SCRIP PRESENTATION FOR THE BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU

1. Vietnam song, battle cry TIEN-LEN, DOC-LAP, TIEN-LEN, DOC-LAP,

mean “forward to independence, and died in heaps”.

2. Well come speech by syndicate leader.

3. Introduction the member of syndicate.

4. INTRODUCTION OF THE BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU.

- Ladies and gentlemen, we would like to highlight this battle by using 5W, 1H
concept.
- First of all, where is Dien Bien Phu? – The geographical location of Dien
Bien Phu is shown on the slide. Basically Dien Bien Phu is located
approximately 300 km to the west of Hanoi and bordering to the Laos.
-When the battle took place? 13 March to 8 May 1945.
-Who was involved? It is between the French Expeditionary Corps Forces and
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) Viet Minh Forces.
-What was so significant about this battle? Ladies and gentlemen, First, Dien
Bien Phu had sealed the fate of the French in Indochina forced Paris to
abandon the pursuit of colonial interests in Indochina. Second, It is the first
victory of a feudal colonial nation, whose agricultural economy is
backward, against the great imperialist capitalist, which has a modern
industry and a great army. Thirdly, This battle means a lot for the people of
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Fourthly, Dien Bien Phu victory as the
victory [over] the French army and [over] the intervention of Americans.
-Why? And how the battle happened? Will be further discussing later in our
presentation.

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5. SCOPE OF PRESENTATION
Ladies and Gentlemen, our scope of presentation today is as follow:
- Key Personnel Involved.
- Background of the battle.
- France Plans.
- Viet Minh Plans.
- The Battle.
- Analysis.
- Lessons learnt.
- Conclusion.

6. AIM - The aim of our presentation today is to analyse the battle of Dien Bien
Phu and abstract some lesson learnt which could applicable for MAF.

7. KEY PERSONEL INVOLVED

- Ladies and gentlemen, we would like to highlight some of the important
individual involved in this battle.
- HO CHI MINH – He was the President of Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRVN) on that particular period and he is also known as father
of Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
- GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP – He was Democratic Republic of
Vietnam Defence Minister after Democratic Republic of Vietnam
independence in 1945 and has been appointed as the Viet Minh campaign
commander for Dien Bien Phu.
- GENERAL RAOUL SALAN – He was the French Commander in Chief
in Indochina Operation until May 1953.

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 - GENERAL HENRY NAVARRE – Took over as French Commander in
Chief in Indochina Operation in May 1953 from GENERAL RAOUL
SALAN.
- GENERAL RENE COGNY – The GOC of 2nd Infantry Division during the
battle of Dien Bien Phu.

8. BACKGROUND OF THE BATTLE

- Ladies and gentlemen, after the surrender of Japanese during World War
II, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, under Ho Chi Minh’s leadership,
contested the return of the French to Indo-China. The overthrow of the
French ruling order by the Japanese and their defeat to Germany in
Europe during WW II has assisted in the liberation of Vietnam only to the
extent that it demonstrated the colonial structure in Indochina was not
invulnerable.
- In October 1947, the French launched an ambitious plan code-name
Operation LEA and managed to storm Ho Chin Minh’s Viet Bac
headquarters. This had force Ho’s entire top command and 40,000 Viet
Minh slipped through the French pincer movement and went into the
jungle. Thus began the French military’s search for a conventional set-
piece battle against Ho’s elusive guerrillas.
- This is starting point of first Vietnam War between the French and Viet
Minh. The war soon became serious and both sides suffered punishing
defeats. By the winter of 1953-54, the French and Viet Minh manoeuvre in
Indochina are shown at slide. (Brief the situation)

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9. FRANCE PLANS
- Ladies and Gentlemen, the French Expeditionary Corps had been fighting
inconclusively in Indochina for six years since 1947 to 1953. Progress
could not be measured since no fronts existed in this colonial war. The
conflict against Vietnamese revolutionaries of the Viet Minh had never
been localized, and the Expeditionary Corps units were overstretched.
- After nomination as commander-in-chief of the French Expeditionary
Corps in May 1953, General Henri Navarre and his advisors devised a
two-phase strategy to remedy these problems and better coordinate the
activities of French units in Indochina. The first phase of the plan
(eventually known as the Navarre Plan), from the spring of 1953 to
the autumn of 1954, called for the pacification of Vietnam below the
eighteenth parallel and the consolidation of friendly bases and positions in
the South.
- In the North, the objective for the same period was to maintain a
"defensive mentality” and avoid large-scale confrontations with the enemy.
Having achieved supremacy in the South, Navarre would then implement
the second phase of his plan. From late 1954 to 1956, the French
Expeditionary Corps would launch offensives against enemy strongholds
throughout the North.
- Ladies and gentlemen, on 28 October 1953, Laos signed a Treaty of Amity
and Association with France by which Paris recognized Laotian
independence and sovereignty within the French Union. The signing of
that pact reinforced the conviction of the authorities in Paris that Laos had
to be defended at all cost.
- Why Dien Bien Phu? Ladies and Gentlemen, Dien Bien Phu was
situated along route 41, at a crossroads, which commanded the main

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 access routes running into Laos from Vietnam. The French High
Command estimated that control of this strategic point would not only halt
the flow of supplies entering Laos from Vietnam and choke rebel
aggression but also deter further Vietnamese involvement in Laos. The
other reason is to draw Viet Minh into a large-scale confrontation, where
he believed that his paratroopers, foreign legionnaires, armored vehicles,
and fighter-bombers would destroy the communist Viet Minh once and for
all.

- Navarre's response to the plight for the defence of Laos was Operation
Castor . On 20 November 1953, six battalions of the Expeditionary
Corps parachuted into Muong Thanh valley in the district of Dien Bien
Phu in Lai Chau province.
- Work began on the defensive positions and strong points as an outer ring
of defenses namely; Anne-Marie, Beatrice, Claudine, Dominique,
Elaine, Francoise, Gabriele, Huguette and farther to the south and
relatively isolated, Isabelle.

- The plan was to establish a major French base of operations, complete

with airfield, at Dien Bien Phu. On 3 December 1953, General Navarre
ordered that the remote outpost at Dien Bien Phu be fortified, he
instructed his subordinates that, in the event of attack, the position "must
be defended at all cost.

10. VIET MINH PLANS

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 - After Ho Chi Minh announced that his government was prepared to arrive
at a political solution of the conflict, French National Assembly deputy
Pierre Mendès-France became a vocal advocate of negotiations.
- To strengthen his bargaining position and improve the prospects of victory,
Ho Chi Minh ordered Vo Nguyen Giap "to throw all available forces
against the Expeditionary Corps" at Dien Bien Phu.
- The People's Republic of China (PRC) considerably increased its
assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam after mid-February
1954. For the month of March, China provided 4,000 tons of material aid
and 2,000 tons in food supplies to the Vietnamese. The material
assistance consisted mainly of guns and artillery pieces of various
calibres. The China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) also dispatched
several Chinese technicians, advisors, and artillery crews to Vietnam.
- When General Giap first learned of the French had landed several
battalions of troops at Dien Bien Phu on 20 Nov 1953, he stated that the
first problem he had to resolve was whether to place a small force around
the French to contain the garrison while his main force was left free for
mobile operations, or to make a direct attack with the bulk of his main
force on the Dien Bien Phu garrison and leave the diversionary offensives
to local forces. General Giap preliminary moves to Dien Bien Phu can best
be shown at slide. (Explaining the slide)

11. THE BATTLE

- French patrols began raiding out from Dien Bien Phu in December but by
end of January, Viet Minh ambushes restricted them to the valley of their
base. The French Air Force did its best to interdict the Viet Minh supply
routes from Hoah Binh and Yen Bay.

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- The Politburo of the Viet Minh planned to launch the attack on Dien Bien
Phu in the late afternoon of 26 January. However, on that day early
morning, General Giap called off the attack because he fell Viet Minh were
not 100% certain of victory.
- FIRST PHASE ATTACK
- Viet Minh probing attacks began on 11 March and early in the morning of
the 13 March, proceeded by a furious bombardment from all his guns,
which caved in the defences; first major attack was against Beatrice.
Concentrating a division against a battalion, the strong point was
overwhelmed. Two days later the same fate befell Gabrielle.
- The use of human wave attacks apply by Chinese infantry characterized
Vietnamese assaults on French positions during the early stages of the
battle.
- That approach was costly. Between 13 and 16 March, the Viet Minh
suffered more than 9,000 casualties, including 2,000 dead.
- On 17 March, Giap modified his strategy. The Vietnamese eventually
ceased conducting human wave raids. Instead, they dug trenches and
tunnels to get close to the enemy.
- Subsequently, Anne-Marie, fell on the night of 17 th March.
- The next day, the French dropped another three more parachute
battalions to reinforce de Castries after the first phase of the Viet Minh
attack.

- SECOND PHASE ATTACK

- Ladies and gentlemen, Second phase attack took off twelve days later
against the French main defence position in a series of overlapping
attacks.

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- All the artillery was concentrated in turn for divisional attacks on
Dominique by 312 Division on the 30 th Mar.
- On Huguette by 308 Division on 1 April.
- On Elaine by 316 Division on 3 rd April.
- In the south 57 Brigade of 304 Division attacked Isabelle on the 3 rd
April.
- General de Castries had committed his reserves to counter-attack or
reinforce on strong point, Viet Minh switched their attack to another
direction.
- Under cover of a massive and accurate bombardment. French air support
was unable to make an impression on the Viet Minh trenches and in the
face of heavy anti-aircraft fire the Air Force’s losses began to mount.
- The monsoon rains in earnest in April causes the French trenches in
Claudine and Dominique become flooded.
- On 11 April midnights, French dropped another reinforcement parachute
battalion into the garrison.
- French camp had shortage of food and ammunition and made it
increasingly difficult for the 16,000 strong garrisons to contain Viet Minh
advances.
- On 1 May, Viet Minh’s attacked the perimeter on all sides and maintained
the pressure for a week.
- On the night of 2 May, General Cogny committed the last parachute
battalion from his Airborne Reserve.
- On 7 May, De Castries surrendered and Isabelle gave up the next day.
- (The French at Dien Bien Phu defence layout and Viet Minh attacking
approach are best shown at slide).

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12. THE AFTERMATH
- Ladies and gentlemen, the total strength of the French expeditionary
Corps and Viet Minh forces involved in this battle are shown at slide.
- This main battle had last 54 days; the French had suffered 2200 killed and
over 6000 wounded. More than 6000 unwounded French soldiers were
taken prisoner, but fewer than half those captured survived prison camp. It
is difficult to estimate Viet Minh casualties, although it is clear that they
lost well over 10,000 killed and 20,000 wounded during the campaign.

13. ANALYSIS
- Ladies and gentlemen, through our analysis, we believed that they are
many factors explaining the outcome of this battle. Firstly, the heavy
artillery provided by the People Republic of China and deployed by
the Viet Minh in the higher grounds surrounding the valley was highly
significant. Large-calibre artillery positioned on mountaintops not only
confused the enemy but also exacted a toll on his fighting capabilities
and morale.
- Secondly, the real surprise to the French was not that the Communists
had that kind of artillery but Viet Minh's ability to transport a
considerable mass of heavy artillery pieces across road fewer
mountains to Dien Bien Phu and to keep it supplied with a sufficient
amount of ammunition to make the huge effort worthwhile.
- Thirdly, in retrospect, Giap's decision to cancel the attack scheduled
for 26 January to more effectively prepare his artillery units for the battle
was sound.

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 - Fourthly, the logistical effort undertaken to sustain Viet Minh units sent
to the front was no less significant.
- Fifthly, The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) mobilized 33,500
dân công (patriotic workers) to assist and support the Viet Minh
contingent at Dien Bien Phu. Using 2,724 modified bicycles known as
xe thô , 2,673 junks, and 17,400 horses, those workers carried to the
front 20,584 tons of rice, in addition to ammunition and other necessities.
Their contribution was essential to enable Giap to wage a protracted
conflict.
- Six, overconfidence and underestimation of the potential of the Viet
Minh by Paris and the High Command in Hanoi was another factor that
proved detrimental to the French cause.
- Seven, the French also failed to appraise correctly the firepower of
the Viet Minh and its ability to sustain the siege and its 40,000 troops for
as long as it did. Most significantly, they underestimated the dedication
and resilience of those involved in the Vietnamese resistance.

14. ANALYSIS RELATED TO PRINCIPLE OF WAR

- Ladies and gentlemen, we believed that the French has violated some of
the principles of war at every level of war-strategic, operational, and
tactical at Dien Bien Phu. These violations contributed significantly to their
defeat.
- The first principle of war is the selection and maintenance of aim . The
French aim or objective at Dien Bien Phu was neither clearly defined nor
attainable. General Navarre's instructions prior to the airborne landing at
Dien Bien Phu (Operation Castor) were to adjust his operations to his
means. French authorities in France did not learn of the launching of

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 Operation Castor until six hours after it started. Strategic guidance was
issued to General Navarre, but Operation Castor certainly was not
designed to fulfill that guidance.
- The second principle of war is the offensive action . Ladies and
gentlemen, Operation Castor started on 20 November 1953 with five
French battalions parachuting into Dien Bien Phu. At this point the French
had seized the initiative. However, any hopes of remaining on the
offensive ended quickly. By early December French troops found it tough
going beyond the valley floor. Offensively, actions were soon limited to air
support, patrols, and local counterattacks. By 13 March 1954 the attack on
Dien Bien Phu had begun, and the offensive was forever lost to the Viet
Minh. Giap.
- The next principles of war are concentration of force. Strategically, The
French simply were not willing to pay the price to field a large force in
Indochina. As early as 1950, the French Parliament passed a law
restricting the use of draftees to French homeland territories, which
precluded their use in Indochina. The average size of the French
Expeditionary Corps in Indochina hovered around 150,000 troops, which
was insufficient to achieve strategic mass in Vietnam..
- The next principle is flexibility . Strategically, the French government
maintained loose control of operations in Indochina leaving much to the
discretion of the on-scene commander. As already discussed the
government had taken steps, which limited their flexibility.
- The last principles involved were security. O nly three days after the start
of Operation Castor French newspapers ran headlines of the parachute
assault. The Viet Minh never publicised their operations some of the

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 biggest blunders made by the French at Dien Bien Phu can be traced to
surprise.

15. LESSON LEARNT

- There are many lessons learnt, which could be earned from study the
battle of Dien Bien Phu. We believed that those lessons learnt are very
important and applicable for MAF.
- Ladies and gentlemen, this battle had reminded us especially officers or
commander of MAF that never neglected an important of intelligence
when conduct planning for any operations in future. The correct
intelligence needs to follow up with the right action plan and will assists us
to success in any operations in future.
- The French experience in this battle had thought us that we as a part of
MAF leadership personnel must always carry the right attitude and not to
under estimated our opponent in any occasion.
- This battle also shown that the important of Arty fire during the offensive
operation. For the MAF Artillery Regiment officers, we would like to remind
you here, that one of the lesson learnt is the planning and employment of
Artillery assets. Your appreciation in the selection of suitable ground when
located your Artillery gun position, nothing was impossible even though
you need across a jungle or mountain in Malaysian environment.
- Ladies and gentlemen, this battle also reminds us that the flexible of
tactic. As a commander on the ground, we should more flexibility when
applying our tactic according to the terrain, weather, situation and ground.
This battle also thought us that the important of against people war.

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 - This battle also thought us that by having the advance technology and
modern MAF are not guaranteed us in winning any battle. We shouldn’t
forgot about the important of training. Although our country are peace now
but we need get our attitude right when deal with this responsibility.
- Finally, We believed it is important for us to learn the experience and
adopted some of the doctrine and tactic from the Vietminh, which could
may be help us in future conflict.

16. CONCLUSION
- Dien Bien Phu suggested that the Viet Minh, in that terrain, probably had
the best infantry in the world, among the best generals, the best logistic
support and the best fifth-column preparation. Who could have thought
that so everyday and triumphantly respectable a thing as a bicycle could
be so militarily decisive? And of course that was why there had been so
fantastically many thefts of bicycles in Hanoi and the main towns before
Dien Bien Phu- for a man or woman pushing a bicycle could travel the
narrowest path, carrying on it fifty or a hundred kilos of rice or shells or
parts of a disassembled howitzer.
- The fall of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 ended ninety
years of direct French involvement in Vietnam. With the Geneva Accords
of July 1954, France formally renounced its mission civilisatrice in
Indochina, and the Vietnamese were promised peace. The months and
years to follow, however, brought more frustration to Vietnamese
nationalists. Unity and independence, they soon found out, were not about
to be achieved. Picking up where France left off, another Western nation
would increase its military commitment in Indochina and defer the
restoration of peace and stability in Vietnam.

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 - (Did Americans had drawn the lessons from French experience? )
- (..A four-star general once said:’ The French haven’t won a war since
Napoleon. What can we learn from them?)
- (….I don’t think so, that’s why the Americans continued in South
Vietnam…-General Giap)
- (The French experience in Indochina was almost totally written off and
disregarded - Sir Robert Thompson).

17. Ladies and gentlemen, with the conclusion we end our presentation today. Let
take 3 minutes standing break before we proceed to clarification and question and
answer sessions.

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