SPE 63112

Application of a Completion Equipment Reliability Database in Decision Making

Einar Molnes, ExproSoft and Geir-Ove Strand, SINTEF Petroleum Research

Copyright 2000, Society of Petroleum Engineers Inc.

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 2000 SPE Annual Technical Conference and potential benefits which can be drawn from such
Exhibition held in Dallas, Texas, 1–4 October 2000.
databases. Some industry cases are now established
This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE Program Committee following review of
information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents of the paper, as
which have demonstrated the cost saving potential of
presented, have not been reviewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers and are subject to such databases.
correction by the author(s). The material, as presented, does not necessarily reflect any
position of the Society of Petroleum Engineers, its officers, or members. Papers presented at
SPE meetings are subject to publication review by Editorial Committees of the Society of
Petroleum Engineers. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper
Examples of applications of reliability data are:
for commercial purposes without the written consent of the Society of Petroleum Engineers is

•
prohibited. Permission to reproduce in print is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300
words; illustrations may not be copied. The abstract must contain conspicuous Risk and reliability studies
acknowledgment of where and by whom the paper was presented. Write Librarian, SPE, P.O.
Box 833836, Richardson, TX 75083-3836, U.S.A., fax 01-972-952-9435.
• LCC/LCP analysis
• Tender evaluations and purchasing decisions
Abstract • Rig contracting strategies
A study (JIP) on reliability of well completion equipment • Incentive based contract definitions
(“Wellmaster Phase III”) was completed by SINTEF in • Downhole barrier acceptance criteria definitions
November 1999. This has resulted in a comprehensive
database on well completion equipment, with a total of Cautiously defined and consistent reliability data
8000 well-years of completion experience represented collection requirements is a prerequisite for successful
1
and more than 1000 downhole failures included, given reliability databases. The new ISO 14224 standard
as input from the 16 funding oil companies of this JIP. constitutes a valuable reference in this context.
The database represents all categories of downhole
equipment, from tubing hanger level down. The paper The Wellmaster Phase III project objective has been to
points towards the major contributors to well contribute to improvement in completion equipment
interventions and downtime, indicating industry average reliability through systematic collection, analysis and
and benchmark failure rates of the most vital completion feedback of reliability data to participating oil companies
components. A historical evolution in reliability of and equipment manufacturers.
Subsurface safety valves (SCSSV) is demonstrated, and
the industry wide effect of reliability improvements is The main deliverable from the project has been the new
shown through specific examples. In the North Sea, Wellmaster data collection software for completions with
reliability data has gained widespread acceptance for an integrated analysis tool, an updated database on
use in decision making. The paper lists several cases completion equipment and reliability statistics and a
2
where reliability data of downhole equipment has been summary report on main findings.
used with a major impact on field development and
subsequent operational expenditures. Data analysis has focused on in-service equipment
failures, defined as failures occurring from 6 days after
landing the tubing hanger on the wellhead. Failures
1. Introduction occurring prior to that are defined as installation failures,
and a fair amount of these failures have also been
Reliability data has gained widespread use in the reported. All failure reported are also listed in a web-
offshore business due to industry studies like OREDA, application where the Wellmaster JIP member
Wellmaster and others. The introduction of statutory companies have access.
codes and regulations in a number of oil producing
countries has also strongly accelerated this
development. During the last decade, offshore industry
managers have become increasingly aware of the
2 EINAR MOLNES AND GEIR-OVE STRAND
Work process description
By means of the Wellmaster software, a completion
schematic is built to represent the completion
configuration and give details on the equipment in the
well. Failure data are captured directly via this schematic
by pointing at the failed item and entering detailed data.
Failure modes unique to each item are predefined and
can be selected when entering information on new
failures. In this way, a comprehensive and consistent
database can be generated. An integrated processing
package is then used to prepare a range of different
reliability reports from the database (MTTF, failure mode
distribution, MTTW, run time distributions etc.). Upon
reporting of failure data, an e-mail connection can be
established with the manufacturer with the possibility for
the manufacturer to feed back information on the likely
cause of equipment failure.
Well and equipment performance data is normally
collected by the operating company itself, or through
assistance from a contractor. The data is then checked
for consistency and quality in accordance with the
agreed data collection requirement. Upon data quality
compliance, the data are merged into a master
database, which in turn is fed back to the contributing
member companies on CD-ROMs. A subset of the data
(equipment failure data) can be viewed by the JIP
member companies in a dedicated Internet browser,
WellWatch. The different steps of the data collection, QA
and data feedback cycle is shown in Figure 1.
Database contents
The Wellmaster database is currently the most
comprehensive completion equipment database
worldwide, with participation from 16 major oil
companies in Phase III. Key figures on the database
scope are as follows:
• More than 71000 completion string items
represented in equipment database
• A total of 1002 equipment failures included for a total
of 5 different completion equipment categories
• A total of 1613 wells with 1921 completions are
included, representing a total of some 8000
completion-years of experience
The majority of data in the Wellmaster database is from
the North Sea. Figure 2 illustrates the data distribution
by region. In Phase III, a fair amount of data from the
Gulf of Mexico has also been added, whereas earlier
project phases have included almost exclusively North
Sea data.
The database is dominated by data from oil producers,
SPE 63112
but a significant amount of data from water injectors and
gas/condensate producers are also included. A
breakdown of well type vs. well service time is shown in
Figure 3.
With respect to completion type, the data are dominated
by data from fixed offshore platforms (79.6 %), but a
considerable proportion also exists for subsea
completed wells (11.4 %). The remaining data are from
TLP wells (6.1 %) and onshore wells (2.9 %).
2. Case histories (benefits)
Heidrun TLP
The first TLP (Tension Leg Platform) on the Norwegian
continental shelf was installed in Saga Petroleum's
Snorre field. The production risers for the Snorre TLP
are fitted with passive fire protection. The decision to
use passive fire protection on the risers was based on
detailed regulations issued by the Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate (NPD) and a series of risk analyses
performed by Saga Petroleum.
In 1992, the NPD issued the new risk analysis
3
regulations . These regulations state that a risk analysis
should be performed for all major potential risks
associated with offshore field development and
operation. The results from the analysis shall be
measured against risk acceptance criteria which have to
be pre-defined by the operating oil company. If the risk
level as demonstrated by the risk analysis is below the
pre-defined acceptance criteria, the results from the risk
analysis may in some cases override the requirements
given in more detailed regulations concerning certain
safety systems.
The Heidrun platform is the 2nd TLP installation on the
Norwegian Continental shelf. For this development,
several risk analyses were performed which addressed
the need for passive fire protection of the risers.
SINTEF was requested to do a 3rd party verification of
these studies, in order to produce input to the final
decision concerning the issue of fire protection of the
Heidrun risers.
The decision point in these risk analyses was the
blowout escalation risk, i.e the risk that a blowout on one
of the oil production wells would escalate to additional
wells - thus jeopardizing the entire Heidrun TLP. The
blowout escalation risk is directly related to the rate of
critical failures of the downhole safety valve
(DHSV/SCSSV).
In the 3rd party verification study, a review and update of
the studies with the latest reliability data for SCSSVs
SPE 63112 APPLICATION OF A COMPLETION EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY DATABASE IN DECISION MAKING
was performed. This clearly indicated that the blowout
escalation risk for the Heidrun TLP was within the pre-
defined acceptable level. This led to an approval from
the NPD to develop the Heidrun field without passive fire
protection of the TLP production risers.
This led to a cost saving of minimum NOK 750 million
(ca USD 120 million) for the Heidrun TLP when
compared to the Snorre TLP. Without the availability of
updated and recognized, independent SCSSV reliability
data this cost saving would not have been achieved.
Alternative SCSSV leakage acceptance criteria
4
A paper presented earlier this year summarized the
findings from a study which has looked at alternative
leakage acceptance criteria for SCSSVs. The basis for
the widely used API RP 14B was reviewed and
compared with an alternative method to define
acceptance criteria (leak rate levels). This alternative
method utilizes principles from risk and reliability
analysis to suggest a systems oriented approach for
primary and secondary barriers (the x-mas tree master
valve and the SCSSV) in combination - rather than
looking at these items on an isolated basis.
Rather than applying the API RP 14B criteria for all well
types, the paper suggests the use of a matrix with
recommendations on well type specific risk levels and
corresponding acceptance criteria. Compared to today’s
practice, this implies a certain relaxation of acceptance
criteria without compromising the overall safety level.
This is achieved through increasing the test frequency
whenever a situation arises in which one of the main
barriers (PMV/SCSSV) has failed according to the
existing API RP 14 B criteria.
The direct implication of this is that considerable cost
savings can be achieved during the wells lifetime. The
cost saving potential is greatest for subsea producers,
due to the high cost of interventions.
The results from the work described in this paper are
now carried forward and implemented into a new
NORSOK standard for risk based acceptance criteria for
SCSSVs. This standard will be applicable for the
Norwegian Continental Shelf, but can also be applied
internationally. The standard is expected to be ready by
the end of 2000.
SCSSV removal from subsea completions?
A hot issue over the last 1-2 years involving extensive
use of completion and subsea equipment reliability data
in risk analysis is the issue of SCSSV removal from
subsea completions. Studies have been performed on
this issue in Brazil, Gulf of Mexico (through) and in the
3
U.K., with a study underway in Australia as this paper is
written. In the authors’ opininon, there is no general
answer to this question. This issue has to be addressed
on the basis of local/regional regulations concerning
requirements on external protection of subsea wellheads
and x-mas trees and the risk picture (dropped object
risk, trawlboard impact risk and other potential external
damage factors).
Studies have also been performed where non-
conventional completion configurations have been
studied, typically on removal of annulus safety systems
from gas lifted wells.
2. Results
The Wellmaster Phase III project extended previous
historical data provided by SINTEF. The Ekofisk Bravo
blowout in Norway in April 1977 paved the way for a
collective effort on improvement of safety levels for
Norwegian offshore installations and was the basis for
SINTEFs initial reliability study on SCSSVs which was
published in 1983. Since then, an unbroken chain of
historical data on performance of both SCSSVs and
other completion equipment data has followed.
Figure 4 illustrates the historical evolution in SCSSV
reliability. A significant improvement in SCSSV
performance has resulted, from an initial Mean Time to
Failure (MTTF) of 14.2 years (1983) to the most recent
result of 36.7 years (1999). This represents a
tremendous boost in well production availability and
availability of the SCSSV as a safety barrier. Morever,
downhole reliability data has become an important
instrument in communication with interpretation of
auhorities’ rules and regulations in many offshore
regions around the world. The challenge for many
operators is the time lag from demonstration of
performance improvement to revisions of governmental
regulations.
A distinct trend in well completions is the increased
preference towards the use of single rod piston, flapper
type tubing retrievable safety valves without equalizing
feature. This trend towards design “standardization” is
paying off when looking at this purely from a SCSSV
reliability and well intervention standpoint. However, as a
result of the reduction in piston area, the control
pressure needs to be increased. This has some negative
effects for subsea completions, with high control
umbilical pressures, increased probability of hydraulic
leaks in control pods, subsea hydraulic connections and
other.
High completion equipment reliability is particularly
important for subsea completed wells, particularly in
4 EINAR MOLNES AND GEIR-OVE STRAND SPE 63112

deep waters. This is illustrated by some examples from throughout the organizations and more frequent
the North Sea, which were reported in the Wellmaster updating of the historical data now high on the agenda of
Phase III project: the participating oil companies.

Well A experienced a failure (leakage in closed position) Collection, analysis and feedback of reliability data is an
of the TR-SCSSV in June 1995. Upon failure diagnosis effective means of communicating performance of
of the well, a tubing to annulus communication due to a equipment and operations across organizations
leaking GLV was noted. The well was shut down and a boundaries. The fact that reliability data is now being
subsea workover followed. Due to problems with rig utilized for definition of new standards and governmental
availability and production allocation restraints, the well regulations, is another indication of the need for
was off production until October 1996. During the continuous collection and analysis of reliability data by
workover, the failed GLV was replaced and an insert independent third parties.
valve was run inside the failed TR-SCSSV. Total well
downtime was 476 days.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Well B also involved a failure of the SCSSV. A critical
failure (leakage in closed position) occurred on the TR- The authors wish to thank the participants of the
SCSSV during initial completion, in August 1997. The Wellmaster Phase III project for permission to publish
failure was caused by a coiled tubing bottom hole this paper. The participants were A/S Norske Shell,
assembly hanging up while pulling out of hole at TR- Amerada Hess Norge A/S, BHP Petroleum Pty. Ltd.,
SCSSV depth, indicated through flapper and hinge pin BP Exploration Operating Company Ltd., British Gas
damage during the subsequent workover. Workover 1 Exploration and Production plc, Enterprise Oil plc
took place during January/February 1998. The tubing Mobil Exploration Norway Inc., Norsk Agip A/S
hanger was found to be stuck in the wellhead and failed Norsk Hydro ASA, Norske Conoco AS,TOTAL Norge
to release. Dolomite particles from a kill pill was found to A.S, Saga Petroleum ASA, Statoil, Chevron Petroleum
be jamming the tubing hanger lock/unlock mechanism. Technology Company, Exxon Production Research
The workover was aborted, and preparations were made Company and Texaco Group Inc.
to re-enter the well through Workover 2, where the
tubing hanger was to be milled out. Workover 2 was
performed during April/May 1999, when the tubing NOMENCLATURE
hanger was successfully milled, the tubing pulled and a
new completion string run. The well was brought back on GLV Gas lift valve
production in May 1999 after a shut-in period of 482 MTTF Mean time to failure
days. MTTW Mean time to workover
NORSOK The competitive standing of the
In both cases, the shut-in period was extended due to Norwegian Continental Shelf
limitations in rig availability. Both wells are prolific OREDA Offshore Reliability Data
producers, causing significant loss of revenues in this SCSSV Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety
period. Valve
TR Tubing retrievable
WR Wireline retrievable
3. Conclusions

Reliability databases have been present in the offshore REFERENCES

industry for some two decades, with the number of
applications of reliability data in decision making /1/ ISO 14224: “Petroleum and natural gas
continually growing. industries – Collection of reliability and
maintenance data for equipment”. Issued by
The key to successful reliability databases in the ISO/TC 67/WG 4 N5.
offshore sector lies in populating the databases with data
in sufficient quality and quantity. In the current low cost /2/ Molnes, E. and Strand, G.-O.: “Reliability of Well
era of the industry, it is difficult to convey the benefits of Completion Equipment – Phase III Main Report”.
these databases to management. SINTEF Petroleum Research Report
32.0898.00/04/99 (Confidential). Trondheim,
A wider acceptance of the benefits of the results now November 1999.
seems to be emerging, with current focus on stronger
implementation of the data collection software
SPE 63112 APPLICATION OF A COMPLETION EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY DATABASE IN DECISION MAKING 5

/3/ The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate:

”Regulations concerning implementation and use
of risk analysis in the petroleum activities.”

/4/ Molnes, E. and Strand, G.-O.: “Towards risk

based acceptance criteria for downhole safety
valves”. Paper presented to Petrobras VI
Technical Meeting – Reliability Engineering, Rio
de Janeiro, 28-30 March 2000.
6 EINAR MOLNES AND GEIR-OVE STRAND SPE 63112

Buffer Database
Manufacturer

Moderator/
Failure report duplicate Failure cause comment QA

Wellmaster
Wellmaster
Client E-Mail
Windows NT Agent
version 2.5 ExproSoft
Online WellWatch Wellmaster
Database Server

Generate automatic
Company reply and confirmation
WellWatch
Database HTML
Web Browser

Users - Oil companies Users - Manufacturers

Figure 1 Wellmaster/WellWatch information flow chart.

Distribution Wells by Region

Africa
Adriatic 2.7 % S.E. Asia/Australia
0.1 % 2.5 %

GoM
8.1 %

Other
0.1 %

North Sea
86.5 %

North Sea Other GoM Adriatic Africa S.E. Asia/Australia

Figure 2 Distribution of wells by region.

SPE 63112 APPLICATION OF A COMPLETION EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY DATABASE IN DECISION MAKING 7

Service Time (well years)

5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Oil production Water Gas Gas injection Other
well injection well production well
well
Welltype

Figure 3 Distribution of well service time by welltype.

50
45
40 36.69
MTTF (years)

35
30
25 20.2 19.55
20 16.4
14.2 12.7
15
10
5
0
SCSSV I SCSSV II SCSSV III SCSSV IV Wellmaster II Wellmaster III
(1983) (1986) (1989) (1992) (1996) (1999)

Figure 4 Historical development of TR-SCSSV (flapper valve type) reliability during the period 1983-1999.