XII. MALIMAS, ARIEL CONRAD S.

89. San Miguel Corporation, Inc v. San Miguel Corp. Employees Union-PTWGO, G.R. No. 168569,
October 5, 2007
FACTS: Some employees of San Miguel Foods Inc. (SMFI) brought grievance against Finance Manager
Gideo Montesa for discrimination, favoritism, unfair labor practice and harassment. SMFI failed to act on
the complaint which prompted San Miguel Corporation Employees Union PTWGO (the Union) to file a
case with the National Labor Relations Commission against SMFI, its President Amadeo Veloso and
Montesa. It prayed that SMFI et al. be ordered to promote the therein named employees with the
corresponding pay increases or adjustment including payment of salary differentials plus attorney’s fees,
and to cease and desist from committing the same unjust discrimination in matters of promotion. SMFI
filed a motion to dismiss on the alleged ground that the grievance issue should be resolved in the
grievance machinery provided in the collective bargaining. The Union opposed the motion to dismiss.
The NLRC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC’s decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not complaints for violation of seniority rule under the CBA falls within the Labor
Arbiter’s jurisdiction
RULING: Yes. As for the alleged ULP committed under Article 248 (i), for violation of a CBA, this
Article is qualified by Article 261 of the Labor Code, provides that violations of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice
and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. As reflected in the
above-quoted allegations of the Union in its Position Paper, the Union charges SMFI to have violated the
grievance machinery provision in the CBA. The grievance machinery provision in the CBA is not an
economic provision, however, hence, the second requirement for a Labor Arbiter to exercise jurisdiction
of a ULP is not present. The Union likewise charges SMFI, however, to have violated the Job Security
provision in the CBA, specifically the seniority rule, in that SMFI “appointed less senior employees to
positions at its Finance Department, consequently intentionally by-passing more senior employees who
are deserving of said appointment. As above-stated, the Union charges SMFI to have promoted less senior
employees, thus bypassing others who were more senior and equally or more qualified. It may not be
seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA, a
ULP over which the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. SMFI, at all events, questions why the Court of
Appeals came out with a finding that it (SMFI) disregarded the seniority rule under the CBA when its
petition before said court merely raised a question of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals having affirmed
the NLRC decision finding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the Union complaint and thus
remanding it to the Labor Arbiter for continuation of proceedings thereon, the appellate court said finding
may be taken to have been made only for the purpose of determining jurisdiction.
90. Philippine Electric Corp. (PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168612, December 10, 2014
FACTS: Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture
and repairs of high voltage transformers. Among PWU members were selected for promotion, therefore
ordering them to undergo training, eventually shall receive allowance until the training is completed.
PWU is a legitimate labor organization and the exclusive bargaining representative of PHILEC’s rank-
and-file employees. PHILEC and its rank-and-file employees were governed by collective bargaining
agreement providing for the steps in increasing the employee’s basic salary in case of promotion. PWU
members claimed that schedule of training allowance did not conform to Article X of their CBA. PWU
and PHILEC decided to settle their grievance to voluntary arbitration. PHILEC contends that they applied
Modified “SGV” pay grades to avoid salary distortion. However, Voluntary Arbitrator held that PHILEC
violated its CBA with PWU, therefore ordering the PHILEC to pay the PWU members allowance based
on their CBA. PHILEC filed a petition for certiorari on Court of Appeals (CA), alleging that Voluntary
Arbitrator gravely abused its discretion in rendering his decision, but the CA affirmed the decision of
Voluntary Arbitrator. PHILEC filed its petition before the SC for review on certiorari insisting that they
did not violate their CBA with PWU.
ISSUE: Whether or not Voluntary Arbitrator gravely abuse its discretion in directing PHILEC to pay the
training allowance based on CBA with PWU.
RULING: No, the Voluntary Arbitrator did not gravely abuse its discretion. The Voluntary Arbitrator
correctly awarded training allowances based on the amounts and formula of the CBA. A Collective
Bargaining Agreement is “a contract executed upon the request of either the employer or the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees incorporating the agreement reached after the negotiations
with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including
proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement.” A collective
bargaining agreement being a contract, its provisions “constitute the law between the parties” and must be
complied with in good faith. Therefore, the allowance of the members of the PWU must be computed
based on Article X of their CBA. Moreover, PHILEC allegedly applied the “Modified SGV” pay grade
scale to prevent any salary distortion within PHILEC’s enterprise. This, however, does not justify
PHILEC’s non-compliance with the collective bargaining agreement. This pay grade scale is not provided
in the collective bargaining agreement. It could have invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code, to
incorporate the “Modified SGV” pay grade scale in its collective bargaining agreement with PWU. But it
did not. Therefore, PHILEC cannot insist on the “Modified SGV” pay grade scale’s application.
92. NYK-Fil Ship Management v. Dabu, G.R. No. 138938, October 24, 2000.
FACTS: Petitioner NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc., a local manning agent, hired respondent Gener G.
Dabu to work as oiler for nine months on board the vessel M/V Hojin with a monthly basic salary of
US$584.00. Respondent underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) on where he
disclosed that he has diabetes mellitus. The doctor who conducted the PEME noted that respondent has
diabetes mellitus type 2, controlled with medications. On April 10, 2013, respondent consulted a doctor in
Sri Lanka who found him with elevated blood sugar level and was suffering from diabetes mellitus and
declared him unfit for sea duty. The company-designated physician declared that respondent's diabetes
mellitus is not work-related. However, respondent's treatment was continued for a maximum period of
130 days. Respondent continued his follow-up consultations as he still complained of body pains and
weakness and was prescribed medicines. Respondent wrote letters to petitioner appealing for the
continuation of his treatment since his sickness was work-related taking into account his 23 years of
working in petitioner's various vessels. Respondent then consulted Two (2) other doctors, Dr. Efren R.
Vicaldo and Dr. Czarina Sheherazade Mae A. Miguel, who both found that this ilness is work-aggravated/
related. Dabu sought payment of disability benefits, damages and attorney's fees from petitioner, but was
denied. Dabu then filed a notice to arbitrate with the National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB).
November 28, 2014- the NCMB-Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA) ruled in favor of Dabu, and
ordered respondent to pay him $60,000 Petitioner appealed the PVA’s decision, on September 15, 2015,
the Court of Appeals reversed the PVA Decision, and dismissed Dabu’s complaint. However, after Dabu
filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), the CA amended its decision and granted Dabu’s (MR). CA
dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground of being FILED OUT OF TIME. Petitioner filed for review
on the ground that the Court of Appeals committed a serious error in rendering the amended decision on
the ground that it was allegedly filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed an error in rendering the amended decision.
RULING: No, there is no merit in the petition. Decisions of the voluntary arbitrator(s) shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.
Clearly, the decision of the voluntary arbitrator becomes final and executory after 10 days from receipt
thereof. In Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals: It is true that Rule 43, Section
4 of the Rules of Court provides for a 15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal: Despite Rule 43
providing for a 15-day period to appeal, SC ruled that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be
appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided in
the Labor Code. We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of decisions rendered
by Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute provides that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision "shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties."
Being provided in the statute, this 10-day period must be complied with; otherwise, no appellate court
will have jurisdiction over the appeal. This absurd situation occurs when the decision is appealed on the
11th to 15th day from receipt as allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under the law, has already
become final and executory. Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution provides, the SUPREME
COURT "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" in promulgating rules of procedure in
courts. The 10-day period to appeal under the Labor Code being a substantive right, this period cannot be
diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules of Court. In Shioji v. Harvey, this court held that the
"rules of court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law, if not in conflict with
positive law." Rules of Court are "subordinate to the statute." In case of conflict between the law and the
Rules of Court, "the statute will prevail." The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or
decision shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt of the award or
decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion for reconsideration with the Voluntary
Arbitrator, the motion must be filed within the same 10-day period since a motion for reconsideration is
filed "within the period for taking an appeal." IN THIS CASE, petitioner received the PVA decision on
February 9, 2015, and filed the petition for review 15 days after receipt thereof, i.e., on February 24,
2015. The CA, upon respondent's motion for reconsideration, rendered its Amended Decision dated
March 3, 2016 dismissing the petition and vacating the earlier decision it made granting the petition. The
CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time, citing the PHILEC case above-quoted.