Ta Chau 1963

Brill
The Search for National Identity among the Turks

Author(s): Frank Tachau
Source: Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Vol. 8, Issue 3 (1963), pp. 165-176
Published by: Brill
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THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY
AMONG THE TURKS *)
BY
FRANK TACHAU
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.
One of the critical turning points in the process of social, political

and intellectual transition in Turkey occurred at the time of the
First World War. It was symbolized by the final and irrevocable
collapse of the multi-national Ottoman Empire and the rise of the
territorially limited, nationalist Republic of Turkey. Much insight
into the nature and intensity of this transition may be gained from
a study of the confused welter of ideas which blossomed forth during
the years preceding and following the collapse of I918. The political
collapse of these years brought in its wake an intellectual crisis of
rather severe proportions. The downfall of the old political and
social order undermined the belief system which had nurtured and
supported it. The construction of a new social and political system
correspondingly required the adoption of a new ideology 1. Our
attention in this article will focus on the phase which followed the
collapse of I918 and saw the establishment and consolidation of
the new regime. More specifically, the discussion will concentrate
on the ideas of Turkish nationality and nationalism. These ideas
played a crucial role in the search for a viable ideological basis for
the new political community.
It would be a mistake to assume that the idea of a specifically
Turkish nationality constituting a specifically Turkish state gained
immediate and universal acceptance with the military and political
triumph of Mustafa Kemal. With the benefit of hind-sight, we may
be tempted to view the territorial diminution of the Turkish state
* This article is based on a paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American
Oriental Society, Harvard University, April, I962.
1 For a trenchant statement of the relation between
ideology and social and political
transition, see N. Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, I96I), Introduction.
i66 FRANK TACHAU
and the supporting nationalist movement as inevitable. To those

who lived at the time, however, this inevitability was not quite
so apparent.Certainlysuchbroadcriteriaof identificationas Islamism
and Ottomanism were finally discredited, at least in the political
arena. The idea of pan-Turkism died a somewhat slower death,
despite the unequivocal rejection of irredentism embodied in the
so-called National Pact (Misak-f Milli) of I920 and in the public
statements of Mustafa Kemal. These considerations are reflected
in Professor Bernard Lewis' recent monumental study of modern
Turkish history 1. In the course of his discussion, Lewis contrasts
the traditional concepts of loyalty in the Ottoman-Muslimenviron-
ment with such European-inspiredideas as fatherland, patriotism,
and nationality. He further traces the adaptation of these European
ideas to the Turkish environment, culminating with the Kemalist
Republican era. What is missing from Lewis' treatment, however,
is an indication that the ongoing heated debate concerning the
proper ideological and conceptual content for the newly imposed
political, cultural, and social forms, did not end with the establish-
ment of the Republic in I923.
One of the striking features of the very early days of the Kemal-
ist regime is the lack of any clear definition of Turkish nationality.
Even after Kemal graduallydroppedthe use of the terms "Ottoman"
and "Muslim" in favor of "Turk" and "Turkish", he did not
clearly indicate what he understood by the concept of the Turkish
nation. There were two potentially troublesome points at issue
here, one involving the relations with Turkic peoples outside the
boundaries of the Republic, the other embodying the problem of
the minorities remaining within the confines of the new state.
What was needed was a criterion for national identification that
would appeal to the emotions of the Turkish majority while neither
over-emphasizing the cultural kinship with the Turks of Central
Asia and elsewhere nor alienating the non-Turkish groups within
the new body politic. A number of answers were suggested during
the I920's. We shall first concentrate on the concept that went
by the name of Anatolianism (Anadoluculuk)2.
1 The Emergenceof Modern Turkey (New York: Oxford
University Press, I961), reviewed
in W.I., N. S., VII, pp. 222-23 (Ed.),
a This name
had, for the first time, been used by Halide Edib, in I918: G. Jaschke,
Der Turanismus der Jungtirken, W.I. 23, 194I, p. I6 (Ed.).
NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG THE TURKS I67
Professor Lewis treats of this concept as it appearedin the I930's

in connection with the extremely chauvinistic and far-fetched
Turkish History Thesis. But there was an earlier and much more
elaborate presentation of this notion. It was expounded in the
journal Anatolia (Anadolu) published in the years I924 and I925
by a group of young Istanbul university students 1. This group
and its journal have apparently not yet been examined by Western
scholars.
The conception of nationalism which emerged in the pages of
this journalwas quite differentfrom that which had been expounded
during the pre-IgI8 Young Turk period, particularly by such
writers as Ziya Gokalp. Indeed, Gbkalp was singled out for con-
demnation because of his alleged misconceptions along this line.
Ziya Bey had defined the nation as "a group made up of individuals
who have had the same education" and who therefore have a
common language, religion, morals, and esthetic sense 2. But this
was inadequate in the view of the Anatolianists. They insisted on
adding identification with the fatherland. In other words, both a
common culture and a common fatherland were necessary for a
people to form a nationality or nation; if either were missing, a
nation could not be said to exist 3. Consequently, the very idea of
a "Turkish" nation was a contradiction in terms.
'Turk' is not the name of a nation. It is the name of a race from which many nations
have sprung: Anatolians, Azerbaijanis, Northern [Turks], Turkestanis, etc. - all of these
are without doubt Turks; but they are not of one nation. In order for them to be one nation,
their cultures and fatherlands must be one. But their fatherlands are different from one
another, and even their cultures are [not the same] 4.
The identification of the nation with the fatherland was further

reinforced by the use of historical interpretation. The proper
conception of national history, it was asserted, was to trace the
history of a people within a certain territory, that is, within a
1 The precise composition of the group is not at this point entirely clear.
Many of the
articles were signed with various pseudonyms. Some of my information has been gleaned
from interviews with two survivors of the group who are active and wellknown members
of the Istanbul University faculty. Copies of the journal may be found in the library of
the Tiirkiyat Enstitiisii in Istanbul and in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution,
and Peace at Stanford, California.
Tiirkfiiliigiin Esaslarz (Istanbul: Varllk Yayinlari, published
1952; first in I923), p. 15.
8 Mehmet Halil, "Milliyetperverligin
Manasl", Anadolu mecmuassnos. 9, IO, ii (Decem-
ber I924, January-February, 1925), p. 3I3.
4 Ibid., pp. 3I5-I6.
I68 FRANK TACHAU
fatherland. The salient historical fact for the people of the new
Republic thus was the unification and centralization of Anatolia
by the Seljuk Turks. It was they who had first defined the bound-
aries of this fatherland; and these had remained roughly the same
ever since. After the decline of the Seljuks, Anatolia was once
again divided among a number of petty princes, to be reunited at
the beginning of the sixteenth century by the Ottoman Sultan
Selim the Grim. The development of the Ottoman Empire, however,
brought with it the submergence of its own genuine national
character, as the converts of the slave household took over the
government, the Sultans ceased marrying Turkish princesses,
and Anatolia, the true fatherland of the Empire, was relegated to
the status of a colony. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Imperial army
(as against the Janissary Corps) was still made up of Anatolian
peasants; it was they who fought the battles and won the basic
victories of the Empire. Thus, although the Ottoman Empire was
on the face of it a denationalized entity, its basis still rested on
the peasants of Anatolia 1.
In a similar vein, the Republic was but the latest in a series of
Anatolian states. Indeed, the proper name of the new state was
not Turkey at all, but rather "the Republic of Anatolia". "To
call this republic the Republic of Turkey is to try to change its
character" 2. By the same token, to say that the Anatolians are
of the "Turkish nation" is to call them by a racial name and to
deny the nationality of other groups within the Turkish race.
"We are Anatolians, Anatolia is our fatherland, our nation is the
Anatolian nation". Thus, the pan-Turkists who wished to gather
together all Turks, regardless of culture or fatherland, were pur-
suing unattainable ideals. "Turanism cannot be a goal, an ideal
for the Anatolian nation" 3 In fact, the emphasis on the Anatolian
fatherland went so far that one contributor to the journal bitterly
attacked the contemporary press for the attention it was devoting
to the Muslims from Rumeli who were migrating to Turkey under
the population exchange provided for by the Lausanne Convention.
1 Mikrimin Halil, "Milli Tarihimizin Mevzuu", op. cit., nos. 2 and 3 (May and June
I924), pp. 53-59, 85-92.
2 Mehmet
Halil, "Asil Hakikat", op. cit., no. 8 (November 1924), pp. 281-84.
3
"Milliyetperverligin Manasl", pp. 315-I6.
By contrast, the sufferings of the Anatolian peasants went unno-

ticed, it was charged. By definition, the writer did not consider
the migrants genuine members of the Anatolian nation 1. Nor was
he too far off the mark: indeed Lewis suggests that the population
exchange was really "no repatriation at all, but two deportations
into exile-of Christian Turks to Greece, and of Muslim Greeks to
Turkey" 2.
In its reaction against pan-Turkism and its insistence on a
limited territorial basis for national identification, it would seem
that the approach of the journal Anatolia might have admirably
served the purposes of Mustafa Kemal. Yet there is no evidence
that the movement, if such it was indeed, had any effect on, or
was even recognized by Atatiirk. Several reasons may be cited.
In the first place, none of the contributors or participants was
at that time in a position of importance or influence, and there
is no evidence that the views of the group evoked any kind of
popular response. Indeed, there is evidence to the contrary. Second-
ly, it should be recalled that the years I924 and I925 were marked
by political uncertainty and even instability. This was the period
that saw the abolition of the Caliphate, the office of ?eyh-iil-islm,
the Ministry of the $eriat and religious control over education-
basic reforms affecting vital social and political institutions. Na-
turally, they broughtin their wake political opposition in the country
and the Parliament, and ultimately contributed to the Kurdish
uprising of I925. It is probably no accident that the last issue of
the journal appeared in February 1925, that is, about the time
the Kurdish insurrection began. One of the members of the group
has stated that the closing of the journal was associated with the
passage of the Takrir-i Siikun law of March4, 1925, which granted
virtually dictatorial powers to the government to enable it to deal
with the opposition in general and the insurrection in particular 3.
Clearly, Kemal had his mind on other concerns; he was not yet
prepared to worry unduly about a proper definition of Turkish
nationality.
CelAlettin Kemal, "Kim Igin, Ne itin?" op. cit., no. 8, pp. 309-10.
2 Op.
cit., pp. 348-49.
S Ibid., p. 26I; G. L. Lewis, Turkey (New York: F. A. Praeger, I955), p. 86; E. Z. Karal,
Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasl, 1954), p. I36.
Die Welt des Islams, VIII 12
7o0 FRANK TACHAU
Thirdly, according to the testimony of one of the members of

the group, Mustafa Kemal moved far more rapidly than they or
anyone else had anticipated. His reforms, though they dealt
primarily with social and political forms, were of a radical nature.
The Anatolianists, by contrast, thought in terms of a more gradual
evolution of a modem Anatolian nation through a slow amalgama-
tion of aspects of European civilization with existing cultural
features 1.
In the I920's, then, the problem of basic national identity may

be said to have given rise to two extreme points of view: the
Anatolianist view, discussed above, and the pan-Turkist view,
already current during the Young Turk period. Between these
two extremes there was a broad middle ground which encompassed
many attempts to formulate an alternative definition of Turkish
nationality which could combine the emotional appeal of pan-
Turkism with the more moderate idealism of the Anatolianists.
A running debate on this question took place during the I920s
within the ranks of one of the few organizations which survived
the transition from Young Turk to Kemalist rule.
This organization was the Turk Ocags(Turkish Hearth). It had
been founded in March of I912 by a group of students at the
Military Medical Faculty in Istanbul. It was to serve as a cultural
center with the purpose of promoting Turkish nationalism. With
the Ottoman Empire crashing in ruins on all sides, no clear line
was ever drawn between the Turks within the Empire and those
outside. In fact, the Hearth became the focal point of pan-Turkist
activities 2.
1Interview with Professor Hilmi Ziya Ulken, March I6, I956.

T. Z. Tunaya, TiirkiyedeSiyasi Partiler (Political Parties in Turkey), (Istanbul, Dogan
Kardesler Yaymlari, 1952), pp. 378, 382; Yusuf Akcuraoglu, Turk Yslz (Turkish Year),
(Istanbul: Yeni Matbaa, I928), p. 439, 440; T. Z. Tunaya, "Yeniden Dogus", (New Birth),
Vatan, March 30, 1949. Jaschke labels the organization as the one which "first inscribed
Turanism on its banner": "Der Turanismus und die kemalistische Tiirkei", Beitrdge zur
Arabistik, Semitistik und Islamwissenschaft, (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, I944), p. 472.
Professor Faik Resit Unat asserts that the Hearth brought 42 Turkish youths to Istanbul
for training and education and hoped to send them back to their homelands in Central
Asia as convinced Turkish nationalists; personal interview, March 9, 1956. On the other
hand, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrilver, one of the founders of the organization and national
head after its revival in the 1950's, denies that the Hearth ever attempted to arouse Turkish
minorities in other lands against the people among whom they lived; personal letter, August
I, I956.
NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG THE TURKS I7I
However, the successful conclusion of the War for Independence

(Milli Miicadele) brought the realization that union with Turks
outside Turkey was not even remotely feasible, and a shift in
emphasis on the part of the Hearth became necessary. A redefinition
of the role and purpose of the organization became the subject of
intermittent and heated discussion throughout the I920's. These
discussions indicate some of the difficulties involved in scaling
down the old pan-Turkist ideology to match the new outlook of a
territorially limited national state.
Hamdullah Suphi, one of the founders of the organization and its
acknowledged leader, set the tone for the debate at the first con-
gress of the "new" Hearth in Ankara in I924. The organization
had two duties, he told the delegates. One was to defend the
"spiritual fatherland" of the nation, that is, to rescue its cultural
and artistic relics from the hands of foreigners and to purify the
language. The second duty of the Hearth was to guard and defend
the new reforms, especially the principle of unrestricted national
sovereignty. Thus, the main function of the Hearth was to be
education of the people towards an enlightened awareness of their
nationality and its meaning. Accordingly, the second article of
the new constitution of the organization stated its purpose to be:
"to work to develop Turkish culture while strengthening national
consciousness among all Turks, to work towards...cultural pro-
gress and towards the development of the national economy"1.
This provision was attacked by those who wished to make
nationalism dependent on ethnic origin. Membersshould be carefully
screened, they argued, in order to prevent mere opportunists from
infiltrating the organization. Such non-Turkish opportunists 2
were every day proclaiming their Turkishness and some had
already succeeded in being elected to posts of leadership in local
branches of the Hearth.
In answer to such fears, various speakers tried to definenational-
ism. Racial and blood ties were rejected outright by all of them.
Instead, like G6kalp, they insisted that nationality must be based
1 I340 Senesi Nisamnda Toplanan Birinci Turk Ocaklart Umumf
Kongresi Zabztlars
(Proceedings of the First General Congress of the Turkish Hearths Meeting in April of the
Year 1924), (Ankara: Yeni Guin Matbaasl, I34I [1925]), pp. 8-I3, 33. Note, however, the
use of the words "national consciousness among all Turks." (Italics added).
2 Albanians and Arabs were
primarily indicated.
172 FRANK TACHAU
on cultural and ideological unity. "I want those who reside or live
in Turkey to have the same ideas and feelings", declared one
delegate. It was up to the Hearth to instil such ideas and feelings,
he added, in order to prevent the rise of separatist groups (such as
had cropped up in the Balkans and played such a prominent role
in the collapseof the OttomanEmpire).This argumentwas supported
by other influential delegates, including Hamdullah Suphi.
There was some disagreement as to the status of those non-
Turks who had sided with the nationalist cause in the War for
Independence. The difficulty of defining a Turk was admitted.
One delegate described two types of Muslim people in Turkey.
One was clearly non-Turkish (e.g., Arabs and Kurds), while the
other was a Turkishtype (e.g., Laz and Circassians).The first group
was easy enough to define, he stated; the problemfor the Hearths
was a clear definition of the second group. In other words, he called
for an answer to the question: "Who is Turkish?" The president
of the congress (Ahmet Agaoglu), in summing up the debate,
emphasized his belief that the reason for the difficulty was the
lack of national consciousness in the country. If a true national
consciousness existed, he declared, there would be no need for the
Hearth 1
Here the conflict between the outlook of pan-Turkism and the
new approach of Kemalism stands fully revealed. A strictly ethnic
criterion of identification would logically include the Turkic
peoples of Central Asia while excluding such Anatolian groups as
Circassians, Laz, Kurds, and others. Since the objective of the
Kemalists was the establishment of a strong state on a limited
territorial base, it was quite natural for them to reject ethnic or
racial standards because of the danger of reviving or perpetuating
irredentist ambitions and desires and the danger of alienating
Anatolian non-Turks.
The third annual congress of the Hearth in I926 attacked this
same problem from a slightly different angle. Its members engaged
in a long debate on the question of assimilating non-Turkish ele-
ments into the national community 2. The debate began with a
1 Debate in ibid., pp. 4I-56.

2 This was stimulated, no doubt, by the Kurdish uprising of the previous year.
committee report which stated that there were a number of groups

in the country which failed to identify themselves with the Turkish
nation as evidenced particularly by their use of languages other
than Turkish. The most important of these groups was located in
the eastern and southeastern provinces and consisted primarily of
Kurds and of Turks who believed themselves to be Kurds. These
people were potentially dangerous. Just as Tsarist Russia had used
the Armenians against Turkey, so the Kurds might be similarly
made use of by a foreign power, specifically England, which feared
a strong Turkey in the East 1.The reason for this situation, according
to the spokesman, was that the Turks had not taken sufficient
interest in the eastern provinces and had failed to work in coopera-
tion with "brother nations" (presumably in Azerbaijan and Iran).
Other speakers agreed on the importance of the problem of
assimilating such groups. The existence of similar groups in the
western part of the country (e.g., Bosnians and Circassians) was
cited. The fact that these groups were not using the Turkish langua-
ge and were preserving their status as separate communities with
their own forms of dress and customs appears to have been par-
ticularly distressing. It was pointed out that this was a result of
the Ottoman policy of protecting subject nationalities by granting
them extensive concessions. This policy had been rejected by the
Republic, it was declared, and it should now be the duty of the
Turkish Hearth to dissolve and assimilate these peoples by dissem-
inating Turkish culture. Cooperation with the government was
urged, particularly in pressing for passage of a law making it
mandatory for all citizens to speak Turkish. Toward the end of the
debate, Hamdullah Suphi cited historical examples to show that
the Turkish nation had great capabilities for assimilating alien
peoples. "We are confident of our future", he declared, "because
we are the heirs of... a propitious past".2
1 Here the memory of proposals for an
independent Armenian state in eastern Anatolia
probably played a role. The Christian (mainly American) missionary colleges in this part
of the country were also under suspicion in this matter, in Turkish eyes. In addition, the
boundary dispute with Britain in the Mosul oil region undoubtedly figured in the minds
of the Turks.
2 Turk Ocaklarr
Uiiuncii Kurultayt Zabstlars (Proceedings of the Third Congress of the
Turkish Hearths), April I926, (Istanbul: Kader Matbaasi, I927). The debate is on pp.
177-226; Hamdullah Suphi's remarks appear on pp. 207-II. The fifth congress (I928) again
took up this question and discussed it in much the same terms. See Turk Ocaklars
Besinci
Kurultays (Fifth Congress of the Turkish Hearths), (Ankara: Turk Ocaklan Matbaasl, I930).
I74 FRANK TACHAU
Debate also revolved around the question of the proper function

of the Hearth, particularly vis-a-vis the Republican government.
Unlike the defunct Ottoman regime, this government was based
upon a specifically Turkish nationalism, however that might be
defined. The question was one of differentiation between the
proper sphere of official governmental responsibility and non-
official Hearth activities. Generally speaking, the Hearth was
envisaged as the organizationwhich would cultivate strong national
sentiment through education and propaganda, particularly among
non-Turkishgroups. The general feeling was that close cooperation
with the government should be maintained. This feeling was clearly
expressed by Ahmet Agaoglu, a prominent figure in both the Hearth
and the government. In a series of articles in the semi-official daily
Hakimiyet-i Milliye he questioned the wisdom of maintaining the
Hearth as an organization aloof from politics. He admitted the
validity of this aloofness under the Ottoman regime, when the
government had failed to recognize the existence of a Turkish
nation and there had been a need for an awakening of national
consciousness among the Turks, regardless of political affiliation.
Now, however, these limiting factors had been removed, he argued,
and the government, the state, and indeed the whole country had
accepted the nationalist movement wholeheartedly. It is clear,
however, that Agaoglu did not want the Hearth to engage in parti-
san politics, but rather to tie itself more closely to the government.
The Hearth should play an intermediary role between government
and people; its function should be to explain and defend nationalist
ideals and their application. Agaoglu therefore urged greater
governmental support and control of the organization. This general
line was also laid down in a leading article by Falih Rlfkl (Atay),
one of Atatiirk's closest collaborators.He declared that the Republic
was trying to reform the laws and institutions of the Ottoman
Empire in order to provide a nationalist basis for them. But such
reformshad so far only shaken Turkish social life without effecting a
real change. This was the function of the members of the Hearth 1.
But the search for a basis of national identification without
undue pan-Turkist overtones proved highly elusive. Indeed, the
1
Hakimiyet-i Milliye, April 25, 26, 27, 28, May I, I926.
Kemalist conception of nationalism was marred by occasional

nostalgic throwbacks among Hearth members to earlier ideas.
This is not altogether surprising in view of the pan-Turkist ten-
dencies of the organization's early years. Thus, Hamdullah Suphi,
in his closing address before the second annual Congress of the
Hearth in I925, declared:
My dear friends: after long centuries of separation, we have reached the time of reunion ...
At this moment, hands are outstretched in every corer of the Turkish world seeking their
distant brethren.
Do political boundaries separate nations? [If] you build a wall through a forest, [and]
the roots of the trees beneath the wall and their branches above embrace one another,
of what use are boundaries? The entire Turkish world has begun to feel the consciousness
of unity ... .
Such obvious and outspoken appeals to pan-Turkist sentiment
could not have been well received by the Kemalist regime. In fact,
in I927 a significant change was made in the constitution of the
Hearth which was aimed squarely at such nostalgic ideas. It
stipulated that:
The field of active operations of the Turkish Hearth is limited by the boundaries of the
Republic of Turkey 2.
The trend away from pan-Turkism was thus made formal. This
was only the first in a series of steps which eventually resulted in
the total disbandment of the Hearth organization in I93I. Thus,
incidentally, the discussion of the proper division of labor between
Hearth and government was simply sidestepped; the organization
was condemned as an anachronism that might get in the way of
the more vital People's Republican Party 3.
To sum up, it is apparent that during the I920's pan-Turkist
irredentism was at least officially disavowed. On the other hand, a
more conservative "Anatolian" nationalism also failed to gain
1 Hamdullah Suphi, Dag Yolu (Mountain Road), a collection of speeches, Vol. I, (Ankara,
I928), p. 133. I have been unable to locate a copy of the proceedings of the I925 Congress.
2 Turk Ocaklars Yasass
(Constitution of the Turkish Hearth), (Ankara: Turk Ocaklar
Matbaasi, 1927), Article 2. Jaschke quotes that this change was made at the instigation
of the Soviet government which was worried about a resurgence of pan-Turkism; Beitrdge
zur Arabistik, Semitistik und Islamwissenschaft,p. 473.
3 The New York
Times, March 25, April 12, I931. In place of the Hearth, the Republican
Party established in I932 a cultural branch which came to be known as Halkevleri (People's
Houses). These Halkevleritook over the physical plants of the Hearth chapters and carried
out a program very similar to that of the earlier organization. By the end of the Second
World War, they had become an established instituion throughout the country. They were
closed upon the assumption of power by the Democratic Party after the election of i950.
For a description, see D. E. Webster, The Turkey of Atatirk,
176 TACHAU, NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG THE TURKS
acceptance. In short, no clearly defined concept of Turkish nationa-

lism or nationality was forthcoming. Nevertheless, neither the
Anatolianist nor the pan-Turkist point of view was entirely sub-
merged or lost. Both re-emerged during the I930's when a new
and officially sponsored effort was made to develop a clear concept
of Turkish nationality. Thus, pan-Turkismsurvived in the emphasis
which the so-called Turkish History Thesis placed on the origin
of the Turks in Central Asia and their alleged role in establishing
civilization throughout the world. On the other hand, the attempt
in the Thesis to prove that there was an ancient and enduring
identification of the Turks with the territory of Asia Minor is
perhaps even more significant. As Lewis argues, the chief objective
of the Thesis was "to teach the Turks that Anatolia-Turkey-was
their true homeland, the centre of their nationhood from time
immemorial,and thus to hasten the growth of that ancient, intimate
relationship, at once mystical and practical, between nation and
country that is the basis of patriotism in the sovereign nation-states
of the West" 1. Despite differences in detail, it would seem that
the basic aim of the promulgators of the History Thesis was the
same as that of the young Anatolianists of the I920'S.
In retrospect, it would seem that, while pan-Turkist sentiments
are not yet by any means entirely dead, the attempt to identify
nation with country has had more lasting effect than many other
Kemalist reforms. This is evident both in the widespread interest
in and acceptance of Anatolian folk culture, as well as in the more
familiar love of country or patriotism which has become the hand-
maid of the moder sovereign nation-state, in Turkey as well as
elsewhere. At the same time, it cannot be said that the search-
for a genuine Turkish national identity has yet ended 2.
1 op. cit., p. 354.
2
Thus, contrary to official policy, we have evidence that ethnic and religious minorities
are still not accepted as full-fledged Turks. There have also been instances of continuing
identification with Turks outside the Republic. For a discussion of both these points, see
my "The Face of Turkish Nationalism as Reflected in the Cyprus Dispute", The Middle
East Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (Summer I959).

Ta Chau 1963

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Ta Chau 1963

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Brill

The Search for National Identity among the Turks

One of the critical turning points in the process of social, political

and the supporting nationalist movement as inevitable. To those

Professor Lewis treats of this concept as it appearedin the I930's

The identification of the nation with the fatherland was further

By contrast, the sufferings of the Anatolian peasants went unno-

Thirdly, according to the testimony of one of the members of

In the I920's, then, the problem of basic national identity may

1Interview with Professor Hilmi Ziya Ulken, March I6, I956.

However, the successful conclusion of the War for Independence

1 Debate in ibid., pp. 4I-56.

committee report which stated that there were a number of groups

Debate also revolved around the question of the proper function

Kemalist conception of nationalism was marred by occasional

acceptance. In short, no clearly defined concept of Turkish nationa-

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