Javellana vs.

Executive Secretary
50 SCRA 30; March 31, 1973

FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain respondents from implementing any of the
provisions of the proposed constitution not found in the present constitution. Javellana maintained that the respondents are
acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing proposed constitution and that the president is without power to
proclaim the ratification of the constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo Roxas, among others.
Petitioners pray for the nullification of Proclamation 1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any order, decree, and proclamation
which are similar in their objectives.

ISSUES:
1. Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 justiciable?
2. Was the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention ratified validly in compliancewith applicable laws?
3. Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the people?
4. Are the petitioners entitled to relief?
5. Is the proposed Constitution in force?

HELD:
Whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to an existing constitution is a judicial
question as it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been amended in the manner
required by the constitution. The Constitution proposed by the 1971 Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with
Article XV section 1 of the 1935 Constitution which provides only one way for ratification (election or plebiscite held in
accordance with law and only with qualified voters). Due to the environmental and social conditions in the Philippines (i.e.
martial law), the Court cannot honestly say that the people acquiesced to the proposed Constitution. The majority ruled to
dismiss the cases as the effectivity of the proposed Constitution is the basic issue posed by the cases which considerations
other than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new constitution is in force as there are not enough votes to say
otherwise.
 GREGORIO AGLIPAY vs. JUAN RUIZ
64 PHIL 201- March 13, 1937
FACTS:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance
from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
 In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage
stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty- third International Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic Church. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the respondent publicly
announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing.
ISSUE:

Is there a violation of principle of separation of church and state?

HELD:

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the
provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the
phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the
appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In
the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations.
The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of
the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936,
incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner’s complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was “to advertise
the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country.” The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event
considered of international importance “to give publicity to the Philippines and its people”. It is significant to note that the
stamps as actually designed and printed, instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map
of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: “Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of
the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be
said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman
Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in
view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by
its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated.
There is no violation of the principle of separation of church and state. The issuance and sale of the stamps in
question maybe said to be separably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received
by the Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the government (to promote tourism).

Demetria v. Alba
 148 SCRA 208
Facts:
The petitioner sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1,
Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that: “The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in
the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.” As concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly,
parties with general interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers—on the primary grounds that Section
44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of
legislative powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations. Demetria
averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution. The Solicitor General, for the public respondents,
questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another,
coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become
moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution
(which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President…may by law be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”

Issue: Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional.

Ruling:
No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department to any program of any department included
in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in
the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void. "For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e.
public funds, provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in
the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the appropriation and disposition
of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.

Belgica v. Executive Secretary

GR 208566

FACTS:
Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently
embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and
void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-
delegability of legislati

DECISION: Partly Granted

RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the
principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny
and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution. Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.

Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. vs. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III et al,
GR 209287, July 1, 2014
FACTS:
In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et al. maintain that the issues in these consolidated cases were
mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized because the Court’s interpretation of savings can be overturned by
legislation considering that savings is defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a statutory
issue. They aver that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations constitute savings and may be used
for augmentation and that the Court should apply legally recognized norms and principles, most especially the presumption of
good faith, in resolving their motion. On their part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial reconsideration of the decision on the
ground that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all moneys under the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP) used for alleged augmentation of appropriation items that did not have actual deficiencies. They submit that
augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts recommended by the President for the programs, activities and projects
(PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal protection, constitutional

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the
following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related
executive issuance UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
the doctrine of separation of powers

RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an
effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC
No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects
mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation
on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best
intentions must come within the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be
carried out through legal methods.