YOM KIPPUR WAR

SLIDE 1: TITLE WITH PICTURES (S/L ASAD)

1. Commandant, DS body and course participants Assalamualaikum and Good Morning. In the
sequence of battle study, it is now the turn of SSG 11 to present Arab Israel War of 1973 which is
better known as Yom Kippur War to the Israelis and Ramadan War to the Arabs. This war has a
special significance in the history of warfare. This was a large-scale conventional war involving
thousands of tanks and hundreds of aircraft. The employment of airpower achieved a new
dimension which had a direct impact on the subsequent development of airpower .Before going
over to the different aspects of this war let me introduce the members of SSG 11 to you.

SLIDE 2 : NAME OF THE SSG MEMBERS

2. Ladies and Gentlemen, our presentation will take about 30 minutes or so and will follow the
sequence as shown on the screen:

SLIDE 3 : SEQUENCE OF PRESENTATION

PART I : INTRODUCTION
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE.
AIM
PART II : CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE
AREA ORIENTATION.
CAUSES OF THE WAR.
STRATEGIES.
CONCEPT OF OPERATION.
ORBAT/MILITARY BALANCE
THE BATTLE.
PART III : ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR.
WEAKNESSES OF THE CONFLICTING PARTIES.
LESSONS LEARNT.
CONCLUSION.
PART IV : FORUM DISCUSSION
CLARIFICATION AND Q & A.
REMARKS OF SUPERVISING DS.

SLIDE 4: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE

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3. The origin of 1973 war can be traced back to the 1967 Six Days War where the Arabs
suffered a humiliating defeat and lost large territories. Arabs went for a well planned and a
coordinated retaliation. The belligerent parties were Israel on one side and Egypt and Syria on the
other. Arabs enjoyed the direct support of the then USSR and other neighbouring Arab countries.
The USA and few other European allies supported Israel. This ushered a new era of military conflict
which was characterized by large-scale use of ground based air defence weapons and its
suppression. Indeed the entire science of military strategy and tactics had to be re-evaluated in the
light of the lessons of this war. Virtually, the airpower emerged as the most dominant factor in
conducting any type of warfare in the subsequent decades.

4. The Yom Kippur War is an excellent show case of many lessons of warfare. These lessons
are still valid. The war presented excellent cooperation among the forces especially in the land air
battles. The war is a rare example where the ground forces supported to attain air superiority by the
IAF by destroying Egyptian AD capabilities. Thus, the Israeli ground forces effectively performed
Suppression of Enemy air defence (SEAD) operations. The use of Electronic Counter Measures
(ECM), Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), and Satellites
paved the way of modern warfare. The battle of Bekka valley in 1982 and Gulf War in 1991 were
the follow up of many lessons learned from this war. The unprecedented success of anti-tank
missile has drawn a new tactics to deal with tank offensive. As such the study of this war is very
much relevant for conventional forces of third world countries where resources are limited and
demand fullest utilization of all possible means through improvisation. Therefore, the Yom Kippur
War stands as reference before us.

AIM

5. The aim of our presentation is to:

SLIDE 5
THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO ANALYZE THE YOM KIPPUR WAR AND DRAW
APPROPRIATE LESSONS.
AREA ORIENTATION (BY MAJ HANIM)

6. Ladies and Gentlemen, before going over to different aspects of war, let me now orient you
with the area, where the war was fought:

SLIDE 6, 7: MAPS SHOWING THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA

AND FRONTS OF
2 THE WAR.
 SLIDE 8: CAUSES OF THE WAR

7. Ladies and Gentlemen, the Yom Kippur war was the direct consequence of the Six-Day war
of June 1967 in which Israeli Forces had occupied vast areas of Arab territory in the Sinai, the
Golan Heights, the West bank and East Jerusalem. Despite the acceptance by the Israel of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 242 which had called for the vacation of Arab
territories occupied by Israel during 1967 War, it had shown no signs of giving up these territories.
The Egyptian President Anwar Sadat finally decided to launch military attack in order to regain the
lost territory. The Egypt and Syria had begun to formulate a highly secret two-front war plan of
simultaneous attack to recover the lost territories in the Sinai and Golan heights.

SLIDE 9: WAR STRATEGY

8. Ladies and gentlemen, now I would like to draw your attention to the strategies followed by
both Arab and Israel forces.

SLIDE 10: ARAB STRATEGY

9. The Arab Strategy. The strategy evolved by Arab forces was mainly based on their
experience of and the lessons they had learnt from the Arab-Israel War of June 1967. The Arabs
knew that they could not win the war against Israel without gaining air superiority, which was at the
same time impossible. Therefore, the Arabs decided on a strategy of limited objectives. The
Egyptian plans were limited to crossing of the Suez Canal and establishing the bridgehead on the
east bank under the cover of surface-to air missile (SAM) systems and anti aircraft guns (AAA),
which could neutralize Israeli air superiority over the limited tactical area of the Suez Canal. It was
planned to employ the EAF for interdiction and close support missions in the beginning of the war
and wait till the IAF weakened due to its aircraft losses by the ground based anti aircraft missile
and gun systems. But in reality, this situation did not arise because the United States mounted a
massive airlift to re-supply Israel with weapons and made up for losses suffered by the Israeli Air
force. The Syrian objectives, on the other hand, were not so limited and included the regaining of
all the territories of the Golan Heights which Israel occupied in the War of 1967. In addition, in the
joint Arab plan of Egypt and Syria, Jordan was expected to pose a potential threat across her border
with Israel, without actually starting hostilities.

SLIDE 11 : ISRAELI STRATEGY

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10. The Israeli Strategy. The Israeli war plans against the Arabs relied mainly on the
superior quality of its air force and its capability to undertake pre-emptive strike missions against
Arab air forces as experienced in the war of 1967. Israeli expectation was that after the Air Force
had gained the command of the air, and simultaneously ground forces had been mobilised, the
Israeli tank forces supported by the air force would mount a counter attack without any interference
from the enemy air force. However, the surprise joint attack by Egypt and Syria on two widely
separated fronts put tremendous pressure on Israeli political and military leadership. According to
Chaim Herzog, while the Arabs, with the help of Soviet advisors had done a detailed analysis and
evaluation of the lessons of the 1967 war and had made important changes in their concepts,
strategy, and organisation and set up an independent AD Command in Egypt; Israel on the other
hand, swept under the carpet of all the shortcomings that had been revealed in the war but had been
overlooked in the euphoria.

SLIDE 12: CONCEPT OF OPERATION

(BOTH CONCPTS SHOULD BE HIGHLIGHTED ON MOUSE CLICK)

11. The Arab Concept. The Arabs planned to attack Israel from two fronts. Egypt
planned to attack from the south at Sinai while Syria from the north at Golan Heights.
Arab’s plan was to punch a surprise-crushing blow by both air and ground forces. The
Arab plan was to limit the strike sortie in depth, until the IAF had been thinned by the
Arab GBAD. They used their Air Force to defend the rear areas and the homelands.
The Arab concept of Operation was strategically offensive but tactically defensive in
respect of air power.

12. The Israeli Concept. The Israeli plan was to hammer the Arab onslaught if
Arabs ever broke the cease fire line. Their plan was to defend Israel and her ground
forces at the same time maintain air superiority over the battlefield. The 2nd
priority of Israel was to interdict Arab transport, concentrations of forces, attack on
airfields and other strategic targets. The Israeli concept was strategically defensive
but tactically offensive in respect of airpower.

13. The Yom Kippur War involved huge number of personnel and equipment. The military
balance between Israel and Arab forces prior to the war is shown on the screen:

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 SLIDE 13: MILITARY BALANCEARAB –ISRAEL WAR 1973

Arab Forces Israel

Total Strength 430,000 300,000
Army 380,000 275,000
Navy 17,000 5,000
Air Force 33,000 20,000
Reserves 700,000 180,000
Tanks 3,200 1,800
Field Artillery 1,200 500
Combat Aircraft 946 488
Submarines 12 02
Destroyer 5-8 --
Fast Attack Boats 75-85 51
Ground Based Air 180 batteries SA-2 and SA-3 10 HAWK Missile batteries
Defence (GBAD) 75 batteries SA-6 Several hundred 20 mm and
Over 2000 SA-7 40 mm AAA.
Large amount of ZSU-23-4

AND FRONTS OF THE WAR.

14. The Yom Kippur war can be divided into four distinct phases:

SLIDE 14
A. PHASE I: EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN JOINT OFFENSIVE (6-9 OCTOBER).
B. PHASE II: ISRAELI COUNTER ATTACK AGAINST SYRIA (10-13 OCTOBER).
C. PHASE III: EGYPTIAN SECOND OFFENSIVE (14-15 OCTOBER).
D. PHASE IV: ISRAELI CROSSING OF THE CANAL (15-22 OCTOBER).

SLIDE 15: PHASE I: EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN JOINT OFFENSIVE AND

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL (6-9 OCTOBER)

15. On October 6, 1973 Egypt and Syria launched a joint surprise attack on Israel at about 1400
hours. The attack was carried out by ground forces supported by the Egyptian and Syrian Air
Forces. EAF ac mounted intense attack on communication centres and other command and control
facilities in the Sinai just prior to the commencement of the ground offensive to disrupt
communication and logistic links between the forward posts in the Sinai and military headquarters
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in Israel. These attacks were mounted to delay the Israeli reaction to the Egyptian offensive across
the canal.

16. On the Suez front, the Egyptian forces had crossed the Canal on October 6 at five places
and ferried across about 400 tanks within the first 24 hours. Thereafter, they captured the Israeli
fortifications on the east bank known as the Bar-Lev Line, throughout 100-mile long Canal. On
October 7, strong contingents of infantry and armour crossed over to the east bank using Soviet
built pontoon bridges of which there were about a dozen across the Canal. The Israeli Air Force
flew a large number of missions to attack and destroy Egyptian missile sites and pontoon bridges.
However, it suffered serious loses due to Egyptian SAM systems and anti aircraft guns. By October
8 Egypt had occupied the whole length of the Suez Canal on the east bank and its forces were in the
process of consolidating their position.

17. On the Syrian front, the Syrians Army mounted armoured offensive with 1,400 tanks and
was strongly supported by Syrian Air Force. The Syrian forces made a rapid advance under SAM
and aircraft cover during next three days and recovered whole of Golan Heights. By the morning of
October 7, they were just nine miles from the Sea of Galilee. Israel immediately switched entire air
effort to this front and suffered heavy losses due to dense and overlapping deployment of SAM and
anti aircraft guns.

SLIDE 16: PHASE II: ISRAELI COUNTER ATTACK AGAINST SYRIA

(10-13 OCTOBER)

18. On October 10, the Iraqi armoured force of some 18,000 men and 200 aircraft had joined
the Syrian forces and had gone into action against Israel. The situation on the front, however, had
established with the arrival of Israeli reinforcements and Israeli forces had mounted a counter
offensive which had forced the Syrian Army to retreat. In this Counter offensive 800 Syrian tanks
were reported to be destroyed during the war on the Golan front. In this phase Israeli Air Force
attacked the biggest oil refinery at Homes and set it on fire and also attacked the main ports of
Tartus and Latakia, which were used to receive soviet military supplies fro Syria.

19. By October 12, Israeli counter attack on the Golan front had forced the Syrian Army to
withdraw behind the 1967 ceasefire line and Israeli armour along with Israeli troops had entered
Syrian territory to a depth of six miles. Ground war and air battles continued with great intensity on
the Syrian front and on October 13 Jordan and Saudi Arabia announced their decision to join the

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war on the side of Syria and deployed their troops on the Syrian front. This phase was the turning
point on the Golan front due to outstanding performance of Israeli Air Force.

SLIDE 17: PHASE III: EGYPTIAN SECOND OFFENSIVE (14-15 OCTOBER)

20. The objective of the Egyptian offensive was to advance to the western entrances of the
passes in the Sinai in order to relieve pressure on the Syrian front. The Egyptian offensive began
with an air strike against Israeli Command and control centres in the Sinai. Other important military
targets were also attacked by the Egyptian Air Force. The Israeli forces put up stiff resistance and
used newly acquired TOW anti-tank missiles against advancing Egyptian armour which caused
heavy losses. In addition the Israeli Air Force mounted a large scale close support operations
against the Egyptian offensive. Egyptian forces penetrated 15-16 km east of the Canal position.
Israel reduced its air effort from Golan front and devoted maximum air effort to help the Israeli
forces in stopping the advance in the Sinai.

21. October 14 was the day of air battle also. Egyptian air force fought its most successful battle
on that day. This phase is marked with the largest tank battles of the history apart from the battle of
Kursk in the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Egyptian lost about 200 tanks in armour
battles and few dozens to the IAF aircraft.

SLIDE 18 : PHASE IV: ISRAELI CROSSING OF THE CANAL

(15-22 OCTOBER)

22. The last phase of the war lasted from October 15 to October 22. General Sharon of Israel
Army was given the task of crossing Canal with a brigade of paratroopers assisted by armour. The
specific task was to establish bridgehead about three miles wide and destroy SAM systems on the
west bank. This was to be done in order to create a gap in the Egyptian missile umbrella so that the
Israeli Air Force could mount missions over the bank and wrest air superiority from the Egyptian
Air Force. The Israeli offensive across the Canal began at 5 PM on October 15 and by 9 AM on
October 16 about 30 tanks and 2000 Israeli troops had crossed the Canal. The advancing troops
destroyed several missile sites in this area and created 15 miles wide gap in the missile umbrella.
This gap was well used by Air Force to gain air superiority over tactical area and mount close air
support its Army and interdiction over Egyptian targets.

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23. In the next few days 2-3 Israeli brigades had crossed the Canal from the east bank to the
west bank. The Israeli Air Force gave priority to target ground based air defence systems and they
were also be able to protect the small and scattered Israeli infiltration force in the initial stage. Here
it was important to note that it was the ground forces which initially provided support to the air
force by neutralizing the missile batteries, thus enabling the air force in turn to give support to
ground forces. During this phase, the Egyptian Air Force was very active and flew nearly 1500
sorties.

24. There were quite effective naval battles in the form of blockade and missile engagement.
Israel used her small navy aggressively and effectively. The war saw first massive use of sea
launched surface to surface missiles. The blockade could possibly bring strategic results if the war
would have been prolonged, and could have nullified to some extent Israel's retention of control
over Sharmes-Sheikh, with its commanding position at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba.

25. The war was also characterized by the super powers involvement in terms of weaponries,
intelligence and logistics. The supplies from the United States and the Soviet Union were in very
large quantities. In 566 round trips of about 14,000 miles each the United States flew in some
22,395 tons of supplies in C-5 and C-141 freighters, and this lift was supplemented by a further
5,500 tons carried by El Al aircraft. The Soviet Union flew 934 round trips with An-12 and An-22
freighters, carrying some 15,000 tons. Both the United States and the Soviet Union mounted sealift
as well, but the quantities carried are not known. The Soviet sealift is likely to have had more effect
on the course of the war, because of the shorter distance involved.

23. Precise figures of men and material lost by both sides are not available, but the following
estimates give a fair approximation of relative losses:

SLIDE 19 : LOSSES
KILLED WOUNDED POW & MISSING AFV'S AIRCRAFT SHIPS
ISRAEL 2,500 7,500 500 820 110 3
ARABS 17,700 66,000 8,800 1,900 515 + 35 Hels 13

AND FRONTS OF THE WAR.

SLIDE: INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY (BY MAJ AZMAN)

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SLIDE: ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES (ECM)

27. The sophisticated multi frequency capabilities of the SA-6 and ZSU 23-4 were unfamiliar to
the Israelis, as well as the complicated homing guidance system of SA-6 in particular. Syrians in
Golan height had fewer AD weapons to engage the Israeli aircraft. Surface to Air Missiles’ radars
were deceived by different jamming techniques. IAF ac dropped chaff to confuse the radar of
missile and proved effective. They used flares to confuse SA-7. Use of ECM, modified chaff
package and lo-hi-lo tactics found the soft spot of SA-6.

28. The attempt to neutralize Egyptian SAM defence using same procedure did not work,
probably due to better training and weapon familiarity of the Egyptians. Moreover they capitalized
on its presence by using spoof techniques against RWR and claimed to have prompted several
unnecessary ejections. They used deception-jamming methods and also used false voice commands
in the IAF radio frequency. By ground attack during Operation Gazelle, gap was created by
destroying SAM battery resulting the C2 links were being broken and mutual coverage was
eliminated. Then IAF exploited the weakness and repeated the techniques used in Golan height.

SLIDE: PRECISION GUIDED WEAPONS

29. IAF used different surface to air missiles like MIM-23B Hawk, MIM-72A Chaparral and
Redeye for their AD. Beside the conventional weapons, they used PGM like AGM-12 Bullpup,
AGM–45A Shrike, AGM-65A Maverick to cause havoc to Arab ground targets. The Arabs used
several types of Surface to Air Missiles such as SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 and SA-7 for AD which caused
heavy toll to Israeli aircraft. The IAF was virtually ineffective until number of these missiles sites
were destroyed to create gap within Egyptian AD Network. The Israeli pilots had to develop new
tactics of approaching at low altitudes and sudden steep climb prior to reaching lethal killing zone
of surface to air missiles. Israel also used HOBOS and Martin Marietta Walleye I. The TOW anti
tank missiles proved very effective scoring 100 percent hits, beating all previous records in
accuracy.

SLIDE: USE OF RECONNAISSANCE AC, UAV AND SATTELITE

30. The US SR-71 reconnaissance ac detected the gap between the 2nd and 3rd Army of Egypt.
Subsequently Operation Gazelle was carried out and neutralized the SAMs which were a turning
point of the war. IAF used Teledyne Ryan Model 1241 multi mission UAV for high altitude

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photographic reconnaissance. There was other reports suggesting the use of Firebee I type drones to
deliver Israeli built air-to-ground missiles to attack Egyptian missile sites. Both USA and USSR
helped their clients with satellite pictures during the war.

SLIDE: WEAKNESSES OF CONFLICTING PARTIES

31. The Arabs though successfully launched offensive in two fronts but could not capitalize it in
the later part due to Israel’s tactical and technological innovations. The Arabs had to retreat even
after they could reoccupy the lost territory. Few reasons can be drawn in this context:

a. SLIDE: RELIANCE ON AD BARRIER The Arab reliance on the AD Barrier

reducing the effective utilisation of the air assets.

b. SLIDE: NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY VS QUALITY The Egyptian and

Syrian numerical superiority in aircraft over Israel was in the order of 2:1. But the Arab
pilots were not equal match to their Israeli counter parts.

c. SLIDE: LACK OF TRAINED PILOTS The EAF did not have enough pilots
and a percentage of them were only partially trained.

d. SLIDE: TECHNOLOGICAL GAP The technological gap between the Arabs

and the Israelis had narrowed down since the 67 war. However there was no doubt about
the fact that the Soviet systems, which the Arabs were operating, were complicated and
rendering crash courses to bring up the standard of the aircrew did not provide the requisite
results.

e. SLIDE: COMMITMENT The Egyptian and Syrian air forces were never
really committed to full-scale battle. The Arabs had planned for a conflict with limited gains
in mind. They had hoped that the war could get over with in a short period of time.
Therefore it could have been their endeavour to preserve their air assets.

32. Neither could exposed a fully effective command, control and communication system
during the war and nor they had modern secured communications. Israeli C 3 faced severe
problems. On a number of occasions, communication broke down and senior commanders lost
track of what their subordinate units were doing. There were two fatal errors on the part of the
Israelis. The first was the intelligence evaluation, and the failure at the command level and the
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ministerial level to appreciate the parallel developments on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts. The
second major error was the stubborn assumption of the Israeli defence and military establishment
that the unrealistic and unfavourable ratio of forces along the borders was adequate to hold any
Egyptian and Syrian attack.

33. Syria lacked effective C3 system to match the size of its forces. Syria had no real air
reconnaissance capability and mission planning, had no real Forward Air Control capability, and
committed its aircraft to combat using poorly ground controlled intercept (GCI) methods that put its
fighters away in the face of a far better trained and organized Israeli fighter forces.

34. Egypt was considerably better prepared. It could operate the equipment the USSR had
installed when it deployed the Soviet SAMs and C3I units during the war of attrition. They
conducted large numbers of field and command post exercises before the war begun. Like Israel,
Egypt lacked the key elements of an airborne C 3 system for support of the ground battles. Egypt
attempted to establish clear zones to separate its SAM and air operations, but failed to use its air
control and warning and GCI systems to identify aircraft entering the airspace covered by its
SAMs. As such it shot down as many as 60 own aircraft.

SLIDE: OBSERVANCE OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR

35. Ladies and gentlemen, while analysing the battle in terms of principles of war, I will spell
out examples irrespective of services. This again does not mean that the examples are the only
instances.

SLIDE: SELECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF AIM

36. The aim of the Arabs was to defeat Israel on the field of battle and capture important land
areas. They could not achieve the aim as failed to persist on offensive actions. After immediate
success of first offensive, the Arabs remained under the shield of SAM umbrella which restricted
them to continue offensive action. On the other hand, the Israelis earned their aim by all out efforts
and won victory.

SLIDE: OFFENSIVE ACTION

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37. The Yom Kippur War was the battle of offensive actions. Arabs Forces took the initiative to
carry out offensive action against Israeli airfields, headquarters and supply centres. They
coordinated a well orchestrated offensive attack on both fronts. Such offensive action was pre-
emptive and surprising to Israeli Armed Forces as well. Except the IAF, Israel did not have
sufficient forces on ground to counter such a huge offensive. Israel had to launch counter offensive
actions to avert defeat.

SLIDE: SECURITY

38. The Egyptians employed several passive measures with varying degrees of success. They
succeeded in deceiving Israel to belief that their concentration of forces were for routine exercise.
In “successive planning”, method was chosen by the Egyptian President and his commanders, so,
such requirement for action gradually were shifted from one level to a lower level in accordance
with a fixed scheme. The plan was kept secret within a very small number of advisers close to
Sadat until five to six months before the war. Moreover, Arabs protected their air craft on ground by
constructing hardened aircraft shelters and dispersing at many airfields. They also used dummy
sites to deceive the Israeli air forces.

SLIDE: SURPRISE

39. Arabs made a pre-emptive surprise attack. After the 1967 war, Israelis were extremely over
confident and did not search for the military weaknesses. They were busy with their ensuing
election, and were reluctant to mobilize prematurely. Israeli attention was focused on the success of
the Palestinian guerrillas in Austria. Egyptian’s considered the Israeli advantages of air superiority,
technological ability and rigorous training. They selected 6 October for the attack after considering
that it was the holy day in the Jewish religious, which would find many Israeli soldiers on leave and
also the month of Ramadan when Israeli’s will not expect any attack from the Arab’s. Egypt could
persuade the Israeli political leaders that Egypt was not ready for war and would not be ready for at
least a year. Egypt also deceived Israel’s intelligence into believing that Egyptian units were
engaged in military manoeuvres rather than actual preparations for an invasion. Cairo newspapers
announced that army officers were permitted to leave to go on the Umrah. This led to a major
strategic surprise of the Israeli forces and is generally considered to be the result of shrewd
Egyptian planning and Israeli confidence.

SLIDE: COOPERATION
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40. Cooperation is a means of attaining concentration of force with economy of effort in
pursuance of the aim and sound administration is the prerequisite for success in war. In Yom Kippur
War, the Egyptian, Syria and other Arab countries had built up a remarkable relationship. This can
be seen in the April 1973, the first organization for cooperation between Syrian and Egyptian fronts
had been set up. The Federal Armed Forces Commander in Chief approved the control system over
both fronts. October 6 was also a proud landmark on the way toward serious Arab cooperation. It
showed the deep-rooted common origin or the Arab and the strong tie that so closely bind them.
The Arab insistence upon carrying their share in historical responsibility was confirmed, as was
their readiness to give and to sacrifice until all territories are liberated, all rights are restored and
victory achieved.

SLIDE: FLEXIBILITY

41. Israel aircraft were not restricted to one particular role and they shifted their missions
accordingly to fit the tactical necessities. For example IAF kept A-4 for CAS, but at times they
used F-4 for CAS depending on the situations. Besides carrying troops, the Arabs used helicopters
for drooping napalm bombs. On the other hand, the Israelis used helicopters for command and
control.

SLIDE: CONCENTRATION OF FORCE

42. The Egyptian Air Force concentrated around 150 aircraft on the first day along with 1500
artillery guns while attacking on the Berlev line. IAF could concentrate more in air attacks as the
Egyptians and Syrians decided not to attack in depth of Israel territory which resulted in
suppression of Arab AD. When IAF faced tremendous defence from Syrian AD batteries, then they
concentrated more on suppressing the Syrian batteries than CAS missions. After achieving their
aim of SEAD, they transferred their concentration on providing CAS to their land forces.
Ultimately Israel achieved air superiority over their area of interest. Another aspect of the crippling
firepower was the concentrated artillery fire, which followed the massive air strike. Egypt used
some 3,000 field guns, which also provided firepower in the shape of barrage for the assaulting
troops to follow and to keep direction with. All this was tremendous and the Egyptian Armed
Forces had applied the principle of concentration of firepower well.

SLIDE: ECONOMY OF EFFORT

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43. The surprise attack by the Arab forces and their SAM defence caused heavy damage and
destruction to Israeli Air Force. To prevent further losses, Israel moved their ground forces to
counter the initial attack while used limited number of aircraft in suppressing Arab AD. They
maintained reserve of their combat aircraft which were later used after gaining air superiority over
the Arab territory. Israel used correct tactics and weapon to meet the requirement during battle. On
the other hand, the Arab having much greater number of aircraft and AD weapons could not
maintain the superiority in the war. One report says that the Arab fired almost 50-75 SAM per
aircraft killed, which resulted to their deficiency of missile stock during the early stage of battle.

SLIDE: ADMINISTRATION

44. Logistic considerations are often the deciding factor in assessing the feasibility and
influencing the outcome of the war. Egyptians and Syrians had built up a massive forward supply
depot. This greatly reduced their logistics management problems as well as their logistic
vulnerability. On the other hand, Israel had deficiency in their mobilization and depot systems
which gave the Arabs a significant advantage. During the war, both Arab and Israel received a
huge amount of latest aircraft and weapons from USSR and USA respectively. It was the US
equipment supplied to Israel by air (only 26% of the total US equipment was supplied by air)
played a vital role in averting her defeat.

LESSONS LEARNT

45. The Yom Kippur War is an excellent show case of many lessons of warfare. Many of them
are universal i.e. applicable for any country and some are particularly applicable for Malaysian
Armed Forces. The war presented excellent cooperation among the forces especially in the land air
battles. The war is a rare example where the ground forces supported to attain air superiority by the
IAF by destroying Egyptian AD capabilities. Thus, the Israeli ground forces effectively performed
Suppression of Enemy air defence (SEAD) operations. The use of Electronic Counter Measures
(ECM), Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), and Satellites
paved the way of modern warfare. The battle of Bekka Valley in 1982 and Gulf War in 1991 were
the follow up of many lessons learned from this war. The unprecedented success of anti-tank
missile has drawn a new tactics to deal with tank offensive. As such the study of this war is very
much relevant for conventional forces of third world countries where resources are limited and
demand fullest utilization of all possible means through improvisation. Therefore, the Yom Kippur
War stands as reference before us.
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46. This was one of the biggest international wars, waged under conditions of international
détente, involving the largest concentrations of troops, weapons and sophisticated equipment never
before seen in the entire military history of the region. It was distinguished by the employment of
the missiles, which featured prominently in land, sea, air and AD operations, as well as electronic
and counter electronic measures. The important military lessons that the war of 1973 brings out are:

a. SLIDE: SURPRISE Surprise was achieved by the Arab forces in open deserts
despite the great development of modern means of surveillance and intelligence. The main
reasons behind Israelis misperception of Arab offensive are complacency and
underestimation of the enemy. On the other hand for the Arabs it was the security of
information and planning. This proves that surprise as a principle of war has withstood the
test of times and will continue to do so in future wars. Therefore, the important lesson of
this war for Malaysian Armed Forces is to remain considerably prepared with credible force
for any eventualities and to create efficient mobilisation of troops in the shortest possible
time.

b. SLIDE: JOINT OP A modern battle will continue to remain one of combined

arms in which all arms co-ordinate to achieve one mission or one objective. Israel's
dependence on the tank alone was the cause of its failure in many battles. On the Egyptian
side, the combined arms concept achieved prominent success at the tactical level. Also, the
collaboration of all branches of the armed forces achieved success at both operational and
strategic levels. The lesson for Malaysia is to develop joint ness among the services. This
may be achieved through frequent joint exercise and educating the service personnel of each
other’s capability.

c. SLIDE: STRONG AIR DEFENCE When opposed by a strong AD system, air

supremacy is difficult to be achieved by an air force. The passive AD measures taken by
Egyptian also proved its requirement on reducing own casualties and destruction from any
enemy attack. Therefore, it is necessary for Malaysian Armed forces to develop strong AD
system capable of coping with the modern technology. However, this lesson seems to have
been taken in to consideration as we look into RMAF Air Power Doctrine.

d. SLIDE: AIRFORCE IS THE LEADING ELEMENT The air force will

continue to play a leading role in armed conflicts. This means, on the other hand, the

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necessity of building up a strong and credible air power capability. This can be achieved
through priority selection of equipment, armament and creation of a balanced force mix.

e. SLIDE: TANK OFFENSIVE AND ANTI TANK WPN The struggle between
the tanks and the anti-tank weapons will continue despite the success the latter achieved in
this war. This lesson necessitates the development of tactics for tank offensive.

f. SLIDE: INDIGENOUS ARMAMENT INDUSTRY One of the most important

lesson of this war is the necessity of diversifying arms sources and developing a larger
national potential for an armament industry. Malaysia, depends on the foreign powers for
the supply of its armament and equipment. This dependency needs to be reduced by
developing indigenous armament industry.

g. SLIDE: PREPARATION FOR A SHORT WAR There is a danger of preparing for a

short war; if a war is not won within a stimulated time, it is invariably lost because plans
and stocks of materials do not cater for extra time.

h. SLIDE: AIR RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE Air reconnaissance and

surveillance played an important role in this war. It seems that the power with the best
reconnaissance satellite system will have an outstanding advantage in any future war, while
a country without one, or without access to one, will be at an acute disadvantage.

i. SLIDE: OFFENSIVE ACTION Almost no military campaign can be won without

persistent offensive action. Persistent offensive action is needed not only to achieve victory
but also to avert defeat. Arabs failed to persist on their offensive operations which invited
Israel to take initiative.

j. SLIDE: QUALITY VS QUANTITY Quality is important, not quantity, both in

equipment and tactics. In the war the Arabs had superiority with SAMs in both quality and
quantity; on the other hand, Israeli had edge over its opponents in qualitative aircraft and
tactics.

SLIDE: CONCLUSION (S/L ASAD)

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47. Ladies and gentlemen, the war of 1967 and 1973 were interrelated events. The humiliating
defeat of the Arabs in 1967 paved the way for another major war in 1973. While the war in 67 was
one sided air war without hi-tech weapons, the 1973 war opened up the horizon of modern warfare
and revealed the potential of PGM, EW and UAVs. The war had been characterised by surprise and
tactical and technological innovation. The Arabs though successfully launched offensive in two
fronts but could not capitalize it in the later part due to Israel’s tactical and technological
innovations. The Arabs had to retreat even after they could reoccupy the lost territory. In the war
both Arab and Israel made extensive use of air power to their benefit. As far as the concept was
concerned Arab followed a strategically offensive but tactically defensive strategy. On the other
hand Israel followed a strategically defensive but tactically offensive strategy. The analysis
revealed how the principles of war were integrated to achieve the best result.

29. An analysis to the Israeli position shows that the war was considered to be against Israeli
interest, and therefore it was to be avoided as much as possible. Unlike 67 War the Israelis were in
the difficult situation due to the Arabs extensive SAM defences. Israeli Air Force initially suffered
heavy causalities. Despite initial success achieved by the Arabs they could not retain the same till
the last. The Arabs employment of air power did not happen in conformity of the accepted air
power Principles and in many a cases they lacked the vision as a whole. Therefore, they were not
able to turn that initial victory a total one. On the other hand Israel took a different approach even
after a set back. They employed the air power with a vision which ushered them a victory. Although
the war was short but it was very important from the air power perspective. Number of valuable
lessons can be drawn from this which are certainly important and likely to contribute in any future
air war. This great victory achieved by the Arabs during the Yom Kippur War was not the end of the
struggle against Israel. It is no more than one more link in its multi-link chain. They still have
oncoming stages for which they should prepare themselves with the same strength and solidarity so
as to attain their ultimate goal.

30. Ladies and gentlemen, we all take a very short break of 3 minutes to stand before you for
the clarification and question and answer session.

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