FACTS:
prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the
Government signed a contract with CDCP to reclaim
certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay
which also included the construction of Phases I and II of 
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself  I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR
to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent
of the total reclaimed land.
Pres. Marcos created and tasked PEA to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas and to
develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands. By virtue of PD No.
No. 1085, he transferred
transferred
to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore
of the Manila Bay.
Then President Aquino issued Special Patent granting
and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed
under MCCRR Project. Subsequently, the Register of  BRING THIS SUIT;
Deeds of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of 
Titles in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the Freedom Islands.
PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI, a private
corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands through
negotiation without public bidding. The JVA also required
the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of  JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER
submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete
the configuration in the Master Development Plan. The
BOD of PEA and Pres. Ramos approved the JVA.
Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the
"grandmother of all scams. As a result joint investigation
was conducted and found out that JVA is illegal for  GROSSLY
alienating reclaimed lands which is land of public
domain.
Pres. Ramos created a task force to investigate the
legality of JVA, which tasked force upheld the legality of  First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for
JVA contrary to conclusions reached by Senate
committees. Inquirer and Today published reports that
there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and
 AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V.
Ramos.
Chavez, petitioner as a taxpayer, filed the instant
Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining  
Order contending
Order contending that:
a. government stands to lose billions of pesos in the
sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI
b. praying public disclosure of terms of any
negotiation pursuant to right of people to information
on matters of public concern.
c. assailing also the sale of PEA to AMARI of lands
of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the
sale of alienable lands of the public domain to
private corporations.
PEA and AMARI signed the Amended JVA and the
office of the Pres. approved under the administration of 
then Pres. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA petitioner now
renegotiated contract be declared null and void.
ISSUES:
IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC
BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL
FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE
GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL
FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI  TO
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION
ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL
 AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED
TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND
STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM
FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
  AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS
DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT.
HELD:
 
in the petition are moot and academic because of 
subsequent events.
 We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by
PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President
cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the
Court of its jurisdiction.
PEA and AMARI have still to implement the
  Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of 
the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds
necessarily includes preventing its implementation.
 Supervening events, whether intended or accidental,
cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if 
there is a grave violation of the Constitution.
 Even in cases where supervening events had made
the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve
the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and
the public.
 The instant petition is a case of first impression.
 There is a need to resolve immediately the  If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can
constitutional issue raised in this petition because of  demand from PEA this information at any time
the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI during the bidding process.
of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed  Information on on-going evaluation or review  of 
lands. bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or 
review committee is not immediately accessible
S econd issue: whether the petition merits dismissal  under the right to information.
for failing to observe the principle governing the
hierarchy of courts.  However, once the committee makes its official 
recommendation, there arises a "definite
 Principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to  proposition" on the part of the government.
cases involving factual questions.
 From this moment, the public's right to information
 The instant case raises constitutional issues of  attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-
transcendental importance to the public. The Court proprietary information leading to such definite
can resolve this case without determining any proposition.
factual issue related to the case.
 The right to information, however, does not extend
T hird
issue: whether the petition merits di smissal for  to matters recognized as priv ileged information.
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
 Since there is no claim by PEA that the information
 We rule that the principle of exhaustion of  demanded by petitioner is privileged information, we
administrative remedies does not apply in the instant rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to
case. information includes official information on on-going 
negotiations before a final contract.
 The principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply when the issue involved is S ixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended 
a purely legal or constitutional question. JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or 
to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
 The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity
of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of   The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore
the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of  and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
lands of the public domain to private corporations. doctrine.

Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to
bring this suit  the sea belonged to the party undertaking the
 Since the instant petition brought by a citizen
involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural
resources - matters of transcendental public
importance.
 The petitioner has the requisite locus standi .
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from
reclamation, provided the government issued the
necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the
reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 provides that
property of public dominion referred not only to property
devoted to public use, but also to property not so used
but employed to develop the national wealth.

Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going  executing provision; declare that property of public
negotiations before a final agreement.
 Section 7 Art. III and Section 28 Art. II of the
Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-
making and in the operations of the government, as
well as provide the people sufficient information to
exercise effectively other constitutional rights.
 The court distinguish between information the law on
public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and
information the constitutional right to information
requires PEA to release to the public.
 Gov¶t Auditing Code requires public bidding on
matters relating to the disposition of property of 
PEA.
 So PEA must on its own and without demand from
anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the
disposition of its property.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889, a not self-
dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the
defense of the territory, shall become a part of the
private property of the State upon declaration of the
executive and passing of a law by the legislative.
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should 
retain title to all lands reclaimed by the government .
It also vests in the government control and disposition of 
foreshore lands.
 Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the
government only if these lands were no longer 
needed for public purpose and mandated  public 
bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands.
 This act made government reclaimed lands sui 
generis in that unlike other public lands which the
government could sell to private parties; these
reclaimed lands were available only for lease to
private parties.
 This act did not repeal the provision of Spanish Law
of Waters allowing private parties to reclaim parts of  government can sell to private parties¶ government
the sea with government¶s permission and such
reclaimed lands remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 the Public Land Act authorized the
Governor-General to "classify lands of the public
domain, to "declare what lands are open t o disposition or  Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government
concession and also limited alienable or disposable
lands only to those lands which have been "officially
delimited and classified.
 This act categorically mandated that disposable
lands of the public domain classified as government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be
disposed of to private parties by lease only and  
not otherwise.
 Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands
remained sui generis, as the only alienable or 
disposable lands of the public domain that the
government could not sell to private parties.
 Under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands
to private parties, unless the legislature passed a
49
law allowing their sale.
 It did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming
parts of the sea pursuant to Spanish Law of Waters
and lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties
with government permission remained private lands.
The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and
corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain that were classified
as agricultural lands under existing public land laws.
 The prohibition on private parties from acquiring
ownership of government reclaimed and marshy
lands of the public domain was only a statutory
prohibition and the legislature could therefore
remove such prohibition.
 But the legislature did not repeal Act 2874 but
continued the long established State policy of  1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all
retaining for the government title and ownership of  natural resources except agricultural lands of the public
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the
public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine
National Assembly readopted the prohibition in 1935
Constitution of sale of government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy disposable lands of the public domain.  All  of the public domain, and   private corporations
these lands are intended for residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural purposes.
 The government could sell to private parties only
those lands for non-agricultural purposes not
classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain.
 This act states that disposable lands of the public
domain intended for residential, commercial,
industrial or other productive purposes other than
agricultural "shall be disposed of under the
 provisions of this chapter and not otherwise ."
 Since then and until now, the only way the
reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public
domain is for the legislature to pass a law
authorizing such sale.
 One reason for the congressional authority is that
units and entities from the maximum area of public
lands that could be acquired from the State.
 These government units and entities should not just
turn around and sell these lands to private parties in
violation of constitutional or statutory limitations.
In case of  sale or lease of disposable lands of the
public domain, CA No. 141 mandates the
Government to put to public auction all leases or 
sales.
 CA No. 141 did not repeal Spanish Law of Waters
provision allowing private parties to reclaim portions
of the sea with government permission. However,
this time the reclaimed is not automatically a
 private land.
 It could become private land only after being 
classified as alienable agricultural land of the
 public domain open to disposition.
The Civil Code of 1950 the government must formally
declare that the property of public dominion is no longer 
needed for public use or public service, before the same
could be classified as patrimonial property of the State.
 It also included as property of public dominion those
properties without being for public use, are intended
for public service or the "development of the
national wealth."
 Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of 
the State, even if not employed for public use or 
public service, if developed to enhance the national
wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.
domain.
 Under 1973 Constitution, private corporations could
hold alienable lands of the public domain only
through lease.
 Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands
became absolutely barred from acquiring any 
kind of alienable land of the public domain .
 The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of 
alienable lands of the public domain, while the
statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
 The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain did not apply to PEA since it was
 then, and until today, a fully owned government The Threshold Issue
corporation.
 The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private
 PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PE   A "to hold  corporation, can acquire and own under the
lands of the public domain" even "in excess of the   Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed
area permitted to private corporations by statute." foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in
T hus, PE   A can hold title to private lands, as well  view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
as title to lands of the public domain. Constitution.

 In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and  Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
submerged alienable lands of the public domain, Constitution , the foreshore and submerged areas
there must be legislative authority empowering PEA of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public
to sell these lands in view of CA 141. domain and consequently "owned by the State."

 Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell  As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not
but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and be alienated," unless they are classified as
submerged alienable lands of the public domain. "agricultural lands" of the public domain.

 Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to
PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain would be subject to the constitutional
ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain.
 Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit
private individuals.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the
1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public  
domain.
 Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution
allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of  
the public domain only through lease.
 As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general
law governing the lease to private corporations of  public or quasi-public use.
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of 
the public domain is still CA No. 141.
 The constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional
limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the
allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain.
 Without the constitutional ban, individuals who
already acquired the maximum area of alienable
lands of the public domain could easily set up
corporations to acquire more alienable public lands.
 An individual could own as many corporations as his
means would allow him.
 The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does
not convert these inalienable natural resources of 
the State into alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain.
 Likewise, the mere transfer by the National
Government of lands of the public domain to PEA
does not make the lands alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial
lands of PEA.
CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be
declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified .
There must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to disposition or 
concession and must not been reserved for some
 PD No. 1085 authorized the issuance of special land
patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the
foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay
coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of 
a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the
Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of 
the public domain.
 T he Freedom Islands are thus alienable or 
disposable lands of the public domain, open to
disposition or concession to qualified parties.

The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750  The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and
hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare submerged lands into alienable or disposable lands
reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of  open to disposition is necessary because PEA is
the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming  tasked under its charter to undertake public services
 part of Manila Bay . that require the use of lands of the public domain.

 Under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and  Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and
own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be
which will be titled in its name in line of 70-30% of  needed for public use or service since many of the
total net usable area. functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute
essential public services.
 To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to
the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture PEA's  Absent two official acts ± a classification that these
statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim lands are alienable or disposable and open to
foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay.
 disposition and a declaration that these lands are
not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by
PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain.
 PEA must observe the provisions of CA No. 141
requiring public auction, in the absence of a law
exempting PEA from holding a public auction.
 For the Special Patent issued to PEA expressly
acknowledge that the provisions of CA No. 141
apply to the disposition of reclaimed alienable lands
of the public domain unless otherwise provided by
law.
 Executive Order No. 654 which authorizes PEA "to
determine the kind and manner of payment in
contracts it entered into for reclamation does not
exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction.
 No. 1445, the Government Auditing Code required
sale of valuable government property through public
bidding.
 It is only when the public auction fails that a
negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the
Commission on Audit must approve the selling price.
 At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens
are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore
and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain. Private corporations are barred from
bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
 The failure of public bidding conducted on
December 10, 1991, by PEA involving only 407.84
hectares is not a valid justification for a negotiated
sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly
auctioned.
 Besides, the failure of public bidding happened more
than three years before the signing of the original
JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the
country had greatly improved during the intervening
period.
 The Ban on Private corporations or associations
holding alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease is clear and absolute.
 A private corporation, even one that undertakes the
physical reclamation of a government project,
cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain in view of the constitutional ban.
 Thus whatever repayment Scheme in the contract
entered by PEA if the contractor or developer is a
private corporation like AMARI can only be paid with
leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed lands to
avoid a direct collision with the Constitution.
 The issuance of special patent and certificate of title
to PEA does convert the FREEDOM ISLAND into
private land contrary to what defendants contended.
 Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership
but is merely evidence of ownership previously
conferred by any of the recognized modes of 
acquiring ownership.

Registration does not give the registrant a better 
right than what the registrant had prior to the
registration.
 The registration of lands of the public domain under 
the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public
lands into private lands.
 Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to
be registered under the Torrens System without
losing their character as public lands.
 Such registration, however, is expressly subject to
the condition in CA No. 141 that the land "shall not
be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of 
in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress."
 The need for legislative authority prevents the
registered land of the public domain from becoming
private land that can be disposed of to qualified
private parties.
 Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint
venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA
requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of 
the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land
Share in the name of AMARI.
 This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
private corporations "shall not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by l ease.
 The Court must perform its duty to defend and
uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the
 Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
S eventh issue: whether the Court is the proper 
forum to raise the issue of whether the Amended 
JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
 Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void
ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last
issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and
this last issue involves a determination of factual
matters