Cornago 2010 On The Normalization of Sub-State Diplomacy PDF

The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 5 (2010) 11-36 brill.
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On the Normalization of Sub-State Diplomacy
Noé Cornago
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of the Basque Country, Campus of Leioa,
PO Box 644, Bilbao, Basque Country 48080, Spain
noe.cornago@ehu.es
Received: 2 June 2009; revised: 25 October 2009; accepted: 30 November 2009
Summary
Against conventional approaches that tend to minimize the importance of sub-state diplomacy, this arti-
cle argues that this reality is presently undergoing a process of legal and political normalization through-
out the world and deserves greater attention from both diplomatic practitioners and experts. This process,
which is embedded in wider structural transformations, is driven simultaneously by two competing forces
that are present in virtually all states: first, international mobilization of sub-state governments them-
selves, since they increasingly pursue relevant political objectives in the international field through their
own methods and instruments; and second, the various attempts to limit and control that activism
deployed by central governments through various legal and political instruments. After a brief discussion
on the notion of normalization in critical social theory and its validity for diplomatic studies, this article
examines the normalization of sub-state diplomacy through four, closely interconnected conceptual
lenses: normalization as generalization; normalization as regionalization; normalization as reflective
adaptation; and, finally, normalization as contentious regulation. Normalization enables the diplomatic
system to operate in an increasingly complex environment while simultaneously affirming its own hierar-
chical structure. The limits of that normalization process, as well as its wider implications for diplomatic
theory and practice, are also discussed.
Keywords
diplomacy, sub-state, paradiplomacy, constituent units, foreign relations, normalization, international
socialization
Introduction
Although rarely spectacular, neither in form nor content, the international activism
of sub-state governments is rapidly growing across the world, discreetly transforming
diplomatic routines and foreign policy machineries. The institutional contours
and political relevance of that reality have been extensively studied over recent
decades from the point of view of disciplines as diverse as international law,1
1)
See Luigi Di Marzo, Component Units of Federal States and International Agreements (Alphen aan den
Rijn: Sijhoff & Nordhoff, 1980); Renaud J. Dehousse, Federalisme et relations internationales (Brussels:
Bruylant, 1991); and Manuel Pérez-González (ed.), La acción exterior de los länder, regiones y comunidades
autónomas (Oñati: IVAP-HAEE, 1994).
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI: 10.1163/187119110X12574289877326
12 N. Cornago / The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 5 (2010) 11-36
international relations and comparative politics,2 and international political econ-

omy.3 In contrast, specialists in diplomatic studies have only exceptionally consid-
ered sub-state interventions in the international realm as noteworthy.4 Reflecting
on that situation in one of his innovative contributions to the field, and after care-
ful examination of existing sub-state diplomatic activities in the Nordic space,
Neumann convincingly pointed out that this issue deserves closer attention by
practitioners or scholars concerned with coherence between diplomatic practices
and conventional diplomatic discourses.5
Literature on sub-state diplomacy has never attracted mainstream attention in
diplomatic studies, nor in the field of international relations, but it has become
the subject of intense scholarly debate. Initially, the most influential works were
more descriptive than explanatory in content. They identified the many interna-
tional strategies implemented by diverse sub-state governments in areas as diverse
as foreign trade and investment, tourism promotion, environmental protection
and human security, as well as in other social or cultural domains. However, in
addition to these basically descriptive accounts, the most influential literature in
the field has always concentrated specific attention on the way in which decen-
tralization of international relations, as sub-state diplomacy implies, may affect
conventional understanding of diplomacy as an exclusive dominion of sovereign
states.6
Following pioneering work in the field by Duchacek and Soldatos, this phe-
nomenon has frequently been described as ‘paradiplomacy’.7 Although the con-
ceptual validity of this notion has often been questioned, paradiplomacy can be
defined in simple terms as:
2)
Among the most significant works that contributed to give form to this debate, see Ivo D. Duchacek,
Daniel Latouche and Garth Stevenson (eds.), Perforated Sovereignties and International Relations: Trans-
Sovereign Contacts of Subnational Governments (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); Hans J. Michelmann
and Panayotis Soldatos (eds.), Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Brian Hocking (ed.), Foreign Relations and Federal States (London:
Leicester University Press, 1993); and Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating (eds.), Paradiplomacy in
Action: The Foreign Relations of Sub-National Governments (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
3)
See Guy Lachapelle and Stéphane Paquin (eds.), Mastering Globalization: New Sub-States’ Governance
and Strategies (London: Routledge, 2005).
4)
Among the most important exceptions, see Brian Hocking, ‘Catalytic Diplomacy: Between Newness
and Decline’, in Jan Melissen (ed.), Innovation in Diplomatic Practice (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
1998), pp. 21-42; and Alan K. Henrikson, ‘Facing Across Borders: The Diplomacy of Bon Voisinage’,
International Political Science Review, vol. 21, no. 2, 2000.
5)
See Iver B. Neumann, ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy’, Millen-
nium, vol. 32, no. 3, 2002, pp. 627-652.
6)
See Stéphane Paquin, Paradiplomatie et relations internationales: Théorie des stratégies internationales des
régions face á la mondialisation (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2004).
7)
See Ivo D. Duchacek, ‘Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in International
Relations’, and Panayotis Soldatos, ‘An Explanatory Framework for the Study of Federated States as For-
eign-Policy Actors’, both in Michelmann and Soldatos (eds.), Federalism and International Relations: The
Role of Subnational Units, pp. 1-33 and 34-53.
N. Cornago / The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 5 (2010) 11-36 13
[. . .] sub-state governments’ involvement in international relations, through the establishment of

formal and informal contacts, either permanent or ad hoc, with foreign public or private entities,
with the aim to promote socio-economic, cultural or political issues, as well as any other foreign
dimension of their own constitutional competences.8
But beyond any attempt to clarify its content, paradiplomacy has most certainly
been a particularly contested concept given that it suggests a contentious connec-
tion with diplomacy — and not simply with the international realm — while
simultaneously affirming its own separated autonomy. That connotation is absent
in other possible notions, such as that of ‘constituent diplomacy’, which is consis-
tently suggested by Kincaid, or that of ‘multilayered diplomacy’, as advocated
by Hocking. These, in contrast, tend to emphasize the consensual and inclusive
dimensions of this reality over its possible controversial aspects.9 However, and in
order to avoid possible terminological disputes, ‘sub-state diplomacy’ can perhaps
be a more appropriate denomination for a reality that is becoming commonplace
in the daily policy-making processes of many local and regional governments
throughout the world and is increasingly accepted by the diplomatic system itself.
This article, however, will consider exclusively the case of those diplomatic
practices that are deployed by intermediate or regional governments, leaving the
case of ‘city diplomacy’ outside its scope. This decision deserves some justifica-
tion. Not in vain, it has been aptly suggested that:
[. . .] the vast array of entities commonly labelled ‘regions’ actually encompasses a wide range of quite
different phenomena.10
This lack of conceptual precision significantly complicates the process of system-

atizing research efforts. Regions can be sub-national, international, trans-national,
or supranational in scope. They can be formalized institutions as well as non-for-
malized entities. They can be basically economic, cultural or political realities, or
simply a matter of spatial continuity. Regions can also be a collective sense of
belonging. This conceptual ambiguity poses a serious challenge for positivist
approaches to empirical research, but it has quite different implications for inter-
pretive social sciences.11 Indeed, conceptual flexibility can also be a fruitful
8)
See Noé Cornago, ‘Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy in the Redefinition of International Security:
Dimensions of Conflict and Cooperation’, in Aldecoa and Keating, Paradiplomacy in Action, p. 40.
9)
On the notions of ‘constituent diplomacy’ and ‘multilayered diplomacy’, see Johan Kincaid, ‘Foreign
Relations of Sub-National Units: Constituent Diplomacies in Federal Systems’, in Raoul Blindenbacher
and Arnold Koller (eds.), Federalism in a Changing World: Learning from Each Other (Montreal QC:
McGill-Queens University Press, 2002), pp. 74-96; and Brian Hocking, Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-
Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy (London: Macmillan, 1993).
10)
See Peter Schmitt-Egner ‘The Concept of “Region”: Theoretical and Methodological Notes on its
Reconstruction’, Revue d’integration européenne / Journal of European Integration, vol. 24, no. 3, 2002,
pp. 179-200.
11)
For a basic introduction to interpretive social sciences, see Mark Bevir and R. Rhodes, ‘Interpretive
venue for enquiry. After all, in spite of the crucial differences that are present
among them, the Canadian provinces, Spanish autonomous communities, Bra-
zilian and Indian states, Russian republics, Bolivian departments and Italian
regions — as is the case with many other meso-level governments that are easily
recognizable throughout the world — share common features that are difficult to
ignore. All of them are government bodies with relevant competences and sig-
nificant administrative resources, and, undoubtedly of greater importance, all of
them are more than a city but less than a sovereign state. That meso-level position
entails important implications in terms of their ultimate nature and political rel-
evance. The internationalization of cities, for instance, can hardly be considered a
challenge to the integrity — neither territorially nor simply symbolically — of
the state’s sovereignty. In contrast, diplomatic efforts deployed by territorial units
or regional governments are generally submitted to more careful political moni-
toring, by both central or federal governments as well as the diplomatic system,
precisely because of suspicions regarding that possibility.
Bearing these precedents in mind, and in contrast with relevant contributions
in the field of diplomatic studies that tend either to deny or minimize their pos-
sible relevance,12 this article asserts that so-called ‘normalization’ of sub-state
diplomacy is a politically relevant process. In addition, the article argues that this
process is highly indicative of the crucial transformation that diplomacy is cur-
rently experiencing worldwide. Bringing the insights of Foucault on social con-
trol through normalization processes to the diplomatic field,13 we can say that
normalization enables institutional diplomatic structures to operate in an increas-
ingly complex environment. Normalization simultaneously allows the flourishing
of diplomatic innovation that growing pluralization of international life produces,
while simultaneously affirming the hierarchical structure of the diplomatic sys-
tem. Normalization can consequently be defined as a mode of control that recog-
nizes an otherwise deviant practice as valid, while the limits of these practices are
fixed and carefully monitored.14
Embedded in broader structural transformations — in economic, institutional,
cultural, technological or environmental domains — these normalizing processes
Theory’, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Science (Houndmills:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 131-152.
12)
The consideration of sub-state diplomacy in the context of diplomatic studies is still marginal and
rarely direct. For instance, the lack of specific attention to that reality is noteworthy in the otherwise
outstanding title by Christer Jönsson and Richard Langhorne (eds.), Diplomacy (3 volumes) (London:
Sage, 2004).
13)
On Foucault and international relations, see Kimberly Hutchins, ‘Foucault and International Rela-
tions Theory’, in M. Lloyd and A. Thacker (eds.), The Impact of Foucault on the Social Sciences and
Humanities (London: Macmillan, 1997) pp. 102-127; and Andrew W. Neal, ‘Michel Foucault’, in
J. Edkins and N. Vaughan Williams (eds.), Critical Theorists and International Relations (London:
Routledge, 2009), pp. 161-170.
14)
On the normalization issue, see John D. Caputo and Mark Yount, ‘Institutions, Normalization and
Power’, in J. Caputo and M. Yount (eds.), Foucault and the Critique of Institutions (University Park PA:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993) pp. 3-26.
are simultaneously driven by two competing forces that are present within virtu-
ally all states: first, the mobilization of sub-state governments themselves, as they
are increasingly pursuing, by their own means, relevant political objectives in the
international field; and second, the various attempts to limit and control that activism
that are implemented by central governments through diverse legal instruments
and political means. For the purpose of clarity, this process of normalization will
be consecutively examined through four different, closely interconnected concep-
tual lenses: 1) normalization as virtual generalization; 2) normalization as differ-
entiated regionalization; 3) normalization as reflective adaptation; and 4)
normalization as contentious regulation. The limits of this process of normaliza-
tion, as well as its wider implications for diplomatic theory and practice, will also
be discussed. However, this exploration of the normalization of sub-state diplo-
macy does not aim to be celebratory. It will not depict a parsimonious and fluid
process but a contentious and controversial one, albeit generally peaceful and
never conducive to war. Through these processes of normalization, the interna-
tional activism of sub-state governments, which were once considered by many
academics and practitioners to be deviant, irrelevant, nonsensical or simply excep-
tional, finally becomes accepted. However, as will be suggested, this process is
never finished. Sooner or later, the political controversy reappears.15
It can arguably be said that, formulated in this way, the notion of normaliza-
tion implies that the described process has a top–down direction, one in which
central governments are the masters of the game, always aware of its political
design and ultimate objective, while sub-state governments simply try, once and
again, to find new venues for their international projection under the close scru-
tiny of their respective hosting states. But in order to understand normalization
in the diplomatic field, top–down as well as bottom–up processes are equally
relevant. Although they are situated in very different places of enunciation, both
state officials and sub-state representatives, in dealing with these issues, deploy a
mixture of utilitarian bargaining and communicative reasoning. Their respective
actions and arguments are certainly affected by a speech context, in which the
most powerful side is usually the one representing the voice of the affected state
through its central government representatives. But their interventions are also
embedded in a wider functional and normative context. That context to some
extent modulates the attitudes that both sides will observe when dealing with the
need to assess the political convenience and appropriateness of sub-state diplo-
macy, as well as its necessary adjustment to the prevailing diplomatic system.16
15)
On the ways in which the disciplining and normalizing processes described by Foucault are embedded
in wider structural conditions operating on a global scale, see Jan Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault: Discourse,
Liberal Governance and the Limits of Foucaldian IR’, International Relations, vol. 21, no. 2, 2004,
pp. 324-345.
16)
On these notions, as well as on their validity for understanding innovation and change in the diplo-
matic milieu, see Harald Müller, ‘Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist
That process of mutual adjustment between sub-state and state government

officials can also be described in terms of international socialization. This notion
has recently been defined by Checkel in the following terms:
Socialization is defined as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given com-
munity. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these norms. In adopt-
ing community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a logic of
consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite inde-
pendent from a particular structure of material incentives and sanctions.17
But in spite of the fruitfulness of that notion, and from the point of view that
inspires this article, the normalization approach is preferred for four basic reasons.
First, mainstream literature on international socialization is generally centred
on further exploring the middle ground between rationalist and constructivist
approaches to foreign policy and international institutionalization.18 Conversely,
the literature has generally ignored structural dimensions, which have an impor-
tant explanatory weight for this article’s purposes. Second, sub-state governments
are invariably ignored in the most influential literature in the field. Despite its
growing interest in NGOs, private groups or epistemic communities, central gov-
ernments are the sole relevant governments for this body of literature. Third, as
happens with its original sources in social theory and political science, literature
on international socialization tends to focus on the consensual dimensions of
political life, while this article, on the other hand, emphasizes the contentious
dimensions of this normalizing process.19 Finally, in contrast to prevailing
approaches to international socialization, this article is less interested in explain-
ing how sub-state diplomacy reveals the internalization of existing diplomatic
norms than in the opposite — that is to say, how the diplomatic system responds
to the growing international activism of sub-state governments across the world.
Normalization as Virtual Generalization

This section takes as its point of departure the assumption — basically under-
stood as non-controversial — that we are witnessing the generalization of sub-
Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations’, European Journal of International
Relations, vol. 10, no. 3, 2004, pp. 395-435.
17)
See Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and
Framework’, International Organization, vol. 59, no. 4, 2005, p. 803.
18)
See Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an
Institutional Environment’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 6, no.1, 2000, pp. 109-139.
19)
For instance, in spite of her careful attention to domestic complexity, Flockhart ignores the impor-
tance of sub-state governments in her very innovative work. See Trine Flockhart, ‘Complex Socialization:
A Framework for the Study of State Socialization’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 12,
no. 1, 2006, pp. 89-118.
state diplomacy over virtually the entire world. Against conventional views, the
international activism of sub-state governments is neither exclusive to federal
countries nor to firmly established democracies. It is undoubtedly particularly
salient in the case of some federal countries, such as Canada or the United States,
as well as in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Germany and Switzerland, but it is also
relevant in many unitary and decentralized countries, such as France, Italy, Spain
or the United Kingdom. More interestingly, and beyond the Western world, sub-
state diplomacy is becoming increasingly present in countries as diverse as Argen-
tina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia
or South Africa.20 As Paquin has succinctly pointed out, the growing involvement
of sub-state governments in the international realm has become so ‘intensive and
extensive’ across the world, that its ultimate significance certainly demands greater
attention.21
Efforts to promote foreign trade and investment, the maintenance of perma-
nent delegations abroad, the extension of international agreements through
diverse soft-law mechanisms, limited participation in international treaty-making
processes in cases where it is constitutionally established — for example, Austria,
Belgium or Germany — intensive participation in multilateral negotiation schemes
on a geographical or functional basis, direct relationships with international orga-
nizations, the frequent sending and hosting of international missions, the launch-
ing of occasional political statements on international issues, place branding and
public diplomacy campaigns, foreign aid programmes and cross-national envi-
ronmental cooperation schemes . . .; all of the above, and many other instruments
with their corresponding administrative and budgetary provisions, are becoming
common practice for sub-state governments worldwide. In fact, with this reality
in mind — and particularly intense in cases where constituent units have legisla-
tive powers — Criekemans has convincingly suggested that the boundaries
between paradiplomacy and diplomacy are perhaps watering down.22
The causes of this trend are very diverse, but in broad terms it can be said that
under present global conditions, sub-state governments have to respond to a
20)
Evidence of the global spread of sub-state diplomacy can be found in Rudolf Hrbek (ed.), External
Relations of Regions in Europe and the World (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003); Tullo Vigevani, Luiz E. Wan-
derley and Marcelo Passini (eds.), A dimensão subnacional e as relações internacionales (Sao Paulo: Cedec/
EDUC-EDUSC, 2004); Sergio Gelfenstein (ed.), La paradiplomacia: Las relaciones internacionales de los
gobiernos locales (Mexico: Porrua, 2006); Raoul Blindenbacher and Chandra Pasma (eds.), Dialogues on
Foreign Relations in Federal Countries (Montreal: Forum of Federations/IACFS, 2008); and Hans J.
Michelmann (ed.), Federalism and Foreign Relations (Ottawa ON: McGill-Queens University Press,
2009).
21)
See Stéphane Paquin, ‘Les actions extérieures des entités subétatiques: quelle signification pour la politique
comparée et les relations internationales’, Revue internationale de politique comparée, vol. 12, no. 2, 2005,
pp. 129-142.
22)
See David Criekemans, ‘Are the Boundaries between Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy Watering Down?’,
paper presented at the Second Global International Studies Conference/WISC, Ljubljana, Slovenia,
23-26 July 2008.
number of economic, environmental, technological, cultural and security prob-

lems. These go far beyond the conventional imaginary in which the differentia-
tion between domestic and foreign policy was historically formulated. This
structural change imposes the need to create new public and private institutions,
new modes of attribution of responsibility and legitimacy, and new global norms.
It is probable that the driving force behind the new, international dynamism of
sub-state governments is the territorial and institutional impact of global eco-
nomic restructuring over the past two decades. The expansion of commerce and
the removal of barriers to trade and foreign investment through various liberaliza-
tion schemes, as well as the new regulatory framework for global competence,
have greatly affected local and regional economies, additionally eroding sub-state
autonomy.23 The combined effects of a new economic geography, institutional
restructuring, new technological facilities, cross-national migration and new
environmental concerns have, in short, all helped to propel sub-state govern-
ments towards a new era of global competitiveness. After a very original analysis
on the ways in which regional governments represent themselves in the public
sphere through their official websites, Dijkink and Winnips conclude that regions
nowadays compete internationally:
[. . .] not only on the basis of traditional location factors — transport, taxes, and labor market — but
also by calling up the image of an entirely alternative society which is portrayed as both ‘flexible’ and
‘capable’ of reinvention, adopting a new [. . .] rhetoric which invariably relies on a mixture of cultural
and technological arguments.24
This understanding of the situation gives sub-state diplomacy its distinctive dis-
cursive tone, one that can be encountered all over the world with only minor
variations, in places such as Texas in the United States, Shandong in China, Anda-
lusia in Spain, Gauteng in South Africa, or Kansai in Japan, to name only a few.
Of course, in spite of these general aspects, sub-state involvement in foreign affairs
generally acquires specific profiles depending on the precise political and consti-
tutional systems that are present in each sovereign state, as well as in each broader,
regional context. However, it is worth noting that global dynamics seem to
prevail over domestic conditions.25 But relevant dynamics here are not solely
functional. Significant normative dimensions are also highly influential. Social
23)
See David Sadler, The Global Region: Production, State Policies and Uneven Development (Oxford: Per-
gamon Press, 1992); and Darel E. Paul, Rescaling International Political Economy: Subnational States and
the Regulation of the Global Political Economy (New York: Routledge, 2005).
24)
See Gertjan Dijkink and Constance Winnips, ‘Alternative States: Regions and Post-Fordism Rhetoric
on the Internet’, Geojournal, vol. 48, no. 4, 2004, p. 323.
25)
For an accurate reflection on the importance of these issues, see Marcelo A. Medeiros, ‘Sub-National
State Actors and their Role in Regional Governance’, in Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann and Johanna Maria
van der Vleuten (eds.), Closing or Widening the Gap?: Legitimacy and Democracy in Regional Integration
Organizations (London: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 103-116.
disintegration and uncertainty, conflicting attributions of responsibility, territo-

rial alienation from core regions within the affected states, political reassertion of
cultural singularities, awareness about new, institutional, legitimating needs…;
all of these aspects provide us with a new understanding of how sub-state govern-
ments are expected to react to this new global context. As a result of this interplay,
sub-state diplomacy is becoming more and more intensive not only in matters of
functional relevance — such as trade, investment, infrastructure and environ-
mental resources — but also, although to a lesser degree, in normative issues such
as ethno-political claims, human rights advocacy or international solidarity.
Normalization as Differentiated Regionalization

In spite of its pervasive influence, the global dynamics discussed in the previous
section cannot completely explain the specific profiles that sub-state diplomacy
acquires in different areas of the world. Regional integration schemes have had
significant implications at a domestic level, creating both new, institutional con-
strictions and opportunities, and fostering the mobilization of sub-state govern-
ments in the international realm. When contemplated in a comparative perspective,
the relationships between the wider structural conditions posed by regional inte-
gration schemes such as the European Union (EU), North American Free-Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur, or Common Market
of the South) or the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the
diverse modes of international activism adopted by sub-state governments within
each of these areas, become clear. In other words, there is a structural link between
what has been called ‘macro-regionalism’ and ‘micro-regionalism’.26 While macro-
regionalism creates new structures of opportunity, as well as new constraints,
through economic integration and institutional building, micro-regionalism
reveals a significant ability for policy learning and adaptation alongside sub-state
governments within each of these macro-regional spaces created by sovereign
states. This adaptive process, which is particularly salient in the field of cross-
border and other issue-thematic cooperation schemes,27 seems to prevail over
the constitutional framework of the hosting states, facilitating a remarkable
isomorphism in sub-state diplomacy within each of these broader integration
schemes. This process of regionalization allows sub-state governments in different
countries to adopt idiosyncratic forms of international projection within each
of these areas. Sub-state governments with diverse constitutional powers and
26)
First introduced by Björn Hettne, ‘Globalization and New Regionalism: The Second Great Transfor-
mation’, in Björn Hettne, András Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (eds.), Globalism and the New Regionalism
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), pp. 1-24. Later these notions were also applied by Shaun Breslin
and Glenn D. Hook (eds.), Microregionalism and World Order (London: Palgrave, 2002).
27)
A critical overview of cross-border issues across the world is offered by Markus Perkmann and Ngai
Ling Sum (eds.), Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).
institutional strength are consequently able to cooperate with each other in spite
of their heterogeneity. Within the limits of this brief article, this section will offer
some examples regarding the ways in which this process actually works.
The European case is particularly relevant for illustrating the structural link
between sub-state diplomacy and both regional cooperation and integration schemes.
In addition, it shows how the normalization process that we are discussing has
been effectively implemented by both the European Commission and EU mem-
ber states simultaneously, following the path previously set by the Council of
Europe. Although the EU initially undermined important sub-national compe-
tences, its evolving institutional framework — over the course of various con-
secutive reforms — has finally established a somewhat favourable political context
for sub-state mobilization. This process has substantially transformed administra-
tive cultures among EU member states and has enabled the spread of a shared
perception concerning the need to provide institutional venues for mobilizing
sub-state governments across the European region and beyond.28
For those not familiar with the European integration process, it is worth men-
tioning the milestones in the EU’s institutional recognition of regional govern-
ments as actors of political relevance: first, the creation in 1994 of the Committee
of the Regions with its consultative role on issues such as territorial and social
cohesion, education and culture, public health, transport and infrastructure; sec-
ond, the recruitment of regional authorities as partners in implementing Euro-
pean structural policies; and third, the provision that EU member states can
be represented in the Council of Ministers by representatives of their respective
constituent units. The latter has been effectively implemented by Austria, Bel-
gium, Germany and, more recently, Spain. Moreover, through significant fund-
ing incentives, the EU has actively promoted the launch of multiple, cross-border
and inter-regional cooperation schemes across the continent. All of these aspects
have been of significance in contributing to the growing acceptance of multi-level
governance as one of the driving forces behind the whole European integration
process. On analysing this reality, it is important to stress that the initiatives
adopted by the EU have always been designed in a particularly inclusive manner.
In so doing, the EU deliberately attempted to enable the most disparate incarna-
tions of sub-state governments to participate in these innovative venues for pol-
icy-making in the European polity. Furthermore, through the provision of these
institutional venues for political participation, the EU has been quite successful
in responding to sub-states’ claims for greater political recognition, which were
particularly intense in countries such as Belgium, Spain, Italy and the United
Kingdom. Although problematic issues such as ethno-territorial claims remain to
28)
Comprehensive accounts of this process can be found in John Loughlin (eds.), Subnational Democracy
in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and
Michael Keating, Regions and Regionalism in Europe (London: Edward Elgar, 2004).
be solved,29 it can in short be argued that sub-state diplomacy has encountered

quite a favourable context in the EU, with political space for participation and
significant incentives — in the form of economic support — for the institution-
alization of sub-state international activism.
The European case sharply contrasts with that of North America. Although
very different in nature and scope, NAFTA has also provoked significant sub-
national mobilization in the United States, Mexico and Canada. Sub-state
governments’ concerns over the erosion of their autonomy within new sub-
continental trade and investment liberalization schemes were difficult to contain.30
NAFTA, indeed, soon revealed the institutional shortcomings in addition to the
important implications of its political design on the constitutional systems of its
member states, as well as the limitations of policy convergence in areas such as
trade, investment and the environment. Canadian provinces and US states have
also been particularly active in denouncing the critical implications of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) on sub-national competences. Their continual com-
plaints about the erosion of constitutional competences have nonetheless provoked
a reluctant, albeit increasingly clear, federal recognition of their role in global
trade.31 As a result, US states and Canadian provinces are discovering that —
given their economic power and social legitimacy — they are able to influence
federal positions on relevant international issues such as global trade, security,
human rights or environmental problems.32 A recent study reveals, however, quite
unsurprisingly, that US state governors with greater institutional powers, budget-
ary control and electoral support are more likely to achieve higher degrees of
foreign policy activity.33 The case of Mexico requires a different approach. The
combination of economic liberalization and democratic pluralism has revitalized
Mexican federalism, fostering the political mobilization of its constituent units
both at domestic and international levels. However, increasing territorial inequal-
ities and competences are posing a serious challenge to political stability in Mex-
ico.34 In coherence with NAFTA’s lack of common institutions and huge structural
asymmetries, the relationships between Mexico’s constituent units and their US
counterparts tend to be, even in the case of cross-border cooperation schemes,
quite competitive. In contrast, relationships between US states and Canadian
29)
See John McGarry and Michael Keating (eds.), European Integration and the Nationalities Question
(London: Routledge, 2006).
30)
See Stephan De Boer, ‘Canadian Provinces, US States and North American Integration: Bench Warm-
ers of Key Players’, Choices, vol. 8, no. 4, 2002.
31)
See Chris Kukucha, ‘Domestic Politics and Canadian Foreign Trade Policy: Intrusive Interdepend-
ence, The WTO and the NAFTA’, Canadian Foreign Policy, vol. 10, no. 1, 2003.
32)
See Michelle Sager, One Voice or Many? Federalism and International Trade (New York: LFB Scholarly
Publishing, 2002).
33)
See Samuel L. McMillan, ‘Subnational Foreign Policy Actors: How and Why Governors Participate in
US Foreign Policy’, Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 4, no. 3, 2008, pp. 227-253.
34)
See Jorge Schiavon, La proyección internacional de las entidades federativas en México y el mundo (Mex-
ico: Matías Romero Institute-SRE, 2006).
provinces, which are particularly intense on environmental issues, are consider-

ably more cooperative.
Disputes over borders and political authoritarianism have for decades pre-
vented the emergence of powerful regional governments in Latin America. None-
theless, the consolidation of democracy and renewed efforts to impel regional
integration under schemes such as Mercosur or the new Andean Community
have greatly facilitated a new era of decentralization across the continent. In the
case of Mercosur, some important steps have been taken to recognize the growing
role of sub-state governments in the promotion of economic integration and
political confidence. Simultaneously, sub-state governments have started to experi-
ment with different modes of international mobilization, with the aim of pro-
moting diverse policy issues, fostering greater international cooperation in trade
and investment, infrastructure and important environmental issues.35 This trend
is particularly evident in Argentina and Brazil because of both their strong federal
systems and the growing sub-national implications of Mercosur, although it is
also notable even in unitary countries such as Chile or Peru. However, in order to
complement this new openness, Latin American chanceries have also developed
new instruments to monitor these forms of sub-state international activism better.
In Argentina, in 1992, legal and administrative measures were adopted in order
to maintain the growing internationalization of the provinces under certain con-
trol.36 A similar pattern was followed in Brazil. In 1997, Brazil’s federal govern-
ment reorganized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so as to include new institutional
provisions adapted to this new reality.37 In addition, in the context of past eco-
nomic crises, the World Bank directly offered substantial loans to various Brazil-
ian states and Argentinean provinces, facilitating their internationalization in
quite an unexpected way. Although far more discretely, given the political condi-
tions of the affected states, sub-state diplomacy is also becoming visible in coun-
tries such as Bolivia, Chile, Colombia or Peru. In the case of Bolivia, sub-state
diplomacy is rapidly acquiring a new ethno-political profile, which is provoking
serious concerns within Bolivia’s central government. However, in other cases,
such as those of Chile and Peru, sub-state initiatives are generally promoted by
central governments themselves — as a new and promising tool for regional inte-
35)
Sub-state multilateralism has been particularly relevant in the context of MERCOSUR. See, for
instance, the many initiatives adopted by the North-East Argentina Regional Foreign Trade Commission
(CRECENEA), Southern Brazil Commission for Development and Trade (CODESUL) (online at
http://www.crecenea.org.ar/html/crecenea-codesul.htm), as well as by the South American Midwest Inte-
gration Zone (ZICOSUR) (see online at http://www.zicosur.net/Nueva_ZICOSUR/ingles/), all accessed
on 10 November 2009. On these processes, see Jorge Tapia (ed.), El marco jurídico-institucional de la
integración fronteriza subregional (Iquique: Arturo Prat University, 2003).
36)
See Eduardo Iglesias et al., Las provincias argentinas en el escenario internacional (Buenos Aires: CARI-
UNDP, 2008).
37)
See Tullo Vigevani, ‘The Legal and Institutional Framework for the International Management of Sub-
national Government Players in Brazil’, Integration and Trade, vol. 21, no. 8, 2004, pp. 27-46; and Gilberto
M.A. Rodrigues, ‘Relações internacionais federativas no Brasil ’, Dados, vol. 51, 2008, pp. 1015-1034.
gration and building cross-national confidence — by launching a number of

cross-border cooperation schemes for issues such as education, the environment,
tourism, or technical infrastructures.38
Because of the overwhelming influence of countries such as Russia, China,
India and Japan, in addition to the notable differences that exist among them,
it is difficult to extract general conclusions about sub-state diplomacy in the
immense zone between the post-Soviet space and the so-called Asia–Pacific rim.
Consequently, the following paragraphs will simply attempt to summarize the
most significant developments in each of these crucial countries, in order to ascer-
tain their respective influence in shaping specific forms of sub-state diplomacy.
The demise of the Soviet Union contributed quite unexpectedly to giving a
particularly high profile to sub-state diplomacy in the so-called post-Soviet space.
After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the new Russian Federation assigned a
special role to sub-national involvement in foreign affairs. In order to assure its
new legitimacy, the federal government decided to include the Russian regions’
constituent units in their foreign policy and diplomacy designs. Regions were
allowed to maintain international relations and to sign certain international
agreements on the basis of their own competencies, while the central government
was committed to not reaching agreements with neighbouring states, nor to sub-
scribing or modifying international treaties without consulting the affected
regions. Regions were also allowed to establish missions abroad as well as to
receive official delegations from equivalent regions in foreign states, and regions’
governors were routinely included as delegation members in official diplomatic
missions and international negotiations. Through the development of this toler-
ance, the Russian Federation tried, during the Yeltsin era, both to reduce ethnic
demands — for example, in Tatarstan — as well as to promote rapid integration
in the global economy.39 Certainly, this tolerance was much more restricted for
some critical regions, but with the exception of the republics of the Caucasus,
only rarely have Russian regions adopted foreign policy positions in head-on
opposition to those of the federal government.40 This friendly environment, which
was encountered by most Russian regions during the 1990s with regard to their
international activism, along with its resonance in neighbouring states,41 was
nonetheless interrupted under Russian President Putin’s leadership. His efforts to
38)
See Sergio González Miranda, Arica y la triple frontera: Integración y conflicto entre Bolivia, Perú y Chile
(Santiago: Aríbalo, 2006).
39)
For a contextualized assessment on these early developments in the immediate post-Soviet context, see
Neil Melvin, Regional Foreign Policies in the Russian Federation (London: RIIA, 1995).
40)
On the proliferation of Russian sub-state diplomacies during the Yeltsin era, see Andrey Makarychev,
Islands of Globalization: Regional Russia and the Outside World, ETH Working Paper no. 2 (Zurich: ETH,
2000); and Jerome Perovic, Internationalization of Russian Regions and the Consequences for Russian Foreign
and Security Policy, EHT Working Paper no. 3 (Zurich: ETH, 2000).
41)
See Renata Dwan and Oleksandr Pavliuk (eds.), Building Security in the New States of Eurasia: Subre-
gional Cooperation in the Former Soviet Space (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
concentrate political power at the core of the Russian presidency hindered the
international activism of Russian republics for some time. The Law on Coordina-
tion of Foreign Relations and International Trade of the Subjects of the Russian
Federation, which was passed in January 1999, established that international
agreements by the regions would only be allowed if they went through a complex
process of securing approval at the federal level, but still allowed sub-state inter-
national relations in fields such as trade and investment, science, environmental
and cultural cooperation, and humanitarian relief. However, according to recent
assessments, Russian sub-state diplomacy is at present still significantly active.42
The Chinese case also presents some interesting peculiarities. In the framework
of its experimental transition to capitalism, China promoted the international
projection of its provinces for strictly economic purposes. But later, this narrow
economic approach was revised under a renewed foreign policy doctrine in which
provinces were called upon to play a major role. This process began in coastal
regions such as Guangdong, among others, with the aim of promoting de facto
economic integration with Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan. But the increasing
economic disparities between coastal provinces and the more depressed northern,
inland and western provinces later provoked significant complaints from the
remaining provinces, which facilitated their international mobilization too. After
the Tiananmen crisis, China adopted a new diplomatic strategy, seeking to elude
its international isolation through innovative foreign policy instruments. In this
context, sub-state diplomacy, with the exceptions of Tibet and Xingjian, was wel-
comed by Beijing. As a result of these overlapping dynamics, Chinese provinces
are among the most active actors all over the world in the field of sub-state diplo-
macy. They have been able to extend a particularly dense network of relationships
with diverse public and private counterparts across the world.43 Moreover, a num-
ber of case studies show the important role played by the Chinese diaspora in the
shaping of these paradiplomatic efforts.44
In contrast with the Russian and Chinese cases, the Japanese case has received
very little attention among specialists. Japanese prefectures have also, however,
been very active in the international realm. In addition to being especially active
in the economic and environmental fields, Japanese prefectures have found their
42)
On the current state of sub-state diplomacy in Russia, see Alexander S. Kuznetsov, ‘Paradiplomacy
as the Domestic Source of Russian Foreign Policy: An Analysis on the Basis of Theoretical Framework’,
paper prepared for the 50th annual International Studies Association meeting, New York, 15-18 February
2009.
43)
See Peter T.Y. Cheung and James T.H. Tang, ‘The External Relations of China’s Provinces’, in David
M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 91-120; and Chen Zhimin, ‘Coastal Provinces and
China’s Foreign Policy-Making’, in Yufan Hao and Lin Su (eds.), China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal
Forces and Chinese American Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 187-207.
44)
See, for instance, Miguel Santos Neves, ‘Macau and Europe: The Challenges of the Paradiplomacy
Game’, China Perspectives, vol. 44, no. 6, 2002, pp. 54-66.
more distinctive contribution to sub-state diplomacy across the world in the pro-
motion of pacifism and nuclear disarmament.45
Conversely, the Indian federal system has not had sub-national sub-state diplo-
macy facilitated until very recently.46 Ethnic claims and border disputes have
always complicated Indian foreign policy designs, but it has been suggested that
the very existence of ethnic ties across borders — as in the case of Kashmir, Pun-
jab or Assam — could be turned into different forms of cross-border cooperation
that would favour economic development and regional stability.47 In addition,
during recent years, and because of the considerable economic success of south-
ern states, a certain north-south cleavage seems to have emerged. Some Indian
states, such as Kerala, Karnataka, Andra-Pradesh and Maharastra are becoming
increasingly active in the economic field. Others, such as Jammu and Kashmir,
have only recently begun to show a new international ambition. However, these
mobilization efforts depend largely on personal leadership, political coalitions
and party politics in the broader Indian political system. Nevertheless, despite
federal governments’ concerns on the issue, the most relevant force driving Indian
constituent units to develop new transnational ties are, without doubt, the disci-
plining schemes resulting from both India’s membership of the WTO and the
World Bank’s direct financing of sub-national debt.48
Within the ASEAN space, and in coherence with its overall lack of suprana-
tional ambition and its low institutional profile, instead of missions around the
world and incentives for foreign investors, the internationalization of constituent
units in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines has been largely the
result of a variety of informal, economic cooperation schemes in border areas.
Through the configuration of the so-called ‘growth triangles’, a particularly effi-
cient division of labour among regional governments was promoted with spec-
tacular economic results. The oldest and most celebrated ‘growth triangle’ is the
one that links Singapore, Malaysia’s Johor province and Indonesia’s Riau Island,
although dozens of them were created in recent decades.49 While the concept
of ‘growth triangles’ has caught the public’s imagination in Asia, these transna-
tional economic experiments also had important social implications, in the form
of increasing income inequalities, territorial imbalances and ecological distress.
In addition, the effects of the economic crisis and new security concerns are
45)
See Jain Purnendra, Japan’s Subnational Governments in International Affairs (London: Routledge,
2005).
46)
See Amitah Matton and Happymon Jacob, ‘Republic of India’, in Hans J. Michelmann (ed.), Federal-
ism and Foreign Relations (Ottawa ON: McGill-Queens University Press, 2009), pp. 169-189.
47)
See R. Dossani and S. Vijakumar, ‘Indian Federalism and the Conduct of Foreign Policy in Border
States’, APARC/Stanford Working Papers, 2005.
48)
See Rob Jenkins, ‘India’s States and the Making of Foreign Economic Policy: The Limits of the Con-
stituent Diplomacy Paradigm’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 33, no. 4, 2003, pp. 63-82.
49)
A reflective balance on these initiatives can be found in Katsuhiro Sasura, Microregionalism and Gov-
ernance in East Asia (London: Routledge, 2004).
currently complicating the progress of these sub-state cooperating schemes. How-

ever, they have over time become a sort of catalyst for political change.50
Finally, it is worth commenting on the African case. Although the socio-eco-
nomic and political conditions of the vast majority of African states make the
normalizing of sub-state diplomacy a difficult task, some relevant developments
have been registered during recent years. In accordance with the general objec-
tives of state-building and democratization, it has been suggested that starting
from the potential of some bordering regions it will be possible to give new impe-
tus to preventive diplomacy and economic development. At present, this trend is
particularly evident in the case of South Africa, but in the near future it could
extend to other African countries.51 Based on the existing de facto integration
among some neighbouring economies, new regional cooperation schemes — such
as the renewed Southern African Development Community (SADC) — have
increased opportunities for sub-state diplomacy. Certainly, the social benefits of
these new, transnational projects generally fostered by South African provinces
remain to be seen, but they are having a significant demonstrative effect on coun-
tries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia and Uganda, among others.52
In short, this brief exploration of sub-state diplomacy across the world seems
to confirm that in addition to global dynamics and the specific constitutional dif-
ferences that exist among sovereign states, sub-state diplomacy acquires specific
profiles depending on the changing opportunities and constraints that are posed
by the broader regional cooperation or integration schemes that are present
throughout the world. When regional integration schemes have produced com-
mon institutions and supra-nationality, sub-state governments have encountered
a particularly favourable context for the recognition of their political relevance in
many policy issues. In these cases, innovative venues for sub-state participation in
multi-layered diplomatic processes have also been created. This would be valid for
the EU, and, albeit more modestly, Mercosur, but not yet for the NAFTA case. In
contrast, when new regionalism basically remains an intergovernmental issue,
as happens in the ASEAN, sub-state diplomacy also adopts a low, institutional
profile, being generally economic in content, and proving to be less relevant
politically.
Finally, in cases such as those of Russia, China or India, in which the central-
ization of power is more marked, sub-state diplomacy has also flourished but only
to the extent that it has proven to be a political instrument with enough flexibility
to facilitate better integration in diverse macro-regional integration or coopera-
50)
On the social and political implications of ‘growth triangles’, see Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Excep-
tion: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 88-92.
51)
See Christina Murray and Salim A. Nakhjavani, ‘Republic of South Africa’, in Hans J. Michelmann
(ed.), Federalism and Foreign Relations (Ottawa ON: McGill-Queens University Press, 2009), pp. 212-240.
52)
See Nico Steyler, ‘Cross-Border External Relations of South African Provinces’, in R. Hrbek (ed.),
External Relations of Regions in Europe and the World (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), pp. 247-253.
tion schemes, although it is ultimately submitted to the foreign policy priorities

of federal governments. More importantly, this article suggests that the resulting
modalities of sub-state diplomacy can be understood as a form of commitment
between constituent units’ mobilization efforts and the necessary adjustment to
the changing regional context that states themselves are, more or less willingly,
obliged to promote actively if they want to escape from international isolation
and ostracism. In this sense, it can be argued that the normalization of sub-state
diplomacy is also becoming regionalized.
Normalization as Reflective Adaptation

In addition to the global and regional dynamics discussed above, and in order to
have an accurate understanding of the specific profiles that sub-state diplomacy
adopts throughout the world, it is important to recognize the complex relation-
ship between these changing structural conditions and the dimensions of political
agency at play, as Lecours has aptly indicated.53 That is precisely what this section
aims to emphasize under the guiding notion of normalization that is understood
as ‘reflective adaptation’. Our point of departure is the assertion that sub-state
diplomacy is not simply the determined outcome of certain structural conditions,
either at a global level within broader regional integration schemes, or at the core
of each sovereign state. Sub-state diplomacy is always a form of political agency
that reveals a political will for greater recognition in the international realm as
well as an assertion of institutional autonomy in a context of increasing complexity.
It is noteworthy, for instance, how easily adaptable the practices, institutions
and discourses of sub-state diplomacy have proven, even in the most disparate
contexts. This ease reveals an interesting process of policy learning and reflective
adaptation to the changing structural contexts alongside sub-state governments
worldwide. This process of adaptation, however, does not signify a move towards
uniformity. Prominent differences exist, in ends and means, among sub-states
governments with regard to their form of involvement in the international realm.
These differences are the inevitable outcome of their very diverse geopolitical
context, constitutional nature, demographic size, institutional conditions, cul-
tural distinctiveness, economic resources, and so on. Precisely for these reasons, it
is particularly significant that such heterogeneous entities have been able to coop-
erate in some efficient and stable forms despite their huge institutional differ-
ences. Their cooperation has been possible through a process of mutual policy
learning and reflective awareness about the best way to conciliate their will for
international projection and the specific opportunities and constraints in a diplo-
matic world that is tailored to fit sovereign states. In addition, that process entails
53)
See Andre Lecours, ‘Paradiplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Policy and International Relations of
Regions’, International Negotiation, vol. 7, 2002, pp. 91-114.
a kind of selective normalization of sub-state diplomacy, which is promoted

by sub-state governments themselves in order to gain greater effectiveness and
legitimacy.
As seen in the previous section, this selective adaptation first facilitated the
extension of diverse cooperation schemes among authorities of different countries
but under similar structuring contexts. However, these networks were later
extended throughout the world, putting even the most heterogeneous entities in
contact. Built on the basis of these precedents, these policy learning and policy
diffusion processes are increasingly relevant in the most diverse policy domains.
They are particularly prominent in some clearly functional fields, such as eco-
nomic cooperation, environmental issues, science and technology, transportation
and basic infrastructure, but they are also becoming more and more relevant in
areas of normative concern such as ethnic conflict, public health and education,
cultural diversity, human security, humanitarian relief or development aid.54 Fur-
thermore, it can be argued that it is precisely the relevance acquired by many of
these initiatives that makes it possible for states themselves — or more properly
speaking, central governments and supreme courts — to realize sooner or later
that the international activism of their constituent units, which they tend to
understand as basically annoying, is much more extended and much less disturb-
ing than they initially figured. In this sense, it can be said that through these
processes of mutual reflective adaptation, sub-state diplomacy has become sig-
nificantly normalized.
Normalization as Contentious Regulation

Participation by diverse territorial constituencies in foreign trade, environmental
management, cultural exchanges or diverse political negotiations beyond the con-
tours of their hosting states has been a durable and widespread feature of diplo-
macy over the course of history. Notwithstanding, as a result of both the functional
and normative imperatives that shaped the modern system of states, that plurality
of practices was later significantly reduced. The centralization of diplomacy, which
was greatly facilitated by the codification process of diplomatic law, was largely
54)
Some of the most important regional networks are the Assembly of European Regions (AER), http://
www.aer.eu/en/home.html; the International Association of French-Speaking Regions (AIRF), http://
www.regions-francophones.com/; the Latin-American Organization of Intermediate Governments (OLAGI),
http://www.olagi.org/sitio.html; and Northern Forum, http://www.northernforum.org. Among the most
active-issue thematic international networks are the Network of Local Authorities for Information Soci-
ety/it4all, http://www.it4all-regions.org/it4all/; the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable
Development/nrg4SD, http://www.nrg4sd.net/; the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR),
http://www.crpm.org/index.php; and the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), http://www.
aebr.net/. Even the most sceptical observer will be impressed by the intense activity of these networks (all
websites were accessed on 10 November 2009).
achieved at the price — more or less abruptly — of silencing that old diversity of
voices. As early as 1931, Harald Stoke pointed out in quite solemn words that:
Generally speaking, two types of federations may be distinguished with reference to the conduct of
foreign relations: those which allow a degree of international intercourse to members of the union,
and those which deny all such intercourse. The federations of the latter type are much numerous
than those of the former.55
But on contemplating the existing practice over the world, it can be said that this
reluctance has been notorious, even in such exceptional cases when constitutional
systems acknowledge that constituent units play a certain role in the domain of
international relations. In past decades, however, diplomacy has been gradually
adapted to the growing demands of global capitalism and to the increasing com-
plexities and pluralization of social life, challenging its conventional understand-
ing as mere statecraft. This new context has facilitated a new international activism
alongside sub-state governments that appear to be both difficult to contain and
necessary to regulate. Consequently, and in an attempt to respond to that new
situation, states all over the world have, during recent decades, established differ-
ent legal and institutional mechanisms in order to acknowledge, albeit reluctantly,
a new and more active role by sub-state governments in their foreign policy
designs and diplomatic machineries. As with the heterogeneous practice that
they try to regulate, these mechanisms are not fully uniform, but they are widely
extended with important implications not only for each directly affected state,
but also for the whole community of states. Sooner or later, all states need to
consider both the treatment that they are expected to offer to foreign constituent
units, as well as the treatment that they understand that other states should offer
to their own constituencies. Consequently, when countries as diverse as Australia,
Brazil, India, Mexico, Spain and South Africa decide to reform their foreign pol-
icy schemes in parallel forms, opening the doors to a new diplomatic role for their
constituent units, the adaptive process becomes evident.56
These processes of recognition at a domestic level, which are widely spread over
the most disparate countries around the world, have in addition shaped the recip-
rocal basis for what can be considered a formative process of a new customary
practice in the field of diplomatic law.57 To analyse thoughtfully the diverse legal
and institutional mechanisms that exist in each state across the world is, of course,
55)
See Harald Stoke, The Foreign Relations of the Federal State (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1931), p. 1.
56)
Evidence about it can be found in the chapters on Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain, in Brian
Hocking and David Spence (eds.), Foreign Ministries in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2002).
57)
For more on this, see Noé Cornago, ‘Paradiplomacy as International Customary Law: Subnational
Governments and the Making of New Global Norms’, in Klaus-Gerd Giesen and Kees Van der Pijl (eds.),
Global Norms for the Twenty-First Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006), pp. 67-81.
outside the scope of this article. Fortunately, there is substantial literature with an
in-depth analysis of developments in this field in a vast array of countries. How-
ever, a brief characterization of that diversity seems necessary in the context of the
aims and rationale of this article. In some cases — such as Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many or Switzerland — constitutions assign an international role to constituent
units, recognizing a certain international dimension to their exclusive or shared
competences. This legal clarification — later enhanced through various constitu-
tional amendments — generally facilitates a climate of intergovernmental coop-
eration and mutual respect with regard to the internationalization of sub-state
governments. But more frequently, constitutions reserve exclusive powers in the
international sphere for central or federal government, ignoring any international
dimension for sub-state competences, as is the case for Australia, Canada, France,
Italy and Spain, among many others. In these cases, the existing legal framework
has been the result of frequent disputes, leading to legal controversies that were
later resolved by the ruling decisions of supreme courts. In other cases, and in the
context of the democratization process, some federal states — such as Argentina,
Brazil, India, Mexico, Russia and South Africa — as well as unitary states — for
example, Bolivia, Chile and Poland — have adopted diverse legal and administra-
tive reforms in order to facilitate a greater, albeit carefully limited, role for their
constituent units in the international realm.
But in order to understand the real significance of that plethora of legal reforms,
judicial decisions and political instruments, it may be useful to take distance from
the legal–positivist approaches that are commonly adopted in the scholarly treat-
ment of this reality. Not in vain do the political implications of these conflicting
legal arguments on the limits of sub-state diplomacy vary considerably in each
case, but ultimately there is always a form of empirical compromise between the
scenarios desired by each party, the truly available options, and, finally, the
achieved outcomes. After all, as Michelmann has recently pointed out:
The cooperation of the two orders of government requires consultation through durable and ade-
quately conceptualized institutions of intergovernmental relations, and it requires the willingness to
make compromises. Effective cooperation is essential.58
In sum, when the crudest power politics are not at play — such as in Chechnya —
sooner or later that compromise adopts the grammar of political bargaining and
deliberation, consequently reaffirming the contours of a stable, albeit recogniz-
ably plural, political community. However, it is worth emphasizing that strictly
legal arguments never resolve the case. Only factual politics will resolve the case.59
58)
See Hans J. Michelmann, ‘Conclusion’, in Hans J. Michelmann (ed.), Foreign Relations in Federal
Countries (Kingston ON: McGill-Queens University Press, 2008), p. 352.
59)
For the concrete case of Tatarstan, the ambivalences of that game have been aptly examined by Kath-
erine E. Graney, ‘Projecting Sovereignty in Post-Soviet Russia: Tatarstan in the International Arena’, in
Yet factual politics have a double sense here: first, they can be circumscribed
to the existing power relationships between central and sub-state governments
within the affected state; second, and far beyond the contours of a particular
state, the political context can also be understood with regard to the many impli-
cations of the restructuring of the global political economy upon states’ sover-
eignty. These implications — whether in the economic, political, social, or legal
domain — are shaping both new opportunities and constraints for policy innova-
tion and institutional change within and beyond states. Some additional reflec-
tions can help us to understand how these two driving forces could operate
simultaneously.
Sub-state diplomacy is frequently controversial, not because of its material
scope or its supposedly undesirable legal consequences for the affected states, but
to the extent that it appears as symbolically relevant — significant expressions of
certain values that seem to question precisely those other values that sustain the
centralization of international relations as optimum. As mentioned above, this
symbolic dimension usually reveals a will of recognition as well as a more or less
controversial assertion of political subjectivity.60 It is that assertion of a differenti-
ated subjectivity that is perceived as a challenge by hosting states. On this matter,
Paquin has convincingly argued that:
Against common beliefs, nationalist claims are negotiable and can be the object of compromise.61
In a similar vein, Wolff has recently pointed out that:
Rather than seeing paradiplomacy as a threat, it should be embraced as a necessity and an opportu-
nity in the process of managing and ultimately resolving what might otherwise be protracted self-
determination conflicts.62
But it is worth commenting that even in those cases where a clear will of differen-
tiation with regard to the hosting state exists — as happens in Catalonia, Flanders,
Quebec or Tatarstan — sub-state diplomacy only rarely turns into what Duchacek
called ‘protodiplomacy’ — that is, those ‘initiatives and activities of a non-central
government abroad that graft a more or less separatist message on to its economic,
John McGarry and Michael Keating (eds.), Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 264-294.
60)
In real practice, however, it is not always easy to differentiate symbolic concerns from functional
issues. This is something particularly clear in the case of cross-border cooperation where ethno-cultural,
socio-economic and environmental issues are frequently mixed. For a reflective overview on this, see
James Anderson, Liam O’Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson (eds.), New Borders for a Changing Europe: Cross-
Border Cooperation and Governance (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
61)
Stéphane Paquin, ‘La paradiplomatie identitaire: Le Québec, la Catalogne et la Flandre en relations
internationales’, Politique et sociétés, vol. 23, no. 2-3, 2004.
62)
Stefan Wolff, ‘Paradiplomacy: Scope, Opportunities and Challenges’, The Bologna Center Journal of
International Affairs, vol. 10, 2007, pp. 141.
social, and cultural links with foreign nations’, even at the risk of provoking
serious conflict.63 That would be the case of Trans Dniester, Puntland or Somalil-
and among other so-called ‘states within states’.64 These attempts to simulate full
sovereignty in the international realm are, however, incompatible with the stable
and confident political context that conventional sub-state diplomacy needs to
enjoy in order to be truly effective and, ultimately, non-conductive to unafford-
able intergovernmental conflict. As Lecours has pointed out in simple but con-
vincing words:
The development of a sustainable paradiplomacy requires the establishment of adequate channels of

consultation and coordination between regional and state officials. Obviously, this necessitates some
level of acceptance on the part of state officials [. . .]. Assuming that there is such basic acceptance,
the intensity of the consultation and coordination will depend first and foremost on the nature and
extent of paradiplomacy. If the foreign action of a sub-state unit is modest, [. . .] a fairly informal
process of information-sharing may very well be enough to place state officials at ease. If paradiplo-
macy is more ambitious, [. . .] the relationship [. . .] needs to go beyond information-sharing to
include genuine consultation and, even, coordination. 65
Considering the game from another angle, states also need to establish criteria for
judging the accordance of certain sub-state diplomatic practices with the new
standards that they are reluctant — but ultimately inclined — to accept in con-
formity with the changing rules of the game. In this case, the underlying rule is
very easy to identify: the maintenance of sub-state diplomacy as a relatively low-
profile activity that is always submitted to the ultimate consent of the affected
sovereign states. The precise contours of these limits are nevertheless very difficult
to specify. But some recent controversies can serve to illustrate how elastic the
criteria sustained by states with regard to the limits of sub-state diplomacy can be,
depending on their diverse perceptions and interests. In August 2009, the US State
Department harshly protested after Scottish authorities decided to hand over
the notorious Lockerbie airline bomber, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, to Libyan
authorities on ‘compassionate grounds’. Yet only two months earlier, the United
Kingdom had regarded President Obama’s direct negotiations — without British
Foreign Office consent — with Bermuda’s government over the release of four
Guantanamo Bay detainees to the British overseas territory as ‘humiliating’.
In contrast, the growing recognition of sub-state governments as legitimate
interlocutors or important policy partners in some multilateral institutions gener-
ally offers a more consensual profile. Both the Council of Europe and the Euro-
63)
See Ivo D. Duchacek, The Territorial Dimension of Politics Within, Among, and Across Nations (Boulder,
CO: Westview), p. 240.
64)
See Paul Kingston and Ian S. Spears (eds.), States within States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-
Cold War (London: Palgrave, 2004).
65)
See André Lecours, ‘Political Issues of Paradiplomacy: Lessons from the Developed World’, Discussion
Papers on Diplomacy, no. 113 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’,
2008), p. 8.
pean Communities were pioneers in this field, opening some venues that were to
some extent later emulated by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and Mercosur respectively. But that trend is also becoming
increasingly visible among some institutions of the UN system, such as the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation (FAO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United
Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). The venues for this have
been diverse. Sometimes, sub-state governments simply declared themselves com-
mitted to their respective declared goals, offering complementary resources and
consequently contributing to the effective achievement of their objectives. In
these cases, sub-state governments do not have as their objective any form of
formal membership. They simply aim to be recognized as relevant partners in
global development efforts. Examples of this are the unilateral signing of ‘Agenda
21’ by many regional governments throughout the world, or more recently the
campaign of the United Nations ‘Millennium Development Goals’. But in addi-
tion, and particularly when they are acting as donors, constituent units are also
able to sign diverse Memorandums of Agreement (MoA) with institutions such as
UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, UNIFEM, the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), among others. These agreements are usually implemented
in a consistent and non-controversial way, generally under the silent supervision
of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) agencies of each of the affected
states, and the goodwill of executive teams in international organizations. Even
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has recently opened its doors to
sub-state governments, albeit in a rather more selective way. Under the so-called
State Partnership Programme, the US Department of State has been able to link
the US states’ National Guard to their overseas operations under NATO rule.66
These forms of recognition have nonetheless always had a low institutional pro-
file, invariably submitted to the ultimate consent of the affected member states.
They constitute an important innovation in multilateralism, which is opening the
door to new forms of multi-level governance on a global scale.67
Perhaps of more relevance is the way in which institutions such as the World
Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have recently entered in direct
contact with constituent units in countries such as Argentina, Brazil or India.
Although these relationships were for technical reasons initially facilitated by fed-
eral governments, their consequences are far-reaching, given that the decentral-
ization of borrowing can contribute in a critical way to states’ territorial imbalances
66)
See Peter Howard, ‘The Growing Role of States in US Foreign Policy: The Case of the State Partner-
ship Program’, International Studies Perspectives, vol. 5, 2004, pp. 179-206.
67)
See Ian Bache and Mathew Flinders (eds.), Multi-Level Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004).
and institutional fragmentation. But beyond these specific cases, sub-state inter-
national mobilization is frequently a rather contentious process in which, in the
words of Sagan and Halkier:
[. . .] different public and private actors have attempted to institutionalize their particular visions and
priorities, frequently questioning both the external delimitation and the internal constitution of
regions.68
Considered through these lenses, the difficulties encountered by states to regulate

new sub-state diplomacy can be reconsidered. Contemporary, legal and political
regulation of diplomacy, as happens with many other on-going regulatory efforts
all over the world, is a contentious process in which the initial will of the states,
even the will of the most powerful among them, has to be tempered, taking into
account not only the global functional dynamics propelled by world trade and
investment, technological innovations or environmental challenges, but also the
changing legitimizing needs of late–modern capitalism. Consequently, the real
driving force behind the normalization of sub-state diplomacy is the pervasive
pressure that is posed by the new global political economy and its transformative
forces.69
Conclusion
This article offers an interpretative exploration on the normalization of sub-state
diplomacy. Normalization can be defined as a mode of institutional control that
recognizes as valid — albeit reluctantly — an otherwise deviant practice, while
the limits of that practice are immediately fixed and carefully monitored. In the
international realm, normalization enables the diplomatic system to operate in an
increasingly complex environment, facilitating its own adaptation and durability.
Normalization allows the selective incorporation into the diplomatic field of
important innovations that are produced by the pluralization of global life, sim-
ply because they are — both for functional and normative reasons — too relevant
to be ignored. But it simultaneously reaffirms the hierarchical structure of the
diplomatic system.
For the case of sub-state diplomacy, four main venues for that normalizing
process have been identified here. First, the notion of normalization as generaliza-
tion has been suggested as a way to emphasize that the growing involvement of
68)
See Iwona Sagan and Henrik Halkier, ‘Introduction: Regional Contestations’, in I. Sagan and
H. Halkier (eds.), Regionalism Contested: Institutions, Society and Governance (London: Ashgate, 2005),
p. 2.
69)
For more on this, see Sol Picciotto, ‘Regulatory Networks and Multi-Level Global Governance’, in
O. Dilling, M. Herberg and G. Winter (eds.), Responsible Business: Self-Governance and the Law in Tran-
snational Economic Transactions (Oxford: Hart, 2008), pp. 315–341.
sub-state governments in the international sphere undoubtedly constitutes its

main normalizing force. Sub-state interventions in the diplomatic realm — once
considered exceptional or deviant — are becoming normal, simply because their
practices, institutions and discourses are increasingly widespread throughout the
world in the most disparate institutional contexts and are rapidly changing per-
ceptions and attitudes within the conventional diplomatic system itself.
Second, investigation confirmed that in spite of the crucial importance of
global dynamics, the shaping of specific forms of sub-state diplomacy across
the world cannot be understood without closer attention to the structural link
between sub-state mobilization at an international level and the wider context
posed by the specific forms that are adopted around the world by so-called new
regionalism. Moreover, the resulting modalities of sub-state diplomacy can also
be seen as a form of commitment between sub-national mobilization efforts and
the necessary adjustment to the changing regional context that states themselves
are ultimately obliged to promote in different ways so as to avoid international
ostracism. In this sense, the normalization of sub-state diplomacy is also becom-
ing regionalized.
Third, the article emphasized that sub-state diplomacy is not simply the deter-
mined outcome of certain structural conditions. It is always a form of political
agency that reveals a political will for greater recognition in the international
realm, as well as an assertion of institutional autonomy in an increasingly com-
plex context. The above-mentioned process of regionalization does not, however,
impede the mutual adaptability of sub-state diplomacy throughout the world.
That adaptability is, in addition, demonstrative of quite a singular process of
transnational policy innovation and learning alongside sub-state governments. It
reveals a capacity for reflective adaptation to changing structural contexts and that
also facilitates its growing institutional recognition by the diplomatic system.
Finally, the article analysed the main legal and institutional mechanisms that
states have deployed in recent decades, in order to acknowledge, albeit reluc-
tantly, a new role to be played by sub-state governments in both their foreign
policy designs and diplomatic machineries. As with the heterogeneous practice
that they try to regulate, these mechanisms are not completely uniform. Rather,
they are widely extended with important implications not only for each directly
affected state, but also for the whole community of states. For, sooner or later, all
states need to consider the treatment that they are expected to offer foreign con-
stituent units, as well as the treatment that they understand other states should
offer their own constituencies. However, as shown in this article, the regulatory
process is never completed. Sooner or later, political controversies reappear, for
sub-state diplomacy, like conventional diplomacy, is also, as Sharp has convinc-
ingly pointed out:
[. . .] a discrete human practice, constituted by the explicit construction, representation, negotiation

and manipulation of ambiguous identities.70
The most salient difference would nonetheless be that in the case of sub-state
diplomacy, negotiation and manipulation of ambiguous identities, which Sharp
aptly identifies as the core of diplomatic culture, take place not only among states
but also within them. If this statement has some plausibility, sub-state diplomacy
would be another, particularly ubiquitous, illustration of the way in which some
current existing diplomatic practices exceed the ‘representational capabilities’ of
mainstream diplomatic discourses.71
Noé Cornago is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of the Basque Country in
Bilbao, Spain, where he is also in charge of the Masters Degree in International Decentralized Cooperation:
Peace and Development. He has published widely on diplomacy, multilateralism, decentralized cooperation and
the international relations of constituent units. He has been a visiting scholar at Ohio State University and the
University of Idaho in the United States; Université Laval in Quebec, Canada; the Bordeaux Institute of
Political Studies/ ‘Sciences Po Bordeaux’ in France; the Free University of Colombia; as well as various uni-
versities in Spain.
70)
See Paul Sharp, ‘For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations’, Interna-
tional Studies Review, 1999, vol. 1, p. 33.
71)
On both the formative process as well the current exhaustion of classic diplomacy’s representational
dimensions, see Costas M. Constantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy (Minneapolis MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 1-30.

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The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 5 (2010) 11-36 brill.

On the Normalization of Sub-State Diplomacy

international relations and comparative politics,2 and international political econ-

[. . .] sub-state governments’ involvement in international relations, through the establishment of

This lack of conceptual precision signiﬁcantly complicates the process of system-

That process of mutual adjustment between sub-state and state government

Normalization as Virtual Generalization

number of economic, environmental, technological, cultural and security prob-

disintegration and uncertainty, conﬂicting attributions of responsibility, territo-

Normalization as Diﬀerentiated Regionalization

be solved,29 it can in short be argued that sub-state diplomacy has encountered

provinces, which are particularly intense on environmental issues, are consider-

gration and building cross-national conﬁdence — by launching a number of

currently complicating the progress of these sub-state cooperating schemes. How-

tion schemes, although it is ultimately submitted to the foreign policy priorities

Normalization as Reﬂective Adaptation

a kind of selective normalization of sub-state diplomacy, which is promoted

Normalization as Contentious Regulation

In a similar vein, Wolﬀ has recently pointed out that:

The development of a sustainable paradiplomacy requires the establishment of adequate channels of

Considered through these lenses, the diﬃculties encountered by states to regulate

sub-state governments in the international sphere undoubtedly constitutes its

[. . .] a discrete human practice, constituted by the explicit construction, representation, negotiation

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