Pueblo V Yip Berrios

Colina Bruno, Maria 11/14/2023
For Educational Use Only
Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

142 D.P.R. 386, 1997 P.R.-Eng. 53,457, P.R. Offic. Trans.
Texto original en espanol About 9:00 a.m. that day, when defendant Henry Yip Berríos
1997 JTS 14, 142 D.P.R. 386, 1997 WL 53457 (P.R.), was trying to leave the housing project where he lived, in his
1997 P.R.-Eng. 53,457, P.R. Offic. Trans. 1983 Saab, he was stopped by police officer Héctor Ruiz
García, who was assigned to one of the blocked roads.
The People of Puerto Rico, Plaintiff and petitioner According to the transcript of the evidence suppression
v. hearing, when officer Ruiz García stopped the vehicle he
Henry Yip Berríos, Defendant and respondent ordered Yip García to show him his driver's license and the
vehicle registration.
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.
No. CE–93–735 When officer Ruiz García stopped Yip Berríos and asked him
San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 30, 1997 for the license and registration, he had no knowledge or
suspicion that Yip Berríos had committed or was about to
commit an offense. Specifically, he had no knowledge or
Justice HERNÁNDEZ DENTON delivered the opinion of
suspicion that Yip Berríos had violated Act No. 141 of July
the Court.
20, 1960 (9 L.P.R.A. § 301 et seq.) (1976), as amended,
known as the Vehicle and Traffic Law of Puerto Rico. What
is more, from the record before our consideration it does not
Synopsis arise that any of the arrest warrants being served in the
Certiorari housing project involved Yip Berríos. In this context, the
police officer solely stopped Yip Berríos to comply with the
The prosecution seeks reversal of the ruling issued by the order issued by police supervisors to stop all vehicles
Superior Court, Bayamón Part, which suppressed certain entering or leaving the housing project.
evidence seized by the Police of Puerto Rico after Henry Yip
Berríos was stopped at a roadblock set up on the roads Yip Berríos produced the documents required. When officer
leading to the Virgilio Dávila public housing project in Ruiz García examined them, he noticed that the license plate
Bayamón. The trial court found that the evidence was number on the vehicle registration (50B92) did not match the
obtained in violation of the constitutional guarantee against vehicle's license plate (AWM–422). The officer asked Yip
unreasonable searches and seizures, since the police detained Berríos to step out of the vehicle. 1 Ruiz García then looked
defendant without having reasonable grounds to believe that inside the vehicle and saw a firearm between the two front
he had violated the law. The prosecution alleges that the trial seats. When questioned about this, Yip Berríos accepted that
court suppressed evidence validly seized by the Police of he did not have a license to carry weapons. It was then that
Puerto Rico during a “roadblock at which all the vehicles Ruiz García placed him under arrest, made him the pertinent
were indiscriminately stopped.” We affirm. legal warnings, and proceeded to search him. As a result of
this search, the police found in the pockets of his pants two
aluminum foil wrappings containing what turned out to be
I heroine. The heroine and the weapon found in the car were
In the morning of Friday, April 16, 1993, from fifty (50) to seized by the police.
sixty (60) Puerto Rico Police officers went to the Virgilio
Dávila public housing project to serve arrest warrants. As Based on these events, the prosecution charged Yip Berríos
part of this operation, the police blocked off the three (3) with violations of sec. 404(a) of the Controlled Substances
public roads that led to the housing project in order to check Act, 24 L.P.R.A. § 2404 (1979); of sec. 2–801(7) of the
the driver's licenses and registrations of all incoming or Puerto Rico Vehicle and Traffic Law, 9 L.P.R.A. § 591(7)
outgoing vehicles. (1976); and of secs. 6, 8, and 11 of the Weapons Law, 25
© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

L.P.R.A. §§ 416, 418, and 421 (1979). Defendant timely had committed or were committing an offense or traffic
moved to suppress the evidence, alleging that his stop at the violation. Consequently, to resolve this matter we must
housing project was illegal because there were no reasonable consider the scope of the constitutional protection against
grounds or probable cause to believe that he had committed unreasonable searches and seizures under Art. II, Sec. 10 of
an offense. Thus, he alleged that the evidence obtained in our Constitution and under the Fourth Amendment to the
such circumstances should be suppressed. Constitution of the United States, in the specific context of
the case under our consideration.
The Superior Court, Bayamón Part (Hon. Ramón E. Gómez
Colón, J.) accepted defendant's contentions and suppressed After examining the parties' briefs, we will first discuss the
the evidence seized at the roadblock. The court concluded last three errors assigned. We will then address the
that absent individualized suspicion, Yip Berríos's stop unconstitutionality finding made by the trial judge. Thus,
violated our constitutional provisions and, therefore, the with the benefit of the parties' appearance and after
evidence obtained as a result of said police action should be examining the applicable law, we resolve.
suppressed. Likewise, the court declared unconstitutional
sec. 5–1120(a) of the Puerto Rico Vehicle and Traffic Law, 9
L.P.R.A. § 1152 (1976), which requires motorists to stop and
II
show the necessary documents when so required by a peace
Insofar as it is pertinent, Art. II, Sec. 10 of the Constitution
officer.
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico provides:
The State petitioned this Court for certiorari, assigning the The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
following four (4) errors to the trial court: houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated.
1. Whether the Superior Court erred in declaring ....

unconstitutional sec. 5–1120(a) of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law and in not applying, even in that case, the good-faith No warrant for arrest or search and seizure shall issue
search doctrine. except by judicial authority and only upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
2. Whether the Superior Court erred in not applying the rule describing the place to be searched and the persons to be
that allows traffic “roadblocks” to examine driver's licenses arrested or the things to be seized.
and vehicle registrations.
Evidence obtained in violation of this section shall be
3. Whether the Superior Court's interpretation of Delaware v. inadmissible in the courts.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), was correct.
P.R. Const. art. II, § 10.
4. Whether it was correct for the Superior Court to determine
that the evidence should be suppressed because it was This provision is analogous to the Fourth Amendment to the
obtained as a result of an illegal operation. Constitution of the United States, 3 Diario de Sesiones de la
We issued the writ.2 The first error assigned requires that we Convención Constituyente (Journal of Proceedings of the
pass upon the constitutional validity of Traffic Law sec. 5– Constitutional Convention) 1568 (1961); 3 José Trías
1120(a). The last three errors, on the other hand, question the Monge, Historia constitucional de Puerto Rico 191, Río
constitutional capacity of the State to set up traffic Piedras, Ed. Universitaria (1982); and, like its federal
roadblocks on our public thoroughfares and stop motor equivalent, its basic objective is to protect the ambit of the
vehicles without having an individualized suspicion or individual's privacy and dignity against arbitrary state acts.
reasonable grounds to believe that the driver or the occupants Pueblo v. Santiago Alicea, 138 D.P.R. ___ [38 p.r. Offic.


Trans. ___] (1995); Pueblo en interés menor N.O.R., 136 Empleados, 104 D.P.R. 436, 440 [4 P.R. Offic. Trans. 605,
D.P.R. ___ [36 P.R. Offic. Trans. ___] (1994); Pueblo v. 610] (1975). See also López Vives v. Policía de P.R., 118
Martínez Torres, 120 D.P.R. 496, 500 [20 P.R. Offic. Trans. D.P.R. 219 [18 P.R. Offic. Trans. 264] (1987).
515, 520] (1988). In the federal jurisdiction, see: United
States v. Mendelhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Katz v. United As is known, when determining whether there is protection
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). In practical terms, said under the Fourth Amendment or under its equivalent in
constitutional provision seeks to prevent state intrusion on Puerto Rico, it must be first determined whether the person
the privacy and liberty of persons except in those instances who claims constitutional protection is entitled to have a
permitted by the very body of laws. See 1 Ernesto L. Chiesa, reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the
Derecho Procesal Penal de Puerto Rico y Estados Unidos challenged governmental action, be it a search or a seizure.
283 (1991); 1 Olga E. Resumil de Sanfilippo, Práctica Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361; California v.
jurídica de Puerto Rico, Derecho Procesal Penal 203 et seq. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). Thus, we have advised that
(1990). our constitutional protection requires that it be determined
“whether the person has a reasonable right to harbor,
Although the constitutional guarantee granted to individuals wherever, within the specific circumstances of the case, the
under Art. II, Sec. 10 of our Constitution is analogous to the expectation that his privacy be respected.” Pueblo v. Lebrón,
federal guarantee, in the past we have held that its content is 108 D.P.R. 324, 331 [8 P.R. Offic. Trans. 333, 339] (1979);
different. Pueblo v. Dolce, 105 D.P.R. 422, 429 [5 P.R. Offic. E.L.A. v. P.R. Tel. Co., 114 D.P.R. 394, 402 [14 P.R. Offic.
Trans. 582, 591] (1976). There, we held that “[b]oth Trans. 505, 515] (1983).
provisions were intended for different circumstances and it is
logical that their construction should conform, within the With regard to Art. II, Sec. 10 of our Constitution, the
frame of our relations with the United States, to the changing standard for determining whether the governmental action is
realities of each society.” Id. constitutionally permissible is the reasonableness of the state
intrusion on the person's privacy. This is normally
In this context, we have pointed out that the Fourth determined by balancing the state interests vis-à-vis the
Amendment to the federal Constitution “describes the individual rights. The greater or lesser degree of expectation
minimum ambit of the guarantee it recognizes.” Id. at 427 [5 of privacy that our body of laws recognizes to a person in
P.R. Offic. Trans. at 588]. This means that although the states certain circumstances is pertinent to the analysis of the
and Puerto Rico cannot reduce the ambit of protection reasonableness of the state action and, consequently, for
recognized by the caselaw construing the Federal Fourth determining the scope of the constitutional protection. In this
Amendment, they may broaden it in order to afford greater context, and given the fact that in Puerto Rico the individual
protection to citizens. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60– rights, and particularly the right to privacy and dignity,
61 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). In receive a broader protection than in the federal jurisdiction,
fact, our Constitution contains two additional provisions the reasonableness standard is stricter in our jurisdiction.
besides Art. II, Sec. 10, that give greater vitality to the
constitutional protection of privacy: These are Sec. 1 of our
Bill of Rights, which provides that “[t]he dignity of the
III
human being is inviolable,” and Sec. 8, which establishes the
In People v. Sosa Díaz, 90 P.R.R. 606 (1964), we specifically
right of every person “to the protection of law against
extended the Art. II, Sec. 10 constitutional protection to
abusive attacks on his honor, reputation and private or family
motor vehicles. We have advised, however, that the scope of
life.” This broader specificity and extension of our
the protection afforded to persons in circumstances involving
constitutional text has led us to affirm that, with regard to the
automobiles is smaller. See Pueblo v. Malavé González, 120
protection of the right to privacy, our Constitution follows “a
D.P.R. 470, 478 [20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 487, 496] (1988);
broader style than the traditional.” E.L.A. v. Hermandad de


Pueblo v. Acevedo Escobar, 112 D.P.R. 770, 775 [12 P.R. However, with regard to a greater degree of intervention, as
Offic. Trans. 971, 978] (1982). This does not mean that when would be searching inside the vehicle, we stated that absent
we travel in an automobile we waive our right to privacy and special circumstances, for such act to be constitutionally
against self-incrimination. Pueblo v. Malavé González, 120 valid, a judicial warrant must be obtained. Id.
D.P.R. at 478–479 [20 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 496]. What
happens is that given the conceptual and functional In a later case, Pueblo v. Martínez Torres, 120 D.P.R. 496,
differences between a vehicle and a house, as well as the fact 500 [20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 515, 520] (1988), we upheld the
that traffic on our public thoroughfares is highly regulated, validity of the stop of a motor vehicle and the arrest of its
we have recognized as reasonable a higher degree of driver by a police officer who acts on the basis of collective
government intrusion on the ambit of individual privacy in information, when the officer who initiates the chain of
such circumstances than that ordinarily recognized in a communication has reasonable grounds to believe that the
house. Id. at 478 [20 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 496–497]; Pueblo arrested person has violated the law.
v. Acevedo Escobar, 112 D.P.R. at 776 [12 P.R. Offic. Trans.
at 978]. In one case or the other, however, the validity of Likewise, we have validated the prerogative of the police to
governmental intrusion depends on whether such intrusion is detain a citizen for investigative purposes as part of said
reasonable under the circumstances of the case. body's obligation to patrol public roads and investigate
criminal activity, as long as the detained person consents to
Both under the Federal Fourth Amendment and under the the intervention. Pueblo en interés menor N.O.R., 136 D.P.R.
Constitution of Puerto Rico, the temporary detention of a ___ [36 P.R. Offic. Trans. ___] (1994); Pueblo v. Acevedo
motorist by state officers, even if for a brief period or for a Escobar, 112 D.P.R. at 778 [12 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 980].
specific purpose, constitutes a seizure of the person. Whren v.
United States, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); United States v. The controversy under our consideration today is different.
Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). Such is the The police stopped Yip Berríos's vehicle without having
situation when a state officer stops a vehicle at a roadblock. 3 reasonable grounds to believe that he had broken the law.
Thus, the stop of a vehicle by a police officer is framed Neither did the police have Yip Berríos's consent. In light of
within the constitutional imperative that under the the above, we must decide whether a roadblock stop made
circumstances of the case, such seizure must be reasonable without having some degree of individualized suspicion is
so as not to injure the rights of citizens. Whren v. United permissible under our constitutional system.
States, 135 L.Ed.2d at 95.
Never before had we had the opportunity to examine such
In the past we have recognized as reasonable the stop of a controversy in Puerto Rico. In the United States, on the
motor vehicle under circumstances that give rise to contrary, this controversy has been considerably debated, and
reasonable grounds or probable cause to believe that a traffic the United States Supreme Court has been the main exponent
violation has occurred.4 Pueblo v. Malavé González, 120 of the fundamental principles on which the Fourth
D.P.R. 470 [20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 487] (1988); People v. de Amendment constitutional protection against unreasonable
Jesús Robles, 92 P.R.R. 320 (1965). In the federal searches and seizures rests in that context. Thus, in resolving
jurisdiction, see: Whren v. United States, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 this case, we resort to that jurisdiction to examine the
(1996); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977); treatment given in such circumstances to the constitutional
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979). On that guarantee so that we may pintpoint the minimum ambit of
occasion we pointed out that it was valid to stop a motor constitutional protection that the states and Puerto Rico are
vehicle when the driver had committed a traffic violation, obliged to give to the citizenry. We will timely delineate
and indicated that the “stop ha [d ] a specific purpose and below the profile of the constitutional protection under our
[was] for a limited period of time.” Pueblo v. Malavé Constitution. Reference to cases from other jurisdictions is,
González, 120 D.P.R. at 481 [20 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 498]. in this sense, illustrative. Federal caselaw shall be solely


used for purposes of determining the minimum content of visual inspection, and any kind of verbal exchange between
Sec. 10 of the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. the person stopped and the state officers. On the other hand
we have the subjective intrusion, characterized by a feeling
of apprehension, fright, or even surprise caused by the stop
to those who travel on the public highways. According to the
IV
United States Supreme Court, this type of intrusion or
The Federal Supreme Court considered the constitutional
interference with individual privacy is substantially less in
validity of stopping a motor vehicle at a traffic checkpoint
the case of checkpoints than that which ordinarily occurs
for the first time in United States v. Martínez–Fuerte, 428
when a person is stopped by a police officer on preventive
U.S. 543 (1976).5 That case —which consolidated several
(roving) patrol. In this respect, the Court explained:
cases— challenged the validity, under the Fourth
Amendment, of stops made by the Border Patrol at two “At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other
permanent checkpoints near the United States border with vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the
Mexico as a measure to control the entry of illegal aliens.6 officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be
frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.”
In upholding the constitutional validity of the challenged
stops, the Federal Supreme Court held that the United States United States v. Martínez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558 (citing
Constitution allowed for the operation of what it called with approval United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894–895
“reasonably located checkpoints” at which vehicles may be (1975)).
stopped in the absence of any individualized suspicion. Id. at
562. To arrive at this conclusion, the United States Supreme Upon balancing the interests at stake, the Federal Supreme
Court examined the reasonableness of the police action in Court deemed that given the public interest involved and the
light of the balance between the interests at stake. On the one scope of the intrusion on individual privacy, the government
hand, it considered the magnitude of the public interest that intervention was reasonable and, thus, the checkpoint stop
gave rise to the police action and the effectiveness of the withstood constitutional scrutiny.
mechanism used to advance said interest. On the other hand,
the Court considered the scope of governmental intrusion on Three years later, the United States Supreme Court decided
individual privacy. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In this case, a
police officer patrolling in New Castle County, Delaware,
In that respect, the United States Supreme Court pointed out stopped a motor vehicle, inside of which he seized
that the governmental interest in controlling the traffic of marijuana. According to the patrolman's testimony, it was a
immigrants was very high, while the resulting intrusion on routine stop made without reasonable suspicion or grounds
individual privacy was minimal, because neither the vehicles to believe that the person stopped had committed an offense
nor the occupants were searched. Id. at 558. The Court or a traffic violation. The police officer stopped the vehicle
further held that the discretion exercised by state officers and just to check the driver's license and the vehicle registration.
the potential interference of checkpoints with legitimate Note that unlike Martínez–Fuerte, the stop in Prouse was not
traffic was minimal.7 part of a roadblock, but a preventive- (roving) patrol stop.
The important distinction established in Martínez–Fuerte In assessing the reasonableness of the intrusion on individual
with regard to the type of intrusion on individual privacy to privacy, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
which a person may be subjected contributed to the contention that the governmental interest in identifying
determination of constitutionality of the checkpoint unlicensed motorists and the interest in ensuring that vehicle
challenged therein. On the one hand we have what the Court safety regulations are observed sufficed to validate a system
called objective intrusion, consisting of the stop itself, the in which the state officer has absolute discretion to stop


motorists. Thus, the Court held that stopping a vehicle and accidents caused by drunk drivers.
requesting the driver's license and vehicle registration,
absent any degree of individualized suspicion on the Many state jurisdictions, in turn, have passed upon the
commission of an offense by the vehicle occupants, was controversy under our consideration, reaching different
impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. Under the results influenced by their respective state constitutions. 8 In
federal minimum constitutional requirements, the police are this context, some courts have validated roadblocks at which
barred from making a preventive- (roving) patrol stop motorists are forced to merely slow down when approaching
without having some degree of individualized suspicion to them and may choose to either engage in conversation with
justify it. the police officer or drive on. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489
(Utah App.1990); Little v. State, 479 A.2d 903 (Md.1984).
Notwithstanding the above, the United States Supreme Court Other courts have allowed motorists approaching a
implicitly accepted that conducting a license-checking roadblock to take an alternate route and avoid contact with
roadblock may be constitutionally valid if methods that the checkpoint. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah
involve less intrusion on individual privacy or that do not App.1990); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal.1987);
involve the unconstrained and arbitrary exercise of discretion State v.Super. Ct. In & For County of Pima, 691 P.2d 1073
by state officers are employed. Thus, it added that (Ariz.1984). And others still have required that the State
“[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type obtain a previous judicial warrant to establish the roadblock.
stops is one possible alternative” for doing away with said State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D.1976).
arbitrariness. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at [663].
Some state courts have been more specific and have
The validity of a roadblock was again put to the test in identified a series of requirements or factors that must be
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). considered when passing on the constitutional validity of
In that case, the Federal Supreme Court passed upon the roadblocks.9 However, the extensive caselaw that validates
validity of a state alcohol-control program that set up the governmental practice of setting up roadblocks has
roadblocks or driver checkpoints along the roads. The consistently used the scrutiny method developed by the
roadblock challenged in Sitz followed pre-established federal caselaw. Thus, the reasonableness of the
guidelines prepared in collaboration not only with the governmental acts has been subject to the result of the
Michigan Police force, but also with state prosecutors and balance of the following three factors: (1) the magnitude of
with the University of Michigan Transportation Research the public interest served by the seizure; (2) the degree to
Institute. which such seizure advances the public interest; and (3) the
degree of intrusion on individual privacy and freedom. These
Following the Martínez–Fuerte and Prouse precedents, the factors, in turn, have been influenced by the different
United States Supreme Court held that the degree of constitutional requirements of the states with regard to the
intrusion on individual privacy, both objective and degree of protection they give to the ambit of individual
subjective, was minimal, and thus, when balancing the same privacy. The result of this analysis determines the
against the governmental interest at stake —reducing constitutional validity of the roadblock in question.
accidents caused by drunk drivers— and against the
effectiveness of the program in achieving that goal, the In light of these tests, the evaluation of the roadblock under
decision should weigh in favor of the governmental program. our consideration requires that we first determine whether
Likewise, the Court held that the highway sobriety the seizure that a roadblock stop ordinarily presumes is
checkpoint program in Sitz did not give state officers the permissible under our constitutional scheme. If this analysis
unconstrained discretion dissaproved in Prouse. As a result, shows that such stop is permissible, we must then examine
the Court validated the initial stop of motorists at the the constitutionality of the specific roadblock under our
roadblocks under its consideration in an effort to reduce consideration.


motor vehicle on the public thoroughfares.
On the other hand, the individualization existing in cases

V
involving a stop made by a preventive (roving) patrol or
The standard that permeates Art. II, Sec. 10 of our
during an arrest is almost nonexistent in the case of a
Constitution, and which delimits the degree of permissible
roadblock stop. We note that all motorists passing through a
state intrusion on the ambit of individual privacy, is that of
roadblock are subject to detention by state officers. In the
reasonableness. As an integral part of this evaluation is the
eyes of the public, state intrusion in that context is less
expectation of privacy harbored by a person in a specific
offensive and, thus, its effect on the reputation of the
context. Having recognized the existence of a legitimate
detained person is less or almost nonexistent.10 State intrusion
expectation of privacy, any governmental act that attempts to
acquires thus another nuance, another scope. It is a state
intrude on that ambit must be reasonable under the specific
intrusion that in certain circumstances may be substantially
circumstances of the case. The higher the legitimate
less than that proscribed by our body of laws in the absence
expectation of privacy, the broader the scope of the
of probable cause.
constitutional protection. The lesser the legitimate
expectation of privacy, the lesser the scope of the
In light of the above, requiring probable cause for stopping a
constitutional protection and, therefore, the degree of legally
vehicle at a roadblock may constitute an onerous burden for
permissible state intrusion on that ambit would be greater. In
the public interest that in a given circumstance gave rise to
both cases, “[t]he analysis of the scope of the constitutional
such roadblock. Consequently, we hold that the validity of a
protection shall be made in accordance with the application
roadblock in our jurisdiction is subject to an analysis of its
of the balance of interests doctrine.” Resumil de Sanfilippo,
reasonableness. Said analysis must be based on the tests that
supra, at 205.
the federal and state caselaw have recognized as pertinent
and which this Court has adopted. These tests are: (1) the
When examining the nature of a roadblock stop, we must
magnitude of the public interest that gives rise to the
point out that the State regulates, controls and limits in many
roadblock operation; (2) the degree to which the roadblock
forms the use of public highways to maintain and promote
advances such interest; and (3) the scope of the intrusion on
the safety of the people who travel daily on them. 37 A.L.R.4
individual privacy. Each roadblock must be individually
th
10, 13; 7A Am.Jur.2d § [14] (1997). To such ends,
examined to determine whether it meets the constitutional
motorists are required to have a driver's license, and motor
requirements established in our body of laws and whether, in
vehicles must be registered in the Puerto Rico Department of
the balance of interests, a narrower scope of the
Transportation and Public Works. See Act No. 141 of July
constitutional protection is reasonable in view of the public
20, 1960 (9 L.P.R.A. § 301 et seq.) (1976), as amended. Any
interest at stake.
person who wishes to be legally authorized to drive a motor
vehicle must meet the statutory and regulatory requirements
As part of this analysis, we must examine the principal goal
established to such effects by our body of laws.
sought by the roadblock operation in order to determine if it
suffices to justify the degree of intrusion on individual
When using highways, people know that the police are
privacy that a vehicle stop presupposes. In this respect, we
continually surveying public thoroughfares. Constant police
agree with the decisions arrived at by almost all United
activity on our country's highways is even perceived by the
States jurisdictions to the effect that setting up a roadblock
population as normal. This situation dilutes to a certain
for the purpose of finding anyone who has committed an
extent the expectation of privacy that a person may
offense does not justify the validity of the stop. See United
reasonably have when driving a motor vehicle, and illustrates
States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C.Cir.1989); Galberth
the fact that society recognizes as valid some degree of
v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C.App.1991). Thus, as a
intrusion on the ambit of individual privacy when driving a
general rule, the employment of roadblocks for “general


enforcement purposes” is illegal. interference with normal traffic must be minimal or, in any
event, reasonable.11
Likewise, the State cannot invoke the existence of a
legitimate purpose as a pretext for advancing goals that do On the other hand, for a roadblock stop to be reasonable
not pass constitutional muster. In this respect, aspects such as under our constitutional scheme, there must be certain
the location of the roadblock, the time, and the practices of objective criteria that eliminate the arbitrariness of state
state officers during the roadblock operation must be officers. Criteria such as the occupants' race, sex, or age are
examined to determine whether the principal purpose of the simply untenable under our constitutional scheme. 12
roadblock is unrelated to the alleged objective. See United Therefore, in the event that not all vehicles are stopped,
States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C.Cir.1989); United objective patterns must be previously established to prevent
States v. Morales–Zamora, 974 F.2d 149 (1992). Also, an discriminatory detentions.13
evaluation must be made of the effectiveness of the
roadblock in advancing the public interest at stake. The use The arbitrariness of field officers may be controlled, on the
of empirical evidence may be an adequate instrument in other hand, through guidelines previously established by
making this determination. Moreover, the existence of other supervisory officers. The participation of higher-ranking
less onerous and less harmful alternatives for achieving officers in the preparation of these guidelines has been
governmental goals may justify a finding of considered as an adequate mechanism for minimizing the
unconstitutionality of the governmental act. degree of discretion left to the officer working at the
roadblock operation. See Little v. State, 479 A.2d 903
In general terms, the harm caused to individual privacy must (Md.1984). These guidelines must include aspects such as
be minimal. Following the distinction made in Martínez– the time and duration of the roadblock, safety standards,
Fuerte, this has a dual character: the objective intrusion — vehicle stop criteria, and other procedures inherent to the
that is, the scope and duration of the stop— must be brief. roadblock operation that restrict the exercise of discretion of
Thus, absent other circumstances that give rise to reasonable field officers. Once these standards or guidelines are
grounds to believe that an offense has been committed, it is adopted, they must be strictly complied with. See Com. v.
excessive to ask a person to step out of the car or to question Anderson, 547 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass.1989) (the Court declared
said person beyond what is necessary to establish the identity the challenged roadblock unconstitutional because the
of the driver, or to ask said person to produce the documents scheduled duration of the same was extended without
that show his or her legitimacy as a driver. See Ingersoll v. following the previously established guidelines for extending
Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal.1987) (personnel timed the it).
detention periods, which, at the initial stage, averaged 28
seconds, while the average time for those who were taken to The above doctrinal lineaments give reasonableness, under
a second testing area was 6 minutes and 13 seconds). our Constitution, to the seizure constituted by a roadblock
stop. When this type of governmental act —which
With regard to the subjective intrusion, or the intrusion constitutes a warrantless seizure— is challenged in court, the
produced by the apprehension or surprise experienced by State must prove its reasonableness.
persons as a result of the roadblock, we must point out the
following: (1) the roadblock must be clearly visible; thus, the There may be instances, however, that warrant the
degree of illumination at the checkpoint and the placement, establishment of a traffic roadblock in which the
at a reasonable distance, of warnings about the police reasonableness tests we have outlined above need not be
operation at the checkpoint are important; see United States strictly met. This may be the case of an emergency situation
v. Hernández, 739 F.2d 484 (9 th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 in which the police are required to fence off an area or set up
U.S. 1021 (1984); (2) the checkpoint operation must a barricade at some place as a protective measure. These
guarantee the safety of passing motorists; and (3) the exceptional instances may justify a departure from the


above-mentioned general rule and shall be examined in light the prosecution argues that the state interest in “protecting
of the concrete facts from which they arise.14 vehicular property and reducing the crimes committed with
the help of illegally obtained vehicles, supports the validity
Let us examine the context of Yip Berríos's detention against of roadblocks conducted for purposes of checking driver's
this backdrop. licenses and vehicle registrations.” Id. And asks the Court to
validate the roadblock conducted in this case and, thus, the
detention of defendant Yip Berríos.
VI
Certainly the detection of traffic and vehicular property
The roadblock under our consideration was set up by the
offenses is a state interest that deserves considerable
Police of Puerto Rico on a Friday morning, without previous
deference. In fact, in the past we have recognized that “due
notice, on the three roads leading into and out of the Virgilio
to the very mobility of automobiles, these are occasionally
Dávila public housing project, where defendant Yip Berríos
used by criminals to commit illegal acts and frequently
lived. According to the record of the case, all vehicles
become the product of the criminal act itself.” Pueblo v.
attempting to enter or to leave the housing project were
Malavé González, 120 D.P.R. at 479 [20 P.R. Offic. Trans. at
stopped at the challenged roadblock without any degree of
497]. However, an in-depth analysis of all the circumstances
individualized suspicion that the person stopped had
surrounding the roadblock operation in the case at bar raises
committed an offense or a traffic violation. After the vehicles
serious doubts about the validity of the government's
were stopped, the police asked the drivers to produce their
contention that the principal purpose of the roadblock
driver's licenses and vehicle registrations. It was under these
conducted at the Virgilio Dávila public housing project was
circumstances that the vehicle on which Yip Berríos traveled
to systematically check driver's licenses and vehicle
was stopped and seized, and as a result of which the anomaly
registrations.
in the vehicle's license plate was observed and the evidence
seized. Within this framework, we must determine whether
We must point out that on that day the police was serving
the initial stop of Yip Berríos's vehicle was constitutionally
several arrest warrants at the same housing project at which
valid in light of the delineated reasonableness standards for
the roadblock was conducted. We cannot conceive that the
roadblock stops.
police carried out both activities simultaneously without a
previous plan to such effect. The prosecution does not state,
The prosecution points out in his brief that the basic purpose
however, that the roadblock was conducted as a cautionary
of the roadblock conducted that day at the Virgilio Dávila
measure, to prevent the flight of any of the persons whose
public housing project was to check the driver's licenses and
arrest warrants were being served. The prosecution does not
vehicle registrations of all motorists traveling on the
even point out that the roadblock was an exceptional
blocked-off roads. Thus, the prosecution states:
measure to appease an emergency or a situation of danger for
The plan consisted of the typical “roadblock”: asking all the public. The State solely and exclusively rests on the
incoming or outgoing motorists to show the vehicle argument that the roadblock was conducted as a “typical
registration and the driver's license. roadblock” for the purpose of checking the vehicle
registrations of passing motorists. Although the issue raised
Brief for Petitioner at 4. before us only concerns the detention of Yip Berríos at the
roadblock, the simultaneous police operation carried out at
Further on, the prosecution points out that “[t]he roadblock the housing project along with the roadblock suggests that
set up by the police in the morning of April 16, 1993, at the the principal objective of the roadblock was not exclusively
Virgilio Dávila public housing project, is [ ... ] recognized by to systematically check the driver's licenses and vehicle
Delaware v. Prouse, supra, for the purpose of checking registrations of passing motorists, as the prosecution alleges.
vehicle registrations and driver's licenses.” Id. at 13. Thus, “We judges should not, after all, be so naive as to believe


statements which no one else would believe.” People v. interest in checking driver's licenses and vehicle
Luciano, 83 P.R.R. 551, 561 (1961). registrations.
The roadblock in the case under our consideration is similar Also, the characteristics of the roadblock conducted at the
to the types of roadblocks that have been rejected in other Virgilio Dávila housing project show a considerably high
jurisdictions because they serve no specific objective or degree of intrusion on the privacy of oncoming motorists. By
public interest, and because they were established for diverse blocking off the three entrances to the housing project, the
purposes; in other words, for the purpose of “finding who roadblock exclusively affected the residents of said housing
has committed a serious crime.” See Hagood v. Town of project. All those who wished to enter or leave the housing
Town Creek, 628 So.2d 1057, 1061 (Ala.Cr.App.1993); project in a vehicle necessarily had to pass through the
Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C.App.1991); roadblock. Thus, more than a roadblock, we are facing a
Wirin v. Horrall, 193 P.2d 470 (1948). In this sense, the seizure of an entire specific community.
challenged roadblock has the characteristics of the type of
roadblock that, as professor LaFave warns, poses a serious It must also be noted that the challenged roadblock was
threat to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable conducted in the early morning hours, when people usually
searches and seizures. He states: leave their homes to go to work, to school, or to perform all
kinds of activities typical of our society. It was at that
It is not permissible for the police to celebrate Burglary moment that the police intervened with all the persons who
Prevention Week by setting up random roadblocks to were leaving their homes in their vehicles. These
search cars for burglary tools, to blockade a high-crime circumstances aggravate the magnitude of the intrusion on
area of the city and search all cars leaving that area, or to the individual privacy of the persons traveling on those
establish roadblocks “to curb the juvenile problem” or for roads, including defendant Yip Berríos.
the purpose of “deterring drug traffic and violence.” Such
tactics as these pose “the most serious threat to the interest On the other hand, a thorough analysis of the record of the
in privacy.” case shows that the blockade was conducted without there
being any rules or guidelines delimiting the sphere of action
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
of police officers assigned to the roadblock. As a matter of
Fourth Amendment 313–314 (3 rd ed.1996). (Footnotes
fact, the prosecution does not state in his brief that the traffic
omitted.)
roadblock was conducted as part of a previous plan
established under neutral guidelines that would curtail the
On the other hand, it does not seem to us that setting up the
possibility of arbitrary police acts. Instead, relying on
roadblock at the entrance to the housing project was the most
Prouse, the prosecution invites us to validate the stop made
adequate mechanism for detecting traffic and vehicular
at the Virgilio Dávila public housing project for the mere fact
property violations. It must be pointed out that the persons
that all vehicles passing through the blocked-off roads were
affected by the roadblock were practically those who lived at
stopped and that, therefore, the stops were not arbitrary.
the housing project, not the general population traveling on
other, even more traveled, roads where the roadblock would
Certainly in Prouse the Federal Supreme Court leaves
have been a more adequate way of advancing the state
implicit the possibility of conducting police-run roadblocks
interest at stake. The State did not furnish evidence showing
in circumstances in which vehicle stops are not arbitrary. In
that the Virgilio Dávila public housing project had a serious
Prouse, however, the Court did not declare a priori the
traffic violation problem, or that a large number of vehicles
constitutionality of all roadblocks at which all passing
traveled through said project. In this sense, the State has not
motorists were stopped. The pronouncements of said Court
shown that the roadblock location turned the roadblock into
should only be construed in the sense that one possible
the most reasonable means for advancing the mentioned state
alternative for eliminating arbitrariness in roadblock


operations could be by stopping all vehicles. Arbitrary Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
vehicle stops, however, are not the only factor that should be
considered when determining the validity of a roadblock.
Each roadblock must be assessed on a case-by-case basis in
VII
order to determine the reasonableness of the government act
We have yet to determine the constitutionality of sec. 5–
in light of the balance of the interests at stake and of the
1120(a) of the Puerto Rico Vehicle and Traffic Law, which
totality of the circumstances surrounding the operation.
was declared unconstitutional by the trial judge. Said section
provides:
In view of the above, we conclude that the detention of
defendant Yip Berríos violated our Bill of Rights's (a) Every vehicle driver shall, at the behest of a police
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and officer, stop immediately, identify himself, and show to
seizures. The State did not show the constitutional validity of said officer all papers which, under this chapter and its
the seizure of the person; therefore, the trial court did not err regulations, said driver must carry with him or in his
in ordering the evidence suppressed. vehicle.
Even considering the facts of this case in light of the 9 L.P.R.A. § 1152(a) (1976).
minimum provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution —that is, under a less strict standard of It is a well-known fact that since the 1950's we have held
reasonableness— we would still arrive at the same that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality or
conclusion. In the first place, the roadblock in this case is unconstitutionality of a law or an act unless it is
different from the types of roadblock validated by the United indispensable and unless the controversy under consideration
States Supreme Court in Martínez–Fuerte and in Sitz, cannot be adjudicated on other grounds. See Pueblo v.
particularly because instead of conducting a roadblock, the Ramos Santos, 138 D.P.R. ___ [38 P.R. Offic. Trans. ___]
police here blocked off an entire community. In the second (1995); Caquías v. Asoc. Res. Mansiones de Río Piedras, 134
place, an analysis of the reasonableness of the roadblock D.P.R. ___ [34 P.R. Offic. Trans. ___] (1993); Fac. C. Soc.
under the reasonableness scrutiny test developed in federal Aplicadas, Inc. v. C.E.S., 133 D.P.R. ___ [33 P.R. Offic.
caselaw leads us to conclude that the resulting intrusion on Trans. ___] (1993); P.P.D. v. Admor. Gen. de Elecciones, 111
individual privacy was unreasonable. Note that the interest at D.P.R. 199 [11 P.R. Offic. Trans. 260] (1981).
stake cannot be efficiently advanced through the employed
methodology. The roadblock location, as we said above, That is the situation in this case. Once it has been determined
limits to a great extent its efficiency in advancing the interest that the government act was unreasonable and that, therefore,
involved. Balancing these factors against the intrusion on the the evidence seized must be suppressed, we need not pass on
privacy of Yip Berríos and of other residents of the housing the constitutionality issue of sec. 5–1120(a) of the Vehicle
project under the federal analysis, the decision must favor and Traffic Law. In this sense, the trial court went too far in
defendant Yip Berríos. passing on the constitutionality of said section when there
were other grounds to adjudicate the case. In so doing, the
Stopping motorists in their own communities when they trial court erred. Therefore, its decision in this respect must
leave their homes early in the morning, in order to check be reversed.
their driver's licenses and vehicle registrations, considerably
infringes on the privacy of persons, more so when the Judgment shall be rendered accordingly.
roadblock is not part of a plan devised under neutral
guidelines. This degree of intrusion may not be justified by Justice Negrón García issued a dissenting opinion. Justice
an interest in enforcing vehicle and traffic laws, even under Corrada del Río issued a dissenting opinion. Justice Fuster
the minimum individual protection guaranteed under the Berlingeri took no part in this decision.


roadblocks on avenues, main highways and expressways.

Are such roadblocks to be permitted only on those heavy-
(Official Translation) traffic areas? Why exclude streets leading to residential
areas? If we exclude them, how can we justify the
The People of Puerto Rico,
establishment of roadblocks in business or mixed areas? If
Plaintiff and petitioner
the roadblocks meet the caselaw rules laid down by
numerous courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
v. No. CE–93–735 Certiorari
why are they unreasonable under the Constitution? What
harm is done to the right to privacy? Where is the
Henry Yip Berríos, discrimination?
Defendant and respondent
A morning roadblock set up on the streets leading to a
Justice Negrón García, dissenting. residential area is declared illegal because it affects the
privacy of those who go to work, to take their children to
school, or to carry out other activities. This is a majority
speculation with no supporting evidence whatsoever.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 30, 1997
Also, do these same situations not arise in a context of much
heavier traffic flow in the metropolitan area, where
I thousands of vehicles, including thousands of persons,
Whether separate or mixed, the metropolitan area —San parents, and students travel every day to work and school? Is
Juan, Bayamón, and Carolina— is made up of different it implied that the police may only set up a roadblock at noon
commercial and residential nuclei (public and private) or at night? Is there a particular constitutional time at which
connected by lots of secondary streets, avenues and the police can apply the Traffic Law? In that sense, it must
expressways, such as the Ponce de León and Fernández be clear that the roadblock in the case at bar was not set up in
Juncos avenues in Santurce, Highway No. 1 to Bayamón, front of the driveways of some residences, as it may be
Highway No. 1 to Caguas, the 65 th Infantry Avenue to misconstrued, but right on the public thoroughfare.
Carolina, and many others. Thousands of vehicles travel at
all times along this immense network of public The majority gives great weight to the fact that the only three
thoroughfares. roads that lead to the Virgilio Dávila public housing project
were blocked off. To [set up a] roadblock means to
Today the Court majority makes an abstraction of these and interrupt and control one or several access routes. The
other realities such as the phenomenon of vehicular traffic, majority also points out that as a result, the police stopped all
its high population mobility, the many criminal activities this vehicles that attempted to enter or leave the housing project
generates, and the limited police resources, and holds that it without having an individualized suspicion that a certain
is unconstitutional for the police to set up a roadblock on the person had committed an offense or a traffic violation. That
roads leading to the Virgilio Dávila public housing project in was not, and is not necessary. Precisely, abundant federal
Bayamón, where more than fifty (50) search warrants were and state caselaw requires that for a roadblock to be valid, it
being served. must not be arbitrary or selective; that is, as a general rule,
all passing vehicles must be stopped. If only those persons
We must not impose on the police —as if with a judicial suspected of traffic violations were detained, a roadblock
straitjacket— a rule that limits roadblocks solely to main would not be necessary, inasmuch as the Rules of Criminal
highways, avenues or expressways, and excludes secondary Procedure authorize a peace officer to detain, without a
roads that connect directly with private or public residential previous warrant, persons who commit an offense in his
areas. It is certainly very difficult and impractical to set up presence.15


The majority abandons its trier role when it concludes that

These statements of the majority and our questions lead us to the roadblock location was not the most adequate police
a central premise: the doctrine that a roadblock is not mechanism. Thus, they substitute such conclusion for the
illegal even when there are mixed motives or other well-informed police criterion for deciding when and where
collateral purposes for the same is ignored. Thus, in a roadblock should be established. In Michigan Dept. of
Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11 th Cir.1995), the Eleventh State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), the Court, citing
Circuit stressed the unquestionable authority of the police to Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979), described the
conduct roadblocks for the purpose of checking driver's balancing factor as “the degree to which the seizure advances
licenses and vehicle registrations. The court held that when the public interest” and pointed out that for purposes of
the police have one lawful purpose sufficient to justify a Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among the
roadblock, using it to intercept drugs does not render said reasonable alternatives remained with the police officers,
roadblock unconstitutional. United States v. McFayden, 865 who have a clear perspective of the limited resources
F.2d 1306 (D.C.Cir.1989), validated a roadblock conducted provided, and a responsibility for using them in the most
for the principal purpose of enforcing traffic statutes in efficient manner. Planning the schedule, frequency, and
connection with a police program to curb drug trafficking. location of roadblocks is not a judicial function; such
function falls on the police.
The majority affirms that this case resembles cases in other
jurisdictions where the lawfulness of the roadblock has been The majority holds that the State did not furnish evidence to
rejected because it served no specific purpose or public show that there was a serious traffic violation problem at the
interest, and because it was established for diverse purposes; Virgilio Dávila public housing project, or that there was a
in other words, for purposes of “finding anyone who has great vehicular flow at said project. We know of no judicial
committed an offense.” Once again, this is majority decision that requires the police to have knowledge of
speculation. There is not the slightest evidence that in previous violations of the law when conducting a
stopping other vehicles and checking driver's licenses and roadblock operation. This thwarts the purposes of the
vehicle registrations, the police went beyond that brief roadblock, inasmuch as all the caselaw focuses on an
intrusion and, using the stop as a pretext, seized the uncontradicted reality to which Puerto Rico, with more than
opportunity to search the occupants or inside the vehicles for 1,700,000 vehicles, is no exception: there are thousands of
the purpose of “finding anyone who has committed an unlicensed drivers traveling on the streets, as well as many
offense.” vehicles whose license plates have been unlawfully altered.
Undoubtedly, the police have a legitimate interest in
We believe it is highly unusual that this Court does not detecting them. Neither do we know of any persuasive
find a public interest in the roadblock. As the Solicitor judicial decision that holds that the validity of a
General rightly points out, the political branches of the roadblock must depend on the vehicular flow at a
government have the primary responsibility to attack the particular place. In fact, such decision could render the
crime problem through the most aggressive and effective roadblock impractical or force the police, in order to prevent
mechanisms; this means resorting to classical or novel intolerable traffic tie-ups that unnecessarily affect the
methods that take into consideration ingenuity, new freedom of citizens and the vehicular flow, to refrain from
modalities, and criminal schemes. The purpose of the police stopping all passing vehicles and, instead, to systematically
in this case was to detect traffic and vehicular property —on the basis of a fixed numerical standard— let some
violations on the streets leading to and from a residential vehicles pass through and stop others. It is easy to imagine
area, while numerous search warrants were being the huge traffic congestion and the serious problems
simultaneously served. Is it seriously possible to declare triggered by a roadblock operation conducted on the
the roadblock unconstitutional because of that operation? main highways and avenues of the metropolitan area.


To the majority of the Court, the characteristics of the orders given by the officers specifically instructed the
roadblock conducted at the Virgilio Dávila housing project policemen at the roadblocks, leaving them no margin for
showed a “considerably high” degree of intrusion on the discretion, to briefly stop all vehicles passing through it and
privacy of passing motorists. The majority rests on the fact to check the driver's license, vehicle registration, and
that anyone who wished to drive into or out of the housing inspection status.
project necessarily had to pass through the roadblock. That
is precisely the idea behind a police roadblock: that That same day, at 9:00 a.m., Henry Yip Berríos, who lived at
everyone without exception must pass through it, because Virgilio Dávila, left the housing project in a Saab. When he
it would be arbitrary if the police, without just cause, arrived at one of the roadblocks, policeman Héctor Ruiz
allowed some motorists to evade the roadblock by using García, from the Bayamón Norte Police Station, ordered him
alternate roads. Besides, it is absurd to propose a thesis to stop. Just like he did with all other motorists, the
that leaves motorists free to voluntarily decide whether policeman asked Yip Berríos to show the driver's license and
or not to pass through a roadblock; the police would vehicle registration. Yip Berríos turned in the documents
never be able to thoroughly fulfill its legitimate purpose from inside the vehicle.
to verify whether the motorists are duly authorized and
whether their vehicles are in order. When policeman Ruiz García realized that the vehicle's
license plate number did not match the number on the
The majority mentions the cases in which this Court has held registration —a violation of sec. 2–801(7) of the Traffic Law,
that the constitutional protection of Art. II, Sec. 10 of our Act No. 141— he immediately ordered Yip Berríos to step
Constitution is smaller in circumstances involving out of the vehicle. When Yip Berríos got out of the vehicle,
automobiles. Despite this fact, however, the majority, taking policeman Ruiz García saw, in plain view, a firearm (a Colt
a leap in the dark, affirms once again that the infringement Commander .45 pistol loaded with six bullets) between the
on the privacy of Yip Berríos was “considerably high.” The two front seats. He asked Yip Berríos if he had a license to
majority rests this assertion on nonapplicable cases that carry such weapon. He answered that he did not, and Ruiz
have to do with the reasonableness of motor vehicle stops García arrested him, gave him the legal warnings, and
in circumstances that give rise to reasonable grounds, and searched him. The search produced two transparent plastic
forgets that roadblocks are valid precisely in circumstances wrappings, a subsequent analysis of which showed that they
in which there are no such reasonable grounds because there contained heroin wrapped in aluminum foil.
are compelling state interests (checking driver's licenses and
vehicle registrations) and because roadblocks are the less Consequently, the prosecution charged him with violations of
intrusive means to serve those interests. sec. 2–801(7) of the Puerto Rico Vehicle and Traffic Law,
secs. 6, 8, and 11 of the Weapons Law, and sec. 404(a) of the
Bearing in mind these preliminary critical observations, we Controlled Substances Act. Yip Berríos successfully moved
will make a brief account of the facts. for suppression. The learned trial court concluded that his
initial detention at the roadblock violated his rights under
Sec. 10 of our Constitution and under the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States. Furthermore, the
II
trial court declared unconstitutional sec. 5–1120 of the
On April 16, 1993, the Police Drug Enforcement Unit served
Puerto Rico Vehicle and Traffic Law, 9 L.P.R.A. § 1152,
more than fifty (50) search warrants at the Virgilio Dávila
because it supposedly allowed the police to arbitrarily stop
public housing project in Bayamón. Simultaneously, the
vehicles without suspicion of criminal activity. On motion of
Bayamón Norte Police Station officers planned and
the Solicitor General, we reviewed.
ordered the erection of visible roadblocks on the three
public roads leading into or out of said housing project. The
The only issue raised before us is whether the initial stop of


the vehicle driven by Yip Berríos at the roadblock was valid. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Court stated
There is a unanimous consensus that, if it was valid, the that its use for the purpose of checking licenses would
subsequent acts of policeman Ruiz García were legitimate. outweigh its concerns over constitutional violations. The
Court held that except in circumstances in which there is
reasonable suspicion that a motorist has no driver's license,
that his vehicle is not registered, or that he has broken the
III
law, his detention for the purpose of checking his driver's
Article II, Sec. 10 of our Constitution 16 protects persons,
license or the vehicle registration is unreasonable under the
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
Fourth Amendment. The Court clarified, however, that its
and seizures, prohibits wire-tapping, and requires a judicial
holding did not preclude the states from developing alternate
warrant for making searches, seizures or arrests, only when
methods —such as roadblocks— that involved less intrusion
probable cause supported by oath exists.
or that did not involve the unconstrained use of discretion.
The first and third paragraphs of said section are an almost

Sitz reaffirmed that approach. The Federal Supreme Court
literal translation of the Fourth Amendment to the
validated the roadblock after balancing the state interest in
Constitution of the United States.17 Both Sec. 10 and the
preventing drunken driving, the degree to which it can be
Fourth Amendment seek to protect the right to privacy.
reasonably said that this system helps advance said interest,
and the minimum degree of intrusion on individual motorists
This right, however, is not absolute, and must sometimes
that are momentarily detained. In light of United States v.
yield to compelling state interests. E.L.A. v. P.R. Tel. Co.,
Martínez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), the Court clarified
114 D.P.R. 394, 402 [14 P.R. Offic. Trans. 505, 514–515]
the elements of “subjective intrusion” and the potential to
(1983). For state interests to prevail over individual rights,
generate “apprehension or surprise,” and evaluated
reasonableness must be the guiding standard. This
checkpoint stops from a different perspective, inasmuch as
standard is ordinarily determined by balancing individual
the subjective intrusion — which produces fear or anxiety in
rights and state [interests]. The governmental need to
law-abiding motorists— is noticeably less during a
perform certain functions is measured against the importance
checkpoint or roadblock stop than during a preventive-
of the individual right to be affected. Of course, the
(roving) patrol stop.
reasonableness of a government act varies according to the
protection afforded by the body of laws to individual rights;
In Martínez–Fuerte, the Court explained that roving patrols
in this case, a motorist's expectation of privacy reduced
operate mainly at night on seldom-traveled roads, while at
by a traffic roadblock.
roadblocks motorists can see that other vehicles are also
being stopped and, thus, they can see visible signs of police
Unfortunately, even though the majority opinion recognizes
authority and are much less likely to be frightened or
this approach, in its analysis, as we have said, it incurs
annoyed by the individual intrusion.19
essential inconsistencies and generic assertions that preclude
it from fairly and satisfactorily balancing those interests.
In sum, although the majority opinion apparently admits that
the right to privacy is not absolute, its result negates it. Let
That conclusion is not in keeping with the caselaw that
us weigh the interests of citizen Yip Berríos and the state
construes our Sec. 10 and its homologue, the Fourth
interests in order to arrive at a correct and fair juridico-
Amendment, after which the former was modeled. For
constitutional result.
several years, the use of roadblocks for the purpose of
checking driver's licenses or detecting drunk drivers has
been permitted by almost all courts that have had the
opportunity to examine such practice.18 Since the dictum in IV


As we said earlier, Sec. 10 prohibits unreasonable searches entire residential communities to isolate themselves and to
and seizures. The term unreasonable is not defined in the control vehicular entrance and exit. Caquías v. Asoc. Res.
Constitution. “[T]he adjective reasonable derives from the Mansiones de Río Piedras, 134 D.P.R. ___ [34 P.R. Offic.
Latin rationabilis, which means ‘moderate, fair, agreeable to Trans. ___] (1993).
reason. 2. ant. rational.’ 2 Diccionario de la lengua
española, supra, at 1147. As such, it means to act with sound To combat these evils, the Vehicle and Traffic Law
judgment. It deals with eminently pragmatic, relative, and establishes two general types of regulations. One group
changing realities. It is not static. At different times and includes the rules directly related to the operation of
moments it can convey different meanings and nuances. It vehicles, such as speed limits, turning, stopping, and others
can be applied to unexpected —more or less compelling and (9 L.P.R.A. §§ 841–847). The other group —which can be
pressing—circumstances where freedom and the course of described as prospective in character— creates an
action to be followed are significantly curtailed. What is administrative framework for the purpose of guaranteeing
reasonable rests on temperance, caution, prudence; on action that drivers are qualified to drive, and that vehicles are in
or omission. Hence, the changing behavior of a human being good working condition and to facilitate the task of
involved in a criminal act and the different circumstances identifying and recovering stolen vehicles. For instance, the
surrounding said act (place, time, persons, ages, nature and Traffic Law requires —under penalty of civil and penal
seriousness), are relevant factors necessary to assess the sanctions— that all motorists pass an examination that tests
reasonableness of a warrantless search and seizure.” Pueblo their skills in order to obtain a license (9 L.P.R.A. §§ 651–
v. Malavé González, 120 D.P.R. 470, 491 [20 P.R. Offic. 722); that all vehicles have license plates and be duly
Trans. 487, 509–510] (1988) (Negrón García, J., dissenting). registered and licensed (9 L.P.R.A. §§ 401–592); and that all
(Emphasis added and in the original.) vehicles be inspected yearly (9 L.P.R.A. §§ 1191–1192).
In light of the elements that nurture the constitutional But besides having an overall legitimate interest in
standard of reasonableness, we must conclude that the scales regulating vehicular traffic, the State has a compelling
are tipped in favor of the police act. First, it is interest in using the specific method invalidated today by
unquestionable that the state interest in regulating vehicular the majority. That is, the State needs to be able to establish
traffic is not only legitimate, but of the highest hierarchy. document checkpoints to guarantee enforcement of the
In 1993 there were 1,740,371 vehicles registered in the law. Otherwise, motorists would have few reasons for
Department of Transportation and Public Works. It is a well- obtaining and carrying their licenses, because it would be
known fact that the automobile is a highly dangerous highly improbable that they will be in a situation in
instrument that has the potential for causing serious injury or which they would have to show these documents to law
death when used incorrectly. We need not repeat here the enforcement officers. Roadblocks promote observance of
sad traffic casualty statistics in Puerto Rico. Also, the traffic laws because they increase the motorists' awareness
automobile is frequently an instrument, or the object of a that they may actually be required to show their licenses.
crime. Criminals use the automobile to travel to, or to flee There is no sense in requiring the classic probable law
from the scene of the crime. To obstruct identification, standard because, if it were required, nobody would care
some criminals usually alter the external characteristics about driving without a license.
of the vehicles and change the license plates, as Yip
Berríos did. Thousands of automobiles are stolen each The difficulties of the majority position are evidenced by
year, objects of crime. The owners are not the only victims, the establishment of a requirement that dooms the
but society in general as well, due to the impact of these effectiveness of the Traffic Law to a state of social
crimes on the economy and insurance business. A new crime impotence. Given the continuous flow of thousands of
category has cropped up in the last few years —the so-called vehicles, how can the police, in the discharge of their
“carjacking”— a criminal phenomenon that has forced responsibilities, determine probable cause to believe that


a motorist is not authorized or is not carrying his license?

The only situation in which this would happen would be, Third, we have seen that the intrusion on Yip Berríos's
tangentially, when the motorist is stopped for another privacy was highly subtle. He merely stopped and gave
detectable violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. In policeman Ruiz García his driver's license and the vehicle
such circumstances, there is no independent deterrent that registration. If —as the majority also accepts— the degree of
we could link to the obligation of possessing and carrying intrusion of a roadblock operation at which all vehicles are
the license, since the violation for which the motorist was stopped is substantially less, how can it be held that his right
stopped carries its own penalty. to privacy was violated?20
Second, the reasonable expectation of privacy is The intervention with Yip Berríos was minimal. It was
significantly less when a person drives a vehicle on a necessary to stop his vehicle because it was the only way
public thoroughfare. The existence of such reasonable the license and vehicle registration could be checked. At
expectation of privacy among motorists —though reduced that time he was not even asked to step out of the car. It was
— is what triggers and makes applicable the Sec. 10 not until later —when probable cause arose to believe that he
reasonableness requirement because, otherwise, attempting was violating the Traffic Law— that policeman Ruiz García
to balance the interests at stake would be unnecessary and an ordered him to do so.
exercise in judicial futility. The majority accepts that this
expectation is less than that which may be reasonably had in Police behavior was an example of moderation and
other places or circumstances. Even then, the analysis of the consideration. The police required from Yip Berríos —as
majority does not reveal any effect of this reduced well as from all other motorists— only the necessary
expectation of privacy on the permissible ambit of minimum to carry out the quasi-administrative function
roadblocks. In other words, the result at which the justifying the roadblock: to require and check licenses and
majority arrives implies that the expectation of privacy vehicle registrations. The police operation did not
that could be had inside a vehicle has been placed on the transgress the limits and was not used as a subterfuge to
same level as that which could be had inside a dwelling. carry out unlawful searches of motorists and their
The only possible explanation for this inference is that even vehicles. The decision to set up the roadblock in such
though the police strictly and reasonably met the statutory manner that all motorists traveling on those streets would
parameters by setting up the roadblock on the public have to show their licenses was taken at the Bayamón Police
thoroughfares, since they limited the public roads Station. This plan sought to prevent abuses resulting from the
connecting the entrance to, and exit from a residential unconstrained exercise of discretion by individual officers
area, a judicial fiat has led the majority to apply when stopping vehicles. In so doing, the police implemented
standards that solely belong to the protection of privacy the basic measures accepted by the Federal Supreme Court in
inside a home. Prouse and in Sitz, as well as by the abundant caselaw cited
above.
In so doing, the majority overlooks the fact that it is
precisely because the expectation of privacy in an In balancing the three factors discussed, we conclude that
automobile is less that the use of roadblocks has been using the roadblock to check vehicle registrations —
deemed constitutional. particularly the procedure followed in this case— was
reasonable and in keeping with the Constitution.
This moves us to consider two possible interpretations of the
majority decision: one, the reduction of the expectation of The majority Opinion suggests that the evidence must be
privacy in a vehicle is almost imperceptible; the other, that suppressed because it is the fruit of a supposedly illegal
the cited caselaw, which establishes a lesser degree of operation. It implicitly rests on the fruit of the poisonous tree
expectation, has not been given the weight it deserves. doctrine. This is a mistake. There was no need to carry


out the operation of serving more than fifty (50) search reasonable expectation of having his privacy significantly
warrants inside the housing project to validly set up a reduced when traveling in a vehicle on public roads; third,
roadblock; its constitutionality did not depend on the the method used by the police was highly reasonable and
launching of said operation. produced only a slight and permissible intrusion on his
privacy.
There are absolutely no constitutional grounds for letting

V
his offenses go unpunished.
Finally, the decision of the learned trial court declaring
unconstitutional sec. 5–1120(a) of the Traffic Law is erred.
Said section provides: (Official Translation)
(a) Every vehicle driver shall, at the behest of a police The People of Puerto Rico,
officer, stop immediately, identify himself, and show to Plaintiff and petitioner
said officer all papers which, under this chapter and its
regulations, said driver must carry with him or in his v. No. CE–93–735 Certiorari
vehicle.
9 L.P.R.A. § 1152(a). Henry Yip Berríos,

Defendant and respondent
In this respect, the trial court concluded that this subsection
gave all policemen carte blanche to stop any vehicle without Justice Corrada del Río, dissenting.
any type of control over that decision, and that such
delegation of authority violated the citizens' rights protected
under Art. II, Sec. 10.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 30, 1997
This provision does not confer such ample powers to the

police as the trial court believes. The language of this I
provision does not purport to establish the authority of the On this occasion, the prosecution comes before this Court
police, but to detail the obligations of citizens before an seeking reversal of a ruling issued on November 10, 1993,
authorized police demand. The authority of the police, by the Superior Court, Bayamón Part, which found that a
however, does not stem from this provision, but from other roadblock conducted by the Police of Puerto Rico to check
statutory or regulatory sources that must, of course, adjust driver's licenses and other vehicle documents was
to the Sec. 10 requirements. In its text, the obligation is unconstitutional, and ordered the suppression of certain
described in absolute terms because the decision to stop evidence obtained as a result of said operation.
or not to stop when asked by the police cannot be left to
the arbitrary judgment of each motorist; but the After thoroughly examining and studying the record of the
policeman is not relieved of his obligation to abide by the case, we deem that the Constitution of the United States and
constitutional mandates.21 the Constitution of Puerto Rico do not prohibit the police
from blocking off a public thoroughfare to indiscriminately
Summing up: first, the police had and have a legitimate and stop all passing vehicles under the circumstances described
compelling interest in regulating vehicular traffic, in this case. Roadblocks having these characteristics do not
particularly through the use of motorist checkpoints, as the impinge on the constitutional protections against searches
only way to effectively enforce the license and registration and seizures; they are, however, an effective method for
requirement; second, Yip Berríos, as a motorist, had a serving essential state interests such as enforcing traffic laws


and maintaining public order. We also find that this type of When defendant replied that he did not, he was arrested and
roadblock does not subject motorists to an unreasonable given the pertinent legal warnings.24 It was then that
inspection of their traffic documents, and that a suspicious defendant was searched. Two wrappings containing what
irregularity in the same can give rise to reasonable grounds was later on identified as heroin were found on his person.
for conducting a warrantless search when a firearm is
observed in plain view. The prosecution charged defendant with violating sec. 2–
801(7) of the Traffic Law, secs. 6, 8, and 11 of the Weapons
For the reasons stated above, we dissent from the Opinion Law, 25 L.P.R.A. §§ 416, 418, and 421, and sec. 404(a) of
issued today by the majority. the Controlled Substances Act, 24 L.P.R.A. § 2404. By ruling
of November 10, 1993, the Superior Court, Bayamón Part,
granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence, and found
that the roadblock violated the provisions of Art. II, Sec. 10
II
of the Constitution of Puerto Rico and the Fourth
The roadblock at issue here was conducted during the
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.25
morning of Friday, April 16, 1993. That morning, the police
blocked off the three access roads to the Virgilio Dávila
public housing project in Bayamón. By blocking these access
roads into the housing project, the police sought to stop all III
vehicles entering or leaving the same.22 Insofar as it is pertinent, Art. II, Sec. 10 of the Constitution
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico provides that:
It is essential to underline that although these vehicles were
stopped without any suspicion that their occupants had § 10. [Searches and seizures; wire-tapping; warrants]
committed an offense, all vehicles traveling on those three
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
streets during the roadblock operation were stopped; this
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
indicates that the stops were not selective or arbitrary, but
and seizures shall not be violated.
indiscriminate.23
[....]
While the traffic roadblock operation was under way, around
fifty (50) police officers were serving more than fifty (50) No warrant for arrest or search and seizure shall issue
search warrants at the Virgilio Dávila housing project. except by judicial authority and only upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
At around 9:00 a.m., defendant Henry Yip Berríos, who was describing the place to be searched and the persons to be
driving a green 1983 Saab on his way to one of the blocked arrested or the things to be seized.
housing project exits, was stopped by members of the police
Evidence obtained in violation of this section shall be
force. According to the testimony of state policeman Héctor
inadmissible in the courts.
Ruiz García, defendant was asked to show his driver's
license and the vehicle registration. Yip Berríos produced the P.R. Const. art. II, § 10.26
requested documents. While examining the same, policeman
Ruiz García realized that the license number in the vehicle We have held that, as a general rule, any warrantless criminal
registration (50B92) was different from the license plate or administrative search or seizure is unreasonable per se
number (AWM–422). The policeman then saw a firearm (a “unless the search is consented to, directly or indirectly, or
Colt Commander .45 pistol loaded with six bullets) placed emergency situations require otherwise and the weight of the
between the car's front seats. The policeman asked Yip interests in conflict demands a different solution.” E.L.A. v.
Berríos if he had the pertinent license to carry such weapon. Coca–Cola Bott. Co., 115 D.P.R. 197, 207–208 [15 P.R.


Offic. Trans. 268, 282] (1984). (1996). We have also found that in certain circumstances, the
State's power of inquiry in the discharge of its administrative
With regard to the issue under our consideration, our caselaw functions outweighs a violation of privacy claim. E.L.A. v.
has held that Art. II, Sec. 10 of our Constitution bars the P.R. Tel. Co., 114 D.P.R. 394 [14 P.R. Offic. Trans. 505]
State from unreasonably searching a motor vehicle. People v. (1983). We have held, on the other hand, that freedom of the
Sosa Díaz, 90 P.R.R. 606 (1964).27 Applicable federal press, which is also a constitutionally fundamental right,
caselaw has consistently held that the stopping of a motorist prevails in certain contexts over the individual right to
by the State constitutes a seizure of the person. See Whren v. privacy. Clavell v. El Vocero de P.R., 115 D.P.R. 685 [15 P.R.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); and Offic. Trans. 902] (1984).
United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
In other words, when Yip Berríos was stopped and when, Today we state that the state function of protecting our
upon reasonable grounds, the firearm he transported in plain citizens from the serious problems of crime, drugs, and
view in the cabin of his automobile was seized, he was a delinquency prevails over a minimal intrusion on a motorist
recipient of the protection afforded by our Constitution. for purposes of asking him to show the documents that allow
him to drive a motor vehicle on our thoroughfares, and that
We must remember, however, that in Pueblo v. Malavé such act does not impinge upon the fundamental right to
González, 120 D.P.R. 470, 478 [20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 487, privacy even if the roadblock is conducted simultaneously
496] (1988); and in Pueblo v. Acevedo Escobar, 112 D.P.R. with another police operation carried out for the purpose of
770, 775 [12 P.R. Offic. Trans. 971, 978] (1982), we serving search warrants on the surrounding area.
recognized that the degree of constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches afforded to motor vehicles is
not as airtight as the protection shield that our Constitution
IV
affords to a dwelling. For the reasons stated below, the
The caselaw of the majority of United States jurisdictions is
protection that defendant carried with him, and that shielded
persuasive in preconizing the constitutionality of traffic
him like an invisible cloak, does not render invalid the search
roadblocks conducted on public thoroughfares.28 The
of his automobile under the particular facts of this case.
majority of the federal courts that have pronounced
themselves on the constitutionality of these roadblocks have
Also, we must consider our application of Art. II, Sec. 10,
upheld their validity.29
through this Court's pronouncements in E.L.A. v. P.R. Tel.
Co., 114 D.P.R. 394, 402 [14 P.R. Offic. Trans. 505, 514–
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
515] (1983). In that decision, we pointed out that the rights
Circuit concluded that the Constitution does not interfere
granted under that section are not absolute, and that in
with the authority of the police to conduct roadblocks on
certain circumstances the right yields to compelling state
public thoroughfares for the purpose of checking the driver's
interests. See also: Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979);
licenses and the registrations of all passing vehicles. Merrett
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Cámara v.
v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11 th Cir.1995). In United States v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967); and Jeffrey J.
Miller, 608 F.2d 1089 (5 th Cir.1989), reh. denied, 613 F.2d
Buslog, Note, Exploring the Constitutional Limits of
315 (5 th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980), the
Suspicionless Seizures: The Use of Roadblocks to Apprehend
Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit validated the
Drunken Drivers, 71 Iowa L.Rev. 577, 579 (1986).
acts of Texas police officers who set up a license and vehicle
registration checkpoint on a public highway, at which no
Under that doctrinal rule, we have held, for purposes of our
automobile was exempt. Said Court was emphatic in
jurisdiction, that the right to privacy yields to the freedom of
pointing out that since all vehicles traveling in either
expression of a candidate for an elective office. Bonilla
direction were stopped, the checkpoint was not selectively
Medina v. P.N.P., 140 D.P.R. ___ [40 P.R. Offic. Trans. ___]


operated and, as such, was not prohibited by the Federal nature of the state interest, we will assess, as a second step,
Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the reasonableness of the effected operation in order to
the Tenth Circuit consistently found reasonable a similar determine whether it was unacceptably intrusive.
roadblock that led to a comparable vehicle search in United
States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854, 856–857 (10 th Cir.1981), Before we reach the first stage of this analytical scheme, we
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1982), reh. denied, 454 U.S. must emphasize our firm support of constitutional rights,
1069 (1981); United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1376 which protect our people from abuses that could be
(10 th Cir.1984); and United States v. López, 777 F.2d 543, committed against them by the State. However, when the
547 (10 th Cir.1985). state action does not reach the unacceptably offensive point
of constituting an abuse, other considerations come into play,
The extensive state caselaw that has also examined the as are the interest of the State in behalf of its members. To
constitutionality of roadblocks of the type under our such effect, and insofar as it is pertinent to the instant case,
consideration today under the Fourth Amendment to the the State's most important obligation is to do whatever is
United States Constitution reiterates the constitutionality of permissible to safeguard the life, property, and freedom of
the same.30 In Miller v. State, 373 So.2d 1004 (Miss.1979), those under its protection. To achieve this goal, the State is
the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the stop by the authorized by our laws to set up roadblocks such as that
police of all vehicles traveling on a public thoroughfare for under our consideration today.
the purpose of checking the motorists' driver's licenses was
constitutional under the Fourth and the Fourteenth We will examine the substance of the state interest at stake in
Amendments. In that case, the police arrested the occupants this case in order to verify its compelling nature.
of an automobile after smelling the odor of marijuana
coming from inside the stopped vehicle. See also Pueblo v. It is a well-known fact that criminality is one of the social
Acevedo Escobar, 112 D.P.R. at 779 [12 P.R. Offic. Trans. at problems that most weighs on our people. The social changes
981–982]; People v. Wells, 608 N.E.2d 578, 582 of the last decades have brought along problems of
(Ill.App.1993); and State v. MacDonald, 856 P.2d 116, 120 coexistence in densely populated areas. Prominent among
(Kan.1993). the symptoms and causes of these problems are the dangers,
anarchy, and entropy that criminality represents. Criminality
Likewise, in State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (Me.1985), the —especially that linked to illegal drug traffic and organized
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine found that the state police crime— as all competitive markets, expands and evolves; the
had acted reasonably, for Fourth Amendment purposes, when operations of this market develop in more and more
they set up a roadblock at a public highway selected for the damaging forms to our people. As the methods used to
purpose of reducing the danger such roadblock could cause commit crimes evolve through the use of state-of-the-art
to passing motorists. This case also involves a total traffic technology, the police are forced to respond with innovative
roadblock at which all vehicles were stopped. The defendant and stern measures to combat the new faces of criminality.
in that case was stopped and arrested when he failed to show
his driver's license to the officer who requested it. We must understand that given the development of large-
scale criminal activity related to the controlled-substance
market, traditional police-patrol methods have lost
effectiveness in crime control and thus, in recent years, the
V
police force has launched operations aimed at controlling the
Our analysis of the constitutionality of roadblocks in Puerto
criminal wave before it causes greater damage at the shore.
Rico is twofold. We must first weigh the constitutional
See Charles P. McDowell, Police in the Community 112
safeguards that protect defendant in the face of the state
(1975); and Peter K. Manning, Police Work: The Social
interest in making such stop. After examining the compelling
Organization of Policing 348 (1977). Among the measures


adopted to combat crime in areas with the highest incidence those involved in criminal activities, roadblocks increase the
of criminal activity are saturation patrols and roadblocks, for risk of being arrested, inasmuch as they cannot predict when
which methods ranging from helicopters to the National and where they will be stopped for checking the driver's
Guard have been used. Seth Mydans, Powerful Arms of Drug license and vehicle documents. Document inspection
War Arousing Concern for Rights, N.Y. Times, October 16, roadblocks for traffic law enforcement purposes also give the
1989, at A1. Roadblocks, a relatively new tactic in the war police an opportunity to identify and to act against criminals
against crime, have several benefits.31 that go in an automobile to commit criminal acts. Rendering
ineffective the product of roadblocks would inflict a mortal
The government specifically has a compelling interest in wound on the community itself; a self-inflicted wound.
protecting persons from those who drive motor vehicles
without being duly authorized to carry out this potentially In sum, the purpose of the mentioned roadblocks is to protect
dangerous operation. That interest is sufficiently important to Puerto Rican society32 and, specifically, those persons who
justify the use of government-run roadblocks for purposes of live in the designated area.33 Constitutional parameters allow
identifying traffic violators. See United States v. McFayden, that roadblocks be set up for said purposes. The fact that
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C.Cir.1989). search warrants were being simultaneously served at the
Virgilio Dávila housing project does not impair the
The State regulates, controls, and limits the use of public constitutional validity of the roadblock conducted on the
highways to maintain and promote the safety of the people periphery of said housing project.
who travel daily on them. 37 A.L.R.4 th 10; 7A Am.Jur.2d §
[14] (1997). To such ends, Act No. 141 of July 20, 1960 (9 Today we must strike a balance between the interests of a
L.P.R.A. § 301 et seq.), as amended, requires that the motorist who travels on a public highway and the interests of
government qualify, through the issuance of licenses, those the State in stopping him for the good of the community.
persons who are permitted to drive, and requires that motor Within the context of the factual framework of this case, the
vehicles be duly registered in the Department of interests of the State, for the good of the community, clearly
Transportation and Public Works. prevail.
The State also has a compelling interest in curbing vehicle

theft through available investigative measures. Roadblocks
VI
conducted for the purpose of checking that the documents
Even when the state interests are compelling —as they
required by the law for the operation of motor vehicles are in
clearly are in this case— we must examine whether the
order are an effective operation that includes, among others,
police action is reasonable.34
the identification and arrest of motorists driving stolen motor
vehicles.
The abundant United States caselaw has laid down the tests
for determining the reasonableness of traffic roadblocks. We
To understand the utility of roadblocks, it suffices to
deem that in State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185
understand that vehicular transportation allows the criminal
(Kan.1983), the Supreme Court of Kansas made a
to expand his area of operation. We have recognized, as a sad
comprehensive and accurate itemization of the factors to be
reality, that “due to the very mobility of automobiles, these
considered. Such factors are:
are occasionally used by criminals to commit illegal acts.”
Pueblo v. Malavé González, 120 D.P.R. at 479 [20 P.R. Offic. (1) The degree of discretion, if any, left to the officer in
Trans. at 497]. the field; (2) the location designated for the roadblock; (3)
the time and duration of the roadblock; (4) standards set
In general terms, roadblocks reduce criminal activity. This is by superior officers; (5) advance notice to the public at
the so-called “deterrent effect.” Buslog, supra, at 593. For large; (6) advance warning to the individual approaching

motorist; (7) maintenance of safety conditions; (8) degree Every vehicle driver shall, at the behest of a police officer,
of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of operation; (9) stop immediately, identify himself, and show to said
average length of time each motorist is detained; (10) officer all papers which, under this chapter and its
physical factors surrounding the location [ ....]; (11) the regulations, said driver must carry with him or in his
availability of less intrusive methods for combating the vehicle.
problem; (12) the degree of effectiveness of the procedure; 9 L.P.R.A. § 1152(a).38
and (13) any other relevant circumstances which might In light of what the Legislative Assembly established in that
bear upon the test.35 section of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, it is inescapable to
conclude that the police acted in keeping with the applicable
These factors are controlling. We will now apply the most law by stopping defendant's car and asking him to show his
pertinent factors to the roadblock that gave rise to the case driver's license and the vehicle registration.
under our consideration.
We deem that the location and duration of the roadblock
To reduce the degree to which roadblocks could impinge on were also reasonable. We have stated above that the fact that,
constitutional rights, it is required that the police conduct the along with the roadblock, several search warrants were being
roadblock without arbitrarily determining which vehicles simultaneously served at the Virgilio Dávila housing project,
will be stopped. State v. Binion, 900 S.W.2d 702, 705 does not render unreasonable the use in said area of a traffic
(Tenn.Cr.App.1995); and People v. Little, 515 N.E.2d 846, law enforcement roadblock. Neither does it come forth from
848–849 (Ill.App.1987). As we explained earlier, the the record that the duration of the roadblock was
roadblock under our consideration was a total roadblock: all unreasonable.
vehicles passing through the blocked-off roads were
stopped.36 This, in the words of the majority, means that there As for the preparation and instructions received by the police
were “objective criteria” (stopping all passing vehicles to officers for setting up the roadblock, 39 the evidence presented
check the validity of traffic documents, as required by law) shows that they were adequately instructed on the matter.
that eliminated “the arbitrariness of state officers.” State policeman Héctor Ruiz García specifically pointed out
in his testimony that the supervisors informed the policemen
We must also consider whether the roadblock was that they had to briefly stop all vehicles and to check driver's
unreasonably intrusive on the defendant's person. Certainly licenses and vehicle registrations. Brief for Petitioner at 4.40
the fact that he was ordered to stop was not unreasonably
intrusive. Neither was the police request to show his driver's We consider that the anxiety caused to motorists when
license and the vehicle registration unacceptably intrusive. ordered to stop by a law enforcement officer is an important
Clearly these facts cannot give the impression that the factor. In United States v. Martínez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
roadblock subjected defendant to an excessive or offensive (1976), the Federal Supreme Court passed on the subjective
inspection or treatment. effect of a roadblock on the mind and the psyche of a
stopped motorist. See also State v. MacDonald, 856 P.2d at
It seems clear to us that the Police of Puerto Rico, as 118–119; and State v. Coccomo, 427 A.2d 131, 135
government agency, has the faculty and the discretion to set (N.J.1980). In Martínez–Fuerte, that Court held that this type
up traffic roadblocks.37 As to the authority of the police to of vehicular roadblock does not weigh on the motorist's
stop a vehicle for the purpose of checking the validity of the mind, inasmuch as the operation conducted on a public
driver's license and the vehicle registration, see sec. [5–1120] highway does not take him by surprise. Id. at 559.41 The
(a) of Act No. 141 of July 20, 1960, as amended by Act No. Court also held that the openly public manner in which these
58 of May 30, 1973 (9 L.P.R.A. § 301 et seq.), known as the roadblocks are conducted is reassuring for motorists,
Puerto Rico Vehicle and Traffic Law, which provides: inasmuch as they can see that the police are also stopping
other motorists at the same place. Id. In this respect, several


jurisdictions and commentators have favored the use of clearly deferred to supervisory police officials in the
roadblocks on public highways because they are a way of determination to resort to whatever measures are necessary,
checking that traffic laws are being complied with without reasonable, and constitutionally permissible to perform their
causing the instinctive fear mentioned above. See Michigan imperative function.
Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452–453 (1990);
and Buslog, supra, at 603–604.
VII
Another factor to be considered when determining the
The majority opinion focuses on the premise that the stop of
reasonableness of the roadblock is its effectiveness in
defendant's automobile was not proper at law because the
achieving the interest sought and for which the operation was
officers did not have reasonable grounds to individually
conducted. In the United States, traffic roadblocks have
approach the vehicle and observe what was inside it in plain
proved successful in fighting drug trafficking, gang-related
view. The majority premise is mistaken.
violent crimes, drunken driving, and, as a by-product, the
flow of illegal immigrants. Galberth v. United States, 590
The Federal Supreme Court has persuasively held that
A.2d 990 (D.C.App.1991); Michigan Dept. of State Police v.
certain types of checkpoint operations require no reasonable
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); United States v. Martínez–Fuerte,
grounds to stop a vehicle. Michigan Dept. of State Police v.
428 U.S. 543 (1976); Meiring, supra ; and Rick Holguin,
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 456; and United States v. Martínez–Fuerte,
Roadblocks to Curb Gangs to be Set Up in Paramount, L.A.
428 U.S. at 556. To thus conclude, the Court took into
Times, August 9, 1991, at A1.
consideration: 1) the importance of the government interest
served by the checkpoint; 2) the degree to which such
Among the factors related to the reasonableness of the
checkpoint advances said compelling interest; and 3) the
roadblock is the question whether the State has less intrusive
degree of intrusion of the checkpoint. These standards were
methods to achieve the same purpose. Delaware v. Prouse,
first delineated in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50–51, and
440 U.S. at 659–660. The argument that roadblocks are not
were subsequently applied to assess the constitutionality of
the only method to effectively serve state interests is not
vehicular checkpoints. These tests were also equivalent to
convincing. See Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of
the above-discussed tests used to determine the legality of
State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to Meaningful Judicial
roadblocks; therefore, we need not express ourselves again
Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 42 Hastings L.J. 285,
on this subject.
306 (1991). The use of roadblocks has been widely
recognized as an effective method for attaining the purposes
The majority is also erred in holding that the roadblock
sought and, even if there are other less intrusive methods,
conducted in this case “is similar” to the roadblocks
these have not shown to be equally effective. Moreover, this
criticized by professor LaFave in the following terms:
does not mean that the roadblock is unreasonably intrusive,
particularly if it is promptly and indiscriminately conducted. It is not permissible for the police to celebrate Burglary
Prevention Week by setting up random roadblocks to
A license and registration checkpoint operation is even less search cars for burglary tools, to blockade a high-crime
intrusive than drunk driving roadblocks. Even that type of area of the city and search all cars leaving that area, or to
roadblock, which frequently requires subjecting motorists to establish roadblocks “to curb the juvenile problem” or for
a mental or physical test or to a careful observation of their the purpose of “deterring drug traffic and violence.” Such
behavior,42 was found constitutionally valid by the United tactics as these pose “the most serious threat to the interest
States Supreme Court in Sitz, where said Court held that the in privacy.”
state interest in curbing drunken driving and in accumulating
evidence to obtain convictions are compelling and justify the 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
use of such roadblocks. In its decision, that Honorable Court Fourth Amendment 313–314 (3 rd ed.1996). (Footnotes


omitted and emphasis added.) This holding does not preclude ... other States from
developing methods for spot checks that involve less
Regardless of whether those types of roadblock pose the intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise
above-described danger, they are not comparable with the of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at
roadblocks in the instant case. The record indicates that the roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative.
Police of Puerto Rico did not block off the streets to search
all vehicles, but to verify motorist compliance with the traffic Id. at 663. (Footnote omitted and emphasis added.)
laws by simply requesting driver's licenses and vehicle
registrations.
VIII
It is also advisable to correct the error committed by the trial On the other hand, in its decision, the majority of this Court
court when it stated that the Prouse ruling establishes a states:
controlling rule of law in this case. That decision must be
strictly construed taking into consideration the meaning with Each roadblock must be individually examined to
which the Court pronounced itself. determine whether it meets the constitutional requirements
established in our body of laws and whether, in the
In Prouse, the Federal Supreme Court addressed the balance of interests, a narrower scope of the constitutional
constitutionality of a vehicular checkpoint that was patently protection is reasonable in view of the public interest at
different from that conducted by the Police of Puerto Rico in stake.
the case under our consideration. In Prouse, the police
officers arbitrarily selected and searched passing vehicles. We wish to have the judicial economy that would not require
The patrolman whose conduct was examined by that Court that each roadblock be singled out for purposes of subjecting
explained in his testimony that he “saw the car in the area it to constitutional scrutiny. We deem that an efficient
and wasn't answering any complaints, so [he] decided to pull method for determining the constitutionality of a roadblock
them off.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650–651. The would be to regulate them in order to maintain a uniform and
Court found that what had taken place there was a “random not an arbitrary procedure for conducting the same. 44 It is
spot-check.” We believe, as the Federal Supreme Court did, incumbent upon the Legislature and the pertinent agencies to
that a stop in such circumstances is unconstitutional. establish such regulations; however, we suggest that the
establishment of a uniform regulated procedure for
In the case at bar, on the contrary, the record indicates that conducting roadblocks would support the constitutionality of
the policemen were stopping all the vehicles entering or the same. See State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 712–713 (Iowa
leaving the housing project.43 Therefore, the policemen 1995); State v. [Cloukey], 486 A.2d 143, 147 (Me.1985). Of
involved in the instant case did not individually determine course, it would be incumbent upon the courts to determine
which vehicles would be checked for traffic law enforcement the validity of any such law or regulation in light of the
purposes; rather, they stopped every vehicle passing through applicable constitutional principles, and to pass upon the
the blocked-off public road for the purpose of checking the claim of defendants or of persons accused of breaking the
legality of its registration and of the driver's license. law in order to determine, on the basis of the circumstances
surrounding each particular case, whether suppression lies.
It is the very Federal Supreme Court which, anticipating a
legal controversy as that raised in the present case,
established a distinction between the two investigative IX
procedures. The Court, justifying the stop of all vehicles Since the police action in stopping defendant's vehicle, just
traveling on a public highway, stated: like they had stopped all other passing vehicles, was


constitutionally valid, so was the seizure of the firearm that policeman knew that defendant carried said firearm in his
defendant carried in plain view in his vehicle. automobile, or that the policeman was particularly looking
for said weapon. It seems obvious to us that a pistol of such
From the transcript of evidence of the hearing held on high caliber in a motor vehicle is an object that, when
September 28, 1993, to discuss defendant's motion to observed, points to its criminal nature. Clearly the plain view
suppress, we know that the trial court found that after state doctrine applies.
policeman Ruiz García noticed the inconsistency in
defendant's documents, he looked towards the inside of For the foregoing reasons, we deem that defendant's arrest
defendant's vehicle and saw the weapon in plain view. With was in keeping with the law. In the past we have held that a
regard to these facts, we quote the Honorable Judge Ramón police officer may arrest a person and seize his weapon if
R. Gómez Colón, who presided over the hearing and issued said person does not produce valid documents showing that
the pertinent ruling: “I have no doubt that it was like that.” he authorized to carry such weapon. Pueblo v. Del Río, 113
Transcript of Evidence at 3. D.P.R. 684, 690 [13 p.r. offic. Trans. 886, 893] (1982). Of
course, it logically follows that once defendant was arrested
We have defined that for a law enforcement officer to have for illegal possession of a firearm, it was proper to search his
“reasonable grounds” to conduct a warrantless search, he person, which search led to the seizure of the heroin he
must have obtained “that information and knowledge that carried in his pocket. See 1 Ernesto L. Chiesa, Derecho
leads an ordinary and prudent person to believe that the Procesal Penal de Puerto Rico y Estados Unidos § 6.14
person arrested has committed an offense.” Pueblo v. (1991).
Martínez Torres, 120 D.P.R. 496, 504 [20 P.R. Offic. Trans.
515, 523] (1988). (Emphasis in the original.)45 To such effects, United States caselaw has pointed out that if
a police officer detects criminal evidence at a constitutionally
Let us examine the information obtained by state policeman valid traffic roadblock, he must investigate the same and not
Ruiz García on whether defendant had committed an offense. “close his eyes” just because the original purpose of the
The policeman observed the weapon in plain view; therefore, roadblock was to ensure traffic law enforcement. See United
he had reasonable grounds to suspect that defendant had States v. Merryman, 630 F.2d 780, 782–785 (10 th Cir.1980);
committed an offense. See State v. Bidegain, 541 P.2d 971, United States v. Miller, 608 F.2d 1089 (5 th Cir.1989); State v.
974–975 (N.M.1975). In Pueblo v. Dolce, 105 D.P.R. 422, MacDonald, 856 P.2d at 119; and State v. Bolton, 801 P.2d
436 [5 P.R. Offic. Trans. 582, 600] (1976), the Court 98, 109–110 (N.M.App.1990).
established the following requirements for the illegal
evidence in plain view doctrine: (1) the article must have
been discovered in plain view and not in the course or as a
X
result of a search; (2) the officer observing the evidence must
It has been said that he who is willing to sacrifice freedom
have had a right to be in the position of viewing such
for safety deserves neither freedom nor safety. Our
evidence; (3) the object must be inadvertently discovered;
pronouncements today follow that wise thought. The
and (4) the criminal nature of the object must arise from
dangerous crime wave that affects us cannot justify, to any
mere observation.
extent, the suspension of the protections afforded by our
Constitution.
In the case under our consideration, after policeman Ruiz
García became aware of a suspicious inconsistency between
Today we dissent because the roadblock conducted by the
the automobile's license plate number and the number on the
police in the morning of April 16, 1993, simply did not
vehicle registration, he discovered the pistol because it was
exceed the minimum parameters required by our
lying in plain view between the front seats of the automobile
Constitution. The compelling state interest in enforcing
driven by defendant. There is no evidence to suggest that the


traffic laws, fighting crime, and maintaining the public order,

justifies the traffic roadblock conducted in the present case.
What is essential is that these operations be conducted in a
correct and reasonable manner, as was the roadblock under
our consideration today.
The roadblock conducted by the police is consistent with our

Constitution; and in view of such constitutionality, the
majority of this Court invalidates in its opinion an instrument
designed to promote the very public safety that is so
threatened by criminality. Today our Court, with no
constitutional motives, precludes the State from achieving its
purpose of protecting the citizenry and maintaining public
order.


Footnotes
1
In its Petition for Certiorari, the prosecution directs our attention to a contradiction between the statements made
by the trial judge at the evidence suppression hearing and what he finally stated in the ruling appealed. The
discrepancy is whether the order to step out of the car given by the officer to Yip Berríos was given before or after
the officer found the inconsistency in the license plate number. We have observed that the record before us
contains expressions made by officer Ruiz García that tend to show that the order to step out of the car was given
before he became aware of the anomaly in the license plate number. See Petition for Certiorari, App. IV. However,
although such inconsistency does exist, it does not dispose of the controversy raised in this case because, even
assuming the position most favorable to the State —that the request to step out of the vehicle was made after the
officer noticed the anomaly— we arrive at the same conclusion in light of the totality of the circumstances existing
in the roadblock operation. See Transcript of Evidence Suppression Hearing at 3; Petition for Certiorari, App. IV, at
31.
2
By Resolution of December 7, 1993, we stayed the proceedings at the trial court and requested the original record
of the case. At that time, Justice Rebollo López stated that he had “reservations about the validity of the stop of
respondent's vehicle.”
3
There may be cases, however, in which a roadblock does not necessarily imply the seizure of a person. This may
be the case of a roadblock that only forces the driver to slow down when passing through.
4
The concepts “probable cause” and “reasonable grounds” are synonyms. In the past, we have defined them as “that
information and knowledge that leads an ordinary and prudent person to believe that the person arrested has
committed an offense, regardless of whether or not commission of an offense is later established.” Pueblo v.
Martínez Torres, 120 D.P.R. 496, 504 [20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 515, 523] (1988). (Emphasis in the original.) See also
People v. González Rivera, 100 P.R.R. 650, 653–654 (1972).
5
Previous United States Supreme Court caselaw had only considered the constitutional validity of searches made at
traffic checkpoints or of stops made by state officers conducting preventive (roving) patrols in circumstances in
which the officers had no individualized suspicion that the occupants of the vehicles had violated the law. In this
respect, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), where the Court held that a warrantless stop and search
of a vehicle may be made only in those cases in which the stop was made upon probable cause for believing that
the stopped vehicles contained illegal alcoholic beverages; Almeida–Sánchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973), where the Court rejected the government's contention that the national interest in controlling immigration
constituted sufficient justification for exempting state patrols from the probable cause or previous warrant
requirement for validly searching a motor vehicle; United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), where
the Court declared unconstitutional the stop of a vehicle made by a Border Patrol on preventive (roving) patrol for
the sole reason that its occupants appeared to be of Mexican ancestry; United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975),
where the Court held that under Fourth Amendment requirements, the police cannot search a motor vehicle in the
absence of probable cause or of the motorist's consent to do so.
6
At one of the challenged traffic checkpoints, all vehicles were stopped. At the other checkpoint, vehicles slowed
down when passing through the checkpoint, while an officer observed them. If the officer concluded that a vehicle

looked suspicious, he directed it to a secondary inspection area, where its occupants were asked about their
citizenship and immigration status.
7
In this respect, the Court held:
“The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for
making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on
motorists as a class. And since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less
room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops.”
United States v. Martínez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976).

8
For cases from other jurisdictions in which the use of systematically established traffic checkpoints was validated,
see: Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11 th Cir.1995); State v. Bates, 902 P.2d 1060 (N.M.App.1995); State v. Loyd,
530 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1995); Hooten v. State, 442 S.E.2d 836 (Ga.App.1994); People v. Wells, 608 N.E.2d 578
(Ill.App. 3 Dist.1993); United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389 (10 th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988);
United States v. Miller, 608 F.2d 1089 (5 th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980); Smith v. State, 515 So.2d
149, 152 (Ala.Cr.App.1987); Miller v. State, 373 So.2d 1004 (Miss.1979); State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143
(Me.1985).
For some cases in which the challenged roadblock was declared unconstitutional, see: Hagood v. Town of Town
Creek, 628 So.2d 1057 (Ala.Cr.App.1993) (the Court declared unconstitutional the challenged roadblock
because it was set up in front of an apartment building, for diverse purposes, without following previously
established written guidelines, and without taking adequate safety measures, for which reason the Court held
that the State had failed to carry its burden of proving the reasonableness of its act); People v. Evans, 579
N.Y.S.2d 853 (1992) (the Court invalidated a traffic roadblock established at an area with a high incidence of
prostitution for the sole purpose of fighting said problem); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App.1991) (among
the factors on which the finding of unconstitutionality rested were: the lack of an explicit plan for conducting the
roadblock; absence of supervisory officers participating in the roadblock; and lack of indications that the
roadblock was authorized on the basis of a previous analysis of the public interest protected by such strategy, its
effectiveness, and the degree of intrusion on individual privacy); Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990
(D.C.App.1991) (the Court held that the general interest in controlling crime did not suffice to justify the
challenged roadblock, more so when there was no empirical evidence supporting the government's contention
that the roadblock was an adequate mechanism for reducing drug-related offenses).
9
A particularly illustrative case is State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan.1983), in which the Supreme Court of
Kansas established the following factors for determining the validity of roadblocks: (1) the degree of discretion, if
any, left to the police officer; (2) the location of the roadblock; (3) the time and duration of the roadblock; (4) the
standards set by superior officers; (5) whether advance notice was given to the public at large; (6) whether advance
warning was given to the approaching motorists; (7) maintenance of safety conditions; (8) the degree of fear and
anxiety generated by the mode of operation; (9) the average length of time each motorist is detained; (10) the
physical factors surrounding the location, type and method of operation; (11) the availability of less intrusive
methods for combating the problem; (12) the degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and (13) any other relevant
circumstances that might bear upon the test.

10
For a similar reason in E.L.A. v. Coca–Cola Bott. Co., 115 D.P.R. 197 [15 P.R. Offic. Trans. 268] (1984), we
adopted a standard that was less rigorous than that employed in the criminal law sphere to determine probable
cause in cases involving administrative searches.
11
In other jurisdictions, this last factor has been crucial when determining the degree of intrusion on a person's
individual privacy and freedom. See Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11 th Cir.1995); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 (1983); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299, 1316 (Cal.1987) (the Court stated: “Minimizing the
average time each motorist is detained is critical both to reducing the intrusiveness of the stop on the individual
driver and to maintaining safety by avoiding traffic tie-ups”).
12
We point to a press release issued by the American Civil Liberties Union (A.C.L.U.) on May 22, 1996, which
divulged the results of a study that concluded that in the State of Maryland black motorists were stopped and
searched by the police for illegal drugs four times as much as white motorists, which fact could reveal a pattern of
race-based stops. Such practice is simply untenable under our Constitution and under the Federal Constitution.
13
See, for instance, State v. Barcia, 562 A.2d 246 (N.J.Super.A.D.1989) (every twentieth vehicle passing through the
roadblock was stopped); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal.1987) (every fifth vehicle passing through the
roadblock was stopped).
14
Some situations that may be considered emergency situations are: insurrections, threats involving explosives, and
situations involving hostages, among others. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment 664 et seq. (3 rd ed.1996).
15
The internal structure of the majority Opinion is highly contradictory. On the one hand, the majority —again,
resting on no evidence— questions that the principal purpose of the roadblock was to systematically check
driver's licenses and vehicle registrations. Aside from the fact that such position is totally speculative, the
majority opinion expresses that the Solicitor General has not stated that the roadblock was conducted as a
cautionary measure, to prevent the flight of any of the persons who were being served with the search warrants or,
as an exceptional measure, to appease an emergency or a situation of danger for the public. Does this mean that if
the Honorable Solicitor General had written it thus in his brief the roadblock would have been validated? Is the
majority suggesting that taking measures to prevent the flight of a person, or to protect the safety of the field
officers, is another valid reason for setting up a roadblock?
16
This provision has been traditionally linked to Secs. 1 (“[t]he dignity of the human being is inviolable”) and 8
(“[e]very person has the right to the protection of law against abusive attacks on his honor, reputation and private
or family life”) of Art. II. The constitutional protection of individual privacy stems from these three provisions.
17
To facilitate the comparison, we copy the English text of the Fourth Amendment:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”
The differences are few. First, Sec. 10 separates the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment by inserting the
prohibition against wire-tapping.
Second, the second clause of Sec. 10 is more detailed than the Fourth Amendment, inasmuch as it clarifies that

the warrant shall be issued by judicial authority. It also specifies that the warrant may be for authorizing
searches, seizures, or arrests. The difference is more apparent than real, inasmuch as the word “warrant” denotes
all that was added to Sec. 10. This is not the only instance in which our Constitution is more detailed than the
Federal Constitution.
Despite these similarities, our caselaw has given an independent life to Sec. 10, mainly because of the effect on
this section of other sections mentioned in our Bill of Rights that also protect the right to privacy. It has also
been said that the protection to the right to privacy afforded by our Bill of Rights follows “a broader style” than
the Federal Constitution. Therefore, the Federal Supreme Court caselaw construing the Fourth Amendment is
binding upon us only insofar as it fixes the minimum parameters of constitutional protection.
However, the mentioned “broader style” is descriptive, not prescriptive. It should not thoughtlessly give rise
to a process through which the Puerto Rican constitutional standard is mechanically determined by using as
basis the degree of protection of privacy established by Federal Supreme Court caselaw and subsequently
broadening the same. That our caselaw could establish a higher degree of protection than the Federal
Constitution may be predictable, but this is not, and must not be a prerequisite.
What our Constitution requires is not that we automatically establish a broader protection than the federal
protection, but that we establish a protection grounded on the principles embodied in our own Bill of Rights. If
the reasoning laid down in the caselaw of other jurisdictions persuades us, it is perfectly appropriate to adopt the
same.
18
State v. Bates, 902 P.2d 1060 (1995); United States v. Treviño, 60 F.3d 333 (1995); Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547
1995); State v. Binion, 900 S.W.2d 702 (1995); United States v. Holloman, 908 F.Supp. 917 (1995); State v. Loyd,
530 N.W.2d 708 (1995); Hooten v. State, 442 S.E.2d 836 (1994); State v. Rodríguez, 877 S.W.2d 106 (1994);
People v. Wells, 608 N.E.2d 578 (1993); Hagood v. Town of Town Creek, 628 So.2d 1057 (1993); State v.
MacDonald, 856 P.2d 116 (1993); State v. Barker, 850 P.2d 885 (1993); People v. Cascarano, 587 N.Y.S.2d 529
(1992); Davis v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 843 P.2d 260 (1992); Brunson v. State, 580 So.2d 62, reh. denied
(1991); Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (1991); Brimer v. State, 411 S.E.2d 128 (1991); State v. Sánchez,
800 S.W.2d 292 (1990); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Orr v. People, 803 P.2d 509
(1990); United States v. Morales–Zamora, 914 F.2d 200 (1990); State v. Bolton, 11 N.M. 28, 801 P.2d 98
(cert.denied) (1990); Cains v. State, 555 So.2d 290 (1989); Camp v. State, 764 S.W.2d 463 (1989); State v. Gascon,
811 P.2d 1103 (1989); United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (1989); State v. Mazurek, 567 A.2d 277 (1989);
Commonwealth v. Lovelace, 402 Mass. 1002 (1988); State of Missouri v. Payne, 759 S.W.2d 253 (1988); Cobey v.
State, 533 A.2d 944 (1987); State v. Valencia Olaya, 736 P.2d 495 (1987); United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389
(1987); Smith v. State, 515 So.2d 149 (1987); People v. Little, 515 N.E.2d 846 (1987); Cardwell v. State, 482 So.2d
512 (1986); United States v. Díaz–Albertini, 772 F.2d 654, cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 82 (1985); United States v.
López, 777 F.2d 543 (1985); State v. García, 481 N.E.2d 148, reh. denied, 489 N.E.2d 168, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
1889 (1985); State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (1985); People v. Bartley, 109 Ill.2d 273, 93 Ill.Dec. 347, 486 N.E.2d
880, cert. denied, 89 L.Ed.2d 608, 106 S.Ct. 1384 (1985); State v. Alexander, 489 N.E.2d 1093 (1985); State v.
Martin, 496 A.2d 442 (1985); United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371 (1984); Stark v. Perpich, 590 F.Supp. 1057
(1984); State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983); State v.
Shankle, 647 P.2d 959 (1982); Garrett v. Goodwin, 569 F.Supp. 106 (1982); 588 F.Supp. 825 (1984); United States
v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832, 70 L.Ed.2d 110, 102 S.Ct. 130, reh. denied, 454 U.S. 1069,
70 L.Ed.2d 605, 102 S.Ct. 620 (1981); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J.Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980); People v.
Estrada, 68 Ill.App.3d 272, 24 Ill.Dec. 924, 386 N.E.2d 128, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 968, 62 L.Ed.2d 382, 100 S.Ct.
459 (1979); United States v. Miller, 608 F.2d 1089, reh. denied (CA5 Tex.), 613 F.2d 315, cert. denied, 447 U.S.

926, 65 L.Ed.2d 1119, 100 S.Ct. 3020 (1979); Sowers v. State, 146 Ga.App. 701, 247 S.E.2d 225 (1978); Irwin v.
State, 178 Ind.App. 676, 383 N.E.2d 1086 (1978); State v. Frisby, 245 S.E.2d 622, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127
(1978); State v. Ruud, 90 N.M. 647, 567 P.2d 426 (1977); State v. Bloom, 90 N.M. 192, 561 P.2d 465 (1977);
Brantley v.State (Okla.Crim.), 548 P.2d 675 (1976); United States v. Millar (CA10 N.M.), 543 F.2d 1280 (1976);
State v. Bidegain, 88 N.M. 466, 541 P.2d 971 (1975); People v. Ingle, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975); United States v.
Martínez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976); State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535, 207 S.E.2d 459 (1974); People v.
Andrews, 484 P.2d 1207 (1971); United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884 (1970); People v. Washburn, 265 Cal.App.2d
665, 71 Cal.Rptr. 577 (1968); State v. Severance, 108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968); State v. Smolen, 4 Conn.Cir.
385, 232 A.2d 339, certif. denied, 155 Conn. 720, 231 A.2d 283, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); People v. De
la Torre, 257 Cal.App.2d 162 (1967); State v. Kabayama, 98 N.J.Super. 85, 236 A.2d 164, aff'd, 52 N.J. 567, 246
A.2d 714 (1967); Morgan v. Heidelgberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So.2d 512 (1963); and Commonwealth v. Mitchell,
355 S.W.2d 686 (1962).
19
The majority conclusion is not in harmony with our doctrine. For a concise exposition of the same, we cite
professor Chiesa verbatim:
“It is important to note that what is at stake here is a balance of interests between the degree of reasonable
expectation of privacy and the compelling state interests. Hence, the degree of protection is as great as is
the degree of reasonable expectation of privacy. This explains why a home is more protected than a vehicle.
On the other hand, the greater the compelling state interest justifying the act, the higher the probability that
said act will prevail as reasonable; while the weaker the compelling state interest, the higher the probability
that said act will be declared unreasonable and unlawful, and that the exclusionary rule will be applied. In a
case in which the reasonable expectation of privacy is very strong (like in a home), while the compelling state
interest justifying the search is very weak, it is highly improbable that the government act will stand as
reasonable. Only extraordinary cases, such as those involving emergency searches, would be justified. At the
other end is the case in which there is a weak legitimate expectation of privacy —such as that which a
citizen has when driving a vehicle on a heavily-traveled public highway— vis-à-vis a strongly
compelling government interest, such as combating vehicle theft and preventing traffic accidents; in
that situation, it is more probable that the vehicle stop will be justified as reasonable.”
1 Ernesto L. Chiesa, Derecho Procesal Penal de Puerto Rico y los Estados Unidos § 6.13(B), at 406–407,
Columbia, Ed. Forum (1991). (Emphasis added.)
20
It must also be noted that no reasonable expectation of privacy can be had with regard to a driver's license, because
said license is an official document. Pueblo v. Domínguez Fraguada, 105 D.P.R. 537, 544 [5 P.R. Offic. Trans. 749,
757] (1977).
21
Neither can the authority of police officers under sec. 1152(c) be restrictively construed. Said section provides:
“The Police may stop or examine any vehicle which, in their judgment, is being used in violation of this
chapter or any other legal provision regulating the operation of vehicles, or other laws, or whose driver or
passengers are involved in any traffic accident; to this end, the Police shall be authorized to block the way of
any such vehicle on any public highway when its driver refuses to stop.”
This subsection does not define the full scope of the police authority to stop vehicles or cover the universe of
possible stops. Its text seeks to curb the discretion of each policeman while patrolling public

thoroughfares.
This, however, does not apply when the police establishes an objective traffic control plan. For instance, the
police may set up roadblocks at which all vehicles traveling on one or several specific roads are stopped. The
common element between the stop made by a policeman when “in [his] judgment, [the vehicle] is being used in
violation of this chapter” and a roadblock stop is that in both cases the policeman's discretion has been
curbed and channeled so as to prevent any unreasonable intrusion on the motorists' expectation of
privacy.
As the United States Supreme Court held in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), and in Michigan Dept. of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), these safeguards meet constitutional requirements.
22
See the transcript of the Evidentiary Hearing held on September 28, 1993, at 3.
23
The fact that defendant lived at the Virgilio Dávila public housing project could suggest that the roadblock set up
on the access streets to said housing project sought to selectively stop all vehicles belonging to the residents of that
community. But we must not forget that said roads are public and open to access and use by any person, whether
resident, visitor, pedestrian, or stranger.
24
In its first footnote, the majority admits that there is an inconsistency over whether defendant was ordered to step
out of the car before or after the policeman saw the firearm in plain view. However, in its statement of facts, the
majority deems that the policeman ordered defendant to step out of the vehicle before he saw the weapon.
There is confusion over when was defendant ordered to step out of the car. At the Evidence Suppression
Hearing, the trial judge mentioned that it was after defendant replied that he did not have the firearm's
documents that he was ordered to step out of the vehicle. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing held on
September 28, 1993, at 3. On the other hand, the ruling appealed indicates that defendant was ordered to step out
of the car before the firearm was observed. Some expressions of state policeman Ruiz García seem to support
this second chain of events. See Petition for Certiorari, Appendix IV, at 31. Nevertheless, we deem that such
query is immaterial to the constitutional issue raised before us, inasmuch as the mentioned inconsistency in the
vehicle's license plate sufficed to ask defendant to step out of the vehicle; therefore, we proceed with our
analysis without giving further consideration to said question.
25
We deem that the question raised by the majority —whether the “principal objective of the roadblock was not
exclusively to systematically check the driver's licenses and vehicle registrations of ... motorists” passing through
the blocked-off roads— is of little utility. As the Superior Court pointed out, we cannot divorce the roadblock
conducted by the police from the simultaneous search-warrant operation at the housing project. However, for
purposes of our constitutional analysis of the mentioned traffic roadblock, we must focus our consideration on the
fact that the police were stationed on those roads with orders to stop the vehicles for purposes of checking licenses,
registration, and inspection documents, and not for other purposes.
26
Article II, Sec. 10 of our Constitution affords the constitutional protection recognized in the federal sphere by the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. See Pueblo v. Santiago Alicea, 138 D.P.R. ___ [38 p.r.
Offic. Trans. ___] (1995); Pueblo en interés menor N.O.R., 136 D.P.R. ___ [36 P.R. Offic. Trans. ___] (1994);
Pueblo v. Martínez Torres, 120 D.P.R. 496, 500 [20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 515, 520] (1988); 3 Diario de Sesiones de la
Convención Constituyente (Journal of Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention) 1568 (1961); and 3 José Trías
Monge, Historia constitucional de Puerto Rico 191, Río Piedras, Ed. Universitaria (1982).

On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV.

27
Our constitutional assessment must also consider that —as already clarified by our caselaw— the fundamental
right to privacy is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and by the Constitution of Puerto Rico.
28
It seems clear to us that a roadblock of the type mentioned here does not infringe on the minimum protections
required by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although the United States caselaw studied
deals with the protections afforded by said amendment, its legal basis is so convincing that it is highly persuasive
even with regard to the constitutional determination of more specific and protective rights, such as those granted
by Art. II, Sec. 10 of our Constitution.
29
See: United States v. Treviño, 60 F.3d 333, 336–338 (7 th Cir.1995); United States v. Holloman, 908 F.Supp. 917,
920–923 (M.D.Fla.1995); United States v. Morales–Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 202–203 (10 th Cir.1990); United States
v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C.Cir.1989); United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1392 (10 th Cir.1987); United
States v. Díaz–Albertini, 772 F.2d 654, 658 (10 th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1985); United States v.
López, 777 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10 th Cir.1984); Stark v.
Perpich, 590 F.Supp. 1057, 1061–1062 (D.Minn.1984); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, (1983); Garrett v. Goodwin,
569 F.Supp. 106, 121 (W.D.Ark.1982); United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854, 856–857 (10 th Cir.1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1982), reh. denied, 454 U.S. 1069 (1981); United States v. Miller, 608 F.2d 1089 (5 th
Cir.1989), reh. denied, 613 F.2d 315 (5 th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980); United States v. Martínez–
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Millar, 543 F.2d 1280, 1282 (10 th Cir.1976); and United States v.
Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 886 (10 th Cir.1970).
30
See: State v. Bates, 902 P.2d 1060, 1064 (N.M.App.1995); Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 1995); State v. Binion,
900 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tenn.Cr.App.1995); State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Iowa 1995); Hooten v. State, 442
S.E.2d 836, 841–842 (Ga.App.1994); State v. Rodríguez, 877 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo.banc 1994); People v. Wells,
608 N.E.2d 578, 581–582 (Ill.App.1993); Hagood v. Town of Town Creek, 628 So.2d 1057, 1059–1062
(Ala.Cr.App.1993); State v. MacDonald, 856 P.2d 116, 118–119 (Kan.1993); State v. Barker, 850 P.2d 885, 889–
890 (Kan.1993); People v. Cascarano, 587 N.Y.S.2d 529 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1992); Davis v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue,
843 P.2d 260 (Kan.1992); Brunson v. State, 580 So.2d 62, 64 (Ala.Cr.App.1991); Galberth v. United States, 590
A.2d 990, 1001 (D.C.App.1991); Brimer v. State, 411 S.E.2d 128, 129–130 (Ga.App.1991); State v. Sánchez, 800
S.W.2d 292, 295–297 (Tex.App.1990); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Orr v. People,
803 P.2d 509, 511–512 (Colo.1990); State v. Bolton, 801 P.2d 98, 102 (N.M.App.1990); Cains v. State, 555 So.2d
290, 296 (Ala.Cr.App.1989); Camp v. State, 764 S.W.2d 463 (Ark.App.1989); State v. Gascon, 811 P.2d 1103,
1105–1108 (Idaho App.1989); State v. Mazurek, 567 A.2d 277, 281 (N.J.Sup.A.D.1989); State of Missouri v.
Payne, 759 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Mo.App.1988); Cobey v. State, 533 A.2d 944, 950 (Md.App.1987); State v. Valencia
Olaya, 736 P.2d 495, 497 (N.M.App.1987); Smith v. State, 515 So.2d 149, 152 (Ala.Crim.App.1987); People v.
Little, 515 N.E.2d 846, 849 (Ill.App.1987); Cardwell v. State, 482 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla.App.1986); State v. García,
481 N.E.2d 148, 152 (Ind.App.1985), (reh. denied, 489 N.E.2d 168 (Ind.App.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014

(1985); State v. Martin, 496 A.2d 442, 446 (Vt.1985); People v. Bartley, 486 N.E.2d 880, 883–885 (Ill.1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1985); State v. Alexander, 489 N.E.2d 1093, 1096–1097 (Ohio Mun.1985); State v.
Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143, 146–147 (Me.1985); State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174, 1184–1185 (Kan.1983); State v.
Shankle, 647 P.2d 959 (Or.App.1982); State v. Coccomo, 427 A.2d 131, 132 (N.J.1980); People v. Estrada, 386
N.E.2d 128, 132–133 (Ill.App.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979); Miller v. State, 373 So.2d 1004, 1008
(Miss.1979); Sowers v. State, 247 S.E.2d 225, 226 (Ga.App.1978); Irwin v. State, 383 N.E.2d 1086
(Ind.App.1978); State v. Frisby, 245 S.E.2d 622, 625 (W.Va.1987), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1978); State v.
Ruud, 567 P.2d 496, 498–499 (N.M.1977); State v. Bloom, 561 P.2d 465, 466 (N.M.1977); Brantley v.State, 548
P.2d 675, 676 (Okla.Crim.Ct.1976); State v. Bidegain, 541 P.2d 971, 974–975 (N.M.1975); People v. Ingle, 369
N.Y.2d 67 (1975); State v. Swift, 207 S.E.2d 459, 460 (Ga.1974); People v. Andrews, 484 P.2d 1207, 1209
(Colo.1971); People v. Washburn, 71 Cal.Rptr. 577 (Ca.Ct.App.1968); State v. Severance, 237 A.2d 683, 685–686
(N.H.1968); State v. Smolen, 232 A.2d 339, 343–344 (Conn.Cir.Ct.1967), certif. denied, 231 A.2d 283
(Conn.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); People v. De la Torre, 64 Cal.Rptr. 804 (Ca.App.1968); State v.
Kabayama, 236 A.2d 164, 165–166 (N.J.1967), aff'd, 246 A.2d 714 (N.J.1968); Morgan v. Heidelgberg, 150 So.2d
512, 515 (Miss.1963); and Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky.1962).
31
A commentator has pointed out that every time the police attempt to adopt innovative measures to combat the ever-
evolving forms of criminal activity, they will face great opposition. Adrienne L. Meiring, Note, Walking the
Constitutional Beat: Fourth Amendment Implications of Police Use of Saturation Patrols and Roadblocks, 54 Ohio
St. L.J. 497, 520, 535 (1993). We deem that such opposition is useful and necessary in our democratic and pluralist
system, but this does not mean that just because a tactic is new it must be discontinued. This conservative attitude
would impose undue restrictions on the State and would be counterproductive to the common welfare.
32
Also, checking the documents required by law for driving a motor vehicle gives the police an opportunity to find
out whether the stopped motorist is driving in a state of intoxication.
“In sum, the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can
reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are
briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state program.... [I]t is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.

33
The majority infers that the only result of blocking the streets leading to a community would be to subject the
members of that community to a much stricter surveillance than that imposed on residents of other communities.
The opposite is the truth. A roadblock conducted on a community's entrance and exit streets promotes the safety
and welfare of its members because they receive much more crime-preventing police surveillance, aside from the
fact that such roadblocks can protect that community from visitors, strangers, or intruders with criminal intentions.
34
Unlike the Federal Constitution, in which the right to privacy derives and is inferred from other rights such as the
due process of law, the equal protection of the laws, the Fourth Amendment, and several others, our Constitution
expressly incorporates said right into its very text. However, both constitutions operate under the axiom that a
search is unconstitutional if it is unreasonable.
In Pueblo v. Dolce, 105 D.P.R. 422, 429 [5 P.R. Offic. Trans. 582, 591] (1976), we held that although Art. II,
Sec. 10 of our Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution are analogous, “[b]oth
provisions were intended for different circumstances and it is logical that their construction should conform,

within the frame of our relations with the United States, to the changing realities of each society.” For such
reason, in construing the rights and guarantees afforded by our Constitution, we have the faculty to broaden its
protections over the minimum rights provided by the Federal Constitution. However, we do not concur with the
majority proposition that such competence constitutes logical grounds for construing that “the reasonableness
standard in our jurisdiction is stricter.” The Diccionario de la lengua española associates “reasonable” with
“fair,” with “agreeable to reason.” 2 Diccionario de la lengua española 1228, Madrid, Ed. Espasa–Calpe (21 st
ed.1992). That is the perspective from which we weigh state actions in order to determine whether they are in
keeping with our values. Reasonableness is reasonableness, regardless of whether the protection of privacy is
directly constitutional in rank, as in our case, or derives from other constitutional rights, as in the case of the
Federal Constitution.
35
The factors established in State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan.1983), have been adopted and applied by many
jurisdictions. See, for instance, State v. MacDonald, 856 P.2d at 118–119 (Kansas); People v. Little, 515 N.E.2d at
848–849 (Illinois); State v.Super. Ct. In & For County of Pima, 691 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Ariz.1984); Ingersoll v.
Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299, 1313 (Cal.1987); and State v. Valencia Olaya, 736 P.2d at 498 (New Mexico).
36
Although the majority decision understates the fact that the police were stopping all vehicles traveling on those
streets, we deem that the indiscriminate nature of such stops, and the fact that the police did not act with
unconstrained discretion, are essential factors to be considered when determining the constitutionality of the
procedure that was carried out. See Meiring, supra, at 520.
37
It must be noted that the Federal Supreme Court validated a state-run highway sobriety checkpoint program even
though the state legislature never pronounced itself on that subject. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that said
Court deemed that although the roadblock was an administrative, not a legislative, initiative, it is not
constitutionally banned. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
38
In its ruling of November 10, 1993, the Superior Court, Bayamón Part, ruled that this legal provision was also
unconstitutional because it gave the police authority to arbitrarily stop vehicles without having reasonable grounds
therefor. However, to arrive at the appropriate decision in this case, we need not pass upon the constitutionality of
said section of the Traffic Law, because by validating the constitutionality of the roadblock, the chain of events that
culminated in the observation in plain view of the firearm gains lawfulness.
39
See Garrett v. Goodwin, 569 F.Supp. at 121.
40
The majority decision suggests that the roadblock at issue here was set up for the principal purpose of finding
anyone who had committed an offense. Had this been the purpose, the roadblock would have been unreasonable,
given the lack of reasonable grounds. That perspective does not change our constitutional analysis because the
majority is mistaken. That was not the purpose of the traffic roadblock under our consideration here. During the
roadblock operation, the policemen limited themselves to obeying their orders: to ask stopped motorists to show
their driver's licenses and vehicle registrations. Therefore, it seems clear to us that the purpose of the roadblock
was merely to detect specific Traffic Law violations. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
41
In this respect, the majority opinion states that to be reasonable, the roadblock must be “clearly visible.” So was
the roadblock under our consideration. It was conducted in the morning and set up on well-traveled streets; thus,
we conclude that it met said requirement.
42
See also Jones v. State, 459 So.2d 1068 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984).

43
It must be pointed out also that Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), involves a checkpoint operation
conducted on a highway, not on the entrance and exit street of a residential area, like in the case under our
consideration. Id. at 650. Therefore, the compelling state interest in protecting the members of a community that
had been particularly scourged by criminal activity was not among the purposes of the checkpoint operation
conducted in Prouse.
44
Although the operation conducted in the present case had no unconstitutional flaws, we concur with the majority in
that in the future we need objective criteria in order to eliminate any arbitrariness of state officers. Criteria such as
the occupants' race, sex, or age are clearly untenable. We, just like the majority, are also concerned about the
possibility that the police could manipulate a roadblock of the type under our consideration as a subterfuge to act
arbitrarily on the rights of the occupants of the vehicles to be stopped. It would be naïve to think that the police
would not use a roadblock operation to arbitrarily harass or investigate.
Since we believe that such operations could be corrupted in that manner, it would be possibly desirable that the
Legislative Assembly and the pertinent government agencies adopt a uniform procedure applicable to all
roadblocks. It may be convenient to take measures to ensure that the roadblock is being conducted in a
reasonable manner. For instance, in Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal.1987), personnel was assigned to the
roadblock to time detention periods so that detentions would not become unreasonably long.
45
See also People v. González Rivera, 100 P.R.R. 650, 654–655 (1972).
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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

1. Whether the Superior Court erred in declaring ....

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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

motor vehicle on the public thoroughfares.

On the other hand, the individualization existing in cases

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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

roadblocks on avenues, main highways and expressways.

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The majority abandons its trier role when it concludes that

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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

The first and third paragraphs of said section are an almost

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a motorist is not authorized or is not carrying his license?

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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

There are absolutely no constitutional grounds for letting

9 L.P.R.A. § 1152(a). Henry Yip Berríos,

This provision does not confer such ample powers to the

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Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

The State also has a compelling interest in curbing vehicle

Pueblo v. Yip Berrios, 1997 JTS 14 (1997)

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