INTERNATIO NAL SERIES OF MONOGRAPHS IN

P U R E A N D A P P L IE D M A T H E M A T IC S
G eneral E ditors : I. N . Sneddon and M . Stark
E xecutive E ditors : J. P. K ahane, A. P. R obertson and S. U lam

VOLUME 31

ELEMENTS
OF MATHEMATICAL LOGIC
 JAN LUKASIEWICZ

ELEMENTS
OF MATHEMATICAL LOGIC

TRANSLATED FROM POLISH

by
OLGIERD WOJTASIEWICZ

PERGAMON PRESS
OXFORD • LONDON ■EDINBURGH ■NEW YORK
TORONTO • PARIS • BRAUNSCHWEIG

PWN—POLISH SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHERS

WARSZAWA
 Pergamon Press Ltd., Headington Hill Hall, Oxford
4 & 5 Fitzroy Square, London W .l
Pergamon Press (Scotland) Ltd., 2 & 3 Teviot Place, Edinburgh 1
Pergamon Press Inc., 44—01 21st Street, Long Island City, New York J1101
Pergamon of Canada, Ltd., 6 Adelaide Street East, Toronto, Ontario
Pergamon Press S.A.R.L., 24 rue des Ecoles, Paris 5e
Friedr. Vieweg&Sohn Verlag, Postfach 185, 33 Braunschweig, West Germany

First edition 1963

Reprinted 1966

Copyright 1963
by PANSTWOWE WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE
(PWN — POLISH SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHERS)
WARSZAWA

Original Title:
Elementy logiki matematycznej
WARSZAWA, PWN
Second Edition 1958

Library o f Congress Catalog Card No. 63-10013

Printed in Poland

(1487/64)
 CONTENTS

P reface to th e Second E d i t i o n ......................................................... vii

A u th o r’s P reface to th e F irst E d i t i o n ............................................ ix
I. Introduction.............................................................................................. 1
1. T rends in M athem atical Logic. M athem atical Logie
V ersus P hilosophical L o g i c ................................................ 1
2. T heorem s a n d R ules of Inference. T he S en ten tial
Logic an d th e T erm L ogic ................................................. 9
II. The Sentential C a lc u lu s...................................................................... 22
3. T h e P rim itiv e T erm s a n d th e Axiom s of th e S en ten tial
C a lc u lu s ........................................................................................ 22
4. D efinitions a n d R ules of Inference in th e S en ten tial
C a lc u lu s ........................................................................................ 31
5. T heorem s of th e S en ten tial C a lc u lu s ............................... 41
m . Selected Problems from the Methodology of the Sentential Calculus 67
6. T h e C onsistency a n d th e Independence of A xiom s
of th e S en ten tial Calculus. M any-valued Lo g i c . . . . 67
7. T he Com pleteness of th e S e n ten tial Calculus . . . . 81
IV. The Sentential Calculus with Quantifiers ........................................... 92
8. Q uantifiers. R ules of Inference. T h e s e s .......................... 92
V. Aristotle’s S y llo g is tic .......................................................................... 103
9. Axiom s. D efinitions. R ules of I n f e r e n c e ...................... 103
10. Theses of A risto tle’s S y l l o g i s t i c ........................................ 107
119
The L ist of W orks Q uoted ................................................................... 122
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

T he first edition of J a n L ukasiew icz's Elements of Mathematical

Logic ap p eared in 1929 as auth orized lectu re notes x. P ublished by
th e A ssociation of S tu d e n ts of M athem atics an d P hysics in W arsaw
U n iv ersity , th ese lectu re n o tes served tw o purposes: stu d e n ts of th e
F a c u lty of th e M athem atical a n d N a tu ra l Sciences used th em when
p rep arin g fo r th e exam inatio n in th e foundations of philosophy; th e
n o tes included th e la te s t resu lts o btained b y th e ir a u th o r, among
th em som e resu lts th a t h a d n o t been p u blished before. T h irty years
a fte r, L ukasiew icz’s book h a s n o t lo st its d idactic an d scientific
v alue, a n d a t th e sam e tim e i t h a s acquired th e value of a n historical
do cu m ent testify in g to th e role th a t w as played b y th e researches of
th e W arsaw cen tre in th e developm ent of m ath em atical logic in
th e first decade a fte r W o rld W a r I.
T he new ed itio n of th e Elements differs from th e first b u t slightly.
T h e corrections m ade are sm all a n d few . T he only section t h a t has
been m odified m ore essentially is Section I I I . 7, containing a proof
of th e com pleteness of th e se n ten tia l calculus. T he proof of com­
pleteness w hich is given h e re is m odelled on Lukasiew icz’s later
proofs. I n its basic id ea it does n o t differ from t h a t given in th e
first edition, b u t is m ark ed ly sh o rter. T he la s t section of the
Elements— “ On R easoning in th e N a tu ra l Sciences” —h as been
dropped, too. In clu d e d in th e first edition as a “ S up p lem en t” , it
w as n o t connected w ith th e c o n te n ts of th e rem aining sections.
T he firs t edition of th e Elements h a d no footnotes a t all. Thus,
a ll th e fo o tn o tes in th e second edition come from its editor. F u rth e r,
th e first edition has been ro u n d ed off b y a detailed bibliography
of- th e w orks referred to in th e Elements a n d of those w orks h y
Lukasiew icz w hose su b ject m a tte r p e rta in s to th e problem s discussed
in th e Elements.
J E R Z Y S i-U P E C K l
 AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

T he p resen t n o tes from lectures delivered a t W arsaw U niversity

in th e a u tu m n trim e ste r of th e academ ic y e ar 1928/9 are e n title d
Elements of Maihematical Logic fo r th e y cover only th e tw o sim plest
logical system s, nam ely th e se n ten tial calculus an d A risto tle’s
syllogistic *. I h a v e endeavoured to p resen t th ese tw o system s in
m y lectures in such a w ay th a t th e y m ight b e accessible to beginners.
I hope t h a t C hapter IV , to o , in w hich I outline th e se n ten tia l calculus
extended b y th e in tro d u c tio n of u n iversal quantifiers, w ill n o t p resen t
an y serious difficulties to th e read er. T h e m o s t' difficult issues
discussed in th ese lectures belong to th e m ethodology of th e se n ­
te n tia l calculus. E specially difficult is th e proof of th e com pleteness
of th a t calculus, given in Section III .7 , w hich requires a longer a n d
careful stu d y . I h av e, how ever, included t h a t proof b o th because of
its exceptional im portance, a n d because of th e fa c t th a t in its p resen t
form it h as nev er been published before.
T hese lectu re notes b ring fo r th e first tim e, in a m ore extensive
form , som e of th e resu lts of m y long researches on m ath em atical
logic. I en u m e rate here th e m ore im p o rta n t new resu lts whose a u th o r­
ship, I th in k , I m a y ascribe to m yself. T hey are as follows: 1. T he
parenthesis-free n o tatio n of expressions in th e se n ten tial calculus
an d in A risto tle’s syllogistic. 2. T he system of axiom s of th e se n ­
te n tia l calculus 8 given on p . 27-28. 3. T he w ay of noting dow n proofs
in th e se n ten tia l calculus a n d in A ristotle’s syllogistic, a n d in m an y
cases th e v ery stru c tu re of those proofs. 4. R em arks on “ generalizing
dedu ctio n” on p. 46. 5. System s of m any-valued logic. 6. T he idea
of th e proof of th e com pleteness of th e sen ten tial calculus, p resented
in I I I .7 . 7. T he axio m atizatio n of A risto tle’s syllogistic, w ith com ­
p lete proofs of th e law s of th e square of opposition, th e law s of
conversion, a n d all th e v alid m odes of syllogism s. 8. Some h istorical
rem ark s (e.g., oh th e form of A risto tle’s syllogism , on Stoic logic,
o n F rege as th e founder of th e sen ten tial calculus, a n d rem arks
a b o u t O rigenes a n d Sextus).
To th o se resu lts w hich I h a v e o b tain ed b y m y own reflection I
could also a d d th e proof of th e consistency of th e sen ten tial calculus
a n d th e m eth o d of exam ination of th e independence of th e theses
of th a t calculus. B u t th e proof of consistency of th e sen ten tial cal-
X a u t h o r ’s prefa ce to the f ir s t e d it io n

cuius h a d alre ad y been given in 1921 b y E . L . P o s t in his p a p e r

“ In tro d u ctio n to a G eneral T h eo ry of E le m e n tary P ro p o sitio n s” , an d
a m eth o d of exam ining th e independence of th e theses of th e sen-
te n tia l calculus w as first p ublished in 1926 b y B ernays in his p ap er
“ A xiom atisehe U ntersuchungen des A ussagenkalkuls der ‘P rincipia
M ath em atica’ ” 3. I h a d conceived th e sam e m ethod even before
1926 as a re su lt of engaging in th e stu d y of m any-valued logic, an d
th a n k s to th e suggestive rem ark b y D r T arsk i t h a t th e results of
m an y-valued logic m ig h t in som e cases be used in proving independ­
ence (cf. A . T arsk i’s p a p e r “ 0 w yrazie pierw otnym lo g isty k i”
(On th e P rim itiv e T erm of L ogistic), [32], p p . 11 a n d 12 of th e off­
p rin t). B y using a “ m a trix ” m ethod, w hich I h a d devised, to exam ine
independence, I h a d m ade sure a n d h a d published, even before
B ernays (in a re p o rt on a lectu re e n title d “ D em onstration de la
com patibility des axiom es de la th eo rie de la deduction” [12]), th a t
in W h iteh ead a n d B ussell’s system of se n te n tia l calculus A xiom 1.5,
a n d in H ilb ert’s system , given in [5], A xiom 2 w ere n o t independent
of th e rem aining ones, while all th e o th e r axiom s in b o th system s
were in d ep en d en t of th e rem ainin g ones. I n th a t re p o rt I also dem ­
o n stra te d th e independence of th e axiom system specified on p. 27
in th e p re se n t lectu re notes.
I n P o s t’s p ap er of 1921 qu oted above, th ere are certain p u rely
form al considerations concerning m any-valued system s of th e sen­
te n tia l calculus. In view of th is fa c t I should like to p o in t o u t th a t
m y system of th ree-valued logic h a d been developed before 1921,
since I presen ted it as early as on J u n e 19, 1920, a t a sittin g of th e
P olish Philosophical Society in Lwow (cf. [11])- M y researches on
m an y -v alu ed logic h a v e since been considerably advanced b y th e
m em bers of m y Sem inar, D r L in d en b au m an d Mr W ajsberg. Am ong
o th er th ings, M r W ajsberg has show n t h a t th e system of three-valued
logic can b e axiom atized. T hese resu lts h av e so far n o t been p rin te d 4.
W h a t is included in th ese lectures over an d above th e p oints
e n u m erated above is n o t m y p ro p e rty . Som e inform ation I hav e
d raw n from books, m ainly from Principia Mathematica by W hiteh ead
a n d B ussell [35] a n d from F reg e’s w orks. T he exam ple of th e m a th ­
em atical proof given in P a ra g ra p h 6, as well as th e historical d a ta
concerning Axiom 2, given on p . 29-30, com e from V ailati [33], p p . 518 £f.
A le tte r from P rofessor B ernays, of G ottingen, w hich reached m e
in S eptem ber 1928, inform ed m e t h a t th is a u th o r h a d sim plified th e
system of axiom s of th e se n te n tia l calculus based on im plication,
as fo rm u la te d b y .D r T arsk i (ef. p p . 49 a n d 98).
I owe m ost, how ever, to th e scientific atm osphere w hich has
developed in W arsaw U niversity in th e field of m ath em atical logic.
 a u t h o r ’s p r e f a c e to the f ir s t E D IT IO N XI

In discussions with, m y colleagues, especially Professor S. Lesniewski

an d D r A. T arski, a n d often in discussions w ith th e ir a n d m y own
stu d e n ts, I h a v e m ade clear to m yself m an y a concept, I h a v e
assim ilated m an y a w ay of form ulating ideas, a n d I have learned
a b o u t m an y a new resu lt, a b o u t w hich I am to d ay no t in a position
to sa y to w hom th e c red it of au th o rsh ip goes. I t was in such dis­
cussions, for exam ple, if m y m em ory does n o t fail me, th a t th e
rules w ere established fo r using th e universal quantifiers in t h a t
system of th e sen ten tial calculus w hich is described in Chap. IV .
W hen outlining th a t system , a n d especially w hen explaining th e
concept of m eaningful expression in th a t system and th e rule of
su b stitu tio n , I h av e availed m yself of th e inform ation kindly supplied
b y D r T arski, w ho h a d presen ted such a system earlier th a n I did,
and h a d discussed it in his courses. To be exact, I shall also ad d t h a t
I h a v e a d o p ted th e term functor from Professor K otarbinski, an d
th e te rm meaningful exjpre&Hon from Professor Lesniew ski. I t is
also to Professor Lesniew ski th a t I owe th e critical opinions con­
cerning th e in te rp re ta tio n of im plication, as form ulated ou page 25
of th ese Elements s.
I delivered these lectures, as I usually do, from m em ory, re so rt­
ing to notes only in th o se p a rts w hich a re expressed in sym bols.
T h a t is w h y M r. F resb u rg er, as th e e d ito r of these lectu re notes, h a d
to ta k e g re a t p ain s to m ak e read ab le w h a t w ere originally spoken
lectures. I a v a il m yself of th is o p p o rtu n ity to express to him m y
h e a rtfe lt th a n k s fo r th e w ork he h a s done. I m u st also a d d th a t
Mr P resb u rg er’s c o n trib u tio n to th is p u b licatio n can also be seen
in som e places in th e c o n te n ts of th ese n otes. T his refers above all
to th e p ro of of th e com pleteness of th e se n ten tia l calculus. T he
ex p lan atio n of th e concept of m eaningful expression in th e sen ten tial
calculus as w ell as th e ru le of su b stitu tio n in th a t calculus also owe
to M r. P resb u rg er th e ir p re se n t form , w hich is m ore ex act th a n th e
one I gave in m y lectures.
As com p lem entary readings th e rea d er m ay use th e tex tb o o k
of m ath em a tica l logic b y H ilb e rt a n d A ckerm ann, published in 1928:
Grundeiige der theoretischen Logih [6]. I t m u st be said th a t t h is
tex tb o o k h as in no w ay influenced th e co n ten t of th e p resen t lectu re
notes, w ith th e exception of one term inological p o in t: following its
a u th o rs I use th e term s free o r bound variable, in stead of real or
apparent variable, as has been th e usage th u s far. I should also a d d
th a t I am now p rep a rin g a com prehensive m onograph w hich is to
cover th e w hole of th e m o st im p o rta n t problem s of th e sen ten tial
calculus *.
J A N L U K A S IE W IC Z
W arsaw. February 23, 1929.
 I. INTRODUCTION
1. Trends In M athematical Logic.
M athematical Logic Versus Philosophical Logic

1. G eorge B oole, a n E n g lish m ath em atician w ho lived

in th e m id -1 9 th c e n tu ry , is considered th e fo u n d er of
m a th e m a tic a l logic. H is fu n d a m e n ta l w ork, p u b lish ed in
1854, is e n title d A n In v e stig a tio n o f the L a w s of T h o u g h t [2].
In h is an aly sis B oole s ta rte d from th e o b serv atio n th a t
th e g en eral law s of th o u g h t, w ith one ex cep tio n , are
stric tly analogous to th e law s of m a th e m a tic a l alg eb ra.
L e t u s consider th e m a th e m a tic a l law of co m m u ta­
tiv ity of m u ltip lic a tio n , w hich B oole sym bolizes as:
soy = y x \ in co n fo rm ity w ith th a t law , th e p ro d u c t of a n y
tw o n u m b ers is n o t ch an g ed w hen th e o rd er of its elem ents
is rev ersed . T h e le tte rs x a n d y w hich ap p e ar in th e law
of c o m m u ta tiv ity are v ariab les w hose v alu es a re e x ­
pressions th a t sta n d fo r a n y n u m b ers, fo r th a t law is
co rrect fo r all n u m b ers. B oole also uses v ariab les, b u t
th e ir v alu es a re expressions stan d in g fo r classes of o b jects.
I n th u s d efining th e ran g e of th e v aria b le s, B oole in te r­
p re ts th e expression x y as d en o tin g th e class of o b jects
th a t belong b o th to th e class x a n d to th e class y . If, fo r
in stan ce, x is th e class of w h ite o b jects, a n d y is th e class
of sheep, th e n in B oole’s in te rp re ta tio n x y is th e class
of th o se o b jects w hich belong b o th to th e class of w h ite
o b jects a n d to th e class of sheep, a n d th u s is th e class
of w h ite sheep. B y in te rp re tin g v ariab les an d m u ltip li­
catio n in th is w ay B oole n o ticed th a t th e law of com m u­
ta tiv ity : x y ~ y x rem ain s v a lid if w e ap p ly i t to classes
of o b jects. E o r th e class of th o se o b jects w hich belong
b o th to th e class x a n d to th e class y is id e n tic a l w ith
2 I . IN T R O D U C T IO N

th e class of th o se o b jects w hich belong b o th to th e class y

a n d to th e class x . T h is fa c t can b e illu stra te d , w hich,
b y th e w ay, B oole d id n o t do, b y m eans of circles, in
a m an n er k n ow n fro m tra d itio n a l logic. In th is in te r­
p re ta tio n a circle sta n d s fo r a class of o b jects. If, as in
F ig . 1 , tw o circles sta n d fo r th e
classes x a n d y 7 th e n th e p a rt
com m on to b o th circles rep resen ts
b o th th e class x y an d th e class y x .
A p a rt from th is analogy w ith
th e law of c o m m u ta tiv ity of m u l­
tip lic a tio n B oole p o in ted to m an y
o th e r sim ilarities betw een th e
law s p e rta in in g to classes a n d th e law s of m ath em atical
alg eb ra, a n d th u s fo u n d ed th e alg eb ra of logic. W e w ill
n o t, how ever, b e concerned w ith i t in an y g re a te r d etail,
fo r o u r aim is o nly to ch a racteriz e th e sta n d p o in t ta k e n
b y B oole. W ith th a t en d in view w e sh all b e concerned
w ith th e p o in t a t w hich, as B oole saw it, th e an alogy
w ith m a th e m a tic a l alg eb ra com es to a n end.
F ollow ing B oole’s in te rp re ta tio n , in th e alg eb ra of
logic th e law x x = x is tru e fo r a n y v alu es of th e v a ria b le x .
F o r th e class x x is th e class of th o se o b jects w hich belong
b o th to th e class x a n d to th e class x , a n d hence form th e
class x . T hus, e.g ., th e class of th o se o b jects w hich belong
b o th to th e class of m en a n d to th e class of m en is th e
class of m en. Y e t in m a th e m a tic a l alg eb ra th e law :
x x = x is n o t tru e fo r ev ery v alu e of th e v a ria b le x . W e
know th a t th e eq u a tio n x 2 = x , as an eq u a tio n of th e
second degree, h a s only tw o so lutions, in o u r case th e
v alu es 0 an d I . T ak in g th is fa c t in to acco u n t B oole con­
clu d ed th a t in th e alg eb ra of logic all th o se law s are
v a lid w hich a re tru e in m a th e m a tic a l alg eb ra w hen th e
v alu es are lim ited to th e v alu es 0 an d 1. F o r w ith th is
re stric tio n th e law x x — x is tru e fo r aU valu es of th e
v a ria b le x , since w e h av e: 0 *0 = 0 an d 1 * 1 = 1 .
 TRENDS IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 3

I n h is a lg eb ra of. logic B oole also in te rp re te d th e

sym bols of zero a n d u n ity . Since th e y are c o n sta n t sym bols,
th e y are to be u n d ersto o d as c e rta in c o n sta n t classes;
according to B oole, “ 1 ” stan d s for th e class of all objects,
an d “ 0 ” fo r th e em p ty class, th a t is th e class to w hich
no o b ject belongs. H ence every o b ject belongs to th e
class “ 1 ” , i t is th e class of th e to ta lity of o b jects. T he
em p ty class, e.g., is th e class of m o u n tain s of gold, th e
class of sq u are circles, th e class of chim eras, etc., fo r
no o b ject is a m o u n tain of gold, no o b ject is a sq u are
circle, no o b ject is a chim era. T he p roblem of existence
of th e em p ty class en tails considerable d ifficu lty , fo r if
no sq u are circles ex ist th e n it seem s th a t th e class of
sq u are circles should n o t ex ist eith er. W e sh all n o t analyse
th is issue m ore closely.
I n developing his alg eb ra of logic B oole in tro d u ced
logical ad d itio n an d logical su b tra c tio n , b o th u n d ersto o d
in a specific w ay. T h e la tte r o p eratio n w ill be explained
to serve th e p u rp o se of o u r ex p o sitio n of th e su b ject.
T he class x — y , th e difference of th e classes x a n d y, is
th e class of th o se o b jects w hich belong to th e class x ,
w ith th e ex cep tio n of th e o b jects belonging to th e class y .
If, e.g., x is th e class of m en an d y is th e class of A sians,
th e n x — y is th e class of all m en ex cep t th e A sians.
L ikew ise, if a? is th e class of m en, th e n 1 —a; is th e class
of all o b jects ex cep t m en, th a t is th e class of non-m en.
I n h is alg eb ra of logic B oole h an d led th e eq u alities
of classes ju s t lik e m ath em atical eq u alities. S ta rtin g from
th e law : x x = x , or x %— x , as discussed above, b y sub-
stra c tin g x 2 fro m b o th sides of th e eq u a lity h e o b tain ed
a?2—a? — x — it2, an d hence: 0 = x — x 2, or x — x2 = 0 . B y
tstrin g x o u tsid e p aren th eses he o b tain ed th e law
x (1 —«c) = 0 .
If, fo r in sta n c e , x is th e class of m en , th e n th is law sta te s
th a t th e class of th e o b jects belonging b o th to th e class
4 I . INTKOUUCTION

of m en an d to th e class of non-m en is th e em p ty class.

T his law w as fo r B oole a n expression of th e logical
p rin cip le w hich, since A risto tle, h a d b een know n as th e
p rin c ip le o f contradiction. I n co n fo rm ity w ith th a t p rin cip le,
no o b ject m ay possess sim u ltan eo u sly tw o co n tra d ic to ry
p ro p erties, e.g., b e a t th e sam e tim e a m an a n d a non-m an.
B oole ascribed to h is alg eb ra of logic an im m ense im ­
p o rtan c e because h e saw th a t w ith its h elp h e w as in
a p o sitio n to p ro v e th e m o st im p o rta n t logical law s.
T he exam ple of reaso n in g given above shows clearly
th a t B oole’s m eth o d w as p u re ly algebraic. B oole’s w ork
was co n tin u ed in th e sam e d irectio n b y th e A m erican
logician P eirce, th e a u th o r of m an y p ap ers o n m ath em atical
logic, published in A m erican periodicals. I t w as on P eirce’s
w orks th a t th e G erm an logician E rn s t S chroder, w ho
lived in th e second h alf of th e 1 9 th cen tu ry (d. 1902),
b ased his researches; he is th e a u th o r of th e m o st com ­
prehensive w ork on m ath em atical logic so fa r, th e th ree-
volum e stu d y e n title d V o rlesu n g en iiber d ie A lg eb ra der
L o g ik [28],
S chroder te rm in a te s th a t tre n d in m ath em atical logic
w hich w as b ased on th e ap p licatio n s of th e algebraic
m eth o d x. F o r a logician co n n ected w ith th a t tre n d m a th ­
em atics w as th e m odel of how to proceed in research,
an d som etim es ev en an au x iliary discipline. B oole em ployed
fa irly d ifficu lt m a th e m a tic a l th eo rem s in o rd er to p re se n t
a n d p ro v e som e of th e re su lts h e o b tain ed in his logical
research. E x te rn a lly th e alg eb ra of logic used m ath em atical
sym bolism . P roblem s w ere fo rm u lated in a m ath em atical
w ay, e.g., m an y references w ere m ad e in th e alg eb ra of
logic to solving logical eq u atio n s.
2. T he fo u n d er a n d re p re se n ta tiv e of th e o th er tre n d
in m ath em atical logic w as th e G erm an m ath em atician
G ottlob F reg e, w ho Kved in th e second h alf of th e 1 9 th
a n d in th e early 2 0 th cen tu ry . I n 1879 h e p ublished h is
firs t w ork o n m ath em atical logic, e n title d B e g riffssc h rift [3].
 TRENDS IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 5

A t th a t tim e h e a p p a re n tly d id n o t know th e w orks

of B oole a n d h is follow ers. F reg e’s m o st im p o rta n t
w ork is G rundlagen d er A r ith m e iik [4]. F reg e s e t him self
th e ta s k of in v e stig a tin g how fa r i t is possible to proceed
in a rith m e tic b y m ean s of reaso n in g th a t is b ased ex clu ­
sively on th e g en eral law s of th o u g h t a n d does n o t re so rt
to th e sta te m e n ts a b o u t em p irical fa cts. T h e aim of F reg e’s
researches w as to d em o n strate th e p o ssib ility of founding
a ll of a rith m e tic on logical law s alone. To achieve th a t,
F reg e h a d to give com plete proofs, w ith o u t an y g ap s
w h atev er, fo r if th e re is a g ap in a proof, th e suspicion
arises th a t p erh ap s in th a t p lace w e re so rt to som e e x tra -
logical prem ises. I t is only w hen a ll th e proofs a re g iv en
in a com plete form th a t w e can b e su re th a t a rith m e tic
can b e b u ilt on logical prem ises alone.
W h en striv in g to reach h is id eal of th e s tric tly scien tific
m a th e m a tic a l m eth o d , n am ely th e a x io m a tic m eth o d , a l­
re a d y u sed b y E u clid , F reg e m ad e Ms tw o p rin cip al d is­
coveries: h e created c e rta in new logical system s, p rev io u sly
(even in B oole’s w orks) im p erfectly k now n a n d u n d e r­
sto o d (above all th e se n te n tia l calculus, expounded in
B eg-riffsschrift ), a n d w as th e firs t, as i t seem s, to n o tice
th e difference b etw een th e prem ises on wM eh a reasoning
is b ased , a n d th e ru les o f in feren ce, th a t is th e ru les w hich
d eterm in e how we a re to proceed in order to p ro v e a g iv en
th esis on th e s tre n g th of c e rta in prem ises. T he difference
b etw een th e prem ises of reaso n in g an d th e ru les of
in feren ce is b ro u g h t clearly in to relief w hen th e prem ises
a re w ritte n in a sym bolic fo rm : i t th e n becom es clear th a t
th e ru les of inference ca n n o t also b e w ritte n in sym bols,
a t le a s t if w e confine ourselves to th o se sym bols w hich
occur in th e prem ises.
T h e n eed to use sym bolism in logic becam e clear to
F reg e w hen h e n o ticed th e d ifficu lties re su ltin g fro m
ev ery d ay speech. F reg e’s log ical sym bolism co u ld n o t, as
w as th e case w ith B oole’s sym bolism , b e m odelled on m a th e ­
2
6 1. INTRODtiCTlON

m atics, fo r F re g e ’s logic w as to serve ab o v e all to lay

th e fo u n d a tio n s of a rith m e tic ; co n seq u en tly , th e use of
a rith m e tic a l sym bolism in logic w ould lead to an am ­
b ig u ity of sym bols. T his is .the firs t difference betw een
th e tre n d re p re se n te d b y F reg e a n d th e alg eb ra of logic.
T he second difference re su lts from th e firs t: as h e did
n o t u se alg eb raic sym bolism , F reg e w as n o t te m p te d to
se t logic ta sk s w hich w ere analogous to m a th e m a tic a l
problem s, he d id n o t u se m a th e m a tic a l m eth o d s in logic
a n d th erefo re b e tte r u n d ersto o d th e specific n a tu re of
th e logical problem s. F in a lly , th e th ird difference is con­
n ected w ith F re g e ’s p rin c ip a l o b jectiv e: since h e w an ted
to b ase a rith m e tic on logical fo u n d atio n s h e could n o t
re so rt in his research to an y m a th e m a tic a l th eo rem s.
T h e priceless v alu e of F re g e ’s logical research es con­
sists in th e ir ex cep tio n al precision; th e ir a u th o r w orked
o u t a tru ly scien tific m eth o d of lay in g th e fo u n d atio n s
of m ath em atics, a n d in t h a t re sp e c t th e tre n d in logic
in itia te d b y F re g e h as m u ch g re a te r services to its c red it
th a n th e tre n d re p re se n te d b y th e alg eb ra of logic.
F reg e’s logic in flu en ced th e E n g lish scien tists
A . IS". W h iteh ead a n d B . B u ssell, th e a u th o rs of P r in c ip ia
M a th e m a tie a [35], v ol. 1 of w hich, co n tain in g th e stu d y
of m a th e m a tic a l logic, ap p e ared in 1910 (second p rin tin g
in 1925). P r in c ip ia M a th e m a tie a is w ritte n in a special
sym bolic lan g u ag e, w ith com m ents o n th e te x t in E n g lish .
T h a t w o rk p u t in to effect F reg e’s id ea th a t m ath em atics
sh o u ld b e p re se n te d as a sy stem th a t begins w ith logic,
on w hich a re b a se d th e v ario u s b ran ch es of m ath em atics
in th e n arro w er sense of th e w ord. W h iteh ead a n d B ussell
also availed, th em selv es, especially in w h a t concerns
sym bolism , of th e w orks of th e Ita lia n m a th e m a tic ia n
G. P ean o , w ho in h is P o rm u la ire de m a th em a tiq u es stro v e
to n o te dow n m a th e m a tic a l theo rem s in sym bols h e h a d
in v e n te d , a n d to p ro v e th e m in a s tric t m an n er. T he la s t
v olum e of his p u b lic a tio n ap p eared in 1908 as F o rm u la rio
 TRENDS IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 7

m atem aticoj w ritte n in th e a rtific ia l language called la tin o

sin e fle x io n e . T he au th o rs of P r in c ip ia M a th em a tica
ad o p ted a m odified sym bolism of P ean o , w hich is sim pler
th a n th e in tric a te n o ta tio n used b y F reg e. Y e t w hen it
com es to p recision a n d su b tle ty in th e scientific m eth o d ,
b o th P ean o ’s form ulas a n d th e w ork of W h iteh ead an d
B ussell p ro v e in ferio r to F reg e’s w orks. F reg e is th e m odern
logician m o st p e n e tra tin g in fin d in g a n d m o st su b tle in
solving th e problem s th a t re st a t th e ro o ts of logic.
3. W h a t is th e relatio n sh ip betw een m ath em atical
logic, th e d ev elo p m en t of w hich h as been described above,
an d p h ilo so p h ic a l lo g ic f W hen using th e te rm p h ilo so p h ica l
logic I h av e in m ind th a t se t of issues w hich are raised
in books w ritte n b y philosophers, I h av e in m ind th a t
logic w hich w e h av e learn ed in secondary school. P h il­
osophical logic is n o t a hom ogeneous discipline, b u t
co n tain s issues of diverse co n ten t. I n p a rtic u la r, i t en ­
croaches u p o n psychology w hen i t refers n o t only to sen ­
ten ces in th e logical sense of th e w ord, b u t also to th o se
p sy ch ic p h en o m en a w hich correspond to sentences an d
w hich a re called *‘ju d g m en ts” o r “ p ro p o sitio n s” . Com ­
b in in g logic w ith psychology is a re su lt of a n erroneous
in te rp re ta tio n of th e su b ject m a tte r of logical re s e a rc h a.
I t is o ften said th a t logic is th e science of th e law s of
th o u g h t, a n d since th in k in g is a p sychic a c t, th erefo re
logic sh o u ld fo rm p a r t of psychology. I t m ig h t as w ell
b e arg u ed th a t a rith m e tic is a psychological discipline
becau se i t is concerned w ith ad d in g an d m u ltip ly in g
n u m b ers a n d raisin g th em to pow ers, a n d th e re is no
d o u b t th a t a d d itio n , m u ltip lic a tio n a n d raisin g to a pow er
are psy ch ic a c ts. T e t no one claim s th a t, a rith m e tic is
p a r t of psychology. L ikew ise, logic is n o t p a rt of p sy ch o l­
ogy. T h e psychological issues connected w ith th e process
of t h in k in g m u st be in v estig ated b y q u ite d ifferen t m eth o d s
from th o se used in logic.
P h ilo so p h ical logic also in clu d es c e rta in epistem ological
2*
8 I. INTRODUCTION

problem s, e.g ., th e p ro b lem of w h a t is tru th , an d w h eth er

th e re is a n y crite rio n of tru th . T e t th ese m a tte rs also
do n o t belong to logic: as w e sh all see la te r, i t is possible
to b u ild w ith m ax im u m p recisio n lo g ical system s in w hich
no referen ce w h a te v e r w ill b e m ad e to tr u th a n d falsehood.
T he p ro b lem of tr u th belongs to th o se epistem ological
issues w hich are ex trem ely d ifficu lt to solve, h a v e so fa r
been rid d e n w ith o b scu rity , a n d p ro b a b ly w ill n o t be
solved soon.
I f w e rem ove from philo so p h ical logic all th o se issues
w hich belong to psychology, epistem ology a n d philo so p h y
in g en eral, th e n w h a t rem ain s w ill c o n stitu te w h at is
called fo rm a l logic , co n tain in g logical issues p ro p er. A nd
th ese issues of philo so p h ical logic do n o t d iffer from
th e issues of m a th e m a tic a l logic, b u t th e y a re tre a te d b y
philosophers w ith m uch less p recision th a n b y m a th e m a t­
ical logicians. P h ilo so p h ical logic, fro m th e beginning
of m o d ern ph ilo so p h y u p to o u r tim es, h as suffered
a serious decline. I f one m ay sp eak of a k in sh ip of m ethods
u sed in fo rm al logic an d in m a th e m a tic a l logic, th is can
only re fe r to an c ie n t logic. T he an cien ts created certain
logical sy stem s, still v ery im p erfect b u t w hich ce rtain ly
can b e considered th e firs t stag es in th e d ev elo p m en t of
co n tem p o rary system s of m a th e m a tic a l logic. Conse­
q u en tly , if m a th e m a tic a l logic is opposed to philosophical
logic, th is p e rta in s p rin cip ally to m o d ern a n d m o st re cen t
tim es. I n fa c t, th e re are n o t tw o logics, m ath em atical
a n d p h ilo so p h ical; th e re is only one logic, founded b y
A risto tle, co m p leted b y th e an c ie n t school of th e S toics,
an d p u rsu ed , o ften w ith g re a t su b tle ty , b y m edieval
logicians, an d i t is th a t logic w hich is developed b y
m ath em atical logic. T he re a liz a tio n of th a t u n ity of logic
is alread y gain in g gro u n d , an d som e au th o rs cease to use
th e te rm “ m a th e m a tic a l logic” . T he re c e n t {1928) book
b y D . H ilb e rt a n d W . A ckerm ann b ears th e title G rundziige
der theoretischen LogiJc [ 6 ] a n d co n tain s an ex p o sitio n of
 THEOREMS AND RULES OF INFERENCE 9

m ath em atical logic. I f th e p re se n t lectu res 3 are e n title d

P rin c ip le s o f M a th e m a tic a l L o g ic , th is is only in o rd er
to em phasize w h a t w ill h e th e ir tre n d a n d m e th o d 4.

2 . Theorems and Rules o f Inference.

The Sentential Logic and the Term Logic

4. I n tex tb o o k s of tra d itio n a l logic A risto tle’s sim plest

syllogism is u su ally p re se n ted in th e follow ing form :
A ll M is P ,
1 A ll $ is M .
T herefore a ll S is P .
To illu s tra te th is, exam ples lik e th e follow ing a re given:
A ll m en a re m o rtal,
A ll P oles a re m en.
T herefore a ll P oles are m o rtal.
A risto tle of S tag ira, a G reek philosopher w ho liv ed
in th e fo u rth c e n tu ry B .O . (d. 322 B . C.), is considered
th e fo u n d er of logic an d , in p a rtic u la r, th e a u th o r of
th e syllogism q u o ted above ®. A risto tle w as in fa c t th e
a u th o r of a logical th e o ry w hich m ig h t be called th e
theory o f syllo g ism a n d w hich, as w e know to d ay , is only
a sm all frag m en t of th e w hole of logic. P hilosophers,
how ever, w ere so fascin ated b y A risto tle ’s w ork th a t
th e y o ften asserted th a t th e w hole of logic w as con­
ta in e d in th e th e o ry of syllogism a n d th a t th a t th e o ry
w as a com plete a n d p erfect discipline. Such a view of
A risto tle’s syllogistic w as h eld b y Im m an u el K a n t. These
fa c ts te stify to th e g re a t a u th o rity enjoyed b y A risto tle,
b u t a t th e sam e tim e to th e decline of logical th in k in g
in th e case of m o d em philosophers. A risto tle’s w ork is
v e ry rem ark ab le; in h is ow n tim e it w as th e p ro d u c t
of a genius, y e t i t is b u t a tin y frag m en t of w h at we
know a b o u t logic to d ay .
10 I . INTRODUCTION

T he p a tte rn of a syllogism g iv en u n d e r I , as fo rm u lated

in tra d itio n a l logic, is n o t A risto tle ’s syllogism . I f w e
d isreg ard c e rta in slig h t differences, A risto tle ’s syllogism
w hich corresponds to th e tra d itio n a l syllogism quoted
ab o v e can b e w ritte n dow n as follow s:
If all M is P
II and a ll 8 is M ,
th e n all S is P .

P ra c tic a lly all th e h isto ria n s of logic fa il to n o tice th e

difference b etw een th e form s I a n d I I , ' a n d q u o te A ris­
to tle ’s syllogism in fo rm I ; th is is also done b y one of
th e m o st reliab le h isto ria n s of logic, th e G erm an scholar
P ra n tl, w ho liv ed in th e m id -1 9 th ce n tu ry .
T h e difference b etw een th e tw o form s of syllogism ,
as given above, is v e ry essen tial. A risto tle’s syllogism (II)
is a co n d itio n a l sen ten ce , w hich h as a n an tec ed en t an d
a co n seq u en t: th e a n te c e d e n t is co n tain ed b etw een th e
w ords “ if” a n d “ th e n ” a n d consists of tw o clauses con­
n e c te d b y th e w o rd “ a n d ” , a n d th e co n seq u en t follow s
th e w o rd “ th e n ” . T h u s th e e n tire syllogism form s a single
sentence, a com plex sen ten ce. On th e o th e r h an d , th e
tra d itio n a l syllogism (I) does n o t fo rm a single sentence,
b u t consists of th re e sen ten ces: th e firs t tw o sentences
a re n o t co n n ected b y th e w o rd “ a n d ” in to a single w hole,
a n d th e ex p ressio n “ th e re fo re ” does n o t, as does th e
ex p ressio n “ if ... th e n ” , com bine tw o sentences in to
a com plex sen ten ce. W h a t is th e d ifference b etw een th e
expressions “ th e re fo re ” a n d “ if ... th e n ” ? T h e expression
“ th ere fo re” is u sed w h en w e d raw conclusions. I n th e
ex am p le of syllogism I , as g iv en above, fro m th e sentences
“A ll m en a re m o rta l” an d “A ll P oles are m en ” w e
d ed u ce th e sen ten ce “ A ll Poles are m o rta l” . T he in ­
feren ce is considered co rrect only if th e sentences from
w hich w e s ta r t— th e prem ises— are considered correct.
 THEOREMS AW'D RULES OF INFERENCE 11

If in syllogism I w e su b s titu te “ m an ” fo r M , “ p la n t”
for P , an d “ P o le” fo r S , w e o b ta in th e follow ing syllogism :

A ll m en are p la n ts.
A ll P oles are m en.
T herefore all P oles are p lan ts.

Ho one, how ever, w ould consider th a t syllogism to b e

correct. T h e sense of in co rrectn ess of th a t syllogism
re su lts from th e falsehood of th e firs t prem ise. B u t if
th e syllogism is fo rm u lated in th e form I w ith th e v ariab les
S , M , P , th is can n q t m ean th a t one considers th e prem ises
w ith th e v ariab les to b e tru e : no one w ill say th a t th e
expression “ All M is P ” is tru e . T h a t expression is n eith er
tru e n o r false before d efin ite term s are s u b stitu te d fo r
th e v aria b le s M a n d P . I f w e w a n t to im p a rt sense to
syllogism I, fo rm u lated w ith v ariab les, we m u st tr e a t
it as a schem e of inference w hich expresses th e follow ing
ru le: w hoever accepts sentences o f the ty p e “AM M is P ”
a n d “AM 8 is Af” , he is also en titled to accept a sentence
o f the ty p e “ AM S is P ” . I n th is ru le w e re fer n o t to th e
accep tan ce of th e sen ten ce “ A ll M is P ” , b u t to th e
accep tan ce of a sen ten ce o f the ty p e o f “ A ll M is P ” .
A nd b y sentences of th e ty p e s of “ A ll M is P ” w e u n d e r­
sta n d th o se sen ten ces w hich are o b tain ed fro m th e ex ­
pression “ A ll M is P ” b y th e su b stitu tio n fo r th e v ariab les
of som e d e fin ite term s.
T he d ifficu lties discussed ab o v e an d p e rta in in g to th e
tra d itio n a l syllogism , do n o t ap p e ar in th e case of A ris­
to tle ’s syllogism . A risto tle ’s syllogism form s, as h a s been
said, a single sen ten ce w hich is tru e fo r all th e su b stitu tio n s
of d efin ite term s fo r th e v ariab les, regardless of w h eth er
a fte r such su b stitu tio n s th e prem ises becom e tru e or false
clauses. F o r th e sam e su b stitu tio n s fo r w hich syllogism I
w as n o t tru e , syllogism I I is tru e : i f all m en are p la n ts
a n d all P o les are m e n , th en all P oles are p la n ts.
12 I. INTRODUCTION

O ur w ay of u n d ersta n d in g syllogism I enables us

b e tte r to ex p lain th e d ifference b etw een a lo g ical theorem
a n d a ru le of inference. I n th e fo rm u latio n of a ru le of
inference w e en co u n ter expressions w hich h a v e n o logical
sense; th ese are th e expressions “ w hoever accep ts” , “is
e n title d ” . These expressions p e rta in to th e m ode of p ro ­
cedure of th e p erso n w ho m akes an inference. I n syllo­
gism I I , w hich is a logical th eo rem , no such expressions
occur.
I f o u r w ay of in te rp re tin g th e tra d itio n a l syllogism
is co rrect th e n w e h a v e to s ta te th a t its fo rm u latio n
given u n d e r I is v e ry obscure a n d does n o t convey to th e
re ad er its a c tu a l c o n te n t. T ra d itio n a l logic com pletely
ignored th e difference b etw een a logical th eo rem an d
a ru le of inference. F o r u s, th a t difference is of an essen tial
n a tu re , a n d in th e fu tu re w e sh all em phasize it m ost
stric tly in o u r con sid eratio n s.
5. A fte r A risto tle, logic in a n tiq u ity w as devel­
oped in th e school of th e S to ic s 8. I ts fo u n d er in th e
3 rd c e n tu ry B .C . w as Zeno of Edition (C itium ), a n d its
m ost o u tstan d in g re p re se n ta tiv e w as C hrysippus. T he
w ritin g s of th e S toics h av e n o t been p reserv ed u n til o u r
tim es, an d only frag m en ts of S toic logic h a v e reach ed us.
T he Stoics also fo rm u lated c e rta in syllogism s, a n exam ple
of w hich is th e follow ing fo rm u la:
I f p j th e n g.
Ill K ow p .
T herefore g.
L ike th e tra d itio n a l syllogism , th e syllogism fo rm u lated
above is a schem e of inference. I n a ll p ro b a b ility i t w as
precisely u n d er th e influence of th e S toic syllogism th a t
tra d itio n a l logic u sed to fo rm u late A risto tle’s syllogism s
as schem es of in feren ce a n d fo rg o t a b o u t th e original
A risto telian form of th e syllogism . T he ru le of inference,
th e schem e of w hich is th e S toic syllogism as given above,
 T H E O R E M S A N D R U L E S O F IN F E R E N C E 13

w ould b e: w hoever recognizes sentences of th e ty p e “ I f p ,

th e n 3 ” an d “ p ” , is e n title d also to recognize th e sentence
of th e ty p e “ g” . T h is ru le is w h a t is called the ru le of
detachm ent (or: m o d u s p o n e n s — T r.), one of th e sim plest
ru les of inference, to b e m e t in ev ery logical system .
T he follow ing schem e is a n exam ple of th e ap p licatio n
of th a t ru le:
I f to d a y is F rid a y , th e n tom orrow is S atu rd ay .
N ow to d a y is F rid a y .
T hen to m o rro w is S a tu rd a y .
I t is possible to fo rm u late a logical th eo rem w hich
w ould b e in a sim ilar re la tio n to th e said ru le as A risto tle’s
syllogism is to tra d itio n a l syllogism . T he th eo rem in
q u estio n is:
IV I f (if p , th e n q) an d p , th e n q.
T his th eo rem is a co n d itio n al sentence, as is syllogism I I .
I ts a n te c e d e n t obviously is “ (if p , th e n q) a n d p ” , its
co n seq u en t, q. T he a n te c e d e n t is a co m b in atio n in to one
sen ten ce, b y m eans of th e w ord “ a n d ” , of tw o sentences,
th e firs t of w hich is in tu rn a co n d itio n al sentence.
W h a t is th e difference b etw een syllogism I I and
syllogism IV ? I n b o th cases v ariab les do occur in th e
syllogism s: M } P , 8 in th e fo rm er, a n d p , q in th e la tte r.
T h e essen tial d ifference as b etw een th ese v ariab les p e r­
ta in s to th e valu es w hich th e y can assum e. I n A risto tle ’s
syllogism only term s can b e v alu es of th e v ariab les;
m oreover, th is p e rta in s o n ly to g en eral n am es, i.e., such
as m ay serv e as p re d ic ates to m ore th a n one o b ject. T hey
m ay b e such term s as “ a P o le” , “ a p la n t” , b u t n o t
in d iv id u a l term s such as “ A risto tle of S ta g ira ” , o r em p ty
term s, i.e., w hich ca n n o t serv e as p re d ic ates to a n y o b ject,
e.g., “ ch im era” , “ a sq u are circle” , etc. O n th e o th er h an d ,
th e v alu es of th e v ariab les in syllogism IV m ay n o t be
term s. S hould we s u b s titu te fo r th e v ariab les p a n d q
14 I . IN TO O D U C TIO K

som e term s, e.g ., “ a m a n ” a n d “ a p la n t” , resp ectiv ely ,

we w ould o b tain :
I f (if a m an , th e n a p la n t) a n d a m an , th e n a p la n t.
T his ex pression w o n ld b e n e ith e r tru e n o r false; m oreover,
i t w ould n o t b e a sen ten ce a t all; i t w onld b e a m eaningless
expression. O nly sentences m ay b e th e v alu es of th e
v ariab les in syllogism IY . A s in schem e I I I , in syllogism IV
w e m ay s u b s titu te fo r p th e sentence “ to d a y is F rid a y ” ,
an d fo r q th e sen ten ce “ tom o rro w is S a tu rd a y ” , an d we
o b ta in th e follow ing tru e sentence:
I f (if to d a y is F rid a y , th e n tom o rro w is S atu rd ay )
an d to d a y is F rid a y , th e n tom o rro w is S atu rd ay .
T erm s an d sentences a re q u ite d ifferen t categories of
expressions, so th a t in th o se cases w here w e use a te rm
m eaningfully, w e m ay n o t use a sentence m eaningfully,
an d w here w e use a sentence m eaningfully, w e m ay n o t
use a te rm m ean in g fu lly . T hus, A risto tle’s th e o ry is con­
cern ed w ith expressions in w hich te rm v ariab les occur,
a n d th e logical th e o ry o rig in ated b y th e Stoics is con­
cern ed w ith expressions in w hich only se n te n tia l v a ria ­
b les occur.
I n th e lig h t of th e difference now u n d e r discussion
th e logic of th e S toics a n d th e logic of A risto tle are tw o
d ifferen t logical th eo ries: the fo rm er is a logic o f sentences,
a n d the latter is a logic o f term s . T h is difference is stressed
h ere becau se p hilosophical logic ab so lu tely does n o t
realize th is fa c t: S to ic syllogism s are u su ally p resen ted
th e re as a so rt of com plem ent of A risto tle’s syllogism s.
I n th e syllogistic of th e Stoics no term s occur a t all,
w hereas in A risto tle ’s syllogistic we h av e to do w ith
sentences, a lth o u g h se n te n tia l v ariab les do n o t ap p ear
th e re . W e sh all see la te r th a t th e syllogistic of th e Stoics
logically precedes th a t of A risto tle: in ju stify in g theorem s
of th e logic of term s w e m u st base ourselves on theorem s
from th e logic of sentences.
 TH E O R E M S A N D R U L E S O F IN F E R E N C E 15

T he logic of sentences, w hich is n o t ta k e n in to acco u n t

in th e te x tb o o k s of p h ilo so p h ical logic, is a m u ch m ore
im p o rta n t th e o ry th a n th e th e o ry of th e A risto te lia n
syllogism . I n m a th e m a tic a l reaso n in g th e th e o ry of th e
A risto telian syllogism h as p ra c tic a lly no ap p licatio n s,
w hereas th e re is p ro b a b ly no in tric a te m ath em atical
p ro o f w hich does n o t re fe r to th eo rem s from th e logic
of sen ten ces.
T h e logic of sentences w as fo r th e firs t tim e fo rm u lated
as a sy stem in F re g e ’s B e g r iffs s c h r ift ; th e au th o rs of
P r in c ip ia M a th e m a tic a called i t th e theory o f d ed u ctio n ,
w hich is n o t a fo rtu n a te te rm , since one m ig h t th in k th a t
it is a th e o ry of d ed u cin g in general.
I n th e lig h t of in v estig atio n s b y m a th e m a tic a l logic,
A risto tle ’s syllo g istic is a sm all fra g m en t of a m ore general
th e o ry fo u n d ed b y P ro fesso r S. Le^niew ski a n d called b y
h im o n to lo g y 7. T h e th eo rem s of ontology w hich are
ap p licab le to m ath em atics are m ain ly th eo rem s n o t in ­
cluded in A risto tle ’s syllogistic.
6 . To illu s tra te th e issues ra ise d h ere I sh all give th e
proof of a m a th e m a tic a l th eo re m as a n exam ple. I n th a t
proof I sh all a v a il m yself of one a rith m e tic a l th eo rem ,
a n d of lo g ical th eo rem s I sh all use only tw o, b o th belonging
to th e s e n te n tia l calcu lu s; I sh all m ak e no referen ce to
th e th e o ry of th e A risto te lia n syllogism . I n th is exam ple
I sh all use c e rta in ru les of in feren ce, w hich w ill give us
a n o p p o rtu n ity to becom e d ire c tly a c q u a in te d w ith th e
d ifferen ce b etw een a th eo re m a n d a ru le of in feren ce, as
em p h asized above. T h e ex am p le to b e given now w ill be
a m odel of a co m p lete m a th e m a tic a l p ro o f, satisfy in g th e
co n d itio n s of p recisio n fo rm u lated b y F reg e.
I sh a ll m ake u se of tw o ru les of in feren ce: th e ru le
of d e ta c h m e n t a n d th e ru le of su b stitu tio n . T he ru le of
d e ta c h m e n t w as fo rm u la te d above in connection w ith
S to ic syllogism I I I . L e t th e sym bol G b e u sed so th a t
th e ex p ressio n Cpq is a n a b b re v ia tio n of th e co n d itio n al
16 I . IN T R O D U C T IO N

sen ten ce w ith th e a n te c e d e n t p a n d th e co n seq u en t q.

T h e ru le of d e ta c h m e n t e n title s n s to ac cep t a sentence
of th e ty p e q o n th e s tre n g th of accep tan ce of sentences
of th e ty p es C pq a n d p .
T h e ro le of su b s titu tio n m o re o r less corresponds to
th e p rin cip le w hich in tra d itio n a l logic w as called d ictu m
de o m n i {a sta te m e n t a b o u t ev ery th in g ). I n L a tin i t goes:
q u id q u id de o m n ib u s va let , valet e tia m de q u ib u sd a m et de
s in g u lis , w hich in a n in fo rm al tra n s la tio n m ig h t b e p u t as:
w h a t holds o f a ll th in g s o f a certa in h in d , also holds o f som e
a n d o f sin g le th in g s o f th a t h in d . W h a t is v a lid , e.g ., of all
m en, is also v a lid of A risto tle of S ta g ira . T h e ru le of
s u b stitu tio n p erm its u s, o n th e s tre n g th of a generally
recognized th eo rem w ith v aria b le s, to accep t as tru e
a sen ten ce o b tain ed fro m th is th eo rem b y rep lacin g
v ariab les w ith som e o th e r expressions, b u t th e expressions
rep lacin g th e v ariab les m u st b e of th e sam e categ o ry as
th e v ariab les concerned: sentences are to be su b stitu ted fo r
sen ten tia l va ria b les , a n d term s fo r te rm variables .
I n p hilosophical logic th e p rin cip le d ic tu m de o m n i w as
considered th e m ain p rin cip le of d ed u ctiv e inference.
T his led to th e conclusion th a t d ed u ctio n alw ays s ta rts
from g en eral sentences a n d lead s to c e rta in less general
sentences. T o d ay w e know from m a th e m a tic a l logic th a t
in d ed u ctiv e inference w e h a v e to use o th e r ru les as
w ell as th e ru le of su b stitu tio n , e.g., th e ru le of de­
ta c h m e n t. I f th ese ru les a re com bined, th e n , as we shall
soon see, w e m ay o b ta in q u ite new re su lts, n o t con tain ed
in th e prem ises. C o n trary to w h a t is o fte n th o u g h t, d e­
d u ctio n is n o t ju s t ex p lan a tio n o r re a liz a tio n of those
law s w hich w e p rev io u sly knew in som e im p licit w ay.
D ed u ctiv e inference is a v ery po w erfu l m eth o d of reaso n ­
in g a n d lead s to new discoveries. A ll m ath em atics reso rts
to th a t m eth o d of inference, a n d i t is w ell know n how
im p o rta n t m ath em atics is fo r techn o lo g y an d th e n a tu ra l
sciences.
 TH EO R EM S AND R U L E S O F IN F E R E N C E 17

O ne of th e th eo rem s of th e se n te n tia l calculus, to w hich

we sh all refer, is th e law of th e hypothetical syUogism.
I f th e sym bol C, in tro d u c e d above, sta n d s fo r a n im p li­
catio n , th e law can b e w ritte n in th e follow ing form :
1 G G pqG G qrG pr .

T his law is a co n d itio n al sen ten ce th e an te c e d e n t a n d

th e co n seq u en t of w hich a re m ark ed b y braces below ;
th e an te c e d e n t a n d th e co n seq u en t of th e co n seq u en t
are m ark ed b y b races ab o v e. T heorem 1 is u su ally ap p lied
w hen we h av e tw o recognized sentences of th e ty p e C pq
an d Ggr. W e firs t m ake a p p ro p ria te su b stitu tio n s in T heo­
rem 1 . N e x t, on th e s tre n g th of th e ru le of d etach m en t—
in view of th e reco g n itio n of th e an te c e d e n t of T heorem 1,
nam ely a sen ten ce of th e ty p e Cpq —we o b ta in a sentence
of th e ty p e C C qrG pr ; h ere ag ain , in view of th e reco g n itio n
of its an tec ed en t, n am ely a sen ten ce of th e ty p e Gqr, w e
o b ta in b y d etac h m e n t a sen ten ce of th e ty p e Gpr.
B efore sym bolizing th e second logical prem ise we sh all
in tro d u ce an ab b re v ia tio n of th e sen ten ce “ it is n o t tru e
th a t p ” j w hich w ill be sym bolized N p . T he prem ise w ill
b e w ritte n as
2 C G N ppp.

W e h av e sym bolized, w ith recourse to ab b rev iatio n s

alread y ad o p ted , th e follow ing sentence: “ I f (if i t is n o t
tru e th a t p , th e n p ) , th e n p " . T heorem 2 is a co n d itio n al
sentence th e a n tec ed en t of w hich again is also a co n d itio n al
sentence w ith a n a n te c e d e n t w hich is th e n eg atio n of th e
consequent. To u n d e rsta n d th e sense of T heorem 2 le t
us n o te th a t i t enables us to s ta rt from a sentence of th e
ty p e G N p p a n d to o b ta in in conclusion, on th e stre n g th
of th e ru les of su b stitu tio n an d d etach m en t, a sentence
of th e ty p e p . I n fa c t, a sentence of th e ty p e p m u st
h ere be tru e ; should i t n o t be tru e , th e n its n eg atio n ,
18 I . IN T R O D U C T IO N

i.e.j a sen ten ce of th e ty p e N p , w ould b e tru e . Y e t from

th a t sen ten ce a n d from a recognized sentence of th e ty p e
C N p p w e w ould o b ta in , o n th e stre n g th of th e ru le of
d e ta c h m e n t, a sen ten ce of th e ty p e p ; in th is w ay w e
w ould h a v e to recognize tw o c o n tra d ic to ry sentences,
of th e ty p e s N p a n d p , resp ectiv ely . Since tw o con­
tra d ic to ry sentences can n o t b o th b e tru e , th e n our assum p­
tio n a b o u t th e tr u th of th e sentence of th e ty p e N p m u st
b e false; a n d hence th e sentence of th e ty p e p is tru e .
A p a rt from th e se tw o prem ises from th e dom ain of
th e se n te n tia l calculus w e sh all re fer in th e proof to th e
follow ing th eo rem from th e a rith m e tic of n a tu ra l num bers:
i f the p ro d u c t o f two n a tu ra l n u m b e rs , a - b, is d ivisib le by
the p r im e n u m b e r n , a n d i f the n a tu ra l n u m b er a is n o t
d ivisib le by the p r im e n u m b er n , th en the n a tu ra l n u m b er b
is d ivisib le by the p r im e n u m b er n . I t follow s from th is
th eo rem th a t if th e p ro d u c t of tw o n a tu ra l num b ers is
div isib le b y th e p rim e n u m b er n , th e n th e elem ents of
th a t p ro d u c t c a n n o t b o th b e n o t d ivisible b y n . F o r th e
p u rp o se of th e sym bolic n o ta tio n of th is th eo rem w e
sh all in tro d u ce, a p a rt fro m log ical ab b rev iatio n s, th e
follow ing a rith m e tic a l a b b re v ia tio n : sentences of th e ty p e
**a is d ivisible b y th e p rim e n u m b er w” w ill b e w ritte n as
“(a s P n )” 8, a n d th e sen ten ce “ a is n o t d ivisible b y th e
p rim e n u m b er n ” , b ein g eq u iv alen t to th e sentence “ i t
is n o t tru e th a t a is d ivisible b y th e prim e n u m b er w” ,
w ill b e w ritte n as “N ( a e P n ) ” . C onsequently th e th eo rem
of th e a rith m e tic of n a tu ra l num b ers referred to above
w ill h a v e th e follow ing form :

3 C (a - b eP n ) G N (a s P n ) (b e P n ) .

T he v ariab les a a n d b w hich occur in th is th eo rem can

ta k e as th e ir v alu es o nly nam es of n a tu ra l num bers.
N ow , ad o p tin g as prem ises only th e th re e th eo rem s
given above (tw o logical an d one arith m etical), a n d a p ­
 T H E O R E M S AN D B U R E S OB IN F E R E N C E 19

p ly in g o n ly tw o ru les of in feren ce: th e ru le of s u b s titu tio n

an d th e ru le of d e ta c h m e n t, w e sh a ll p ro v e th e follow ing
th eo rem :
G (a • a e P n ) (a e P n ) .
T his th eo rem s ta te s th a t i f the square o f a n u m b e r a is
d ivisib le b y a p r im e n u m b e r, th en the n u m b e r a its e lf also
is d iv isib le b y th a t p r im e n u m b e r . E .g ., 36 is d iv isib le b y 3,
a n d th e re fo re 6 , to o , is d iv isib le b y 3. T he th eo rem w hich
w e a re to p ro v e is a m o d ern ized fo rm of E u c lid ’s th eo rem
g iv en in h is E le m e n ts as T heorem 12 in B ook IX . T h e
p ro o f w hich w ill b e g iv en h e re re p e a ts th e b asic id e a of
E u c lid ’s p ro o f a n d is u su a lly re fe rre d to as a n ex am p le
of a p ro o f w hich, am o n g o th e r th in g s, refers to T heorem 2.
T h a t th eo re m is th e su b je c t m a tte r of th e m o n o g rap h [33]
w ritte n b y th e I ta lia n lo g ician V a ila ti, w ho liv e d in th e
second h a lf of th e 1 9 th ce n tu ry .
STow com es th e p ro o f. To T heorem 3 w e ap p ly th e ru le
of su b stitu tio n : fo r all th e occurrences of th e n u m erical
v a ria b le b in th e th eo rem w e s u b s titu te th e n u m erical
v a ria b le a a n d th u s o b ta in th e accep tan ce of th e re su ltin g
sen ten ce 4. T his step w ill b e sym bolized th u s:
3 b ja * 4,
4 G (a *a e P n ) G N (a eP n ) (a e P n ) .
X e x t w e a p p ly to T h eo rem 1 th e ru le of s u b stitu tio n .
W e p erfo rm a s u b s titu tio n such th a t th e a n te c e d e n t of
th e sen ten ce to b e o b ta in e d w ill h a v e th e sam e fo rm as
sen ten ce 4.
1 p j ( a *a e P n ) , q /G N (a e P n ) (a e P n ), r j(a e P n ) * 5,
5 GG (a • a e P n ) G N (a e P n ) (a e P n )

G G G N (a e P n ) ( a e P n ) (a e P n ) C (a *a e P n ) (a e P n ) .

T he accep ted sen ten ce 5 is a co n d itio n al sentence th e

a n te c e d e n t of w hich is equiform w ith th e accep ted
20 I . IN T R O D U C T IO N

sen ten ce 4; h en ce th e co n seq u en t of sen ten ce 5 can, on

th e s tre n g th of th e ru le of d etac h m e n t, h e recognized as
sen ten ce 6 :
5 * 04 — 6 ,

6 0 0—Oj V(a e. P n ) (a e -------

-
P n ){a e P n ) 0 (a • a e P u )(a e P n ) .
-----------------------------------------------------■ — -----------------------------------------------------*

To T heorem 2 w e ap p ly th e s u b stitu tio n in such a w ay

th a t w e o b ta in a sen ten ce equiform w ith th e an tec ed en t
of sen ten ce 6 :
2 p j(a e P n ) * 7 ,
7 0 G N (a e P n ) (a e P n ) ( a e P n ) .

T he ru le of d e ta c h m e n t can now b e ap p lied to sentences

6 a n d 7:
6 * 07 — 8 ,

8 0 (a • a e P n )(a e P n ) .

S en ten ce 8 is th e th eo rem th a t w as to b e p ro v ed .
T h e p ro o f of T heorem 8 as g iv en ab o v e is a n ex am p le of
a co m p lete proof. I n th a t proof, th e reco g n itio n of every
sen ten ce is ju stifie d b y a c e rta in ru le w hich w as ad o p ted
in ad v an ce. E v e ry step in th e p ro o f ca n be su b sta n ti­
a te d ; th e su b sta n tia tio n is to b e fo u n d in th a t lin e of th e
p ro o f w hich p reced es ev ery sen ten ce recognized in th e
p ro o f.
T h e p ro o f g iv en above m ig h t be carried o u t w ith o u t
th e use of sym bols, b u t th e n i t w ould seem m ore com ­
p lic a te d a n d less clear. T he sym bols w e h av e ad o p ted
are sh o rte r th a n th e co rresponding w ords in ev ery d ay
lan g u ag e a n d en ab le us to see a t a glance how a given
th eo rem is co n stru cted . M oreover, sym bolic n o ta tio n m akes
easier a co m p lete fo rm alizatio n of th e proof. T h e p ro o f
m ig h t b e checked q u ite m echanically. A p erso n w ho d id
n o t k now th e m ean in g of th e sym bols we h av e u sed w ould
 T H E O R E M S A N D R U L E S O F IN F E R E N C E 21

be in a p o sitio n to check th e co rrectn ess of th e proof

if h e on ly knew th e ru les of inference.
T he p ro o f given ab o v e is a m odel of scien tific precision.
W hoever h as u n d e rsto o d in w h at th e p recision of such
a fo rm alized p ro o f co n sists w ill use d ifferen t sta n d a rd s
w hen m easu rin g th e ^precision of th e proofs h e finds in
o th e r disciplines: m ath em atics, p h y sics, th e n a tu ra l sci­
ences. N o t ev e ry discip lin e can to d a y re ach such a lev el
of scien tific p recisio n as h a s b een achieved b y m ath e m a tic a l
logic. B u t i t is a good th in g to h a v e a h ig h sta n d a rd of
scien tific p recisio n , fo r we ca n th e n p ro p e rly e v a lu a te th e
precision of o th e r p ro o fs a n d striv e to in crease it. T his
is one of th e g re a te s t ach iev em en ts of m a th e m a tic a l logic:
it has created a n ew sta n d a rd o f sc ie n tific -precision , so fa r
u nequ a led i n general b y m a th em a tics , a n d a fo rtio ri by other
d isc ip lin e s.
 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

3. The Primitive Terms and the Axioms o f the Sentential Calculus

7. T he se n te n tia l calculus is a n axiom atic deductive

system . T he d ed u ctiv e m ethod, also called th e geom etrical
m ethod an d k n o w n as early as a n tiq u ity , used to be
in te rp re te d in v arious w ays. B laise P ascal, th e em inent
1 7 th -ce n tu ry m ath em atician an d philosopher, in his essay
D e V esp rit geom eirigue fo rm u lated th e view t h a t th e ideal
geom etrical m eth o d consists in defining ev ery th in g an d
su b sta n tia tin g ev ery th ing. This, how ever, is unachievable,
as P asca l knew . I n order to define a n expression we m u st
m ak e use of o th e r expressions. Since w e can n o t proceed
to in fin ity , we m u s t a d o p t c e rta in w ords w ith o u t de­
fin itio n . T h u s in ev ery d ed u ctiv e th e o ry th e re are certain
u n d efin ed w ords w hich are called th e p r im itiv e term s of
t h a t th eo ry . T he m eaning of a p rim itiv e te rm can only
b e explained b y exam ples.
I t is also n o t possible to prove all th e sentences of
a given th eo ry , fo r th e proof of a n y sentence is based
o n th e tr u th of o th e r sentences. C onsequently, a t th e
o u tse t of every d ed u ctiv e th eo ry w e m u st recognize w ith o u t
p roof ce rtain sentences w hich are called th e a xio m s of th a t
th eo ry . I n philosophy th e te rm axiom s often m eans sen­
tences w hich, besides being ad o p ted w ith o u t proof are
d irectly self-evident. This was A risto tle’s in te rp re ta tio n
of th e te rm “ axiom ” . On th e o th er h an d , th e Stoics called
all sentences axiom s. I n o u r in te rp re ta tio n , axiom s are
sentences w hich are recognized w ith o u t proof, b u t need
n o t b e self-evident. Y e t i t serves th e purpose w ell so to
choose th e axiom s of a th e o ry t h a t th e ir tr u th is clear
 P R IM IT IV E TER M S A N D A XIOM S 23

w ith o u t proof. M oreover, w h a t is a n axiom in one d e ­

d u ctiv e sy stem , t h a t is a sentence w hich in t h a t system
is ac cep ted w ith o u t proof, m a y in a n o th e r sy stem occur
as a th e o re m a n d h e p ro v a b le in t h a t system .
T h e sy stem of th e se n te n tia l calculus w hich is to be
ex p o u n d ed below co n tain s tw o k in d s of p rim itiv e term s:
sym bols of n eg a tio n IF a n d sym bols of th e conditional
sentence O. I n th e se n te n tia l calculus, sm all le tte rs of th e
L a tin a lp h a b e t w ill b e u sed as se n te n tia l variab les, i.e.,
v ariab les w hich can ta k e a n y sentences as th e ir values.
C apital le tte rs, such as IF a n d C, w ill be ta k e n to b e co n ­
sta n ts, i.e., sym bols fo r w hich no o th e r expression m a y
be s u b stitu te d .
T h e expression of th e ty p e IFp is th e n e g a tio n of th e
sentence p . I n E n g lish , th e w ord n o t, w hich corresponds
to th e sym bol IF, is u su ally n o t p laced before th e n eg a te d
sentence. T h e n eg atio n of th e sentence “ to d a y is T h u rsd a y ”
is th e sen ten ce “ to d a y is n o t T h u rsd a y ” . I f w e w a n t to
p lace th e n eg atin g expression before th e sentence in
q u estio n w e m u s t u se th e m ore com plicated p h ra se “ i t
is n o t tr u e t h a t ” ; if we do so th e n th e n e g a tio n of th e
sentence u n d e r discussion will b e “ i t is n o t tru e t h a t to d a y
is T h u rs d a y ” . I n t h a t re sp e c t-th e G reek lan g u ag e is m ore
co n v en ien t, for th e re th e n eg atin g w ord m a y b e p laced
before th e w hole sentence; such also is th e p osition of
n eg atio n in S to ic logic.
T h e ex pression IFp, lik e every expression co n tain in g
v ariab les, is called a fu n c tio n . T he fu n c tio n in q u estio n
consists of tw o p a r ts : th e fu n c to r IF a n d th e a rg u m e n t p .
A n expression consisting of th e fu n c to r IF a n d of one
a rg u m e n t w hich is a sen ten ce a n d sta n d s to th e rig h t of
th e fu n c to r, is a sentence. T h a t is w h y w e say t h a t the
fu n c to r IF is a sen ten ce-fo rm in g fu n c to r o f one sen ten tia l
a rg u m en t.
T h e expressions p a n d IFp a re tw o c o n tra d ic to ry
sentences. Two c o n tra d ic to ry sentences c a n n o t b o th b e
3*
24 I I . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

tru e : if th e sen ten ce p is tru e , th e n th e sen ten ce N p m u st

b e false, a n d if th e sen ten ce p is false, th e n th e sentence
N p is tru e . U su ally we sym bolize a false sen ten ce as “ 0 ” ,
a n d a tru e sen ten ce as “ 1 ” . W e m ay th ere fo re w rite dow n
in sym bolic n o ta tio n th e follow ing e q u a tio n s: NO — 1 ,
N X = 0, w hich a re to b e re a d : the n eg a tio n o f a fa lse se n ­
tence is a tru e sentence , the n eg a tio n o f a tru e sentence is
a fcilse sentence.
T h e fu n c tio n C pg is a co n d itio n a l sentence (im p lic a tio n )
w ith th e a n te c e d e n t p a n d th e co n seq u en t g; i t is re a d
“ if p , th e n <?” . T h e fu n c to r G is w ritte n b efo re th e a n te ­
ced en t p a n d th e co n seq u en t q of th e im p licatio n . I n
E n g lish , th e fu n c to r G h as its c o u n te rp a rt in tw o w ords,
“ if” a n d “ th e n ” . I n th a t re sp e ct, to o , b o th G reek an d
L a tin com e closer to th e n o ta tio n w e h a v e ad o p ted , fo r
in th o se lan g u ag es th e sym bol of th e co n d itio n al sentence
co nsists of one w o rd a n d sta n d s a t th e b eg in n in g o f th e
co n d itio n al sen ten ce.
I n o u r logical sym bolism w e sh all alw ays w rite fu n cto rs
a t th e b eg in n in g of th e fu n ctio n s in q u estio n . I n th is
w ay w e av o id th e n eed to w rite th e p aren th eses. A sim ilar
n o ta tio n co u ld ju s t as w ell b e u sed in a rith m e tic . S hould
w e w rite dow n th e sum of tw o n u m b ers “ a -b 6 ” as “ + 06 ” ,
th e n w e could w rite th e law of a sso c ia tiv ity

«+(& +<?) = { a + b ) + c

in th e p aren th esis-fre e n o ta tio n as

- \- a - { - b c = -t--{-a&c

I n re ad in g th e la s t lin e w e m u st b e a r in m in d th a t every
sym bol fo rm s a sum to g e th e r w ith tw o n u m erical
expressions th a t sta n d to th e rig h t of it. T hese num erical
expressions m ay in tu rn b e e ith e r v ariab les o r sum s. W e
sh o u ld re a d th e co n d itio n al sentences, such as th o se given
in 6 , S ectio n 1.2, in th e sam e w ay.
 P R IM IT IV E TER M S AND AXIOM S 25

The sym bol 0 is a fu n c to r of tw o arg u m en ts; it form s

a n im p licatio n —hence a sentence— of tw o arg u m en ts t h a t
are sentences; the sym b o l G is th u s a sen ten ce-fo rm in g
fu n cto r o f tw o sen ten tia l a rg u m en ts.
The im p licatio n Cpq is o ften identified w ith th e sentence
“ if V is th e n q is ” , w hich, how ever, is a n in co rrect in te r­
p re ta tio n . T h e sentence q u o ted above is m eaningful on ly
if th e v ariab les a re tre a te d as te rm v ariab les, e.g., “ if
P e te r is, th e n P a u l is” . B u t in th e im p licatio n Cpq th e re
are only se n te n tia l v ariab les. I t is also erroneous to id e n ­
tify th e im p licatio n Cpq w ith th e sense of th e sentence
“ if *p’ is tru e , th e n tq > is tru e ” , fo r th e last-n am ed sen­
ten ce m eans “ if th e sentence ip'>is tru e , th e n th e sentence
iqJ is tr u e ” . H ere th e variab les are in q u o ta tio n m arks,
for we h av e to do w ith th e nam es of th o se variables.
O n th e o th e r h a n d , in th e sentence Cpq it is n o t th e nam es
of v ariab les w hich occur, b u t th e variables them selves.
T h e th ird erroneous in te rp re ta tio n of th e m eaning of th e
sentence Cpq is its id en tificatio n w ith th e m eaning of th e
sentence “ is a consequence of ‘p ’ th is m eans t h a t
“ th e sentence ‘g’ can be in ferred from th e sentence ‘p ’ ” ,
so t h a t h ere ag ain we h av e to do w ith n am es of v ariables
a n d also w ith th e possibility of inferring som ething, w hich
is n o t in h e re n t in th e m eaning of th e sentence Cpq.
I n o rd er to becom e b e tte r ac q u ain te d w ith th e m eaning
of th e sentence Cpq le t us discuss th e cases in w hich th a t
sentence is tru e or false. R e ta in in g th e sym bols “ 0” a n d
“ 1 ” as stan d in g , respectively, for false a n d tru e sentences,
we h av e to analyze, according to th e falsehood or tr u t h
of th e arg u m en ts of th e im plication, th e following fo u r
cases:
<700, <701, <710, <711.

F irs t of all, le t us n o te t h a t <710 = 0, t h a t is, t h a t a n

im p lic a tio n w ith a tru e antecedent a n d a fa lse consequent
is fa lse. F o r should, e.g., th e im plication “ I f W arsaw lies
26 I I . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

o n V istu la th e n 2 - 2 = 5” b e tru e , th e n b y recognizing

th e tru e sen ten ce “ W arsaw lies o n V istu la” w e could
p ro v e, o n th e s tre n g th of th e ru le of d etac h m e n t, th e false
sen ten ce “ 2 -2 = 6” .
I n o rd e r to discuss th e rem ain in g eases le t us analyze
th e follow ing a rith m e tic a l th eo rem w hich is an im p licatio n :
I f a; is d iv isib le b y 9, th e n x is d iv isib le b y 3.
T his im p lica tio n is tru e fo r all th e v alu es of th e n u m er­
ical v a ria b le x . H en ce o n su b s titu tin g a?/16 we should
o b ta in a tru e sen ten ce. T he su b s titu tio n yields:
I f 16 is divisible b y 9, th e n 16 is d ivisible b y 3.
W e h av e th u s o b ta in e d a n im p lica tio n w ith a false
a n te c e d e n t a n d a false co n seq u en t. I n view of such
exam ples w e agree th a t <700 = 1, i.e ., th a t a n im p lic a tio n
w ith a fa lse antecedent a n d a fa lse consequent is true.
B y su b stitu tin g : o?/15 w e o b ta in :
I f 15 is div isib le b y 9, th e n 15 is divisible b y 3.
H ow th e an te c e d e n t is false a n d th e co n seq u en t tru e .
W e th erefo re ag ree th a t C01 = 1, i.e ., th a t a n im p lic a tio n
w ith a fa lse antecedent a n d a tru e consequent is true.
B y su b stitu tin g : jz/18 w e o b ta in a n im p licatio n w ith
a tru e an te c e d e n t a n d a tru e co n seq u en t:
I f 18 is d ivisible b y 9, th e n 18 is d ivisible b y 3.
C onsequently, w e ag ree th a t O il = 1, i.e., th a t a n
im p lic a tio n w ith a tru e antecedent a n d a tru e consequent
is tr u e .
O n th e o th e r h a n d , w e c a n n o t fin d a su b stitu tio n fo r
w hich th e an te c e d e n t of th e im p lica tio n u n d e r discussion
is tru e , a n d th e co n seq u en t false.
T his m an n er of d eterm in in g th e tr u th or th e falsehood
of im p licatio n s en tails c e rta in p ro p erties of im p licatio n s
w hich seem p arad o x ical from th e p o in t of view of ev ery ­
d ay usage. T he an teced en ts a n d consequents, as discussed
 P R IM IT IV E TE R M S AND AXIOMS 27

in our exam ple, w h eth e r tru e or false, h a v e some in n er

sem an tic links resu ltin g fro m th e general arith m etical
th eorem . B u t in th e se n te n tia l calculus we m ay n o t
im pose on th e v ariab les such sem antic links, w hich m ay
b e ta k e n from an y field— m ath em atics, law , geography.
W e m a y n o t do so fo r we a re u n ab le to characterize those
links in th e field of logic, w hich does n o t presuppose th e
know ledge of a n y such specialized discipline. W e m u st
th erefo re recognize as tru e , e.g., an im plication w ith a false
an tec ed en t a n d an a rb itra ry consequent, even if th e re
be no sem an tic lin k b etw een th e an tec ed en t an d th e
consequent. H ence we shall recognize as tru e th e sentence:

I f Lwow lies on Y istula, th e n 2 • 2 — 5.

Likew ise, we shall recognize as tru e th e sentences:

I f 2*2 = 5, th e n W arsaw lies on V istula,

I f 2*2 = 4, th e n W arsaw lies on V istula.
P u ttin g to g e th e r all th e possible cases, w e shall say
generally t h a t a n im p lic a tio n is tru e i f a n d o n ly i f either
its antecedent is fa lse , or its consequent is tru e. S uch an
in te rp re ta tio n of th e im plication is an extension of th e
sense of th e expression co n d itio n a l sentence as used in
ev ery d ay language, an d hence its p arad o x ical properties
in th e field of logic.
O u r ex p lan atio n s concerning th e in tu itiv e sense of
th e p rim itiv e term s are in no w ay definitions of those
term s. T hey are m erely com m ents w hich m ak e i t easier
to grasp th e p ro p erties of th e p rim itiv e term s, properties
w hich re su lt from th e axiom s of th e se n te n tia l calculus.
8 . As suggested b y P rofessor Le^niewski, b o th th e
axiom s a n d th e theorem s of a ded u ctiv e system will be
called theses o f t h a t system . T he following th ree theses
w ill b e a d o p te d as th e axiom s of o u r system of th e sen­
te n tia l calculus:
28 H . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

1 G G pqG G qrG pr,

2 G G N ppp ,

3 G pG N pq.

A p a rt from v ariables, th ese axiom s include only tw o kinds

of th e p rim itiv e term s discussed above. T he firs t tw o
axiom s a re th o se sentences w hich we h av e reso rted to in
Section 1.2 to p ro v e a rith m e tic a l theorem s. Axiom 1 is
one of th e form s of the lam o f hyp o th etica l syllo g ism , form s
w hich w ere k n o w n to A risto tle. T h a t law m ay ap p ear
m o re in tu itiv e in th e fo rm :

G R G p q G q rG p r .

T h e sym bol R , w hich w ill b e in tro d u ced in to th e sen ten tial

calculus b y a definition, is a sentence-form ing fu n c to r
of tw o se n te n tia l arg u m en ts. Sentences of th e ty p e R p q
are re a d iip a n d q” . T h e Symbol K is th e sign of co n ju n ctio n
of tw o sentences. T h e second form of th e law of h y p o th e t­
ical syllogism is to be re a d : “ I f (if p , th e n q, an d if q,
th e n r), th e n if p , th e n r ” .
A xiom 1 ca n b e in ferred from th e second form of th e
law of h y p o th e tic a l syllogism on th e stre n g th of th e law
o f exportation:

C G K pqrG pC qr .

T his law au th o rizes us, in th e case of a n im plication th a t

h as in its a n te c e d e n t a co n ju n ctio n of tw o sentences, to
shift one of th ese tw o sentences to th e consequent. F o r
in stan ce, fro m th e sentence “ if a? is even a n d x is divisible
b y 3, th e n x is divisible b y 6” , we m ay ob tain , b y th e
law of e x p o rta tio n a n d th e rules of su b stitu tio n an d
d etac h m e n t, th e sentence “if a; is even, th e n (if a? is divisible
b y 3, th e n x is divisible b y 6)” . W e shall reach A xiom 1
 PRIMITIVE TERMS AND AXIOMS 29

precisely in th is w ay, b y assum ing th e second form of

th e law of th e h y p o th e tic a l syllogism . B y su b stitu tin g in
th e law of ex p o rta tio n : p / Cpq, qjC qrf rjC p r, we o btain:
C C K C p q C q rC p rC C p q C C q rC p r .

Since th e an tec ed en t of th e sentence th u s o b tain ed is th e

second form of th e law of th e h y p o th e tic a l syllogism ,
we assert th e consequent, i.e., A xiom 1,
Q uite sim ilarly we m ig h t reach th e second form of
th e law of h y p o th e tic a l syllogism b y assum ing A xiom 1
an d th e following law o f im p o rta tio n :

GCp G qrC K pgr .

H ence, th e second form of th e law of th e h y p o th etical

syllogism m ig h t replace Axiom 1. W e shall n o t, how ever,
a d o p t i t as a n axiom since we w ould th u s increase th e
n u m b er of p rim itiv e term s in our system of th e sen ten tial
calculus b y th e co n ju nction sym bol K .
T he reasoning b ased on A xiom 2 w as know n, as
m en tio n ed in Section 1.2, to E uclid. E u clid ’s com m en­
ta to r, th e J e s u it Clavius, who lived a t th e e n d of th e
1 6th ce n tu ry , drew a tte n tio n to reasoning of th is k in d
a n d em phasized its stran g e stru ctu re . T h e m ode of in ­
ference b ased on A xiom 2 becam e p o p u lar am ong J e s u it
scholars owing to Clavius. I n th e early 1 8 th ce n tu ry th e
Ita lia n S accheri pub lished his book JEuclidcs ab o m n i
naevo v in d ic a te s , in w hich h e endeavoured to p ro v e
E u clid ’s p a ra lle l axiom — a n issue w hich long absorbed
th e a tte n tio n of m ath em atician s Saccheri w an te d to base
his proof o n A xiom 2 a n d to d em o n strate t h a t E u clid ’s
axiom follows from its negation. T oday we know t h a t
such a p ro o f is n o t possible. T e t Saccheri’s investigations
w ere n o t lo st: b y draw ing conclusions from th e negation
of th e p arallel axiom he gave rise to non-E uclidean
geom etries.
30 ir. T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

To ex p lain th e sense of Axiom 3 le t ns su b stitu te fo r p

a n y tru e sentence, sym bolized b y “ 1 ” . T he axiom m il
th e n y ield : C lC & lq .
T he ru le of d e ta c h m e n t w ill give CN Xq. B u t we know
t h a t N 1 — 0, so t h a t w e h av e: GOq, T hus b y m eans of
A xiom 3 we m a y a sse rt a n im p licatio n w ith a false a n te ­
ced en t a n d a n a rb itra ry consequent. This is in agreem ent
w ith previous ex p lan atio n s concerning th e fu n c to r C,
for we have: (700 — 1, 001 = 1.
A xiom 3 can be deduced from th e law of ex p o rtatio n
an d a certain th eo rem t h a t was k n ow n to th e F ran ciscan
B u n s Scotus, one of th e m o st em inent m edieval philos­
ophers (late 1 3 th a n d early 14 th century). Scotus asserted
t h a t if tw o c o n tra d ic to ry sentences were b o th tru e , th e n
ev ery th in g w ould be possible, for i t is n o t possible t h a t
tw o co n tra d ic to ry sentences should b o th be tru e . S cotus’
th eo rem corresponds to th e follow ing law in th e sen ten tial
calculus:
G K pN pq.

A n exam ple of consequence given b y S cotus: Socrates

ex ists a n d Socrates does n o t e x ist , hence the stic k sta n d s
in the corner , is a n ap p licatio n of t h a t law .
B y s u b stitu tin g in th e law of ex p o rta tio n : q jN p , r jq ,
we o b tain
G C K pN pqC pG N pq.

Since th e an tec ed en t of th e im p licatio n th u s o b tain ed is

S co tu s’ law , w e assert, b y th e ru le of d etach m en t, th e
consequent w hich is A xiom 3.
T he ex p lan atio n s concerning th e th ree axiom s in
question, given u n d er 6, Section 1.2, a n d above, are
in ten d ed to convince th e re a d e r t h a t th e y are tru e . F o r
according to w h a t h as been said ab o u t axiom s, th e y need
n o t be self-evident w ith o u t explanation.
 DEFINITIONS AND RULES OF INFERENCE 31

4. Definitions and Rules o f Inference in the Sentential Calculus

9. O u r sy stem of th e se n te n tia l calculus w ill contain,

n o t o nly p rim itiv e te rm s, b u t also defined terms* To
im p a rt precision to th e concept of definition le t ns co n ­
sider a n y d efin itio n c u rre n t in ev e ry d ay usage. F o r in ­
stance, w e o ften en co u n ter th e follow ing; a square —
p a ra llelo g ra m w ith equal sid es a n d angles .
I n su ch a definition, th e sym bol ” is re a d “ is”
(or “ is the. sam e a s” ). A definition alw ays includes tw o
expressions, e.g., “ a sq u a re ” a n d “ a p arallelo g ram w ith
eq u al sides a n d angles” , w hich b y t h a t definition h av e
th e sam e m eaning. O ne of th ese expressions, in th is ease
“ a parallelo g ram w ith eq u al sides a n d angles” , is ad o p ted
as com prehensible; in tra d itio n a l logic i t is called th e
d e fin ie n s ( th a t w hich defines). T h e o th e r expression, in
th is case “ a sq u a re ” , is in tra d itio n a l logic called th e
d e fin ie n d u m ( th a t w hich is to b e defined); i t is tre a te d
as incom prehensible before th e in tro d u c tio n of th e defi­
n itio n in question, so t h a t th e m ean in g of th e definiendum
is ex p lain ed only b y th e definiens. T h e fa c t t h a t th e
definiens m u s t b e com prehensible even before th e defi­
n itio n h as b een in tro d u ced , d em o n strates th e im possi­
b ility of defining all th e term s of a th eo ry , a n d th e n e ­
cessity of ad o p tin g c e rta in p rim itiv e term s.
A p a rt fro m th e p ro p e rtie s described above, definitions
m u s t h a v e a n o th e r essential p ro p e rty . I f th e definiendum
occurs in a tru e sentence, th e n th e sentence o b tain ed from
th e fo rm er th ro u g h th e re p lacem en t of th e definiendum
b y th e a p p ro p ria te definiens o u g h t to re m a in tru e . F o r
in stan ce, if i t is tru e t h a t th e diagonals of a sq u are cross
a t rig h t angles, th e n i t is also tru e t h a t th e diagonals of
a p arallelogram w ith eq u al sides a n d angles cross a t th e
rig h t angles. A n d vice v ersa, if th e definiens occurs in a tru e
sentence, th e n th e re p la cem en t of t h a t definiens b y th e
a p p ro p ria te definiendum o u g h t to yield a tru e sentence.
32 IT. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

W h a t h as now been said a b o u t definitions, was alread y

know n in tra d itio n a l logic. Y e t research in m ath em atical
logic has raised a n o th e r issue connected w ith definitions.
A re definitions to b e m ere ab b rev iatio n s, or can th e y
also perform a creativ e role a n d h av e a n essential share
in reasoning? I t h as tu rn e d o u t t h a t definitions m ay be
tre a te d so th a t a d efinition D m akes it possible to prove
a th eo rem T in w hich th e definiendum of th e definition D
does n o t occur b u t w hich nevertheless ca n n o t be proved
w ith o u t th e said definition I). I n this w ay th e definition D
w ould p lay a n essential role in th e proof a n d th u s w ould,
like th e prem ises of th e proof, c o n trib u te a new elem ent.
W ith o u t engaging in an y d etailed analysis n o t belonging
to a general course in logic, I shall only s ta te t h a t in
m y opinion definitions ca n n o t p la y any creativ e r o l e 1.
I n th is resp ect I sh are th e sta n d p o in t of th e a u th o rs of
P r in c ip ia M a th em a tica an d ho ld th a t definitions are
th eo retically superfluous. I f th e re is a th e o ry in w hich
definitions do n o t ap p ear a t all, th e n n o th in g new should
be o b tain ab le in t h a t th e o ry a fte r th e in tro d u ctio n of
definitions, ex cep t for th e fa c t th a t th e o u tw ard form s
of c e rta in theorem s m ay be changed as a re su lt of replacing
th e defm iens b y th e definiendum . In m y opinion th e
a d v a n ta g e to be o b tain ed from definitions m ay only be
t h a t (1) definitions serve to a b b re v ia te certain expressions
belonging to a given th eo ry , a n d t h a t (2) b y in tro d u cin g
a new te rm definitions m ay, to g e th e r w ith t h a t new term ,
co n trib u te som e new in tu itio n s to th e th e o ry a n d th u s
ad d to th e term s belonging to th e th eo ry in question term s
w hich h av e a m eaning outside t h a t th eo ry . These m erits
of definitions will soon b e illu stra te d b y exam ples.
T here is still one issue connected w ith definitions:
are th e definitions belonging to a given th eo ry theses of
t h a t th eo ry ? H ere again I shall a b stain from d etailed
considerations an d confine m yself to th e sta te m e n t th a t
th e req u irem en ts fo rm u lated above m ake m e tr e a t defi-
 D E F IN IT IO N S A N D R U L E S O F IN F E R E N C E 33

n itio n s as ce rtain equalities w hich a re theses of a given

th eo ry , b u t a re n o te d dow n on th e m arg in of t h a t th eo ry ,
as a re th e ru les of inference. T he special ru le of inference,
called th e ru le o f rep la cem en t , p erm its us to use definitions
so t h a t in a n y thesis w e m ay replace one side of a given
definition b y th e o th er.
10. T h e firs t definition to be given now sta te s t h a t
th e expressions A p q a n d C N p q h av e th e sam e m eaning.
T h a t definition, w ith th e help of th e second of th e tw o
expressions q u o ted , containing only those elem ents w hich
h a v e alre ad y o ccurred in th e axiom s, enables us to in ­
tro d u ce in to o u r sy stem of th e se n te n tia l calculus th e
new te rm A , w hich is a sentence-form ing fu n c to r of tw o
se n te n tia l arg u m en ts. L e t i t be n o te d firs t of all t h a t
th is definition sh o rten s a n expression consisting of fo u r
le tte rs to one consisting of only th ree. B u t th e m ore
im p o rta n t th in g is th e new in tu itio n w hich th a t definition
in tro d u ces in to th e sen ten tial calculus. T he fu n c to r A
corresponds to th e expression or in ev eryday language
a n d is a sym bol of th e a ltern a tio n of tw o sentences.
L e t us s tu d y th e w ord “ o r” b y an exam ple. A person
calls u p a firm w hose m anagers are P e te r an d P a u l an d
asks w hen h e can fin d an y one of th e m anagers in th e
office. H e is to ld t h a t betw een 12 an d 2 p.m . P e te r is
in th e office o r P a u l is in th e office. I f th e inform ation
is tru e , th e n th e in q u irer will, in th e specified period of
tim e, fin d in th e office a t least one of th e m anagers,
th o u g h h e m ay fin d b o th . A t an y ra te , if P e te r will n o t
b e in th e office, P a u l will b e there. W e see t h a t if th e
sentence iip or g” is tru e , th e n th e sentence “ if n o t p ,
th e n g” is tru e . S hould th e in q u irer h av e been inform ed
t h a t if P e te r is n o t in th e office betw een 12 a n d 2 p.m .,
th e n a t t h a t tim e P a u l is in th e office, th is w ould m ean
t h a t betw een 12 a n d 2 p.m . P e te r is in th e office or P a u l
is in th e office. T his exam ple confirm s t h a t th e expressions
A p q an d C N p q h av e th e sam e m eaning.
34 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

L et it b e n o ted , how ever, t h a t th e w ord “ o r” can

also h av e o th er m eanings th a n h as th e fu n c to r A . I n th e
sentence “ I shall go to th e rig h t or I shall go to th e le ft”
we w a n t to exclude th e p o ssib ility of th e sim ultaneous
tr u th of th e sentences “ I shall go to th e rig h t” an d “ I
sh all go to th e le ft” . I n th is sense “ eith er ... or” w ould
p erh ap s b e m ore ap p ro p riate. B u t o u r definition does
n o t im p a rt such a sense to th e fu n c to r A . H ence, in con­
fo rm ity w ith o u r definition, th e following sym bolic equal­
ities are satisfied:
A 0 0 = C N 00 = CIO = 0 ,
A 0 1 = CAfOl = O i l = 1 ,
A 1 0 = C N 10 = €00 = 1 ,
A l l = CAT! 1 = 001 = 1 .
T hus we see t h a t the fu n c tio n A p q , called a ltern a tio n ,
is fa lse o n ly i f its both a rg u m en ts are fa lse, a n d i n a ll other
cases it is tru e .
T he second d efin ition of w hich w e shall av ail ourselves
in th e sen ten tial calculus, sta te s t h a t th e expression K p q
m eans th e sam e as th e expression AfGpAlq. T h e fu n c to r K
corresponds to th e w ord “ a n d ” in ev ery d ay language,
a n d th u s is th e sy m b o l of th e co n ju n ctio n of tw o sentences.
T h e expression defining con ju n ctio n is a n eg atio n of th e
expression CpAlq. T he tr u t h of th e last-n am ed expression
excludes th e po ssib ility of th e sim ultaneous tr u th of th e
sentences p a n d q. F o r in stan ce, from th e tr u th of th e
sentence “ if P e te r is in th e office, th e n P a u l is n o t in th e
office” it follows t h a t th e sentences “ P e te r is in th e office”
a n d “ P a u l is in th e office” c a n n o t be sim ultaneously tru e .
H ence th e fu n c tio n K p q , bein g the- n eg atio n of th e e x ­
pression GpAfq, is tru e o n ly if th e sentences p a n d q do
n o t exclude one a n o th e r b u t are sim ultaneously tru e .
T his is in ag reem en t w ith th e c u rre n t sense of th e w ord
“ a n d ” , fo r th e sentence “ P e te r is in th e office a n d P a u l
 DEFINITIONS AND RULES OF INFERENCE 35

is in th e office” is tru e only if b o th its com ponents are

sim u ltan eo u sly tru e .
O u r d efin itio n yields th e following sym bolic equalities:
K 0 0 = N C O N O = N C 01 = N 1 = 0 ,
K O I = K C 0 K 1 = HCOO = H I =- 0 ,
m o = H C 1H 0 = H C 11 = H I = 0 ,
m i = h c i h i = nr c i o = h o = 1 .

T hus w e see t h a t the fu n c tio n K p q is tru e o n ly i f both its

a rg u m en ts are tru e , a n d i n all other cases it is fa lse .
T h e th ird d efin itio n sta te s t h a t th e expression D p q
h as th e sam e m eaning as th e expression C p N q . T he
fu n c to r D j w hich also is a sentence-form ing fu n c to r of
tw o se n te n tia l arg u m en ts, is called th e sym bol of n o n -
c o n ju n c tio n (or a ltern a tive d en ia l). H o co n ju n ctio n in th e
g ra m m a tic a l sense of th e w ord corresponds in E nglish
to th e fu n c to r D . N o te t h a t th e co n ju n ctio n of tw o sen­
tences is defined as th e n eg atio n of th e expression w hich
defines n o n -co n ju n ctio n. H ence th e expression K p q m ig h t
be defined as h av in g th e sam e m eaning as N D p q . R e f­
erence h as alread y b een m ade to th e fa c t t h a t th e tr u th
of th e expression C p N q excludes th e po ssib ility of th e
sim u ltan eo u s t r u th of th e sentences p a n d q. T he sense
of th e fu n c to r D is m ore clearly explained b y th e following
eq u alities:
m o = coho = c o i = 1 ,
d o i = c o m = co o = i ,
m o = c ih o = c i i = i ,
D l l = C1H 1 = CIO — 0 .

T h u s the fu n c tio n D p q is fa lse o n ly i f both its argum ents

are tru e , a n d otherw ise it is a lw a ys true.
T h e fu n c to r D , w hich does n o t ac tu a lly c o n trib u te
a n y new in tu itio n s to th e se n te n tia l calculus, is here in ­
tro d u c e d only fo r th eo re tica l reasons, because i t h as th e
36 I I . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

p ro p e rty t h a t i t can serve as th e only p rim itiv e te rm of

th e sen ten tial calculus. T his h as been d em o n strated b y
th e A m erican logician H . M. S h e ffe ra. I n our system of
th e sen ten tial calculus th e re are tw o p rim itiv e term s:
C a n d N , b u t th e re is a n axiom system in th e sen ten tial
calculus w hich h as th e fu n c to r T> as its only prim itive
te rm ; all th e o th er fu n cto rs can in th a t system be defined
b y m eans of th e fu n c to r J>.
T he fo u rth , a n d th e last, definition to be in tro d u ced
now states th a t th e expression E p q has th e sam e m eaning
as th e expression N C C p q N O q p . T he fu n cto r E is called
th e sym bol of equivalence. To realize its m eaning le t us
refer to th e definition of conjunction. W hen in th e e x ­
pression th a t defines conjunction we su b stitu te Gpq for p ,
an d Cqp for q, we o b tain th e expression th a t defines
equivalence. H ence th e m eaning of th e expression E p q
is th e sam e as th a t of K C p q C q p ; its tr u th sta te s th e
occurrence of im plications from th e first arg u m en t to th e
second an d from th e second to th e first. T he expression
E p q is read: p i f a n d o n ly i f q. F o r equivalence w e obtain
th e following equalities:
.000 = N C C 0 0 N C 0 0 = N G 1 N 1 = JV010 = NO = 1 ,
E 0 1 = N C C O IN CIO = N C 1 N 0 = E C U = N1 0 ,
E 10 = N G G 10N C 01 = N G 0 N 1 = N G 0 0 = Arl = 0 ,
j011 = N G G 1 1 N G 1 1 = N C 1 N 1 = N C 1 0 = NO = 1 .
T hus we see t h a t the fu n c tio n E p q is true o n ly i f its argum ents
are either both fa lse or both tru e. W h e n one of the a rgum ents
is tru e a n d the other is fa lse, the fu n c tio n E p q is false.
T he analysis given th u s fa r in th is subsection offers
inform al ex planations of th e definitions listed below:
01 Apq — C N pq,
02 K pq -- N G pN q ,
03 E p q — C pN q ,
04 E pq — N G G pqN C qp .
 D E F IN IT IO N S AND B U L E S O F IN F E R E N C E 37

The sym bol “ = ” in these definitions sta te s th a t th e ex­

pressions o n its tw o sides h a v e th e sam e m eaning.
11. E xpressions of th e se n te n tia l calculus include th e
v ariables p t g, r , ..., a n d co n stan ts, p rim itiv e or defined,
w hich to g e th e r w ith sen ten tial argum ents ag ain form
sentences. E v e ry expression w hich is form ed of variables
an d w hich is a sentence, will be called a m e a n in g fu l e x ­
p ressio n . T his te rm is le ft undefined, b u t th e following
th eo rem will enable u s to decide ab o u t every expression
form ed of v ariab les a n d of co n stan ts of th e sen ten tial
calculus, w h eth er i t is a m eaningful expression or n o t.
T h e ex p ressio n x is a m e a n in g fu l exp ressio n i f a n d o n ly
i f one o f the fo llo w in g co n d itio n s is s a tis fie d :
1) a? is a sm all le tte r,
2 ) x is th e n eg atio n of a m eaningful expression,
3) x is a n im p licatio n w ith arg u m en ts w hich are
m eaningful expressions,
4) x is a n a lte rn a tio n w ith arg u m en ts w hich are
m eaningful expressions,
5) x is a co n ju n ction w ith arg u m en ts w hich are
m ean in g fu l expressions,
6 ) x is a n o n -co n junction w ith argum ents w hich are
m eaningful expressions,
7) x is a n equivalence w ith argum ents w hich are
m eaningful expressions.
I n conform ity w ith th is theorem , if an x is a m eaningful
expression, th e n one of th e seven conditions given above
is satisfied. A n d conversely: if one of th e seven conditions
given above is satisfied} th e n x is a m eaningful expression.
L e t Z s ta n d fo r an y m eaningful expression. T he following
sym bolic equalities are th e n satisfied:
~NZ = Z , CZZ = Z , AZZ = Z , KZZ = Z ,
D ZZ* Z , BZZ= Z .
L e t u s consider a n expression form ed of variables an d
co n stan ts of th e sen ten tial calculus, e.g., G N p A K p H q r .
4
38 U . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

I t follows fro m th e th eo re m ab o v e t h a t every sm all le tte r

is a m ean in g fu l expression. W e th erefo re replace in th e
expression now u n d e r discussion every sm all le tte r b y Z
a n d a p p ly th e sym bolic eq u alities given above:
C N Z A K Z N Z Z = G Z A K Z Z Z = C Z A Z Z = GZZ = Z .
W e h a v e th u s d e m o n stra te d t h a t th e expression u n d er
discussion is a m ean in g fu l expression.
L e t u s now suppose t h a t w e h a v e to exam ine th e ex­
p ression N p K D q r . B y proceeding in a n analogous w ay
w e o b ta in N Z K D Z Z = Z K Z . I t is claim ed t h a t th e ex­
p ression u n d e r discussion is n o t a m eaningful expression.
I n fa c t, w ere i t a m ean in g fu l expression, th e n in conform ity
w ith th e th eo rem above a t le a st one of th e seven conditions
w ould h a v e to b e satisfied. As can easily b e ascertained,
n o n e of th e se conditions is satisfied.
P ro ceed in g in th is w ay w e m a y decide a b o u t every
e x p re ssio n . t h a t consists only of variab les a n d co n stan ts
of th e se n te n tia l calculus w h eth e r it is a m eaningful ex­
pression. F o r in stan ce, we can m ak e sure t h a t th e ex­
pressions
N pC qqK p , C N qC r, JB pqK pr

are n o t m eaningful expressions, b u t th e expressions

G C q rG N p K q p , D rC pK qp
are m eaningful expressions.
I n o rd er to fo rm u la te th e rules of inference in a m ore
precise w ay we shall use th e w ord eq u ifo rm . W e say th a t p
is equiform w ith p , t h a t th e expression G N p is equiform
w ith th e expression G N p . I n e v e r y d a y language we say
a b o u t th o se expressions w hich in o u r sense are equiform ,
t h a t th e y a re th e sam e or id en tical. This, how ever, is n o t
co rrect, since equiform expressions n eed n o t be identical.
E q u ifo rm ity consists only in th e sim ilarity of geom etrical
form s.
 D E F IN IT IO N S A N D K U U 3S O F IN F E R E N C E 39

W e s a y th a t a n exp ressio n @ is a correct su b stitu tio n o f

the e x p ressio n a i f a n d o n ly i f /? d iffe rs fr o m a o n ly i n th a t
in p la ce o f certa in variables w h ich occur i n a the exp ressio n f}
has ce rta in m e a n in g fu l exp ressio n s , su ch th a t m e a n in g fu l
exp ressio n s in are e q u ifo rm w henever th e y correspond to
eq u ifo rm variables in a.
F o r in stan ce, th e expression
(a) G G pqG G qrCpr
follow ing a correct su b stitu tio n , yields th e expression
((3) GGp G N pqG G G N pqr Gpr
o b ta in e d th ro u g h th e su b stitu tio n q jG S p q , On th e o th e r
h an d , th e expression
(£') C C p C N p q G C qrC pr
is n o t a correct su b stitu tio n of th e expression (a), for th e
v ariab les in th e expression (a) w hich a re equiform w ith q
do n o t h a v e in ((3') c o u n terp arts in equiform m eaningful
expressions. T he first such v aria b le h as in (£') its co u n ter­
p a r t in a n expression equiform w ith C M pq, a n d th e second,
a n expression equiform w ith q.
L e t u s now fo rm u late th e rules of inferences in our
sy stem of th e s e n te n tia l calculus. T here are th re e such
ru les: th e ru le o f su b stitu tio n ) th e ru le o f detachm ent, a n d
th e ru le o f rep la cem ent w hich enable us to m ak e use of
definitions.
T h e ru le o f substitution', if a n expression a is a thesis
of th e sy stem , th e n w e m a y recognize as a th esis of th e
sy stem a n y expression w hich is a co rrect su b stitu tio n of
th e expression a.
T h e ru le o f detachm ent', if an y expressions a a n d /S
are theses of th e system an d th e expression a is a n im plica­
tio n w ith th e a n te c e d e n t equiform w ith th e n we m ay r e ­
cognize as a th esis of the system an y expression y w hich
is equiform w ith th e consequent of th e im plication a.
4*
40 I I . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

T h e ru le of rep la cem en t : if a n expression a is a thesis

of th e system , a n d a n expression is p a r t of expression a
a n d is equiform w ith th e rig h t side of one of th e definitions
given above o r one of its co rrect su b stitu tio n s, th e n we m ay
recognize as a th esis of th e sy stem a n y expression y w hich
is o b tain ed fro m expression a th ro u g h th e replacem ent
of expression /? b y a n expression equiform w ith th e left
side of th e sam e definition or b y its corresponding correct
s u b stitu tio n of t h a t le ft side.
T he ru le of re p lacem en t m akes use of t h a t p ro p e rty
of th e definition t h a t w h ate v er is tru e a b o u t th e definiens
(th e rig h t side of th e definition) is also tru e a b o u t th e
definiendum (th e le ft side of th e definition). N o te t h a t
o u r ru le of rep lacem en t does n o t s ta te a n y th in g a b o u t
replacing th e definiendum b y th e definiens. I t h a s been
d eliberately given a w eaker fo rm u latio n , since even in
th a t version i t suffices to m ake a fu ll use of th e definitions.
T he ru le of re p lacem en t enables u s to m ak e u se b o th
of definitions a n d of th e ir correct su b stitu tio n s. S tartin g ,
e.g., from A xiom 3:
G pC N pq

we m a y use D efinition 01:

A p q ™ G Tfpq
an d pro v e th e thesis:
C pApq .
O n th e o th er h a n d , we m ay s ta r t from A xiom 2:

G G N ppp

an d use th e follow ing correct su b stitu tio n of D efinition 01:

A p p = G Tlpp
a n d pro v e th e thesis:
C Appp .
 T H E O R E M S O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 41

T here a re v e ry essential differences b etw een th e ru le

of s u b stitu tio n a n d th e ru le of replacem ent. F irs t, th e
ru le of s u b stitu tio n allows only fo r replacem ent of single
sm all le tte rs, i.e., se n te n tia l variables, w hereas th e ru le
of rep lacem en t allows fo r th e rep lacem en t of expressions
containing a g re a te r n u m b e r of sym bols. T he second
difference consists in th is, t h a t w hen applying th e ru le
of su b stitu tio n we m u st replace all equiform variables b y
equiform expressions, w hereas th e rule of rep lacem en t
m akes i t possible to replace only one expression in a thesis,
even if a second expression, equiform w ith th e first,
occurs in th a t thesis. T hus, e.g., w hen we h av e th e thesis:
G C N pqC N pq
we m ay av ail ourselves of th e rule of replacem ent a n d
D efinition 01 an d o b ta in b o th th e thesis
G ApqApq
an d th e theses
C ApqC N pq , G C N pqApq .

5. Theorems o f the Sentential Calculus

12. W e shall now proceed to pro v e som e theorem s

of th e se n te n tia l calculus, in doing so w e shall confine
ourselves to th e th re e axiom s a n d th e th re e rules of
inference given above. T h e proofs w ill b e carried o u t in
th e com plete form , w ith o u t a n y gaps. T he n o ta tio n ,
how ever, will re so rt to ab b rev iatio n s. E v e ry p ro v ed thesis
w ill h av e its n u m b er a n d w ill b e preceded b y a proof line.
F o r in stan ce, T heorem 4 w ill be preceded b y th e following
p ro o f line:
1 p jG p q , qfG C qrG pr, r js * 01 — 4 .
A proof line alw ays consists of tw o p a rts , sep a rated b y
a n asterisk. P a r t one indicates, in o u r exam ple, th a t th e
ru le of su b stitu tio n is to b e applied to Thesis 1. T h a t
42 n . T H E SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

p a r t of th e proof lin e w hich follows th e asterisk indicates

t h a t th e s u b stitu tio n of Thesis 1, o b tain ed in th e w ay
in d ic a te d above, h as th e form of a n im plication whose
a n te c e d e n t is equiform w ith Thesis 1, an d w hose con­
seq u en t is equiform w ith T heorem 4, now being proved.
T hus, b y ap p ly in g th e rule of d etac h m e n t, w e m a y prove
T heorem 4.
T he n um bers of those theses w hich a re n o t ju s t a u x ­
iliary , b u t are fo r som e reasons in te re stin g in them selves,
w ill b e un d erlin ed . T he axiom s are re p e a te d below:
1 G G pqG G qrG pr ,
2 G G N ppp ,
3 G pG N pq.
W e p ro v e T heorem 4:
1 p j C p q , q jC G q rC p r, rjs * 01 — 4,
4 G C G C q rG p rsC C p q s.
T he ab b rev iatio n in th e proof line c a n b e ex p an d ed q u ite
m echanically. B y carrying o u t th e in d ic a te d su b stitu tio n s
in A xiom 1 we o b ta in
G G G pqG G qrG prG G G G grC prsG C pqs .

T he an tec ed en t of th e su b stitu tio n o b tain ed is in fa c t

equiform w ith T hesis 1, a n d hence w e m a y recognize
Thesis 4, w hich is equiform w ith th e consequent of th e
su b s titu tio n o b tain ed .
W e now p ro v e th e n e x t theorem :
4 q fG q r , r fC s r , sfG G sqG pC sr * G4 p f s , s/G p G sr — 5,
5 G G pG qrC G sqG pG sr.
W e m a y w rite th e proof in g reater detail. T he su b stitu tio n
of Thesis 4, in d icated in th e first p a r t of th e pro o f line,
h as th e fo rm
C G C G G qrC srC pC srC C sqC pC srC G pG qrC G sqC pC sr .
 T H E 0 E E M 3 . O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 43

T h e a n tec ed en t of th is s u b stitu tio n is equiform w ith th e

follow ing s u b stitu tio n of T hesis 4, in d ic a te d in th e second
p a r t of th e p ro o f line:
C G C C qrG srG pC srG G sqG pC sr .

H en ce w e m ay recognize T hesis 5, w hich is equiform w ith

th e co n seq u en t of th e firs t su b stitu tio n . I n th is p ro o f we
tw ice ap p ly th e ru le of su b stitu tio n , a n d once th e ru le
of d etac h m e n t. T hesis 5 is im p o rta n t because o n its
stre n g th , if w e h a v e a recognized sen ten ce of th e ty p e
G pC qr a n d a n im p lica tio n of th e ty p e Gsq, in th e first
sen ten ce w e m ay rep lace th e sentence q b y th e sentence s
a n d a c cep t th e sen ten ce of th e ty p e G pC sr.
W e sh all n o t h e re a fte r ex p an d th e p ro o f lines in d etail.
W h a t is w ritte n dow n in th e p ro o f lin e can alw ays be
checked q u ite m ech an ically b y m ak in g su re th a t th e
exp ressio n sym bolized b y th e firs t p a r t of th e proof lin e
is equiform w ith th e expression sym bolized b y th e second
p a rt.
4 sfG C C p rsC C q rs * C lp fG q r , q fC p r, rfs — 6 ,
6 C O p q G C C p rsG O q rs .
5 p jG p q } q fC C p r s , rfC C q r s , s j t * C6 — 7 ,
7 C C tC C p rsG G p q G tG C g rs .

H av in g p ro v e d T heses 4 -7 w e are now in. a p o sitio n to

ded u ce T hesis 8 :
7 tjC p q , p j q , r f s 1 s /G p s , qjr * C l rjs — 8 ,
8 C C q rC C p q C C rsC p s .

T hesis 8 is called sorites . I t is a g en eralizatio n of th e law

of th e h y p o th e tic a l syllogism , i.e., A xiom 1. B y m eans
of T hesis 8 one m ay , on th e s tre n g th of th e recognized
im p licatio n s of th e ty p e Gqr, Gpq , Grs, prove th e im p li­
catio n of th e ty p e C p s .
44 I I . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

ISTot-e th a t in p ro v in g theo rem s we h a v e so fa r reso rted ,

a p a rt from th e ru les of inference, only to A xiom 1, b u t
n e ith e r to A xiom 2 n o r to A xiom 3.
1 q jG N p q * 03 — 9 ,
9 G G C JSfpqrG pr .
T hesis 9 w ould becom e m ore in tu itiv e if we ap p lied to i t
Definition 01 on th e stre n g th of th e ru le of rep lacem en t.
W e w ould th e n o b ta in th e th eo rem
C G A p q rC p r .

B y th is th eo rem , on th e stre n g th of a tru e im p licatio n

w hose a n tec ed en t is an a lte rn a tio n one can p ro v e a n
im p licatio n w hose a n te c e d e n t is equiform w ith th e first
arg u m en t of th a t a lte rn a tio n , an d th e co n seq u en t rem ains
unchanged.
9 rfC G G N p p p G G q p p * C6 p [ N p , r [ p , s fp — 10 ,
10 GpGG G N p p p GGqpp .
10 p jC G N p p p * G2 — 0 2 p jG G N p p p — 1 1 ,
11 G C qG G N pppC G N ppp.

I n th e second p a r t of th e la s t p ro o f lin e above, th e double

ap p licatio n of th e ru le of d etach m en t h as b een m arked,
9 p j t , q[G G N p p p , rjG G N p p p * O il q fN t — 12 ,
12 G tG G N p p p .
7 p j N p , r /p , s jp * 012 — 13 ,
13 0 G N pqG tC G qpp .
1 p [ G N p q } qjG tC G gpp * 013 — 14 ,
14 G G G tG C q p p rG C N p q r.
14 tjN G G q p p , r[G G qpp * 02 p jG G q p p — 15 ,
15 G G N pqG C qpp.
 TH EO R EM S O P T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 45

T hesis 15 m akes i t possible to p ro v e a sentence of th e

ty p e p on th e stre n g th of accep ted sentences of th e ty p es
G N p q an d Ggp.
T hesis 2 of o n r axiom sy stem m ig h t be rep laced b y
T hesis 15; th e axiom sy stem consisting of theses 1, 3 a n d
15 w ould suffice to b u ild th e se n te n tia l calculus.
13. T he th eo rem s p ro v ed so fa r a re in tro d u c to ry theses.
W e sh all now p ro v e a series of th eo rem s co n tain in g th e
p rim itiv e te rm G.
9 q j p , r fp * C2 — 16 ,
16 G pp .
T hesis 16 is called th e la w o f id e n tity . I n philosophical
lo g ic th is n am e d en o tes to a c e rta in in d efin ite th eo rem
p e rta in in g to term s. A tte n tio n is d raw n h ere to th e fa c t
th a t in o u r sy stem th e law of id e n tity refers to sentences.
I t ca n also b e fo rm u lated in a stro n g er form , n am ely as
th e th esis: B p p . T he law of id e n tity in th e form of T hesis
16 is o ften criticized . I t is claim ed th a t th e law of id e n tity ,
as a tau to lo g y , is of no im p o rtan ce w h atev er; th e sentence
“ if to d a y is W ednesday, th e n to d a y is W ednesday’* is
of no u se in a n y in feren ce th a t w ould b e of in te re st. I t
w ould in fa c t b e so if w e w an te d to av ail ourselves of
T hesis 16 in p ro v in g a sen ten ce p b y m eans of th a t
sentence p . T hesis 16, how ever, m ay occur in reasoning
as a p rem ise. W e m ig h t, fo r in stan ce, assum e only T hesis 15
a n d T hesis 16 in o rd e r to p ro v e o u r A xiom 2. T he p roof
lin e of such a p ro o f w ould ru n :
15 q jN p * <716 pjJSTp — 2 .
I n th is w ay th e law of id e n tity can p la y an essen tial rdle
in proofs.
9 rJC C qpp * <715 — 17 ,
17 C pG C qpp.
5 p l q , q jO N p q , r jq , s fp * G 17 p j q , q jN p — C3 — 18 ,
18 C qC pq.
46 I I . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

T hesis 18, as p ro v e d above, called th e la w o f s im p lific a tio n ,

p o in ts to th e p ro p e rty of th e sym bol C re fe rre d to in
S ectio n II.3 . B y s u b s titu tin g in T hesis 18 a n y tru e sen ­
ten ce fo r q, e.g ., “ 2 - 2 — 4” , a n d b y ap p ly in g th e ru le
of d e ta c h m e n t w e o b ta in G p ( 2 - 2 = 4). T hus a n im p li­
c a tio n w ith a tru e co n seq u en t a n d a n a rb itra ry an teced en t
is tru e .
W e sh all now engage in c e rta in co n sid eratio n s con­
n e c te d w ith T hesis 18, w hich w ill show b y an exam ple
th a t b y m eans of d ed u c tiv e reaso n in g w e m ay pass from
c e rta in th eo rem s to m o re g en eral ones (cf. p . 16 above).
B et u s assum e th e tr u th of th e th esis

18! CpGpCrCsr .
W e p ro v e:
18x p jO p G p C rC sr * C l 8 X— C18X— 182 ,
182 C rC sr.

T hesis 183 d iffers fro m T hesis 18 o n ly b y th e sh ap e of

th e v aria b le s, a n d is th e re fo re also th e law of sim plification.
W e p ro v e fa rth e r:

1 8 2 rjC rC sT j sjq * O l8 2 — 1 8 s ,
183 G q C rG sr .
1 8 2 rjG q C rG sr, s jp * 0 1 83 — 1 8 4 ,
18* G p C q C rC sr.

1 8 . q ]p * 1 8 . ,
18J C p C p C rG a r .

T hesis 184, th ro u g h su b stitu tio n s, h a s y ield ed T hesis 18x,

b u t a t th e sam e tim e T hesis 184 is m ore g en eral th a n
T hesis 18x. Y e t b y assum ing o n ly T hesis 18x w e m ay ,
b y re so rtin g to th e ru le of s u b stitu tio n a n d th e ru le of
d etac h m e n t, p ro v e T hesis 184. T h u s w e see th a t b y com -
 T H E O R E M S O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 47

b illin g th e ru le of su b s titu tio n w ith th e ru le of d etach m en t

w e m ay re ach conclusions th a t a re m ore g en eral th a n th e
p re m ise s3. Tw o such th eses as 18x a n d 184, one of w hich
can b e p ro v ed only if th e o th e r is assum ed, a n d conversely,
th e o th e r can b e p ro v ed o n ly if th e firs t is assum ed, are
called in feren tid U y equiva len t. I t also follow s from our
ex am p le th a t th e law of sim p lificatio n is in feren tia lly
e q u iv alen t to T hesis 18x.
3- P H , * 018 — 19 ,
19 C C G p g rG q r .
T he s u b stitu tio n pjJSfp in T hesis 19 w ould y ield
G G G N pqrG qr
w hich, a fte r th e ap p licatio n of D efin itio n 0 1 , w ould in
tu rn y ield
C C A p q rC q r
th a t is a th eo rem analogous to th a t o b ta in e d fro m T hesis 9.
19 p j N q , q j p , rjC G pqq * 015 p f q t q jp — 20 ,
20 G pG G pqq.
T hesis 20 is u su ally considered a n eq u iv alen t of th e S toic
syllogism m o d u s p o n e n s , given u n d e r 5 in S ectio n 1.2,
Thesis 20 ca n n o t, how ever, rep lace th e ru le of d etach m en t.
5 P l q , q lG q r , s fp * 020 p j q , qjr — 21 ,
21 C G pG qrC qC pr .
T hesis 21 is th e v e ry im p o rta n t law o f co m m u ta tio n . F ro m
th e th eo rem “ I f x is div isib le b y 2 , th e n (if x is divisible
b y 3, th e n x is div isib le b y 6 )” w e m ay, on th e stre n g th
of th e law of co m m u tatio n , o b ta in th e theorem “ I f x
is d ivisible b y 3, th e n (if a? is divisible b y 2, th e n x is di­
v isib le b y 6 )” .
21 p (G p q , q jG q r , rjG p r * 01 — 22 ,
22 G G qrG G pqG pr .
48 I I . T U B S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

B y ap p ly in g th e law of co m m u tatio n to Thesis 1 w e h av e

obtained^ as T hesis 22, a n o th e r form of th e law of th e
syllogism .
1 p jC p G g r , q jC q C p r, r.js * 021 — 23 ,
23 C C C q C p rsC C p C q rs.
23 q [ N p , r jq , ajC G G pqpp * 015 qjG pq — 03 — 24 ,
24 G G G pqpp.
T hesis 24 w as k n o w n ev en to P eirce. I t m akes i t possible
to p ro v e a sen ten ce of th e ty p e p o n th e stre n g th of
a sen ten ce of th e ty p e C G pqp.
21 p fC p q , q fC C p rS j rjC G yrs * 06 — 25 ,
25 G C C prsC G pqG C qrs .
25 p jC p q , r j p , e f p , q jr * 024 — 26 ,
26 C G G p q rC C rp p .
26 r jq * 27 ,
27 G CG pqqG G qpp.
T hesis 27 enables u s to rep lace, in a n expression of th e
ty p e GCpqq , th e sen ten ce p b y th e sentence q, a n d vice
v ersa. I t is co n n ected w ith th e p o ssib ility of defining
a lte rn a tio n w ith th e a id of th e term 0 alone:
A p q = i G C pqq.
U sing such a d efin itio n w e m ig h t, on th e stre n g th of
T hesis 27, p ro v e th e la w o f co m m u ta tiv ity o f a ltern a tio n :
C ApqAqp ,
1 p jG C p g r , q jC G rp p , r fs * 026 — 28 ,
28 O 0 0 G rppsG C G pqrs .
28 e(G G prr * 027 p j r , q \p — 29 ,
29 C C C p q rC C p rr .
 T H E O R E M S O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 49

T hesis 29 is im p o rta n t because, as A. T arsk i h as show n,

w h en co m b in ed w ith T hesis 1 a n d T hesis 18 i t form s
a sy stem of th re e sen ten ces th a t is su fficien t to p ro v e
a il th o se p o ssib le th eses of th e s e n te n tia l calculus w hich
co n tain O as th e o n ly c o n sta n t. P . B em ay s n o ticed th a t
T hesis 29 can b e rep laced in th a t sy stem b y th e sim pler
T hesis 24.
29 rjG p q * 016 p fC p q — 30 ,
30 C C pCpqG pq.

T hesis 30 occurs as a n axiom in th e axiom system of th e

se n te n tia l calculus fo rm u lated b y D . H ilb e r t4. I t w as
alre ad y k n o w n to S ex tu s E m p iricu s, p h y sician a n d p h i­
lo so p h er w ho liv ed a b o u t A .D . 200.
W e sh all now p ro v e sev eral th eo rem s w hich m ay
b e re g a rd e d as lem m as in th e p ro o f of T hesis 35.
7 tjG G p q r, s j r t qjs * 029 — 3 1 ,
31 G G psG G G pqrC G srr .
21 p j C p s , q jG G pqr, rjG G srr * 031 — 32 ,
32 G G G pqrG G psG G srr .
32 q jr , rjG qG pr * 018 q jG p r , p lq — 33 ,
33 G C psC G sG qC prC qC pr .
21 p j G p s , q jC sG q C p r} rjG qG pr * 033 — 34 ,
34 C G sC qG prC G psG qG pr .
34 sjG q r , g/O^gr * 022 — 35 ,
35 G G p G q rC G p q G p r.

T hesis 35 occurs as a n ax io m in th e firs t axiom sy stem

of th e s e n te n tia l calculus, g iv en b y F reg e in h is B e g r iffs -
sc h rift [3]. I t differs fro m T hesis 22 only in th a t th e
a n te c e d e n t p is ad d ed to it.
50 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

14. W e shall now fo rm u late a n u m b er of theorem s

w hich co n tain th e sym bols (7 an d JSf, b u t no defined term s
of th e se n te n tia l calculus.

21 q f N p , r j q * <73 — 36 ,
36 CNpCpq.
1 pjJ Sfp j * 036 — 37 ,
37 C G G pqrG N pr.
27 p ( l ) f p , q j p * 02 — 38 ,
38 GCpSfpJH p .
37 p j N p , q l p , r j p * 02 — 39 ,
39 CJSrUTpp .
9 q / N N - p , r j N S f p * 038 p j N p — 40 ,
40 GpNNp .

Theses 39 an d 40 fo rm th e v e ry im p o rta n t la w o f double

negation. T he follow ing ty p e s of inference a re b ased on
th is law : i t is n o t tr u e t h a t C opernicus w as n o t a Pole,
th erefo re Copernicus w as a P ole; C opernicus w as a P ole,
th erefo re i t is n o t tru e th a t C opernicus w as n o t a P ole.

1 p f N N p , z i p , rjq * (739 — 41 ,
41 G C pqC N N pq.
1 p j C p q , qjG H fN pq * (741 — 42 ,
42 C G G N N pqrC C pqr.
42 r jG G q N p N p * 015 p / N p — 43 ,
43 G C pqC G qN pNp .
5 p jG p q , q jG q N p , r ( N p * 043 — 44 ,
44 G G sG qN pG G pqG sN p .
5 p f G N p q , q jG q p , r fp * 03 5 — 45 ,
45 C G sG qpC C N pqG sp .
 T H E O R E M S O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 51

44 s \N q * (736 p f q , q f N p — 46 ,
46 G G pqG NqN p .

44 sfq> ql&q * plq»qlNp — 47,

47 G G pN qG qN p .
45 s j N q * 036 p f q , qjp — 48 ,
48 G G N pqG N qp .
45 s f q , q f N q * 0 3 p f q , qjp — 49 ,
49 G G N pN qG qp .
T heses 46, 47, 48, 49 fo rm th e fo u r law s o f tra n sp o sitio n .
T hesis 46 p erm its n s to recognize a n im p lica tio n of th e
ty p e G N q N p o n th e s tre n g th of a n im p lica tio n of th e ty p e
C pq. To p u t i t g en erally , th e law s of tra n sp o sitio n p e rm it
us, o n th e s tre n g th of an accep ted im p licatio n , to ac cep t
a n im p lica tio n w hose a n te c e d e n t is c o n tra d ic to ry to th e
co n seq u en t of th e fo rm er im p licatio n , a n d w hose co n ­
seq u en t is c o n tra d ic to ry to th e a n te c e d e n t of th e fo rm er
im p licatio n . B y ap p ly in g T hesis 46 to th e sentence “ if
to d a y is T h u rsd ay , th e n to m o rro w is F rid a y ” w e o b ta in
th e sen ten ce “if' to m o rro w is n o t F rid a y , th e n to d a y is
n o t T h u rsd a y ” .
T heses 18, 21, 35, 39, 40, 46 occur as axiom s in th e
firs t axiom sy stem of th e se n te n tia l calcu lu s, g iven b y
F reg e in h is B e g r iffs s c h r ift [3]. Y e t T hesis 21 is su p e r­
fluous as a n axiom , fo r i t can b e p ro v e d b y T heses 18
a n d 35 5.
I n S ectio n 1.2, w e h av e d ed u ced from T hesis 2
a m a th e m a tic a l p ro o f belonging to th e categ o ry of w h a t
is called apagogie p ro o fs. B y m eans of th e law s of
tra n sp o sitio n w e can form alize c e rta in apagogie proofs
w hich a re m o st fre q u e n tly used. To p ro v e a th eo rem T
th e follow ing reaso n in g is o ften em ployed: th e falsehood
of th eo rem T is assum ed, w hich is ta n ta m o u n t to th e
assu m p tio n of th e tr u th o sentence N T . A conclusion W .
52 II- the s e n t e n t ia l c a l c u l u s

of w hich i t is otherw ise know n th a t it is false, is d raw n

from th a t assu m p tio n ; th u s, i t is know n th a t sentence
N W is tru e . S ince th e assu m p tio n h as re su lted in a false
conclusion, i t m u st b e false. H ence sentence N T is false,
a n d th erefo re sen ten ce T is tru e .
I n th e se n te n tia l calculus th e reasoning given above
w ould b e: in T hesis 48 we m ak e th e su b stitu tio n s p j T ,
q fW , a n d we o b ta in
CCNTW GNW T .
Since it is d em o n strated in th e p ro o f th a t C N T W , we
ap p ly th e ru le of d etac h m e n t a n d o b ta in C N W T . Since
th e an tec ed en t N W of th e la s t im p licatio n is accepted,
we ag ain ap p ly th e ru le of d etac h m e n t an d o b tain th esis T .
1 p / C N p q y q lG N q p * 048 — 50 ,
50 C C C N q p rC C N p q r.
22 q jC q ry r jC N r N q * 046 p f q y q jr — 5 1 ,
51 G C pC q rC p G N rN q .
22 q jC q N r , r jC rN q * 047 p ( q y q jr — 52 ,
52 G G p C q N rG p C rN q .
50 rjC C p q q * 015 p j q , q jp — 53 ,
53 G C N pqC C pqq.
21 p jG N p q , q jG p q y rjq * 053 — 54 ,
54 G G pqG G N pqq .
T heses 53 an d 54 are rem ark ab le in th a t th e y p e rm it us
to recognize th e sentence q on th e stre n g th of tw o recog­
nized im p licatio n s of th e ty p e s Cpq an d C N p q (w ith
equiform consequents an d c o n tra d ic to ry an teced en ts).
C onsequently, a sentence im plied b y tw o co n trad icto ry
sentences is tru e .
T heses 18, 2 1 , 2 2 , 30, 3, 54 ap p ear as axiom s of th e
sen ten tial calculus in a n a rticle b y D. H ilb e r t6. O ne of
 t h e o r e m s o f t h e s e n t e n t ia l ca lcu lu s 53

th em , how ever, nam ely T hesis 30, is superfluous, since

i t can h e p ro v ed b y m eans of th e rem ain in g ones 7.
44 s (C p N q * (747 — 55 ,
55 0 C pqC C pN qN p .

T hesis 55 p erm its u s to recognize a sentence of th e ty p e

N p on th e stre n g th of sentences of th e ty p e Gpq an d
C p N q , T h u s a sentence w hich im plies tw o. co n tra d ic to ry
sentences is false. T he apagogic reaso n in g b ased on Thesis
55 w as know n in a n tiq u ity . T he C h ristian a u th o r O rigenes,
w ho liv ed in th e th ird ce n tu ry A .D ., gives a n exam ple,
seem ingly of S toic origin, of th e follow ing consequence:
if y o u know th a t y o u are dead, th e n y o u a re d ead ; if
y o u k now th a t y o u are d ead , th e n y o u are n o t d ead ;
a n d co n seq u en tly y o u do n o t k now t h a t you a re dead.
T h e firs t prem ise is b ased on th e assu m p tio n th a t all
know ledge is tru e , a n d th e second, o n th e assu m p tio n
th a t if one know s som ething th e n one is n o t dead. I n
co n fo rm ity w ith th e conclusion draw n, no one can know
th a t h e is dead. W e d irec t th e re a d e r’s a tte n tio n to
T hesis 55 because i t is o ften claim ed th a t tw o sentences
of th e ty p es Gpq an d C p N q can n o t b o th be tru e . This
erroneous view re su lts from th e fa c t th a t people fo rg et
th a t a tru e im p licatio n m ay h a v e a false an teced en t.
1 p fG N p q , qjGGpqq * <753 — 56 ,
56 G C G G pqqrC O N pqr .
56 g /r, v(GGpqGGqrr * (732 g /r, sfq — 57 ,
57 G G N prG C pqG C qrr .
1 p J G jfp r , qjC G pqG C qrr , rfs * C57 — 58 ,
58 C G G CpqC GqrrsC GN p r s ,
58 sJCGqrGGpqr * (721 p jG p q , qfG qr — 59 ,
59 G G N p r GGqrGCpqr .
5
54 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

T heses 19, 37, 59 form a sy stem of th eses w hich su f­

fices to p ro v e a ll th e th eo rem s o f th e s e n te n tia l calculus;
h en ce th a t sy stem is in feren tiaJly e q u iv a le n t to o u r th re e
axiom s. T h e th eses q u o te d ab o v e a re in te re stin g in view
of th e ir s tru c tu ra l re la tio n sh ip : th e y are, resp ectiv ely , of
th e ty p e 8: C a fi, G a y , C yC fia.

22 q jC N p r , r fC C q rC C p q r, p j s * 059 — 60,
60 C C sC X fprC $C C qrC C pqr.

60 s jC p r j p fJifp * 041 q jr — 61,

61 C C p rC CqrC C N p q r .

T hesis 61 d iffers fro m T hesis 59 o n ly in th a t th e sentences

jy p a n d p a re re p la c e d resp ectiv ely b y p a n d N p .

1 q j N N p , rjq * 0 4 0 — 6 2 ,
62 C C NN pqC pq.

21 r jp * 018 q{p , p j q — 6 3 ,

63 C qC pp.
4 8 p /g , 2 / G pp * 063 q l ^ q — 64,
64 G N C ppq.

61 p /g , r/g , q jN G p p * 016 p jq — 064 — 65,

65 C C NqN C ppq.

T heses 62 a n d 65 w ill b e u sefu l in S ection I I I .7 .

48 qjC pq * 036 — 6 6 ,
66 G N G pqp.

46 P/2> 2 / 0 p g * 018 — 67,

67 C N C pqN q.
 T H E O R E M S O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 55

T heses 66 an d 67 d em o n strate th a t th e falsehood of an

im p lica tio n en tails th e tr u th of th e an te c e d e n t of th a t
im p lica tio n a n d th e falsehood of th e consequent.

48 p f q , q /C p N q * (718 q fN q — 6 8 ,
68 C N CpN qq,

T hesis 68 differs fro m Thesis 67 on ly in th a t th e sen­

ten ces q a n d N q are rep laced , resp ectiv ely , b y th e con­
tra d ic to ry sentences N q a n d q.
51 q jG p q , rjq * (720 — 6 9 ,
69 G pG N qN G pq.
T hesis 69 is co n n ected w ith T heses 66 a n d 67 j it shows
th a t th e tr u th of th e an tec ed en t a n d th e falsehood of th e
consequent of a n im p licatio n e n ta il th e falsehood of th a t
im p licatio n .
52 q jC p N q , rfq * (720 q jN q — 70,
70 G pC qN G pN q.
T hesis 70 differs fro m T hesis 69 o n ly in th a t sentences
N q a n d q a re rep laced , resp ectiv ely , b y sentences q
and N q.
70 p j G p p , qjGqq * (716 — (716 p fq — 71,
71 N G G ppN G qq.

T hesis 71 is a n exam ple of a th eo rem th a t begins w ith

th e fu n c to r N .
15. W e now give a n u m b er of th eo rem s in w hich th e
sym bols of a lte rn a tio n occur alongside th e p rim itiv e term s.
F irs t w e recall th e d efin itio n of a lte rn a tio n .

Ol A p q — G N pq.
3 * 0 1 -7 2 ,
72 Op A p q .
5*
56 I I . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

T he p ro o f lin e of T hesis 72 in d icates th a t in T hesis 3

w e h av e rep laced , in co n fo rm ity w ith th e ro le of rep lace­
m en t, th e expression equiform w ith th e rig h t side of
D efin itio n 01 b y a n expression eqniform w ith th e le ft
side of th a t d efin itio n .
18 p/JVp * 0 1 -7 3 ,
73 G qApq.
B y T heses 72 a n d 73 ev ery sentence im plies a n a lte rn a ­
tio n , one of th e arg u m en ts of w hich is th e sentence in
qu estio n , an d th e o th er arg u m en t is a n a rb itra ry sentence.
2 * 01 g/p- 7 4 ,
74 G Appp.
I n th is p ro o f w e h a v e n o t re so rte d d irectly to D efini­
tio n 01, b u t to one of its co rrect su b stitu tio n s. T hesis 74,
to g eth er w ith th e su b stitu tio n q jp of T hesis 73, yields th e
law of ta u to lo g y fo r a lte rn a tio n , w hich, using th e sym ­
bol E m ig h t b y n o te d dow n as a single th esis: E A p p p .
48 * 0 1 -0 1 p f q , q jp - 75,
75 G ApqAqp.
I n th e p ro o f above w e h av e tw ice ap p lied th e ru le of
rep lacem en t: w e h a v e firs t av ailed ourselves d irectly of
D efin itio n 01, a n d th e n of its co rrect su b stitu tio n . T hesis 75
is th e law of c o m m u ta tiv ity of a ltern a tio n ; i t sta te s th a t
th e o rd er of th e arg u m en ts w hich occur in an a lte rn a tio n
m ay b e changed.
22 p fE fp * 0 1 -0 1 g/r- 76,
76 G G q rC A p q A p r.
21 qfEFq * 01 p f q , qjr • 01 p f q , q jC p r • 77,
77 GC p A q rA q G p r.
77 p j N p * 01 q (A q r • 01 q jr - 78,
78 G A p A g rA q A p r.
 T H E O R E M S O P T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 57

T heses 73, 74, 75, 76, 78 form th e axiom sy stem of th e

se n te n tia l calculus p re se n te d in P r in c ip ia M a th em a tiea [35].
T h a t axiom sy stem is p reced ed b y th e follow ing d efin i­
tio n of im p licatio n : C pq = A N p q , fo r th e p rim itiv e te rm s
of th a t sy stem are A a n d JOT. I n th is w ay a defined te rm
occurs in th e axiom s them selves. T hesis 78 can b e p ro v ed
b y m eans of th e rem ain in g axiom s, an d as such is su p e r­
fluous as an axiom 9.
9 * 01*79,
79 CC A pqrC pr.
19 p jW p * 0 1 * 8 0 ,
80 C C A p q rC q r.
61 * 0 1 * 8 1 ,
81 G C prC C qr C A p q r .

T hesis 81 enables u s to ac cep t, o n th e stre n g th of sen ­

ten ces of th e ty p e : C p r a n d Cqr, a sen ten ce o f th e ty p e
C A p g r. T heses 79, 80 a n d 81 m a y b e a d o p te d as axiom s
of th e se n te n tia l calcu lu s if we a d o p t A a n d 27 as th e
p rim itiv e term s a n d a d m it th e occurrence of d efin ed term s
in axiom s. T h e said th eses are stru c tu ra lly re la te d , fo r
th e y a re , resp ectiv ely , of th e ty p e Ca/?, C ay, C fiC y a 10.

53 * 01*82,
82 C ApqC C pqq.
37 r(q * 01 8 3 ,
83 C C C pqqApq.
T heses 82 a n d 83 d e m o n stra te , as m en tio n ed above
(cf. th e re m a rk to T hesis 27), th e ad m issib ility of th e
follow ing d efin itio n of a lte rn a tio n : A p q = GCpqq.
16 p jC N p q * 0 1 1 * 8 4 ,
84 C ApqC N pq.
58 n . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

T h e sy m b o l “ I ” w h ich occurs in th e p ro o f lin e in d icates

t h a t in th e a p p ro p ria te s u b s titu tio n of T hesis 16 w e
re p la c e o n ly th e firs t ex pression, equiform w ith th e rig h t
side of th e d efin itio n . T hesis 84 corresponds to th e S toic
schem e of inference, called m o d u s toTlendo p o n e n s , w hich
th e S toics u sed to sym bolize as follow s:
p o r q.
I t is n o t tru e th a t p .
T h erefo re q.

16 p jG N p q * 0 1 1 1 -8 5 ,
85 C C N pqApq.
41 * 01 p /iy p - 8 6 ,
86 G C p q A P fp q .
62 * 01 p l& p • 8 7 ,
87 C AN pqCpq.
T heses 86 a n d 87 d e m o n stra te th e ad m issib ility of a d e­
fin itio n of im p lic a tio n su ch as is a d o p ted in P r in c ip ia
M a th e m a tic a (cf. th e re m a rk to T hesis 78 above).

±6 p f A N p q , q jC p q * 087 — 8 8 ,
88 G N G pqN AN pq.
46 p j C p q , q jA P fp q * 086 — 80,
89 G N AN pqN G pq.
85 q ilifp * 016 p j N p — 90,
90 A p lS fp .
T hesis 90 is a sym bolic ex p ressio n of th e la w o f the e x ­
clu d ed m id d le , w hich sta te s th a t of tw o c o n tra d ic to ry
sen ten ces a t le a s t one is tru e . T he sen ten ce “ to d a y is
 t h e o r e m s o f t h e s e n t e n t ia l c a lcu lu s f>9

W ed n esd ay o r to d a y is n o t W ed n esd ay ” is a n ap p licatio n

of T hesis 90.
16. T he follow ing series of th eo rem s includes, in a d d i­
tio n to th e fu n c to rs w hich h av e alre a d y occurred, also th e
fu n c to r K . T he d efin itio n of co n ju n ctio n is re p eated h ere:
02 K p q = N G p N q .
70 * 0 2 -9 1 ,
91 C pC qK pq.
21 r jK p q * C91 — 92,
92 G qG pK pq.
T heses 91 a n d 92 enables us to accep t, on th e stre n g th
of tw o accep ted sentences, th e co n ju n ctio n w hose a r­
g u m en ts are th e sentences in question.
66 q fN q * 0 2 -9 3 ,
93 C K pqp.
68 * 0 2 -9 4 ,
94 C K pqq.
Theses 93 a n d 94 en ab le u s to accep t, on th e stre n g th
of a n accep ted co n ju n ctio n , a n y of its arg u m en ts.
30 q fK p p * 091 q jp — 9 5 ,
95 G pK pp.
T hesis 95 an d th e s u b stitu tio n of T hesis 94, q /p , give th e
law o f ta utology fo r conjunction-, i t m ig h t b e sym bolized
as one th esis: E K p p p .
1 p f K p q , q fp * 093 — 9 6 ,
96 G G p rG K p q r.
1 p f K p q * 094 — 97,
97 C C g rG K p q r.
60 I I . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

T heses 96 an d 97 enable n s to recognize a n im p licatio n

of th e ty p e G K p q r on th e stre n g th of an im p licatio n of
th e ty p e Gpr o r Cqr.

5 p fG K p q r , q fC q K p q , r jC q r , s jp
* 022 q jK p q , p jq — 091 — 9 8 ,
98 C G K p q rC p G qr .
21 p fC K p q C q r , q jC K p q q , r jG K p q r * 095 p j K p q — 0 9 4 — 9 9 ,
99 C G K p q G q rC K p q r .
1 p jO p r , q jC K p q r , r js * 096 — 100,
100 0 0 G K p q rsG G p rs.
100 r jC q r, s/G K p q r * 099 — 1 0 1 ,
101 0 C pC qr G K p q r .
Theses 98 a n d 101 a re th e law s o f exp o rta tio n a n d im p o r ­
ta tio n , referred to above (cf. p . 28-29).

101 p jG p q , qjG qr, r fG p r * 0 1 — 1 0 2 ,

102 C K G p q C q rC p r.
101 p jC q r , q jC p q , r jC p r * 022 — 103,
103 G K G qrG pqC pr .

T he law of im p o rta tio n enables n s to give to th e law of

th e syllogism th e fo rm of T hesis 1 02 or T hesis 103.
101 g jC p q , rjq * 020 — 104,
104 G K pG pqq.
T hesis 104 corresponds to th e S to ic schem e of inference
called m o d u s p o n e n s.
101 r jK q p * 092 q jp , p fq — 1 0 5 ,
105 G K pqK qp.
 T H E O R E M S O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 61

T hesis 105 is th e la w o f c o m m u ta tiv ity o f co n ju n ctio n .

101 qfUTp , rjq * 0 3 — 106,
106 CKpAFp{ jf.
A s m en tio n ed above, T hesis 106 w as know n to D u n s
S cotus.
101 q/XTq, r jN C p q * 069 — 107,
107 G K pN qN C pq.
47 p j K p & q , qjC pq * 0107 — 108,
108 G G pqN K pN q .
108 q jp * 016 — 109,
109 N K pN p.
T hesis 109 is a sym bolic fo rm u latio n of th e la w of con-
tra d ic tio n , w hich s ta te s th a t tw o c o n tra d ic to ry sentences
c a n n o t b o th b e tru e . T he sen ten ce “ i t is n o t tru e th a t
(to d a y is W ed n esd ay a n d to d a y is n o t W ednesday)” is
a n ap p lic a tio n of T hesis 109.
88 q /N q * 02 *110 ,
110 C K pqN AN pN q.
89 q fN q * 02 *111,
111 C N AN pN qK pq.
T heses 110 a n d 111 d em o n strate th e ad m issib ility of th e
follow ing d efin itio n of co n ju n ctio n : K p q — N A N p N q .
47 p j K p q , q fA N p A fq * 0 1 1 0 — 112,
112 C AN pN qN K pq.
48 p j A N p N q , q jK p q * O l l l — 113,
113 C N K pqAN pN q.
T heses 112 a n d 113 are de M o rg a n 's la w s, w hich s ta te
62 I I . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CA LCU LU S

th a t th e re is a b ila te ra l im p lica tio n b etw een th e n eg atio n

of th e co n ju n ctio n of tw o sentences a n d th e a lte rn a tio n
of th e n eg atio n s of th o se sentences.
65 * 02 q jl S g-114,
114 GNC pqK pN q.
107 p f N p * 01 *115,
115 C K N pN qN Apq.
114 p / R p * 0 1 -1 1 6 ,
116 G N A p q K N p iN q .
T heses 115 an d 116 also are de M o rg a n ’s la w s ; th e y s ta te
t h a t th e re is a b ila te ra l im p licatio n betw een, th e n eg a tio n
of th e a lte rn a tio n of tw o sen ten ces a n d th e co n ju n ctio n
of th e n eg atio n s o f th o se sentences.
17. T h e follow ing series of th eo rem s w ill also in clu d e
S h e ffe r’s sym b o l , o r sym bol of a ltern a tive d e n ia l . I ts d efin i­
tio n is now recalled :
03 D p q = G p N q .
38 * 03 2 /P -1 1 7 ,
117 G D ppN p.
18 q fN p * 03 q jp -118,
118 G N pD pp.

T heses 117 an d 118 d em o n strate th e ad m issib ility of th e

follow ing d efin itio n of n eg atio n b y m eans of th e sym bol
of a lte rn a tiv e d en ial:
N p = D pp.
47 + 03-03 p ) q , g /p -1 1 9 ,
119 G D pqD qp.
T hesis 119 is th e la w o f c o m m u ta tiv ity of altern a tive
d e n ia l.
 T H E O R E M S O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L uA LC U LU S 63

55 * 0 3 -1 2 0 ,
120 G G pqC BpqN p.
120 * 03 p jD p q , q i p ' 121,
121 O C pqD D pqp.
1 p fG p q , q lD D p g p * (7121 — 122,
122 C G D D p q p rC C p g r.
122 r jD p D p q * (7119 p jD p q , q fp — 123,
123 C C pqD pBpq.
68 * 0 3 -1 2 4 ,
124 G N Bpqq.
22 q!NDpq<s rjq * (7124 — 125,
125 C G pN D pqG pq.
125 * 03 q fD p q - 1 2 6 ,
126 C D pD pqG pq,
T heses 123 a n d 126 d em o n strate th e ad m issib ility o f th e
follow ing d e fin itio n of im p lica tio n b y m eans of th e sym bol
of a lte rn a tiv e d e n ia l alone:
G pq = B p D p q .
S heffer h as sh o w n 11 th a t a ll th e term s o f th e se n te n tia l
calcu lu s ca n b e d efin ed b y m eans of a lte rn a tiv e d en ial.
I t ca n b e seen fro m th e re su lts o b ta in e d ab o v e th a t th e
te rm s of th e s e n te n tia l calculus w hich ap p e a r in o u r sy stem
ca n b e d efin ed b y m eans of th e sym bol of a lte rn a tiv e
d en ial: fo r n e g a tio n a n d im p lic a tio n th is c a n b e seen
d ire c tly fro m T heses 117, 118, 123 an d 126; a lte rn a tio n ,
co n ju n ctio n a n d eq u iv alen ce a re d efin ab le b y m eans of
n eg a tio n an d im p lica tio n , w hich ca n easily be red u ced to
a lte rn a tiv e d en ial.
T he F re n c h lo g ician J . M o o d gav e a single axiom
of th e se n te n tia l calcu lu s, w ith a lte rn a tiv e d en ial as
64 IT. T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

th e only p rim itiv e te rm 12 K icod’s axiom is v ery com ­

p lic a te d a n d n o t v e ry in tu itiv e . I n o u r n o ta tio n i t can h e
w ritte n dow n as follow s:
D D p D q r D D tD ttD D s q D D p s D p s .
In s te a d of th e u su al ru le of d etach m en t, fo rm u lated w ith
re sp e c t to im p licatio n , K icod’s sy stem co n tain s th e ru le
w hich p e rm its u s to ac cep t th e ex p ressio n y o n th e
s tre n g th of th e recognized expression D a D fiy a n d th e
recognized expression a.
18. T h e la s t series of th eo rem s of th e se n te n tia l cal­
culus inclu d es th eo rem s th a t co n tain th e sym bol of eq u i­
valence, in tro d u c e d above b y D efin itio n 04:
04 E p q = N G G p q N G q p .
1 6 p fN G G p q N G q p * 041*02 p fG p q , qfG qp 11*127,
127 G E p q K G pqG qp.
16 p ftfC G p q N G q p * 02 p fG p q , q(G qp I* 0411*128,
128 G K G pqG qpEpq.
T heses 127 a n d 128 show w h a t h a s a lre a d y b een p o in ted
o u t above, n am ely th a t th e follow ing d efin itio n of eq u i­
v alen ce m ig h t b e u sed :
B pq = K G pqG qp,
66 p fG p q , q fN C q p * 04*129,
129 G EpqG pq.
6 8 p fG p q , qfG qp * 0 4 -1 3 0 ,
130 C EpqC qp.
T heses 129 a n d 130 p e rm it us to accep t, o n th e s tre n g th
of a n ac cep ted equivalence of tw o sen ten ces, th e im p li­
c a tio n b etw een one of th ese tw o sentences a n d th e o th er.
70 p fG p q , qfG qp * 04*131,
131 C G pqG G qpE pq.
 T H E O R E M S O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 65

T hesis 131 p erm its u s to accep t th e equivalence of tw o

sen ten ces o n th e stre n g th of tw o im p licatio n s h o ld in g in
tw o d irectio n s b etw een th e se tw o sen ten ces. W h en T hesis
131 is ap p lied to th e th eo rem s p ro v e d above, a n u m b er
of law s a re o b tain ed w hich h a v e th e fo rm of equivalences.

131 q jp * 016 — 016 — 1 3 2 ,

132 Epp.
T hesis 132 is th e la w o f id e n tity i n the fo rm o f a n equivalence.
131 p fG p G q r , qjG qG pr * 021 — 021 p f q , qjp — 133,
133 E G p G qrG qG pr.

T hesis 133 is th e la w o f eom m utaM on i n the fo r m o f a n

equivalence.
131 p jG p G p q , qjC pq * 030 — 018 q fC pq — 134,
134 EG pC pqG pq.
131 q j l f N p * 040 — 049 — 1 3 5 ,
135 EpN N p.

T hesis 135 is th e law o f double n eg a tio n i n the fo r m o f

a n equivalence.
131 p jC p q , q jC N q N p * 046 — 049 p f q , qjp — 136,
136 E C p q G H fq N p .

T hesis 136 is th e la w o f tra n sp o sitio n i n the fo rm o f a n

equivalence .
131 p jG p q , q fA N p q * 086 — 087 — 1 3 7 ,
137 EG pqAN pq.
131 p jG p G q rj q jG K p q r * 0101 — 098 — 138,
138 E G p C q rG K p q r.
66 I I . THIS S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

T he law s of im p o rta tio n a n d e x p o rta tio n are w ritte n dow n

in one sentence, n am ely T hesis 138.
131 p f N p , q jD p p * 0118 — 0117 — 139,
139 jW N p D p p .

131 p fC p q , q jD p D p q * 0123 — 0126 — 140,

140 E C pqJD pD pq.

Theses 137, 139, 140 a re eq u iv alen ts of th e possible d e­

fin itio n s m en tio n ed above.
W e sh all now p ro v e a n u m b er of th eses in w hich d e­
fin ed sym bols do n o t occur. T h ey w ill p ro v e u sefu l in
S ection I I I . 7 13.
40 p (G p p * C16 — 1 4 1 ,
141 N N C pp.
5 p jC N C p q r , q jC N q N C p q , r jC N q r , sjp
* 022 q jN C p q , p j N q — 069 — 142,
142 GCJtf C p q rG p C N g r.
21 p jG N G p q G N q r , q jC N G p q N q , r jC N C p q r
* 035 p j N C p q , q j N q — 067 — 143,
143 0 G N C p q C N q rC N C p q r.
25 p f N G p q , rjC JP qr, sfG N G p q r , q jp * 0143 — 066 — 144,
144 GGp C N q rG N C p q r.
22 qjG qr, rIG C rsC qs * 0 1 p f q , q jr , r js — 145,
145 C C p C q rC p C C rsC q s.
l p j G p C q r } qJC pC C rsC qs , rjC C rsC p C q s
* 0145 — 0 2 1 , q (G rs , rjC qs — 146,
146 C C p C q rC C rsC p C q s.
 III. SELECTED PROBLEMS FROM
THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SENTENTIAL
CALCULUS

6. The Consistency and the Independence o f Axiom s o f the Sentential Calculus.

Many-valued L ogic

19. I n th e n e x t tw o sections w e sh all h e concerned

w ith problem s th a t do n o t b elong to th e sy stem of th e
se n te n tia l calculus itself, b u t are p ro b lem s i n w h ich the
sen ten tia l ca lcu lu s i s a n object o f in v e stig a tio n , a n d th u s
belong to the m ethodology o f th a t sy stem . T hese issues,
th em selv es of g re a t im p o rtan ce, h a v e n ev er b een ra ise d
in p h ilo so p h ical logic a n d h a v e developed e n tire ly in
co n n ectio n w ith m a th e m a tic a l logic. O ur an aly sis w ill n o t
ta k e th e fo rm of fo rm alized a n d co m p lete p ro o fs, as w ere
u sed ab o v e in p ro v in g th eo rem s of th e s e n te n tia l calcu lu s.
T h e proofs to b e p re se n te d below m ig h t b e fo rm alized
w ith in som e a x io m a tic sy stem , b u t th a t w ould b e ex ­
trem ely d ifficu lt. O u r pro o fs w ill b e ca rrie d o u t as is u su ally
done in m a th e m a tic s, i.e ., w e sh all s ta r t fro m assu m p tio n s
w hose tr u th w ill b e d ic ta te d b y in tu itio n . O u r p u rp o se is
o n ly to convince th e re a d e r of th e tr u th of th e th eo rem s
given.
T h e firs t p ro b lem to b e d e a lt w ith is th a t of th e
co n sisten cy of th e axiom s of th e se n te n tia l calculus. I t
w ill b e show n t h a t if w e s ta r t fro m o u r axiom s an d
p roceed in accordance w ith th e ru les of inference, w e can
n ev er p ro v e tw o sen ten ces, one of w hich h a s th e fo rm a,
a n d th e o th e r N a , a n d th u s are c o n tra d ic to ry . T his is
v e ry im p o rta n t, fo r sh o u ld w e p ro v e tw o co n tra d ic to ry
sen ten ces, we w ould h a v e to recognize th e tr u th of b o th
68 I I I . M ETHODOLOGY O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

th ese sentences, since w e recognize th e tru th of every

sentence th a t is p ro v ab le in th e sen ten tial calculus. B u t,
in conform ity w ith th e p rin cip le of co n trad ictio n , tw o
co n tra d ic to ry sentences ca n n o t b o th b e tru e . T he possi­
b ility of a rriv in g a t a c o n tra d ic tio n w ould th u s underm ine
th e fo u n d atio n of o u r sy stem ; c e rta in theses of th e system
could th e n b e false sentences, a n d th e sen ten tial calculus
w ould lose its v alu e as a th e o ry in w hich only tru e sen­
ten ces are p ro v ab le. T he inconsistency of ou r system
w ould also e n ta il a n o th e r consequence. S hould w e p ro v e
tw o th eses of th e form s, resp ectiv ely , a an d N a , th e n
w e could a p p ly to .Axiom 3 th e su b stitu tio n p j a an d
th u s o b ta in
C aC N aq.

B y ap p ly in g d etach m en t tw ice we could p ro v e thesis q.

B y su b stitu tin g fo r q a n y m eaningful expression w e w ould
th e re b y prove it. H ence in a n in co n sisten t system ev ery
m eaningful expression w ould b e a thesis of th a t system ,
w hich w ould com pletely o b lite ra te th e difference betw een
th e falsehood a n d th e tr u th of m eaningful expressions.
I n o rd er to ca rry o u t a p ro o f of consistency of th e
system of th e se n te n tia l calculus le t us draw a tte n tio n
to th e fa c t th a t in our sy stem definitions are m erely a b ­
b rev iatio n s a n d do n o t p lay an y essen tial role in th e proofs.
T h e ru le of rep lacem en t p erm its us to replace in an y th esis,
th e definiens b y th e definiendum . W e could p ro v e th a t,
in ou r system , from a n y th esis th a t co n tain s a definiendum
we m ay also deduce a th esis in w hich th e said definiendum
is rep laced b y th e a p p ro p ria te definiens. I n th is w ay, in
o u r system of th e se n te n tia l calculus ev ery p ro o f h a s its
c o u n te rp a rt in w hich no defined term s occur. H ence if
o u r sy stem w ere in co n sisten t, i.e., if w e could p ro v e in
i t tw o co n tra d ic to ry sentences of th e form , respectively,
jS an d -/V/5, w e could also p ro v e tw o sentences co n tain in g
no defined term s, h av in g th e form , resp ectiv ely , a an d JV'a,
 C O N SISTEN C Y O F A X IO M S. M A N Y -V A LU ED LOGIC 69

w here a w ould d iffer from a t th e m o st b y h av in g a c e rta in

d efiniendum re p la ced b y th e corresponding definiens. B u t
no defined term s w ould occur in th e proofs of sentences
of th e fo rm a a n d N a . T h u s to p ro v e th e consistency of
o u r sy stem i t suffices to d em o n strate th a t th e defin itio n -
free sy stem of th e se n te n tia l calculus is co n sisten t. Such
a system differs fro m o u r system only in- th a t i t includes
no ru le of rep lacem en t, a n d th e ru le of s u b stitu tio n is
re stric te d to m ean in g fu l expressions th a t co n tain no d e­
fin ed term s.
T he b asic id ea of a proof of consistency of th e d efinition-
free se n te n tia l calculus consists in co n stru ctin g a ce rtain
p ro p e rty <p0 w hich satisfies th e follow ing th re e conditions:
1) p ro p e rty <pa is a n a ttrib u te of every axiom ;
2) if an expression has p ro p e rty <p0> th e n ev ery su b ­
s titu tio n of th a t expression (co n tain in g n o defined term s)
h as p ro p e rty <p0; if an y tw o expressions h av e p ro p e rty <p0,
th e n th e expression o b tain ed fro m th e m o n th e stre n g th
of th e ru le of d etac h m e n t also h as p ro p e rty <p0',
3) tw o c o n tra d ic to ry expressions, i.e ., of th e form s a
a n d JOfa, resp ectiv ely , can n o t b o th h a v e p ro p e rty <p0.
C ondition 2) can b e fo rm u lated m ore b riefly b y sta tin g
th a t p ro p e rty <p0 is hereditary w ith re sp e c t to th e ru les of
inference of th e defin itio n -free se n te n tia l calculus.
I f w e succeed in in d icatin g a p ro p e rty <p0 w hich satisfies
th e th re e co n d itio n s s ta te d above, th e n th e sy stem u n d er
in v estig atio n is, of course, n o t in co n sisten t, since ev ery p o s­
sible th esis of th e sy stem h as p ro p e rty <p0. T h e la tte r follow s
fro m co n d itio n s 1) a n d 2). E v e ry th esis of th e sy stem is
d eriv ed fro m axiom s a fte r a fin ite n u m b er of ap p licatio n s
of ru les o f inference. Since ev ery axiom h as p ro p e rty q>9
a n d p ro p e rty <p^ is h e re d ita ry w ith re sp e c t to th e ru les
o f inference, th e n th a t p ro p e rty m u st re a c h ev ery th esis.
S hould, th e n , tw o expressions of th e form s o a n d JVa,
resp ectiv ely , b e th eses of th e sy stem , th e y w ould b o th
h a v e to possess p ro p e rty <pQ) b u t th is is im possible in view
6
70 111. m e t h o d o l o g y o f t h e s e n t e n t i a l c a l c u l u s

of condition 3). T herefore th e system of th e se n te n tia l

ealcnlus ca n n o t b e in co n sisten t.
W e shall now in d ic a te a p ro p e rty <p0 w hich satisfies
th e th re e conditions in question. L et us consider th e
sym bolic equalities p e rta in in g to negation and im plication,
an d given on p p . 23-24 above. T hey will be sym bolized in
a n a b b rev iated fo rm as th e following tab le:

0 0 1 N
0 I 1 1
1* 0 1 0
T he sym bols in th e first colum n of th e ta b le are th e values
of th e arg u m en t of n eg a tio n or th e values of th e first
arg u m en t of im p licatio n ; th e values of th e second arg u m e n t
of im p licatio n a re in th e first row of th e tab le. T he fo u r
values of im p licatio n corresponding to th e respective com ­
b in atio n s of th e v alues of th e argum ents are to be found
in th e tw o low er row s of th e tw o m iddle colum ns, an d th e
values of negation, in th e la s t colum n of th e table.
I n the p ro o f o f co n sisten cy w e need n o t treat the sym bols
“ 0” a n d “ 1 ” a# falsehood a n d tru th . F o r us th e y are sym bols
w hose m eanings are red u ced to th e role assigned to th em
b y th e ta b le above.
L e t us now exam ine A xiom 1. L e t us su b stitu te fo r
th e v ariables p , q, r som e of th e sym bols “ 0 ” a n d “ 1 ” ,
so t h a t equiform sym bols are su b stitu te d fo r equiform
variables, e.g., p /1 , g/0, r/0 . The re su lt is
(70 1 0 0 COOCIO.
L e t us red u ce th e expression o b tain ed on th e stre n g th
of th e ta b le above:
OCIOOOOOOIO =*= C0C10 = 000 = 1 .
T he expression u n d e r in v estig atio n has, a fte r com plete
red u ctio n , changed in to th e sym bol “ 1” . I t can easily be
ascertain ed t h a t fo r every su b stitu tio n of th e sym bols “ 0”
 C O N SISTEN C Y O P A X IO M S. M A N Y -V A LU ED LOGIC 71

an d “ 1” for v ariab les in A xiom 1 tlie resulting expression

changes, a fte r a red u ctio n in accordance -with th e ta b le
above, in to th e sym bol “ 1 ” . The n u m b er of such su b ­
stitu tio n s will b e finite, in th e p re se n t case i t will be
23 = 8 . I n general, it can be d e m o n stra te d t h a t for an
expression containing n diversiform variables th e n u m b er
of such su b stitu tio n s will b e 2n.
T h e p ro p e rty th a t, for every su b stitu tio n of th e sym bol
“ 0 ” or “ l ” for th e variables, th is expression, after r e ­
d u ctio n in conform ity w ith th e ta b le given above, alw ays
changes in to th e sym bol “ 1 ” , is ex actly th e p ro p e rty <p0 for
w hich we are searching. T he sym bol “ 1 ” , w hich is m ark ed
w ith an asterisk above, is called th e d esignated value.
I t is now to be d em o n strated t h a t th e given p ro p e rty
93,1 satisfies th e th re e conditions in question. F irs t, p ro p e rty
<p0 m u st be th e p ro p e rty of o u r axiom s. I t h as been m e n ­
tio n ed above t h a t Axiom 1 h as p ro p e rty 9?0 • I f we in te rp re t
th e sym bols “ 0 ” a n d “ 1 ” as falsehood a n d tr u th , respec­
tiv ely , we see t h a t if a n expression has p ro p e rty q>0 th is
is eq u iv alen t to th e given expression changing in to a tru e
sentence for all th e su b stitu tio n s fo r th e variables.
I t can be verified d irec tly t h a t th e rem aining axiom s
also h av e p ro p e rty <p0. F o r A xiom 2 w e h a v e only tw o
su b stitu tio n s, p j 0 an d p ( 1 , w hich can easily b e checked:
CCiVOOO = <7(7100 = COO = 1 ,
C C N 1 11 = (7(7011 = (711 « 1 .
F o r A xiom 3 th e re are 22 = 4 su b stitu tio n s. L e t one of
th em , p j l , q/0, be checked b y w ay of exam ple:
c i c m o = (71(700 = O il = 1 .
T he checking of th e rem aining th re e su b stitu tio n s is le ft
to th e reader.
W e now consider condition 2 ): p ro p e rty <jp0 is h e re d ita ry
w ith respect to th e rules of inference of th e definition-free
sen ten tial calculus. Suppose th a t th e expression W h a s
6*
72 111. M ETHODOLOGY O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

p ro p e rty <p0 a n d tlia t th e su b stitu tio n p j a is perform ed,

w here a is a m ean ingful expression t h a t contains no
defined term s. S uppose fu rth e r t h a t th e resu ltin g ex­
pression P does n o t h a v e p ro p e rty <p0j i.e., t h a t after
a c e rta in s u b stitu tio n i t changes on red u ctio n in to th e
sym bol “ 0 ” . A fter th is su b stitu tio n th e expression a changes
o n red u ctio n in to a c e rta in sym bol. L e t us now su b stitu te
fo r p in th e expression W th e sym bol in to w hich a has
changed, a n d fo r th e rem aining variables, such sym bols
resp ectiv ely as w e h a v e su b stitu te d in th e expression P .
F o r such a s u b stitu tio n th e expression W w ould also have
to change in to th e sym bol “ 0” , w hich is im possible. H ence
expression P ca n n o t change in to “ 0” fo r a n y su b stitu tio n
w h atev er. T hus, ev ery su b stitu tio n of a n expression th a t
has p ro p e rty tpQ also possesses t h a t p ro p erty .
Suppose now t h a t c e rta in expressions of th e form
Gap an d a h av e p ro p e rty <p0. S hould expression p n o t
h av e p ro p e rty <pQ, th e n fo r a ce rtain su b stitu tio n i t w ould
change in to “ 0 ” . F o r a corresponding su b stitu tio n a w ould
change in to th e sym bol “ 1” , since i t has p ro p e rty <p9.
C onsequently, th e expression Cap w ould change in to “ 0 ”
in conform ity w ith o ur tab le (O10 = 0). T h a t, how ever,
is n o t possible, since th e expression Gap has p ro p e rty <pQ.
H ence expression p m u st h av e th a t p ro p e rty too. T he
property. is th u s 'h e re d ita ry w ith resp ect to detachm ent.
W e pass to co n d ition 3): th e expressions a an d J a
can n o t b o th h av e p ro p e rty <p0, for if, for an y su b stitu tio n ,
a changes in to “ 1 ” , th e n in conform ity w ith onr tab le
{AT = 0) th e expression N a fo r th e sam e su b stitu tio n
changes in to “ 0 ” .
W e h av e th u s d em o n strated th a t th e given p ro p e rty <p0
satisfies th e th ree conditions in question. I n view of
previous considerations i t follows th a t our system of the
sen ten tia l calculus is consistent.
20. T he second issue p erta in in g to our system of th e
sen ten tial calculus is th a t of th e independence o f the a xio m s
 C O N SIST E N C Y O F A X IO M S. M A N Y -V A LU ED LOGIC 73

w e have fo rm u la te d above. T he in te n tio n is t h a t none of

th e th re e axiom s can h e p ro v e d b y m eans of th e rem ain ­
in g axiom s a n d th e rules of inference as a d o p te d in th e
system . F o r sh o u ld a n y of th e axiom s be p ro v ab le b y
m eans of th e rem ain in g ones, i t w ould th u s becom e su p er­
fluous as a n axiom a n d could be included in th e system
as a th eo rem . Superfluous axiom s a re to be avoided.
T he axiom system s of F rege, W h iteh ead a n d B ussell,
a n d H ilb e rt, as m en tioned above, do n o t satisfy th e
re q u irem en t of independence since, as h a s been in d icated
in* th e foregoing, each of these system s contains one
d ep en d en t axiom . I t w ill b e d em o n strated t h a t m y system
of axiom s is a system of theses each of w hich is in d ep en d en t
of th e others. T he m eth o d of th e proof of independence,
w hich will b e described here, w as first published
b y P . B ernays this m eth o d was know n to m e
before.
I t follows easily from th e com m ents on th e proof of
consistency th a t to prove th e independence of th e axiom s
in o ur system i t suffices to prove th e independence of
th e axiom s of th e definition-free sen ten tial calculus. F o r if
th e re were a proof of an axiom b y m eans of th e rem aining
ones, th e n th e re w ould also be a proof of t h a t axiom
t h a t w ould n o t contain any defined term s; th u s th e axiom
in question w ould also be dependent in th e definition-
free sen ten tial calculus.
T he proof of th e independence of th e axiom s of th e
definition-free sen ten tial calculus is in som e respects sim ilar
to th e proof of consistency. F o r in stan ce, to pro v e t h a t
A xiom 1 is in d ep en d en t of Axioms 2 a n d 3, we shall
co n stru c t a certain p ro p e rty q>x t h a t satisfies th e following
th re e conditions:
1) p ro p e rty ^ is a n a ttrib u te of A xiom s 2 a n d 3;
2) p ro p e rty <px is h e re d ita ry w ith resp ect to th e rules
of inference of th e definition-free sen ten tial calculus;
3) p ro p e rty rpx is n o t a n a ttrib u te of A xiom 1.
74: H I . M ETH O D O LO G Y O P T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

I f th e re exists a p ro p e rty <px t h a t satisfies these three

conditions, th e n A xiom 1 is in d ep en d en t of A xiom s 2
an d 3. F o r b y conditions 1) an d 2) every consequence
of Axioms 2 an d 3 h as p ro p e rty <pL. H ence if Axiom 1
w ere a consequence of A xiom s 2 an d 3, i t w ould also
h av e to possess p ro p e rty y x . This, how ever, is im possible
in view of condition 3). T hus from th e existence of p ro p ­
e rty q>! follows th e independence of A xiom 1.
P ro p e rty <px is defined b y a ta b le analogous to th e
ta b le used in th e proof of consistency. T e t in th is case
th e v ariab les ta k e on th re e values: “ 0” , “ 1” , “ 2” . I f an
expression h as p ro p e rty <px , th e n fo r a n y su b stitu tio n of
th e sym bols “ 0 ” , “ 1” , “ 2” fo r th e variables i t alw ays
changes in to “ 1 ” a fte r re d u c tio n in conform ity w ith th e
ta b le given below.

0 0 12 IV
0 1 1 1 1
0 10 0
2 1 1 0 2

A p a rt from th e equalities fo r im plication an d negation

alread y know n, th is ta b le also yields o th er equalities,
e.g., 0 2 0 = 1, 0 1 2 = 0, A 2 = 2.
I n order to check condition 1) we h av e to check 3”
su b stitu tio n s for a n expression containing n diversiform
variables. H ence for A xiom 2 we h av e to check th re e
su b stitu tio n s. L e t us exam ine, b y w ay of exam ple, th e
su b stitu tio n p /2 ; i t yields:

O G N 222 = CC222 = C01 = 1 .

F o r Axiom 3 we h av e to check 32 — 9, su b stitu tio n s.

F o r in stan ce, th e s u b stitu tio n p / l , qf2 yields:

G10N12 = G1G02 = 0 1 1 = 1 .
 C O N SIST E N C Y O F A X IO M S. M A N Y -V A L U E D LO G IC 75

I t can easily b e verified, th a t for all o th er su b stitu ­

tions we also g et “ 1 ” a fte r reduction. T his verification
is le ft fo r th e read er.
L e t u s exam ine condition 2), w hich sta te s t h a t p ro p e rty
is h e re d ita ry . T h a t p ro p e rty <px is h e re d ita ry w ith
resp ect to su b stitu tio n can easily b e show n b y a reasoning
analogous to th a t used in th e proof of consistency. L e t us
now consider tw o expressions, of th e form CajH a n d a,
w hich h av e th e p ro p erty p x. Suppose t h a t for som e su b ­
s titu tio n expression § does n o t change in to “ l ” , i.e.,
changes in to “ 0 ” or “ 2 ” . F o r th e corresponding su b ­
stitu tio n , a changes in to “ 1” , for a has p ro p e rty <pt . H ence,
in view of o u r tab le (CIO = 0, <712 = 0), th e expression
Ca/? w ould change in to th e sym bol “ 0 ” . This, how ever,
is im possible since th e expression Cafi has p ro p e rty <px.
H en ce /3 m u st also h av e p ro p e rty <px. P ro p e rty <px is th u s
h e re d ita ry w ith respect to th e rules of inference of th e
definiton-free sen ten tial calculus.
F in ally , i t can easily be ascertain ed t h a t Axiom 1
does n o t h a v e p ro p e rty (px, i.e., t h a t on re d u ctio n i t does
n o t change in to th e sym bol “ 1 ” for all su b stitu tio n s.
F o r a certain su b stitu tio n Axiom 1 changes, a fte r re d u c ­
tio n , in to th e sym bol “ 0 ” . This is th e following su b sti­
tu tio n : p j 2 , g/ 0 , r / 2 , w hich yields:

<7C20<7C02<722 = C l CIO = CIO = 0 .

Since p ro p e rty <pz satisfies th e th re e conditions fo r­

m u la te d above, A x io m 1 is in d e p e n d e n t o f A x io m s 2 a n d 3.
To p ro v e th e independence of Axiom 2 w e consider
th e p ro p e rty g?2, defined b y th e ta b le below.

c 0 1 TV
0 1 1 0
1* 0 1 0
76 I I I . M ETH O D O LO G Y O P T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

A n expression lias property <p2 if, for every su b stitu tio n

of th e sym bols “ 0 ” an d “ l ” for th e variables it alw ays
changes in to th e sym bol “ 1 ” , following a re d u ctio n p e r­
form ed in- accordance w ith th e ta b le given above.
I t can easily b e seen t h a t Axiom s 1 and 3 h av e p ro p ­
e rty <p2. F o r A xiom 1 th is follows from th e fa c t th a t
th e said axiom includes im p licatio n symbols only, an d for
im plication th e ta b le gives th e sam e equalities we h a d
in th e p roof of consistency. F u rth e r, it follows from th e
ta b le above t h a t N p = 0 regardless of th e v alu e of p ;
likewise, GOq — 1, O p l = 1. H ence, for Axiom 3 we have,
regardless of th e v alu e of th e variables:
G p C N p q = CpCOq = G p l = 1 .

I t can also easily be ascertained, ju s t as i t was in

th e proof of consistency, th a t p ro p e rty <p2 is h ered ita ry
w ith resp ect to th e rules of inference. O n th e o th er h an d ,
A xiom 2 does n o t h a v e p ro p e rty <p2, for on su b stitu tin g
p j 0 we h av e
C G N 000 = 00000 = 010 = 0 .

W e have th u s dem onstrated the independence of A x io m 2

fr o m A x io m s 1 a n d 3.
To pro v e th e independence of A xiom 3 we fo rm u late
p ro p e rty 973, defined b y th e tab le below.

€ 0 1 nr
0 1 1 1
1* 0 1 1

A n expression has p ro p e rty <p2 if, for every su b stitu tio n

of th e sym bols “ 0 n a n d “ 1 ” for th e variables, i t alw ays
changes in to th e sym bol “ 1 ” following a red u ctio n in
conform ity w ith th e ta b le above. I n th e p a r t p ertain in g
to im plication, th is ta b le does n o t differ a t all from th e
 C O N SISTEN C Y O F A X IO M S. M A N Y -V A LU ED LOGIC 77

ta b le used in th e proof of consistency, a n d hence A xiom 1

h as p ro p e rty <pz . A xiom 2 also h as p ro p e rty <pz fo r v e have:

GGWOOO = CC100 = 000 = 1 ,

G G N 111 = 00111 = O il = 1 .

I t can also easily b e seen t h a t p ro p e rty <pz is h e re d ita ry

w ith re sp e ct to th e rules of inference. O n th e o th e r h an d ,
A xiom 3 does n o t h av e p ro p e rty <pZi since th e su b stitu tio n :
p j l , qjO yields
G i c m o = o i o i o = o io = o .

W e have th u s dem onstrated the independence o f A x io m 3

fr o m A x io m s 1 a n d 2.
This com pletes th e proof of independence of our
system of axiom s: n o a x io m i n o u r system o f the sen ten tia l
calculus is a consequence of the re m a in in g a xio m s.
21. T h e p ro o f of th e independence of th e axiom s of
th e sen ten tial calculus included th e use of a ta b le w ith
th re e valu es: “ 0 ” , “ l ” , “ 2” . I n proving th e independence
of th e v ario u s theses of th e sen ten tial calculus one often
h a s to u se tab les t h a t contain th re e or m ore different
valu es. A tte n tio n h a s been d raw n to th e fa c t th a t in
p ro v in g consistency a n d independence it is n o t necessary
to tr e a t th e sym bols “ 0 ” a n d “ 1 ” as stan d in g for false
a n d tru e sentences, respectively. H ow ever, one m a y w ish
to know w h eth er th e th ird sym bol used in th e proofs of
independence, can also be in te rp re te d logically, as can
th e sym bols “ 0 ” a n d “ 1 ” .
I n carry in g o u t th e proof of independence we h av e
d em o n strated th a t ev ery th esis of th e sen ten tial calculus
h a s p ro p e rty <p0l w hich w e consider to be th e charac­
teristic p ro p e rty of th e tru e sentences of th e calculus
u n d e r in v estig atio n . F o r a t th e ro o t of th e logic we use
th e re is th e assu m p tio n t h a t every sentence alw ays has
one, an d only one, of th e tw o logical values: falsehood
78 I I I . M ETHO D O LO G Y O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

a n d tru th . T his assu m p tio n is u su ally n o t fo rm u lated

explicitly, b u t is a basic assu m p tio n m ad e in logic. This
principle of tw o v alues in o u r logic corresponds to th e
p rinciple of co n trad ictio n a n d th e principle of th e ex­
cluded m iddle in te rp re te d as follows: no sentence is b o th
tru e a n d false (th e principle of co n trad ictio n ), a n d every
sentence is eith er tru e or false (th e principle of th e ex­
cluded m iddle). I t is only in t h a t sense t h a t these principles
m ay be considered basic law s of logic.
The principle of tw o values offers us a criterion for
checking m eaningful expressions of th e sen ten tial cal­
culus w ith o u t p ro v in g th em b y m eans of axiom s. F o r
in conform ity w ith t h a t principle, to check th e general
tr u th of a m eaningful expression we h av e precisely to
d eterm in e w h eth e r all th e su b stitu tio n s of t h a t expression,
in w hich th e v ariab les ad o p t one of th e tw o values, false­
hood or tru th , “ 0 ” or “ 1 ” , change in to tru e sentences.
I n o th er w ords, in order to check w h eth er a m eaningful
expression is tru e w e have to m ake sure w h eth er i t h as
p ro p e rty y0.
W e m ig h t, how ever, a d o p t a sta n d p o in t a t variance
w ith th e p rinciple of tw o values in logic. W e m ig h t assum e
t h a t a sentence, in th e logical sense of th e term , m ig h t
h a v e v alues o th e r th a n falsehood a n d tru th . A sentence,
of w hich w e do n o t know w h eth er i t is false or tru e , m ig h t
h a v e no v alu e d eterm in ed as tr u th or falsehood, b u t
m ig h t h av e som e th ird , u n d eterm in ed , value. W e m ight,
fo r in stan ce, consider th a t th e sentence “ in a y ea r from
now I shall b e in W arsaw ” is n eith er tru e n o r false a n d
h as a th ird , u n d eterm in ed , value, w hich can be sym bolized
as W e m ig h t go still fu rth e r an d ascribe to sentences
in fin itely m a n y v alues co n tain ed betw een falsehood an d
tr u th . I n t h a t case w e w ould h a v e a n analogy w ith th e
calculus of p ro b ab ility , in w hich infinitely m an y degrees
of p ro b a b ility are ascribed to events. In th is w ay we
should o b tain a bundle of m any-valued logics: a three ­
 CONSISTENCY OF AXIOMS. MANY-VALUED LOGIC 79

va lu ed logic, a fo u r-va lu ed logic, etc., a n d finally a logic

of in fin ite ly m a n y va lu e s . Sym bols o th e r th a n “ 0 ” a n d “ 1 ”
u sed in th e proofs of independence w ould th u s correspond
to th e v ario u s degrees of tr u th of sentences in logics w ith
th e corresponding n u m b ers of values. I h av e developed
th e m eth o d of p ro v in g th e independence of theses of th e
se n te n tia l calculus precisely in connection w ith th e stu d y
of m an y -v alu ed logic.
I n th ree -v alu ed logic w e w ould h av e to give a ta b le
fo r im p licatio n a n d negation, analogous to th e one we
h a v e in tw o-valued logic. T he following ta b le seems th e
m o st in tu itiv e :
0 O i l N

0 111 1
* i l l i
1* O i l 0

I n th is w ay, in th ree-v alu ed logic ev ery m eaningful ex­

pression w hich, for all th e su b stitu tio n s of th e sym bols
“ 0” , “ i ” , “ 1 ” fo r th e variables, alw ays changes in to th e
sym bol “ 1” follow ing a re d u ctio n in conform ity w ith th e
ta b le above, is tru e . I t can easily be verified t h a t in
th ree-v alu ed logic, in te rp re te d in th is w ay, o u r A xiom s 1
an d 3 are tru e . On th e o th er h an d , A xiom 2 is n o t tru e ,
fo r on su b stitu tin g : p / i , we h a v e

c c N m = c c m = C l* = * .
I t follows fro m th e ta b le above th a t every th eo rem of
th ree -v alu ed logic also is a theorem of tw o-valued logic
(b u t, of course, n o t vice versa). T h u s three-valued logic
is a 'proper p a r t of tw o-valued logic.
T h ree-v alu ed logic can b e fo rm u lated as a n axiom atic
sy stem , as w as o u r sy stem of tw o-valued sen ten tial
calculus 2. I f th a t w ere done, th e n in p ro v in g theorem s
we w ould n o t h av e to refer to th e ta b le given above.
80 I I I . M ETH O D O LO G Y O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

I n th e logic of in fin itely m a n y values i t is assnm ed

th a t sentences can ta k e on in fin itely m a n y values, re ­
p resen ted b y ra tio n a l n u m b ers x t h a t satisfy th e con­
d itio n 0 < x < 1. O bviously, no tab le can be b u ilt for
such a logic, since i t w ould h av e to consist of infinitely
m a n y row s a n d colum ns. T he properties of im plication
a n d n eg atio n in th e logic of infinitely m an y values are
defined as follows, i t being assum ed t h a t p a n d q are
ra tio n a l n um bers in th e in te rv a l [ 0 , 1 ]:
if p < q , th e n C pq = 1 ;
i t p > q , th e n Cpq = 1 — + q ;
N p — 1 —p .
T he pro p erties of im p licatio n a n d negation, as given in
th ree-v alu ed logic, follow from th ese equalities. I t can
also b e seen t h a t if th e argum ents of im plication a n d
neg atio n are n o t outside th e in te rv a l of th e ra tio n a l
nu m b ers [ 0 , 1 ], n e ith e r are th e values of im p licatio n and
neg atio n outside t h a t in terv al.
I n m an y -v alu ed logic th e following definitions are
ad opted:
A p q *= O C p q q ,
K pq = N A N p N q ,
B p q — K G pqC gp .

T hese definitions of a lte rn a tio n an d equivalence have

b een discussed above. T he definition of conjunction is
b ased on D e M organ’s laws.
T he logic of in fin itely m an y values is a proper p a rt
of tw o-valued logic; in m o st cases those theorem s of
tw o-valued logic on w hich are based certain form s of
apagogic reasoning are n o t v alid in infinite-valued logic.
T h e relatio n sh ip betw een th e m any-valued logics and
tw o -v alu ed logic resem bles th a t betw een non-E uclidean
geom etries an d E u clid ean geom etry. B o th non-E uclidean
 T H E C O M PL E T E N E SS O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULTJS 81

geom etries a n d m an y -v alu ed logics are co n sisten t system s,

alth o u g h th e y d iffer fro m E u clid ean g eo m etry a n d tw o ­
v alu ed logic re sp ectiv ely . W ith o u t p reju d ice to th e issu e
w hich logic, if an y , is tru e , we m a y p o in t o u t th a t tw o ­
v a lu e d logic h a s th e a d v a n ta g e of b ein g m uch sim pler th a n
are m an y -v alu ed logics. B u t, in a n y case, m any-valued
logics h a v e p ro v ed u sefu l b y developing th e m eth o d of
in v estig atin g independence, a m eth o d w hich I could d em ­
o n s tra te h ere only in a v ery lim ited w ay 3.

7. The Completeness o f the Sentential Calculus

22. I n th e preceding section w e discussed tw o -v alu ed

logic a n d s ta te d th a t i t is o u r in te n tio n th a t p ro p e rty <p0j
defined in th e p ro o f of co nsistency, should b e th e ch a rac­
te ristic p ro p e rty of th e se n te n tia l calculus. I n connection
w ith th e p ro o f of consisten cy i t w as also d em o n strated
th a t ev ery th esis of th e se n te n tia l calculus h as p ro p e rty <p0.
T h e issue now arises w h eth er ev ery expression th a t has
p ro p e rty <p9 is a th esis of th e se n te n tia l calculus, in o th er
w ords, 'w hether every expression w hich we h o ld to be
tru e in co n fo rm ity w ith th e p rin cip le of tw o-valuedness
of logic, is a consequence of o u r sy stem of axiom s. E or
i t m ay b e th a t o u r sy stem of axiom s is to o w eak to p ro v e
a ll th e sen ten ces h av in g p ro p e rty g?0 . T h is w ould b e tru e ,
fo r in stan ce, of a sy stem co n sistin g only of th e firs t tw o
axiom s: Axiom 3, w hile possessing p ro p e rty <p0, w ould be
n o t d ed u eib le fro m such a sy stem of axiom s.
B u t th e p ro b lem of com pleteness can b e fo rm u lated
w ith o u t an y referen ce w h atev er to p ro p e rty <p0- Suppose
th a t ev ery ex pression th a t h as p ro p e rty 9o0 is a th esis
of o u r sy stem of th e se n te n tia l calculus. L e t us consider
a n ex p ressio n w hich does n o t h a v e p ro p e rty <po, e.g ., th e
ex p ressio n C pq. O n s u b stitu tin g p j l , qjO, w e o b tain :
CIO = 0. B y ap p ly in g th e ru le of su b stitu tio n , w e can
easily o b ta in from th e expression u n d e r consid eratio n
82 I I I . M ETH O D O LO G Y O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

a n o th e r expression w hich w ould change in to “ 0 ” for all

the. possible su b stitu tio n s. I t suffices to su b stitu te p fC p p ,
q jN C p p , w hich w ill yield: C C p p N C p p . T he expression
N C G p p N C p p , h a v in g p ro p e rty <p0, is b y definition a thesis
of th e system . T h u s we see t h a t a n expression w hich does
n o t h a v e p ro p e rty <p0 o n being joined to th e system , enables
us to a rriv e a t a co n trad ictio n w ith in th e system .
B y follow ing th is exam ple we can easily d em o n strate
in general t h a t if ev ery expression h av in g p ro p e rty <pQ
is a thesis of th e system , th e n every m eaningful ex­
pression (w ith o u t defined term s) w hich is n o t a thesis
of th e system , o n being joined to th e system , enables us
to arriv e a t a co n trad ictio n . I t follows d irectly th a t th e
converse holds tru e as well: if every m eaningful expression
(w ith o u t defined term s) w hich is n o t a thesis of th e system ,
on being jo in ed to th e system , enables us to arriv e a t
a co n trad ictio n , th e n every expression w ith p ro p e rty <j30
is a thesis of th e system . F o r should an expression w ith
p ro p e rty <p„ n o t b e a thesis of th e system , th e n on being
jo ined to th e system it w ould h av e to re su lt in a con­
tra d ic tio n ; b u t we know from th e proof of consistency
th a t no expression w ith p ro p e rty <p0 can in our system
yield a co n trad ictio n .
I t follows from th e above th a t th e answ er in th e
affirm ativ e to th e question raised above is equivalent to
th e follow ing theorem : every m e a n in g fu l expression (w ithout
defined term s) either is a thesis o f our system of the senten tia l
calculus, or} w h en jo in e d to that system , enables u s to
arrive at a contradiction. If th is theorem is tru e th e n we
say t h a t our system of th e sen ten tial calculus is a complete
system .
T he first proof of th e com pleteness of th e sentential
calculus w as given b y th e A m erican logician E . P o st
in 1921. A n o th er proof of com pleteness was offered in
W arsaw b y A. T arsk i 4. T he proof of com pleteness to be
given below differs from th e tw o m entioned above.
 T H E C O M PL E T E N E SS O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 83

I n o rd er to p ro v e th e com pleteness of o u r system of

th e sen ten tial calculus it is necessary, to d em o n strate t h a t
th e re a re no m eaningful expressions (w ith o u t defined
term s) w hich are n o t consequences of th e system an d
a t th e sam e tim e do n o t lead to a co n trad ictio n on being
jo in ed to th e system . Such expressions w ill he called in d e ­
p e n d e n t exp ressio n s.
I t is assum ed t h a t sm all G reek le tte rs, w hether w ith
subscribed indices or n o t, s ta n d fo r an y m eaningful ex­
pressions of th e sen ten tial calculus w hich do n o t contain
defined sym bols. I t is also assum ed t h a t th e te rm thesis
m a y s ta n d eith er for a n y of A xiom s 1, 2 or 3, or for an y
expression w hich can b e derived from th ese axiom s b y
m eans of th e rules of su b stitu tio n a n d d etac h m e n t alone.
T he concept of equiva len t exp ressio n s , im p o rta n t for
fu rth e r analysis, is also introduced.
D ef. l a . T h e exp ressio n s a a n d fi are equivalent i f a n d
o n ly i f the im p lic a tio n s Cap a n d Cfia are theses.
b. T h e expression a is eq u iva len t to the exp ressio n s f$x
a n d /?3 i f a n d o n ly i f the im p lic a tio n s Caf$t , Cafi2 a n d
C@x Cfi2a are theses 5.
T he relatio n s th u s defined will b e n o ted sym bolically:

(a) ,
(b) &
A n u m b er of lem m as concerning th e concept of equiv­
a le n t expressions will now b e given:
L . l . T h e fo llo w in g equivalences are true (they are a c ­
com panied b y th e n um bers of theses from w hich a given
equivalence follows):

(a) C a G fiy ^ C fiC a y , (2 1 )

(b) a C N a N C pp , (3, 65)
(c) C N N ay ~ C ay , (62, 41)
84: I I I . M ETHO D O LO G Y O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

(d) C N C a P y ~ C a G N f$ y , (142, 144)

(e) G C a P y ~ C N a y , Gfiy. (37, 19, 59)
D etailed proofs of th e firs t a n d th e la s t of th ese eq u iv ­
alences w ill be g iv en here; th e proofs of th e rem aining
equivalences are analogous.
B y s u b stitu tin g p i a, qjfi, r j y in Thesis 21, an d th e n
p/j8, qja, r(y in th e sam e th esis, we s ta te th a t th e follow ing
tw o im p licatio n s:
G C aC fiyC fiG ay an d C C fiC ayC aC py
are theses;
T his, w ith D ef. l a , lead s to equivalence (a).
~Now le t th e follow ing su b stitu tio n s be m ad e in Theses
37, 19 a n d 59: p /a , g/£, rfy. T hus th e im p licatio n s
C C C a P y G N a y , G C C aPyC fiy an d O G NayG G PyG G afiy

are th eses. T his, w ith D ef. l b , lead s to equivalence (e).

L . 2 a, I f
(1 ) a ~ /3 and P~y
then
(2 ) a ~ y.

P ro o f. I t follow s from assu m p tio n s (1 ) th a t th e im plica­

tio n s
Ca p , Gfictj Gf3y and <7y/S

are th eses. W e su b s titu te in T hesis 1 : p /a , qjfi, r f y , an d

n e x t: p /y , qfft, rja . O n ap p ly in g th e ru le of d etach m en t
to th e expressions th u s o b tain ed a n d to expressions (3)
w e s ta te th a t th e im plications

Gay an d G ya

are theses. H ence, equivalence (2) is tru e.

 T H E C O M PL E T E N E SS O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 85

L . 2b. I f
(1 ) a'--'/? and P~Ynyt
th en
(2) a ~ y XTy %.
P roof. I f follows fro m assum ptions (1) t h a t th e im plica­
tio n s
(3) Cap, Cfia, CPyx, C 0y2, and Cyx Cy
are theses. I n Thesis 1 w e s u b s titu te p j a , qjft, r f y x, a n d
n e x t p j a , qjp, r j y z . O n ap p ly in g th e ru le of d e ta c h m e n t
to th e expressions th u s o b tain ed a n d to expressions (3)
we s ta te t h a t th e im plications
(4) C ayx and Cayz
are theses.
W e now s u b s titu te in Thesis 146: p j y x , qly*, r IPt s l a-
O n ap p ly in g th e ru le of d e ta c h m e n t to th e expression th u s
o b tain ed an d to expressions (3) w e s ta te t h a t th e expression
Cyx Cy a a is a thesis. T his, a n d th e fa c t t h a t expressions (4)
are theses, leads to th e e q u a lity (2 ).
L. 3. I f
(1) f i~ y
then
(2 ) CanCan^ x... Ca1P ‘-^ C a n Can_ 1... Gaxy .

P ro o f. T h e proof of th is lem m a is b y ind u ctio n .

F o r n — 1 th e equivalence (2 ) h a s th e form

(3) Caxp^Ca^y.

I t follows from assu m p tio n (1) a n d from D ef. l a

t h a t th e im plications
(4) Cfiy and Cyfl
are theses.
7
86 I I I . 3U3THODOliOCrIf O I' T U B SB K T B N T IA L CALCULUS

W e s u b s titu te in Thesis 22: q j§ 9 r { y f p j a x, a n d n e x t

qjy, r(fi, p f a x . O n ap p ly in g th e ru le of d etac h m e n t to th e
expressions th u s o b tain ed a n d to expressions (4) we s ta te
t h a t th e im p licatio n s
GGaxfiGaxy and G C a^yG a^^
a re theses. T his, a n d Def. l a , leads to equivalence (3).
T hus, for n = 1 th e lem m a is tru e .
L e t Jfc b e a n y n a tu ra l n u m b er. T he tr u th of th e follow ­
ing equivalence is assum ed:
Gak Gak_ 1...G axp ~ G a k Gak_ 1... Gaxy .
H ence th e im p licatio ns
(5) GGak Gctk_ x... G<xxfiGctk Gak_x... Gaxy ,
CGak Gak^ x.., CcqyCafc Gak_ x... C oifi
are theses. W e ag ain su b stitu te in Thesis 22: q!Gak Cak_ x„.
Gaxp, rlG<xk Cak_ 1...G a l y , p l a k+lt a n d n e x t: qjG ak , Cak_ x...
Gaxy , rlC a k Gak_ x ... Gaxfi, p j a k+x. O n ap p ly in g th e ru le of
d e ta c h m e n t to th e expressions th u s o b tain ed a n d to
expressions (5) w e s ta te t h a t th e im plications
GGak+1 Cg^ ... G a i^G a k+1 Gak ... Gaxy ,
GGak+1 Gak ...C al yG ak+x Cafc... Gax /?
are theses. H ence th e equivalence
Gak+1 Gak ... 0a* ft ~ Gak+1 Gak... 0 % y
is tru e . T h e in d u ctiv e pro o f of equivalence (2) is th u s
com pleted.
L .4 . I f the sequence i x, i„ is a n y p e r m u ta tio n o f
the n u m b e rs 1 , 2 , ..., n , th en
(1) Gai i Cai t ...G a inP ~ G a xGa2...C a n f} .
P ro o f. I n th e p ro o f of th is lem m a th e following th eo rem
fro m th e th e o ry of p e rm u ta tio n s w ill b e used:
 T H E C O M P L E T E N E SS O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 87

B y p e rfo rm in g i n the sequence 1 , 2 m u ltip le

a d ja cen t tra n sp o sitio n s w e ca n o b ta in a n y p e r m u ta tio n of
the n u m b ers o f th a t sequence 6.
L e t & b e a n a tu ra l n u m b er less th a n n . F ro m eq u iv ­
alence (a) of L em m a 1 i t follows t h a t
Gak+1 Gak <?«*+2• • • GanP ~ Gak ®ak+l < ? < * * + 2 “ * *

T h is equivalence a n d th e preceding lem m a le a d to th e

equivalence
Gax... Gak_ x Gak+1 Cak Cak+2... Can fi
~ C a x ... Gak_ 1Gak Cak+1.„ .
T his, L .2 a , an d th e co m b in ato rial th eo rem q u o ted
ab o v e easily lead to equivalence (1 ).
23. T h e follow ing lem m a is of p a rtic u la r im p o rtan ce
fo r fu rth e r analysis:
L .5 a . I f

a n d the exp ressio n 0 is n o t in d e p e n d e n t , th en exp ressio n a

is n o t in d e p e n d e n t .
b. I f
(1 ) 0 ^ 0 !, 03
a n d n eith er §x n o r 02 is in d e p e n d e n t then exp ressio n a is
n o t in d ep en d e n t.
P ro o f. O nly p a r t b of th e lem m a w ill be p ro v ed , th e
p ro o f of p a r t a being le ft to th e read er.
F ro m th e assu m p tio n t h a t expressions 0X a n d 0 2 are
n o t in d ep en d e n t i t follows t h a t eith er b o th of th e m are
th eses o r t h a t a t le a st one of th em , w h en jo in ed to th e
sy stem , leads to a co n trad ictio n .
F ro m D ef. l b a n d (1) i t follows im m ed iately t h a t
in th e fo rm e r case expression a is a th esis a n d th u s
is n o t a n in d ep en d e n t expression. I t also follows from
D ef. l b an d (1) t h a t th e joining to th e system of
7*
88 I I I . M ETH O D O LO G Y O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

exp ressio n a e n ta ils th e jo in in g to th e sy stem of b o th

expressions & a n d /?2. T h u s, if th e jo in in g of one of th ese
expressions lead s to a c o n tra d ic tio n in th e system , th e n
th e jo in in g to th e sy stem of ex pression a also en tails
a c o n tra d ic tio n in th e sy stem ; h en ce in th e la tte r of th e
tw o p ossible cases, ex p ressio n a is n o t in d ep en d en t.
E v e r y m e a n in g fu l e x p ressio n o f th e sen ten tia l calculus
h a v in g th e fo r m
I CaxCal ...C anNCpp
w ill be called a n e x p re ssio n o f fo r m I . T h e exp ressio n s
al} O a,..., an w ill be called the antecedents o f exp ressio n I .
I t follow s fro m eq u iv alen ce (b) of L em m a 1 th a t
L . 6 . E v e r y m e a n in g fu l e x p ressio n o f th e sen ten tia l calculus
is eq u iva len t to a ce rta in e x p ressio n o f fo rm I .
D ef. 2. A n e x p ressio n o f fo r m I is called sim p le i f a n d
o n ly i f each o f its antecedent is a sin g le variable or the n eg a tio n
o f a sin g le variable.
F o r in stan ce,
G pC N qN C pp, C r C s C tN C p p , G N qC qN G pp
a re sim ple expressions.
L . 7. N o sim p le exp ressio n <pis a n in d e p e n d e n t expression.
P ro o f. L e t n s consider tw o cases:
a. T h e a n te c e d e n ts of th e ex pression p include con­
tra d ic to ry expressions.
b . N o tw o an tec ed en ts of th e expression 9? a re con­
tra d ic to ry .
I t follow s easily fro m L . 4 th a t in case a th e expression q>
is e q u iv a le n t to a c e rta in su b s titu tio n of T hesis 3, th a t
is to a n ex pression w hich is n o t in d ep en d en t. I t now
follow s fro m L .5 a , th a t in th e case u n d e r co n sid eratio n
th e lem m a is tru e .
I n case b fo r ev ery n o n -n eg ated v a ria b le th a t occurs
in th e an tec ed en ts of th e ex pression q> we su b s titu te th e
 T H E C O M PL E T E N E SS O P T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 89

exp ressio n G pp, a n d fo r every n eg a te d v a ria b le w hich

occurs in th ese an teced en ts, th e expression N G pp. I t can
easily b e seen th a t snch a su b stitu tio n ca n b e m ade.
O n ap p ly in g re p eated ly th e ru le of d e ta c h m e n t to th e
ex p ressio n th u s o b tain ed a n d to T heses 16 a n d 141 w e
o b ta in one of th e follow ing th re e expressions:
N G pp, JSfG G ppG pp, N C Lf C p p N G p p .
H ence, u sin g T hesis 64, w e easily in fer th a t in case b th e
jo in in g to th e sy stem of th e expression tp re su lts in a con­
tra d ic tio n , an d so in th a t case, to o , th e expression <p is
n o t in d ep en d en t.
D ef. 3. L e t <p a n d ip be any. exp ressio n o f th e fo r m I .
T h e exp ressio n <p is sim p le r th a n the expression y> i f
a n d o n ly i f either the expression <p is w ritte n w ith few er
sym b o ls th a n the exp ressio n y or these tw o exp ressio n s are
w ritte n w ith the sa m e n u m b er o f sym b o ls a n d th e e x p ressio n <p
has a greater n u m b e r o f antecedents th a n h as th e exp ressio n tp.
T hus, fo r in sta n c e , th e expressions
G qN G p p , G qG rK G p p , G p G N q N G pp
a re resp ectiv ely sim p ler th a n th e expressions

G N JSfqN G pp, G G trG q G rN C p p , G N C pqNG pp.

Xi. 8 . A n y ex p ressio n <p o f the fo r m I w h ich is n o t a sim p le

exp ressio n is eq u iva len t to one or tw o sim p le r ex p ressio n s .
P ro o f. I t follow s easily fro m D ef. 2 a n d fro m D .4 th a t
th e expression <p is eq u iv alen t to a c e rta in expression of
fo rm I
()
1 Opy
in w hich th e an te c e d e n t y> is n e ith e r a single v aria b le n o r
th e n eg atio n of a single v a ria b le . C onsequently, th e ex p res­
sion yj m u st h a v e one of th e follow ing th re e form s:
N N a, N G aP, G ap.
90 H I . M ETHODOLOGY O P T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS

I t follow s from equivalences (c) an d (d) of L em m a 1 th a t

in th e firs t tw o cases exp ressio n (1) is eq u iv alen t to one
sim pler expression, a n d fro m equivalence (e) of th e sam e
lem m a i t follow s th a t in th e th ird case expression (I)
is e q u iv a le n t to tw o sim pler expressions. H ence th e lem m a
follow s fro m th e sta te m e n t th a t expression <p is eq u iv ­
a le n t to ex pression (1), a n d fro m L .2 a a n d L .2 b .
T h e lem m as g iv en ab o v e m ak e i t possible to p ro v e:
T heorem . T h e sy ste m o f the sen ten tia l ca lcu lu s , based
o n the aodoms
1 0 GpqG G grG pr ,
2 G G N ppp,
3 C pG N pq,

a n d in w h ich the ru les o f su b stitu tio n a n d detachm ent are

v a lid , is a com plete system .
P ro o f. I t w ill b e show n th a t ev ery m eaningful express­
ion w ritte n ex clusively w ith v ariab les a n d th e sym bols C
a n d T l e ith e r is a consequence of A xiom s 1, 2, 3, or, w hen
jo in ed to th e sy stem , re su lts in co n tra d ic to ry expressions
in th a t sy stem ; h en ce, w e sh all show th a t no m eaningful
expression is a n in d ep en d e n t expression.
S uppose th a t c o n tra ry to w h a t w e in te n d to prove,
in d ep en d e n t expressions e x ist. I f th is is so, th e n b y L .6
a n d L .5 a th e re also e x ist in d ep en d e n t expressions of th e
fo rm I . I t follow s from L .7 th a t th e y ca n n o t b e sim ple
expressions. T hus th e assu m p tio n of th e ex isten ce of
in d ep en d e n t expressions en tails th e existence of in d ep en d ­
e n t expressions of fo rm I w hich are n o t sim ple ex ­
pressions.
N o te fu rth e r th a t th e ex isten ce of in d ep en d e n t ex ­
pressions of form I . en tails th e existence of th e sim plest
of su ch expressions, i.e. such th a t none of th ese ex ­
pressions is sim pler th a n it. F o r in every n o n -em p ty set
of expressions th e re is an expression th a t is w ritte n w ith
 T H E C O M PL E T E N E SS O F T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS 91

a n u m b er of sym bols w hich is n o t g re a te r th a n an y o th e r

expression of t h a t set. A m ong th e expressions of form I
w ritte n w ith th e sam e n u m b er of sym bols th e re m u st
b e one w hich h a s a n u m b e r of an teced en ts g re ater th a n ,
o r th e sam e as, th e rem aining expressions.
T h en le t <p b e a n in d ep en d en t expression of fo rm I
w hich is n o t a sim ple expression, a n d le t no expression
sim pler th a n <p b e a n in d ep en d e n t expression. B u t b y
L .8 expression <p is eq u iv alen t to one or tw o sim pler
expressions. T his, w ith L .5 a a n d L. 5b, shows t h a t th e
expression <p is n o t in d ep en d en t. T hus th e assum ption
o r th e existence of in d ep en d en t expressions leads to
a co n trad ictio n . H ence th e theorem is tru e.
 IV . T H E SEN TEN TIA L CALCULUS
W IT H Q U A N TIFIER S

8. Quantifiers. Rules of Inference. Theses

24. T he sy stem of th e se n te n tia l calculus expounded

ab o v e co n tain s se n te n tia l v ariab les an d c o n stan t fu n cto rs.
B u t th e se n te n tia l calculus can be ex ten d ed b y th e in ­
tro d u c tio n of v a ria b le fu n cto rs a n d w h a t are called q u a n ­
tifie rs. O ne such sy stem , co n tain in g th e se n te n tia l cal­
culus, is S. Le^niew ski’s p ro to th e tic s1. To a c q u a in t th e
re a d e r w ith th e co n cep t of th e q u an tifier w e sh all o u tlin e
h ere th e se n te n tia l calculus enriched w ith q u an tifiers.
T he te rm “ q u a n tifie r55 w as u sed b y P eirce in h is p a p e r
of 1885 [26]. W e sh all firs t of a ll ex p lain th e m eaning
of th e u n iv ersal q u a n tifie r, sym bolized b y P eirce as f j .
I f <p(p) stan d s fo r a sen ten ce of th e se n te n tia l calculus,
co n tain in g th e v a ria b le p , th e n th e expression of th e form
[]p<p(p) is re a d : “ fo r ev ery p , p i p ) ” . F o r in sta n c e , th e
ex pression of th e fo rm [ J p C p q is re ad : “ fo r ev ery p ,
if p , th e n g” .
B y u sin g th e sym bols of falsehood a n d tru th , “ 0”
a n d “ 1” , w e can com prehend th e m eaning of th e u n iv ersal
q u an tifier. W e u se th e ex pression “ fo r ev e ry p , <p{p)"
to s ta te th a t th e ex pression “p i p ) ” tu rn s o u t to b e tru e
fo r a ll co n crete su b stitu tio n s fo r th e v a ria b le p . Since,
how ever, th e s e n te n tia l v a ria b le p can ta k e o n only tw o
v alu es: “ 0” o r “ 1 ” , i t suffices to d em o n strate th e sim ul­
tan eo u s tr u th of th e sentences <p{0) an d y ( l) , th a t is th e
tr u th of th e ex pression u K<p(0)<p(l)” '} th u s we h av e:
[]p<p (p ) = K<p (0) q>(1). F o r in stan ce, f j p p = -EDI = 0;
— K C 0 0 C 1 1 = -E ll == 1. T he u n iv ersal q u an tifier
 Q U A N T IF IE R S . R U L E S O F IN F E R E N C E . T H E S E S 93

is n o t a fu n c to r, as are C, A , etc. A n expression in w hich

th e q u an tifier is n o t d irectly followed b y a single variable,
b u t is follow ed b y a com pound expression, is m eaningless
fo r us. T hus, fo r in stan ce, th e expression [JJ^qG qq is
m eaningless.
I n th e m eaningful expression f j p G p q th o se variables
w hich a re equiform w ith th e v ariab le t h a t d irectly follows
th e q u an tifier, are called variables bound b y t h a t quantifier.
A v ariab le t h a t is n o t b o u n d is called p e e . I n th e m eaning­
fu l expression G fJ p G p q p n o t all th e v ariab les th a t are
equiform w ith p are b o und: th e la s t v a ria b le equif orm
w ith p is free, because i t does n o t belong to th e m eaningful
expression C pq t h a t d irectly follows th e expression f j p .
I f in a n expression containing a q u an tifier th e re is still
a free v ariab le, it can in tu r n be b o u n d b y a quantifier.
H ence th e expression fJ p G J J p G p q p is m eaningful. I n t h a t
expression th e re are fo u r b o u n d variables equiform w ith p .
B u t th e firs t a n d th e fo u rth of th ese variables are b o u n d
b y the. firs t q u an tifier, belonging to th e expression in
question, w hile th e second a n d th e th ird are b o u n d b y
th e second q u an tifier. T he expression u n d e r consideration
also includes one free variab le, q, w hich m a y be bou n d ,
yielding th e m ean in g ful expression [Jq J~ [p G flC p q p .
The m ean in g fu l expression G q fjp p contains only one
free v ariab le g, so th a t th e expression f j q G q fJ p p is m eaning­
ful. Y e t th e expression f ] p C q [ ] p p is m eaningless, fo r th e
firs t q u an tifier does n o t b in d an y o th e r v ariab le th a n th e
one t h a t follows i t d irectly. I n a m eaningful expression
every q u a n tifie r m u s t b in d a t least tw o variables. T he
expressions f j p , f ] p q , [ J p I I p P 316 no* m eaningful.
I n o rd er to decide w h eth er an expression is a m eaning­
fu l expression of th e sen ten tial calculus w ith th e universal
q u an tifier we m ay use th e following theorem : i f <p{p) is
a m e a n in g fu l exp ressio n th a t co n ta in s a t least one p e e
variable eq u ifo rm w ith p , th e n the exp ressio n o f the fo rm
f j p p i p ) w a m e a n in g fu l e x p ressio n ; in th e m eaningful
94 IV . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS W IT H Q U A N T IF IE R S

expression th u s o b tain ed th e variab les equiform w ith p

a re alread y b o u n d v ariables.
E x am p les h a v e been u se d to explain w h a t expressions
w ith th e u n iv ersal quantifier, a re m eaningful expressions.
B y using th e q u a lity : f]p< p(p) = K<p(Q)q>(l) fo rm u lated
above we can check every m eaningful expression, we
h av e seen t h a t th e expression f ] p p is false, an d th e ex­
pression f ] p G p p is tru e . W e also h ave:

G f j p p p — C K O lp — COp .

T his expression is u n iv ersally tru e, for COO = 1, C01 — 1.

T hus th e expression G f j p p p (w hich contains one free
v ariab le) is u n iv ersally tru e . O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e
m eaningful expression fJ p G p q w ith one free v ariab le q
is n o t u n iv ersally tru e , fo r on su b stitu tin g q/0 we o b tain

fJ p G p O = K C 0 0 C 1 0 = # 1 0 = 0 .

L e t us now ex am ine th e expression C p f j p p : on su b sti­

tu tin g fo r th e free v a ria b le p (0 we h av e

G O fJp p = C0 # 0 1 — COO = 1 .

O n s u b stitu tin g p j l w e h a v e

G lfjpp = G 1K 01 = CIO = 0 .

T he expression C p f j p p is rem ark ab le fo r b eh av in g like

th e fu n ctio n # w hich also gives

# 0 = 1, # 1 = 0 .

T hus th e sym bol of n eg atio n can be defined b y m eans

of im p licatio n a n d th e u n iv ersal quantifier, in th e follow­
in g w ay:
N p — C p fjp p .
 Q U A N T IF IE R S . R U L E S O F IN F E R E N C E . T H E SE S 95

T o g eth er -with th e un iv ersal q u an tifier we m a y in ­

tro d u ce th e ex isten tial q u an tifier T he expression of
th e fo rm ]?p<p(p) is read : “ for som e p , <p(p)” - T he ex­
pression “ fo r some p ,q > (p )” is used w hen w e w a n t to
m ak e su re t h a t th e expression “(pip)” proves tru e for
th e s u b stitu tio n of a ce rtain sentence fo r th e v aria b le p .
I n th a t case a t least one of th e expressions 9 (0 ),gp(l) is
tru e , so th a t, in o th er w ords, th e expression A<p(0)<p(l)
is tru e ; th is yields th e follow ing sym bolic equality:
£p< p(p) = J$?( 0 M 1 ) ,
w hich in tu r n gives
£ p p == A 01 = 1 , ^ J p C p q — A C O q C lq = A l C l q — 1
(regardless of th e v alu e of q ) .
F u rth e r, th e ap p licatio n of D e M organ’s law s gives

^ T J P P iP ) “ (0 ) 9 (1 ) = X-?^93(0)^9?(l) = £ p N * p { p ) .
T h u s we see t h a t th e expression J¥f]p<p(p) is equivalent
to th e expression ^pN < p{p)„ In fa c t, if i t is n o t tru e t h a t
fo r all th e su b stitu tio n s of concrete sentences for th e
v ariab le p , <p(p) proves tru e th e n fo r som e su b stitu tio n
fo r th e v aria b le p th e expression <p(p) proves false, w hich
m eans t h a t th e expression Ncp{p) proves tru e.
25. T h e se n te n tia l calculus w ith q uantifiers can be
fo rm u lated as a n axio m atic system . A n axiom atic system
of th e sen ten tial calculus w ith th e un iv ersal q u an tifier
will be o u tlin ed here, w ith only im plication an d th e
u n iv ersal q u an tifier being a d o p te d as p rim itiv e term s.
isTegation will be defined as m entioned above.
F iv e rules of inference w ill b e ad o p ted . T he first tw o
of th em will b e th e rules of su b stitu tio n a n d of d etach m en t.
T he la tte r is th e sam e as in th e quantifier-free sen ten tial
calculus. To th e form er, how ever, ce rtain reserv atio n s
m u st be added. In th e se n te n tia l calculus w ith a q u an tifier
96 IV - T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS W IT H Q U A N T IFIE R S

th e rule of s u b s titu tio n p erm its us to su b stitu te m eaning­

fu l expressions w ith u n iv ersal quantifiers, b u t su b stitu tio n s
m ay b e m ade for free variables only. T hus, on su b stitu tin g
p I C q r tM v e o b ta in from th e expression

G flp p p
th e expression
c r ip p G q fjq q -
L e t us exam ine th e expression G fJp G p q q w ith th e
free v ariab les q. W e n o te th a t regardless of th e value
of q we h av e: GOq ~ 1 , C lq = q , K l q = q. T hus, regardless
of th e v alu e of q we have:

C r ip C P M = C K C O qC lqq = O K lq q = Gqq .

T he expression C[~JpCpqq is th u s universally tru e . L e t us

s u b s titu te in i t qjG qp. T his will yield th e expression
G fJp G p C q p G q p w hich is n o t universally tru e , fo r on
s u b stitu tin g for th e free v ariables: pjQ , q/1 we o b tain
G f] p G p G lp C 1 0 = G K C 0G 10C 1G 11G 10
= GKCOOCUO = G K 110 = G10 = 0 .

B y su b stitu tin g qjG qp we h av e passed from th e tru e ex­

pression Gj~JpGpqq to th e false expression C fjp C p C q p C q p .
T his has b een d u e only to th e fa c t t h a t a certain free
v ariab le of th e su b s titu te d expression Oqp, nam ely th e
v ariab le equiform w ith p , has becom e a b o u n d v ariab le
a fte r th e su b stitu tio n . I n order to avoid th e possibility
of tran sitio n , on th e stre n g th of th e ru le of su b stitu tio n ,
from a tru e sentence to a false sentence, we in tro d u ce
a re stric tio n on th e ru le of su b stitu tio n , such t h a t every
v ariab le w hich is free in th e su b stitu te d expression m u st
re m a in so a fte r th e su b stitu tio n h as been m ade.
A p a rt from th e ru les of su b stitu tio n an d of d etac h m e n t
w e a d o p t tw o rules fo r h an d lin g th e universal q u an tifier.
 Q U A N T IF IE R S . R U L E S O F IN F E R E N C E . T H E S E S 97

T h e firs t of th em , called th e ru le o f jo in in g the q u a n tifie r,

m il b e referred to as ru le B J . M ule B J p e r m its n s, o n the
streng th o f a th esis o f the fo r m Gaft {p) w h ich is a n im p lic a tio n
w hose consequent co n ta in s the free variable p a n d w hose
antecedent does n o t co n ta in a n y free va ria b le eq u ifo rm w ith
p , to accept as a thesis a n e x p re ssio n o f the fo r m G a f j p f i ( p ),
i,e ., to jo in the q u a n tifie r to the consequent o f the thesis i n
q u estio n . F o r in stan ce, on th e stre n g th of th e th esis GqCpq
w e m a y accep t as a th esis th e expression G q ffp C p q .
Likew ise, on th e stre n g th of th e expression G ffp p G p q
we m a y accep t th e expression G [ ] p p f] p G p q .
B u ie B J can be ju stifie d b y m eans of th e thesis b e ­
longing to th e se n te n tia l calculus: G C p q C G p rG p K q r , w hich
h as n o t b een p ro v ed , b u t w hich ca n easily b e checked,
e.g., b y th e zero-one v erificatio n m eth o d . T h a t th esis
p erm its us, o n th e s tre n g th of sentences of th e fo rm
Gpq a n d C pr, to accep t a sentence of th e form C p K g r.
H ence, if w e h a v e a th esis of th e form Gaf3 (p ), w here a
does n o t c o n ta in a n y free v a ria b le equiform w ith p , th e n
b y su b s titu tio n we o b ta in th e th eses: Ca/3(0 ), <7a/S(l).
T hese in tu r n yield G a K p { 0 )/?(l), t h a t is G a fjp p ( p ) .
B u ie B O , th e ru le o f o m ittin g th e q u a n tifie r , w hich is
th e second ru le of h a n d lin g th e q u an tifier, is in a w ay
a converse of th e ru le B J . O n the stren g th o f a th esis o f the
fo r m C a [ fp f} ( p ) (w h ere a m a y c o n ta in a free variable
eq u ifo rm w ith p ) , ru le B O p e r m its u s to accept a s a th esis
a n e x p ressio n o f the fo r m Ca(${p). F o r in stan ce, on th e
stre n g th of th e th esis G f j p p f f p p w e m a y accep t th e
th esis G f f p p p .
B u ie B O can b e ju stifie d b y m eans of th e theses of
th e sen ten tial calculus: G G p K q rC p q a n d G G pK qrG pr,
w hich p e rm it us to recognize sentences of th e form Gpq
a n d G pr o n th e stre n g th of a sentence of th e form C p K q r ,
T h u s, a thesis of th e fo rm C a[Jp@ (p), i.e., C a K p { 0 ) fi( l)
y ield s theses of th e form Ca(${0) an d Gafi{ 1). T he lasfc
tw o sentences yield th e universally tru e sentence C a fi(p ).
98 IV . T H E S E N T E N T IA L C A L C U L U S "W ITH Q U A N T IF IE R S

T h e la s t ru le of inference in th e se n te n tia l calculus

w ith th e u n iv ersal q u a n tifie r is th e ru le of replacem ent,
w hich a d m its th e definition

(D) N p — C p[[pp .

T h e ru le o f rep la cem en t p e r m its u s to replace, i n every thesis

o f the sy ste m , the rig h t sid e o f a g iv e n d e fin itio n , or o f one
o f its p r o p e r s u b stitu tio n s , b y the le p sid e o f th a t d e fin i­
tio n , or o f its analogous su b stitu tio n .
26. A s th e sy stem of axiom s of th e se n te n tia l calculus
w ith th e u n iv ersa l q u an tifier w e a d o p t th e system of
T a rsk i a n d B e m a y s (referred to on p . 49), w ith C as
th e o nly p rim itiv e te rm . T h e second p rim itiv e te rm , [ ] ,
does n o t occur in th e axiom s. T he axiom s a re as follows:

T1 Q qG pth
T2 G G C pqpp,
T3 C G pqG G qrG pr ,

A n u m b e r of th eo rem s w ill b e deduced from th ese axiom s

b y m ean s of th e fiv e rules of inference, fo rm u lated above.
I n p a rtic u la r, w e sh all p ro v e o u r axiom system of th e
o rd in a ry s e n te n tia l calculus.
T h e follow ing th re e th eses of th e o rd in ary sen ten tial
calculus c a n b e p ro v e d b y A xiom s T l , T2, T3 (the proofs
w ill n o t b e given here):
T4 G pp,
T5 G Gp G qrG qG pr ,
T6 G C q rG C p q C p r .

W e now w rite d ow n th e p ro o f line of Thesis 7:

T2 g //7 p p * D - T 7 ,
T7 G C N ppp.
 Q U A N T IF IE R S . R U L E S O F IN F E R E N C E . T H E S E S 99

I n th e p ro o f lin e above, th e asterisk is p receded b y th e

follow ing sentence derived from T2 b y su b stitu tio n s
G G G pf[pppp.

W e use th e definition of n eg atio n to o b ta in from th is

s u b stitu tio n Thesis 7, w hich is th e second axiom of o u r
sy stem of th e o rd in ary sen ten tial calculus. W e continue:
T4 p IU p p * BO •T 8,
T8 C flp p p .

I n th e p roof given above we ob tain , th ro u g h su b stitu tio n ,

th e sentence
cIIpp U pp

from w hich, on ap p ly ing ru le R O , we o b ta in Thesis T8.

T6 q l f j p p , rjq * CT8 p j q — T 9 ,
T9 GGp [ J p p G p q .
I n th is proof th e ru le of d e ta c h m e n t h as been applied
to th e follow ing su b stitu tio n s of T6 a n d T8:

G C n P P q G C p flP P Gpq, G []ppq,

T9 * D • T 1 0 ,
T10 GNpGpq.
T5 p j N p , q j p , r jq * CT10 — T i l ,
T il GpGNpq.

Thesis T i l is th e th ird axiom of our system of th e o rd i­

n a ry se n te n tia l calculus. T hus all th ree axiom s of o u r
sy stem of th e o rd in ary se n te n tia l calculus occur as theses
in th e se n te n tia l calculus w ith th e universal quantifier.
I n th e sen ten tial calculus w ith th e universal q u an tifier
we m ay , from every thesis <p(jp), co n tain in g a t le a st one
free v ariab le p , o b tain a thesis of th e form f]p<p(p) b y
100 IV . T H E S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS W IT H Q U A N T IFIE R S

jo in in g th e u n iv ersal q u an tifier a t th e beginning. B y w ay

of exam ple, w e sh all d em o n strate th is for th e thesis G pp.
T1 q jG p p ^ p jq * CT4 — T12,
T12 G gC pp.
T12 * B J - T 1 3 ,
T13 <7g//p G p p .
Since th e an tec ed en t of Thesis T12 does n o t include any
v a ria b le equiform w ith p , ru le B J m a y b e applied.

T13 q{C pp * CT4 — T 14,

T14 n*0pp-
T hus b y m eans of th e thesis G pp w e h av e p ro v ed T14.
I f tw o diversiform free v ariab les occur in a thesis, th e y
b o th m ay be b o u n d b y un iv ersal q uantifiers stan d in g a t
th e beginning of t h a t thesis. T his w ill b e show n b y p ro v in g
T18 b y m eans of T1 as a n exam ple.

T1 qjG q C p q , p j r * C T 1 — T 15,
T15 C rC q C p q .
T 1 5 * R J -T 1 6 ,
T16 C rfJ q C q C p q .
T16 * 35J ♦T 17,
T17 G r n v fl^ G p q -
T17 r jC p p * CT4 — T 18,
T18 [ Ip I hG qC pq.
T h e p ro ced u re used in p roving T14 a n d T18 m a y also
b e u sed in th e case of expressions co n tain in g a n a rb itra ry
n u m b e r of diversiform free variables. W h en proceding in
th e reverse o rd er to t h a t observed above, w e m a y elim inate
 Q U A N T IF IE R S . R U L E S O F IN F E R E N C E . T H E S E S 101

th e u n iv ersal q u an tifiers stan d in g a t th e beginning of

a thesis. T h u s expressions of th e form s <p{p) a n d [ ] p < p (p )
are inferentiaU y eq u iv alen t w ith in o u r sy stem of th e
se n te n tia l calculus w ith th e un iv ersal q u an tifier.
T he expressions f} q C p q a n d G pJJqq, th e la tte r of w hich
is d eriv ed fro m th e fo rm er th ro u g h th e shifting of th e
q u an tifier stan d in g a t th e beginning, to th e consequent
of t h a t expression, a re n o t only inferentiaU y e q u iv alen t
b u t sim ply eq u iv alen t. T his w ill b e d em o n strated b y
p ro v in g T24 a n d T27. F o r th is p u rpose w e shall use th e
follow ing tw o theses of th e o rd in ary se n te n tia l calculus,
w hich w ill n o t be p ro v ed here:

T19 C G pC qrC N C p N q r .

T20 C C N C p N q rC p C q r .

Theses T19 a n d T20 are eq u iv alen ts of th e law s of im ­

p o rta tio n a n d ex p o rtatio n . T h eir u n d erlin ed p a rts are
conjunctions w ritte n b y m eans of im p licatio n a n d negation.

T 4 p IF I qCp z * s o *r a i ,
T21 G fJ q C p q C p q .

T 1 9 p l lJ a C p q , q jp , t f q * CT21 — T 22,
T22 G N C Yl9.G pq.N pq.

T22 * R J -T 2 3 ,
T23 G N G fJ q C p q N p f ] q q .

T h e v aria b le q occurs in th e an tec ed en t of T22, b u t it

is b o u n d , so t h a t ru le B J m a y b e applied.

T 2 0 p j f ] q C p q , q l p , r f f ] q q * CT23 — T 24,
T24 G fJ q C p q G p flq q .
8
102 IV . THJfi SJfiNTifiN TlA U C A L C U L U S W IT H Q U A N T I F I E S

T o p ro v e T27 n o reference need b e m ad e to T19 a n d T 2 0 :

T4 p [ f j q q * B O ♦T 2 5 ,
T25 O f[ q q q .
T 6 q j [ j q q t rjq * CT25 — T 26,
T26 w p flq q C p q *
T26 * B J • T 2 7 ,
T27 C G p fJ q s H iC p q .
W e confine ourselves to th ese few theses, w hich give
a v ery g eneral id ea of th e u n iv ersal q u an tifier. Q uantifiers
p la y a n im p o rta n t role in build in g ax io m atic system s, in
p a rtic u la r if th e v ariab le b o u n d b y th e q u an tifier is a nam e
v aria b le . M ath em atical th eo rem s u su ally re q u ire th e use of
q u an tifiers for th e ir sym bolic form ulation.
 V. ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC

9. Axioms. Definitions. Rules o f Inference

27. O nly se n te n tia l variab les occur in th e se n te n tia l

calculus; n e ith e r nam es n o r n am e variab les a p p e a r in it.
I n th e p re se n t c h a p te r we shall be concerned w ith a certain
th e o ry of n am e variables, w e shall p re se n t A risto tle’s
syllogistic as a n ax io m atic system . T rue, a s h as b ee n
m en tio n ed above, A risto telian logic h as little ap p licatio n
in reasonings usu ally m et, y e t th e ax io m atic system to
be p re se n ted h ere is one of th e sim plest k n o w n ax io m atic
system s of n am e variables. I t is above all in view of th e
d o m in an t role w hich used to be, an d in philosophical
logic still is, ascribed to A risto tle’s th eo ry t h a t I in te n d
to axio m atize th a t th e o ry a n d th e re b y to assign it its
p ro p e r p lace in logic, an d to show how i t o u g h t to be
ex p ounded in a precise w ay
I n o ur system th e follow ing le tte rs of th e L a tin a lp h a ­
b e t: a , b , m , will b e used as nam e variables. Two p rim ­
itiv e te rm s: XI an d I , are adopted, b o th of th e m being
sentence-form ing fu n cto rs of tw o nam e argum ents.
A n expression of th e form TJdb is re a d “ all a is &”
a n d is called a . u n iv e rsa l a ffirm a tiv e sentence . As in A ris­
to tle ’s logic, e m p ty n a m es m a y n o t be the values o f o ur
n a m e variables , i.e., such nam es as “ square circle” . I f th is
re stric tio n w ere n o t observed, we w ould h a v e to recognize
ce rtain false theses of th e th e o ry we are going to present.
A n expression of th e form la b is called a p a rtic u la r a ffir ­
m a tive sentence an d is re a d “ some a is th e re stric tio n
of th e v ariab les to n o n -em p ty nam es being v a lid in th is
case too.
8*
104 V . A R IST O T L E ’S SY LLO G ISTIC

T h e fu n cto rs TJ a n d l m a y he in te rp re te d b y circles,
as w as done in th e 1 8 th c e n tu ry b y th e G erm an m a th e ­
m a tic ia n L. E u ler. I f one circle stan d s for objects a, and
th e o th e r fo r ob jects b, th e n th e expression Uab m ay be
in te rp re te d b y th e follow ing figure:

Likewise, th e expression Jab m ay be in te rp re te d by.

th e follow ing figure:

T he p rim itiv e term s given above occur in th e following

fo u r axiom s of o u r system :
SI U aa.

S2 la a .
S3 C K U m bU am U ab.

S4 C K X fm b lm a la h .
A xiom S I is re a d “ all a is a ” , a n d A xiom S2 is re a d “ som e
a is a ” . These sentences a re tru e fo r a ll th e values of th e
v aria b le a w hich a re n o n -e m p ty nam es, e.g., “ all m en
a re m en ” , “ som e m en a re m en ” . Theses S I a n d S2 do
 A X IO M S. D E F IN IT IO N S . R E X E S O F IN F E R E N C E 105

n o t explicitly a p p e a r in A risto tle’s w orks, b u t th e y w ere

recognised b y bis disciples.
T h e n e x t tw o axiom s are A risto tle’s syllogism s, w ritte n
in th e fo rm of co n d itio n al sentences (cf. 1 .2 above).
A xiom S3 is re a d : “ I f all m is b a n d all a is m , th e n all
a is 5” . W h e n in te rp re te d b y E u le r’s circles, th is syllogism
w ould y ield:

A xiom S4 is re a d : “ I f all m is b a n d som e m is a, th e n

som e a is 6” . T he follow ing m a y serve as a n exam ple:
“ A ll P oles are m en, som e P oles a re scientists, therefore
som e scien tists a re m e n ” . T h e in te rp re ta tio n b y E u le r’s
circles w ould b e as follows:

I n o u r sy stem w e a d o p t tw o definitions, w hich define

th e fu n cto rs O a n d Y (these are sentence-form ing fu n cto rs
of tw o n am e arg u m en ts):
El Oab — N U a b .
E2 Yab = m a b .
T h e expression of th e fo rm Oab, called a p a r tic u la r n eg ative
senten ce , is re a d : “ som e a is n o t 6” ; th e expression of
th e fo rm Taft, called a u n iv e rsa l n eg a tive sentence , is re ad :
1 06 V . A K IST O T I/E ’S SY L L O G IST IC

“ no a is 6” . T hese definitions becom e in tu itiv e w h en

ap p lied to exam ples: th e sentence “ som e m e n a re n o t
P oles” m eans th e sam e as th e sentence “ i t is n o t tru e
t h a t all m en are P o les” , a n d th e sentence “ no circles
are sq u ares” m eans th e sam e as th e sentence “ i t is n o t
tru e t h a t som e circles a re squares” .
T h e ax io m atic exposition of A risto telian logic, as offered
in th is book, is b ased on th e se n te n tia l calculus as an
earlier th eo ry , a n d presupposes th e tr u th of all th e theses
belonging to t h a t calculus. T h u s A risto tle’s logic is n o t
a p rim itiv e logical th e o ry , a n d fo r its fo u n d a tio n requires
a c e rta in earlier th e o ry t h a t in v estig ates sentences in
general, w ith o u t engaging in th e stu d y of th e d etails of
th e ir stru c tu re .
I n th e sy stem h e re expounded, m eaningful expressions
are all those expressions w hich are o b ta in e d from a m e a n ­
ingful expression o f th e se n te n tia l calculus b y th e re ­
p lacem en t of all its s e n te n tia l variab les b y som e expressions
of th e form : TJab, la b , Oab, T a b .
T hree rules of inference w ill b e used. T h e ru le of su b ­
s titu tio n , k n o w n fro m th e se n te n tia l calculus, w ill h ere
be m odified so t h a t w e m ay , in th e theses of th e se n te n tia l
calculus, su b s titu te fo r se n te n tia l variab les m eaningful
expressions w hich, a p a rt fro m co n stan ts of th e se n te n tia l
calculus, co n tain term s of A risto tle’s logic. I n th e theses
of o ur system , on ly n am e variab les m a y b e su b s titu te d
fo r n am e v ariables.
T he ru le of d e ta c h m e n t rem ains as i t is in th e sen­
te n tia l calculus. F in a lly , th e ru le of rep lacem en t enables
ns to use th e definitions D 1 a n d D 2, as g iven above, b y
replacing in th e theses of o u r system th e expressions t h a t
are equiform w ith th e rig h t sides of these definitions o r
th e su b stitu tio n s of such expressions correspondingly b y
th e le ft sides of th e definitions in question.
B efore proceeding to p ro v e theses of A risto tle ’s syllo­
g istic we shall specify th o se theses of th e se n te n tia l cal-
 theses of a k x s t o t l e ’s s y l l o g is t ic 107

cuius w hich w ill h e used d irectly ; som e of th ese theses

h a v e h ee n p ro v ed w hen discussing th e se n te n tia l calculus,
w hile th e oth ers can easily b y ju stified b y m eans of th e
zero-one v erificatio n m ethod.
Thl Cpp.
Th2 G C p q G G q rC p r.
Th3 G C pqC N qN p.
Th4 G G pN qO qN p.
Th5 G G N pqG N qp.
Th6 G G K p q rC p G q r.
Th7 GG K p q rC q G p r.
Th8 G C K pqrC K pN rN q.
Th9 G G K pqrG K N rqN p.

T h lO G C K p q r C G sp G K s q r

T h ll C C K pqrG C sqG K psr.

T h l2 G G K p q rG G rsG K q p s.

10. Theses of Aristotle’s Syllogistic

28. W e now proceed to p ro v e theorem s of A risto tle’s

syllogistic. I n doing so we sh all refer exclusively to theses
of th e se n te n tia l calculus a n d th e axiom s, definitions,
a n d ru les of inference of A risto tle’s syllogistic, as given
above.
T he firs t group of th eo rem s to be d e a lt w ith are those
th eo rem s w hich a re u su ally tre a te d in a schem atic w ay
as th e square o f o p p o sitio n . T his is a sq u are a t th e vertices
of w hich are w ritte n th e fo u r fu n ctio n s of syllogistic;
U ab, la b , Y a b t Oab. T he firs t a rg u m e n t of a n y of th e
fo u r fu n c to rs of syllogistic is called su b ject , a n d th e second,
th e p red ica te. T h e fu n ctions w ritte n a t th e vertices of th e
10 8 v . a k i s t o t u e ’s s y l l o g i s t i c

sq u are of op p o sitio n h a v e eqniform su b jects an d eqniform

p red icates. T hese fu n ctions are p laced so t h a t th e universal
sentences, n am ely th e u n iv ersal affirm ativ e sentence an d
th e u n iv ersal n eg ativ e sentence, are a t th e u p p er vertices
of th e sq u are of opposition; th e p a rtic u la r sentences,
n am ely th e p a rtic u la r affirm ativ e sentence a n d th e p a rtic ­

u la r n e g a tiv e sentence, are a t th e low er vertices of th e

square. T h e affirm ativ e sentences are a t th e left vertices
of th e sq u are of opposition, a n d th e negative* sentences,
a t th e rig h t vertices.
C ertain relatio n s of im p licatio n al consequence can be
s ta te d b etw een th e fu n ctio n s of th e sq u are of opposition
or th e ir negations. W e say t h a t th e rela tio n o f contradiction
holds b etw een th e fu n ctio n s w ritte n a t th e ends of th e
sam e diagonal of th e sq u are of opposition. E v e ry fun ctio n
from th e sq u are of opposition im plies th e n eg atio n of th e
fu n c tio n w hich is its co n trad ictio n , a n d conversely, th e
n e g a tio n of an y fu n c tio n from th e sq u are of opposition
im plies th e fu n c tio n w hich is its contradiction. T he re ­
latio n s of co n tra d ic tio n b etw een th e functions of th e
sq u are of opposition will b e p ro v ed as theses fro m S5
to 812, inclusively. I n view of th e properties of im plication
i t fo llo w s fro m th ese th eses t h a t sentences of th e form Uab
a n d Oab ca n n o t b o th b e tru e o r b o th be false; likewise,
 T H E S E S O F A R IST O T L E ’S SY L L O G IST IC 109

th e sentences Y a h a n d Ja b ca n n o t b o th b e tru e or b o th
b e false.
T he rela tio n o f s u b a lte m a tio n holds b etw een a sentence
of th e fo rm l a b a n d a sen ten ce of th e fo rm Uab. T he sen­
ten ce TJab im plies th e sentence la b , b u t n o t conversely.
Likew ise, th e re la tio n of s u b a lte m a tio n holds b etw een th e
sentence Oab a n d th e sentence Y d b . T h e relatio n s of
su b a lte rn a tio n w ill b e p ro v e d as theses from S13 to S16,
inclusively.
T h e rela tio n o f co n tra riety holds b etw een u n iv ersal
sentences, i.e., sentences of th e form U ab a n d Y o b . E a c h
of th ese sentences im plies th e n e g a tio n of th e o th er, b u t
n o t conversely. T h u s c o n tra ry sentences c a n n o t b o th b e
tru e , b u t can b o th b e false. T he law s of c o n tra rie ty w ill
b e p ro v e d as th eses S17 a n d S18.
T h e rela tio n o f su b co n tra riety h olds b etw een p a rtic u la r
sentences, i.e., sentences of th e fo rm l a b a n d OaJ>. T h e
n eg a tio n of each of th ese sentences im plies th e o th e r
sentence, b u t n o t conversely. S u b c o n tra ry sentences can
th u s b o th b e tru e , b u t can n o t b o th b e false. T he law s
of su b c o n tra rie ty will b e p ro v ed as theses S19 an d S20.
W e re p e a t th e axiom s an d definitions of A risto tle’s
syllogistic a n d th e n p ass on to proofs.
SI U aa.
S2 Ia a .
S3 G K U m b U am U a b .
S4 C K U m b lm a la b .
D1 Oab — N U a b t
D2 Y a b = 2s l a b .
T h l pjJSfU ab * D 1 1 ♦S 5 ,
S5 C O abJTU ab.
T h l p fN U a b * D 1 H • S 6 .
S6 O N U abO ab.
110 V . A R IST O T L E ’S SY LLO G ISTIC

T h 4 p jO d b , q jU a b * 0S5 — S 7 ,
87 G U abN O ab.
Th5 p j U a b , qjOab * 0S6 — 8 8 ,
S8 G N O abU ab.
T ill p j N I a b * D 2 I *S 9 ,
89 C Y a b N Ia b .
T h l p j N I a b * D2 II *S10,
810 G N Ia b Y a b .
Th4 p / Y a b , q jla b * OS9 — S l l ,
S ll G la b N Y a b .
Th5 p j l a b , q jY a b * 0810 — 81 2 ,
S12 G N Y a b la b .

T h e law s of th e sq u are of opposition fo r contradictory-

sentences h av e b ee n proved.

T h7 p jJ J a b , q j l a a ,
r jla b * 084 m ja — OS2 — S13 ,
S1.3 G U a b la b .
T h3 p jJ J a b , q jla b * OS13 — 814,
S14 G N Id b N U a b .
S14 * D 2 *D 1 *S 1 5 ,
815 G YabO ab.
Th3 p j Y a b , qjOab * 0S15 — 816,
S16 G N O abN Yab.

T h e laws of su b a lte rn a tio n h av e been proved.

S14 * D 2 • S17,
817 C YabN U ab.
T h4 * p / Y a b , q jU a b * 0817 — S I 8 ,
SI 8 C U abN Yab.
 T H E S E S O P A R IS T O T L E ’S SY L L O G IST IC 111

T h e law s of c o n tra rie ty h a v e b e e n proved.

S l4 * D1 *S19,
SI 9 C N Id b O a b .
T h5 p j l a b , qjO ab * CS19 — S20,
520 G N O a b ld b .
T h e law s of s u b c o n tra rie ty h a v e b een pro v ed .
T hose theorem s of A risto tle ’s syllogistic w hich we a re
going to p ro v e now fo rm th e la w s o f conversion. T hese
law s p e rm it us to exchange in c e rta in cases th e subjects
a n d th e p re d ic ates of expressions belonging to syllogistic,
e ith e r w ith o u t or w ith a sim ultaneous change of th e fu n c to r
in qu estio n .
T h6 p jT J a a , q j l a b , r j l b a
* <7S4 m fa , b ja , afb — CS1 — S 2 1 ,
521 G la b lb a .
Thesis S21 p erm its us to co n v e rt th e p a rtic u la r affirm ativ e
sentences.
T h2 p j U a b , q fla b , r f l b a * CS13 — GS21 — S22,
522 G U a b lb a .
Thesis S22 p erm its us to co n v ert th e u n iv ersa l affirm ativ e
sentences, b u t w ith a sim ultaneous change of th e fu n c to r TJ
in to th e fu n c to r I .
T h3 p f l b a , q fla b * CS21 a (b , bja — S 2 3 ,
523 G N I d b N lb a .
S23 * D 2 -S 2 4 ,
524 G Y a b N Ib a .
S24 * D2 a lb , 6/o- S25,
525 G YabYba.
Thesis S25 p erm its us to co n v ert u n iv ersal n eg ativ e
sentences.
11 2 v. a e i s t o t l e ’s s y l l o g is t ic

29. W e now p ass to th e p ro p e r p a r t of A risto tle’s

syllogistic, n am ely to syllo g ism s. Syllogism s a re certain
m ean in g fu l expressions w hich belong to th e system u n d er
discussion a n d h a v e th e fo rm of im plications. T h e con
se q u e n t of such a n im p licatio n consists of one of th e
fo u r fu n ctio n s, U ab, l a b , Y a h , Oab , a n d its an teced en t,
of a co n ju n ctio n of two. such fu n ctio n s. A n y tw o functions
w hich occur in a g iven syllogism h a v e one, an d only one,
eq u ifo rm arg u m en t, so t h a t th ree , a n d on ly th ree , d i­
v ersifo rm v ariab les occur in a single syllogism w hich
co n tain s six v ariab les.
T h e consequent of a syllogism is called its conclusion,
a n d th e fu n ctio n s o ccurring in th e an tec ed en t are called
th e p r e m is e s of t h a t syllogism . T h a t prem ise w hich
co n tain s th e v aria b le w hich is equiform w ith th e p red icate
of th e conclusion alw ays is th e first arg u m e n t of th e
co n ju n ctio n t h a t form s th e a n te c e d e n t of th e syllogism .
O u r A xiom S3:
G K XJmb TJam Uab

m a y serve as a n ex am p le of a syllogism . T h a t v aria b le

in th e syllogism w hich h a s no equiform c o u n te rp a rt in
th e conclusion, is called th e m id d le term . T h e v aria b le
eq u ifo rm w ith th e p re d ic a te of th e conclusion is called
th e m a jo r term , a n d th e v a ria b le equiform w ith th e su b ject
of th e conclusion is called th e m in o r term . T he la s t tw o
n am es m a y b e ju stifie d only in th e case of o u r A xiom S3,
w h ere in co n fo rm ity w ith th e in te rp re ta tio n b y m ean s of
E u le r’s circles th e n a m e a is as i t w ere co n tain ed in th e
n a m e b.
T h a t p rem ise of th e syllogism w hich includes th e m a jo r
te rm is called th e m a jo r p re m ise , a n d t h a t w hich includes
th e m in o r te rm , th e m in o r p re m ise .
I n th e t e x t t h a t follows th e m id d le te rm w ill alw ays
b e eq u ifo rm w ith m , th e m in o r term , w ith a , th e m ajo r
te rm , w ith b. A ll syllogism are classed in to fo u r figures,
 T H E S E S O F A R IS T O T L E ’S SY LLO G ISTIC 113

according to w h eth e r th e m id d le te rm occurs as su b ject

or as p re d ic a te in th e prem ises. T h e firs t fig u re includes
th o se syllogism s in w hich th e m iddle te rm is th e su b ject
in th e m a jo r p rem ise, a n d th e p re d ic a te in th e m in o r
prem ise. T h e second fig u re includes th o se syllogism s in
w hich th e m id d le te rm is th e p re d ic ate in b o th prem ises.
T he th ird fig u re in clu d es th o se syllogism s in w hich th e
m id d le te rm is th e su b je c t in b o th prem ises. F in a lly , th e
fo u rth fig u re includes th o se syllogism s in w hich th e m iddle
te rm is th e p re d ic a te in th e m ajo r prem ise an d th e su b ject
in th e m in o r prem ise. T he classificatio n of th e syllogism s
in to figures is show n b y th e follow ing schem e of th e
p o sitio n of term s in th e prem ises:
I mb II bm III mb IY bm
am am ma ma
I f th e m ajo r te rm , th e m id d le a n d th e m in o r te rm
are in all syllogism s equiform w ith b, m , a, resp ectiv ely ,
th e n i t can easily b e seen th a t ev ery fig u re in clu d es 64
diversiform syllogism s. B y jo in in g to each co m b in atio n
of v aria b le s one of th e fo u r fu n c to rs w e o b ta in 42 = 16,
com binations o f prem ises, a n d to each o f th ese 16 com ­
b in atio n s we m ay jo in one of th e fo u r conclusions. I n th is
w ay we o b ta in in all 16 *42 = 256 diversiform syllogism s.
Y e t only 24 of th e m , six in each figure, a re tru e syllogism s.
T hese 24 syllogism s w ill b e th e th eses of o u r sy stem .
S ince tw o syllogism s, one belonging to F ig u re I , an d th e
o th e r belonging to F ig u re I I I , h av e b een ad o p ted as axiom s,
S3 a n d S4 resp ectiv ely , th e re a re 22 syllogism s to b e proved.
E ac h of th e 24 tru e syllogism s h as its n am e, com ing
fro m tra d itio n a l logic. F u rth e r, in tra d itio n a l logic th e
le tte rs a, i, e , o, are u sed as sym bols of fu n c to rs, in ste a d
of th e le tte rs 27, J , Y , O, resp ectiv ely , as u sed in th is book.
T h e nam es of syllogism s a re form ed so t h a t th e y co n tain
th re e vow els equiform w ith th e tra d itio n a l sym bols of
fu n cto rs as th e y occur in th e m ajo r prem ise, th e m in o r
114. T , A R IS T O T L E 'S SY LLO G ISTIC

prem ise, an d th e conclusion, in t h a t order, of th e syllogism

in question. T hus, o u r Axiom S3 is called B a rb a ra , an d
A xiom S4, D a tis i. T h e tra d itio n a l nam es will be given
in p aren th eses follow ing th e syllogism s concerned as th e y
are p ro v ed below.
W e shall firs t p ro v e th e rem aining five syllogisms
belonging to F ig u re I.
T h l l p jU 'm b , q j l m a , r j l a b , gf U am
* CS4 — CS22 b jm — S 2 6 ,
526 G K U m b U a m la b (B a r b a r i ).
T h 8 p j V m b , q j l m a , r jla b * OS4 — S 2 7 ,
527 G K U m b N Ia b N Im a .
T h l l p jX Im b , q j N I a b , r j N I m a , s jY b a
* CS27 — CS24 a jb j bja — S28,
528 G K U m b Y b a N Im a .
T h l2 p j U a m , q jY m b , r j N I a b , s jY a b
* OS28 m ja , b jm , ajb — CS10 — S 29,
529 G U Y mb U am Yab ( G elarent).
T h2 p j K Y m b U a m , q j Y a b , rjO ab
* CS29 — GS15 — S30,
530 C K Ym bU am O ab {G elaront).
T h ll p jV m b , q jlm a , r jla b , s jla m
* 0S4 — CS21 b jm — S31,
531 C K U m b la m la b (D a r ii).
T h9 p j V m b , q j l m a , r jla b * OS1 — S32,
532 G K N Ia b lm a N V m b .
S32 a jm , m ja * D 2 a jm *D1 *S 33,
533 G K Y m b la m O a b (F erio).
 THJfiSJES O l' X K IST O T IJS’S SY L L O G IST IC 115

W e sh all now p ro v e th e six syllogism s belonging to

F ig u re I I .
ThlO p j Y m b , qj V a m , r j Y a b , s j Y b m
* CS29 — CS25 a lb , b jm — S 3 4 ,
534 G K Ybm U am Yab (C esar e ).
T h2 p j K Y b m U a m , q jY d b , rjO ab
* CS34-— CS15 — S35,
535 G K Ybm U am O ah ( C esaro ).
T h l2 p j Y a m , q j V b m , r j Y b a , s jY a b
* CS34 6 /a, afb — GS25 a /6 , bfa — S30,
S3 0 O K V bm Y a m Yah ( G am estres ).
T h2 p j K U b m Y a m , q / Y a b , r/O ab
* CS36 — CS15 — S 37,
S3 7 C K O bm Y am O ab ( C a m estro p ).
ThlO p j Y m b , q j l a m , r jO a b , s lY b m
* CS33 — GS25 a jb , b jm — S38,
538 C K Y b m la m O a b (F estin o ).
Th8 p i U m b , qj U a m , r / C/a6 * CS3 — S 3 9 ,
539 GIT Gm6_2V Ga&iV G am .
S39 m /6 , 6/m * D l 6/m *D 1 - S 4 0 ,
540 C K U bm O am O ab (B a ro eo ).
W e sh all n ow p ro v e th e rem aining five syllogism s
belonging to F ig u re ±11.
T h l l p l U m b f q l l m a , r f l a b , s fU m a
* GS4 _ GS13 a f m , 6/a — S 41,
541 O K U m b U m a la b (D a r a p ti) .
116 v. a k i s t o t l e ’s s y l l o g i s t i c

T l i l l p j Y m b , q j l a m , rjO a b , s jU m a
* CS33 — OS22 a jm , bja — S42,
S42 G K Y rn b U m aO ab (F ela p to n ).

T h l 2 p j U m a , q j l m b , r j l b a , s fla b
* OS4 b ja , alb — CS21 a jb , b ja — 843,
843 C K Im b U m a la b ( B is a m is).
Th9 p jU m b , qjU am , rjUab * OS3 — S44,

544 G K K Uab V a m N U m b .
S44 ajm, mfa * D1 a /^ •D1 *S45,
545 C K O m b U m aO ab {B ocardo ).

T l i l l p f Y m b , q j l a m , rjO a b , s j l m a
* CS33 — CS21 a f m t b ja — S46,
846 C K Y m b lm a O a b (F&rison).

F in ally , we shall p ro v e all th e syllogism s belonging

to F ig u re IV .
ThlO p j l m b , qj U m a , r j l a b , s j U bm
* OS43 — CS22 a jb , b jm — S47,
547 O K U b m U m a la b (B a m a lip ).

M ill p jU b m , q fY a m , r}Y a b , s jY m a
* CS36 — 0S25 a jm , bja — 848,
548 CK U bm Ym aYab {Oalemes).

Th2 p J K U b m Y m a , q j Y a b , rjO ab
* 0848 — CS15 — S49,
849 O K U b m Y7naOab {C alem op).
 T H E S E S O F A B IS T O T L E ’S S T IX O G 1ST IC 117

ThlO p j l m b , qjX Jm a , r j l a b , s jlb m

* OS43 — CS21 a jb , b jm — S50,
550 G K Ib m X fm a la b (D im a tis).
T hlO p j Y m b , q{X fm a, rjO d b , s j Y b m
* CS42 — CS25 a jb , b jm — S51,
551 C K Y b m JJmaOab (JPesapo),
T hlO p j Y m b , q j l m a , rjO d b , s j Y b m
* CS46 — CS25 a jb , b jm — S 5 2 ,
552 G K Y b m lm a O d b (F re siso n ).
T h u s, all th e tru e syllogism s occur in o u r system .
A ll th o se syllogism s w hich are n o t specified in o u r system
as theses, a re false sentences.

9
 NOTES

P reface to the Second Edition

1 T he title p ag e of th e firs t ed itio n of th e Elements w as as follow s:

W ydaw nictw a K ola M atem atyczno-Fizycznego Stuchaezdw U ni-
w e rsy tetu W arszaw skiego. Tom X V III. D r J a n L ukasiew icz P ro feso r
U n iw ersy tetu W arszaw skiego. Elementy Logilci Matematycznej. S k ry p t
au to ry zo w an y opraeow al M. P resb u rg er. Z cz^sciow ej subw encji
S en atu Akadem iekiego UniW. W arsz* N akladem K om isji W ydaw -
niczej K ola M atem atyczno-Fizycznego Sluchaezdw U n iw ersy tetu
W arszaw skiego, 1929 [P u b licatio n s of th e A ssociation of S tu d e n ts
of M ath em atics a n d P h y sics in W arsaw U n iv ersity . V ol. X V III.
E lem en ts of M ath em atical L ogic b y D r J a n L ukasiew icz, P rofessor
a t W arsaw U n iv ersity . A u th o rized le c tu re n o tes p re p a re d b y M. P res-
b u rg er. P a rtly su b sidized b y th e S en ate of W arsaw U n iv ersity .
F in an ced b y th e P u b lish in g C om m ittee of th e A ssociation of S tu d e n ts
of M ath em atics a n d P h y sics in W arsaw U n iv ersity , 1929].

Author’s Preface to the First Edition

1 In th e first ed itio n of th e Elements th e te rm “ te o ria d ed u k cji”

(th eo ry o f ded u ctio n ) w as c o n sta n tly used in ste a d o f th e te rm
“ rach u n ek z d an ” (sen ten tial calculus). T his ch ange, w hich is in
co n fo rm ity w ith th e term inology la te r used b y L ukasiew icz, is th e
o n ly term inological a lte ra tio n m ade in th e p re se n t ed itio n of th e
Elements.
* T he n um bers of pages in The Author's Preface refer, of course,
to th e p re se n t ed itio n .
3 F o r d e ta ile d b ib lio g rap h ical d a ta concerning th ese p ap ers see
The L ist of the Works Quoted a t th e end of th is book. P o s t’s a rtic le
is th e re liste d u n d e r [1], a n d B e rn ay s’s article u n d er [27]. F u rth e r
references to The Inst of the Works Quoted w ill be given in th e
form of num b ers in sq u are b ra c k e ts.
4 T he firs t m en tio n p u b lish ed in p rin t an d referrin g to m a n y ­
v a lu e d logics is to be fo u n d in The Farewell lecture Delivered by
Professor Ja n Lukasiewicz in the Great H all of Warsaw University
on March 7, 1918 [10], T h is p ro v es th a t h is sy stem of th ree-v alu ed
logic w as co n stru cted b y L ukasiew icz as early as in 1917. T he
9*
120 N O TES

re su lts o b tain ed b y A . L in d en b au m a re given in [24]. A pro o f th a t

th ree-v alu ed logic can b e ax io m atized is offered in [34].
* Of. [7], p p , 180 f.
8 T h a t m onograph h a s, u n fo rtu n ately , never been pu b lish ed .

Chapter I

1 I n th e y ears th a t follow ed th e p u b licatio n of th e first ed ition

of th e Elements algebraic m ethods ag ain cam e to b e used in research
on logic.
3 A cam paign ag ain st psychologism in logic w as w aged b y
L ukasiew icz from th e v e ry beginning of h is a c tiv ity as a sc ien tist.
F o r d etailed arg u m en ts ag ain st psychologism see, e.g., th e lectu re
Logic and Psychology, delivered in 1908 [9].
3 I.e ., th e lectu res w hose notes becam e th e first edition of th e
Elements.
4 T he relatio n sh ip s betw een m ath em atical logic and philosophical
logic w ere o ften d e alt w ith b y L ukasiew icz in his article s from th e
period 1929-1937 [14], [19-21].
s L ukasiew icz w orked as in ten siv ely od A risto tle’s sy llogistic as
on th e se n te n tia l calculus. H e w ro te a com prehensive m onograph on
th a t su b je c t [23].
* Stoic logic w as discussed b y L ukasiew icz in g rea ter d e ta il
in [18],
7 Le^niew ski’s sy stem is described in [31].
8 T he sym bol e is th e p rim itiv e term of Le.4niewski’s ontology [31].

Chapter II

1 T h e ro le of d efin itio n s in d ed u ctiv e sy stem s is discussed b y

L ukasiew icz in g rea ter d e ta il in [13].
2 I n [29].
3 F o r m ore d etailed rem ark s see [17].
4 Cf. [5].
8 T he sim plification o f system s of axiom s given b y o th e r au th o rs
w as discussed b y L ukasiew icz in [12].
8 Cf. [5].
7 Cf. n o te 5 in th is C h apter.
3 T he axiom s of th e se n ten tia l calculus w hich h as a lte rn a tio n
an d n eg atio n as its p rim itiv e term s, a n d w hich a re given above
on p p . 55-57, h av e a sim ilar stru c tu re .
9 Cf. n o te 4 in th is C hapter.
10 T he system based on th ese axiom s is analysed in [16].
 N O TES 121

11 Cf. [25].
“ Cf. [29].
13 T hese th eses are n o t given in th e first ed itio n of th e Elements.

Chapter XU

1 Cf. [J].
* A n ax io m atic sy stem of th ree-v alu ed logic w as b u ilt b y
M. W ajsberg. Cf. [34].
3 T he issues raised here a re an aly sed b y L ukasiew icz m ore
com prehensively in [15] a n d [24].
* P o s t’s proof is given in [27], T arsk i’s p ro o f h as n o t been
p ublished.
5 I t can easily b e seen th a t eq u iv alen t expressions a re in feren tially
e q u iv alen t, b u t n o t conversely {the concept of in fere n tial equivalence
w as defined on p . 47). F o r in stan ce, th e expressions p an d q are
in feren tially e q u iv a le n t, b u t th e y are n o t eq u iv alen t.
6 Cf. [30], p p . 4 a n d 5.

Chapter IV

1 P ro to th e tic s is expounded in [8].

Chapter V

1 A risto tle’s syllogistic is ex ten siv ely d e alt w ith b y L ukasiew icz
in [22] a n d [23].
 THE LIST OF WORKS QUOTED

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d er ‘P rin cip ia M athem atics* Mathematische Zeitsehrift, X X V ,
1926.
[2] G. Boole, A n Investigation of the Laws of Thought. L ondon 1854.
[3] G. F rege, Begriffsschrift, eine. der mathematischen nachgebildete
Pormelsprache des reinen Denkens. H alle 1879.
[4] Gr. F rege, D ie Grundlagen der ArithmetiJc. B reslau 1884.
[5] D . H ilb e rt, “ D ie logiscben G rundlagen d e r M ath em atik ” .
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[6] D . H ilb e rt, W . A ekerm ann, Grundziige der theoretischen Logik.
B erlin 1928.
[7] S t. Le£niewski, “ O p o d staw acb m a tem a ty k i” [On tb e F o u n ­
dations of M athem atics]. Przeglq/d Filozojiczny, X X X , 1927.
[8] S t. Le&iiewski, “ G rundzuge eines neuen System s d e r G rundlagen
der M a th em atik ” . Fundamenta Mathematieae, X IV , 1929.
[9] J . Lukasiew icz, “ L ogika a psychologia” [Logic a n d Psychology].
Przeglqd Filozoficsny, X , 1907.
[10] J . L ukasiew icz, Tresd wykladu pozegnalnego wygloszonego w auli
TJniwersytetu Warszawskiego dnia 7 marca 1918 [ The Tend of
the Farewell lecture Delivered in the Great H all of Warsaw
University on March 7, 1918], W arszaw a 1918.
[11] J . Lukasiew icz, “ O logic© tro jw arto icio w ej” [On T hree-valued
Logic]. Buch Filozoficzny, V, 1920.
[12] J . Lukasiew icz, “ D em o n stratio n de la com patibility des axiom es
de la th^orie de la ded u ctio n ” . Annates de la Societe Polonaise de
Mathematique, 111, 1925.
[13] J . Lukasiew icz, “ S o la definicji w syBtemach dedukeyjnych”
[T he K ole of D efinitions in D eduetive System s]. Much Filozo-
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n e j” [On th e Im p o rta n ce a n d Needs of M athem atical Logie].
Pfauka Polska, X , 1929.
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S ystem en des A ussagenkalkuls” . Syr aw ozda/nia z posiedzen
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1930.
 T H E L IS T O P W O RK S Q U O TE© 123

[16] J . L ukasiew icz, “ E in V ollstandigkeitsbew eis des zw eiw ertigen

A ussagehkalkuls” . Sprawozdania z posiedzen Towarsystwa HJaulco-
wego Warszawshiego, W y&z. I l l , X X IV , 1931.
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n iaj^ cej’ ” [N otes on N ieod’s Axiom an d o n G e n era liz in g D e­
d u ctio n 1]. Ksiqga pamiqtkowa Polskiego Towarzystwa FUozofiez-
nego, 1931.
[18] J . L ukasiew icz, “ Z M storii logiki zd ari” [From th e H isto ry of
th e L ogic of P ro p o sitio n s]. Przeglqd Filozoficzny, X X X V II,
1934.
[19] J . L ukasiew icz, “ Z naczenie an alizy logicznej d la p o zn an ia”
[T he M eaning of L ogical A nalysis fo r C ognition]. Przeglqd
Filozoficzny, X X X V II, 1934.
[20] J . L ukasiew icz, “ L o g isty k a a filozofia” [L ogistic an d P hilosophy].
Przeglqd Filozoficzny , X X X IX , 1936.
[21] J . L ukasiew icz, “ W ob ro n ie lo g isty k i” [In D efence of L ogistic].
Stadia Gnesnensia, X V , 1937.
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S yllogistic]. Sprawozdania Polshiej Akadem ii Umiej&nosci,
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[23] J . L ukasiew icz, Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of
Modern Formal Logic, O xford 1951. (The second, enlarged ed itio n
of th is book ap p eared in 1957J.
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[26] S. Ch. P eirce, “ O n th e A lgebra of L ogic” . American Journal
of Mathematics, V II, 1885.
[27] E . L . P o st, “ In tro d u c tio n to a G eneral T heory of E lem en tary
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B d. 1 — 1890, B d . 2 — 1891, B d. 3 — 1895.
[29] H . M . S heffer, “ A S e t of F iv e In d ep e n d en t P o stu la te s for B oolean
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of American Mathematics, X IV , 1913.
[30] W . S ierpihski, Zasady algebry wyzszej [T he E sse n tia ls of H igher
A lgebra], W yd. 2, W arszaw a-W roclaw 1951.
[31] J . Slupecki, “ S t. L esniew ski’s C alculus o f N am es” . Studia
Logica, H I , 1955.
124 T H E L IS T O P W O B K S Q U O TED

[32] A . T arsk i, «*0 w yrazie p ierw o tn y m lo g isty k i” [O n th e P rim itiv e

T erm of L ogistic]. Przeglqd Filozofiezny, X X X I, 1923.
[33] G. V ailati, Scritti. L eipzig—F iren ze 1911.
[34] M . W ajsberg, “ A k sjo m aty zacja trojw artosciow ego rach u n k u
zd ari” [A n A sdom atization of th e T h iee-v alu ed S en ten tial
C alculus]. Spra/wozdawia z posiedzen Towarzystwa Naukowego
Warszawskiego, W y d z. I l l , X X I V , 1931.
[35] A . W h iteh ead , B . B ussell, Principia Mathematica. Second
e d itio n , C am bridge 1925.