Legal Separation\Effects of Filing Petition

De la Vina v. Villareal

July 31, 1920, Johnson, J.

Facts:

Geopano, wife, filed a complaint of divorce (Sept. 17, 1917) in RTC Iloilo against her husband de la Vina
on the ground of concubinage (which was allegedly occurring since 1913). When she learned of the illicit
relationship, she was ejected from the conjugal home. She prayed for a decree of divorce, partition of
conjugal property, and alimony pendente. After filing the complaint, she presented a motion for
preliminary injunction to restrain her husband from alienating or encumbering the conjugal property.
Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Persons Digests v1.0 Page No. 34 Respondent Judge Villareal granted the
motion. Husband filed present case of petition for certiorari on the ground that judge had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the action and exceeded his power and authority in issuing preliminary injunction.

Issue/ Held/Ratio:

(1) WON a married woman may ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband
during the existence of a subsisting marriage.

Yes. The general rule of law that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband is not an absolute
rule. The husband unlawfully ejected the wife from the conjugal home to have illicit relations with
another woman. Continued cohabitation would give the impression of the wife’s condonation. A wife
may acquire a separate residence where the husband has given cause for divorce.

(2) WON in an action for divorce, where conjugal property is concerned, a preliminary injunction may be
issued to restrain a spouse from alienating/encumbering conjugal property during the pendency of the
action.

Yes. Plaintiff contends that husband is granted power to alienate and encumber the conjugal property
without the consent of the wife. This only holds true as long as a harmonious relationship exists. When
such relation ceases, the husband’s powers of administration should be curtailed during the pendency
of action to protect the interests of the wife.
Legal Separation\Effects of Filing Petition

De La Vina v Villareal

Facts: In an action for divorce, the plaintiff wife Narcisa Geopano alleged that since the year 1913
and up to date of the complaint, the defendant husband been sustaining illicit relations with one Ana
Calog and having her as his concubine, with public scandal and in disgrace of plaintiff. Upon said
allegations she prayed for (a.) a decree of divorce, (b.) the partition of the conjugal property, and (c.)
alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400 per month. Subsequent to said complaint, plaintiff filed a
motion, alleging that since the filing of her complaint she had personal knowledge that the defendant
was trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged to their conjugal partnership and
prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant. Petitioner contends that the CFI
of Iloilo had no jurisdiction to have cognizance of the said action for divorce because the defendant
therein was a resident of Province of Negros Oriental and the plaintiff, as the wife of the defendant,
must also be considered a resident of the same province inasmuch as, under the law, the domicile of
the husband is also the domicile of the wife; that the plaintiff could not acquire a residence in Iloilo
before the marriage between her and the defendant was legally dissolved.

Issues: WON the wife may obtain a preliminary writ of injuction during the pendency of the case. Did
the judge exceed his jurisdiction?

Held: “Where the husband has given cause of divorce, the wife may acquire another and separate
domicile from that of her husband.”

“Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being of her husband, universal jurisprudence
recognizes an exception to the rule in the case where the husband’s conduct has been such as to
furnish lawful ground for a divorce, which justified her in leaving him, and, therefore, necessarily
authorizes her to live elsewhere and to acquire a separate domicile.” (Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall.
(U.S., 108)).

It is clear therefore, that a married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of
her husband, during the existence of the marriage, where the husband has given cause for legal
separation.

In an action for divorce brought by the wife against husband, in which the partition of the conjugal
property is also prayed for, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband,
prohibiting the latter from alienating or encumbering any part of conjugal property during the
pendency of the action.

It follows from all of the foregoing that the respondent, Hon. Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge
sitting in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, had jurisdiction to hear and determine
the action for divorce instituted in said court by the respondent Narcissa Geopano, and that he did not
exceed his power and authority in issuing a preliminary injunction against the defendant, prohibiting
him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the
action.
Legal Separation\Effects of Filing Petition

Reyes v Ines-Luciano

Facts: Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed in the JDRC of Quezon City a complaint against her
husband, Manuel J.C. Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the defendant
had attempted to kill the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for
her and her three children. The defendant, the petitioner herein, opposed the
application for support pendent elite for the ground that his wife had committed
adultery with her physician.

Issue:

1. WON the alleged adultery of his wife disqualifies her from alimony pendente lite.

2. WON in determining the amount of support pendent lite, it is enough that the
court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence even by afiidavits only or other
documentary evidence.

Held:

1. It is true that the adultery of the wife is defense in an action for support.
However, the alleged adultery of his wife must be established by competent
evidence. The mere allegation that wife has committed adultery will not bar her
from the right to receive support pendente lite. In the instant case, at the hearing
of the application for support pendente lite before the JDRC, petitioner did not
present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife had committed adultery
with any person.

2. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not

necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court
ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable
to it justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely
provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the
court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. It is enough that the
facts be satisfied by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record. The private respondent has submitted documents showing that the
corporations controlled by the petitioner have entered into multi-million contracts in
projects of the Ministry of Public Highways. Considering the high cost of living due
inflation and the financial ability of the petitioner as shown by the documents of
record, We find that the amount of P4, 000.00 a month granted by the respondent
Judge as alimony pendente lite to the private respondent is not excessive.
Legal Separation\Grounds\abatement of action, also abandonment

Lapuz Sy v Eufemio

Facts: Carmen Lapuz Sy and Eufemio Eufemio were married on September 21,
1934 and lived together until 1943 when Eufemio abandoned her. In 1953, she
prayed for a legal separation decree from the JDRC of Manila and that Eufemio be
deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Before the trial could be
completed, Carmen died in a vehicular accident. Eufemio moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that Carmen’s death abated the action. Counsel for the
deceased moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
The JDRC dismissed the case.

Issue: Whether the action for legal separation is abated at the death of one
spouse.

Held: Yes. An action for the legal separation is purely personal. The NCC recognizes
this in its Art. 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim
legal separation; and its Art. 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree already
rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the
action causes the death of the action itself.

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved in this action because these rights are mere effects or
incidental to a decree of legal separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. Judgment
affirmed.
Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Other Effects

Matute v Macadalo

Facts: Armando Medel filed for legal separation against Rosario Matute on the
ground of adultery with Armando’s brother, Ernesto. The court granted the decree
and also awarded their 4 children to Armando’s custody. Thereafter, Armando left
for the States and left the children with his sister, in whose house Rosario also lived
in order to be with her children. After 2 years, Armando came back home and the
children joined him. On 1955, Rosario asked permission from Armando to bring the
children to manila for her father’s funeral. Armando agreed on the condition that
she will return them after 2 weeks. But Rosario did not. Later, Rosario filed a civil
case for the custody of the children and support thereof. She claims that the
children did not want to go back to their father since they claim he was living with
another woman other than their mother. The court denied her custody and ordered
her to return the children to Armando. Rosario then instituted against Armando and
the judge the present action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction.

Issues: 1. Whether the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, 2. Whether

the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion

Held: No. 1. The court had jurisdiction over the case. Whatever mistakes the court
had committed would be merely errors of judgment, and is reviewable by appeal. 2.

No. Unless the custody has been reviewed or modified, the custody of the children
under Armando was stand. The judge was only performing his duty to implement
such award. (Note: Physical Custody – wife vs. Legal Custody – husband. This is a
procedural case; solution is not kidnapping the children but filing the proper
custody case in court.)
Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Other Effects\Use of Surname

Laperal v Republic

Facts: On March 24, 1939, Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria, thereafter
using the name Elisea L. Santamaria. In 1958, a decree of legal separation was
entered between them by CFI Baguio. Elisea Laperal ceased to live with Enrique
Santamaria since then. On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in CFI Baguio a
petition praying that she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea
Laperal.

Issue: Is Elisea allowed to use her maiden name?

Held:

1. A woman’s married status is not affected by a decree of legal separation, there

being no severance of the vinculum, and under the mandatory provisions of Art.
372 NCC, she “shall continue” using her name and surname employed before the
legal separation. There is no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the
procedure prescribed in Rule 103 RRC on change of name has been observed. But
from the petition, the only reason relied upon for change of name is the fact that
Elisea Laperal is legally separated from Enrique Santamaria and has in fact, ceased
to live with him. It is doubtful whether Rule 103 may prevail over Art. 372 with
regard to a married woman legally separated from her husband. However, even
applying Rule 103, the fact of legal separation, the only basis for petition, is not
sufficient ground to justify the change, for to hold otherwise would be to provide for
an easy circumvention of said Art. 372.

2. It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that
a petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued use of Enrique
Santamaria’s surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual
liquidation of conjugal asset. This finding is however without basis. In the first
place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was based; hence,
obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the issuance
of the decree of legal separation in 1958, he conjugal partnership between Elisea
Laperal and Enrique Santamaria had automatically been dissolved and liquidated.
Consequently, there could be no more occasions for an eventual liquidation of
conjugal assets. Order set aside; petition dismissed.
Legal Separation\Effects of Decree

Bañez v Bañez

Facts: In September 23, Aida and Gabrial Banez were awarded a decree for legal
separation because of the latter’s sexual infidelity. Also included in the decree was
the dissolution of their conjugal property, the forfeiture of the respondent’s one half
share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children, payment to
petitioner’s counsel to be taken from the petitioner’s share in the net assets and the
surrender of a vehicle and the house to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a motion to modify the decision. The decision was modified,
obliging the petitioner to pay as attorney’s fees the equivalent of 5% of the total
value of respondent’s ideal share in the net conjugal assets and ordering the
administrator to pay her counsel. She sought for moral and exemplary damages as
well as litigation expenses and an execution of motion pending appeal. Court denied
her motion for damages but gave due course to the execution pending appeal. The
respondent was ordered to leave the house and car to petitioner. The petitioner
meanwhile has been ordered to post a bond to answer for all the damages the
respondent may suffer. The order was appealed by Gabriel, and it was set aside by
the CA. Aida filed a MFR but it was denied. In the meantime, Gabriel,s notice of
appeal was elevated to the CA. Aida filed a motion to dismiss but the court denied it
sine she wasn’t able to pay the docket fee.

Issues: 1. WON the execution of judgment pending appeal is justified. 2. WON an

action for legal is one where multiple appeals is allowed

Held: 1. No. There was no superior or urgent circumstance. 2. No. Multiple appeals
are only allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with
accounting, n actions for partition of property, special civil actions of eminent
domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale for multiple appeals in one case
is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct
issue is resolved by the court and is to be held final. In this case, the 2 appeals
came from the same issue the legal separation. The effects of legal separation are
not separate matters, and they are final when the decree for it has been granted.
They are mere incidents of the decree