SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS.

COURT OF APPEALS,
297 SCRA 469
1998

FACTS:

Herein private respondent Milagros P. Morada is a flight attendant for petitioner SAUDIA airlines, where the former was tried to be raped by
Thamer and Allah AlGazzawi, both Sauidi nationals and fellow crew member, after a night of dancing in their hotel while in Jakarta, Indonesia. She
was rescued. After two weeks of detention the accused were both deported to Saudi and they were reinstated by Saudia. She was pressured by
police officers to make a statement and to drop the case against the accused; in return she will then be allowed to return to Manila and retrieved
her passport. For the second time, she was asked by her superiors to again appear before the Saudi court. Without her knowledge, she was
already tried by Saudi court together with the accused and was sentenced to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes in connection with
Jakarta rape incident. The court found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws;
and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.

ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT the QC Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and try the civil case based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code or
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia court though there is the existence of foreign element.

RULING:

The forms in which a foreign element may appear are many, such as the fact that one party is a resident Philippine national, and that the other is a
resident foreign corporation. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact
that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form. In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the
fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of
the employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across
national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.

The forms in which a foreign element may appear are many, such as the fact that one party is a resident Philippine national, and that the other is a
resident foreign corporation. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact
that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form. In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the
fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of
the employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across
national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.

Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, the problem could present a “conflicts” case. Where the
factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a
“conflicts” case. A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a
“foreign element.” The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely
confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.,

vs
MINORU KITAMURA

G.R. No. 149177

November 23, 2007

FACTS:

Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects
national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year.
Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near
completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-
Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract.

Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automatically
renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.

Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired.
Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no
jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the
principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in
the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages involving contracts executed
outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant
relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.

HELD:

NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement
of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and
the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the
other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.

In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to
adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the
issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's
jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is
given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it
the power to adjudicate the claims.

In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for
a civil case for specific performance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What
they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of
the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed.” It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either
expressly or implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should
determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the
parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue
to be resolved.

Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of
law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this
case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the
laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of
the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of
such law must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are 3
alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the
case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or
apply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While
it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements,
even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion
to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on
the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case,
the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this
conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.

SMALL VS. US

Petitioner Small was convicted in a Japanese Court of trying to smuggle firearms and ammunition into that country. He served five
years in prison and then returned to the United States, where he bought a gun. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which forbids “any person … convicted in any court … of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year … to … possess … any firearm.” (Emphasis added.) Small pleaded guilty while reserving the right to
challenge his conviction on the ground that his earlier conviction, being foreign, fell outside §922(g)(1)’s scope. The Federal District
Court and the Third Circuit rejected this argument.

Held: Section 922(g)(1)’s phrase “convicted in any court” encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions. Pp. 2—9.

(a) In considering the scope of the phrase “convicted in any court” it is appropriate to assume that Congress had domestic
concerns in mind. This assumption is similar to the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have
domestic, not extraterritorial, application, see,e.g., Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285. The phrase “convicted in any
court” describes one necessary portion of the “gun possession” activity that is prohibited as a matter of domestic law. Moreover,
because foreign convictions may include convictions for conduct that domestic laws would permit, e.g., for engaging in economic
conduct that our society might encourage, convictions from a legal system that are inconsistent with American understanding of
fairness, and convictions for conduct that domestic law punishes far less severely, the key statutory phrase “convicted in any court
of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” somewhat less reliably identifies dangerous individuals for
the purposes of U.S. law where foreign convictions, rather than domestic convictions, are at issue. In addition, it is difficult to read
the statute as asking judges or prosecutors to refine its definitional distinctions where foreign convictions are at issue. To somehow
weed out inappropriate foreign convictions that meet the statutory definition is not consistent with the statute’s language; it is not
easy for those not versed in foreign laws to accomplish; and it would leave those previously convicted in a foreign court (say of
economic crimes) uncertain about their legal obligations. These considerations provide a convincing basis for applying the ordinary
assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes here. Thus, the Court assumes a congressional intent that the phrase
“convicted in any court” applies domestically, not extraterritorially, unless the statutory language, context, history, or purpose
shows the contrary. Pp. 2—5.

(b) There is no convincing indication to the contrary here. The statute’s language suggests no intent to reach beyond domestic
convictions. To the contrary, if read to include foreign convictions, the statute’s language creates anomalies. For example, in
creating an exception allowing gun possession despite a conviction for an antitrust or business regulatory crime, §921(a)(20)(A)
speaks of “Federal or State” antitrust or regulatory offenses. If the phrase “convicted in any court” generally refers only to
domestic convictions, this language causes no problem. But if the phrase includes foreign convictions, the words “Federal or State”
prevent the exception from applying where a foreign antitrust or regulatory conviction is at issue. Such illustrative examples
suggest that Congress did not consider whether the generic phrase “convicted in any court” applies to foreign convictions.
Moreover, the statute’s legislative history indicates no intent to reach beyond domestic convictions. Although the statutory
purpose of keeping guns from those likely to become a threat to society does offer some support for reading §922(g)(1) to include
foreign convictions, the likelihood that Congress, at best, paid no attention to the matter is reinforced by the empirical fact that,
according to the Government, since 1968, there have fewer than a dozen instances in which such a foreign conviction has served as
a predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution. Pp. 5—8.

PUYAT VS. ZABARTE

FACTS: On Jan. 24, 1994, respondent Zabarte commenced an action to enforce the money judgment against petitioner Puyat rendered by the
Superior Court for the State of California, Country of Contra Costa, USA.
Puyat filed his Answer with the special and affirmative defenses such that the Superior Court for the State of California did not properly acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of and over the persons involved in, thus the judgment on stipulation for entry in judgment is null and void and
unenforceable in the Philippines; and that respondent has no capacity to sue in the Philippines.

On Aug. 1, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 34 (ROC) alleging that the Answer filed by petitioner failed to tender
any genuine issue as to the material facts. Petitioner begs to disagree; in support hereof, he alleged that the Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in
Judgment is null and void, fraudulent, illegal and unenforceable, the same having been obtained by means of fraud, collusion, undue influence
and/or clear mistake of fact and law. He also maintained that said Judgment was obtained without the assistance of counsel for petitioner and
without sufficient notice to him and therefore, was rendered in violation of his constitutional rights to substantial and procedural due process.

The RTC granted respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and thereafter a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and forum non conveniens.
The RTC rendered its judgment and ordered petitioner to pay respondent. CA affirmed and ruled that summary judgment was proper, because
petitioner had failed to tender any genuine issue of fact and was merely maneuvering to delay the full effects of the judgment. The CA also rejected
petitioner’s argument that the RTC should have dismissed the action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment, on the ground of forum non
conveniens. It reasoned out that the recognition of the foreign judgment was based on comity, reciprocity and res judicata.

ISSUE: Whether the principle of forum non conveniens is applicable in this case.
HELD: NO. Since the present action lodged in the RTC was for the enforcement of a foreign judgment, there was no need to ascertain the rights
and the obligations of the parties based on foreign laws or contracts. The parties needed only to perform their obligations under the Compromise
Agreement they had entered into. Also, under Sec. 5 (n) of Rule 131, a court – whether in the Philippines or elsewhere – enjoys the presumption
that it is acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction, and that it is regularly performing its official duty.
The petitioner claims that the trial court had no jurisdiction, because the case involved partnership interest, and there was difficulty in ascertaining
the applicable law in California. All the aspects of the transaction took place in a foreign country, and respondent is not even a Filipino.

The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that in the absence of proof of California law on the jurisdiction of courts, it is presumed that such law,
if any, is similar to Philippine law. This conclusion is based on the presumption of identity or similarity, also known as processual presumption.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioner are contradictory. On the one hand, he insists that the RTC take jurisdiction over the enforcement case in
order to invalidate the foreign judgment; yet, he avers that the trial court should not exercise jurisdiction over the same case on the basis of forum
non conveniens. Not only these defenses weaken each other, but they bolster the finding of the lower courts that he was merely maneuvering to
avoid or delay payment of his obligation.
Under the principle of forum non conveniens, even if the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law, courts may nonetheless refuse to
entertain a case for any of the following practical reasons:
1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign
jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;

2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice known as forum shopping[,] merely to secure procedural advantages or
to convey or harass the defendant;
3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded;

4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and

5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.

None of the aforementioned reasons barred the RTC from exercising its jurisdiction. In the case at bar, there was no more need for material
witnesses, no forum shopping or harassment of petitioner, no inadequacy in the local machinery to enforce the foreign judgment, and no question
raised as to the application of any foreign law.

Authorities agree that the issue of whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the above-mentioned principle depends
largely upon the facts of each case and on the sound discretion of the trial court.
The petiton is DENIED.

Saudi Arabia Airlines and Brenda Betia v.

Ma. Jopette Rebesencio, et al.

GR No: 198587 Jan.14,2015 Leonen, J.

SUMMARY: Various flight attendants got pregnant while working for Saudi Arabia Airlines, to which they
requested for Maternity leaves. Apparently there was a recently passed Unified Employment Contracts which
allowed for them to be terminated should they ever be pregnant due to lack of physical fitness. The flight
attendants were made to resign upon threat of losing any benefits they might have should they have resigned,
and thus petition for illegal dismissal; Petitioner Airlines claim that the Labor Arbiter and NLRC do not have
jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE: Labor Contracts are a matter of Public Policy, and thus Philippine laws clearly find application in this
case.

Dale Tuddleezy | Law 113 | Group 2

FACTS:
1) Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is a foreign corporation
established and existing under the Royal Decree No. M/24 of
Jeddah, who hired Respondents as flight attendants. After
undergoing seminars required by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration for deployment overseas, as
well as training modules offered by Saudia, Respondents
became Temporary and then eventually Permanent Flight
Attendants; they entered into the necessary Cabin Attendant
Contracts with Saudi.
2) Respondents were released from service on separate
dates in 2006; claimed that such release was illegal since the
basis of termination of contract was solely because they
were pregnant. They claim that they had informed Saudia of
their respective pregnancies and had gone through the
necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves and
while initially, Saudia had given its approval, they ultimately
reneged and rather required them to file for resignation.
5)November 8,2007 - Respondents filed a Complaint with
the Labor Arbiter against Saudia and its officers for illegal
dismissal and for underpayment, along with moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Petitioner Airlines
contests the Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction, as the contract’s
points referred to foreign law and that Respondents had no
cause of action since they already voluntarily resigned.
6) Executive Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, but on
appeal the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and
denied Petitioner Airlines’ Motion for Reconsideration,
hence the current appeal.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
WON the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC has jurisdiction over
Saudi Arabian Airlines and apply Philippine jurisdiction over
the dispute? YES. Summons were validly served on Saudia
and jurisdiction over it validly acquired.

3) Respondents claim that Petitioner Airlines threatened that

if they would not resign, they would be terminated along
with loss of benefits, separation pay, and ticket discount
entitlements; they anchored such on its “Unified
Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" which
provides that “ if the Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any
time during the term of this contract, this shall render her
employment contract as void and she will be terminated due
to lack of medical fitness. “
RATIO:
 No doubt that the pleadings were served to Petitioner
Airlines through their counsel, however they claim that  Furthermore, contracts relating to labor and
the NLRC and Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction since employment are impressed with public interest. Article
summons were served to Saudi Airlines Manila and not 1700 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he relation
to them, Saudi Airlines Jeddah. Saudi Airlines Manila between capital and labor are not merely contractual.
was neither a party to the Cabin attendant contracts They are so impressed with public interest that labor
nor funded the Respondents, and it was to Saudi contracts must yield to the common good.
Jeddah that they filed their resignations. Court ruled  Pakistan Airlines Ruling: relationship is much affected
however that b y its own admission, Saudia, while a with public interest and that the otherwise applicable
foreign corporation, has a Philippine office, and that Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered
under the Foreign Investments act of 1991, they are a illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to
foreign corporation doing business in the Phils and govern their relationship.
therefore are subject to Philippine jurisdiction. As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents
allege to be) the illegal termination of respondents'
 Petitioner Airlines also asserts that the Cabin Attendant employment, this case is immutably a matter of public
Contracts require the application of the laws of Saudi interest and public policy. Consistent with clear
Arabia rather than those of the Philippines. It claims pronouncements in law and jurisprudence, Philippine laws
that the difficulty of ascertaining foreign law calls into properly find application in and govern this case.
operation the principle of forum non conveniens, DISPOSITIVE:
thereby rendering improper the exercise of jurisdiction
by Philippine tribunals. Appealed Decision is Affirmed, case is remanded for a
 Court: Forum non conveniens finds no application and detailed computation of the amount to be paid by Saudi
does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of Airlines.
jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign
law. Though Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides that
Parties may stipulate terms they may deem convenient,
Philippine tribunals may not lose sight of considerations
of law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy that underlie the contract.
 Article II, Sections 1 and 14 of the 1987 Constitution
ensures the equal protection of persons, and the
equality between men and women. Though pregnancy
does present physical limitations that may render
difficult the performance of functions associated with
 being a flight attendant, it would be the height of
iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent
and immutable that, it must entail the termination of
one's employment.

MANILA HOTEL VS. NLRC

n May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in Oman. In June 1988, he was recruited by Palace Hotel in Beijing, China. Due to higher pay
and benefits, Santos agreed to the hotel’s job offer and so he started working there in November 1988. The employment contract between him
and Palace Hotel was however without the intervention of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). In August 1989, Palace
Hotel notified Santos that he will be laid off due to business reverses. In September 1989, he was officially terminated.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and Manila Hotel International, Ltd. (MHIL).
The Palace Hotel was impleaded but no summons were served upon it. MHC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It owns 50% of
MHIL, a foreign corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL manages the affair of the Palace Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled in favor of
Santos. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following reasons:
1. The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the fact that Santos is a Filipino;
2. However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign corporations – MHC cannot be held liable because it merely owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct
business in the affairs of the Palace Hotel. The veil of corporate fiction can’t be pierced because it was not shown that MHC is directly managing the
affairs of MHIL. Hence, they are separate entities.
3. Santos’ contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered into in the Philippines;
4. Santos’ contract was entered into without the intervention of the POEA (had POEA intervened, NLRC still does not have jurisdiction because it will
be the POEA which will hear the case);
5. MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their agents/officers are not residents of the Philippines;
Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all the relevant facts pertaining to the case. It is not competent to determine the facts
because the acts complained of happened outside our jurisdiction. It cannot determine which law is applicable. And in case a judgment is rendered,
it cannot be enforced against the Palace Hotel (in the first place, it was not served any summons).
The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if
it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at bar.