Dino Abazović M.A.

(Bosnia and Herzegovina)

SECULARISM AND SECULARIZATION IN THE PRESENT PUBLIC
DISCOURSE – FROM A NON-RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE

In the introduction to the collection of works entitled The Desecularization of the

World, which appeared in the Ethnic and Public Policy Center, Washington D.C., the
editor of the publication very effectively highlights what is actually happening at
this current stage of our global development. According to him, «the world
today is as furiously religious as it has always been...and in some places even
more so than ever».1 One of the reasons behind this lies in the fact that
“modernity, for entirely understandable reasons, undermines all the ancient
certainties; uncertainty is a condition that many people find very hard to bear;
therefore, any religious movement…that promises to provide or to renew
certainty has a ready market”.2
Perhaps it may seem then a little predictable, but I cannot think of a more
efficient means of starting a deliberation on the theme of secularization from a
sociological perspective or, to be more precise, from the perspective of the
sociology of religion, than with Peter Berger, whose words I have just quoted.
Moreover, this is also because of the less well known fact that Berger, after
having dedicated most of his scientific work to the development of theories on
secularization, in fact not long ago deviated publicly from the majority of his
previous opinions. Berger stated:
“I think what I and most other sociologists of religion wrote in the 1960s about
secularization was a mistake. Our underlying argument was that secularization and
modernity go hand in hand. With more modernization comes more secularization. It
wasn't a crazy theory. There was some evidence for it. But I think it's basically wrong.
Most of the world today is certainly not secular. It's very religious”.3
At that early stage of the scientific approach to the phenomenon, secularization
implied in essence a decline in the social importance of religion, particularly in
the areas of politics, education, and public life. These were the areas of life in
modern society in which religious institutions, actions, and awareness were
losing their social importance. Through this process of the separation of
religion from the other areas of public life, it had been thought that, ultimately,
the influence of religion on the everyday life of an individual would also, in
turn, decrease significantly. As has been demonstrated, this was a fundamentally
incorrect assumption.

1 BERGER, 1999, p. 2.
2 BERGER, 1992, p. 7.
3 BERGER, 1997, p. 974.
 Unfortunately I do not have time, on this occasion, to go into a more in-
depth overview of the theories of an earlier secularization debate (P.L. Berger,
D. Martin, B. Wilson), the works of post-secularists (R. Finke, R. Stark, W.
Bainbridge, W. Hadden), neosecularists (S. Bruce, D. Yamane), or of those
authors focused on the multidimensional nature of the secularization
phenomenon (K. Dobbelaere, J. Casanova, M. Chaves, P. Beyer).
Much like religion, secularization has turned out to be an extremely complex
phenomenon. It is, therefore, unlikely that we will be able to arrive at an
unequivocal answer to the questions posed. It would seem that, in this regard,
Malcolm Hamilton is right in his belief that the key question of the
secularization debate, or discussion, is in fact the defining of religion itself
(Hamilton, 2003). This process would, however, take us too far from the point
and would obscure the focus of this piece of work..
Before we proceed, it is, therefore, very important to acknowledge the
perspective offered by Talal Asad. According to him:
“the secular is neither continuous with the religion that preceded it (which means that it
is not the last stage of something originally sacral), nor is it a simple break from the
religious (therefore, it is not in opposition to the sacral, as some essence that excludes
the sacral). Secular is a concept that connects certain behaviour, knowledge, and
sensibilities in modern life”.4
To his way of thinking, it is of the utmost importance to differentiate
between the ideology of secularism and the process of secularization, in other
words between the «secular» as an epistemological category and «secularization»
as a political doctrine.5
For this reason I place emphasis on the following point. As a sociologist of
religion, I wish
“... to underline the centrality of institutional differentiation at the societal level. Data
on religion, practice, and the dedication of individuals does not [necessarily] diminish
the differentiation of religion from other institutions, such as economy, State,
education, family”.6
The most rewarding method of approaching the issue of secularization from
a sociological point of view is through a multidimensional analysis; initially on
the level of society, and the level of religious organizations and institutions, and
then on the level of the individual. Ultimately we can then arrive at a hypothesis
which is descriptive, yet in no way normative or prescriptive, nor attempting to
foresee future patterns.
Secularization, on the other hand, may and should be understood as
representing a socio-political consequence of the specific religious history7of

4 ASAD, 2003, p. 25.

5 ASAD, 2003, p. 1.
6 YAMANE, 1997, p. 117.

7 I would like to use this occasion to note, once again, that the very term was in fact

coined within the religion to which it owes its origin. “Namely, the Latin word
the area in question, in particular here looking at the case of the post-
reformation history of the Christian West. Furthermore, we can observe that an
increasing number of authors use the term «pluralizing theory» in their work,
thereby attempting to explain in greater detail the status of religion in the
modern world, and trying to avoid any confusion as regards the relationship
between the modernization process and a decline in religious intensity or
religious devotion.
As Gianni Vattimo suggests, secularization not only protects the inalienable
rights of individual awareness, it is also a way of life, incorporating the post-
modern return of religion in a most democratic fashion. This is not, therefore, a
question of secularization as a form of opposition to religion or anti-religious-
ness, but indeed secularization as a form of political dedication, which then
develops into an aspect of real life in a multi-religious world. The same ideas
are put forward by Chris Taylor, who claims that where there is insistence on
citizenship as the basic principle of identity, this then means that conflicting
perspectives are replaced by a unifying experience; that is, the differences
between various identities based on class, sex, religion, etc. are transcended by
this common citizenship. Secularization8 emerges, in this case, as being the
mediator for such a process of transcendence.
At this point I would like to make clear and emphasize the difference
between the term laïcïté and secularization.9 Laïcïté is to be understood as the
republican principle of imposing an obligation on individuals who come
forward in a public arena to leave aside religious and other social issues. It, thus,
involves the separation of religion from State, according to the principle of the
separation of the public and the private, together with the protective separation
of the public sector (in particular education, justice, security forces, health
service). Secularization, on the other hand, is a democratic principle which, to a
large extent, attempts to allow for freedom of action. The religious domain
differs from other domains, but it is also permeated by them and, as a result of
this, it becomes a private and subjective issue and may be expanded. The
mutual imbuing of the various spheres of life is accepted by secularization.
Jürgen Habermas warns us, however, that although the secular nature of the
State is an important precondition, which seeks to guarantee equal religious
freedom for all, it does not always work in a satisfactory way. Thus, we cannot
rely entirely on the mere benevolence of the authorities, who have been known
both to tolerate minorities and to discriminate against them.

saecularizatio existed in the church legal code Codex Juris Canonici and signified one’s
return to the world outside of the monastery community. In a canonic sense, the word
saecularizatio indicated the difference between the religious clergy (who withdrew from
society) and the secular clergy (who remained in society)” (JAKELIĆ, 2003, p. 62).
8 See more in ASAD, 2003.

9 When making a distinction between the two terms, I have referred mostly to Oli-

vier Abel.
“A comprehensive view of State neutrality that, at the same time, is understood to
guarantee similar freedoms for every citizen, is irreconcilable with the reductive
generalizing of a secularist viewpoint. Secularized citizens, insofar as they act in their
role as such, should neither deny to religious standpoints the possibility of truth, nor
contest the right of their believing fellow citizens to make contributions to public
discourse in religious language. A liberal political culture can even expect from its
secularized citizens that they will participate in efforts to translate relevant contributions
from religious language into publicly accessible language”.10
The examples of some Western European states bear vivid witness to the
difference between a non-Church and a secular population (Grace Davie); we
certainly could not place the sign «equals» between these two terms.
And what is the situation in the case of those societies engaged in conflict,
or in a post-conflict situation, in particular those of a multi-confessional
character, ergo Bosnia and Herzegovina? It has been illustrated that the society
and the situation that we are living in here are, in many ways, highly favorable
towards the process of intensification of religiousness. In this respect, the case
of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides us with a more than fitting example for
the verification of such claims.
During the past two decades it is evident that there has been a return to
religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or at least the return of religion into public
life; that is, its transfer from the «invisible» (private) sphere into the
observable/public sphere. Religious renewal and the revitalization of religion
can be seen here, above all, as the «desecularization» of public space and life,
and all relevant indicators point towards the significant revitalization of the
position and role of religion in Bosnian and Herzegovinian society (e.g.
increased participation in religious activities, the increased emphasis on religious
affiliation, the presence of religious communities in political and public life, as
well as in the media, the role of religious communities in the legal system, in the
education system, and so on).11
The relationship between religious communities and politics represents a
special aspect, and this is also, to a large extent, the case in this region. Some
authors from the region, such as Srñan Vrcan, emphasize precisely this nexus as
being the key social transition process. According to Vrcan (2001), here, in
contrast to other Eastern and Central European countries, religion and the
religious bear the hallmarks of a pronounced political fact in a highly expressive

10 HABERMAS, 2006, p. 32.

11 However, in the same way as the retreat of institutional religions in some states in
the so-called West is not synonymous with the retreat of religion, so the revitalization
of religion in the public sphere cannot necessarily be seen as implying an increase in
personal religiousness or the spiritualization of personal life. There has unfortunately
been too little empirical research in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be able to contribute to
a more precise presentation and understanding of the above-mentioned assertions and
processes.
way. At the same time, politics has itself been shaped as a religious fact of its
own.
To give you an illustration of this phenomenon, I would like to mention
some of the most notable examples - Firstly, the use of traditional religious
symbols in the «iconography» of political parties; in some cases it can even be
seen on the official flags, crests, or other symbols of local political parties.
Further, we can witness particular tendencies in this regard in the pre-election
gatherings, promotions, and public presentations of the majority of actors in
the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As had been the case with all
previous elections, the last pre-election race was not spared the (ab)use of
religion and religious symbols. This started with the church bells ringing during
television clips, and the explicit mention of the agreement with the Vatican in
the presidential campaign of the Croat member, and went on to include the
behavior of the main political party leaders, who acted as if each was competing
to be the highest bidder in terms of the harmonization of their programs with
the fundamental requirements of the Islamic community in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. At the pre-election gatherings of those parties which are known
in everyday language as national (or nationalistic), religious symbolism is used
by sympathizers and supporters almost as a rule, in order to confirm their
«well-foundedness» (most often flags with religious symbols or signs, specific
code of dress, the singing of religious songs, and the use of religious language).
In addition, a quasi-religious language can be seen in the statements of party
candidates, with repeated evocation of the significance and role of religious
tradition, as well as the expression of religious self-identification (on the level of
rhetoric, with phrases such as «...to me as a believer...», and on the level of
gesticulation, such as christening, the ritual breaking of Saint Sava cake, or the
praying of el-Fatiha). Indeed the same practice continues even after mandates
have been won, and this practice is also present amongst public servants and
members of the State civil service, a point which is particularly controversial.
As far as religious institutions are concerned, it should be noted that those
representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovinian religious communities who are
active on the local level, that is, those in (and under) the lowest organizational
units (Jamat (community), Roman Catholic parish, Serbian Orthodox parish) do
not always act strictly in accordance with the (official) opinions of the highest
level, and/or according to the public instructions of higher ranked religious
authorities. This makes the open affiliation of the representatives of certain
religious communities to specific political opinions and parties into a real
phenomenon. Accordingly, this also means that religious ceremonies and
buildings are sometimes used for the purpose of political agitation and the
propagating of concrete political opinions (worth particular mention in this
regard has been the behaviour of particular members of the Franciscan order in
Herzegovina, of imams in Krajina, and of rectors in Eastern Herzegovina).
 Through the examples quoted above, I have attempted to demonstrate one
of the possible sociological approaches towards dealing with the problems
(formally-legally) of secularly organized states.
On a somewhat higher level of abstraction, and in particular considering
those states which are of a transitional character and context, I maintain that
Ammy Gutman was right (something I have written about more extensively in
another piece of work12 in underlining the fact that, with or without respect for
the principles of separation of religious communities from the State, groups
founded on religious identity are indeed politically active, and that the
legitimacy of their involvement remains an issue of significant controversy.13
Gutmann starts from the idea of a system of «two-way protection». This means
that, in a democratic environment, the protection of individual religious
freedom is required, but in return for the protection of politics from the power
of organized religion. Consequently, he maintains, this two-way protection
implies two parts, which in fact make up a whole: “goals are to ensure the
enjoyment of religion for all individuals, as well as the separation of Church and
State”.14
Put simply, the principle here is that of renouncing the use of «private
truths» for the purpose of political argumentation and reasoning.

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12 ABAZOVIĆ (2006).
13 GUTMANN, 2003.
14 GUTMANN, 2003, pp. 152-3.
VRCAN, SRðAN (2001): Vjera u vrtlozima tranzicije, Split: Dalmatinska akcija, 2001.