority of this court to promulgate rules pertaining to
criminal cases. Second, the issues of criminal jurisdiction and custody during trial as contained in the
Visiting Forces Agreement were discussed in Nicolas v. Secretary Romulo, et al. xxx. (Laude v. Hon. Ginez,
G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015)
… the COMELEC claims that petitioners: (a) failed to implead the Congress, the Office of the President,
and the ERB which it purports are indispensable parties to the case; (b) did not have the legal standing to
institute the instant petition; and (c) erroneously availed of certiorari and prohibition as a mode of
questioning the constitutionality of RA 10367 and the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an important constitutional issue pertaining to the right of
suffrage, the Court views the matter as one of transcendental public importance and of compelling
significance. Consequently, it deems it proper to brush aside the foregoing procedural barriers and
instead, resolve the case on its merits. xxx. Furthermore, the issue on whether or not the policy on
biometrics validation, as provided under RA 10367 and fleshed out in the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions, should be upheld is one that demands immediate adjudication in view of the critical
preparatory activities that are currently being undertaken by the COMELEC with regard to the
impending May 2016 Elections. Thus, it would best subserve the ends of justice to settle this controversy
not only in order to enlighten the citizenry, but also so as not to stymy the operations of a co-
constitutional body. (Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015)
Operative Fact Doctrine
… the Court has agreed during its deliberations to extend to the proponents and implementors of the
DAP the benefit of the doctrine of operative fact. This is because they had nothing to do at all with the
adoption of the invalid acts and practices. xxx The PAPs under the DAP remain effective under the
operative fact doctrine. As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it
the illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity and
injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
… Here, to order FDCP and the producers of graded films which may have already received the
amusement tax incentive reward pursuant to the questioned provisions of RA 9167, to return the
amounts received to the respective taxing authorities would certainly impose a heavy, and possibly
crippling, financial burden upon them who merely, and presumably in good faith, complied with the
legislative fiat subject of this case. For these reasons, We are of the considered view that the application
of the doctrine of operative facts in the case at bar is proper so as not to penalize FDCP for having
complied with the legislative command in RA 9167, and the producers of graded films who have already
received their tax cut prior to this Decision for having produced top-quality films… In view of the
declaration of nullity of unconstitutionality of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167, all amusement taxes remitted
to petitioner FDCP prior to the date of the finality of this decision shall remain legal and valid under the
operative fact doctrine. Amusement taxes due to petitioner but unremitted up to the finality of this
decision shall be remitted to petitioner within thirty (30) days from date of finality. Thereafter,
amusement taxes previously covered by RA 9167 shall be remitted to the local governments. (Film
Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 203754, June 16, 2015)
… without Our ruling in Coconut Oil, Puregold would have had continued to enjoy tax-free importation
of alcohol and tobacco products into the CSEZ. It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that the subject
deficiency taxes first assessed by the BIR in November 2005, just months after the promulgation of
Coconut Oil, accrued because of such ruling… Hence, this Court is duty-bound to protect the basic
expectations taken into account by businesses under relevant laws, such as RA 9399. For this reason, this
Court subscribes to the doctrine of operative fact, which recognizes that a judicial declaration of
invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to such
declaration… Without a doubt, Our ruling in Coconut Oil cannot be retroactively applied to obliterate the
effect of Section 5 of EO 80 and the various rulings of the former CIR prior to the promulgation of our
Decision in 2005. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Puregold Duty Free, Inc., G.R. No. 202789, June 22,
2015)
Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy
We must, however, differentiate the guidelines for the grant of allowances and benefits to officials and
employees of members of the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group. The judiciary, Civil Service
Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman are
granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. The fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Constitutional and
Fiscal Autonomy Group is an aspect of the members‘ independence guaranteed by the Constitution.
Their independence is a necessary component for their existence and survival in our form of
government. (Maritime Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015)
Allowing the President or his or her alter ego to dictate the allowances or benefits that may be received
by the officers and employees of the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group will undermine their
independence… As said in Velasco v. Commission on Audit, the grant or regulation of the grant of
productivity incentive allowance or similar benefits are in the exercise of the President‘s power of control
over these entities. Not being under the President‘s power of control, the Constitutional and Fiscal
Autonomy Group should be able to determine the allowances or benefits that suit the functions of the
office. (Maritime Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015)
… the reversion to the General Fund of unexpended balances of appropriations – savings included –
pursuant to Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code does not apply to the
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission,
Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights, and the Office of the
Ombudsman… The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of
restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the
funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the
express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence
and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. x x x
(Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
En Banc
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration… In view of the contrasting opinions of the members of
the Third Division on the instant motion, and the transcendental importance of the issue raised herein,
the members of the Third Division opted to refer the issue to the En Banc for resolution. (Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways v. Sps. Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015)
Respondent-movants, therefore, question the validity of the Court‘s Third Division‘s rulings and
postulate that a deliberation of the case by the Court en banc is warranted under Sec. 4(2), Article VIII, of
the 1987 Constitution, (and citing) the 1953 case of Ykalina v. Oricio (No. L-6951, October 30, 1953, 93 Phil
1076, 1079), which held that a presidential order may either be in a written memorandum or merely
verbal… Based on the Court‘s reasoning (in said case), the presidential order that ―may either be in a
written memorandum or merely verbal‖ adverted to in Ykalina should therefore be understood as
limited specifically to those pertaining to appointments. Current jurisprudence, however, no longer
recognizes the validity of oral appointments and, in fact, requires the transmission and receipt of the
necessary appointment papers for their completion. xxx. Here, it is well to recall that the President did
not issue any said executive order or presidential issuance in intimating to the BCDA that he wishes for
the competitive challenge to be cancelled. There was no document offered that was signed by either the
Chief Executive or the Executive Secretary, for the President, to that effect. The situation, therefore, does
not involve a presidential order or instruction within the contemplation of Sec. 4(2), Article VIII of the
Constitution, and, consequently, does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc. Given the
glaring differences in context, the doctrine in Ykalina cannot find application herein, and cannot operate
to divest the Court‘s division of its jurisdiction over the instant case. (SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion
and Development Authority, G.R. No. 203655, September 7, 2015)
Venue
… Section 5 (4), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice… where there are serious and weighty
reasons present, which would prevent the court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and
impartial trial, the Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as o prevent a miscarriage of
justice. That private respondent filed several criminal cases for falsification in different jurisdictions,
which unduly forced Navaja to spend scarce resources to defend herself in faraway places can hardly be
considered as compelling reason which would prevent the MCTC from conducting a fair and impartial
trial. (Navaja v. de Castro, G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015)
Rule-Making Authority
Concededly, there is no clear statement under R.A. No. 1125, the amendatory R.A. No. 9282, let alone in
the Constitution, that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari. By virtue of Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, vesting judicial power in the Supreme Court and such lower
courts as may be established by law, to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, in relation to Section 5(5),
Article VIII thereof, vesting upon it the power to promulgate rules concerning practice and procedure in
all courts, the Court thus declares that the CA's original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing
the DOJ resolution in a preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily
transferred to the CTA pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282, and that such petition shall be governed
by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Accordingly, it is the CTA, not the CA, which has
jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution of dismissal of the BOC's
complaint-affidavit against private respondents for violation of the TCCP. (Bureau of Customs v.
Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253, September 8, 2015)
… there are no vested rights to rules of procedure (Pulumbarit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153745-46,
October 14, 2015)
That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts under Section 2, Article VIII xxx, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1,
Article VIII xxx, does not result in an abnegation of the Court‘s own power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article VIII xxx. Albeit operatively interrelated,
these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own
sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which
its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives, because it
does not define, prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari
cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP
129 which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered
with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure,
which utility is both integral and inherent to every court‘s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court‘s
consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10,
2015)
Administrative Supervision
… the Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court enjoys the privilege of wearing two hats: first, as Clerk
of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and second, as Circuit Registrar within his territorial jurisdiction.
Although the Constitution vests the Court with the power of administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel, this power must be taken with due regard to other prevailing laws... this Court does
not have jurisdiction to impose the proper disciplinary action against civil registrars. While he is
undoubtedly a member of the Judiciary as Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, a review of the
subject complaint reveals that Mamiscal seeks to hold Abdullah liable for registering the divorce and
issuing the CRD pursuant to his duties as Circuit Registrar of Muslim divorces. It has been said that the
test of jurisdiction is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender. The fact that the
complaint charges Abdullah for ―conduct unbecoming of a court employee‖ (sic) is of no moment. Well-
settled is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
complaint. Verily, unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can
act on a matter submitted to it. (Mamiscal v. Clerk of Court, A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J, July 1, 2015)
Who, among the various agencies and instrumentalities of the government, is empowered with
administrative supervisory powers in order to impose disciplinary sanctions against erring civil
registrars? xxx. Under the… the Local Government Code…, the municipal and city mayors of the
respective local government units, xxx in addition to their power to appoint city or municipal civil
registrars are also given ample authority to exercise administrative supervision over civil registrars.,, it
should be remembered that the authority of the Mayor to exercise administrative supervision over
C/MCRs is not exclusive. The Civil Service Commission (CSC), as the central personnel agency of the
government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal… Consequently, it behooves
the Court to also forward the subject complaint to the Office of the Mayor, Marawi City and to the CSC
for appropriate action. (Mamiscal v. Clerk of Court, A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J, July 1, 2015)
The Judicial and Bar Council
… the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own
rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through its
supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC
complies with its own rules. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
… the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in
the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every
position… the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant
meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him and his
office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner‘s case is
necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC. (Villanueva v. Judicial
and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
Contrary to the petitioner‘s contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because
the publication requirement in the ONAR (University of the Philippines Law Center Office of the
National Administrative Register) is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the
Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the Supreme
Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements of the Administrative Code. (Villanueva v.
Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before
they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published… The assailed policy
involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It
is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC
and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in
the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but
a natural consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial
positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
Nonetheless, the JBC‘s failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the petitioner‘s private
interest… the petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies
since the possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary
may not be used to legally demand that one‘s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial
vacancy. One‘s inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC. (Villanueva v. Judicial
and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
Moreover, in view of Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council which disqualifies
from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post those with pending criminal or regular
administrative cases, the Court finds it necessary to investigate whether petitioner declared in his
application for appointment his pending administrative case for grave misconduct and criminal cases for
sexual harassment. (Gonzales v. Serrano. G.R. No. 175433, March 11, 2015)
Judges
… the grant of rank at the same level as the grantees‘ counterpart judges or justices is not and cannot be
a conferment of ―judicial rank‖ and does not thereby accord the grantees recognition as members of the
Judiciary. For incumbent judges and justices who had previous government service outside the
Judiciary, it follows that the grant of rank to them under their old executive positions does not render
their service in these previous positions equivalent to and creditable as judicial service, unless Congress
by law says otherwise and only for purposes of entitlement to salaries and benefits. (Re: Letter of Court of
Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His Services as Commission Member III
of the National Labor Relations Commission, A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015)
… if the Judiciary would recognize past service in the Executive simply because of the equivalency of
rank, salaries and benefits, the situation would be legally problematic as it would have no way of
knowing for itself if the grantee would qualify (based on efficient and meritorious service) since the past
service would be with the Executive, not with the Judiciary. (Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente
S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor
Relations Commission, A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015)
… we hold that Justice Ong was a de facto officer during the period of his incumbency as a
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. (Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185244, July 29, 2015)
Disciplining Authority
Clearly, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude which, as mentioned, is a ground for the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer from his office as an attorney. The Court is mindful that a lawyer‘s
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude does not automatically call for the imposition of the
supreme penalty of disbarment since it may, in its discretion, choose to impose the less severe penalty of
suspension. As held, ―the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely
suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion.‖ Here, however, the
circumstances surrounding the case constrain the Court to impose the penalty of disbarment as
recommended by the OBC. (Re: Decision dated 17 March 2011 in Criminal Case No. SB-2836 entitled People of
the Philippines v. Joselito C. Barrozo”, A.C. No. 10207, July 21, 2015)
Decisions
… the said Decision merely contains a restatement of the parties‘ respective allegations in the Complaint
and the Answer, followed by a narration of the ensuing proceedings, an enumeration of the evidence
submitted by Rev. Cortez, a recitation of jurisprudence relating to preliminary injunction and/or
specifically, to mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ, a short reference to the IPRA which the Court
finds to be irrelevant and finally, a conclusion that a final and permanent injunction should issue. No
discussion whatsoever was made with respect to whether Rev. Cortez was able to establish with
absolute certainty his claimed right over the subject area.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule 36 and Section 1, Rule 120 of
the Rules on Civil Procedure, similarly state that a decision, judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case shall state, clearly and distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is based.
Pertinently, the Court issued on January 28, 1988 Administrative Circular No. 1, which requires
judges to make complete findings of facts in their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects
of the case in the light of the evidence presented, and avoid the tendency to generalize and to form
conclusion without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced.
Clearly, the Decision of the RTC in this case failed to comply with the aforestated guidelines. In cases
such as this, the Court would normally remand the case to the court a quo for compliance with the form
and substance of a Decision as required by the Constitution. In order, however, to avoid further delay,
the Court deems it proper to resolve the case based on the merits. (Republic v. Cortez, G.R. No. 197472,
September 7, 2015)
It is true that under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
However, petitioner must be reminded that what she assails are interlocutory orders and it has already
been ruled by this Court that the above constitutional provision does not apply to interlocutory orders
because it refers only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of the court resolving incidental
matters. (Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 127,
132-133; Mendoza v. Court of First Instance of Quezon City, et al., 151-A Phil. 815, 827 (1973), cited in Ola v.
People, G.R. No. 195547, December 2, 2015)
Periods for Decisions
The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a case within 12 months from
the submission of the last required pleading or as set by the court itself. This is clear from paragraphs (1)
and (2), Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution… Although often holding that a heavy caseload is
insufficient reason to excuse a Judge from disposing his cases within the reglementary period, the Court
has applied this rule by considering the causes of the delay. In Marquez v. Manigbas, the Court relieved
the respondent judge from liability because the delay had been caused by the sudden deluge of cases
brought about by the expansion of the jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts. In Santos v. Lorenzo, the
Court held that a delay of seven months in deciding a case could be excused because of the heavy
caseload of the trial courts in the National Capital Judicial Region. In Lubaton v. Lazaro, the Court, in
sparing the respondent from the sanctions earlier imposed for undue delay, cited the good faith of the
judge, the motivation of the complainant for bringing the charge, and the excessively heavy caseload of
3,500 cases, 1,800 of which involved detainees, leaving her only Fridays for the study of her cases and the
resolution of pending incidents and issuance of the proper orders. The Court, in reversing the sanctions,
observed that "it would be unkind and considerate on the part of the Court to disregard respondent
Judge's limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule." (Re: Complaint dated January
28, 2014 of Wenefredo Parreno, OCA IPI No. 14-220-CA-J, March 17, 2015)
Under Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution, judges of the lower courts are mandated to
resolve or decide matters and cases within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days. This mandate
applies not only to the presiding judges assigned to each court, but also to judges who are tasked to
assist other judges in the resolution of cases. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Retired Judge Filemon A.
Tandinco, A.M.. No. MTJ-10-1760)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Article IX-B
Career Executive Service
For a position to be considered as CES, two elements are required, namely: (a) The position is among
those enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of
1987 or a position of equal rank as those enumerated and identified by the CESB to be such position of
equal rank; and (b) The holder of the position is a presidential appointee. There are also two requisites
that must concur for an employee in the CES to attain security of tenure, to wit: (a) CES eligibility; and
(b) Appointment to the appropriate CES rank. (Seneres v. Sabido, G.R. No. 172902, October 21, 2015)
Security of tenure in the CES is thus acquired with respect to rank and not to position. The guarantee of
security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the particular positions to which they may
be appointed - a concept which is applicable only to first and second-level employees in the civil service -
but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President. Within the CES, personnel can be shifted
from one office or position to another without violation of their right to security of tenure because their
status and salaries are based on their ranks and not on their jobs. (Seneres v. Sabido, G.R. No. 172902,
October 21, 2015)
It is undisputed that the position of NCC (National Computer Center) Director General is a CES position
equivalent to CESO Rank I… Equally uncontested is the fact that petitioner is already CES eligible, but
no President has yet appointed petitioner to any CES rank (despite the previous recommendation of the
CESB for petitioner's appointment to CESO Rank I). Therefore, petitioner's membership in the CES is still
incomplete. Falling short of one of the qualifications that would complete his membership in the CES,
petitioner cannot successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Petitioner's appointment to the
position of NCC Director General could only be construed as temporary, and he could be removed any
time even without cause.... Even assuming that petitioner was already conferred with a CES rank, his
appointment would be permanent as to his CES rank only but not as to his position as NCC Director
General. As member of the CES, petitioner could be reassigned or transferred from one position to
another from one department, bureau, or office to another provided that there would be no reduction in
his rank or salary and that his reassignment/transfer was not oftener than every two years, among other
conditions. (Seneres v. Sabido, G.R. No. 172902, October 21, 2015)
Secondment
A secondment is a movement of an employee from one department or agency to another which is

temporary in nature. It may or may not require the issuance of an appointment, and may involve an
increase in compensation and benefits. Acceptance of a secondment is voluntary on the part of the
employee. (Seneres v. Sabido, G.R. No. 172902, October 21, 2015)
Furthermore, a secondment being temporary in nature, the payment of salaries of a seconded employee
shall be borne by the receiving agency and the seconded employee shall be on leave without pay in his
mother agency for the duration of his secondment. Clearly, petitioner's contention that, upon his
appointment and/or assumption of duties as NCC Director General, he had effectively resigned from
the DFA and that his position at the DFA had already been extinguished, is untenable. (Seneres v. Sabido,
G.R. No. 172902, October 21, 2015)
Appointments – Next-in-Rank Rule
Appointments in the civil service are made fundamentally on the basis of merit. Both the Constitution
and law ensure that those appointed are fit for the position. While those who are next in rank to a vacant
position may be given some preference, no one has a vested right to a government position. Seniority
and salary grades should be given their due weight but should not trump the public interest. (Abad v. De
la Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015)
In promotions, the appointing authority must automatically consider the employees next in rank as
candidates for appointment. (Section 21, paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Civil Service Law)… The reason
behind the next-in-rank rule is to maintain the policy of merit and rewards in the civil service. Since
appointments in the civil service are based on merit and fitness, it is assumed that the appointments of
employees next in rank are equally meritorious. Appointments that consider rank, salary grades, and
seniority promote progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service. Still, the next-in-rank rule is a rule of
preference on who to consider for promotion. The rule does not give employees next in rank a vested
right to the position next higher to theirs should that position become vacant. Appointment is a
discretionary power of the appointing authority. So long as the appointee possesses the qualifications
required by law, the appointment is valid. (Abad v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015)
Concerted Activities
It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions on CNA incentives
was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out by the respondents, they followed
the advice of GM Gamboa ―to be there‖ at the fun run. Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the fun
run. They were in sports attire that they were allowed, nay required, to wear. Else, government
employees would be deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. This, then, being the
fact, we have to rule against the findings of both the CSC and Court of Appeals that the wearing of t-
shirts with grievance inscriptions constitutes as a violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.
(Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015)
Appeals
… if the imposed suspension exceeds thirty days or the fine imposed is in an amount over thirty-day
salary, the decision will only attain finality after the lapse of the reglementary period in the absence of
any motion for reconsideration or appeal. Penalties within the 30-day threshold are immediately
executory penalties. (Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, G. R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015)
The Province erred in filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals, as no appeal may be taken from an
order of execution. Instead, it should have filed a petition for certiorari — the appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (The Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No.
202331, April 22, 2015)
It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for review,
under Section 50 of MC 19 xxx , we agree with the CA‘s conclusion that in filing his petition for review
directly with it from the CSC-CAR Regional Director, petitioner failed to observe the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies renders petitioner‘s CA petition premature and thus dismissible. (Catipon v.
Japson, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015)
Though the appeal before the CSC lacked a notice of appeal as required by CSC Resolution No. 991936 or
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the Consolidated
Memorandum filed by the private respondents was enough to be considered as a sufficient compliance
with the rules. (Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, G. R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015)
Double Compensation
The integration of the benefits and allowances is by legal fiction. The disallowed benefits and allowances
of petitioner Maritime Industry Authority‘s officials and employees were not excluded by law or an
issuance by the Department of Budget and Management. Thus, these were deemed already given to the
officials and employees when they received their basic salaries. Their receipt of the disallowed benefits
and allowances was tantamount to double compensation. (Maritime Industry Authority v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015)
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Article IX-C
Enforcement of Elections Laws
We sustain the validity of Resolution No. 9674. The names of those who commission or pay for election
surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair
Election Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and effects the
constitutional policy of ―guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for public service[.]‖ Section
5.2(a)‘s requirement of disclosing subscribers neither curtails petitioners‘ free speech rights nor violates
the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts. (Social Weather Station v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015)
… the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC over franchises and
permits to operate, though seemingly unrestrained, has its limits… Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or
utilization ―of all franchises or permits for the operation,‖ inter alia, of transportation and other public
utilities. The COMELEC‘s constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not extend
to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate
the same. There is a marked difference between the franchise or permit to operate transportation for the
use of the public and the ownership per se of the vehicles used for public transport. (1-United Transport
Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)
The expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the posting of election campaign
materials on the vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent to the operation of the PUV. Surely,
posting a decal expressing support for a certain candidate in an election will not in any manner affect the
operation of the PUV as such. Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the
posting of an election campaign material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to
operate, but a regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)
A prohibition on the posting of commercial advertisements on a PUV is considered a regulation on the

ownership of the vehicle per se; the restriction on the enjoyment of the ownership of the vehicle does not
have any relation to its operation as a PUV. On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of
commercial advertisements on windows of buses, because it hinders police authorities from seeing
whether the passengers inside are safe, is a regulation on the franchise or permit to operate. It has a
direct relation to the operation of the vehicle as a PUV, i.e., the safety of the passengers. In the same
manner, the COMELEC does not have the constitutional power to regulate public transport terminals
owned by private persons. The ownership of transport terminals, even if made available for use by the
public commuters, likewise remains private. Although owners of public transport terminals may be
required by local governments to obtain permits in order to operate, the permit only pertains to
circumstances affecting the operation of the transport terminal as such. The regulation of such permit to
operate should similarly be limited to circumstances affecting the operation of the transport terminal. A
regulation of public transport terminals based on extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the
posting of election campaign materials thereon, amounts to regulating the ownership of the transport
terminal and not merely the permit to operate the same. Accordingly, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise
or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign
material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political
expression, but also an act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the
PUV or transport terminal. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020,
April 14, 2015)
Indeed, as used in Section 261(h) of BP 881, the term whatever should be not be read strictly in
conjunction with only either the term transfer or the term detail; nor should the phrase transfer or detail
whatever be read in isolation from the purpose of the legal prohibition. Rather, consistent with our rules
in reading provisions of law, the term – whatever – as well as the phrase – transfer or detail whatever–
should be understood within the broader context of the purpose of BP 881. They should likewise be
understood within the context of all other laws that the COMELEC is required to administer and enforce.
This is the proper approach that anyone, including this Court, should take when reading Section 261(h),
as well as all other provisions of BP 881 and other election laws. (Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 211789-90, March 17, 2015)
… any personnel action, when caused or made during the election period, can be used for electioneering
or to harass subordinates with different political persuasions. This possibility – of being used for
electioneering purposes or to harass subordinates – created by any movement of personnel during the
election period is precisely what the transfer ban seeks to prevent. (Aquino v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 211789-90, March 17, 2015)
In sum, we find the COMELEC‘s exercise of its discretion – in ruling that reassignments fall within the
coverage of the prohibited transfers or details– to be well within its jurisdiction. To reiterate in clear
terms, the prohibition on transfer or detail whatever during the election period under Section 261(h) of BP
881 covers any personnel action including reassignments. (Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
211789-90, March 17, 2015)
The Court maintains the general rule that the reglementary period for instituting an election period
should be reckoned from the actual date of proclamation, not from the date of notice. (Garcia v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216691, July 21, 2015)
Registration of Voters
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other
substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution - that is, one which
propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person's ability to
intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good - the same cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional, as in this case. (Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318,
December 16, 2015)
Party-Lists
An incomplete canvass is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation, except where the
election returns missing or not counted will not affect the results of the election. It is clear from the
foregoing that party-list groups garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in
the allocation of additional seats depending on their ranking in the second round. (Aksyon Magsasaka–
Tinig ng Masa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207134, June 16, 2015)
… party-list groups garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the
allocation of additional seats depending on their ranking in the second round…BANAT declared
unconstitutional the continued operation of the two-percent threshold, as it was deemed ―an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of the ‗broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives.‘‖ Apparently, petitioner mistakenly assumed that the statement in
BANAT disallowing fractional seats insofar as the additional seats for the two-percenters in the second
round should also apply to those party-list groups with less than 2% votes. But as demonstrated in
BANAT, the 20% share in representation may never be filled up if the 2% threshold is maintained. In the
same vein, the maximum representation will not be achieved if those party-list groups obtaining less
than one percentage are disqualified from even one additional seat in the second round. (Aksyon
Magsasaka Partido Tinig ng Masa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207134, June 16, 2015)
Rules
… the settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction.
Moreover, the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under Section 4,
Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure… Here, we find that the issue raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been
a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he
represented in his COC, pertains to his qualification and eligibility to run for public office, therefore
imbued with public interest, which justified the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules. (Caballero v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015)
Certificates of Candidacy
The power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to restrict a citizen's right of suffrage should not
be arbitrarily exercised. The COMELEC cannot motu proprio deny due course to or cancel an alleged
nuisance candidate‘s certificate of candidacy without providing the candidate his opportunity to be
heard. (Timbol v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015)
We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is essential that the false
representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this
provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for
which he filed the certificate of candidacy. We concluded that material representation contemplated by
Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or
any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local
Government Code. Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must
consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. (Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015)
En Banc
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution obliges the COMELEC, like the other constitutional
commissions, to decide all cases or matters before it by a ―majority vote of all its [m]embers.‖ When such
majority vote cannot be mustered by the COMELEC en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules
provides the mechanism to avert a non-decision… Verily, under the cited provision, the COMELEC en
banc is first required to rehear the case or matter that it cannot decide or resolve by the necessary
majority. When a majority still cannot be had after the rehearing, however, there results a failure to
decide on the part of the COMELEC en banc… The COMELEC en banc did not err when it dismissed the
electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) when it was unable to reach a majority vote after the rehearing.
Contrary to what petitioner asserts, SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is most definitely an action that was filed
originally before the COMELEC within the contemplation of the said provision. While SPA No. 13-323
(DC) reached the COMELEC en banc only through a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Special First Division, its character as an original case filed before the commission remains the same.
Hence, the failure of COMELEC en banc to decide in this case properly results in the application of the
first effect of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. (Legaspi v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No.
216572, September 1, 2015)
Verily, when an election case originally filed with the COMELEC is first decided by a division, the
subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration from that decision before the en banc does not signify
the initiation of a new action or case, but rather a mere continuation of an existing process. The motion
for reconsideration—not being an appeal from the decision of the division to the en banc — only thus
serves as a means of having the election case decided by the COMELEC en banc. Under this view,
therefore, the nature of the election case as it was before the division remains the same even after it is
forwarded to the en banc through a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the failure of the COMELEC en
banc to decide a motion for reconsideration from the decision of a division in an original election case
would unquestionably bring to the fore the application of the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules. (Legaspi v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 216572, September 1, 2015)
Appeals
Consequently, Rule 64, which complemented the procedural requirement under Article IX-A, Section 7,
should likewise be read in the same sense - that of excluding from its coverage decisions, rulings, and
orders rendered by the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions… The subject matter of
Smartmatic JV's protest, therefore, does not qualify as one necessitating the COMELEC's exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that could properly be the subject of a Rule 64 petition, but is, in
fact, administrative in nature. Petitioners should then have sought redress via a petition for the issuance
of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the COMELEC en banc's June 29, 2015
Decision granting the protest. (Querubin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015)
Thus, under Sec. 58, the proper remedy to question the ruling of the head of the procuring entity is
through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)… This statutory definition
makes no distinction as to whether or not the procuring entity is a constitutional commission under
Article IX of the Constitution. It is broad enough to include the COMELEC within the contemplation of
the term. Hence, under the law, grievances relating to the COMELEC rulings in protests over the
conduct of its project procurement should then be addressed to the RTC. (Querubin v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015)
Election Period
As a general rule, the period of election starts at ninety (90) days before and ends thirty (30) days after
the election date pursuant to Section 9, Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 3 of BP 881. This rule,
however, is not without exception. Under these same provisions, the COMELEC is not precluded from
setting a period different from that provided thereunder. (Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
211789-90, March 17, 2015)
… any personnel action, when caused or made during the election period, can be used for electioneering
or to harass subordinates with different political persuasions. This possibility – of being used for
electioneering purposes or to harass subordinates – created by any movement of personnel during the
election period is precisely what the transfer ban seeks to prevent. (Aquino v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 211789-90, March 17, 2015)
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Article IX-D
Jurisdiction
Nonetheless, expenditures of government funds by the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group are
still audited by the Commission on Audit on a post-audit basis. (Maritime Industry Authority v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015)
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1597 (Further Rationalizing the System of Compensation and
Position Classification in the National Government) states that the authority to approve the grant of
allowances, honoraria, and other fringe benefits to government employees, regardless of whether such
endowment is payable by their respective offices or by other agencies of the Government, is vested in the
President. As such, the precipitous release and payment of the healthcare maintenance allowance
benefits without any authorization from the Office of the President is without basis and should be
rightfully disallowed. (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v. The Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015)
The increase in the salary of the petitioner was correctly disallowed because it contravened the
provisions of the SSL… It is conceded though that the board of directors has full discretion in fixing the
salary of the GM, but it is always subject to the limits under the SSL, unless the charter of the LWD
exempts it from the coverage of the said law. (Almadovar v. Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido-Tan,
Commission on Audit, G.R. 213330, November 16, 2015)
COA Circular No. 95-011, dated December 4, 1995, provides that in the event that the need for the legal
services of a private lawyer cannot be avoided or is justified under extraordinary or exceptional
circumstances, the written conformity and acquiescence of the OGCC and the written concurrence of the
COA shall first be secured. The failure to secure the written concurrence makes the engagement of the
private lawyer or law firm unauthorized. (Almadovar v. Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido-Tan, Commission
on Audit, G.R. 213330, November 16, 2015)
Personal Liability and Refunds
Generally, the public officer‘s good faith does not excuse his or her personal liability over the
unauthorized disbursement... However, with regard to the disallowance of salaries, emoluments,
benefits, and allowances of government employees, prevailing jurisprudence provides that recipients or
payees need not refund these disallowed amounts when they received these in good faith. (Maritime
Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015)
When a government entity engages the legal services of private counsel, it must do so with the necessary
authorization required by law; otherwise, its officials bind themselves to be personally liable for
compensating private counsel‘s services. (The Law Firm of Laguesma, etc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
185544, January 13, 2015)
The Court agrees with the COA decision in holding that the recipients of the healthcare maintenance
allowance benefits who received the allowance of P5,000.00 in good faith need not refund the sum
received. (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v. The Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
196418, February 10, 2015)
Petitioner DPI‘s invocation of the equitable principle of quantum meruit must also fail… as aptly
explained by the respondent COA, the principle of quantum meruit presupposes that an actual delivery of
the goods has been made. In this case, petitioner DPI failed to present any convincing evidence to prove
the actual delivery of the subject textbooks. Thus, the principle of quantum meruit invoked by petitioner
DPI cannot be applied. (Daraga Press, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 201042, June 16, 2015)
As a general rule, public officials who are directly responsible for the any illegal expenditure of public
funds are personally liable therefor… Clearly, therefore, public officials who are directly responsible for,
or participated in making the illegal expenditures, as well as those who actually received the amounts
therefrom – in this case, the disallowed CNA Incentives – shall be solidarily liable for their
reimbursement… By way of exception, however, passive recipients or payees of disallowed salaries,
emoluments, benefits, and other allowances need not refund such disallowed amounts if they received
the same in good faith. Stated otherwise, government officials and employees who unwittingly received
disallowed benefits or allowances are not liable for their reimbursement if there is no finding of bad
faith. (Silang v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213189, September 8, 2015)
In fine, Silang, the City Mayor, as well as the local Sanggunian members, as the approving authority,
together with the UNGKAT officers and members of the Board of Directors who actively participated in
the negotiations for the approval of the disallowed incentives despite knowledge of UNGKAT‘s non-
accreditation at the time, are solidarily liable to refund the disallowed benefits in this case, without
prejudice to any further finding of administrative liability as a consequence of their actions. This
pronouncement is also without prejudice to any finding pertaining to any other public official or person
who may be held liable for the return of such illegal disbursement but were not impleaded in this case.
(Silang v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213189, September 8, 2015)
In this case, the Court is of the view that the payment of the erroneous increase in petitioner's salary was
nonetheless made in good faith. The increase was computed in accordance with the scale provided by
the Office of the Philippine Association of Water Districts, Inc., which also made an erroneous opinion
that R.A. No. 9286 repealed the SSL… Good faith, however, cannot be appreciated in petitioner's other
disbursements. Petitioner knowingly approved the payments to Atty. Esguerra and Atty. Operaria in
spite of the lack of the necessary approval by the government offices concerned. Further, petitioner's
failure to claim her excessive RATA after the NDs were issued does not evince good faith because, at that
time, CBC No. 18 and NBC No. 498 already provided for the allowable RATA to be given to GMs of
LWDs. (Almadovar v. Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido-Tan, Commission on Audit, G.R. 213330, November
16, 2015)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Article X
Local Taxation
The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty. It is inherent in the state. Provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays are mere territorial and political subdivisions of the state. They act only as part of the
sovereign. Thus, they do not have the inherent power to tax. Their power to tax must be prescribed by
law. Consistent with the view that the power to tax does not inhere in local government units, this court
has held that a reserved temperament must be adhered to in construing the extent of a local government
unit‘s power to tax. (Demaala v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 199752, February 17, 2015)
Of course, fiscal autonomy entails "working within the constraints." To echo the language of Article X,
Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, this is to say that the taxing power of local government units is
"subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide." (Demaala v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 199752, February 17, 2015)
Accordingly, under the present Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute,
the tax power of municipal corporations must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide
statutory limitations and guidelines. (Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty
Corporation, G.R. No. 203754, June 16, 2015)
Taking the resulting scheme into consideration, it is apparent that what Congress did in this instance
was not to exclude the authority to levy amusement taxes from the taxing power of the covered LGUs,
but to earmark, if not altogether confiscate, the income to be received by the LGU from the taxpayers in
favor of and for transmittal to FDCP, instead of the taxing authority. This, to Our mind, is in clear
contravention of the constitutional command that taxes levied by LGUs shall accrue exclusively to said
LGU and is repugnant to the power of LGUs to apportion their resources in line with their priorities.
(Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 203754, June 16,
2015)
… while the power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true for LGUs because although the
mandate to impose taxes granted to LGUs is categorical and long established in the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, the same is not all encompassing as it is subject to limitations as explicitly stated in Section
5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, …the LGUs‘ power to tax is subject to the limitations set forth under
Section 133 of the LGC… (Batangas City v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Philippines, G.R. No. 187631, July 8,
2015)
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Article XI
Liability
In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed
during the incumbency of the erring official. The Court, however, is not without remedy against any
official or employee of the judiciary who committed violations while in office, but had already resigned
or retired therefrom. Under the threefold liability rule, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer
may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. In the present case, since Judge Lampasa is
no longer with the judiciary, the Court agrees with the OCA that only the imposition of fine is
appropriate. As to the amount of imposable fine, we take into account the extant of the delay and the
volumes of motions and cases, ninety-four (94) criminal cases and ten (10) civil cases which she failed to
resolve. In these lights, a fine of P20,000 is in order. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Retired Judge
Filemon A. Tandinco, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1760, November 16, 2015)
We point out that to constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected
with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. The respondent in the
present case summoned the SWAT for a purely personal matter, i.e., to aid her brother and sister-in-law.
There was no link between the respondent‘s acts and her official functions as a city prosecutor… The
respondent‘s actions, to my mind, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, an
administrative offense which need not be related to the respondent‘s official functions… we hold that the
Ombudsman correctly ruled that the respondent‘s acts of seeking the assistance of the SWAT and in
riding on board a SWAT vehicle constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and not
misconduct, since there is no nexus between these acts and her official functions. As long as the
questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his/her public office, the corresponding penalty
may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Castro, G.R. No.
172637, April 22, 2015)
The Sandiganbayan
.. it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over cases which do not involve a
sequestration-related incident but an intra-corporate controversy… In the case at bar, the complaint
concerns PHILCOMSAT‘s demand to exercise its right of inspection as stockholder of PHC but which
petitioners refused on the ground of the ongoing power struggle within POTC and PHILCOMSAT that
supposedly prevents PHC from recognizing PHILCOMSAT‘s representative (Africa) as possessing such
right or authority from the legitimate directors and officers. Clearly, the controversy is intra-corporate in
nature as they (sic) arose out of intra-corporate relations between and among stockholders, and between
stockholders and the corporation. (Abad v. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation, G.R. No.
200620, March 18, 2015)
The controversy in the present case stems from the act of Chairman Sabio in requesting the PSE to
suspend the listing of PHC‘s increase in capital stock because of still unresolved issues on the election of
the POTC‘s and PHILCOMSAT‘s respective boards of directors... it is clear that the dispute in the present
case is an intra-corporate controversy. As such, it is clear that the jurisdiction lies with the regular courts
and not with the Sandiganbayan… Based on the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Sandiganbayan 5th
Division, G.R. No. 203023, June 17, 2015)
… within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g),
regardless of their salary grades. While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of the executive
branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials
whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific
inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‗27‘ and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.‖ (Examples - … a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (People v. Sandiganbayan (Third Div.) et al., 645 Phil. 53 (2010)), a department manager of the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) (Geduspan v. People, 491 Phil. 375, 380 (2005)), as
cited in Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al., 600 Phil. 475, 497 (2009); Serana v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 566 Phil. 224, 249 (2008); and Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), 536 Phil. 726, 731
(2006)), a student regent of the University of the Philippines (Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 566 Phil. 224,
249 (2008)), and a Head of the Legal Department and Chief of the Documentation with corresponding
ranks of Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) (Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), 536 Phil. 726, 731
(2006)) fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan… Petitioner (Regional Director of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758) is not an
executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any position particularly
enumerated in Section 4 (A).) (Duncano v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), G.R. No. 191894, July 15,
2015)
Respondents‘ petitions for declaratory relief filed in the RTC asserted their claim of ownership over the
sequestered CIIF companies and indirectly the CIIF SMC Block of Shares, in the following percentages:
11.03% (UCPB) and 11.01% (COCOLIFE). Undeniably, these are related to the ill-gotten wealth cases
(Civil Case Nos.0033-A and 0033-F) involving the issue of ownership of the aforesaid sequestered
companies and shares of stock, which have been tried and decided by the Sandiganbayan, and the
decision had been appealed to and finally disposed of by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 (COCOFED
and Lobregat, et. al‘s ownership claim over the CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares) and G.R.
No. 180705 (Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.‘s claim over UCPB shares under an Agreement with PCA)… it is
clear that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case Nos. 12-1251
and 12-1252. (Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Dumayas, G.R. No. 210901, August 11, 2015)
The Ombudsman
Authority to Investigate
Verily, the Court has, in several cases, held that criminal cases which have been dismissed without
prejudice may be reinstated by motion before the order of dismissal becomes final, or thereafter, by filing
a new Information for the offense. The Court, therefore, disagrees with Ciron‘s view that a new
complaint for preliminary investigation had to be filed before the charges against her could be revived…
In sum, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint against
respondents since the issuance of the Supplemental Resolutions and the filing of the new Informations
against Ciron even without a new complaint having been filed for preliminary investigation were done
in accordance with prevailing rules and jurisprudence. (Ciron v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 194339-41, April 20,
2015)
Meanwhile, the Court disagrees on petitioner's contention that the issue of sexual harassment is better
addressed in the pending criminal case for sexual harassment before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati, for to do so in an administrative proceedings (sic) would be unfair, unjust and extremely
unreasonable. It bears to stress that administrative and criminal charges filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman and the trial court, respectively, are separate and distinct from each other even if they arise
from the same act or omission. This is because the quantum of proof required in criminal cases is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, while in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required. Moreover,
the purpose of the administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-
honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal
prosecution is the punishment of crime. Thus, even the dismissal of a criminal case does not necessarily
foreclose the administrative action against the respondent. (Gonzales v. Serrano. G.R. No. 175433, March
11, 2015)
While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is a substantive, not merely a
procedural right, petitioners are wrong in arguing that the Information filed, without affording the
respondent his right to file a motion for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally
premature. In support of their argument, petitioners cite Sales v. Sandiganbayan wherein it was held that
since filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper, an
Information filed without first affording the accused his right to a motion for reconsideration, is
tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation. The Court finds petitioners'
reliance on Sales as misplaced. A closer look into said case would reveal that the accused therein was
denied his right to move for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a
preliminary investigation under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman before the filing of an
Information. In contrast, petitioners in this case were afforded their right to move for reconsideration of
the adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation when they filed their ―Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information Prematurely Filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
8, City of Manila,‖ pursuant to Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal)
and Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors. (Aguinaldo v. Ventus, G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015)
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals

Republic Act No. 6770
Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court
resolves as follows:
(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of provisional injunctive
writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is declared
INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through
an administrative circular duly issued therefor;
(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE

in effect;
(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay,
Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of the Office of the
Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding
Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complaints xxx and
(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA
is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with
utmost dispatch. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10,
2015)
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court)
from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman… Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of
procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Identifying the appropriate
procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of every court‘s judicial power, the provisional
remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction were thus provided. A
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures
availed of during the pendency of the action… The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive
reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means
necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court…
That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts under Section 2, Article VIII xxx, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1,
Article VIII xxx, does not result in an abnegation of the Court‘s own power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article VIII xxx. Albeit operatively interrelated,
these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own
sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which
its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives, because it
does not define, prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari
cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP
129 which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered
with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure,
which utility is both integral and inherent to every court‘s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court‘s
consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10,
2015)
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions,
such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional
allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court‘s ability to carry out its functions… Hence, with
Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770) without the Court‘s consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the
questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against
Binay, Jr. … these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA‘s certiorari jurisdiction
conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired
over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015)
xxx the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may
be heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court
on pure questions of law. xxx. Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter
the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory ―findings‖ issued by the Ombudsman. More
significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of
certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested
in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court‘s appellate
jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact,
very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which was invalidated in
the case of Fabian v. Desierto (Fabian)… Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the
remedy against ―decision or findings‖ of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the
fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 – attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court‘s appellate
jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman‘s posturing, Fabian should squarely
apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in pari materia in that they ―cover the same
specific or particular subject matter,‖ that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the
Ombudsman… Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the
Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over
the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015)
Condonation Doctrine
The condonation doctrine – which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as
will be herein elaborated upon (―denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct
during a prior term‖) – is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from
the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, (Pascual), which was therefore decided
under the 1935 Constitution. xxx.
… this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As
can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959
and thus, out of touch from – and now rendered obsolete by – the current legal regime. In consequence,
it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and
affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia,
Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court‘s abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Unto this Court
devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow
its interpretation… Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine‘s error, it should be, as a
general rule, recognized as ―good law‖ prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people‘s reliance
thereupon should be respected… (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10,
2015)
The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor (577 Phil. 52, 72 (2008)), also clarified that the
condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will
to disenfranchise. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987Constitution, is plainly inconsistent
with the idea that an elective local official‘s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a
prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another
elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no
constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a
different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a
prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v.
Orbos (279 Phil. 920, 937 (1991)) to apply to administrative offenses:
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised
by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive
clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for
the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded
inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot
grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President
can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases,
with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly
less serious than criminal offenses. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015)
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Article XII
Regalian Doctrine
―The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably
belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.‖ ―[P]ublic
lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.‖ ―Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified
or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed,
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.‖ (Republic v. Sps. Benigno, G.R. No. 205492, March 11, 2015)
Alienable Land
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To support her
contention that the lands subject of her application is alienable and disposable, respondent submitted
certifications from the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City, stating that no public land application
or land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lots embraced by any administrative title.
Respondent‘s reliance on the CENRO certifications is misplaced… Rather, this Court stressed the
importance of proving alienability by presenting a copy of the original classification of the land
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
(Republic v. Lualhati, G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015)
Thus, while judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 209 may be taken, the DENR certificate of
land classification status or any other proof of the alienable and disposable character of the land may not
be dispensed with, because it provides a more recent appraisal of the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable, or that the land has not been re-classified in the meantime. The applicable law
– Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 – requires that the property sought to be registered is
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed; one way of
establishing this material fact is through the DENR certificate of land classification status which is
presumed to be the most recent appraisal of the status and character of the property. (Republic of the
Philippines v. Dayaoen, G.R. No. 200773, July 8, 2015)
Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he,
nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public
domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession… there is no such proof showing that the
subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to
occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be
appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code.
Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez‘ claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of
the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce
any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place. (Republic v.
Cortez, G.R. No. 197472, September 7, 2015)
And, in order to prove that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land,
―the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the Property Registration
Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the
original classification made by the DENR Secretary.‖ (Republic v. Sps. Benigno, G.R. No. 205492, March 11,
2015)
Mining Claims
Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public
domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come within
the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the right to a patent
therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law… In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, we stated that mining rights acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution were vested rights that could not be impaired even by the
Government. Indeed, the mining patents of Yinlu were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
were subsisting prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its
predecessors-in-interest had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral lands that could not and
should not be impaired even in light of their past failure to comply with the requirement of registration
and annual work obligations. (Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation v. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 207942, January 12, 2015)
Exploitation of Resources
… petitioners, being foreign corporations, are not entitled to Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSAs). In reaching its conclusion, this Court upheld with approval the appellate court's finding that
there was doubt as to petitioners' nationality since a 100% Canadian-owned firm, MBMI Resources, Inc.
(MBMI), effectively owns 60% of the common stocks of the petitioners by owning equity interest of
petitioners' other majority corporate shareholders… The application of the Grandfather Rule is justified
by the circumstances of the case to determine the nationality of petitioners… the use of the Grandfather
Rule as a "supplement" to the Control Test is not proscribed by the Constitution or the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995. The Grandfather Rule implements the intent of the Filipinization provisions of the
Constitution… The Grandfather Rule, standing alone, should not be used to determine the Filipino
ownership and control in a corporation, as it could result in an otherwise foreign corporation rendered
qualified to perform nationalized or partly nationalized activities. Hence, it is only when the Control
Test is first complied with that the Grandfather Rule may be applied. Put in another manner, if the
subject corporation‘s Filipino equity falls below the threshold 60%, the corporation is immediately
considered foreign-owned, in which case, the need to resort to the Grandfather Rule disappears. On the
other hand, a corporation that complies with the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity requirement can be
considered a Filipino corporation if there is no doubt as to who has the "beneficial ownership" and
"control" of the corporation. In that instance, there is no need fora dissection or further inquiry on the
ownership of the corporate shareholders in both the investing and investee corporation or the
application of the Grandfather Rule. As a corollary rule, even if the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity ratio
is apparently met by the subject or investee corporation, a resort to the Grandfather Rule is necessary if
doubt exists as to the locus of the "beneficial ownership" and "control." In this case, a further
investigation as to the nationality of the personalities with the beneficial ownership and control of the
corporate shareholders in both the investing and investee corporations is necessary. (Narra Nickel
Mining and Development Corporation v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation, G.R. No. 195580, January
28, 2015)
As explained in the April 21, 2012 Decision, the "doubt" that demands the application of the Grandfather
Rule in addition to or in tandem with the Control Test is not confined to, or more bluntly, does not refer
to the fact that the apparent Filipino ownership of the corporation‘s equity falls below the 60% threshold.
Rather, "doubt" refers to various indicia that the "beneficial ownership" and "control" of the corporation
do not in fact reside in Filipino shareholders but in foreign stakeholders. As provided in DOJ Opinion
No. 165, Series of 1984, which applied the pertinent provisions of the Anti-Dummy Law in relation to the
minimum Filipino equity requirement in the Constitution, "significant indicators of the dummy status"
have been recognized in view of reports "that some Filipino investors or businessmen are being utilized
or [are] allowing themselves to be used as dummies by foreign investors" specifically in joint ventures
for national resource exploitation. These indicators are:
1. That the foreign investors provide practically all the funds for the joint investment undertaken
by these Filipino businessmen and their foreign partner;
2. That the foreign investors undertake to provide practically all the technological support for the
joint venture;
3. That the foreign investors, while being minority stockholders, manage the company and prepare
all economic viability studies. (Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation v. Redmont
Consolidated Mines Corporation, G.R. No. 195580, January 28, 2015)
While petitioners are correct in asserting that Smartmatic JV ought to be at least 60% Filipino-owned to
qualify, they did not adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the joint venture did not meet the
requirement. Petitioners, having alleged non-compliance, have the correlative burden of proving that
Smartmatic JV did not meet the requirement, but aside from their bare allegation that SMTC is 100%
foreign-owned, they did not offer any relevant evidence to substantiate their claim. Even the 2013
financial statements submitted to Court fail to impress for they pertain to the financial standing of
Smartmatic Limited, which is a distinct and separate entity from SMTC. It goes without saying that
Smarmatic Limited's nationality is irrelevant herein for it is not even a party to this case, and even to the
joint venture.
Aside from the sheer weakness of petitioners' claim, SMTC satisfactorily refuted the challenge to its
nationality and established that it is, indeed, a Filipino corporation as defined under our laws. As
provided in Republic Act No. 7042 (RA 7042), otherwise known as the Foreign Investments Act, a
Philippine corporation is defined in the following wise:
Section 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:
a) The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a domestic partnership
or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a trustee of funds for pension
or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and
at least sixty (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of the Philippine nationals: Provided, That
where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stocks
outstanding and entitled to vote of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the
Philippines and at least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of both
corporations must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporations shall be considered
a Philippine national.
In Narra Nickel Mining and Development, Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines, Corp. (G.R. No. 195580, April
21, 2014), the Court held that the "control test" is the prevailing mode of determining whether or not a
corporation is Filipino. Under the "control test," shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least
60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality.
It is only when based on the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, there is, in the mind of the
Court, doubt in the 60-40 Filipino-equity ownership in the corporation, that it may apply the
"grandfather rule.‖ xxx. Applying the control test, 60% of SMTC's 226,000,000 shares, that is 135,600,000
shares, must be Filipino-owned. From the above-table, it is clear that SMTC reached this threshold
amount to qualify as a Filipino-owned corporation. (Querubin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 218787,
December 8, 2015)
Service Contracts
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987
Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words ―service contracts‖ in the 1987
Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length,
portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that
in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as
understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses
prevalent during the martial law regime, to wit: xxx
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or
uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in
provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at
different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give
that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely
objections, if any.
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected
Seascape Tanon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises, and other Cetacean Species, Joined in and
Represented herein by Human Beings v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory
of service agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration, development, and
utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power cannot be taken lightly.
(Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises, and
other Cetacean Species, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21,
2015)
Legislative Franchises
In PAL v. Civil Aeronautics Board, this Court enunciated: Congress has granted certain administrative
agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities… It is
generally recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated
agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies
other than those of a legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by
grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the
grant had been made by an act of the Legislature... It is thus clear that Congress does not have the sole
authority to grant franchises for the operation of public utilities. (Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory
Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015)
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Article XIII
Commission on Human Rights
We stress, at the outset, that the subsequent referral of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for
appropriate prosecutorial action rendered the issues raised in the present petition moot and academic
insofar as the CHR is concerned. Records disclose that the CHR, through Chairperson Rosales and
Commissioners De la Cruz and Mamauag, issued an Order stating that it could no longer act on the
petitioner‘s Motion to Dismiss since the case had been forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus,
no practical relief can be granted to the petitioner by resolving the present petition since the proceedings
before the CHR – the initiation of an investigation through the issuance of the assailed Show Cause
Order – had been terminated. (Quisumbing v. Rosales, G.R. No. 209283, March 11, 2015)
Human Rights
Failure to meet the three-day notice rule for filing motions and to obtain the concurrence of the Public
Prosecutor to move for an interlocutory relief in a criminal prosecution cannot be excused by general
exhortations of human rights. This Petition fails to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court judge.. (Laude v. Hon. Ginez, G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015)
The obligation contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the State Party to establish a system of
accessible and effective remedies through judicial and administrative mechanisms. The present trial of
Pemberton, to which petitioner, Marilou S. Laude, is included as a private complainant, indicates that
there is a legal system of redress for violated rights. That petitioners chose to act on their own, in total
disregard of the mechanism for criminal proceedings established by this court, should not be tolerated
under the guise of a claim to justice. This is especially in light of petitioners' decision to furnish the
accused in the case a copy of her Motion only during the hearing. Upholding human rights pertaining to
access to justice cannot be eschewed to rectify an important procedural deficiency that was not difficult
to comply with. Human rights are not a monopoly of petitioners. The accused also enjoys the protection
of these rights. (Laude v. Hon. Ginez, G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015)
EDUCATION
Article XIV
Academic Freedom
The qualifications of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools, as well as the causes for the
termination of their employment, are an integral aspect of the educational system of private schools… It
is thus within the authority of the Secretary of Education to issue a rule, which provides for the dismissal
of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools based on their incompetence, inefficiency, or
some other disqualification. (Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015)
Accordingly, when the law speaks of immoral or, necessarily, disgraceful conduct, it pertains to public
and secular morality; it refers to those conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental to
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. (Leus v. St. Scholastica’s
College Westgrove, G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015)
Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the teachings and doctrines
of the Catholic Church, including that on pre-marital sexual relations, is strictly upheld and taught to the
students. That her indiscretion, which resulted in her pregnancy out of wedlock, is anathema to the
doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed against the prevailing norms of conduct, the
petitioner‘s conduct cannot be considered as disgraceful or immoral; such conduct is not denounced by
public and secular morality. It may be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not disgraceful or
immoral within the contemplation of the law. To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two
consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child
out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a
disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. (Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College
Westgrove, G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015)
It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the
studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you
will, of the total man. Essentially, education must ultimately be religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty
and reverence. Under the rubric of "right to education," students have a concomitant duty to learn under
the rules laid down by the school. Every citizen has a right to select a profession or, course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. The PMA is not
different. As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to
invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor
Code and the Honor System in particular. The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and
moral principle. It is the minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit behind
each cadet's action. It is the cadet's responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor. Throughout
a cadet's stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as well the members of the
Cadet Corps from its alumni or the member of the so-called "Long Gray Line." (Cudia v. The
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015).

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JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™

NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW

THE CONCEPT OF A STATE

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Appeals in Administrative Proceedings

Publication of Administrative Rules

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific

Laws on the Jurisdiction

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Operative Fact Doctrine

Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy

The Judicial and Bar Council

Periods for Decisions

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

A secondment is a movement of an employee from one department or agency to another which is

Enforcement of Elections Laws

A prohibition on the posting of commercial advertisements on a PUV is considered a regulation on the

Personal Liability and Refunds

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Section 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Commission on Human Rights

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