EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS (Art 2). Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.

 Commonwealth Act No. 638 provides for the uniform publication and distribution of the Official Gazette.
 As recognized by the Supreme Court in Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. "there is much to be said of the view
that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited
readership" and that "undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of
communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly", EO No. 200 Sec. 1 provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.”
 Administrative Code of 1987, Section 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen
(15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
 Executive Order No. 4 s. 2010 – PCOO
 Local Government Code of 1991. Section 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with Penal Sanctions.
- (a) ordinances with penal sanctions shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial capitol, city,
municipal or Barangay hall, as the case may be, for a minimum period of three (3) consecutive weeks. Such
ordinances shall also be published in a newspaper of general circulation, where available, within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, except in the case of Barangay ordinances.
Unless otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall take effect on the day following its publication, or
at the end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later. (b) Any public officer or employee who violates
an ordinance may be meted administrative disciplinary action, without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate civil or criminal action. (c) The secretary to the Sanggunian concerned shall transmit official
copies of such ordinances to the chief executive officer of the Official Gazette within seven (7) days following
the approval of the said ordinance for publication purposes. The Official Gazette may publish ordinances
with penal sanctions for archival and reference purposes.
 Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette
... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced
if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing leaves no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that
provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden for
the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative
and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It
is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. (Tañada v. Tuvera)
 Laws take effect after 15 days of publication: (1) to satisfy dissemination need; (2) must be in full; (3) no
preference as to which newspaper; (4) gazette, newspaper, submission to UP Law Center, posting, digital
 publication; EXCEPT: (1) municipal or local ordinance; (2) internal rules or regulations by administrative
bodies; (3) letter of instructions; (4) interpretative regulations; EXCEPTIONS TO EXCEPTIONS: (1)
administrative rules with penalties; (2) to enforce implementing rules; (3) traffic regulations.
 There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in
the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals. (De Roy v. CA)
 When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself
has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation
of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency
to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. (Commissioner of
Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corp)
 The requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself
has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different
effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication
in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be
dispensed with. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose
is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts, the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official
Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
(Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig inc v. PVAO Military Shrine Services)
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW (Art 3). Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

 Administrative Code of 1987. Section 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.
 Claim of good faith and absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard
rules is not a defense as to exonerate one; under our legal system, ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith. (Catipon Jr. v. Japson)
 The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be
deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance,
does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. (DM Consunji v. CA)
RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS (Art 4). Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.

 Administrative Code of 1987. Section 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the
contrary is expressly provided.
 Revised Penal Code. Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
 Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
 Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. It is axiomatic that
the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may
feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as
a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules
may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering
that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal
cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of
evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses,
because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the
Constitution. (Heirs of Simon v. Chan and CA)
 The defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an
official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of
Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance
may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a
constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the
very nature and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their
violation. In Co v. CA, a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation
should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not
fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
 There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and
benefited accused-appellants. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]enal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal . . . although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." A statute is penal when
it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state. The above-cited provision
of the Constitution is penal in character since it deals with the penalty to be imposed for
capital crimes. This penal provision may be given retroactive effect during three possible
stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution
began; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not begun; and (c) when the
sentence is being carried out (People v. Patalin)
MANDATORY OR PROHIBITORY LAWS (Art 5). Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

 Generally speaking, those provisions which are mere matter of form, or which are not
material, do not affect any substantial right, and do not relate to the essence of the thing to
be done, so that compliance is a matter of convenience rather than substance, are considered
to be directory. On the other hand, statutory provisions which relate to matters of substance,
affect substantial rights and are the very essence of the thing required to be done, are
regarded as mandatory. (Home Bankers v. CA)
WAIVER OF RIGHTS (Art 6). Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

 Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, presupposes that a party has

knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them; done knowingly and intelligently.
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest.
Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent
given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. (DM Consunji v. CA & Juego)
 Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, the person making the
waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration
for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, it is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of a change of mind. A waiver is invalid where there is clear proof
that it was wangled from an unsuspecting person, or the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face.(Aujero v. Philcomsat)
 Waiver must be in writing, especially in criminal proceedings when a constitutional or
statutory right of the accused is being waived. (Villareal v. People)
 It is an elementary rule that the existence of a waiver must be positively demonstrated since
a waiver by implication is not normally countenanced. A waiver must not only be voluntary,
but must have been made knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and consequences. Mere silence on the one who has the right should
not be construed as a surrender thereof; the presumption is against the existence and validity
of such waiver. (Dona Adela v. Tidcorp)
REPEAL OF LAWS (Art 7). (Par 1) Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. (Par 2) When the courts
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
(Par 3) Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the law or the Constitution.

 It is well-settled rule that repeal by implication is not favored. The presumption is against the
inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the
subject and not have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be
read in pari materia (in a similar case -- must be construed together). (Mecano v. COA)
 There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same
subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an
implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one
and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
 An implied repeal is predicated on a substantial conflict between the new and prior laws. In
the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior
one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and
old laws. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible such that they cannot be made to
stand together. (RP v. ICC)
 A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes inoperative from the
moment the repealing law becomes effective (Gov. Javier v. COMELEC). When a subsequent
law impliedly repeals a prior law, the new law shall apply (CIR v. Primetown).
 It must be remembered that repeal by implication is disfavored as laws are presumed to be
passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject, the congruent
application of which the courts must generally presume. (Quintero v. COA)
 Only a law can repeal another law. (Palanca v. CA & Salinas)
 The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface,
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the
subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to
all laws on the subject. (Thornton v. Thornton)
 Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. The power of the legislature to make laws includes
the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts
to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for
interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. A legislature cannot bind a future legislature
to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent
legislatures. (Kida v. Senate)
 The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. A state may not impair
vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power. (Yinlu Bicol v. Trans-Asia)
JUDICIAL DECISIONS (Art 8). Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
 CA rulings are not binding. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, courts
have to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest
judicial organ, the Supreme Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative,
binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and
to submit. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take
their bearings. (Tugade v. CA)
 It is not for the judiciary to question a change in policy, it being a well-established principle
beyond question that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the
policy of legislative or executive action. (Pagpalain Haulers Inc. v. Trajano)
 Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" -
that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute
a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
 Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit." (Pesca v. Pesca)
 Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. Giving effect to the
social justice guarantees of the Constitution is not an exercise of the power of law-making,
but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law. (Floresca v. Philex
Mining)
 Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines, according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a
declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal.” (Co v. CA & People)
 Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice
that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially
the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is
settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though
the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the
same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. (Ty v. Banco Filipino)
 A misinterpretation in a prior ruling should not be allowed to last after its false premises have
been exposed. The Court must reverse. (De Castro v. JBC)
 A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect
those favored by the old rule. (People v. Licera)
 It is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent. The principle of
stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by SC’s final
judgment. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. (Virtucio v. Alegarbes)
 It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by SC constitutes part of that law from the
date it was originally passed, since the Court’s construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. (RP v. Rehman
Enterprises)
DUTY TO RENDER JUDGMENT (Art 9). No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
Revised Penal Code, Art 5. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress
and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made subject of legislation.

 SC mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty
provided for by law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. A court of
law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where
the law itself provides for the sentence of death as penalty in specific and well defined
instances. (People v. Judge Veneracion)
 Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the
guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the
most painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties
if only to satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act.
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly
taken into account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or those whose bizarre
behavior violates the mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must survive
the test of reason. The strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment. (People v.
Ritter)
 It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent is to render justice. Thus, the Courts
interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. There are
some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, the Courts are not bound, because
only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What the Courts do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. (Carlos & Casimira Alonzo v. IAC)
 Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.
There is only room for application. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an
injustice. (Barcellano v. Baas)
DOUBT IN INTERPRETATION OF LAWS (Art 10). In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws,
it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

 In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail. This provision, according to the Code Commission,
is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful
or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law. (In the Matter of Adoption of
Stephanie Garcia
 A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should
be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. Moreover,
 generalia specialibus non derogant. A general law does not nullify a special law. The general
law will yield to the special law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter.
Laws are assumed to be passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all
existing ones on the subject, and it follows that the legislature did not intend to interfere with
or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter. (Tomawis v. Balindong)
APPLICATION OF CUSTOM
Art 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.
Art 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.
 Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. Courts take no judicial notice of
custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local custom
as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact. (Petitions for authority to continue use
of the law firm’s name filed by Salazar, et. al. and Romulo, et. al.)
 Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws or customs. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact. (Yao
Kee, et. al. v. Sy-Gonzales, et. al.)
LEGAL PERIODS (Art 13). (Par 1) When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood
that years are of 365 days each; months, of 30 days; days, of 24 hours; and nights, from sunset to sunrise.
(Par 2) If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have. (Par 3) In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.
Rule 22, RRCP. Computation of Time. Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act
or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance
included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the
place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. Section 2. Effect of interruption.
— Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period after such
interruption shall start to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof. The day of the act
that caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation of the period.
Section 31, Administrative Code of 1987. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar
months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night,"
from sunset to sunrise.
 HUMAN RELATIONS
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
The principle of abuse of rights is found under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
states that:
Art. 19. “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.”
Art. 20. “Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.”
Art. 21. “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
The above articles, depart from the classical theory that “he who uses a right injures no one”. The modern
tendency is to depart from the classical and traditional theory, and to grant indemnity for damages in cases
where there is an abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit.

 When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is
different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator
Arturo Tolentino puts it: “With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the
scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive
of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these
articles”. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. CA).
 There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not
the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle
of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corporation vs. CA).
 Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith." The elements of abuse
of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh. (California Clothing Inc & Ybanez v. Quinones)
 Standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as well as in the
performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe
honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to
the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. (Ardiente v. Pastorfide
et. al.)
 This principle of abuse of rights is based upon the famous maxim suum jus summa injuria
(the abuse of a right is the greatest possible wrong). Breach of trust entrusted on someone
constitutes violation of Art. 19. (Arlegui v. CA)
 Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, SC held that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice
or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because
of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. (Baksh v. CA)
 It is true that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart
from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous
to those provided in Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 of NCC. (Bunag v. CA)
 Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony
is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 of the Civil Code. (Wassmer v. Velez)
 It is well-settled that the maxim of damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a
person’s rights is a loss without injury — damnum absque injuria — for which the law gives
no remedy. But, Article 19 sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good
faith. (Amanoy v. Gutierrez)
 Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights,[59] is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. (Nikko Hotel v. Reyes)
 (1) Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who is any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages." (2) Moral damages are recoverable for the breach
of contract which was palpably wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or
abusive. (3) Considering the attendant wanton negligence committed by petitioners in the
case at bar, the award of exemplary damages by the trial court is justified to serve as a
warning to all entities engaged in the same business to observe due diligence in the conduct
of their affairs. (Go v. CA)
Of the three articles, Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in
statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused
thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith is essential to
abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, even through the forms or technicalities of the law, together with an absence of all information or
belief of fact which would render the transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as
understood by men of affairs.
While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle, the “cardinal law on human
conduct” expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his rights
but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and
good faith, he opens himself to liability.
Article 19 of the Civil Code, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights
but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial
limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality.
PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.
Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or negligence
of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.

 And under Art 22 of NCC, the provisions of which were formulated as "basic principles to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
social order, x x x designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience, x x x guides human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society
to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of
justice." The rules thereon apply equally well to the Government. (RP v. Lacap)
 There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another,
or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles
of justice, equity and good conscience." The principle of unjust enrichment has two
conditions. First, a person must have been benefited without a real or valid basis or
justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another person’s expense or damage. (Loria
v. Munoz Jr.)
PROTECTION TO DISADVANTAGED PARTY IN CONTRACTS
Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account
of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts
must be vigilant for his protection.
LIMITATION AGAINST THOUGHTLESS EXTRAVAGANCE
Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or
emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable
institution.
DAMAGES
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects,
without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against he latter,
without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of
force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise
to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

 Regino v. PCST
INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE CIVIL ACTIONS
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff
to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.
Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no
criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall
likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
 (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt,
or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted
in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for
damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the
latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any
person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the
city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be
independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which
no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to
institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender.
Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the
civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
Art. 100. Revised Penal Code. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a
felony is civilly liable.
RULE 111, RRCP
Section 1.Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
 (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information,
the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Xxx
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but
any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Xxx
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application
is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After the criminal action has been commenced, the
separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal
action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended
in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment
is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action,
the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying
the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed
automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-
examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which
cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action
based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. — In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action.
Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the
independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of
the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may
be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within
a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in
these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the
offended party may file against the estate of the deceased.
Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the
defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for the same act or omission
subject of the civil action.
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
ARTICLE 2176/2194, NCC
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.

 Article 29 of the Civil Code provides that a civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases.
Therefore, the accused cannot be exempted from paying civil damages which may only be
proven by preponderance of evidence. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that
the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the
door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act
or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based
on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. (Manantan v. CA)
 Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a reservation must be made to
institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be
 deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. The right of the injured party to sue
separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or
from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be
deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Maniago v. CA)
 As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or executive, is not liable to one
injured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in
the line of his official duty." "Where an officer is invested with discretion and is empowered
to exercise his judgment in matters brought before him, and when so acting he is usually
given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result or an erroneous or
mistaken decision, however erroneous his judgment may be, provided the acts complained
of are done within the scope of the officer's authority and without malice, or corruption.
(Phil. Match Co. v. The City of Cebu)

CONCEPT OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be
in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

 Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married
to respondent. (Pimentel v. Pimentel)
 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.SC
ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. SC ordered the RTC to continue with the case. (Montanez v. Cipriano)
 It is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission
of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided
by law. It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time
he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal
charge for bigamy against him. (Capili v. People)
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
PRESUMPTIVE/PROVISIONAL PERSONALITY – personality of the conceived child
FULL CIVIL PERSONALITY: JURIDICAL CAPACITY AND CAPACITY TO ACT (Art. 37). Juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON CAPACITY TO ACT
Art. 38. Minority, Insanity or imbecility, the state of being a Deaf-mute, Prodigality and Civil interdiction are
mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as
when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the
state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship.
The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in
special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified
by law.
NATURAL PERSONS
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from
the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed
born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by
will.
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which
of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of
proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to
the other.
JURIDICAL PERSONS
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws creating
or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code
concerning partnerships.
Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring
civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization.
Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public interest or purpose
mentioned in No. 2 of Article 44, their property and other assets shall be disposed of in pursuance of law or the
charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this point, the property and other assets shall be applied
to similar purposes for the benefit of the region, province, city or municipality which during the existence of the
institution derived the principal benefits from the same.
PD 1083 - Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
BOOK TWO - PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
TITLE I - CIVIL PERSONALITY (SHAKHSIYAH MADANIYA)
Article 8. Legal capacity. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in
every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Article 9. Restrictions on capacity. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act:
age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute, the condition of death-illness (marad-ul-maut), penalty,
prodigality, absence, family relations, alienage, insolvency, and trusteeship. The consequences of these
circumstances are governed by this Code and other Islamic laws and, in a suppletory manner, by other laws.
Article 10. Personality, how acquired. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered
born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born alive, however, briefly, at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb.
Article 11. Extinction of personality.
(1) Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of a
deceased person is determined by this Code, by contract, and by will.
(2) After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead.
Article 12. Simultaneous death. If, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, there
is a doubt as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other shall prove the
same; in the absence of such proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to the other. However, the successional rights of their respective heirs shall not
be affected.
Article II, Section 12, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
PD 603 - THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE
Article 5. Commencement of Civil Personality. - The civil personality of the child shall commence from the time
of his conception, for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code.
CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE
Art. 48. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
AMENDED by 1987 Constitution
Art. 49. Naturalization and the loss and reacquisition of citizenship of the Philippines are governed by special
laws.
Art. 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is
the place of their habitual residence.
Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical
persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal representation is established or where
they exercise their principal functions.
Article IV (CITIZENSHIP), 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or
omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 63 – CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT), as amended
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways
and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country; NORDCAM

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more: Provided, however, That a Filipino may not divest himself of
Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country;
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided,
That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is
present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign
country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said
service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that
he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country: And provided, finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate
 nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said
foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as
a Filipino citizen;
(5) By cancellation of the of the certificates of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of
war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband's
country, she acquires his nationality.
The provisions of this section notwithstanding, the acquisition of citizenship by a natural born Filipino citizen
from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries or from the United Kingdom shall
not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship if the law of that country grants the same privilege to
its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from
which citizenship is acquired.
Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. – Citizenship may be reacquired: NRC

(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the disqualification's prescribed in
section two of CA 473 (Revised Naturalization Law).
(2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, That a woman who lost her
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of
this Act after the termination of the marital status;4 and
(3) By direct act of the National Assembly.
Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. – The procedure prescribed for
naturalization under Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven,5 as amended, shall apply to the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by naturalization provided for in the next preceding section: Provided,
That the qualifications and special qualifications prescribed in section three and four of said Act shall not be
required: And provided, further,
(1) That the applicant be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines at least
six months before he applies for naturalization;
(2) That he shall have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of
his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living; and
(3) That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and
allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject.
Section 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Commonwealth6 of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry.
COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473 – REVISED NATURALIZATION ACT
Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications
may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
 period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine
languages; and
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools
recognized by the Office of Private Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine history, government
and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence
in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of continuous residence required under the second condition of
the last preceding section shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner having any of the
following qualifications:
1. Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of the
provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof;
2. Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines;
3. Being married to a Filipino woman;
4. Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not
established for the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race, in any
of the branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two years;
5. Having been born in the Philippines.
Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
a. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
b. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination
for the success and predominance of their ideas;
c. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
d. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
e. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
f. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the
Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and
ideals of the Filipinos;
g. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States 2and the Philippines are at war, during the
period of such war;
h. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States 3whose laws do not grant Filipinos
the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST
THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS
Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or
economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Sec. 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: provided, that the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
 (2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association
for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of
Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of
identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
REPUBLIC ACT NO 9225 - Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-
born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be
deemed citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they
renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised
by, or extended to, those who:
 (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.
Chapter 2, Section 5 to 9, Administrative Code of 1987
Section 5. Who are Citizens. - The following are the citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship, unless by the
act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 6. Effect of Marriage. - Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless
by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 7. Natural-born Citizen. - Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with the Constitution shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 8. Loss or Reacquisition of Citizenship. - Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner
provided by law.
Section 9. Dual Allegiance. - Dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

 The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: (a) Filipino women
who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (b) Natural-born Filipinos
including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the
natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due
to political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time
of repatriation. (Tabasa v. CA)
 There are two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in RA9225. Under the first
paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization
in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required
for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country,
but the terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for the
second group. (David v. Agbay)

RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE

 Physical presence coupled with good faith in establishing domicile, along with animus
manendi et revertendi, is an essential requirement for the acquisition of a domicile of choice.
However, the law does not require that physical presence be unbroken. In Japzon v. Comelec,
 this Court ruled that to be considered a resident of a municipality, the candidate is not
required to stay and never leave the place for a full one year period prior to the date of the
election. (Dano v. COMELEC)
 The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling
or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A new
domicile is reacquired if the following conditions concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in
the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose
to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change
of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual. (Gayo v. Verceles)
 A Filipino's acquisition of a permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment
of his domicile and residence in the PH. (Ugdoracion v. COMELEC)
 For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile,
meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have
personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. There is
no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement
since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down
the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where
once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can
have but one domicile at a time. (Jalosjos v. COMELEC)
 Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant
civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire
dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving
of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic
and to no other. The act of using US passport after renouncing one's American citizenship
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation taken. (Maquiling v. COMELEC)
 CONFLICT RULES
[Resolution of issues involve a CHOICE between local and foreign laws]
Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in
the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be
supplied by the provisions of this Code.
Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms established
by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines.
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country,
or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Art. 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in
accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and
allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the
Philippines.
Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid
in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed.
ARTICLE 2, RPC
Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application,
the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its
atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and
securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and
securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of
Book Two of this Code.
ARTICLE 21, 26, FAMILY CODE
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary
for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract
marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or
guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages
were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the
legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship
between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
 (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or
his or her own spouse.
PRINCIPLES OF TERRITORIALITY, GENERALITY, EXTERRITORIALITY/EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Principle of Generality – Criminal law is binding on all persons who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory.
Exceptions: The following are not subject to the operation of the Philippine criminal laws based to the well –
established principles of international law:
a) Sovereigns and other chiefs of state.
b) Ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resident, and charges d’affaires
Principle of Territoriality – Criminal laws undertake to punish crimes committed within Philippine territory.
Exceptions: The provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable in the following cases even if the felony
is committed outside of the Philippines:
a) When the offender should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship.
A Philippine vessel or aircraft must be understood as that which is registered in the Philippine Bureau of
Customs.
b) When the offender should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippines or obligations
and securities issued by the (Philippine) Government.

c) When the offender should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into the Philippines of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number.
d) When the offender, while being a public officer or employee, should commit an offense in the exercise
of his functions. [Some crimes that may be committed in the exercise of public functions are direct
bribery (Art. 210), indirect bribery (Art. 211), and malversation of public funds or property (Art 217).]
e) When the offender should commit any of the crimes against the national security and the law of nations.
[Some of the crimes under this title are treason (Art. 114), espionage (Art. 117) and piracy and mutiny in
the high seas (Art. 122).]
Extraterritoriality: General rule: Philippine laws have no extraterritorial effects in another country [Reason:
One sovereign country is independent of another.]
Exceptions:
• When our law provides respect to other countries with respect to its citizens and nationals
• When our country enters into a treaty with another country.
• Congressional legislations adopting foreign law to municipal law of the land.
Extraterritorial application of a foreign law allowed when the country gives consent (implied or expressed),
except when the foreign law is against public policy and order.
Foreign Elements
- consist of the following as subject matter:
a. nationality or citizenship
b. personal status
c. property
- points of contacts include:
a. place of contracting
b. place of negotiation of contract
c. place of performance
d. location of subject matter of the contract
e. domicile, residence, place of incorporation, nationality and place of business of parties.
f. If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same state, the
local law of this state shall apply.
Renvoi
The court in resorting foreign law adopts rules of foreign country as to conflict of law which rule may refer
back to the law of the forum. (Aznar vs Garcia, 7 SCRA 95)
Borrowing Doctrine
Philippines may adopt foreign procedural law under the Borrowing Statute such as Sec. 48 of the Civil
Procedure Rule stating “if by the laws of the State or country where the cause of action arose the action is
barred, it is also barred in the Philippines.” (CADALIN vs POEA ADMINISTRATOR, 238 SCRA 721)
Doctrine Processual Presumption

 Foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. If not pleaded, the court will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. (BANK OF AMERICA vs AMERICAN REALTY
CO., 321 SCRA 659)
 “In a conflict between a Philippine law and a foreign law, Philippine law prevails”
 General Rule: foreign documents, before they can be admitted as evidence in Philippine courts, must be
duly authenticated.
 Written laws may be evidenced by an official publication or a copy attested by an officer with the legal
custody of the record or his deputy. (Secretary of an embassy, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular
agent or officer of a foreign service of the Philippines stationed in a foreign country in which the record is
kept and authenticated by the seal of his office). – As provided for by Sections 24 & 25 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.
 Exception to the Rule: a foreign law may be proved in open court by the testimony of an active law
practitioner familiar with the foreign law and quoting the specific foreign law involved. (Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. vs Guerrero).
 Rules of authentication as provided in Sections 24 & 25 of Rule 132 DO NOT APPLY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS IN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS.
 Rules on ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE may be availed of in the presentation of evidence in conflicts of law.
Law of Significant Relationship aka Center of Gravity Doctrine aka Grouping of Contacts

 Choice of law problems in conflicts of law are resolved by application of law of the jurisdiction which has
the most significant relationship or contact with the events and parties to the litigation and issues.
Kilberg Doctrine

 When the rule involves PROCEDURAL, the law of the forum is not bound by the country where the place of
injury or wrongful act arose.
 If the action is filed in Philippine court, the court will adopt its own Rules on Procedure.
Doctrine of Characterization or Doctrine of Qualification

 Court determines the character of the action filed in court in order to determine which law would be
applicable (choice of law to apply) when trying the case.
 Analysis of the factual situation, event or operative fact to determine the “POINT OF CONTACT” or
“CONNECTING FACTOR” (such as situs of the res, place of celebration, place of performance, and place of
delict or wrong doing.
PRINCIPLES ON PERSONAL LAW IN CONFLICTS OF LAWS:
Domiciliary Rule

 law of the domicile of the person is the determining factor

Nationality Rule

 the law of the nationality and citizenship of the person determines his personal law
 what the Philippine follows
Two Remedies in Conflicts of Law:

 Enforcement of rights that accrued in a foreign country, completely or partly, in the form of actions filed in
the Philippines by the aggrieved party;
 Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in the form of petition or complaint to enforce such
foreign judgment in the Phil. courts.
When case involves no foreign element but local laws with conflicting applicability, court will resolve by:

 Reconcile the local laws involved

 If cannot be reconciled, consider the most recent statute to have repealed the older one.
 Except one law from the operation of the other and from the basis thereof decide the case.
 When interpreting the application of law in such case, there is always the presumption that the laws are
enacted to bring justice and equity therefore the court must decide to this effect.
3 Ways to Deal with Conflict of Laws cases:

 Court may deny due to the following grounds: lack of jurisdiction or invoke FORUM NON CONVENIENCE (it
is more convenient to try a case in a different forum).
 Hear the case and apply the local law. (exercise of state’s sovereign prerogatives)
 Hear the case and apply special rules to promote international system to do justice to the parties. (hear the
case and apply foreign law).
REAL PROPERTY: real property and personal property is subject to the law of the country it is situated.
INTESTATE AND TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION: regulated by the nationality of a person whose succession is in
consideration.
CONTRACTS: the law of the place of execution of contract, wills and other public documents that governs its
forms and solemnities is applied.
CORPORATIONS: governed by the law of the country where the corporation is created or incorporated.
Contractual Agreement of parties as to venue
 Agreement of parties as to venue of litigation in the contract is merely permissive UNLESS it is clearly
stipulated in the agreement that the chosen venue is EXCLUSIVE using qualifying or restricting words to
the exclusion of other venue other than the one agreed. (HSBC v Sheman, 176 SCRA 331).
 Rationale: parties cannot stipulate the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter because it is fixed
by law or the Constitution.
Applicable foreign law to resolve conflicts of laws in the absence of a local law directing the court to apply a
foreign law or in the absence of a valid agreement between parties on what rule to govern in case of dispute:
1. Substance vs Procedural Principle
- General rule: All procedural rules shall follow the law of the forum where the case is filed. Substantive
laws shall be governed by the law of the country where the cause of action arose.
2. Center of Gravity Doctrine
- apply the Most Significant Relationship Theory (law of the state which has the most significant
relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort or in
contract); or
- Grouping of Contacts Principles (for torts and contracts) as applied in Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) v
CA 297 SCRA 469.
- What are taken into account:
place where the injury occurred
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, place of business of parties
place where the relationship if any between parties is centered
3. Renvoi
- the court in resorting foreign law adopts rules of foreign country as to conflict of law which rule may refer
back to the law of the forum. (Aznar vs Garcia, 7 SCRA 95)
4. Lex Fori
- “the law of the forum or the court”
- Lex loci – law of jurisdiction in which relief is sought to control to all matters that are remedial or
procedural.
- German Rule of elective occurrence – the place of tort is whenever an essential part of the tort has been
committed and the injured person may choose to sue in either of the places which to him is the most
advantageous to his claim.
- Caver’s Principle – court applies general principles to arrive at a just solution by accommodating
conflicting policies and affording fair treatment of the parties caught in the conflict between state
policies.
● Court faced with conflicts of laws has to decide the same by applying:
First – the written laws
Second – the customs of the place
Third – judicial decisions
Fourth – general principles of law
Fifth – principles of justice, reason and equity
5. Grouping of Contacts
6. Place of the most significant relations
 Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face a communication from the DFA that of
someone’s coverage of any immunity. The DFA’s determination that a certain person is
covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. It should be
noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. At any
rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto
result in the dropping of the charges. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official
may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by
his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
(Liang v. People)
 There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy. It is true that owing to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. (VanDorn v. Romillo)
 If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. (Quita v. CA)
 The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article
26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law. (RP v.
Orbecido)
 (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity
of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced
consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in this country. (2)
That the remarriage of the divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other than the
lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine
law; (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles
the other to recover damages. (Tenchavez v. Escano)
 It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
 and proved. X x x. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the
records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign
service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement is not a mere technicality
but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document
in a foreign country. X x x. With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable,
for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a
foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly
authenticated copy of the statute. (Wildvalley Shipping Co Ltd v. CA)
 In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction,
choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law
are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel
to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive
law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law.
Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to
adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the
defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases
involving property, over the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes
and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is
further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. (Hasegawa v. Katamura)
 On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties,
it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience
of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the
country where the case is filed. As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquires
jurisdiction on the plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint and on the defendant upon
voluntary appearance in court. That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine
courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil
action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the
case is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the
substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds
before the trial court. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-
laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient”
or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
(Raytheon Intl Inc v. Rouzie Jr.)
 FAMILY RELATIONS – MARRIAGE
Title I, Chapters 1-3, Articles 1-54, Family Code of the Philippines (August 3, 1988)

CONCEPT & NATURE OF MARRIAGE. Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
MARRIAGE v. OTHER FORMS OF CONTRACTS.
MARRIAGE ORDINARY CONTRACT
As a contract Special contract; social institution Merely a contract
Applicable law Governed by the law on marriage Governed by the law on contracts
Right to stipulate Not subject to stipulations, except on Generally subject to stipulations
property relations in marriage
settlements
Capacity to contract Legal capacity required Minors may contract thru their parents or guar
dians or in some instances, by themselves
Gender requirement Contracting parties must only be two p Contracting parties may be two or more perso
ersons of opposite sexes ns regardless of sex
Dissolution by Dissolved only by death or annulment, Can be dissolved by mutual agreement among
agreement never by mutual agreement others

REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE. Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.

What constitute legal capacity of the parties to marry?

Age – at least 18yrs
Sex – between male and female
Lack of legal impediment to marry

Are there other requirements, taking into consideration the age of the parties to the marriage,
for the validity of such marriage?
18 to 21 years old - Parental consent and Marriage counselling
22 to 25 years old - Parental advice and Marriage counselling
*Absence of the additional requirement of parental consent does not make the marriage void but only
voidable.

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting
parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage
certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which
fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer.

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or
religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written
authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties
belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during
a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.

Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Art. 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with
Chapter 2 of this Title.

Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-
consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil
registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said
consular official.

Art. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
(1) Full name of the contracting party; (8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the father;
(2) Place of birth; (9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the
(3) Age and date of birth; mother; and
(4) Civil status; (10) Full name, residence and citizenship of the
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the guardian or person having charge, in case the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled; contracting party has neither father nor mother and
(6) Present residence and citizenship; is under the age of twenty-one years.
(7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties;

The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be required to exhibit their residence certificates in any
formality in connection with the securing of the marriage license.

Art. 12. The local civil registrar, upon receiving such application, shall require the presentation of the original
birth certificates or, in default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the contracting parties or copies of such
documents duly attested by the persons having custody of the originals. These certificates or certified copies of
the documents by this Article need not be sworn to and shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax. The
signature and official title of the person issuing the certificate shall be sufficient proof of its authenticity.

If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth or baptismal certificate or a certified copy of
either because of the destruction or loss of the original or if it is shown by an affidavit of such party or of any
other person that such birth or baptismal certificate has not yet been received though the same has been
required of the person having custody thereof at least fifteen days prior to the date of the application, such
party may furnish in lieu thereof his current residence certificate or an instrument drawn up and sworn to
before the local civil registrar concerned or any public official authorized to administer oaths. Such instrument
shall contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses of lawful age, setting forth the full name, residence and
citizenship of such contracting party and of his or her parents, if known, and the place and date of birth of such
party. The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall be preferred as witnesses, or, in their default, persons
of good reputation in the province or the locality.

The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate shall not be required if the parents of the contracting parties
appear personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of
said parties, as stated in the application, or when the local civil registrar shall, by merely looking at the applicants
upon their personally appearing before him, be convinced that either or both of them have the required age.

Art. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to
furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate
of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.

In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit setting forth this circumstance
and his or her actual civil status and the name and date of death of the deceased spouse.

Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage,
are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding
articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent
or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested
in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form
of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to
administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and
the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications.

Art. 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged to ask their
parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such advice, or if it be
unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months following the completion of the
publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by the contracting parties to the effect that such
advice has been sought, together with the written advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application for
marriage license. Should the parents or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn
statement.

Art. 16. In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties concerned shall,
in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister
authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the
proper government agency to the effect that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling.
Failure to attach said certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for
a period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the marriage
license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative sanctions but shall not
affect the validity of the marriage.
Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice, the other party must be
present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph.

Art. 17. The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice which shall contain the full names and residences of the
applicants for a marriage license and other data given in the applications. The notice shall be posted for ten
consecutive days on a bulletin board outside the office of the local civil registrar located in a conspicuous place
within the building and accessible to the general public. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge
of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be issued
after the completion of the period of publication.

Art. 18. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for marriage license, but shall
nonetheless issue said license after the completion of the period of publication, unless ordered otherwise by a
competent court at his own instance or that of any interest party. No filing fee shall be charged for the petition
nor a corresponding bond required for the issuances of the order.

Art. 19. The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the fees prescribed by law or regulations before
the issuance of the marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the nature of a fee or tax of any kind
for the issuance of said license. It shall, however, be issued free of charge to indigent parties, that is those who
have no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for their subsistence a fact established by their
affidavit, or by their oath before the local civil registrar.

Art. 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of one hundred twenty days from
the date of issue, and shall be deemed automatically canceled at the expiration of the said period if the
contracting parties have not made use of it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold characters on the face of
every license issued.

Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for
them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage,
issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.

Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein
required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage.

Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as husband and
wife, shall also state:
(1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party; (5) That either or both of the contracting parties have
(2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence; secured the parental consent in appropriate cases;
(3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the (6) That either or both of the contracting parties have
marriage; complied with the legal requirement regarding parental
(4) That the proper marriage license has been issued advice in appropriate cases; and
according to law, except in marriage provided for in (7) That the parties have entered into marriage
Chapter 2 of this Title; settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof.

Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties
the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of
the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the
marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate
copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and,
in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in place other
than those mentioned in Article 8.
Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to
administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed
in connection with applications for marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax.

Art. 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a
registry book strictly in the order in which the same are received. He shall record in said book the names of the
applicants, the date on which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Marriages Exempted from License Requirement

Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be
solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently
survives.

Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such
party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of
a marriage license.

Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit
executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the
marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or
barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally
before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship
of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage.

Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the legible copy of the
marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the
municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.

Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship
captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers
at ports of call.

Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to
solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether
members of the armed forces or civilians.

Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed
validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their
customs, rites or practices.

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of
the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.

 It was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of
a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. There is
presumption of validity of the marriage of the parties. However once it had been overcome,
it becomes the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was
valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. All the evidence to show that
a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate
to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it
says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that
a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt
from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. And
thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio. (Abbas v. Abbas)
 A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no
real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding
that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating
a purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and
with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent
consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the
parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
 Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to
love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited
or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. Although the Court
views with disdain the parties’ attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, it cannot
declare the marriage void. Hence, though the marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid
and subsisting. (RP v. Albios)
 Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a
marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by
refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of
the perpetration of any of the grounds annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental
consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence. (Villanueva v. CA)
 Mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels
and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty,
neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish
psychological incapacity. X x x. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not
 homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment
presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the
marriage. Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely
given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of
evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances constituting
fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment. (Almelor v. RTC)

Void and Voidable Marriages

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or
guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages
were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the
legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship
between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse,
or his or her own spouse.

Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As
amended by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase "However, in case of marriage
celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe
in ten years after this Code shall taken effect" has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February
23, 1998]).

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice
to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed.

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered
legitimate;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of
the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or
in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage
in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from
the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and
all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are
revoked by operation of law.

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age
or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
 (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears
to be incurable.

Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding
Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the
time of the marriage.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods
indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give
his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian
or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-
one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the
other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time
before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the
discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time
the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after
the marriage.

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.

Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement
between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of
their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said
children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.

Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply
in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified
of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with
the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the
date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.

The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional
rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties
already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their
legitime.

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons.

Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the
immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.

Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under
Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the
subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.

 Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or
resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or
other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner." The
grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. For fraud to
become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when
the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a
litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a real contest,
or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.
(Santos v. Santos)
 The termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several
conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring
it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3)
due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4)
the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined. The mere
reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to the
subsequent marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court
action[.]" "Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that
the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse's physical
 reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee
until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law." The choice of the proper
remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the second marriage and
the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent. A
subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the
spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated.
Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally
considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is
protected by law. Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith
is also not immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being
bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still
applies. (Santos v. Santos)
 There are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code: (1) That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; (2) That the present spouse wishes to
remarry; (3) That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and (4) That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee. 10 (RP v. Nolasco)
 The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one.
As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of
any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is that Article
41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the
stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which can only be discharged upon a showing
of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse's whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is already
dead. (RP v. Tampus)

ART 36, FC

 "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and
LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears: This incapacity consists of the following:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to
commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
 after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved. (Santos v. CA)
 Molina Doctrine (RP v. CA): Following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition
of cases involving psychological incapacity:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition.
 Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist for such declaration. Article
36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. (Marcos v. Marcos)
 The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or
psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. If
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Article 36
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital
obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
 themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may
only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. (Vinas
v. Vinas)
 Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects
of petitioners personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2)
immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of procreative sexuality. None of these three, singly
or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. (Choa v. Choa)
 Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. The
obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the
petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to
determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the
petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also
no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Science
continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and control the
human body. Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know about the root
causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological disorders are still
unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what
the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of
psychological incapacity. (Barcelona v. CA)
 It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article. (RP v. Iyoy)
 Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or
generalizations; each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. (Ngo-Te v. Yu-
Te); declared null and void
 Where the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of
psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be
weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage. (Ting v.
Ting)
 Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in
 the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness. (Suazo v. Suazo)
 In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do
not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal
separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness
and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented
the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. (RP v. Encelan)
 Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity. (Kalaw v. Fernandez)
 It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in
its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. (Tongol v. Tongol)
 In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a
Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the
basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality. (RP v.
Quintero-Hamano)
 While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or
court order". In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations. Finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, the Court
granted the petition. (Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA)
 Litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain
judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must
ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action
regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial
resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again.
Having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds
that the subsequent action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of
marriage license is barred by the decision on the previous petition on the ground of
psychological incapacity. (Mallion v. Alcantara)
 An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as
 legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be protected by the state. (Ferraris v. Ferraris)
 To be tired and to give up on one’s situation and on one’s husband are not necessarily signs
of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen,
the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate
ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a
limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation a relationship where no
marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason
of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated,
did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered
into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide any permanent
remedy. (So v. Valera)
 While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her psychological
incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be medically or clinically
identified. There must thus be evidence to adequately establish the same. (RP v. Baguio)
 An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
(Siayangco v. Siayangco)
 Sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make one
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due
to youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. (Dedel v. CA)
 PROPERTY RELATIONS
Property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order:
 By marriage settlements
 By the provisions of FC
 By the local customs

Marriage Settlements
 Property relations may be (1) absolute community; (2) conjugal partnership of gains; (3) complete
separation of property or (4) any other regime
 In the absence of marriage settlement, ACP shall govern
 Must be executed before the celebration of the marriage, including any modification
 Must be in writing, signed by both parties and shall not prejudice 3 rd persons unless they are
registered in the LCR where the marriage is recorded as well as in the RD
 In case of minor, marriage settlement must also be signed by persons who gave consent
 In case of a party sentenced of civil interdiction, guardian shall be made party to the marriage
settlement
 Shall be governed by Philippine laws, except:
o Where both spouses are aliens
o Where both the location of the property and the place of execution of the contract are outside PH
o Where contract is executed in PH but property is located outside PH whose laws require different
formalities
 If marriage does not take place, marriage settlement provisions including donations are void except
for the stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriage.

Donations By Reason of Marriage

Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of
the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.
Art. 83. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III of
the Civil Code, insofar as they are not modified by the following articles.
Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they cannot
donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present property. Any excess
shall be considered void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and the
formalities of wills.
Art. 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of
foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation
secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount
of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess.
Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases:
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the
marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81;
(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;
 (6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code
on donations in general.
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any
family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
Property Regimes
General Provisions
Absolute Art. 88. The ACP between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage
Community is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community
regime at any other time shall be void.

Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the ACP during the marriage can be made
except in case of judicial separation of property.

When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage has
been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be
recorded in the local civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the
proper registries of properties. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may
petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the
amount of their credits.

Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the ACP between the spouses in all
matters not provided for in this Chapter.
Conjugal Art 107: same as Art 88 and 89.
Partnership
Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a
common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either
or both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the
marriage settlements.

Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements.
Complete N/A
Separation
Unions N/A
Without
Marriage
 What Constitutes Community Property
Absolute (1) All the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or
Community acquired thereafter
(2) Winnings in gambling/games of chance
(3) Jewelries of value
Conjugal (1) All property acquired during the marriage unless proved to be exclusive - Art 116
Partnership (2) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund -
Art 117 (1)
(3) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the
spouses - Art 117 (2)
(4) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse - Art
117 (3)
(5) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or
owner of the property where the treasure is found - Art 117 (4)
(6) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting - Art 117 (5)
(7) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number of each
kind brought to the marriage by either spouse - Art 117 (6)
(8) Winnings in gambling/games of chance - Art 117 (7)
(9) Property bought on installments if such ownership was vested during the marriage. Any
amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the
owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership.
(10) Interests falling due during marriage on money/credit owed to any spouse - Art 119
(11) Improvements when made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in
value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement - Art 120
Complete - property not agreed upon as separate - Art 144
Separation
Unions Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
Without with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
Marriage marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or
her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
 What Constitutes Exclusive Property of Each Spouse
Absolute (1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits
Community as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or
grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants
by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property;
(4) Property explicitly provided to be exclusive in marriage settlements.
Conjugal (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own - Art 109 (1)
Partnership (2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title - Art 109 (2)
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property
belonging to only one of the spouses - Art 109 (3)
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband - Art 109 (4)
(5) Property bought on installments if such ownership was vested before the marriage. Any
amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the
owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership. - Art 118
(6) Payment on money/credit owed to any spouse - Art 119
(7) Improvements when made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in value
are less than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement - Art 120
(8) Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of
determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive property,
and in the absence of designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to the right of
accretion when proper. - Art 113
Complete - present or future property - Art 144
Separation - To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and
all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her
separate property. - Art 145
Unions N/A
Without
Marriage
 Charges and Obligations
Absolute (1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either
Community spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of
this Code on Support;
(2) All consented debts by either of the spouse;
(3) Unconsented debts to the extent that the family may have been benefited;
Art 94 (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the
community property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate
property of either spouse used by the family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational
course, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the
family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common
legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement;
(9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this
Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as
advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the
community; and
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
Conjugal - same as ACP except for (9) - Art 121
Partnership - the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of
fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of
either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities have
been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged
for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. - Art 122 (par 3)
Complete Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of
Separation insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties. - Art
146 (par 1)
Unions N/A
Without
Marriage

What can't be charged to community property

Absolute - whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or
Community any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the
loser - Art 95
Conjugal - whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or
Partnership any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the
loser - Art 123
- payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage, except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family - Art 122 (par 1)
- fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them - Art 122 (par 2)
Complete - the liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall be solidary. -Art 146 (par2)
Separation
Unions N/A
Without
Marriage
 What if Community / Conjugal Property is Insufficient
Absolute If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling
Community under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties. - Art 94
Conjugal If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be
Partnership solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. - Art 121
Complete N/A
Separation
Unions N/A
Without
Marriage

Administration
Absolute - belongs to both spouses jointly
Community
- in case of disagreement, the husband's decision prevails, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.

- in case of incapacity, other spouse may assume sole powers of administration, except on
disposition or encumbrance (which requires court authority or written consent of the other
spouse)

Art 96
Conjugal - same as ACP - Art 124
Partnership
- The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their
exclusive properties. Either spouse may transfer the administration of his or her exclusive
property to the other by means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry
of property of the place the property is located. - Art 110

- A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her
exclusive property, without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to
litigate with regard to the same - Art 111

- The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other automatically
terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation shall be
turned over to the owner-spouse. - Art 112

- If the donations are onerous, the amount of the charges shall be borne by the exclusive
property of the donee spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the conjugal
partnership of gains. - Art 114

- Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be
governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case. -
Art 115
Complete Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate
Separation estate, without need of the consent of the other. - Art 145
Unions
Without
Marriage
 Disposition
Absolute - either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property - Art 97
Community
- neither spouse may donate without consent of the other, except for moderate donations for
charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress - Art 98
Conjugal - either spouse may mortgage, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of his or her
Partnership exclusive property – Art 111
- neither spouse may donate without consent of the other, except for moderate donations for
charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress - Art 125
Complete N/A
Separation
Unions Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
Without acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
Marriage after the termination of their cohabitation. - Art 147 (par 3)

Dissolution
Absolute Art 99 to 101:
Community - The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Article 134 to 138.

- The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute
community except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause,
shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial
authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper
petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any
specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to
satisfy the latter's share.

- If a spouse without just cause abandons (left the conjugal dwelling without intention of
returning by not giving any information as to his or her whereabouts for a period of at least 3
months) the other or fails to comply with his or her marital, parental or property obligations
to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute
community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
Conjugal -same as ACP - Art 126 to 128
Partnership
Complete N/A
Separation
Unions N/A
Without
Marriage
 Liquidation
Absolute Art 102: Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall
Community apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case
of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties.

(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered
to each of them.

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net
assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been
a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. Net profits shall be the increase in
value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.

(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with
whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of
seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise.
In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children.
Conjugal Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure
Partnership shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and
obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition
of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been
vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered
to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of
movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to
fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or
 division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom
the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years
are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there
is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said
children.
Complete N/A
Separation
Unions When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
Without faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
Marriage default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation. - Art 147 (par 4)

Liquidation by Reason of Death

Absolute Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be
Community liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the
community property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the said period, no liquidation is made, any disposition
or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the
foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern
the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages
contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out
simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be
determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case
of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided
between the different communities in proportion to the capital and duration of each.
Conjugal - same as ACP - Art 130 and 131
Partnership
Art. 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be
observed in the appraisal and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters
which are not expressly determined in this Chapter.
Art. 133. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse
and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs
to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which
exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
Complete N/A
Separation
Unions N/A
Without
Marriage
 THE FAMILY
The Family as an Institution

Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes
and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement
destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood.

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.

This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

The Family Home

 Constituted jointly by the husband and the wife (which becomes part of the ACP or CPG; or as exclusive
property of either spouse with consent from the other – Art 156) or by an unmarried head of a family;
the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated – Art 152
 Deemed constituted at the time it is occupied as a family residence and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein – Art 153; the beneficiaries (Art 154) being:
o The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
o Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of
the family for legal support.
 Shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except (Art 155):
o For nonpayment of taxes;
o For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
o For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
o For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
 Property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the
vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home.-Art 156
 Art. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount
of the three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas,
or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law. In any event, if the value of the currency changes
after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be
the basis of evaluation. For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities
and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All
others are deemed to be rural areas.
 Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or
owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a
majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide.
 Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
  Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment
in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than
the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for
an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the
actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its
constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from
subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home,
by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure
shall apply. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered.
The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities
under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.
 Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a
person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home.
 Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable.

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or
illegitimate.

Legitimate Illegitimate Legitimated

Who are?  Children conceived or born during the  Children conceived Art. 177. Only
marriage of the parents (Art 164 par 1) and born outside a children conceived
 Children conceived as a result of artificial valid marriage (Art and born outside of
insemination of the wife provided that such is 165) wedlock of parents
authorized in written and signed instrument who, at the time of
executed before the birth of the child and the conception of
recorded in the LCR together with the BC (Art the former, were not
164 par 2) disqualified by any
 Art. 167. The child shall be considered impediment to
legitimate although the mother may have marry each other
declared against its legitimacy or may have may be legitimated.
been sentenced as an adulteress.
Proof / Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the Art. 175. Illegitimate Art. 178.
how to mother contracted another marriage within children may Legitimation shall
establish three hundred days after such termination of establish their take place by a
the former marriage, these rules shall govern in illegitimate filiation subsequent valid
the absence of proof to the contrary: in the same way and marriage between
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty on the same parents. The
days after the solemnization of the evidence as annulment of a
subsequent marriage is considered to have legitimate children. viodable marriage
been conceived during the former marriage, The action must be shall not affect the
provided it be born within three hundred brought within 5 legitimation.
days after the termination of the former years, except when
marriage; there is no record of Art. 180. The effects
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty birth or admission of of legitimation shall
days following the celebration of the filiation, in which retroact to the time
subsequent marriage is considered to have case the action may of the child's birth.
been conceived during such marriage, even be brought during Art. 181. The
though it be born within the three hundred the lifetime of the legitimation of
alleged parent. children who died
 days after the termination of the former before the
marriage. celebration of the
marriage shall
Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child benefit their
born after three hundred days following the descendants.
termination of the marriage shall be proved by
whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is

established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be

brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
How to Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned Art. 182.
impugn only on the following grounds: Legitimation may be
(1) That it was physically impossible for the impugned only by
husband to have sexual intercourse with his those who are
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days prejudiced in their
which immediately preceded the birth of the rights, within five
child because of: years from the time
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to their cause of action
have sexual intercourse with his wife; accrues.
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were
living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have been
that of the husband, except in case of artificial
insemination of donor sperm
(3) That in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization
or ratification of either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation,
or undue influence.
 Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of
the child shall be brought within one year from
the knowledge of the birth or its recording in
the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper
case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was
recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs
do not reside at the place of birth as defined in
the first paragraph or where it was recorded,
the period shall be two years if they should
reside in the Philippines; and three years if
abroad. If the birth of the child has been
concealed from or was unknown to the husband
or his heirs, the period shall be counted from
the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the
child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
whichever is earlier.

Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn

the filiation of the child within the period
prescribed in the preceding article only in the
following cases:
(1) If the husband should died before the
expiration of the period fixed for bringing his
action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the
complaint without having desisted
therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of
the husband.
Rights Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the Art. 176. Illegitimate Art. 179. Legitimated
right: children shall use children shall enjoy
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the the surname and the same rights as
mother, in conformity with the provisions of the shall be under the legitimate children.
Civil Code on Surnames; parental authority of
(2) To receive support from their parents, their their mother, and
ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers shall be entitled to
and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of support in
this Code on Support; and conformity with this
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other Code. The legitime
successional rights granted to them by the Civil of each illegitimate
Code. child shall consist of
one-half of the
legitime of a
legitimate child.
Except for this
modification, all
other provisions in
the Civil Code
governing
successional rights
shall remain in
force.