Pointers

 in  Political  Law  

2017  BAR  EXAMS  
By  Professor  Victoria  V.  Loanzon  
with  the  assistance  of  Atty.  Clemente  L.  Reyes  IV  
and  Atty.  Allan  Pamis  
 
ADVISORY:   In   reading   this   material,   please   pay   particular   attention   on   cases   penned   by  
Justice  Bersamin.  
 
I.  Preliminary  Considerations  
 
1.  What  is  the  concept  of  the  supremacy  of  the  Constitution?  
Answer:  The  Constitution  is  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land.  A  constitution  is  the  body  of  rules  
and   maxims   in   accordance   with   which   the   power   of   sovereignty   are   habitually   exercised.  
(Cooley)  
 
The   supremacy   of   the   Constitution   mandates   that   all   enactments   of   Congress,   all   issuances  
emanating  from  the  executive  branch  and  private  contracts  must  conform  to  the  provisions  of  
the  Constitution  in  all  respects.  
 
In  Manila  Prince  Hotel  v.  Government  Service  Insurance  System,  the  Court  held:  
“The   fundamental   conception   in   other   words   is   that   it   is   a   supreme   law   to   which   all   other   laws  
must  conform  and  in  accordance  with  which  all  private  rights  must  be  determined  and  all  public  
authority   administered.   Under   the   doctrine   of   constitutional   supremacy,   if   a   law   or   contract  
violates   any   norm   of   the   constitution,   that   law   or   contract   whether   promulgated   by   the  
legislative   or   by   the   executive   branch   or   entered   into   by   private   persons   for   private   purposes   is  
null  and  void  and  without  any  force  and  effect.  Thus,  since  the  Constitution  is  the  fundamental,  
paramount  and  supreme  law  of  the  nation,  it  is  deemed  written  in  every  statute  and  contract.”  
 
2.  Enumerate  the  three  basic  parts  of  the  1987  Constitution.  
Answer:  The  1987  Constitution  has  the  following  parts:  
1. Constitution  of  Liberty  which  provides  for  the  Bill  of  Rights  
2. Constitution   of   Government   which   provides   for   the   government   organization   and   the  
functions  of  the  government  bureaucracy.  
3. Constitution  of  Sovereignty  which  provides  for  the  methods  of  amendment  and  revision  
of  the  Constitution.  
4. A   constitution   provides   for   a   framework   of   government;   identifies   basic   structures   of  
government   and   assign   their   respective   powers   and   duties;   and   establishes   principles  
upon  which  the  government  is  founded  and  its  relationship  to  its  constituents.  
 
3.  Enumerate  the  rules  which  must  be  observed  in  interpreting  the  Constitution.  
Answer:  The  Court  gave  the  following  rules  in  the  interpretation  of  the  Constitution:  
1. Verba   legis:   whenever   possible,   the   words   in   the   Constitution   must   be   given   their  
ordinary  meaning  except  when  technical  terms  are  employed.  
2. Ratio  legis  et  anima:  the  words  in  the  Constitution  should  be  interpreted  in  accordance  
with  the  intent  of  the  framers.  
3. Ut   magis   valeat   quam   pereat:   the   Constitution   must   be   interpreted   as   a   whole.  
(Francisco  v.  House  of  Representatives,  2003)  
 
II.  The  State:  Sovereignty  and  Amending  the  Constitution  
 
1.   A   majority   of   the   incumbent   members   of   the   Senate   and   the   House   of   Representatives   want  
to   introduce   changes   in   the   Constitution.   What   are   the   available   options   by   which   the  
Philippine  Constitution  can  be  amended  or  revised?  
Answer:  The  Constitution  maybe  amended  or  revised  in  the  following  ways:  
(1).  Congress,  Art.  XVII,  Sec.  1:  By  Congress  as  a  constituent  assembly  upon  a  vote  of  ¾  of  all  
its  members.  The  constituent  assembly  may  introduce  revisions  to  the  constitution.  

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  (2).  Constitutional  Convention,  Art.  XVII,  Sec.  3:  By  2/3  vote  of  all  members  of  Congress  call  a  
constitutional  convention  or  by  a  majority  vote  of  all  its  members,  submit  to  the  electorate  
the   question   of   calling   such   convention.   The   constitutional   convention   may   likewise  
introduce  revisions  to  the  constitution.  
 
PLEASE  TAKE  NOTE  THAT:  (1).  The  Congress  has  legislative  power  which  is  plenary  in  nature  but  
the  power  to  amend  the  Constitution  is  not  included.  It  is  within  the  constituent  power  of  the  
people   which   has   been   duly   delegated   to   Congress   when   it   convenes   itself   as   a   constituent  
assembly.  Congress  continues  to  exercise  its  legislative  body  even  it  has  already  been  convened  
as  a  constituent  assembly.  (Gonzales  v.  COMELEC  (1967))  
(2).     The   Court   upheld   the   power   of   Congress   to   enact   the   implementing   details   of   the  
constitutional   convention   provided   the   same   do   not   clash   with   any   specific   provision   of   the  
Constitution  sought  to  be  amended.  (Imbong  v.  COMELEC  (1970))  
 
2.  Disgruntled  by  the  persistent  scheme  of  the  members  of  Congress  to  insert  pork  barrel  funds  
in   the   General   Appropriations   Act,   a   number   of   civic   minded   citizens   rallied   the   electorate   to  
introduce   amendment   to   the   Constitution   to   address   this   concern.   What   is   the   appropriate  
method  to  introduce  such  amendment?  
Answer:  The  qualified  citizens  may  resort  to  People’s  initiative  under  Section  2  of  Art.  XVII.  Said  
section   provides:”   Upon   petition   of   at   least   12%   of   the   total   number   of   registered   voters,   of  
which   every   district   must   be   represented   by   at   least   3%   of   the   voters   therein.   This   may   only   be  
done  once  every  five  years.”    
 
3  Distinguish  between  amendment  and  revision.  
Answer:   Revision   broadly   implies   a   change   that   alters   a   basic   principle   in   the   constitution,   like  
altering   the   principle   of   separation   of   powers   or   the   system   of   checks-­‐and-­‐balances.   There   is  
also   revision   if   the   change   alters   the   substantial   entirety   of   the   constitution,   as   when   the  
change   affects   substantial   provisions   of   the   constitution.   On   the   other   hand,   amendment  
broadly  refers  to  a  change  that  adds,  reduces,  or  deletes  without  altering  the  basic  principle  
involved.   Revision   generally   affects   several   provisions   of   the   constitution,   while   amendment  
generally  affects  only  the  specific  provision  being  amended.  (Lambino  v.  COMELEC,  505  SCRA  
160)  
 
4.  What  are  the  two  steps  in  the  amending  process?  
Answer:  There  are  two  steps  in  the  amendatory  process:  (1)  proposal,  and  (2)  ratification.  
 
5.  What  are  the  two  tests  developed  by  the  Court  to  determine  if  a  change  in  the  Constitution  is  
an  amendment  or  a  revision?    
Answer:    The  Court  has  developed  the  two-­‐part  test:  the  quantitative  test  and  the  qualitative  
test.  The  quantitative  test  asks  whether  the  proposed  change  is  "so  extensive  in  its  provisions  
as  to  change  directly  the  'substantial  entirety'  of  the  constitution  by  the  deletion  or  alteration  
of  numerous  existing  provisions."   In  quantitative  test,  the  Court  examines  only  the  number  of  
provisions  affected  and  does  not  consider  the  degree  of  the  change.  (Lambino  v.  COMELEC,  505  
SCRA  160)  
 
6.  Discuss  the  manner  by  which  amendments  and  revisions  to  the  Constitution  may  be  ratified.  
Answer:   In   case   of   amendments   proposed   by   Congress   or   a   Convention,   Art.   XVII,   Sec.   4,  
paragraph  1:  Ratification  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  a  plebiscite  conducted  by  COMELEC  
which  shall  be  held  not  earlier  than  60  days  nor  90  days  after  the  approval  of  the  amendment  
or  revision.    
In  case  of  amendments  proposed  through  initiative,  Art.  XVII,  Sec.  4,  paragraph  2:  Ratification  
by  a  majority  of  votes  cast  in  a  plebiscite  which  shall  be  held  not  later  than  60  days  nor  later  
than  90  days  after  certification  by  COMELEC  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  petition.  
 
7.  May  a  party  seek  judicial  intervention  in  amending  the  Constitution?  
Answer:  Yes:  The  Supreme  Court  may  exercise  judicial  review  over  any  matter  relative  to  the  
process  of  amending  or  revising  the  Constitution.  (Lambino  v.  COMELEC,  505  SCRA  160)  
 

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8.  How  is  sovereignty  exercised  by  the  Filipinos?  
Answer:   The   right   to   suffrage   is   a   manifestation   of   the   exercise   of   sovereign   powers.   The  
Constitution  has  also  vested  in  the  Filipinos  to  participate  in  referendum,  plebiscite,  the  process  
of  recall  at  the  local  government  level  and  enacting  laws  through  people’s  initiative.  
 
III.  A.  The  State:  The  National  Territory  and  UNCLOS  
 
1.  What  are  the  elements  of  a  state?  
Answer:  The  elements  of  a  state  are:  territory,  people,  sovereignty  and  government.  
 
2.  Enumerate  the  legal  instruments  and  laws  which  define  the  Philippine  territory.  
Answer:  Article  I,  1987  Constitution  defines  the  National  Territory  of  the  Philippines.    
The  following  subsequent  treaties  and  laws  define  the  national  territory  as  well:  
(1).  Treaty  limits:  Treaty  of  Paris,  Art.  III  
(2).  Treaty  between  Spain  and  U.S.  concluded  at  Washington  on  November  7,  1900  and  that  
between  U.S.  and  Great  Britain  on  January  2,  1930  
(3).   Method   of   determining   baselines   under   R.A.   No.   3046,   June   17,   1961,     R.A.   No.5446,  
September    8,  1968;  and  R.A.  No.  9522(  Philippine  Archipelagic  Baselines  Law)  ,  March  10,  
2009,  using  the  straight  line  approach    
(4).   P.D.   No.   1596,   June   11,   1978   which   delineated   other   territories   over   which   the  
Philippines  has  sovereignty  or  jurisdiction  
(5).  Two  Hundred-­‐Mile  Exclusive  Economic  Zone  under  P.D.  No.  1599,  June  11,  1978  
 
3.  Petitioner  Magallona  assailed  the  constitutionality  of  R.A.  No.  9522  on  two  principal  grounds,  
namely:    
(1)   RA   9522   reduces   Philippine   maritime   territory,   and   logically,   the   reach   of   the  
Philippine   state’s   sovereign   power,   in   violation   of   Article   1   of   the   1987   Constitution,  
embodying  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  and  ancillary  treaties,  and    
(2)  RA  9522  opens  the  country’s  waters  landward  of  the  baselines  to  maritime  passage  
by   all   vessels   and   aircrafts,   undermining   Philippine   sovereignty   and   national   security,  
contravening   the   country’s   nuclear-­‐free   policy,   and   damaging   marine   resources,   in  
violation   of   relevant   constitutional   provisions.   Are   the   arguments   of   Petitioner  
Magallona  tenable?  
Answer:  No,  the  arguments  of  Petitioner  Magallona  are  not  tenable.    R.A.  9522  is  a  statutory  
tool   to   demarcate   the   country’s   maritime   zones   and   the   extended   continental   shelf   under  
UNCLOS  III  and  not  to  delineate  the  Philippine  territory.  
UNCLOS   III   has   nothing   to   do   with   the   acquisition   (or   loss)   of   territory.   It   is   a   multilateral   treaty  
regulating,   among   others,   sea-­‐use   rights   over   maritime   zones   (i.e.,   the   territorial   waters   [12  
nautical   miles   from   the   baselines],   contiguous   zone   [24   nautical   miles   from   the   baselines],  
exclusive  economic  zone  [200  nautical  miles  from  the  baselines]),  and  continental  shelves  that  
UNCLOS  III  delimits.    
The   use   of   the   framework   of   the   Regime   of   Islands   to   determine   the   maritime   zones   of   the  
Kalayaan  Island  Group  and  the  Scarborough  Shoal  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  Philippines’  claim  
over  the  subject  territories  as  well  as  claims  over  Sabah.  
The  provisions  of  R.A.  9522  are  compliant  with  UNCLOS  III  and  do  not  violate  the  rights  of  the  
Philippines  over  its  internal  waters.  
 
4.   As   a   signatory   of   UNCLOS,   may   the   Philippines   seek   legal   relief   on   its   claim   as   a   coastal   state  
against  another  signatory  to  the  agreement?  
Answer:  A  party  to  UNCLOS  may  avail  of  three  remedies,  to  wit:  
(1).  Article  279.  Obligation  to  settle  disputes  by  peaceful  means  
(2).  Article  280.  Settlement  of  disputes  by  any  peaceful  means  chosen  by  the  parties  
(3).   Article   286   of   UNCLOS   provides   that   subject   to   Section  3,   any   dispute   concerning   the  
interpretation   or   application   of   this   Convention   shall,   where   no   settlement   has   been  
reached  by  recourse  to  Section1,  be  submitted  at  the  request  of  any  party  to  the  dispute  to  
the  court  or  tribunal  having  jurisdiction  under  this  Section.  

The   Philippines   filed   an   arbitration   case-­‐   “The   Republic   of   the   Philippines   v.   The   People’s  
Republic  of  China”-­‐  to  challenge  China’s  nine-­‐dash  line  claim  in  the  South  China  Sea.    

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On  October  29,  2015,  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  ruled  that  it  has  jurisdiction  on  the  
Philippines’  case  questioning  the  legality  of  China’s  enormous  claims  in  the  South  China  Sea.  
The  Philippines’  case  is  anchored  on  the  1982  Convention  which  allows  coastal  states  the  right  
to  manage,  explore  and  exploit  areas  within  its  200-­‐nautical  mile  exclusive  economic  zone.  
It   also   tackles   the   status   of   certain   maritime   features   in   the   South   China   Sea   (which   the  
Philippines   calls   the   West   Philippine   Sea)   and   the   maritime   entitlements   they   are   capable   of  
generating,   and   the   lawfulness   of   certain   actions   by   China   in   the   South   China   Sea   that   are  
alleged  by  the  Philippines  to  violate  the  UNCLOS.  
The   Philippines   said   China’s   assertion   of   having   “indisputable”   and   “historical”   claims   that  
extends  beyond  what  is  allowed  by  the  UNCLOS  infringes  on  the  country’s  maritime  jurisdiction  
and  prevents  it  from  exercising  its  right  under  the  convention.  
 
5.  What  are  the  significant  pronouncements  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  in  its  July  12,  
2016  ruling?  
Answer:  The  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  "concluded  that,  as  between  the  Philippines  and  
China,  there  was  no  legal  basis  for  China  to  claim  historic  rights  to  resources,  in  excess  of  the  
rights  provided  for  by  the  Convention,  within  the  sea  areas  falling  within  the  '9-­‐dash  line.'  The  
tribunal   said   that   "all   of   the   high-­‐tide   features   in   the   Spratly   Islands   (including,   for   example,   Itu  
Aba,  Thitu,  West  York  Island,  Spratly  Island,  North-­‐East  Cay,  South-­‐West  Cay)  are  legally  "rocks"  
that  do  not  generate  an  exclusive  economic  zone  or  continental  shelf."  
 
6.  What  are  the  maritime  zones  of  the  U.N.  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Seas,  April  30,  1982  
which  are  pertinent  to  the  claim  of  the  Philippine  government?  
Answer:   The   following   provisions   of   UNCLOS   are   relevant   to   the   claim   of   the   Philippine  
government:  
(1).   Internal   waters   of   the   Philippines   consist   of   waters   around,   between   and   connecting  
the   islands   of   the   Philippine   Archipelago,   regardless   of   their   breadth   and   dimensions,  
including   the   waters   in   bays,   rivers   and   lakes.   No   right   of   innocent   passage   for   foreign  
vessels   exists   in   the   case   of   internal   waters.   (Harris,   Cases   and   Materials   on   International  
Law,  5th  ed.,  1998,  p.  407).  
(2).  Contiguous  zone  is  the  zone  contiguous  to  the  territorial  sea  and  extends  up  to  twelve  
nautical  miles  from  the  territorial  sea  and  over  which  the  coastal  state  may  exercise  control  
necessary   to   prevent   infringement   of   its   customs,   fiscal,   immigration   or   sanitary   laws   and  
regulations  within  the  territory  or  territorial  sea.  (Article  33  of  UNCLOS)  
(3).  Territorial  Sea  extends  up  to  twenty-­‐four  nautical  miles.  
(4).  Extended  Continental  Shelf  extends  up  to  150  nautical  miles.  
(5).   Exclusive   Economic   Zone   is   the   zone   extending   up   to   200   nautical   miles   from   the  
baselines   of   a   state   over   which   the   coastal   state   has   sovereign   rights   for   the   purpose   of  
exploring  and  exploiting,  conserving  and  managing  its  natural  resources,  whether  living  or  
non-­‐living,  of  the  waters  super  adjacent  to  the  seabed  and  of  the  seabed  and  subsoil  and  
with   regard   to   other   activities   for   the   economic   exploitation   and   exploration   of   the   zone.  
(Articles  56  and  57,  UNCLOS)  
PLEASE  NOTE  THAT  -­‐  Under  UNCLOS,  however,  warships  enjoy  a  right  of  innocent  passage  when  
a  portion  of  the  territorial  water  of  the  coastal  state  is  used  for  international  navigation.    
Article  42(2)  of  UNCLOS  provides  that  there  shall  be  no  suspension  of  innocent  passage  through  
straits   used   for   international   navigation.   The   right   of   the   coastal   state   to   suspend   the   same  
requires  that  the  coastal  nation  must  publish  the  same  and  without  any  publication,  it  cannot  
insist   to   suspend   the   use   of   such   body   of   water.   A   claim   that   suspension   of   innocent   passage   is  
necessary   for   national   security   may   be   cited   by   the   coastal   state.   Upon   the   other   hand,   if   a   war  
ship   delayed   its   right   of   innocence,   the   same   may   justified   under   Article   18(2)   of   UNCLOS   if   the  
delay  was  caused  by  rendering  assistance  to  persons  or  ship  in  distress.  
 
PLEASE  NOTE  THAT  -­‐  Flag  state  means  a  ship  has  the  nationality  of  the  flag  of  the  state  it  flies,  
but  there  must  be  a  genuine  link  between  the  state  and  the  ship.  (Article  91,  UNCLOS)  
Flag  of  convenience  refers  to  a  state  with  which  a  vessel  is  registered  for  various  reasons  such  
as   low   or   non-­‐existent   taxation   or   low-­‐operating   costs   although   the   ship   has   no   genuine   link  
with  that  state.  (Harris,  ibid.  p.425)  
 

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7.  May  a  foreign  military  vessel  sail  through  the  territorial  waters  of  the  Philippines?  
Answer:   As   a   general   rule,   a   foreign   military   vessel   cannot   enter   the   territorial   waters   of   the  
Philippines.   The   rule   is   not   absolute.   In   a   decided   case,   the   Court   held   that   when   the   US  
Embassy  in  the  Philippines  requested  diplomatic  clearance  for  USS  Guardian  "to  enter  and  exit  
the  territorial  waters  of  the  Philippines  and  to  arrive  at  the  port  of  Subic  Bay  for  the  purpose  of  
routine   ship   replenishment,   maintenance,   and   crew   liberty   in   conformity   with   the   provisions   of  
the   Visiting   Forces   Agreement,   it   was   covered   by   the   exception   to   the   general   rule.   (Arigo   v.  
Swift)  
 
8.  Is  the  Bangsamoro  Juridical  Entity  considered  a  political  subdivision  and  therefore  a  part  of  
the  Philippine  territory?  
Answer:   No.   The   Bangsamoro   Juridical   Entity   is   not   a   political   subdivision   within   the  
contemplation  of  the  Constitution.  However,  the  areas  covered  under  the  BJE  are  part  of  the  
Philippine  territory.  
BJE   is   more   in   the   nature   of   an   associative   state   under   public   international   law   and   it   can  
eventually  gain  statehood.  The  Court  held  that  no  province,  city,  or  municipality,  not  even  the  
ARMM,   is   recognized   under   our   laws   as   having   an   associative   relationship   with   the   national  
government.  Indeed,  the  concept  implies  powers  that  go  beyond  anything  ever  granted  by  the  
Constitution   to   any   local   or   regional   government.   It   also   implies   the   recognition   of   the  
associated  entity  as  a  state.  The  Constitution,  however,  does  not  contemplate  any  state  in  this  
jurisdiction  other  than  the  Philippine  State,  much  less  does  it  provide  for  a  transitory  status  that  
aims   to   prepare   any   part   of   Philippine   territory   for   independence.   (Consolidated   Petitions:  
Province  of  Cotabato  v.  G.R.P.,  G.R.  No.  208566,  October  14,  2008)  
 
III.  B.  The  State:  People  
 
1. Who  are  citizens  of  the  Philippines?  
Answer: The  following  are  citizens  of  the  Philippines:  
1. Those  who  are  citizens  of  the  Philippines  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  this  
Constitution;  
2. Those  whose  fathers  or  mothers  are  citizens  of  the  Philippines;  
3. Those  born  before  January  17,  1973,  of  Filipino  mothers,  who  elect  Philippine  
Citizenship  upon  reaching  the  age  of  majority;  and  
4. Those  who  are  naturalized  in  the  accordance  with  law  (Section  1,  Article  IV)  
 
2.  How  may  one  become  a  naturalized  Filipino  citizen?  
Answer:  An  alien  may  become  a  Filipino  citizen  by:  
1. Filing  a  Petition  for  Naturalization  before  the  Regional  Trial  Court  under  the  provisions  
of  C.A.  143.  
2. Filing  an  application  for  reacquisition  of  Philippine  citizenship  under  R.A.  9225.  
3. Filing  a  local  bill  with  Congress  for  grant  of  Philippine  citizenship.    
 
3.  What  is  the  rule  on  a  claim  of  Philippine  citizenship?  
Answer:   A   person   claiming   Philippine   citizenship   has   the   burden   of   proof   to   establish   such  
claim.  In  the  case  of  In  re:  Vicente  Ching,  the  Court  held  that  “Philippine  citizenship  can  never  
be   treated   like   a   commodity   that   can   be   claimed   when   needed   and   suppressed   when  
convenient.  One  who  is  privileged  to  elect  Philippine  citizenship  has  only  an  inchoate  right  to  
such  citizenship.  As  such,  he  should  avail  of  the  right  with  fervor,  enthusiasm  and  promptitude.”  
One  must  choose  Philippine  citizenship  within  a  reasonable  period  which  has  been  construed  as  
within  three  years  upon  reaching  the  age  of  majority.    
 
4.  May  a  former  Filipino  citizen  seek  to  be  elected  into  public  office?  
Answer:   Yes.   A   former   Filipino   seeking   an   elective   public   office   may   be   a   candidate   provided  
that  he  has  perfected  his  reacquisition  of  Filipino  citizenship  on  the  day  of  election.  (Frivaldo  v.  
COMELEC,  257  SCRA  727)  
 
 
 

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5.  How  is  Philippine  citizenship  construed  under  the  Philippine  electoral  process?  
Answer:   The   right   to   govern   by   virtue   of   a   mandate   from   the   people   is   not   absolute.   The   Court  
held   that”   the   will   of   the   people   as   expressed   through   the   ballot   cannot   cure   the   vice   of  
ineligibility,   especially   if   they   mistakenly   believed,   as   in   this   case,   that   the   candidate   was  
qualified.   Obviously,   this   rule   requires   strict   application   when   the   deficiency   is   lack   of  
citizenship.  If  a  person  seeks  to  serve  in  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines,  he  must  owe  his  total  
loyalty  to  this  country  only,  abjuring  and  renouncing  all  fealty  and  fidelity  to  any  other  state.”  
(Frivaldo  v.  COMELEC,  257  SCRA  727)  
 
6.   May   one   who   has   been   repatriated   as   a   Filipino   citizen   and   continues   to   use   his   foreign  
passport  still  qualify  for  an  elective  public  position?  
Answer:   A   candidate   for   a   political   position   who   repatriated   himself   as   a   Filipino   citizen   but  
who   continues   to   use   his   American   passport   is   deemed   not   qualified   to   run   for   an   elective  
position.  The  passport  is  indicative  of  one’s  citizenship.  (Macquiling  v.  COMELEC,  July  2,  2013)  
 
7.  Pillos  filed  a  Petition  to  Deny  Course  to  Cancel  the  Certificate  of  Candidacy  of  Agustin  for  lack  
of   residence.   In   his   pleading,   Agustin   raised   as   a   matter   of   defense   his   reacquisition   of  
Philippine  citizenship  to  establish  his  claim  of  residence.  Pillos  was  able  to  obtain  certification  
from  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  that  Agustin  used  his  U.S.  passport  for  his  travel  to  Hawaii.  Is  
Agustin  qualified  to  run  as  Mayor?  
Answer:    While  Agustin  filed  a  valid  CoC,  the  use  of  his  USA  passport  after  his  renunciation  of  
foreign  citizenship  rendered  him  disqualified  from  continuing  as  a  mayoralty  candidate.  
(Arsenio  Agustin  vs.  Commission  on  Elections  and  Salvador  Pillos  ,  G.R.  No.  207105,  November  
10,  2015,  Bersamin,  J.  )  

8.  What  are  the  best  proofs  of  reacquisition  of  Philippine  citizenship?  
Answer:  The  best  proofs  are:  Affidavit  of  Renunciation  and  Oath  of  Allegiance.    
 (Arsenio  Agustin  vs.  Commission  on  Elections  and  Salvador  Pillos,  G.R.  No.  207105,  November  
10,  2015,  Bersamin,  J.  )  

9.   Assume   a   situation   where   there   is   a   seeming   conflict   as   to   availment   of   rights   of   a   Filipino  

citizen   under   an   international   agreement   and   a   Philippine   law,   which   would   prevail,   the  
domestic  law  or  the  international  agreement?  
Answer:    In  Secretary  of  Justice  v.  Judge  Lantion  (343  SCRA  377),  the  Court  speaking  through  
Justice  Melo,  said  that  “the  individual  citizen  is  but  a  speck  of  particle  or  molecule  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  the  
vast   and   overwhelming   powers   of   government.   His   only   guarantee   against   oppression   and  
tyranny  are  his  fundamental  liberties  under  the  Bill  of  Rights  which  shield  him  in  times  of  need.”  
The  Court  upheld  a  citizen's  basic  due  process  rights  against  the  “government's  ironclad  duties  
under  a  treaty.”      
 
10.  What  is  the  citizenship  of  a  foundling  abandoned  on  the  footsteps  of  a  church  in  Iloilo?  
Answer:  As  a  matter  of  law,  foundlings  are  as  a  class,  natural-­‐born  citizens.    
Poe-­‐Llmanzares   v.   COMELEC   (March   8,   2016)   found   no   intent   or   language   permitting  
discrimination  against  foundlings.  On  the  contrary,  all  three  Constitutions  guarantee  the  basic  
right   to   equal   protection   of   the   laws.   All   exhort   the   State   to   render   social   justice.   Of   special  
consideration  are  several  provisions  in  the  present  charter:  Article  II,  Section  11  which  provides  
that  the  "State  values  the  dignity  of  every  human  person  and  guarantees  full  respect  for  human  
rights,"   Article   XIII,   Section   1   which   mandates   Congress   to   "give   highest   priority   to   the  
enactment  of  measures  that  protect  and  enhance  the  right  of  all  the  people  to  human  dignity,  
reduce  social,  economic,  and  political  inequalities  x  x  x"  and  Article  XV,  Section  3  which  requires  
the  State  to  defend  the  "right  of  children  to  assistance,  including  proper  care  and  nutrition,  and  
special  protection  from  all  forms  of  neglect,  abuse,  cruelty,  exploitation,  and  other  conditions  
prejudicial  to  their  development."  
 
11.  What  is  the  rule  on  the  treatment  of  foundlings  under  domestic  adoption  laws?  
Answer:   Domestic   laws   on   adoption   also   support   the   principle   that   foundlings   are   Filipinos.  
These   laws   do   not   provide   that   adoption   confers   citizenship   upon   the   adoptee.   Rather,   the  
adoptee   must   be   a   Filipino   in   the   first   place   to   be   adopted.   The   most   basic   of   such   laws   is  

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Article  15  of  the  Civil  Code  which  provides  that  "[l]aws  relating  to  family  rights,  duties,  status,  
conditions,   legal   capacity   of   persons   are   binding   on   citizens   of   the   Philippines   even   though  
living  abroad."  Adoption  deals  with  status,  and  a  Philippine  adoption  court  will  have  jurisdiction  
only  if  the  adoptee  is  a  Filipino.  (Ellis  and  Ellis  v.  Republic,  117  Phil.  976  (1963))  
 
III.  C.  The  State  and  the  Concept  of  State  Immunity  
 
1.  What  is  state  immunity?  
Answer:  State  immunity  is  a  shield  which  the  state  enjoys  and  may  claim  in  the  event  a  suit  is  
filed   against   it.   Section   3   of   Article   XVI   provides   that   the   state   cannot   be   sued   without   its  
consent.  While  the  doctrine  appears  to  prohibit  only  suits  against  the  state  without  its  consent,  
it   is   also   applicable   to   complaints   filed   against   officials   of   the   state   for   acts   allegedly   performed  
by  them  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties.  The  rule  is  that  if  the  judgment  against  such  officials  
will   require   the   state   itself   to   perform   an   affirmative   act   to   satisfy   the   same,   such   as   the  
appropriation  of  the  amount  needed  to  pay  the  damages  awarded  against  them,  the  suit  must  
be  regarded  as  against  the  state.  
 
2. What  are  the  two  theories  which  govern  the  application  of  the  concept  of  state  immunity?  
Answer:  There  are  two  conflicting  concepts  of  sovereign  immunity,  each  widely  held  and  firmly  
established.   According   to   the   classical   or   absolute   theory,   a   sovereign   cannot,   without   its  
consent,  be  made  a  respondent  in  the  courts  of  another  sovereign.  According  to  the  newer  or  
restrictive   theory,   the   immunity   of   the   sovereign   is   recognized   only   with   regard   to   public   acts  
or  acts  jure  imperii  of  a  state,  but  not  with  regard  to  private  acts  or  acts  jure  gestionis.  (Holy  
See  v.  Rosario,  G.R.  No.  101949,  1  December  1994,  238  SCRA  524,  535)  
 
3.  Cite  instances  when  the  state  gives  its  consent  to  be  sued.
Answer:  Manner  by  which  consent  is  given:
(1).  Express  consent  –    
  (a)  General  law;  or  
  (b)  Special  law  
(2).  Implied  consent  –    
(a)  When  the  State  commences  litigation,  it  becomes  vulnerable  to  a  counterclaim;  
(b)  State  enters  into  a  business  contract  in  the  exercise  of  its  proprietary  power;  
(c)  When  it  would  be  inequitable  for  the  State  to  invoke  immunity;  and  
(d)  When  the  state  exercises  it  power  of  eminent  domain.  
 
4.    When  is  a  suit  against  the  state?  
Answer:  When  a  suit  is  against  the  state:  
A  suit  is  against  the  State  regardless  of  who  is  named  the  defendant  if:  
(1).  It  produces  adverse  consequences  to  the  public  treasury  in  terms  of  disbursement  of  public  
funds  and  loss  of  government  property.        
(2).  It  cannot  prosper  unless  the  State  has  given  its  consent.  
 
5.  When  is  a  suit  not  against  the  state?    
Answer:  When  not  against  the  state  
A  suit  is  not  against  the  State:  
(1)   When   the   purpose   of   the   suit   is   to   compel   an   officer   charged   with   the   duty   of   making  
payments   pursuant   to   an   appropriation   made   by   law   in   favor   of   the   plaintiff   to   make   such  
payment,  since  the  suit  is  intended  to  compel  performance  of  a  ministerial  duty;      
(2)  When  from  the  allegations  in  the  complaint,  it  is  clear  that  the  respondent  is  a  public  officer  
sued  in  a  private  capacity;  and  
(3)  When  the  action  is  not  in  personam  with  the  government  as  the  named  defendant,  but  an  
action  in  rem  that  does  not  name  the  government  in  particular.  

6.  Can  a  private  party  make  a  government  entity  liable  on  a  contract  which  that  private  party  
executed  with  another  private  party?  

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Answer:  No.  Under  the  principle  that  the  state  cannot  be  sued  without  its  consent,  a  third  party  
cannot   hold   a   government   entity   liable.   The   government   entity   is   a   stranger   to   the   contract  
between  the  two  private  parties.  (Department  of  Agriculture  v.  NLRC,  227  SCRA)  
 
7.   The   University   of   the   Philippines   (“U.P.”)   signed   a   contract   with   Stern   Builders   Company  
(“SBC”)  for  the  expansion  of  Arts  and  Sciences  Building  in  its  Los  Banos  campus.  U.P.  failed  to  
pay   the   full   balance   of   its   obligation   to   SBC.   SBC   filed   a   civil   suit   against   U.P.   to   collect   the  
outstanding  balance  under  its  contract  with  U.P.  and  also  asked  for  award  of  damages.  The  trial  
court   allowed   the   garnishment   of   funds   of   U.P.   from   its   depository   bank   to   cover   its  
outstanding   obligation   to   SBC   as   well   awards   of   actual   damages   of   ₱   5,716,729.00,   moral  
damages   of   ₱   10,000,000.00   and   attorney’s   fees   of   ₱   150,000.00   plus   ₱   1,500.00   per  
appearance.  Was  the  order  of  garnishment  proper?  
Answer:  No.  Trial  judges  should  not  immediately  issue  writs  of  execution  or  garnishment  
against  the  Government  or  any  of  its  subdivisions,  agencies  and  instrumentalities  to  enforce  
money  judgments.  They  should  bear  in  mind  that  the  primary  jurisdiction  to  examine,  audit  and  
settle  all  claims  of  any  sort  due  from  the  Government  or  any  of  its  subdivisions,  agencies  and  
instrumentalities  pertains  to  the  Commission  on  Audit  (COA)  pursuant  to  Presidential  Decree  
No.  1445  (Government  Auditing  Code  of  the  Philippines).    (University  of  the  Philippines  v.  
Hon.Dizon  and  Stern  Builders,  679  SCRA  54  (BERSAMIN,  J.)
 
8.  What  is  the  primary  reason  why  government  funds  may  not  be  subject  of  garnishment  and  
execution?  
Answer:  The  universal  rule  that  where  the  State  gives  its  consent  to  be  sued  by  private  parties  
either   by   general   or   special   law,   it   may   limit   claimant’s   action   "only   up   to   the   completion   of  
proceedings   anterior   to   the   stage   of   execution"   and   that   the   power   of   the   Courts   ends   when  
the   judgment   is   rendered,   since   government   funds   and   properties   may   not   be   seized   under  
writs   of   execution   or   garnishment   to   satisfy   such   judgments,   is   based   on   obvious  
considerations   of   public   policy.   Disbursements   of   public   funds   must   be   covered   by   the  
corresponding  appropriation  as  required  by  law.  The  functions  and  public  services  rendered  by  
the   State   cannot   be   allowed   to   be   paralyzed   or   disrupted   by   the   diversion   of   public   funds   from  
their  legitimate  and  specific  objects,  as  appropriated  by  law.(  Republic  v.  Villasor,  G.R.  No.  L-­‐
30671,  November  28,  1973,  54  SCRA  83,  87)  
 
9.  SBC  argued  that  U.P.  is  precluded  from  questioning  the  award  of  damages  since  the  same  has  
become   final   and   executory   and   in   keeping   the   doctrine   of   immutability   of   judgment,   the   same  
can  no  longer  be  appealed.  U.P.  appealed  the  award  on  equitable  grounds  since  there  was  no  
proper  service  of  the  copy  of  decision  on  its  General  Counsel  stationed  in  Diliman  campus  since  
the   decision   was   served   in   Los   Banos   campus.     As   between   SBC’s   and   U.P.’s   legal   positions  
which  would  prevail?    
Answer:   The   doctrine   of   immutability   of   a   final   judgment   has   not   been   absolute,   and   has  
admitted   several   exceptions,   among   them:   (a)   the   correction   of   clerical   errors;   (b)   the   so-­‐called  
nunc   pro   tunc   entries   that   cause   no   prejudice   to   any   party;   (c)   void   judgments;   and   (d)  
whenever   circumstances   transpire   after   the   finality   of   the   decision   that   render   its   execution  
unjust  and  inequitable.    
U.P.’s  legal  argument  is  covered  by  the  exception  of  the  doctrine  immutability  of  judgment.  
Equity  jurisdiction  aims  to  do  complete  justice  in  cases  where  a  court  of  law  is  unable  to  
adapt  its  judgments  to  the  special  circumstances  of  a  case  because  of  the  inflexibility  of  its  
statutory  or  legal  jurisdiction.  (University  of  the  Philippines  v.  Hon.  Dizon  and  Stern  Builders  
Corporation,  679  SCRA  54  ,  BERSAMIN,  J.)
 
10.  What  is  the  distinction  between  suability  and  liability  of  the  state?  
Answer:  Suability  depends  on  the  consent  of  the  state  to  be  sued  while  liability  relies  on  the  
applicable   law   and   the   established   facts.   The   circumstance   that   a   state   is   suable   does   not  
necessarily  mean  that  it  is  liable;  on  the  other  hand,  it  can  never  be  held  liable  if  it  does  not  first  
consent  to  be  sued.  Liability  is  not  conceded  by  the  mere  fact  that  the  state  has  allowed  itself  to  
be  sued.  When  the  state  does  waive  its  sovereign  immunity,  it  is  only  giving  the  plaintiff  the  
chance   to   prove,   if   it   can,   that   the   defendant   is   liable.   (Municipality   of   San   Fernando,   La  
Union  v.  Firme,    G.R.  No.  L-­‐52179,  April  8,  1991,  195  SCRA  692,  697  cited  in  U.P.  v.  Hon.  Dizon)  

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11.   Can   a   government   counsel   be   held   personally   liable   for   damages   through   a   counterclaim  
while  defending  the  interest  of  the  state?  
Answer:   No.   A   public   officer   may   not   be   held   liable   for   the   counterclaim   by   one   of   the   accused  
when  he  performs  his  duties  in  good  faith.  (Chavez  v.  Sandiganbayan,  193  SCRA  282)  
 
12.   May   private   individuals   bring   a   suit   against   the   Commander   of   a   warship   of   the   United  
States   of   America   for   its   grounding,   salvaging   and   post-­‐salvaging   operations   which   cause   and  
continue  to  cause  environmental  damage  to  the  marine  resources  of  the  Philippines  in  violation  
of  environmental  laws  of  the  country?  
Answer:   Yes.   The   Court   can   relax   the   procedure   rules   when   the   petition   raises   a   matter   of  
transcendental  importance.  The  Court  held  that  the  liberalization  of  standing  first  enunciated  in  
Oposa,   insofar   as   it   refers   to   minors   and   generations   yet   unborn,   is   now   enshrined   in   the   Rules  
which  allows  the  filing  of  a  citizen  suit  in  environmental  cases.  The  provision  on  citizen  suits  in  
the   Rules   “collapses   the   traditional   rule   on   personal   and   direct   interest,   on   the   principle   that  
humans  are  stewards  of  nature.”    (Bishop  Arigo  et  al  v.  Scott  H.  Swift  et  al.)  
 
13.  What  is  rule  on  the  immunity  of  foreign  states  from  the  jurisdiction  of  domestic  courts?  
Answer:  In  the  case  of  Minucher  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  the  Court  expounded  on  the  immunity  of  
foreign  states  from  the  jurisdiction  of  local  courts,  as  follows:  
“The   precept   that   a   State   cannot   be   sued   in   the   courts   of   a   foreign   state   is   a   long-­‐standing   rule  
of  customary  international  law  then  closely  identified  with  the  personal  immunity  of  a  foreign  
sovereign  from  suit  and,  with  the  emergence  of  democratic  states,  made  to  attach  not  just  to  
the   person   of   the   head   of   state,   or   his   representative,   but   also   distinctly   to   the   state   itself   in   its  
sovereign  capacity.  If  the  acts  giving  rise  to  a  suit  are  those  of  a  foreign  government  done  by  
its   foreign   agent,   although   not   necessarily   a   diplomatic   personage,   but   acting   in   his   official  
capacity,  the  complaint  could  be  barred  by  the  immunity  of  the  foreign  sovereign  from  suit  
without  its  consent.  Suing  a  representative  of  a  state  is  believed  to  be,  in  effect,  suing  the  state  
itself.   The   proscription   is   not   accorded   for   the   benefit   of   an   individual   but   for   the   State,   in  
whose  service  he  is,  under  the  maxim  -­‐  par  in  parem,  non  habet  imperium–  that  all  states  are  
sovereign   equals   and   cannot   assert   jurisdiction   over   one   another.   The   implication,   in   broad  
terms,   is   that   if   the   judgment   against   an   official   would   require   the   state   itself   to   perform   an  
affirmative  act  to  satisfy  the  award,  such  as  the  appropriation  of  the  amount  needed  to  pay  the  
damages   decreed   against   him,   the   suit   must   be   regarded   as   being   against   the   state   itself,  
although  it  has  not  been  formally  impleaded.”  
 
14.  Can  China  National  Machinery  &  Equipment  Corp.    (CNMEG)  claim  that  it  is  immune  from  
suit  since  it  is  acting  as  an  agent  of  the  government  of  China  and  the  contract  for  the  North  
Railway  Project  is  covered  by  an  Executive  Agreement?  
Answer:  Absent  any  certification  from  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  CNMEG  is  presumed  
to  be  neither  a  government  entity  nor  an  agent  of  the  government  of  China.  Even  on  the  
assumption  that  it  is  a  government  entity,  the  restrictive  application  of  state  immunity  is  proper  
when  the  proceedings  arise  out  of  commercial  transactions  of  the  foreign  sovereign,  its  
commercial  activities  or  economic  affairs.  Stated  differently,  a  State  may  be  said  to  have  
descended  to  the  level  of  an  individual  and  can  thus  be  deemed  to  have  tacitly  given  its  consent  
to  be  sued  only  when  it  enters  into  business  contracts.  It  does  not  apply  where  the  contract  
relates  to  the  exercise  of  its  sovereign  functions.  CNMEG  is  engaged  in  a  proprietary  activity.  
To  be  considered  an  executive  agreement,  the  following  three  requisites  provided  under  the  
Vienna  Convention  must  nevertheless  concur:  (a)  the  agreement  must  be  between  states;  (b)  
it  must  be  written;  and  (c)  it  must  be  governed  by  international  law.      
CNMEG  cannot  invoke  immunity  from  suit  since  the  railway  project  is  purely  a  commercial  
undertaking  since  not  all  the  requisites  of  an  executive  agreement  are  present.    (China  National  
Machinery  &  Equipment  Corp.  (Group)  v.  Santamaria,  665  SCRA  189  (2012))  
 
15.  Can  an  employee  of  the  Asian  Development  Bank  invoke  diplomatic  immunity  as  a  defense  
to  dismiss  charges  of  acts  of  slander  by  another  co-­‐employee?  

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Answer:    No,  an  employee  of  the  Asian  Development  Bank  cannot  invoke  diplomatic  immunity  
because  the  grant  of  such  immunity  is  not  absolute  and  is  limited  only  in  relation  to  one’s  
official  duties.  
Section  45  of  the  Agreement    between  the  Philippines  and  the  Asian  Development  provides:  
“Bank,  Officers  and  staff  of  the  Bank  including  for  the  purpose  of  this  Article  experts  and  
consultants  performing  missions  for  the  Bank  shall  enjoy  the  following  privileges  and  
immunities:  
“x  x  x  immunity  from  legal  process  with  respect  to  acts  performed  by  them  in  their  official  
capacity  except  when  the  Bank  waives  the  immunity.”    
The  immunity  mentioned  therein  is  not  absolute,  but  subject  to  the  exception  that  the  acts  
covered  must  be  done  in  "official  capacity.”  Slandering  a  person  could  not  possibly  be  covered  
by  the  immunity  agreement  because  Philippine  laws  do  not  allow  the  commission  of  a  crime,  
such  as  defamation,  in  the  name  of  official  duty.    (Liang  v.  People,  323  SCRA  692  (2000)  355  
SCRA  125  (2001))  
 
16.  Is  government  bound  by  the  mistakes  of  lawyers  in  a  land  registration  case?  
Answer:  In  a  decided  case,  the  Court  reiterated  that  “[a]s  a  matter  of  doctrine,  illegal  acts  of  
government   agents   do   not   bind   the   State   ”and“   the   Government   is   never   estopped   from  
questioning   the   acts   of   its   officials,   more   so   if   they   are   erroneous,   let   alone   irregular.”     This  
principle  applies  in  land  registration  cases.     Certainly,  the  State  will  not  be  allowed  to  abdicate  
its   authority   over   lands   of   the   public   domain   just   because   its   agents   and   officers   have   been  
negligent   in   the   performance   of   their   duties.     Under   the   regalian   doctrine,   “all   lands   of   the  
public   domain   belong   to   the   State,   and   the   State   is   the   source   of   any   asserted   right   to  
ownership   in   land   and   charged   with   the   conservation   of   such   patrimony.”   (Heirs   of   Reyes   v.  
Republic,   529   Phil.   510,   520-­‐521   (2006),Land   Bank   of   the   Philippines   v.   Republic,   567   Phil.   427  
(2008);   Republic   v.   Lao,   453   Phil.   189   (2003);   Spouses   Morandarte   v.   Court   of   Appeals,   479  
Phil.  870  (2004);  Spouses  Palomo  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  334  Phil.    and  Reyes  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  
356   Phil.   605,   624   (1998)   cited   in   Republic   v.   Spouses   Benigno,   G.R.   No.   205492,   March   11,  
2015)  
 
17.  Spouses  Ramos  sued  the  Air  Transportation  Office  (“ATO”)  for  non-­‐payment  of  the  portion  
of  their  property  which  ATO  had  been  utilizing  in  Loakan  Airport.  ATO  moved  to  dismiss  the  suit  
upon  the  claim  that  it  is  immune  from  suit.  Is  the  claim  of  ATO  proper?  
Answer:  No.  The  Court  held  that  ATO  is  an  agency  of  the  government  not  performing  a  purely  
governmental  or  sovereign  function,  but  was  involved  in  the  management  and  maintenance  of  
the  Loakan  Airport,  an  activity  that  was  not  the  exclusive  prerogative  of  the  State  in  its  
sovereign  capacity.  Hence,  the  ATO  had  no  claim  to  the  States  immunity  from  suit.    
Furthermore,  the  doctrine  of  state  immunity  cannot  be  used  as  a  shield  to  defeat  a  valid  claim  
for   compensation   arising   from   the   taking   without   just   compensation   and   without   the   proper  
expropriation   proceeding   being   first   resorted   to.   (AIR   TRANSPORTATION   OFFICE   v.   SPOUSES  
DAVID  AND  ELISEA  RAMOS,  GR  No.  159402,  February  23,  2011,  Bersamin,  J.)

IV.  GENERAL  PROVISIONS  

 
1.   In   the   event   the   Bangsamoro   Basic   Law   is   enacted   into   law,   may   the   Philippine   flag   be  
changed?  
Answer:   Yes   but   not   by   mere   law   but   by   amendment   or   revision   of   the   Constitution.   The  
Philippine  flag  is  specifically  described  under  Section1  of  Article  XVI  of  the  Constitution.  
 
2.  Can  the  President  recommend  to  Congress  to  change  the  country’s  name,  national  anthem  
and  government  seal?  
Answer:   Yes.   The   country’s   name,   national   anthem   and   government   seal   may   be   changed   by  
law  provided  the  same  is  submitted  to  the  people  for  ratification.  (Art.  XVI,  Sec.  2).  
 
3.  May  the  President  as  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief  be  held  liable  for  the  death  of  police  officers  in  an  
encounter  with  the  National  People’s  Army  under  the  principle  of  command  responsibility?  

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Answer:  No.  The  principle  of  command  responsibility/  chain  of  command  will  only  apply  when  
the  President  acts  as  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief  of  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines  (Art.  XVI,  Sec.  
4,   Art.   XVI,   Sec.   5,   Art.   XVIII,   Sec.   24).   The   Philippine   National   Police   is   not   part   of   the   Armed  
Forces  of  the  Philippines.  
 
4.   In   view   of   the   growth   of   cable   television   industry   in   the   country,   some   foreign-­‐owned  
broadcast  media  would  like  to  engage  business  in  the  Philippines  and  register  under  Philippine  
laws.    Is  this  legally  possible?    
Answer:  No.  The  Constitution  provides  that  ownership  and  management  of  mass  media  shall  be  
100%  Filipino  owned  (Art.  XVI,  Sec.  11(1)).  
 
5.   Adorable   Advertising   Company   is   a   company   owned   by   Mexican   nationals.   Can   it   be   allowed  
to  engage  in  advertising  business  in  the  Philippines?  
Answer:  No.  The  Constitution  provides  that  ownership  of  advertising  companies  shall  be  70%  
Filipino  owned  (Art.  XVI,  Sec.  11(1),  Art.  XVIII,  Sec.  23).  
 
6.   Can   Congress   enact   a   law   which   would   require   the   ratification   of   a   treaty   signed   by   the  
President  and  concurred  in  by  two  thirds  vote  of  the  Senate?  
Answer:  Yes.  Section  25  of  Article  XVIII  of  the  Constitution  provides  that  a  treaty  which  would  
require  the  establishment  of  foreign  military  bases,  the  presence  of  foreign  military  personnel  
and   installation   of   equipment   of   a   foreign   military   power   allows   Congress   to   enact   the   law  
which  require  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  by  a  majority  vote  of  the  electorate.    
 
7.   What   is   the   nature   of   agricultural   land   to   be   covered   under   the   agrarian   reform   program  
within  the  contemplation  of  the  framers  of  the  Constitution?  
Answer:   The   Constitutional   Commission   never   intended   to   include   lands   used   for   raising  
livestock   and   poultry,   and   commercial,   industrial   and   residential   lands   within   the   coverage   of  
the  Agrarian  Reform  Program  of  the  Government  is  already  settled.  
In   Luz   Farms   v.   Secretary   of   the   Department   of   Agrarian   Reform   (192   SCRA   51),   the   Court  
pointed  this  out:  The  transcripts  of  the  deliberations  of  the  Constitutional  Commission  of  1986  
on  the  meaning  of  the  word  “agricultural”  clearly  show  that  it  was  never  the  intention  of  the  
framers   of   the   Constitution   to   include   livestock   and   poultry   industry   in   the   coverage   of   the  
constitutionally-­‐mandated  agrarian  reform  program  of  the  Government.  Thus,  a  lot  inside  the  
poblacion  should  be  presumed  residential,  or  commercial,  or  non-­‐agricultural  unless  there  is  a  
clearly  preponderant  evidence  to  show  that  it  is  agricultural.    
 
V.  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  (including  Principles  of  Public  International  Law)  AND  STATE  POLICIES  
 
1.   John   Williams   is   a   member   of   the   U.S.   Armed   Forces   participating   the   Balikatan   exercises  
under  the  Visiting  Forces  Agreement  (“VFA”).  Peeved  by  the  attitude  of  Pedro  Reyes,  a  Filipino  
waiter,   in   a   local   bar   in   Olongapo   City,   he   hit   him   and   Reyes   fell   on   the   ground   which  
accidentally  caused  his  death.  Can  John  Williams  be  criminally  held  under  Philippine  laws?  
Answer:   Yes.   In   Nicolas   v.   Romulo,   Daniel   Smith   was   tried   and   convicted   of   rape   under   the  
Revised   Penal   Code.   John   Williams,   a   military   officer   of   U.S.   government   contingent  
participating  in  the  Balikatan  military  exercises  must  face  trial  before  the  Philippine  courts  for  a  
crime  committed  under  the  Revised  Penal  Code.  
 
2.  What  is  the  nature  of  the  Visiting  Forces  Agreement?  
Answer:   The   Visiting   Forces   Agreement   (“VFA”)   is   a   treaty.   As   held   in   BAYAN   (Bagong  
Alyansang  Makabayan)  v.  Exec.  Sec.  Zamora,  the  VFA  was  duly  concurred  in  by  the  Philippine  
Senate  and  has  been  recognized  as  a  treaty  by  the  United  States  as  attested  and  certified  by  the  
duly  authorized  representative  of  the  United  States  government.    
The   VFA   is   an   agreement   which   defines   the   treatment   of   United   States   troops   and   personnel  
visiting   the   Philippines   to   promote   “common   security   interests”   between   the   US   and   the  
Philippines   in   the   region.   It   provides   for   the   guidelines   to   govern   such   visits   of   military  
personnel,  and  further  defines  the  rights  of  the  United  States  and  the  Philippine  government  in  
the   matter   of   criminal   jurisdiction,   movement   of   vessel   and   aircraft,   importation   and  
exportation  of  equipment,  materials  and  supplies.    

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3.  Does  EDCA  suffer  from  any  constitutional  infirmity?  
Answer:   As   it   is,   EDCA   is   not   constitutionally   infirm.   As   an   executive   agreement,   it   remains  
consistent   with   existing   laws   and   treaties   that   it   purports   to   implement.   The   admission   and  
presence  of  U.S.  military  and  civilian  personnel  in  Philippine  territory  are  already  allowed  under  
the  VFA,  the  treaty  supposedly  being  implemented  by  EDCA.  What  EDCA  has  effectively  done,  
in  fact,  is  merely  provide  the  mechanism  to  identify  the  locations  in  which  U.S.  personnel  may  
perform   allowed   activities   pursuant   to   the   VFA.   As   the   implementing   agreement,   it   regulates  
and  limits  the  presence  of  U.S.  personnel  in  the  country.  
Both   EDCA   and   the   Terms   of   Reference   of   the   VFA   authorize   the   U.S.   to   perform   the   following:  
(a)   participate   in   training   exercises;   (b)   retain   command   over   their   forces;   (c)   establish  
temporary   structures   in   the   country;   (d)   share   in   the   use   of   their   respective   resources,  
equipment  and  other  assets;  and  (e)  exercise  their  right  to  self-­‐defense  
The  new  EDCA  would  grant  American  troops,  ships  and  planes  rotational  access  to  facilities  of  
the  Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines  –  but  not  permanent  bases  which  are  prohibited  under  the  
Philippine   Constitution   -­‐   with   the   result   of   reducing   response   time   should   an   external   threat  
from  a  common  adversary  crystallize.  
 
4. What  are  restrictions  imposed  by  the  Constitution  in  the  exercise  of  the  diplomatic  powers  
by  the  President?  
Answer:     Although   the   Chief   Executive   wields   the   exclusive   authority   to   conduct   foreign  
relations,  this  power  must  still  be  exercised  within  the  context  and  the  parameters  set  by  the  
Constitution,  as  well  as  by  existing  domestic  and  international  laws.  There  are  constitutional  
provisions   that   restrict   or   limit   the   President's   prerogative   in   concluding   international  
agreements,  such  as  those  that  involve  the  following:  
a.  The  policy  of  freedom  from  nuclear  weapons  within  Philippine  territory;  
b.  The  fixing  of  tariff  rates,  import  and  export  quotas,  tonnage  and  wharfage  dues,  and  other  
duties  or  imposts,  which  must  be  pursuant  to  the  authority  granted  by  Congress;  
c.   The   grant   of   any   tax   exemption,   which   must   be   pursuant   to   a   law   concurred   in   by   a   majority  
of  all  the  Members  of  Congress;    
d.  The  contracting  or  guaranteeing,  on  behalf  of  the  Philippines,  of  foreign  loans  that  must  be  
previously  concurred  in  by  the  Monetary  Board;  
e.  The  authorization  of  the  presence  of  foreign  military  bases,  troops,  or  facilities  in  the  country  
must  be  in  the  form  of  a  treaty  duly  concurred  in  by  the  Senate;  and    
f.  For  agreements  that  do  not  fall  under  paragraph  5,  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate  is  required,  
should  the  form  of  the  government  chosen  be  a  treaty;  
 
5. May  a  treaty  concurred  by  the  Senate  be  a  subject  of  ratification  by  the  people?  
 Answer:    Under  Section  25  of  Article  XVIII  of  the  Constitution,  an  agreement  -­‐  the  subject  of  
which  is  the  entry  of  foreign  military  troops,  bases,  or  facilities  -­‐  is  particularly  restricted.  The  
requirements   are   that   it   be   in   the   form   of   a   treaty   concurred   in   by   the   Senate;   that   when  
Congress  so  requires,  it  be  ratified  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  by  the  people  in  a  national  
referendum  held  for  that  purpose;  and  that  it  be  recognized  as  a  treaty  by  the  other  contracting  
State.  
 
6.  If  an  ambassador  of  a  foreign  country  is  found  liable  under  Philippine  laws,  how  will  he  be  
tried?  
Answer:   The   Supreme   Court   shall   exercise   original   jurisdiction   over   cases   affecting  
ambassadors.   (Sec.5   (1),   Art.   VIII).   In   this   particular   case,   the   Supreme   Court   becomes   a   trier   of  
facts  and  law.  
 
7.   Only   independent   states   may   become   subjects   of   public   international   law.   Characterize   an  
independent  state.  
Answer:   The   existence   of   a   state   is   a   function   of   recognition   in   a   community   of   nations.   The  
Court   said   that   a   state   is   required   in   line   with   Pound's   formulation   that   it   be   a   politically  
organized   sovereign   community   independent   of   outside   control   bound   by   penalties   of  
nationhood,   legally   supreme   within   its   territory,   acting   through   a   government   functioning  

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under  a  regime  of  law.  (Elements  of  a  state:  people,  territory,  government  and  sovereignty).  
(Collector  of  Internal  Revenue  v.  Campos  Rueda,  42  SCRA  23)  
 
8.  May  citizens  belatedly  ask  that  treaty  provisions  be  reviewed  covering  the  Reparations  Treaty  
between  U.S.A.  and  Japan  since  the  same  overlooked  the  damages  they  sustained?  
Answer:  No.  Relations  between  nations  may  be  jus  gentium  (governed  by  the  law  of  nations)  
and   jus   inter   gentis   (agreement   between   nations).   The   Court   cannot   interfere   with   or   question  
the  wisdom  of  the  conduct  of  foreign  relations  by  the  Executive  Department.  Accordingly,  
we  cannot  direct  the  Executive  Department,  either  by  writ  of  certiorari  or  injunction,  to  
conduct  our  foreign  relations  with  Japan  in  a  certain  manner.  
The   Supreme   Court   adopted   ICJ’s   ruling   in   Barcelona   Traction   that   “within   the   limits   prescribed  
by   international   law,   a   State   may   exercise   diplomatic   protection   by   whatever   means   and   to  
whatever  extent  it  thinks  fit,  for  it  is  its  own  right  that  the  State  is  asserting.  Should  the  natural  
or   legal   person   on   whose   behalf   it   is   acting   consider   that   their   rights   are   not   adequately  
protected,  they  have  no  remedy  in  international  law.”  (VINUYA  v.  ROMULO,  G.R.  No.  162230,  
12  August  2014,  Bersamin)  
 
9.   May   the   President   be   compelled   by   the   Supreme   Court   to   accede   to   the   request   of   the  
petitioners  to  demand  a  public  apology  from  Japan?  
Answer:   No.   The   Court   concluded   that   the   State   is   the   sole   judge   to   decide   whether   its  
protection  will  be  granted,  to  what  extent  it  is  granted,  and  when  will  it  cease.    
Since   the   Constitution   has   entrusted   to   the   Executive   Department   the   conduct   of   foreign  
relations   for   the   Philippines.   Whether   or   not   to   espouse   petitioners'   claim   against   the  
Government   of   Japan   is   left   to   the   exclusive   determination   and   judgment   of   the   Executive  
Department.   The   Court   cannot   interfere   with   or   question   the   wisdom   of   the   conduct   of   foreign  
relations  by  the  Executive  Department.    
The  Court  held  that  a  mandatory  injunction  will  not  lie  since  it  requires  the  performance  of  a  
particular  act.    Hence,  it  is  an  extreme  remedy  to  be  granted  only  if  the  following  requisites  are  
attendant,  namely:  
(a)  The  applicant  has  a  clear  and  unmistakable  right,  that  is,  a  right  in  esse;  
(b)  There  is  a  material  and  substantial  invasion  of  such  right;  and  
(c)  There  is  an  urgent  need  for  the  writ  to  prevent  irreparable  injury  to  the  applicant;  and  no  
other   ordinary,   speedy,   and   adequate   remedy   exists   to   prevent   the   infliction   of   irreparable  
injury.  
The   Court   cannot   issue   a   writ   requiring   the   President   to   act   in   a   specific   manner   on   any   matter  
affecting  the  country’s  foreign  policies.    (Vinuya  v.  Executive  Secretary  (G.R.  No.  162230,  April  
25,   2010   and   August   13,   2014,   BERSAMIN,   J.   penned   the   decision   in   the   Motion   for  
Reconsideration)  
 
10.   May   the   COMELEC   deny   the   petition   of   Ang   Ladlad   to   participate   in   the   party   list  system   on  
moral  grounds?  
Answer:  No,  the  COMELEC  must  cite  specific  provisions  under  the  Party  List  Law  to  disqualify  
Ang  Ladlad  from  participating  under  the  party-­‐list  system.  The  Constitution  likewise  guarantees  
equal   opportunities   to   public   service   without   discrimination.   (Ang   Ladlad   LGBT   Party   v.  
Commission  on  Elections,  618  SCRA  32)  
 
11.   May   Congress   infringe   on   the   religious   beliefs   of   individuals   in   the   medical   profession   as  
well  as  spouses  in  the  enforcement  of  the  Reproductive  Health  Law?  
Answer:  No.  The  enactment  of  a  law  which  infringes  on  the  religious  beliefs  of  individuals  in  the  
medical   profession   as   well   as   spouses   violates   the   constitutional   principle   of   separation   of  
church  and  the  state  under  Section  6  of  Article  VI  as  well  as  Section  5  of  the  Bill  of  Rights.  
 
12.  Does  the  VAWC  law  violate  the  equal  protection  clause?  
Answer:  The  VAWC  law  is  constitutional  and  does  not  violate  the  equal  protection  clause.  The  
law   is   intended   to   protect   the   rights   of   women   and   children   in   keeping   with   Section   12   of  
Article   II   as   well   as   Section   14   of   Article   XIII.     The   equal   protection   clause   has   the   following  
elements:  
(1).  the  distinction  must  be  substantial;  

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 (2).  the  classification  must  be  germane  to  the  purpose  of  the  law;  
(3).  the  classification  must  apply  not  only  to  existing  conditions;  and  
(4).  the  classification  must  apply  to  all  members  of  the  same  class.  (Garcia  v.  Hon.  Drilon,  
699  SCRA  352)  
 
13.  Can  the  Supreme  Court  still  reverse  the  decision  of  the  trial  court  affirmed  by  Court  of  
Appeals  which  annulled  the  marriage  of  Liberty  Albios  to  Daniel  Fringer,  an  American  citizen,    
on  account  of  immigration  fraud?  
Answer:   Yes.   The   Court   reversed   the   finding   of   the   lower   courts   that   the   marriage   between  
Albios  and  Fringer  was  contracted  in  jest.  The  Court  concluded  that  Albios  and  Fringer  had  an  
undeniable   intention   to   be   bound   in   order   to   create   the   very   bond   necessary   to   allow   the  
respondent  to  acquire  American  citizenship.  Only  a  genuine  consent  to  be  married  would  allow  
them  to  further  their  objective,  considering  that  only  a  valid  marriage  can  properly  support  an  
application   for   citizenship.   There   was,   thus,   an   apparent   intention   to   enter   into   the   actual  
marriage   status   and   to   create   a   legal   tie,   albeit   for   a   limited   purpose.   Genuine   consent   was,  
therefore,  clearly  present.    
The  Constitution  safeguards  the  sanctity  of  marriage.  (Section  12,  Article  II  and  Article  XV,  1987  
Constitution).  (Republic  v.  Albios,  G.R.  No.  198780,  October  16,  2013,  Mendoza,  J.  )  
 
14.  Is  biotechnology  covered  by  the  protection  of  the  Constitution?  
Answer:   Yes.     Biotechnology   is   a   multi-­‐disciplinary   field   which   may   be   defined   as   "any  
technique  that  uses  living  organisms  or  substances  from  those  organisms  to  make  or  modify  a  
product,  to  improve  plants  or  animals,  or  to  develop  microorganisms  for  specific  uses."  Its  many  
applications   include   agricultural   production,   livestock,   industrial   chemicals   and  
pharmaceuticals.     The   Court   in   the   case   of   International   Service   for   the   Acquisition   of   Agri-­‐
Biotech   Applications,   Inc.   v.   Greenpeace   Southeast   Asia   (Philippines)(G.R.   No.209271,   8  
December  2015)  said  that  genetically  modified  crops  affect  the  environment  in  many  ways  such  
as  contaminating  non-­‐GMO  plants,  creating  super  weeds  and  super  pests,  harming  non-­‐target  
species,   changing   soil   microbial   and   biochemical   properties,   and   threatening   biodiversity.  
Applying   the   Precautionary   Principle,   the   Court   required   the   government   to   install   the  
necessary   protocols   to   ensure   compliance   with   the   constitutional   guarantee   of   the   people   to  
good   health   and   the   right   to   a   balanced   ecology.   (Sections   15   and   16   of   Article   II,   1987  
Constitution)  
 
15.  The  Department  of  Agrarian  Reform  appealed  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  which  
ruled   that   the   property   of   Berenguer   located   in   a   poblacion   was   not   covered   the  
Comprehensive  Agrarian  Land  Reform  Law.  On  the  part  of  Berengeur,  he  argued  the  presence  
of   livestock   does   not   necessarily   make   his   property   agricultural   in   nature.     Is   a   parcel   of   land  
dedicated  to  livestock  raising  covered  by  the  Comprehensive  Land  Reform  Law?  
Answer:   No.   The   Court   held   that   the   Constitutional   Commission   never   intended   to   include  
lands   used   for   raising   livestock   and   poultry,   and   commercial,   industrial   and   residential   lands  
within   the   coverage   of   the   Agrarian   Reform   Program   of   the   Government.   The   Court   also  
concluded   that   a   lot   inside   the   poblacion   should   be   presumed   residential,   or   commercial,   or  
non-­‐agricultural  unless  there  is  a  clearly  preponderant  evidence  to  show  that  it  is  agricultural.  
(Department   of   Agrarian   Reform   vs.   Berenguer,   614   SCRA   499,   G.R.   No.   154094   March   9,  
2010,  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
16.  What  is  the  basis  of  the  implementation  of  the  agrarian  reform  program?  
Answer:     Section   4,   Article   XIII,   of   the   Constitution   has   mandated   the   implementation   of   an  
agrarian   reform   program   for   the   distribution   of   agricultural   lands   to   landless   farmers   subject   to  
the  payment  of  just  compensation  to  the  landowners,  viz:  
“Section  4.  The  Sate  shall,  by  law,  undertake  an  agrarian  reform  program  founded  on  
the   right   of   farmers   and   regular   farmworkers,   who   are   landless,   to   own   directly   or  
collectively   the   lands   they   till   or,   in   the   case   of   other   farmworkers,   to   receive   a   just  
share  of  the  fruits  thereof.  To  this  end,  the  State  shall  encourage  and  undertake  the  just  
distribution  of  all  agricultural  lands,  subject  to  such  priorities  and  reasonable  retention  
limits  as  the  Congress  may  prescribe,  taking  into  account  ecological,  developmental,  or  
equity  considerations,  and  subject  to  the  payment  of  just  compensation.  In  determining  

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 retention   limits,   the   State   shall   respect   the   rights   of   small   landowners.   The   State   shall  
further  provide  incentives  for  voluntary  land-­‐sharing.”(Land  Bank  of  the  Philippines  vs.  
Veronica  Nable,  G.R.  No.  176692,  June  27,  2012,  Bersamin,  J.)    
 
17.  What  are  the  factors  to  be  considered  in  the  determination  of  just  compensation  under  the  
Comprehensive  Agrarian  Reform  Program?  
Answer:   The   Congress   has   required   that   any   determination   of   just   compensation   should  
consider  the  following  factors,  namely:  (a)  the  cost  of  the  acquisition  of  the  land;  (b)  the  current  
value   of   like   properties;   (c)   the   nature,   actual   use   and   income   of   the   land;   (d)   the   sworn  
valuation   by   the   owner;   (e)   the   tax   declarations;   (f)   the   assessment   made   by   government  
assessors;   (g)   the   social   and   economic   benefits   contributed   to   the   property   by   the   farmers   and  
farmworkers  and  by  the  Government;  and  (h)  the  fact  of  the  non-­‐payment  of  any  taxes  or  loans  
secured  from  any  government  financing  institution  on  the  land.  (Land  Bank  of  the  Philippines  
vs.  Veronica  Nable,  G.R.  No.  176692,  June  27,  2012,  Bersamin)  
 
18.  What  is  just  compensation?  
Answer:  Just  compensation  means  the  equivalent  for  the  value  of  the  property  at  the  time  of  
its  taking.  It  means  a  fair  and  full  equivalent  value  for  the  loss  sustained.  All  the  facts  as  to  the  
condition   of   the   property   and   its   surroundings,   its   improvements   and   capabilities   should   be  
considered  (Export  Processing  Zone  Authority  vs.  Dulay  149  SCRA  305  [1987]  cited  in  LBP  v.  
Nable,  supra).    
 
19.  Under  what  circumstances  may  Petitioner  ask  the  Supreme  Court  to  review  the  findings  of  
facts  of  the  Court  of  Appeals?  
Answer:  To  review  the  factual  findings  of  the  CA  only  when  the  Supreme  Court  has  a  
compelling  reason  to  do  so,  such  as  any  of  the  following:    
1.  When  the  factual  findings  of  the  CA  and  the  RTC  are  contradictory;    
2.    When   the   findings   are   grounded   entirely   on   speculation,   surmises,   or  
conjectures;  
3.    When   the   inference   made   by   the   CA   is   manifestly   mistaken,   absurd,   or  
impossible;  
4.      When  there  is  grave  abuse  of  discretion  in  the  appreciation  of  facts;  
5.      When   the   CA,   in   making   its   findings,   went   beyond   the   issues   of   the   case,   and  
such  findings  are  contrary  to  the  admissions  of  both  appellant  and  appellee;    
6.      When  the  judgment  of  the  CA  is  premised  on  a  misapprehension  of  facts;  
7.        When   the   CA   fails   to   notice   certain   relevant   facts   that,   if   properly  
considered,  will  justify  a  different  conclusion;    
8.        When  the  findings  of  fact  are  themselves  conflicting;  
9.        When   the   findings   of   fact   are   conclusions   without   citation   of   the   specific  
evidence  on  which  they  are  based;  and,  
10.  When  the  findings  of  fact  of  the  CA  are  premised  on  the  absence  of  evidence,  but  
such  findings  are  contradicted  by  the  evidence  on  record.  (cited  in  Land  Bank  of  the  
Philippines  vs.  Veronica  Nable,  G.R.  No.  176692,  June  27,  2012,  Bersamin)  
 
20.   Several   employees   of   Pinakamasarap   Seasoning   Company   (“PINA”)   participated   in   an   illegal  
strike.   This   prompted   PINA   to   file   a   complaint   to   declare   them   as   striking   employees   and   to  
have  lost  their  employment  status.  However,  the  NLRC  ultimately  ordered  their  reinstatement  
after   finding   that   they   had   not   abandoned   their   work   by   joining   the   illegal   strike.   Are   the  
employees  entitled  to  backwages  for  the  period  of  the  strike  upon  their  reinstatement?    
Answer:   No.   The   Court   held   that   conformably   with   the   long   honored   principle   of   a   fair   day’s  
wage  for  a  fair  day’s  labor,  employees  dismissed  for  joining  an  illegal  strike  are  not  entitled  to  
backwages  for  the  period  of  the  strike  even  if  they  are  reinstated  by  virtue  of  their  being  merely  
members  of  the  striking  union  who  did  not  commit  any  illegal  act  during  the  strike.  (Escario  et  
al.  vs.  National  Labor  Relations  Commission  (Third  Division),  631  SCRA  261,  G.R.  No.  160302  
September  27,  2010,  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
21.  What  is  the  effect  of  disallowance  of  an  expenditure  under  the  General  Appropriations  Act?  

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Answer:  No  money  shall  be  paid  out  of  the  Treasury  except  in  pursuance  of  an  appropriation  
made   by   law.   A   violation   of   this   constitutional   edict   warrants   the   disallowance   of   the   payment.  
However,   the   refund   of   the   disallowed   payment   of   a   benefit   granted   by   law   to   a   covered  
person,  agency  or  office  of  the  Government  may  be  barred  by  the  good  faith  of  the  approving  
official  and  of  the  recipient.  (Brenda  Nazareth,  Regional  Director,  Department  of  Science  and  
Technology     Regional   OfficeNo.   IX   vs.   Hon.   Reynaldo   Villar,   Hon.   Juanito   Espino   Jr.   (CHR  
Commissioners)  and  Dir.  Khem    Inok,  G  .R.  No.  188635,  January  29,  2013,  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
22.  What  is  the  coverage  of  the  Magna  Carta  for  Scientists,  Engineers,  Researchers,  and  other  
Science  and  Technology  Personnel  in  the  Government?  
Answer:   Republic   Act   No.   8439   (R.A.   No.   8439),   otherwise   known   as   the   Magna   Carta   for  
Scientists,   Engineers,   Researchers,   and   other   Science   and   Technology   Personnel   in   the  
Government  provides  for  certain  benefits  to  covered  employees  in  the  use  of  savings,  priority  
shall   be   given   to   the   augmentation   of   the   amount   set   aside   for   compensation,   bonus,  
retirement  gratuity,  terminal  leave,  old  age  pensions  of  veterans  and  other  personal  benefits  x  
x  x.”  (Brenda  Nazareth,  Regional  Director,  Department  of  Science  and  Technology    Regional  
OfficeNo.   IX   vs.   Hon.   Reynaldo   Villar,   Hon.   Juanito   Espino   Jr.   (CHR   Commissioners)   and   Dir.  
Khem    Inok,  G  .R.  No.  188635,  January  29,  2013,  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
23.  What  is  augmentation  within  the  contemplation  of  R.A.  No.  8439?  
Answer:     Augmentation   is   a   requisite   to   make   payments   for   benefits   under   R.A.   8439.     This  
means   that   presidential   approval   is   necessary   in   accordance   with   the       provision   of   the   1987  
Constitution.   Therefore,   the   acts   of   the   agency   in   using   its   savings   to   pay   the   said   benefits  
without  the  said  presidential  approval  are  deemed  illegal.  
R.   A.   No.   8439   was   enacted   as   a   manifestation   of   the   State’s   recognition   of   science   and  
technology   as   an   essential   component   for   the   attainment   of   national   development   and  
progress.  The  law  offers  a  program  of  human  resources  development  in  science  and  technology  
to   help   realize   and   maintain   a   sufficient   pool   of   talent   and   manpower   that   will   sustain   the  
initiative   for   total   science   and   technology   mastery.   In   furtherance   of   this   objective,   the   law   not  
only  ensures  scholarship  programs  and  improved  science  and  engineering  education,  but  also  
affords   incentives   for   those   pursuing   careers   in   science   and   technology.   Moreover,   the   salary  
scale   of   science   and   technology   personnel   is   differentiated   by   R.   A.   No.   8439   from   the   salary  
scales  of  government  employees  under  the  existing  law.  
In   the   funding   of   current   activities,   projects,   and   programs,   the   general   rule   should   still   be   that  
the  budgetary  amount  contained  in  the  appropriations  bill  is  the  extent  Congress  will  determine  
as  sufficient  for  the  budgetary  allocation  for  the  proponent  agency.    
 
24.  What  is  the  exception  to  the  rule  on  augmentation  of  budget  out  of  savings?  
Answer:  The  only  exception  is  found  in  Section  25  (5),  Article  VI  of  the  Constitution,  by  which  
the   President,   the   President   of   the   Senate,   the   Speaker   of   the   House   of   Representatives,   the  
Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  the  heads  of  Constitutional  Commissions  are  authorized  
to   transfer   appropriations   to   augment   any   item   in   the   GAA   for   their   respective   offices   from   the  
savings  in  other  items  of  their  respective  appropriations.    
 
25.   What   is   the   nature   of   the   power   of   the   Commission   on   Audit   (“COA”)   as   an   independent  
constitutional  entity?  
Answer:    The  COA  is  endowed  with  sufficient  latitude  to  determine,  prevent,  and  disallow  the  
irregular,  unnecessary,  excessive,  extravagant,  or  unconscionable  expenditures  of  government  
funds.   It   has   the   power   to   ascertain   whether   public   funds   were   utilized   for   the   purposes   for  
which   they   had   been   intended   by   law.   The   "Constitution   has   made   the   COA   the   guardian   of  
public  funds,  vesting  it  with  broad  powers  over  all  accounts  pertaining  to  government  revenue  
and  expenditures  and  the  uses  of  public  funds  and  property,  including  the  exclusive  authority  to  
define  the  scope  of  its  audit  and  examination,  to  establish  the  techniques  and  methods  for  such  
review,  and  to  promulgate  accounting  and  auditing  rules  and  regulations"  
 
26.  What  are  the  two  types  of  due  process?  
Answer:  The  two  types  of  due  process  are:  substantial  due  process  and  procedural  due  process.  

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27.  What  are  the  elements  of  due  process?  
Answer:  The  elements  of  due  process  are  the  right  to  notice  and  the  right  to  be  heard.  
 
28.  What  is  the  essence  of  due  process  in  administrative  proceedings?  
Answer:  The  observance  of  fairness  in  the  conduct  of  any  investigation  is  at  the  very  heart  of  
procedural   due   process.   The   essence   of   due   process   is   to   be   heard,   and,   as   applied   to  
administrative   proceedings,   this   means   a   fair   and   reasonable   opportunity   to   explain   one’s   side,  
or   an   opportunity   to   seek   a   reconsideration   of   the   action   or   ruling   complained   of.  
Administrative   due   process   cannot   be   fully   equated   with   due   process   in   its   strict   judicial   sense,  
for  in  the  former  a  formal  or  trial-­‐type  hearing  is  not  always  necessary,  and  technical  rules  of  
procedure   are   not   strictly   applied.     (Vivo   v.   PAGCOR,   709   SCRA   276,   G.R.   No.   187854  
November  12,  2013,  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
29.  How  is  due  process  satisfied  in  administrative  cases?  
Answer:  Due  process  is  satisfied  when  a  person  is  notified  of  the  charge  against  him  and  given  
an  opportunity  to  explain  or  defend  himself.  In  administrative  proceedings,  the  filing  of  charges  
and   giving   reasonable   opportunity   for   the   person   so   charged   to   answer   the   accusations   against  
him  constitute  the  minimum  requirements  of  due  process.  (Ledesma  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  541  
SCRA  444  cited  in  Vivo  vs.  PAGCOR)  
 
30.  In  an  administrative  proceeding,  is  a  party  allowed  to  seek  judicial  intervention  by  praying  
for  a  writ  of  preliminary  injunction  to  enjoin  his  dismissal  as  President  of  an  educational  
institution?    
Answer:    Yes,  provided  that  the  plaintiff  submits  evidence  establishing:  
(a) a  present  and  unmistakable  right  to  be  protected;    
(b)  the  acts  against  which  the  injunction  is  directed  violate  such  right;  and    
(c)  a  special  and  paramount  necessity  for  the  writ  to    prevent  serious  damages  
In  the  absence  of  a  clear  legal  right,  the  issuance  of  the  injunctive  writ  constitutes  grave  abuse  
of  discretion  and  will  result  to  nullification  thereof.  Where  the  complainant’s  right  is  doubtful  or  
disputed,  injunction  is  not  proper.  The  possibility  of  irreparable  damage  sans  proof  of  an  actual  
existing  right  is  not  a  ground  for  a  preliminary  injunction.  (Barayuga  v.  Adventist  University  of  
the  Philippines,  655  SCRA  640,  G.R.  No.  168008  August  17,  2011,  Bersamin,  J.)  

31.  What  is  considered  a  ministerial  act?  

Answer:   An   act   is   ministerial   if   the   act   should   be   performed   "[under]   a   given   state   of   facts,   in   a  
prescribed  manner,  in  obedience  to  the  mandate  of  a  legal  authority,  without  regard  to  or  the  
exercise  of  [the  tribunal  or  corporation's]  own  judgment  upon  the  propriety  or  impropriety  of  
the  act  done."  The  tribunal,  corporation,  board,  officer,  or  person  must  have  no  choice  but  to  
perform  the  act  specifically  enjoined  by  law.  This  is  opposed  to  a  discretionary  act  whereby  the  
officer   has   the   choice   to   decide   how   or   when   to   perform   the   duty.   (Cudia   v.   PMA  
SUPERINTENDENT  (G.R.  No.  211362,  February  24,  2015,  Peralta,  J.)  
 
32.  Is  a  cadet  of  the  Philippine  Military  Academy  entitled  to  due  process  in  the  proceedings  
before  its  Honor  Committee?  
Answer:   Yes,   a   cadet   facing   dismissal   from   the   military   academy   for   misconduct   has  
constitutionally   protected   private   interests   to   life,   liberty,   and   property.     Thus,   disciplinary  
proceedings   conducted   by   its   Honor   Committee   must   be   done   within   the   bounds   of   procedural  
due  process.  
For  that  reason,  the  PMA  is  not  immune  from  the  strictures  of  due  process.  Where  a  person's  
good  name,  reputation,  honor,  or  integrity  is  at  stake  because  of  what  the  government  is  doing  
to  him,  the  minimal  requirements  of  the  due  process  clause  must  be  satisfied.    
For  that  reason,  the  PMA  is  not  immune  from  the  strictures  of  due  process.  Where  a  person's  
good  name,  reputation,  honor,  or  integrity  is  at  stake  because  of  what  the  government  is  doing  
to  him,  the  minimal  requirements  of  the  due  process  clause  must  be  satisfied.    
 
33.  Is  a  cadet  entitled  to  counsel  during  the  disciplinary  proceedings  against  him?  

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Answer:     There   is   nothing   in   the   1987   Constitution   stating   that   a   party   in   a   non-­‐litigation  
proceeding  is  entitled  to  be  represented  by  counsel.  The  assistance  of  a  lawyer,  while  desirable,  
is  not  indispensable.  A  party  in  an  administrative  inquiry  may  or  may  not  be  assisted  by  counsel,  
irrespective  of  the  nature  of  the  charges  and  of  the  respondent's  capacity  to  represent  himself,  
and  no  duty  rests  on  such  body  to  furnish  the  person  being  investigated  with  counsel.  
 
34.  What  is  the  nature  of  disciplinary  proceedings  conducted  by  the  Honor  Committee  of  PMA?  
Answer:  The  proceedings  of  the  Cadet  Honor  Committee  can,  for  purposes  of  the  Due  Process  
Clause,  be  considered  a  governmental  activity.    

35.  What  is  the  rule  governing  the  institution  of  action  for  issuance  of  writ  of  sequestration  of  
assets  acquired  during  the  martial  law  years?  
Answer:  Section  26,  Article  XVIII  of  the  Constitution  mandates  that  if  no  judicial  action  has  been  
filed   within   six   (6)   months   after   the   ratification   of   the   1987   Constitution,   the   writ   of  
sequestration   shall   automatically   be   lifted.   (PHILIPPINE   OVERSEAS   TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
CORPORATION   (POTC)   and   Philcomsat,   v.   SANDIGANBAYAN   and   REPUBLIC   (PCGG),   G.R.   No.  
174462,  February  10,  2016)  
 
36.  What  is  the  effect  if  no  action  is  instituted  by  the  government  against  parties  presumed  to  
possess  assets  which  have  been  illegally  acquired?    
Answer:   In   the   case   at   bar,   there   was   no   judicial   action   filed   against   POTC   and   PHILCOMSAT.  
There   has   never   been   any   appropriate   judicial   action   for   reconveyance   or   recovery   ever  
instituted  by  the  Republic  against  POTC  and  PHILCOMSAT.  The  government  will  lose  the  right  to  
recover  questioned  assets  of  the  two  companies.  
 
37.  What  is  the  effect  of  an  action  where  only  the  stockholders  of  POTC  and  PHILCOMSAT  were  
impleaded  in  an  action  before  the  Sandiganbayan?  
Answer:  Failure  to  implead  POTC  and  PHILCOMSAT  is  a  violation  of  the  fundamental  principle  
that  a  corporation  has  a  legal  personality  distinct  and  separate  from  its  stockholders;  that,  the  
filing   of   a   complaint   against   a   stockholder   is   not   ipso   facto   a   complaint   against   the   corporation.  
The   basic   tenets   of   fair   play   and   principles   of   justice   dictate   that   a   corporation,   as   a   legal   entity  
distinct   and   separate   from   its   stockholders,   must   be   impleaded   as   defendants,   giving   it   the  
opportunity   to   be   heard.   The   failure   to   properly   implead   POTC   and   PHILCOMSAT   not   only  
violates   the   latters'   legal   personality,   but   is   repugnant   on   POTC's   and   PHILCOMSAT's   right   to  
due  process.  "[F]ailure  to  implead  these  corporations  as  defendants  and  merely  annexing  a  list  
of  such  corporations  to  the  complaints  is  a  violation  of  their  right  to  due  process  for  it  would  in  
effect   be   disregarding   their   distinct   and   separate   personality   without   a   hearing."   As   already  
settled,  a  suit  against  individual  stockholders  is  not  a  suit  against  the  corporation.  
(PHILIPPINE   OVERSEAS   TELECOMMUNICATIONS   CORPORATION   (POTC)   and   Philcomsat,   v.  
SANDIGANBAYAN  and  REPUBLIC  (PCGG),  G.R.  No.  174462,  February  10,  2016)  
 
38.   What   is   the   constitutional   guarantee   to   due   process   in   judicial   proceedings   involving   ill-­‐
gotten  wealth  during  the  martial  law  years?  
Answer:  While  sequestration  is  the  means  to  revert  the  amassed  ill-­‐gotten  wealth  back  to  the  
coffers   of   the   government,   there   is   need   to   safeguard   the   protection   of   property   rights   from  
overzealousness.  Sequestration  as  statutorily  and  constitutionally  recognized  is  not  permanent.  
It   must   be   lifted   when   the   law   and   proven   facts   warrant,   or   when   the   purpose   has   been  
accomplished.chanr  
 
V.  SEPARATION  OF  POWERS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CHECKS  AND  BALANCES  –  THE  ESSENCE  
OF  DEMOCRACY  AND  REPUBLICANISM  
 
1.   What   is   the   prevailing   rule   for   the   Court   to   take   cognizance   a   suit   which   challenges   the  
constitutionality  of  a  law  or  a  governmental  act?  
Answer:   T   he   prevailing   rule   in   constitutional   litigation   is   that   no   question   involving   the  
constitutionality   or   validity   of   a   law   or   governmental   act   may   be   heard   and   decided   by   the  
Court  unless  there  is  compliance  with  the  legal  requisites  for  judicial  inquiry,  namely:    
(a)  there  must  be  an  actual  case  or  controversy  calling  for  the  exercise  of  judicial  power;    

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 (b)  the  person  challenging  the  act  must  have  the  standing  to  question  the  validity  of  the  
subject  act  or  issuance;    
(c)  the  question  of  constitutionality  must  be  raised  at  the  earliest  opportunity  ;  and    
(d)   the   issue   of   constitutionality   must   be   the   very   lis   mota   of   the   case. (Belgica   v.  
Ochoa,  Jr.,  710  SCRA  1  (2013),  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
2.  What  is  "the  moot  and  academic‘  principle  in  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  judicial  review?    
Answer:   "The   moot   and   academic‘   principle     is   not   a   magical   formula   that   can   automatically  
dissuade  the  Court  in  resolving  a  case."  The  Court  will  decide  cases,  otherwise  moot,  if:    
first,  there  is  a  grave  violation  of  the  Constitution;    
second,  the  exceptional  character  of  the  situation  and  the  paramount  public  interest  is  
involved;    
third,  when  the  constitutional  issue  raised  requires  formulation  of  controlling  principles  
to  guide  the  bench,  the  bar,  and  the  public;  and  fourth,  the  case  is  capable  of  repetition  
yet  evading  review.  (Belgica  v.  Ochoa,  Jr.,  710  SCRA  1  (2013),  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
3.  What  is  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers?  
Answer:  The  principle  of  separation  of  powers  refers  to  the  constitutional  demarcation  of  the  
three  fundamental  powers  of  government.  In  the  celebrated  words  of  Justice  Laurel  in  Angara  
v.   Electoral   Commission,   it   means   that   the   "Constitution   has   blocked   out   with   deft   strokes   and  
in  bold  lines,  allotment  of  power  to  the  executive,  the  legislative  and  the  judicial  departments  
of   the   government.   To   the   legislative   branch   of   government,   through   Congress,   belongs   the  
power   to   make   laws;   to   the   executive   branch   of   government,   through   the   President,   belongs  
the   power   to   enforce   laws;   and   to   the   judicial   branch   of   government,   through   the   Court,  
belongs  the  power  to  interpret  laws.”  
The   principle   of   separation   of   powers   and   its   concepts   of   autonomy   and   independence   stem  
from   the   notion   that   the   powers   of   government   must   be   divided   to   avoid   concentration   of  
these  powers  in  any  one  branch;  the  division,  it  is  hoped,  would  avoid  any  single  branch  from  
lording  its  power  over  the  other  branches  or  the  citizenry.  (cited  in  Belgica  v.  Ochoa,  Jr.,  710  
SCRA  1  (2013),  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
4.  How  is  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers  violated?  
Answer:  Broadly  speaking,  there  is  a  violation  of  the  separation  of  powers  principle  when  one  
branch   of   government   unduly   encroaches   on   the   domain   of   another.   US   Supreme   Court  
decisions  instruct  that  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers  may  be  violated  in  two  (2)  ways:  
firstly,   "one   branch   may   interfere   impermissibly   with   the   other’s   performance   of   its  
constitutionally   assigned   function";   and   "alternatively,   the   doctrine   may   be   violated   when  
one  branch  assumes  a  function  that  more  properly  is  entrusted  to  another.”    In  other  words,  
there  is  a  violation  of  the  principle  when  there  is  impermissible  (a)  interference  with  and/or  
(b)  assumption  of  another  department‘s  functions.    (cited  in  Belgica  v.  Ochoa,  Jr.,  710  SCRA  1  
(2013),  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
5.  What  is  the  principle  of  non-­‐delegability  of  legislative  power?  
Answer:   As   an   adjunct   to   the   separation   of   powers   principle,   legislative   power   shall   be  
exclusively   exercised   by   the   body   to   which   the   Constitution   has   conferred   the   same.   In  
particular,  Section  1,  Article  VI  of  the  1987  Constitution  states  that  such  power  shall  be  vested  
in   the   Congress   of   the   Philippines   which   shall   consist   of   a   Senate   and   a   House   of  
Representatives,  except  to  the  extent  reserved  to  the  people  by  the  provision  on  initiative  and  
referendum.  
Based   on   this   provision,   it   is   clear   that   only   Congress,   acting   as   a   bicameral   body,   and   the  
people,   through   the   process   of   initiative   and   referendum,   may   constitutionally   wield   legislative  
power   and   no   other.   This   premise   embodies   the   principle   of   non-­‐delegability   of   legislative  
power,  and  the  only  recognized  exceptions  thereto  would  be:    
(a)   delegated   legislative   power   to   local   governments   which,   by   immemorial   practice,   are  
allowed  to  legislate  on  purely  local  matters;  and    
(b)   constitutionally-­‐grafted   exceptions   such   as   the   authority   of   the   President   to,   by   law,  
exercise  powers  necessary  and  proper  to  carry  out  a  declared  national  policy  in  times  of  war  or  
other   national   emergency,   or   fix   within   specified   limits,   and   subject   to   such   limitations   and  

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restrictions   as   Congress   may   impose,   tariff   rates,   import   and   export   quotas,   tonnage   and  
wharfage  dues,  and  other  duties  or  imposts  within  the  framework  of  the  national  development  
program  of  the  Government.  (Belgica  v.  Ochoa,  Jr.,  710  SCRA  1  (2013),  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
6. What  is  the  nature  of  the  grant  of  rule-­‐making  powers  granted  to  administrative  agencies?
Answer:   The   grant   of   the   rule-­‐making   power   to   administrative   agencies   is   a   relaxation   of   the  
principle   of   separation   of   powers   and   is   an   exception   to   the   non-­‐delegation   of   legislative  
powers.   Administrative   regulations   or   "subordinate   legislation"   calculated   to   promote   the  
public   interest   are   necessary   because   of   "the   growing   complexity   of   modern   life,   the  
multiplication   of   the   subjects   of   governmental   regulations,   and   the   increased   difficulty   of  
administering  the  law."    (cited  in  Belgica  v.  Ochoa,  Jr.,  710  SCRA  1,  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
7. What  is  the  item-­‐veto  power  of  the  President?  
Answer:  The  fact  that  the  three  great  powers  of  government  are  intended  to  be  kept  separate  
and   distinct   does   not   mean   that   they   are   absolutely   unrestrained   and   independent   of   each  
other.   The   Constitution   has   also   provided   for   an   elaborate   system   of   checks   and   balances   to  
secure  coordination  in  the  workings  of  the  various  departments  of  the  government.  
A   prime   example   of   a   constitutional   check   and   balance   would   be   the   President’s   power   to   veto  
an  item  written  into  an  appropriation,  revenue  or  tariff  bill  submitted  to  him  by  Congress  for  
approval   through   a   process   known   as   "bill   presentment."   The   President‘s   item-­‐veto   power   is  
found  in  Section  27(2),  Article  VI  of  the  1987  Constitution  which  reads  as  follows:  
“Sec.  27.  x  x  x.  
x  x  x  x  
(2)  The  President  shall  have  the  power  to  veto  any  particular  item  or  items  in  an  appropriation,  
revenue,   or   tariff   bill,   but   the   veto   shall   not   affect   the   item   or   items   to   which   he   does   not  
object.”    (Belgica  v.  Ochoa,  Jr.,  710  SCRA  1,  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
8. What  are  the  three  branches  of  government?  
Answer:    Three  branches  of  government:  the  Legislative  Department,  the  Executive  
Department  and  the  Judicial  Department.  (Araullo  vs.  Aquino  III,  728  SCRA  1,  G.R.  No.  209569  
July  1,  2014,  Bersamin,  J.)  

9. What  is  judicial  supremacy?  

Answer:   When   the   Court   is   called   upon   to   resolve   two   conflicting   claims   of   the   two   other  
branches  of  government,  the  Court  is  just  called  upon  to  apply  the  relevant  law  or  interpret  the  
applicable  law  to  the  case.  (Araullo  vs.  Aquino  III,  728  SCRA  1,  G.R.  No.  209569  July  1,  2014,  
Bersamin,  J.)  
 
10. Can  the  courts  resort  to  judicial  legislation?  
Answer:  No,  the  courts  cannot  resort  to  judicial  legislation. The  courts  cannot  enact  laws  since  
this  would  violate  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers.  However,  judicial  decisions  become  
part  of  the  law  of  the  law.    
General  Rule:  Only  Congress  can  enact  laws.  
Exception  to  the  Rule:  Congress  can  delegate  law-­‐making  powers  (ex.  local  government  units)  
and  rule-­‐making  powers  (ex.  IRR  formulated  by  administrative  agencies).    
 
11. Can  the  Court  still  take  cognizance  of  the  case  which  questioned  the  constitutionality  of  the  
DAP  program  of  President  Aquino  after  it  was  withdrawn  and  has  become  moot  and  
academic?  
Answer:  Mootness  is  not  an  excuse  for  the  Court  not  to  take  cognizance  of  the  case:  The  case  is  
not  moot  and  academic  even  if  the  President  has  terminated  the  DAP.  The  fact  that  huge  public  
funds   have   been   allocated,   disbursed,   or   utilized   by   reason   or   on   account   of   the   challenged  
executive   acts   gave     rise   to   an   actual   controversy   that   is   ripe   for   adjudication.   (   Araullo   vs.  
Aquino  III,  728  SCRA  1,  G.R.  No.  209569  July  1,  2014,  Bersamin,  J.)  

12. What  are  the  appropriate  remedies  to  challenge  the  constitutionality  of  DAP?  
Answer:     Certiorari,   Prohibition,   and   Mandamus   are   proper   remedies   to   assail   the  
constitutionality   of   DAP.   Since   certiorari   and   prohibition   are   large   in   scope   and   the   issues  

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involved   the   limitations   of   the   Executive’s   spending   power,   the   said   remedies   are   proper.    
(Araullo  vs.  Aquino  III,  728  SCRA  1,  G.R.  No.  209569  July  1,  2014,  Bersamin,  J.)  

13. What  is  the  effect  of  Petitioner’s    withdrawal  of  its  application  for  land  registration?  
Answer:   The   Petitioner’s   withdrawal   of   its   application   for   land   registration   has   rendered   the  
case  moot  and  academic.  A  case  becomes  moot  and  academic  when,  by  virtue  of  supervening  
events,   the   conflicting   issue   that   may   be   resolved   by   the   court   ceases   to   exist.   There   is   no  
longer   any   justiciable   controversy   that   may   be   resolved   by   the   court.   This   court   refuses   to  
render   advisory   opinions   and   resolve   issues   that   would   provide   no   practical   use   or   value.   Thus,  
courts   generally   "decline   jurisdiction   over   such   case   or   dismiss   it   on   ground   of   mootness."  
Moldex’s  manifestation  stating  its  withdrawal  of  its  application  for  registration  has  erased  the  
conflicting   interests   that   used   to   be   present   in   this   case.   Respondent's   Manifestation   was   an  
expression   of   its   intent   not   to   act   on   whatever   claim   or   right   it   has   to   the   property   involved.  
Thus,   the   controversy   ended   when   respondent   filed   that   Manifestation.   (REPUBLIC   OF   THE  
PHILIPPINES  v.  MOLDEX  REALTY,  INC.  G.R.  No.  171041,  February  10,  2016)  

14. Can   the   Office   of   the   Solicitor   General   deputize   other   legal   officers   of   government  
departments,   bureaus,   agencies   and   offices   to   assist   it   in   representing   the   government   in  
court  cases?    
Answer:   Yes.   The   power   of   the   OSG   to   deputize   legal   officers   of   government   departments,  
bureaus,   agencies   and   offices   to   assist   it   in   representing   the   government   is   well   settled.   The  
Administrative   Code   of   1987   explicitly   states   that   the   OSG   shall   have   the   power   to   "deputize  
legal  officers  of  government  departments,  bureaus,  agencies  and  offices  to  assist  the  Solicitor  
General   and   appear   or   represent   the   Government   in   cases   involving   their   respective   offices,  
brought   before   the   courts   and   exercise   supervision   and   control   over   such   legal   officers   with  
respect  to  such  cases."  But  it  is  likewise  settled  that  the  OSG’s  deputized  counsel  is  "no  more  
than   the   ‘surrogate’   of   the   Solicitor   General   in   any   particular   proceeding"   and   the   latter  
remains   the   principal   counsel   entitled   to   be   furnished   copies   of   all   court   orders,   notices,   and  
decisions.   (REPUBLIC   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   REPRESENTED   BY   THE   LAND   REGISTRATION  
AUTHORITY  vs.  RAYMUNDO  VIAJE,  ET  AL. January  27,  2016,  G.R.  No.180993)  
 
15. Cite  the  exceptions  to  the  rule  on  mootness.  
Answer:  Exceptions  to  the  rule  on  moot  and  academic  cases:  
(1)There  is  a  grave  violation  of  the  Constitution;    
(2)The  case  involved  a  situation  of  exceptional  character  and  was  of  paramount  public  interest;    
(3)   When   the   constitutional   issue   raised   required   the   formulation   of   controlling   principles   to  
guide  the  Bench,  the  Bar,  and  the  public;  and    
(4)  When  the  case  was  capable  of  repetition  yet  evading  review.    
 
16. Do  petitioners  have  legal  standing  to  sue  both  as  taxpayers  and  as  citizens?  
Answer:  Legal  Standing  to  Sue  as  a  Taxpayer  and  as  a  Citizen:  
Considering  that  the  issue  involves  the  expenditure  of  public  funds  (as  taxpayers)  and  the  case  
is  of  transcendental  importance  (as  citizens),  the  petitioners  do  have  a  legal  standing  to  raise  
the  issues    
before  the  Court.    
 
17. What  is  a  public  expenditure?  Is  DAP  an  appropriation?  
Answer:  A  public  expenditure  must  comply  with  the  constitutional  requirement.    Article  VI,  Sec.  
29   of   the   Constitution   provides   “[n]o   money   shall   be   paid   out   of   the   Treasury   except   in  
pursuance      of  an  appropriation  made  by  law.”  
DAP  is  not  an  appropriation.  It  is  a  program.    
 
18. What  are  savings  under  the  General  Appropriations  Act?  
Answer:   Savings   would   include   any   programmed   appropriation   in   the   GAA   free   from   any  
obligation   or   encumbrance,   which   are:   (1)   Still   available   after   the   completion   or   final  
discontinuance   or   abandonment   of   the   work,   activity   or   purpose   for   which   the   appropriation   is  
authorized;  

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(2)   From   appropriations   balances   arising   from   unpaid   compensation   and   related   costs  
pertaining  to  vacant  positions  and  leaves  of  absences  without  pay;  and  
(3)   From   appropriations   balances   realized   from   the   implementation   of   measures   resulting   in  
improved   systems   and   efficiencies   and   thus   enabled   agencies   to   meet   and   deliver   the   required  
or  planned  targets,  programs,  and  services  approved  in  the  GAAs  at  a  lesser  cost.    
 
19. What  are  the  phases  of  the  Philippine  Budget  Cycle?  
Answer:  Philippine  Budget  Cycle  consists  of:  
(1) Budget  Preparation  
(2)  Budget  Legislation  
(3)  Budget  Enforcement  
(4)  Accountability  
 
20. What  is  budget  augmentation?  
Answer:   The   term   “augment”   means   to   enlarge   or   increase   the   allotment   for   an   item   in   the  
GAA  wherein  the  current  appropriation  for  the  said  item  is  deficient.    

21. Who  are  the  public  officers  authorized  by  the  Constitution  to  augment  their  budget  out  of  
savings?  
Answer:  Public  Officers  authorized  to  augment  from  savings  are:  
(1).  President  
(2).  Senate  President  
(3).  Speaker  of  the  House  
(4).  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court;  and    
(5).  Heads  of  the  CSC,  COMELEC,  and  COA.  (Sec.  25(5),  Art.  VI,  Constitution)  
 
22. What  is  the  operative  fact  doctrine?  
Answer:   A   legislative   or   executive   act   is   presumed   to   be   constitutional   such   that   when   it   is  
declared  void  for  being  unconstitutional  does  not  give  rise  to  any  right  or  obligation  but  it  may  
produce  legal  effects  prior  to  being  declared  as  unconstitutional.  

23. Will  the  operative  fact  doctrine  apply  to  the  implementation  of  DAP?  
Answer:   Yes.   The   Court   recognized   that   the   result   of   the   DAP   and   its   related   issuances   could  
not  be  ignored  and  be  undone.  The  Court  also  declared  that  the  doctrine  of  operative  fact  is  not  
confined  to  statutes  and  rules  and  regulations.  The  doctrine  can  be  invoked  only  in  situations  
where  the  nullification  of  the  effects  of  what  used  to  be  a  valid  law  would  result  in  inequity  and  
injustice.    

24. Does  the  Department  of  Justice  exercise  judicial  function  in  determining  probable  cause?  
Answer:   No,   the   determination   of   probable   cause   does   not   involve   any   judicial   function.  
Consistent  with  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers  enshrined  in  the  Constitution,  the  Court  
deems   it   a   sound   judicial   policy   not   to   interfere   in   the   conduct   of   preliminary   investigations,  
and   to   allow   the   Executive   Department,   through   the   Department   of   Justice,   exclusively   to  
determine   what   constitutes   sufficient   evidence   to   establish   probable   cause   for   the   prosecution  
of   supposed   offenders.   (Ampatuan,   Jr.   vs.   De   Lima,   695   SCRA   159,   G.R.   No.   197291   April   3,  
2013,  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
25. Is  judicial  intervention  possible  in  the  conduct  of  preliminary  investigation?  
Answer:    Yes.  By  way  of  exception,  however,  judicial  review  may  be  allowed  where  it  is  clearly  
established   that   the   public   prosecutor   committed   grave   abuse   of   discretion,   that   is,   when   he  
has  exercised  his  discretion  “in  an  arbitrary,  capricious,  whimsical  or  despotic  manner  by  reason  
of   passion   or   personal   hostility,   patent   and   gross   enough   as   to   amount   to   an   evasion   of   a  
positive   duty   or   virtual   refusal   to   perform   a   duty   enjoined   by   law.”   (Ampatuan,   Jr.   vs.   De   Lima,  
695  SCRA  159,  G.R.  No.  197291  April  3,  2013,  Bersamin,  J.  )  
 
 
 

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26. May  the  Court  intervene  in  the  prerogatives  reserved  by  the  Constitution  to  the  Executive  
branch?  
Answer:    The  Constitution  has  entrusted  to  the  Executive  Department  the  conduct  of  foreign  
relations   for   the   Philippines.   Whether   or   not   to   espouse   petitioners’   claim   against   the  
Government   of   Japan   is   left   to   the   exclusive   determination   and   judgment   of   the   Executive  
Department.   The   Court   cannot   interfere   with   or   question   the   wisdom   of   the   conduct   of   foreign  
relation  by  the  Executive  Department.  (  Motion  for  Reconsideration,  Vinuya  vs.  Romulo,  732  
SCRA  595,  G.R.  No.  162230  August  12,  2014,  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
27. What  is  Qualified  Political  Agency?  
Answer:  Qualified  Political  Agency  is  also  known  as  the  alter  ego  doctrine.  Under  this  doctrine,    
all   executive   and   administrative   organizations   are   adjuncts   of   the   Executive   Department,   the  
heads   of   the   various   executive   departments   are   assistants   and   agents   of   the   Chief   Executive,  
and,   except   in   cases   where   the   Chief   Executive   is   required   by   the   Constitution   or   the   law   to   act  
in   person   or   the   exigencies   of   the   situation   demand   that   he   act   personally,   the   multifarious  
executive  and  administrative  functions  of  the  Chief  Executive  are  performed  by  and  through  the  
executive   departments,   and   the   acts   of   the   secretaries   of   such   departments,   performed   and  
promulgated   in   the   regular   course   of   business,   are,   unless   disapproved   or   reprobated   by   the  
Chief  Executive,  presumptively  the  acts  of  the  Chief  Executive.  (Runkle  vs.  United  States  [1887],  
122  U.  S.,  543;  30  Law.  ed.,  1167;  7  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.,  1141;  see  also  U.  S.  vs.  Eliason  [1839],  16  
Pet.,  291;  10  Law.  ed.,  968;  Jones  vs.  U.  S.  [1890],  137  U.  S.,  202;  34  Law.  ed.,  691;  11  Sup.  Ct.,  
Rep.,   80;   Wolsey   vs.   Chapman   [1880],   101   U.   S.,   755;   25   Law.   ed.,   915;   Wilcox   vs.   Jackson  
[1836],  13  Pet.,  498;  10  Law.  ed.,  264.)  
 
28. Can  the  doctrine  of  qualified  political  agency  be  invoked  by  a  collegial  body?  
Answer:   The   doctrine   of   qualified   political   agency   could   not   be   extended   to   the   acts   of   the  
Board  of  Directors  of  TIDCORP  despite  some  of  its  members  being  themselves  the  appointees  
of  the  President  to  the  Cabinet.  Under  Section  10  of  Presidential  Decree  No.  1080,  as  further  
amended   by   Section   6   of   Republic   Act   No.   8494,24   the   five   ex   officio   members   were   the  
Secretary  of  Finance,  the  Secretary  of  Trade  and  Industry,  the  Governor  of  the  Bangko  Sentral  
ng   Pilipinas,   the   Director-­‐General   of   the   National   Economic   and   Development   Authority,   and  
the  Chairman  of  the  Philippine  Overseas  Construction  Board,  while  the  four  other  members  of  
the   Board   were   the   three   from   the   private   sector   (at   least   one   of   whom   should   come   from   the  
export  community),  who  were  elected  by  the  ex  officio  members  of  the  Board  for  a  term  of  not  
more   than   two   consecutive   years,   and   the   President   of   TIDCORP   who   was   concurrently   the  
Vice-­‐Chairman  of  the  Board.  Such  Cabinet  members  sat  on  the  Board  of  Directors  of  TIDCORP  
ex  officio,  or  by  reason  of  their  office  or  function,  not  because  of  their  direct  appointment  to  
the   Board   by   the   President.   Evidently,   it   was   the   law,   not   the   President,   that   sat   them   in   the  
Board.   (Manalang-­‐Demigillo   vs.   Trade   and   Investment   Development   Corporation   of   the  
Philippines  (TIDCORP),  692  SCRA  359,  G.R.  No.  168613  March  5,  2013,  Bersamin,  J.)  

VI.  THE  LEGISLATIVE  BRANCH    

 
1.  May  a  taxpayer  file  an  action  to  compel  Congress  to  enact  a  law  making  the  use  of  marijuana  
for  medical  reasons  legal?  
Answer:   No.   The   writ   of   mandamus   will   not   lie   because   this   violates   the   principle   of   separation  
of  powers.  It  is  discretionary  on  the  part  of  Congress  to  consider  bills  which  its  judgment  will  
serve   the   public.   Judicial   power   includes   the   duty   of   the   courts   of   justice   to   settle   actual  
controversies   involving   rights   that   are   legally   demandable   and   enforceable,   and   to   determine  
whether   or   not   there   has   been   a   grave   abuse   of   discretion   amounting   to   lack   or   excess   of  
jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  any  branch  or  instrumentality  of  government.  (Sec.1,  Art.  VII).  There  
is  no  legally  demandable  right  to  compel  Congress  to  make  such  law.  
 
2.  What  are  the  tests  of  a  valid  delegation  of  power?  
Answer:   The   two   tests   of   a   valid   delegation   of   powers   are:   the   completeness   test   and   sufficient  
standard  test.    
 

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3.  Is  legislative  power  exclusively  vested  in  Congress?  
Answer:  No.  R.A.  No.  6735  provides  for  Initiative  and  Referendum  for  citizens  to  participate  in  
law  making.  
 
 
4.  What  is  the  principle  of  bicameralism?  
Answer:   It   is   a   mechanism   for   compromising   differences   between   the   Senate   and   the   House   of  
Representatives.   By   the   nature   of   its   function,   a   Bicameral   Conference   Committee   is   capable   of  
producing   unexpected   results   which   sometimes   may   even   go   beyond   its   own   mandate.  
(Tolentino  v.  Secretary  of  Finance)  
 
5.  Can  a  candidate  convicted  of  libel  still  qualify  for  an  elective  position?  
Answer:   Libel   is   a   crime   involving   moral   turpitude.   Moral   turpitude   is   defined   as   everything  
which   is   done   contrary   to   justice,   modesty,   or   good   morals;   an   act   of   baseness,   vileness   or  
depravity   in   the   private   and   social   duties   which   a   man   owes   his   fellowmen,   or   to   society   in  
general.  Although  not  every  criminal  act  involves  moral  turpitude,  the  Court  is  guided  by  one  of  
the  general  rules  that  crimes  mala  in  se  involve  moral  turpitude  while  crimes  mala  prohibita  do  
not.   Conviction   of   a   crime   involving   moral   turpitude   is   a   disqualification.   Conviction   must   be  
final  and  executory.    (TY-­‐DELGADO  v.    HRET  and  PICHAY,  G.R.  No.  219603,  January  26,  2016,  
Bersamin,  J)  

6.   Will   the   Writ   of   Mandamus   lie   to   unseat   a   disqualified   member   of   the   House   of  
Representatives?  
Answer:  Yes.  In    VELASCO  v.  BELMONTE,  JR.  et  al.  (G.R.  No.  211140,  January  12,  2016),  Writ  of  
Mandamus  may  lie  to  remove  an  incumbent  member    of  Congress.  
The  Court  based  the  issuance  of  the  Writ  of  Mandamus  on  the  following  grounds:  
1. Cancellation  of  COC  (not  a  Filipino  citizen  and  a  resident  of  the  district);  and  
2. Infirmity   if   oath   taking   (oath   taking   took   place   in   the   residence   of   the   Speaker   of   the  
House)  
 
7.  Enumerate  the  parties  which  may  participate  in  the  party  list  system.  
Answer:   The   following   can   participate   in   the   party-­‐list   system:   national   parties,   regional   parties  
and  sectoral  parties  or  organizations.  (Lokin,  Jr.  Commission  on  Elections,  621  SCRA  385,  G.R.  
Nos.  179431-­‐32,  June  22,  2010,  Bersamin,  J.)  

8.  What  is  the  rule  on  election  of  party-­‐list?  

Answer:  The  party  list  is  the  one  voted  and  not  the  nominee.  The  accredited  party  list  must    
submit  five  (5)  nominees.  
 
9.  What  are  the  grounds  for  substitution  of  nominees  in  a  party  list?  
Answer:  The  following  are  the  grounds  for  substitution:  death  of  nominee,  incapacity  of  the    
nominee  and  withdrawal  of  nominee.  (Lokin,  Jr.  Commission  on  Elections,  621  SCRA  385,  G.R.  
Nos.  179431-­‐32,  June  22,  2010,  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
10.  What  are  the  inviolable  parameters  to  determine  the  winners  in  the  party-­‐list  elections?  
Answer:  The  following  are  the  parameters:  
  (1).  Twenty  percent  allocation  rule;  
  (2).  Two  percent  threshold  vote  rule;  
  (3).  Three  seat  limit  rule;  and  
  (4).  Proportional  representation  rule.  (BANAT  v.  COMELEC,  586  SCRA  210)  
 
11.  Does  Congress  have  oversight  powers  and  functions  of  Congress?  
Answer:   The   exercise   of   oversight   powers   and   functions   of   Congress   is   intrinsic   in   the  
constitutional  grant  of  legislative  powers  and  integral  to  the  system  of  checks  and  balances.  
 
12.  What  are  the  categories  of  oversight  and  legislative  powers?  
Answer:  The  following  are  the  categories  of  oversight  and  legislative  powers?  

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   (1).  Legislative  scrutiny  
  (2).  Legislative  investigation  
  (3).  Legislative  supervision      
 
13.  Aahon  Party  List  sought  to  be  accredited  as  a  party  list.  The  members  of  Aahon  are  males  
and  females  which  have  different  sexual  preferences.  The  COMELEC  denied  their  accreditation  
based  on  biblical  passages.  Is  the  denial  of  COMELEC  proper?  
Answer:  No.  In  Ang  Ladlad  v.  COMELEC  (G.  R.  No,  190852,  April  8,  2010),  the  Court  held  that    
accreditation   is   done   solely   by   COMELEC.     The   Court   said   that   under   the   country’s   system   of  
laws,  every  group  has  the  right  to  promote  its  agenda  and  attempt  to  persuade  society  of  the  
validity  of  its  position  through  normal  democratic  means.  It  is  in  the  public  square  that  deeply  
held   convictions   and   differing   opinions   should   be   distilled   and   deliberated   upon.   The   OSG  
argues   that   since   there   has   been   neither   prior   restraint   nor   subsequent   punishment   imposed  
on  Ang  Ladlad,  and  its  members  have  not  been  deprived  of  their  right  to  voluntarily  associate,  
then  there  has  been  no  restriction  on  their  charter  or  association.  The  Court  said  that  the  moral  
objection  offered  by  the  COMELEC  was  not  a  limitation  imposed  by  law.  Thus  it  held:  “To  the  
extent,  therefore,  that  the  petitioner  has  been  precluded,  because  of  COMELEC’s  action,  from  
publicly   expressing   its   views   as   a   political   party   and   participating   on   an   equal   basis   in   the  
political   process   with   other   equally-­‐qualified   party-­‐list   candidates,   we   find   that   there   has,  
indeed,  been  a  transgression  of  petitioner’s  fundamental  rights.”    
 
OTHER  RULINGS  ON  PARTY  LIST  SYSTEM:  
BANAT   V.   COMELEC,   592   SCRA   294:   The   Constitution   provides   that   Congress   shall   not   have  
more   than   250   members   unless   Congress   provides   otherwise   and   out   of   the   total   number   of  
incumbent   members   not   more   than   20%   shall   come   from   the   party   list.   Of   the   party   list  
members,  each  party  list  shall  be  entitled  to  a  maximum  of  three  seats.    
Paglaum  v.  COMELEC,  694  SCRA  477  (2013):  Sectoral  representation  need      not  be  limited  to  
the   poor   or   marginalized   group;   extent   of   national   membership;   performance   in   party   list  
election  process.  
Abang   Lingkod   v.   COMELEC:   Proof   of   track   record   is   not   necessary   for   purposes   of  
accreditation.    
PGBI   v.   COMELEC,   G.R.   No.   190529,   April   29,   2010.   The   COMELEC   has   the   power   to   delist   a  
party  list  on  two  grounds  under  Section6  (8)  of  R.A.  7941.    
Magdalo  v.  COMELEC,  G.R.  No.  190793,  June  19,  2012.  The  registration  of  political  parties  does  
not   involve   administrative   liability   as   it   is   only   limited   to   the   evaluation   of   qualifications   for  
registration    
 
14.  A  group  of  public  school  teachers  instituted  an  action  before  the  Supreme  Court  to  question  
the   veracity   of   the   entries   to   the   congressional   journal   regarding   the   passage   of   the   law   on  
grant   of   additional   allowances   of   public   school   teachers   for   poll   duty   in   the   forthcoming   May  
2016  elections.  They  alleged  that  the  law  signed  the  President  reflected  a  lesser  amount  that  
what  has  been  reported  in  the  media.  Will  the  action  of  the  public  school  teachers  prosper?  
Answer:  No.  The  courts  may  not  go  behind  the  legislative  journals  to  contradict  their  veracity.  
U.S.  v.  Pons,  34  Phil.,  729-­‐735  (1916)      
 
JOURNAL  ENTRY  RULE  VS.  ENROLLED  BILL  THEORY    
Morales   v.   Subido,   27   SCRA   131   (1969):   An   omission   at   the   time   of   enactment,   whether  
careless   or   calculated,   cannot   be   judicially   supplied   however   much   later   wisdom   may  
recommend  the  inclusion.    
Astorga   v.   Villegas,   56   SCRA   714   (1974):   The   Court   held   that     that   the   enrolled   bill   theory   is  
based   mainly   on   "the   respect   due   to   coequal   and   independent   departments,"   which   requires  
the   judicial   department   "to   accept,   as   having   passed   Congress,   all   bills   authenticated   in   the  
manner   stated."   Thus   it   has   also   been   stated   in   other   cases   that   if   the   attestation   is   absent   and  
the  same  is  not  required  for  the  validity  of  a  statute,  the  courts  may  resort  to  the  journals  and  
other  records  of  Congress  for  proof  of  its  due  enactment.    
   
15.   A   newly-­‐elected   member   of   the   Senate   proposed   a   tax   measure   which   would   effectively  
reduce  the  tax  impositions  on  salaried  employees.  Is  the  proposal  valid?  

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Answer:  No.  All  appropriations  bill  must  emanate  from  the  House  of  Representatives  and  the  
executive   branch   has   no   power   to   transfer   one   budget   for   another   purpose   for   which   it   was  
originally  intended.  (Demetria  v.  Alba,  G.  R.  No.  L-­‐45129,  March  6,  1987)  
Tax   laws   (Art.   VI,   Sec.   28,   Art.   XIV,   Sec.   4(3)).   All   tax,   tariff   and   other   revenue   bills   must  
originate  in  the  House  of  Representatives  but  the  Senate  may  introduce  amendments.  
Demetria   v.   Alba,   G.R.   No.   L-­‐45129,   March   6,   1987:   no   cross   border   transfer   of   funds;   all  
appropriations  bill  must  emanate  from  the  House  of  Representatives  and  the  executive  branch  
has  no  power  to  transfer  one  budget  for  another  purpose  for  which  it  was  originally  intended.  
Belgica   v.   Ochoa,   G.R.   No.   208493,   November   19,   2013:   limitations   on   the   power   to   enact  
appropriation  bills  
 
16.   Two   members   of   the   House   of   Representatives   figured   in   a   brawl   during   the   heated  
deliberation  on  the  passage  of  the  bill  legalizing  marijuana.  The  incident  was  a  subject  of  media  
coverage.   Delfin   Rosario,   a   taxpayer,   asked   the   Ethics   Committee   of   the   House   of  
Representatives  to  discipline  two  members  of  Congress.  Will  his  action  prosper?  
Answer:   Yes.   Each   house   may   determine   the   rules   of   proceedings,   punish   its   Members   for  
disorderly   behavior,   and   with   the   concurrence   of   two-­‐thirds   of   all   its   members,   suspend   or  
expel  a  member.  A  penalty  of  suspension,  when  imposed,  shall  not  exceed  sixty  days.  
 
17.  May  the  President  restrict  the  attendance  of  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  in  congressional  
hearings?  
Answer:  No.  This  will  violate  the  principle  of  checks  and  balances.  
Senate  of  the  Philippines  v.  Ermita,  488  SCRA  1:  The  President  cannot  clip  the  powers  of  the  
legislative  branch  by  restricting  the  attendance  of  officers  and  other  officials  of  the  executive  
branch   from   appearing   in   congressional   hearings   in   the   exercise   of   the   constitutionally-­‐
mandated  power  to  conduct  inquiries.(referring  to  Section  21  of  Art.  VII)  
Neri   v.   Senate   Committees.   The   executive   branch   may   invoke   executive   privilege   in   matters  
covered  by  a  legislative  hearing  and  may  even  decline  attendance  or  responding  to  queries  if  
the  same  is  not  carried  out  in  aid  of  legislation.  
 
18.   May   the   House   of   Representatives   consider   simultaneously   several   complaints   for   inclusion  
in  the  Articles  of  Impeachment?  
Answer:  Yes..  Congress  may  look  into  separate  complaints  against  an  impeachable  officer  and  
consider   the   inclusion   of   matters   raised   therein   in   the   adoption   of   the   Articles   of   Impeachment  
to   be   forwarded   to   the   Senate   as   the   impeachment   tribunal.   The   Court   has   repeatedly   held  
that:   “Impeachment   is   the   most   difficult   and   cumbersome   mode   of   removing   a   public   officer  
from   office.   It   is,   by   nature,   a   sui   generis   politico-­‐legal   process   that   signals   the   need   for   a  
judicious   and   careful   handling   as   shown   by   the   process   required   to   initiate   the   proceeding;   the  
one-­‐year  limitation  or  bar  for  its  initiation;  the  limited  grounds  for  impeachment;  the  defined  
instrumentality  given  the  power  to  try  impeachment  cases;  and  the  number  of  votes  required  
for  a  finding  of  guilt.”  (Gutierrez  v.  House  of  Representatives,  G.  R.  No.  Feb.  15,  2011.  See  also    
Francisco  v.  House  of  Representatives,  on  one  year  rule)  
 
 VOTES  IN  IMPEACHMENT  PROCEEDINGS  
A   majority   vote   of   the   members   of   the   Committee   on   Justice   of   HOR   is   necessary   for  
consideration  of  its  report  in  a  plenary  session.  (Sec.  3(2),  Art.  XI)  
A   vote   of   at   least   1/3   of   all   members   of   the   HOR   is   necessary   to   either   affirm   a   favorable  
resolution  with  the  Articles  of  Impeachment  or  override  its  contrary  resolution.  
A   verified   complaint   or   resolution   of   impeachment   filed   by   1/3   of   all   members   of   the   HOR   shall  
constitute  the  Articles  of  Impeachment.  
Two   thirds   vote   of   all   members   of   the   Senate   is   necessary   to   convict   the   impeached   public  
officer.  
Gutierrez  v.  HOR,  Feb.  15,  2011:  consideration  of  two  complaints  as  basis    
Francisco  v.  HOR,  415  SCRA  44:  initiation  of  a  complaint  for  impeachment    
Chief   Justice   Corona   v.   Senate   of   the   Philippines   et   al.,   G.R.   No.200242,   July   17,   2012:   The  
power   of   judicial   review   includes   the   power   of   review   justiciable   issues   in   impeachment  
proceedings.  
 

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VII.  THE  EXECUTIVE  BRANCH  
 
1.  May  the  tarsiers  of  Loboc,  Bohol  bring  an  action  in  court  to  nullify  a  service  contract  executed  
by  the  Secretary  of  Environment  and  Natural  Resources  and  a  100%  owned  Japanese  company?  
Answer:  Stirctly  speaking,  only  natural  and  juridical  persons  may  be  allowed  to  plead.  However,  
in   Resident   marine   mammals   of   Tanon   Strait   joined   in   and   represented   herein   by   human  
beings  Gloria  Estenzo  Ramos  and  Rose-­‐Liza  Eisma-­‐Osorio,  in  their  capacity  as  legal  guardians  
and   as   responsible   stewards   of   God's   creations   v.   Secretary   Angelo   Reyes   et   al(G.R.   No.  
180771,  April  21,  2015),  the  Court  allowed  the  resident  mammals  of  Tanon  Strait  as  petitioners    
provided   that   the   action   is   brought   in   the   nature   of   a   citizen   suit   with   natural   persons   acting   as  
their   legal   guardians   and   as   friends   for   being   stewards   of   creation.   Under   the   Rules   of  
Procedure   in   Environmental   Cases,   a   citizen   suit   is   encouraged   for   the   protection   of   the  
environment.   This   provision   liberalizes   standing   for   all   cases   filed   enforcing   environmental   laws  
and  collapses  the  traditional  rule  on  personal  and  direct  interest,  on  the  principle  that  humans  
are   stewards   of   nature.   The   terminology   of   the   text   reflects   the   doctrine   first   enunciated   in  
Oposa  v.  Factoran,  insofar  as  it  refers  to  minors  and  generations  yet  unborn.  
 
2.  In  the  action  filed  by  the  stewards  of  the  Bohol  tarsiers,  can  the  respondents  claim  that  their  
approval  of  service  contract  pertaining  to  oil  exploration,  which  requires  presidential  approval,  
amounts  to  approval  of  the  president  under  the  doctrine  of  qualified  political  agency?  
Answer:  No.  The  Court  reiterated  its  ruling  in  Joson  v.  Torres.  In  this  case,  the  Court  explained  
the  concept  of  the   alter  ego  principle  or  the  doctrine  or   qualified  political  agency  and  its  limit  
in  this  wise:  “Under  this  doctrine,  which  recognizes  the  establishment  of  a  single  executive,  all  
executive   and   administrative   organizations   are   adjuncts   of   the   Executive   Department,   the  
heads   of   the   various   executive   departments   are   assistants   and   agents   of   the   Chief   Executive,  
and,  except  in  cases  where  the  Chief  Executive  is  required  by  the  Constitution  or  law  to  act  in  
person   or   the   exigencies   of   the   situation   demand   that   he   act   personally,   the   multifarious  
executive  and  administrative  functions  of  the  Chief  Executive  are  performed  by  and  through  the  
executive   departments,   and   the   acts   of   the   Secretaries   of   such   departments,   performed   and  
promulgated   in   the   regular   course   of   business,   are,   unless   disapproved   or   reprobated   by   the  
Chief  Executive  presumptively  the  acts  of  the  Chief  Executive.”    
The   Court   further   reiterated:   “As   this   Court   has   held   in   La   Bugal,   our   Constitution   requires   that  
the  President  himself  be  the  signatory  of  service  agreements  with  foreign-­‐owned  corporations  
involving  the  exploration,  development,  and  utilization  of  our  minerals,  petroleum,  and  other  
mineral   oils.   This   power   cannot   be   taken   lightly.   xxx   it   must   be   shown   that   the   government  
agency  or  subordinate  official  has  been  authorized  by  the  President  to  enter  into  such  service  
contract   for   the   government.   Otherwise,   it   should   be   at   least   shown   that   the   President  
subsequently   approved   of   such   contract   explicitly.   None   of   these   circumstances   is   evident   in  
the  case  at  bar.”  
 
3.  The  President  granted  Mr.  Estrada  pardon.  Mr.  Estrada  was  elected  Mayor  of  Manila.  Alicia,  a  
registered   voter   of   Manila   questioned   the   grant   of   pardon   alleging   the   text   of   the   pardon  
appears  to  be  conditional  and  therefore,  Mr.  Estrada  is  not  qualified  to  hold  the  post  of  Mayor.  
Is  the  position  of  the  registered  voter  tenable?  
Answer:   No.   The   1987   Constitution,   specifically   Section   19   of   Article   VII   and   Section   5   of   Article  
IX-­‐C,  provides  that  the  President  of  the  Philippines  possesses  the  power  to  grant  pardons,  along  
with  other  acts  of  executive  clemency,  to  wit:  “Section  19.  Except  in  cases  of  impeachment,  or  
as   otherwise   provided   in   this   Constitution,   the   President   may   grant   reprieves,   commutations,  
and  pardons,  and  remit  fines  and  forfeitures,  after  conviction  by  final  judgment.”  There  can  be  
no   other   conclusion   but   to   say   that   the   pardon   granted   to   Mr.   Estrada   was   absolute   in   the  
absence  of  a  clear,  unequivocal  and  concrete  factual  basis  upon  which  to  anchor  or  support  the  
Presidential   intent   to   grant   a   limited   pardon.   He   was   granted   an   absolute   pardon   that   fully  
restored  all  his  civil  and  political  rights,  which  naturally  includes  the  right  to  seek  public  elective  
office,  the  focal  point  of  this  controversy.  The  wording  of  the  pardon  extended  to  former  Mr.  
Estrada  is  complete,  unambiguous,  and  unqualified.  (Risos-­‐Vidal  v.  COMELEC)  
Please  note  that  the  only  instances  in  which  the  President  may  not  extend  pardon  remain  to  
be  in:  (1)  impeachment  cases;  (2)  cases  that  have  not  yet  resulted  in  a  final  conviction;  and  (3)  
cases   involving   violations   of   election   laws,   rules   and   regulations   in   which   there   was   no  

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favorable  recommendation  coming  from  the  COMELEC.  Congress  cannot  in  any  way  delimit  the  
pardoning  powers  of  the  President.  Grant  of  amnesty  requires  the  consent  of  Congress.    
 
4.  Can  the  President  of  the  Philippines  declare  a  state  of  war?  
Answer:   No.   The   Constitution   provides   that   only   Congress   may   declare   the   existence   of   a   state  
of   war.   *Note   that   Congress   cannot   even   declare   a   state   of   war   but   can   only   recognize   its  
existence  under  the  Constitution.  
Please  relate  this  with  the  renunciation  of  war  as  an  instrument  of  national  policy.  
The   Philippines   renounces   war   as   an   instrument   of   national   policy:   In   the   field   of   public  
international   law,   the   law   of   war   has   two   dimensions:   justifications   to   engage   in   war   (jus   ad  
bellum)   and   the   limits   to   acceptable   wartime   conduct   (jus   in   bello   or   International  
Humanitarian  Law).    
As   a   humanitarian   concern,   the   laws   of   war   address   declarations   of   war,   acceptance   of  
surrender  and  the  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war;  military  necessity  (use  of  an  attack  or  action  
intended  to  help  the  military  objective  and  use  of  proportional  and  excessive  force  to  endanger  
civilians(,  along  with  distinction  (careful  assessment  as  to  who  are  combatants  and  the  civilians)  
and   proportionality(   the   legal   use   of   force   whereby   belligerents   must   make   sure   that   harm  
caused   to   civilians   or   civilian   property   is   not   excessive   in   relation   to   the   concrete   and   direct  
military   advantage   anticipated   attack   anticipated   by   an   attack   on   military   objective;   and   the  
prohibition  of  certain  weapons  that  may  cause  unnecessary  suffering.  
The  laws  of  war  should  mitigate  the  consequences  of  war  by:  
Shielding  both  combatants  and  non-­‐combatants  from  unnecessary  suffering;  
Ensuring   that   certain   fundamental   human   rights   of   persons   who   fall   into   the   hands   of   the  
enemy,  particularly  prisoners  of  war,  the  wounded  and  sick,  and  civilians,  are  protected;  and  
endeavouring  that  peace  is  restored.    
 
VIII.  THE  JUDICIAL  DEPARTMENT  
 
1.  What  are  the  requirements  before  the  Court  may  exercise  the  power  to  check  an  act  of  a  
coequal  branch  of  government?  
Answer:  The  Court’s  power  to  check  an  act  of  a  coequal  branch  of  government  must  abide  by  
the  stringent  requirements  for  the  exercise  of  that  power  under  the  Constitution.  Demetria  v.  
Alba   and   Francisco   v.   House   of   Representatives   cite   the   "pillars"   of   the   limitations   on   the  
power  of  judicial  review  as  enunciated  in  the  concurring  opinion  of  U.S.  Supreme  Court  Justice  
Brandeis   in   Ashwander   v.   Tennessee   Valley   Authority.   Francisco   redressed   these   "pillars"  
under  the  following  categories:  
1.  That  there  be  absolute  necessity  of  deciding  a  case;  
2.  That  rules  of  constitutional  law  shall  be  formulated  only  as  required  by  the  facts  of  the  case;  
3.  That  judgment  may  not  be  sustained  on  some  other  ground;  
4.  That  there  be  actual  injury  sustained  by  the  party  by  reason  of  the  operation  of  the  statute;  
5.  That  the  parties  are  not  in  estoppels;  and  
6.  That  the  Court  upholds  the  presumption  of  constitutionality;  
 
2.  What  are  the  three  functions  of  judicial  review?  
Answer:  The  three  functions  of  Judicial  Review  are:    
(a).  Checking  –  when  the  Court  looks  into  possible  abuses  of  each  branch  of  government  
and  the  review  of  decisions  of  lower  courts  and  other  tribunals;    
(b).  Legitimizing  –  when  the  Court  looks  into  constitutionality  of  laws  and  its  application;  
and    
(c).  Symbolic  –  when  the  Court  looks  into  issues  although  they  have  become  moot  and  
academic  to  help  guide  the  bench,  the  bard  and  the  public.  
 
3.  Under  what  circumstances  may  the  Court  disturb  the  findings  of  administrative  tribunals  and  
lower  courts?  
 Answer:   Under   normal   circumstances,   S.C.   will   not   disturb   the   findings   of   facts   of  
administrative   tribunals   and   the   trial   courts.   However,     S.C.   may   review   findings   of   facts   the  
lower  courts  under  recognized  exceptions:  when  the  conclusion  is  a  finding  grounded  entirely  
on  speculation,  surmises  or  conjectures;  when  inference  made  is  manifestly  mistaken,  absurd  
or   impossible;   where   there   is   abuse   of   discretion;   when   judgment   is   based   on  

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misapprehension   of   facts,   when   the   findings   of   facts   are   conflicting;   when   the   Court   of  
Appeals,  in  making  its  findings,  went  beyond  the  issues  of  the  case  and  the  same  is  contrary  
to  those  of  the  trial  court;  when  findings  of  fact  are  conclusions  without  citation  of  specific  
evidence  on  which  they  are  based;  when  the  facts  set  forth  in  the  petition  as  well  as  in  the  
petitioners’  main  and  reply  briefs  are  not  disputed  by  the  respondents;  and  when  the  findings  
of   fact   of   the   C.A.   are   premised   on   supposed   absence   of   evidence   and   contradicted   by  
evidence  on  record.    
 
4.  May  lower  courts  also  exercise  the  power  of  judicial  review?  
Answer:  Yes,  as  a  general  rule,  all  courts  can  exercise  judicial  review.  
 
5.  What  is  the  effect  of  declaration  of  unconstitutionality  of  a  statute?  
Answer:    Under  Civil  Code,  Art.  7,  a  statute  is  void  when  declared  unconstitutional.  All  prior  acts  
prior  to  the  declaration  may  produce  legal  effects.  
 
6.  What  are  Moot  Questions?  
Answer:  As  a  general  rule,  a  matter  is  moot  if  further  legal  proceedings  with  regard  to  it  can  
have  no  effect,  or  events  have  placed  it  beyond  the  reach  of  the  law.  Normally,  courts  will  defer  
to   acting   on   a   matter   that   has   become   moot   and   academic.   However,   where   matters   of  
transcendental  importance  arise,  the  Court  render  a  resolution  to  give  guideposts  to  the  bench,    
bar  and  the  public  if  a  similar  matter  should  arise  in  the  future.  
 
7.  What  is  Political  Question  Doctrine?  
Answer:  In  Baker  v.  Carr,  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  explained  the  political  question  doctrine  in  
this  wise:  "Prominent  on  the  surface  of  any  case  held  to  involve  a  political  question  is  found:  
(1)   a   textually   demonstrable   constitutional   commitment   of   the   issue   to   a   coordinate   political  
department;    
(2)  or  a  lack  of  judicially  discoverable  and  manageable  standards  for  resolving  it;    
(3)  or  the  impossibility  of  deciding  without  an  initial  policy  determination  of  a  kind  clearly  for  
non-­‐judicial  discretion;    
(4)   or   the   impossibility   of   a   court's   undertaking   independent   resolution   without   expressing   lack  
of  the  respect  due    coordinate  branches  of  government;    
(5)  or  an  unusual  need  for  unquestioning  adherence  to  a  political  decision  already  made;    
(6)   or   the   potentiality   of   embarrassment   from   multifarious   pronouncements   by   various  
departments  on  one  question.”    
The   political   question   doctrine   could   be   read   narrowly   or   more   broadly.   Read   narrowly,   the  
political  question  doctrine  should  be  invoked  only  when  the  issue  presented  to  the  Court  is  one  
that  "has  been  textually  committed  to  another  branch  of  government."    That  is,  if  the  framers  
of   the   Constitution   made   clear   their   intention   that   the   judiciary   not   resolve   a   particular  
question  of  constitutional  interpretation,  that  determination  must  be  respected.      
More  broadly,  the  political  question  doctrine  might  be  invoked  when  there  is  a  lack  of  judicially  
manageable   standards   to   decide   the   case   on   the   merits,   when   judicial   intervention   might   show  
insufficient   respect   for   other   branches   of   government,   or   when   a   judicial   decision   might  
threaten  the  integrity  of  the  judicial  branch.  (Baker  v.  Carr,  1962)  
 
8.  What  does  the  Court  approach  an  issue  involving  a  political  question?  
Answer:  In  Marcos  et  al.  v.    Manglapus  et  al.(G.R.  No.  88211  September  15,  1989),  the  Court  
said   that   when   political   questions   are   involved,   the   Constitution   limits   the   determination   to  
whether   or   not   there   has   been   a   grave   abuse   of   discretion   amounting   to   lack   or   excess   of  
jurisdiction   on   the   part   of   the   official   whose   action   is   being   questioned.   If   grave   abuse   is   not  
established,   the   Court   will   not   substitute   its   judgment   for   that   of   the   official   concerned   and  
decide  a  matter  which  by  its  nature  or  by  law  is  for  the  latter  alone  to  decide.    
 
9.  What  is  locus  standi?  
Answer:  The  question  of  locus  standi  or  legal  standing  focuses  on  the  determination  of  whether  
those  assailing  the  governmental  act  have  the  right  of  appearance  to  bring  the  matter  to  the  
court  for  adjudication.  They  must  show  that  they  have  a  personal  and  substantial  interest  in  the  

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case,  such  that  they  have  sustained  or  are  in  immediate  danger  of  sustaining,  some  direct  injury  
as  a  consequence  of  the  enforcement  of  the  challenged  governmental  act.    
 
10.  What  is  material  interest?  
Answer:    "Interest"  in  the  question  involved  must  be  material  -­‐  an  interest  that  is  in  issue  and  
will   be   affected   by   the   official   act   -­‐   as   distinguished   from   being   merely   incidental   or   general.  
Clearly,  it  would  be  insufficient  to  show  that  the  law  or  any  governmental  act  is  invalid,  and  that  
petitioners  stand  to  suffer  in  some  indefinite  way.    
They   must   show   that   they   have   a   particular   interest   in   bringing   the   suit,   and   that   they   have  
been  or  are  about  to  be  denied  some  right  or  privilege  to  which  they  are  lawfully  entitled,  or  
that  they  are  about  to  be  subjected  to  some  burden  or  penalty  by  reason  of  the  act  complained  
of.  The  reason  why  those  who  challenge  the  validity  of  a  law  or  an  international  agreement  are  
required   to   allege   the   existence   of   a   personal   stake   in   the   outcome   of   the   controversy   is   "to  
assure   the   concrete   adverseness   which   sharpens   the   presentation   of   issues   upon   which   the  
court  so  largely  depends  for  illumination  of  difficult  constitutional  questions."  
 
11.  What  is  a  taxpayer’s  suit?  
Answer:     A   taxpayer's   suit   concerns   a   case   in   which   the   official   act   complained   of   directly  
involves  the  illegal  disbursement  of  public  funds  derived  from  taxation.  Here,  those  challenging  
the   act   must   specifically   show   that   they   have   sufficient   interest   in   preventing   the   illegal  
expenditure   of   public   money,   and   that   they   will   sustain   a   direct   injury   as   a   result   of   the  
enforcement  of  the  assailed  act.  
 
12.  When  may  the  legislature  be  considered  a  proper  party  in  a  case?  
Answer:   The   legal   standing   of   an   institution   of   the   Legislature   or   of   any   of   its   Members   has  
already   been   recognized   by   the   Court   in   a   number   of   cases.   What   is   in   question   here   is   the  
alleged   impairment   of   the   constitutional   duties   and   powers   granted   to,   or   the   impermissible  
intrusion   upon   the   domain   of,   the   Legislature   or   an   institution   thereof.   In   the   case   of   suits  
initiated  by  the  legislators  themselves,  the  Court  has  recognized  their  standing  to  question  the  
validity  of  any  official  action  that  they  claim  infringes  the  prerogatives,  powers,  and  privileges  
vested  by  the  Constitution  in  their  office.    
 
IX.  CONSTITUTIONAL  COMMISSIONS  
 
1.  Torres  questioned  the  order  of  dismissal  issued  by  the  Civil  Service  Commission.  She  alleged  
that   CSC   has   no   jurisdiction   over   the   employees   of   the   Philippine   National   Red   Cross.   Is   her  
contention  tenable?    
Answer:  No.  As  ruled  by  this  Court  in  Liban,  et  al.  v.  Gordon,  the  PNRC,  although  not  a  GOCC,  is  
sui  generis  in  character,  thus,  requiring  this  Court  to  approach  controversies  involving  the  PNRC  
on  a  case-­‐to-­‐case  basis.  As  discussed:  “A  closer  look  at  the  nature  of  the  PNRC  would  show  that  
there  is  none  like  it  not  just  in  terms  of  structure,  but  also  in  terms  of  history,  public  service  and  
official   status   accorded   to   it   by   the   State   and   the   international   community.   There   is   merit   in  
PNRC's  contention  that  its  structure  is  sui  generis.”  
It   is   in   recognition   of   this   sui   generis   character   of   the   PNRC   that   R.A.   No.   95   has   remained   valid  
and   effective   from   the   time   of   its   enactment   in   March   22,   1947   under   the   1935   Constitution  
and   during   the   effectivity   of   the   1973   Constitution   and   the   1987   Constitution.   As   correctly  
mentioned   by   Justice   Roberto   A.   Abad,   the   sui   generis   character   of   PNRC   requires   us   to  
approach  controversies  involving  the  PNRC  on  a  case-­‐to-­‐case  basis.  
In  this  particular  case,  the  CA  did  not  err  in  ruling  that  the  CSC  has  jurisdiction  over  the  PNRC  
because   the   issue   at   hand   is   the   enforcement   of   labor   laws   and   penal   statutes,   thus,   in   this  
particular   matter,   the   PNRC   can   be   treated   as   a   GOCC.   (MARY   LOU   GETURBOS   TORRES   v.  
CORAZON  ALMA  G.  DE  LEON,  in  her  capacity  as  Secretary  General  of  the  Philippine  National  
Red  Cross  and  THE  BOARD  OF  GOVERNORS  of  the  PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  RED  CROSS,  National  
Headquarters,  G.R.  No.  199440,  January  8,  2016,  Peralta,  J.)  
 
 
 
 

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2.  Are  funds  of  the  Boy  Scouts  of  the  Philippines  subject  to  audit?  
Answer:  Yes.  The  BSP  is  a  public  corporation  or  a  government  agency  or  instrumentality  with  
juridical  personality  which  does  not  fall  within  the  Constitutional  prohibition  in  Art.  XII,  Section  
16.    Not  all  corporations,  which  are  not  government  owned  or  controlled,  are  ipso  facto  to  be    
considered   private   corporations   as   there   exists   another   distinct   class   of   corporations   or  
chartered   institutions   which   are   otherwise   known   as   “public   corporations.”   These   corporations  
are  treated  by  law  as  agencies  or  instrumentalities  of  the  government  which    are  not  subject  to  
the   tests   of   ownership   or   control   and   economic   viability   but   to   different     criteria   relating   to  
their  public  purposes/interests  or  constitutional  policies  and  objectives  and  their  administrative  
relationship   to   the   government   or   any   of   its   departments   or   offices.   (BOY   SCOUTS   OF   THE  
PHILIPPINES  v.  COA  (G.R.  No.  177131,  2011)  
 
3.   Can   a   public   officer   claim   reimbursement   for   personal   medical   expenses   and   other   travelling  
costs?  
Answer:  No.  COA  may  disallow  expenses  which  do  not  pass  the  “public  purpose  test”  (claims  
for  executive  check-­‐up,  basic  monthly  allowances,  reimbursement  for  gasoline  allowance,  etc.)  
 Any   disbursement   of   public   funds,   which   includes   payment   of   salaries   and   benefits   to  
government   employees   and   officials,   must   (a)   be   authorized   by   law,   and   (b)   serve   a   public  
purpose.   As   understood   in   the   traditional   sense,   public   purpose   or   public   use   means   any  
purpose  or  use  directly  available  to  the  general  public  as  a  matter  of  right.    The  public  servant  
has  the  burden  to  proof  to  establish  that  use  of  public  funds  is  related  to  the  discharge  of  his  
official  functions.  (RAMON  R.  YAP  v.  COMMISSION  ON  AUDIT  (G.R.  No.  158562,  2010)  
 
4. The   COA   en   banc   denied   the   petitioner's   request   for   exclusion   from   liability   involving   the  
acquisition   of   several   parcels   by   the   RSBC.   The   COA   en   banc   also   denied   her   motion   for  
reconsideration.   Is   there   grave   abuse   of   discretion   on   the   part   of   the   COA   in   rendering   its  
assailed  decision?  
Answer:  None.  The  Court  finds  no  grave  abuse  of  discretion  on  the  part  of  the  COA  in  rendering  
its  assailed  decision,  which  disregarded  the  petitioner's  defense  that  she  had  no  knowledge  of  
the  above  transaction,  or  of  the  two  versions  of  the  deed  of  sale,  prior  to  her  post-­‐audit,  or  that  
the  payments  for  the  lots  were  made  long  before  she  signed  "verified  correct"  after  completing  
the  post-­‐audit  process  and  finding  the  supporting  documents  to  be  complete,  or  that  she  did  
not  benefit  from  the  transaction  in  any  way.  
It   is   well   to   be   reminded   that   the   exercise   by   COA   of   its   general   audit   power   is   among   the  
mechanisms   of   check   and   balance   instituted   under   the   1987   Constitution   on   which   our  
democratic  form  of  government  is  founded.  Article  IX-­‐D,  Section  2(1)  of  the  1987  Constitution  
provides   that   the   COA   has   "the   power,   authority,   and   duty   to   examine,   audit,   and   settle   all  
accounts   pertaining   to   the   revenue   and   receipts   of,   and   expenditures   or   uses   of   funds   and  
property,   owned   or   held   in   trust   by,   or   pertaining   to,   the   Government,   or   any   of   its  
subdivisions,   agencies,   or   instrumentalities,   including   government-­‐owned   or   controlled  
corporations  with  original  charters."    
 
5. Zamboanga   City   Water   District   (ZCWD)   is   a   government-­‐owned   controlled   corporation  
(GOCC).  COA  issued  Notices  of  Disallowance  for  ZCWD's  various  payments.  These  covered  the  
disbursements  made  during  the  tenure  of  then  General  Manager  Juanita  L.  Bucoy.  This  included  
salary   adjustments   of   the   Bucoy.   COA   said   that   the   Board   of   Director   had   no   authority   to  
approve  such  adjustments.  Was  COA  action  proper?  
Answer:  Yes.  ZCWD's  contention  that,  pursuant  to  Section  23  of  P.D.  No.  198,  as  amended  by  
R.A.  No.  9286,  the  BOD  has  the  discretion  to  fix  the  compensation  of  the  GM  is  misplaced.    
As  held  in  Mendoza  v.  COA,  unless  specifically  exempted  by  its  charter,  GOCCs  are  covered  by  
the   provisions   of   the   Salary   Standardization   Law   (SSL).The   salary   increase   of   GM   Bucoy,  
including   the   corresponding   increase   in   her   monetized   leave   credits,   was   properly   disallowed  
for   being   in   excess   of   the   amounts   allowed   under   the   SSL.   (ZAMBOANGA   CITY   WATER  
DISTRICT,  vs.  COMMISSION  ON  AUDIT,  January  26,  2016,  G.R.  No.  213472)  

 
 
 

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6. May   the   Commission   on   Elections   be   compelled,   through   a   writ   of   mandamus,   to   enable   the  
Voter  Verified  Paper  Audit  Trail  system  capability  feature  for  the  2016  Elections?  
Answer:  Yes.  The  inaction  of  the  Commission  on  Elections  in  utilizing  the  VVPAT  feature  of  the  
vote-­‐counting   machines   fails   to   fulfill   the   duty   required   under   Republic   Act   No.   8436,   as  
amended.    
Article   XI(C),   Section   2   of   the   1987   Constitution   empowered   the   Commission   of   Elections   to  
"enforce   and   administer   all   laws   and   regulations   relative   to   the   conduct   of   an   election."   One   of  
the   laws   that   the   Commission   on   Elections   must   implement   is   Republic   Act   No.   8436,   as  
amended   by   Republic   Act   No.   9369,   which   requires   the   automated   election   system   to   have   the  
capability  of  providing  a  voter-­‐verified  paper  audit  trail.  The  law  is  clear.  A  "voter  verified  paper  
audit  trail"  requires  the  following:  (a)  individual  voters  can  verify  whether  the  machines  have  
been  able  to  count  their  votes;  and  (b)  that  the  verification  at  minimum  should  be  paper  based.    
There  appears  to  be  no  room  for  further  interpretation  of  a  "voter  verified  paper  audit  trail."  
The  paper  audit  trail  cannot  be  considered  the  physical  ballot,  because  there  may  be  instances  
where  the  machine  may  translate  the  ballot  differently,  or  the  voter  inadvertently  spoils  his  or  
her  ballot.  (BAGUMBAYAN-­‐VNP  MOVEMENT,  INC.,  AND  RICHARD  J.  GORDON,  AS  CHAIRMAN  
OF   BAGUMBAYAN-­‐VNP   MOVEMENT,   INC.   v.   COMMISSION   ON   ELECTIONS,   G.R.   No.   222731,  
March  08,  2016)  
 
7.   The   Board   of   Directors   (the   Board)   of   petitioner   MNWD   passed   a   resolution   granting   the  
payment  of  accrued  COLA  covering  the  period  from  1992  to  1999  in  favor  of  qualified  MNWD  
personnel.  COA  disallowed  payment  of  back  payment  of  COLA  for  failure  of  MNWD  to  submit  
the  documents  to  support  the  claim.  Was  the  disallowance  proper?  
Answer: Yes.   The   Court   finds   that   the   back   payment   of   the   COLA   to   MNWD   employees   was  
rightfully   disallowed.   Pertinent   to   the   issue   is   Section   12   of   the   SSL,   which   provides   that   the  
consolidation  of  allowances  in  the  standardized  salary  as  stated  in  the  cited  provision  is  a  new  
rule   in   Philippine   position   classification   and   compensation   system.   Integration   of   employee’s  
benefits   is   the   rule   rather   than   the   exception.   Therefore,   COA’s   action   was   proper.  
(METROPOLITAN   NAGA   WATER   DISTRICT,   VIRGINIA   I.   NERO,   JEREMIAS   P.   ABAN   JR.,   AND  
EMMA  A.  CUYO,  v.  COMMISSION  ON  AUDIT,  G.R.  No.  218072,  March  08,  2016)  
 
XI.  BILL  OF  RIGHTS  
 
1.  The  Sandiganbayan  denied  the  Petition  for  Bail  of  JPE  because  the  crime  charged  against  him  
is   Plunder   and   the   prosecution   has   indicated   that   the   evidence   of   guilt   is   strong.   JPE   filed   a  
Petition   for   Certiorari   before   the   Supreme   Court.   Will   the   action   filed   by   JPE   before   the  
Supreme  Court  prosper?    
Answer:  Yes,  the  action  will  prosper.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  be  presumed  
innocent   until   the   contrary   is   proved.   The   presumption   of   innocence   is   rooted   in   the   guarantee  
of  due  process,  and  is  safeguarded  by  the  constitutional  right  to  be  released  on  bail;  and  further  
binds   the   court   to   wait   until   after   trial   to   impose   any   punishment   on   the   accused.   (Enrile   vs.  
Sandiganbayan  767  SCRA  282,  G.R.  No.  213847,  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
2. What  factors  did  the  Court  consider  in  the  grant  of  bail  to  JPE?  
Answer:     The   Court   considered   JPE’s   social   and   political   standing   and   his   having   immediately  
surrendered  to  the  authorities  upon  his  being  charged  in  court.  His  surrender  indicates  that  the  
risk  of  his  flight  or  escape  from  this  jurisdiction  is  highly  unlikely.  The  fragile  state  of  his  health  
also   presents   another   compelling   justification   for   his   admission   to   bail.     Sadly,   the  
Sandiganbayan  did  not  recognize  all  these  foregoing  factors  when  it  denied  the  grant  of  bail  to  
JPE.  
 
3.  Aside  from  criminal  proceedings,  what  other  circumstance  would  merit  the  grant  of  bail?  
Answer:   The   national   commitment   to   uphold   the   fundamental   human   rights   as   well   as   value  
the  worth  and  dignity  of  every  person  has  authorized  the  grant  of  bail  not  only  to  those  charged  
in   criminal   proceedings   but   also   to   extraditees   upon   a   clear   and   convincing   showing:   (1)   that  
the   detainee   will   not   be   a   flight   risk   or   a   danger   to   the   community;   and   (2)   that   there   exist  
special,  humanitarian  and  compelling  circumstances.    

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Relate  this  to  the  Court’s    rulings  in  Hongkong  SAR  v.  Hon.  Olalia  and  Munoz  and  Gov’t  of  the  
U.S.A.  v.  Hon.  Purruganan  and  Jimenez  
 
4. Lai   filed   a   Petition   before   the   Supreme   Court   alleging   that   he   was   denied   due   process  
specifically  the  right  to  fair  trial  when  Judge  Elumba  refused  to  inhibit  himself  during  the  trial  
despite   the   fact   that   he   was   the   prosecuting   fiscal   when   the   information   was   filed.   Will   Lai’s  
Petition  prosper?  
Answer:  Yes,  Lai  was  denied  fair  trial.  
It   is   not   disputed   that   the   constitutional   right   to   due   process   of   law   cannot   be   denied   to   any  
accused.   The   Constitution   has   expressly   ordained   that   "no   person   shall   be   deprived   of   life,  
liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of  law."  An  essential  part  of  the  right  is  to  be  afforded  a  
just   and   fair   trial   before   his   conviction   for   any   crime.   Any   violation   of   the   right   cannot   be  
condoned,  for  the  impartiality  of  the  judge  who  sits  on  and  hears  a  case,  and  decides  it  is  an  
indispensable   requisite   of   procedural   due   process.   (Lai   vs.   People,   761   SCRA   156,   G.R.   No.  
175999,  Bersamin)  
 
5. What  is  the  rationale  behind  the  need  for  an  impartial  judge?  
Answer:   The   Court   has   repeatedly   and   consistently   demanded   'the   cold   neutrality   of   an  
impartial  judge'  as  the  indispensable  imperative  of  due  process.    As  a  judge,  Elumba  must  not  
only  be  impartial  but  must  also  appear  to  be  impartial  as  an  added  assurance  to  the  parties  that  
his  decision  will  be  just.    An  accused  expects    go  to  a  judge  who  shall  give  him  justice.    
The  Court  said  that  a  judge  has  both  the  duty  of  rendering  a  just  decision  and  the  duty  of  doing  
it  in  a  manner  completely  free  from  suspicion  as  to  its  fairness  and  as  to  his  integrity.  The  law  
conclusively   presumes   that   a   judge   cannot   objectively   or   impartially   sit   in   such   a   case   where  
there  is  a  seeming  cloud  of  doubt.  
 
6. Will  the  disqualification  of  Judge  Elumba  automatically  result  to  the  acquittal  of  Lai?  
Answer:  No,  the  disqualification  does  not  automatically  result  to  the  acquittal  of  Lai.  To  restore  
the   right   to   fair   trial   of   Lai,   the   proceedings   held   against   him   before   Judge   Elumba   and   his  
ensuing   conviction   should   be   nullified   and   set   aside.   However,   the   case   should   be   remanded   to  
the  RTC  for  a  partial  new  trial  to  remove  any  of  the  prejudicial  consequences  of  the  violation  of  
the  right  to  due  process.  The  case  shall  be  raffled  to  a  Judge  who  is  not  otherwise  disqualified  
like  Judge  Elumba  under  Section  1,  Rule  137  of  the  Rules  of  Court.    

7.   Gacal   filed   an   administrative   case   against   Judge   Jaime   I.   Infante   to   whose   court   a   murder  
case   was   raffled.   He   accused   Infante     with   gross   ignorance   of   the   law,  gross   incompetence,   and  
evident  partiality.  The  judge  failed  to  set  a  hearing  before  granting  bail  to  the  accused  and  for  
releasing  him  immediately  after  allowing  bail.  Will  the  administrative  case  filed  by  Gacal  against  
Judge  Infante  prosper?  
Answer:  Yes,  the  case  will  prosper.  
Bail  hearing  is  mandatory.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  accused  never  filed  a  petition  for  grant  of  
bail,  due  process  requires  a  hearing  be  held  before  bail  is  granted.  Judge  Infante  betrayed  his  
gross  ignorance  because  the  accused  is  charged  with  murder,  a  crime  punishable  by  reclusion  
perpetua  and  is  a  non-­‐bailable  offense.  Judge  Infante  apparently  acted  as  if  the  requirement  for  
the   bail   hearing   was   a   merely   minor   rule   to   be   dispensed   with.   (Gacal   vs.   Hon.   Infante,   658  
SCRA  535,  A.M.  No.  RTJ-­‐  04-­‐184,  Bersamin,  J.)  
 
8. What  is  the  purpose  of  conducting  a  hearing  before  bail  is  granted?  
Answer:    The  Court  has  in  a  decided  case  said  that  although,  in  theory,  the  only  function  of  bail  
is   to   ensure   the   appearance   of   the   accused   at   the   time   set   for   the   arraignment   and   trial.   In  
practice,  bail  serves  the  further  purpose  of  preventing  the  release  of  an  accused  who  may  be  
dangerous  to  society  or  whom  the  judge  may  not  want  to  release.  Therefore,  a  hearing  upon  
notice  is  mandatory  before  the  grant  of  bail,  whether  bail  is  a  matter  of  right  or  discretion.  

9.  May  the  right  against  unreasonable  search  and  seizure  be  waived?  
Answer:  Yes,  the  right  against  unreasonable  search  and  seizure  may  be  waived.  
In   Esquillo   v.   People,   the   Supreme   Court   affirmed   the   conviction   of   Esquillo.     The   Court   held  
that  Esquillo’s  acts  showed  she  waived  her  right  to  question  her  arrest.  The  acts  included  the  
fact  that  she  did  not  question  early  on  her  warrantless  arrest  –  before  her  arraignment  as  well  

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as   the   inadmissibility   of   evidence   acquired   on   the   occasion   thereof.     She   raised   these   issues   for  
the  first  time  only  on  appeal  before  the  appellate  court.  By  such  omissions,  she  is  deemed  to  
have   waived   any   objections   on   the   legality   of   her   arrest.   (ESQUILLO     v.   PEOPLE,     G.R.   No.  
182010,  Majority  Opinion)  

`10.  When  may  law  enforcers  resort  to  “stop  and  frisk”  search  and  seizure?  
Answer:  Justice  Bersamin  in  his  Dissenting  Opinion  in  Esquillo  v.  People,  reminds  us  that  police  
officers  must  not  rely  on  a  single  suspicious  circumstance.  There  should  be  "presence  of  more  
than   one   seemingly   innocent   activity,   which,   taken   together,   warranted   a   reasonable   inference  
of  criminal  activity.”  The  Constitution  prohibits  "unreasonable  searches  and  seizures.”  Certainly,  
reliance   on   only   one   suspicious   circumstance   or   none   at   all   will   not   result   in   a   reasonable  
search.    
Section  2  of  the  Constitution  provides  that  the  right  of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their  persons,  
houses,  papers,  and  effects  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  of  whatever  nature  and  
for   any   purpose   shall   be   inviolable,   and   no   search   warrant   or   warrant   of   arrest   shall   issue  
except  upon  probable  cause  to  be  determined  personally  by  the  judge  after  examination  under  
oath   or   affirmation   of   the   complainant   and   the   witnesses   he   may   produce,   and   particularly  
describing  the  place  to  be  searched  and  the  persons  or  things  to  be  seized.    
 
11.  Is  “stop  and  frisk”  search  and  seizure  allowed  in  the  prosecution  of  a  crime?  
Answer:   Yes,   this   is   allowed.   This   is   found   under   Section   5   (a),   Rule   113   of   Rules   on   Criminal  
Procedure.  
For   the   exception   in   Section   5   (a),   Rule   113   to   operate,   this   Court   has   ruled   that   two   (2)  
elements  must  be  present:  (1)  the  person  to  be  arrested  must  execute  an  overt  act  indicating  
that   he  has   just   committed,   is   actually  committing,   or   is   attempting   to   commit  a   crime;   and  (2)  
such   overt   act   is   done   in   the   presence   or   within   the   view   of   the   arresting   officer.   (Miclat   v.  
People,  G.R.  No.  176077,  Peralta,  J.)  
 
12. Enumerate   acceptable   instances   when   a   search   and   seizure   may   conducted   without   a    
search  warrant?  
Answer:  The  general  rule  is  a  search  may  be  conducted  by  law  enforcers  only  on  the  strength  of  
a  valid  search  warrant  is  settled.  The  same,  however,  admits  of  exceptions,  viz:  
(1)  consented  searches  (malls,  schools,  hotels);    
(2)  as  an  incident  to  a  lawful  arrest;    
(3)  searches  of  vessels  and  aircraft  for  violation  of  immigration,  customs,  and  drug  laws  (human  
smuggling,  smuggling  of  taxable  goods,  drugs);    
(4)  searches  of  moving  vehicles  (COMELEC  checkpoints,  PNP  checkpoints,  hot  pursuit);    
(5)   searches   of   automobiles   at   borders   or   constructive   borders   (checkpoints   in   areas   under  
Martial  Law);    
(6)  where  the  prohibited  articles  are  in  "plain  view;"    
(7)   searches   of   buildings   and   premises   to   enforce   fire,   sanitary,   and   building   regulations  
(protection  of  public  health  and  safety);  and    
(8)  "stop  and  frisk“  operations  (searches  conducted  at  airports  and  harbors  prior  to  boarding)    
 
13.  Under  what  circumstances  may  law  enforcers  invoke  the  plain  view  doctrine?  
Answer:  Objects  falling  in  plain  view  of  an  officer  who  has  a  right  to  be  in  a  position  to  have  
that   view   are   subject   to   seizure   even   without   a   search   warrant   and   may   be   introduced   in  
evidence.   The   plain   view   doctrine   applies   when   the   following   requisites   concur:   (a)   the   law  
enforcement   officer   in   search   of   the   evidence   has   a   prior   justification   for   an   intrusion   or   is   in  
a   position   from   which   he   can   view   a   particular   area;   (b)   the   discovery   of   evidence   in   plain  
view   is   inadvertent;   (c)   it   is   immediately   apparent   to   the   officer   that   the   item   he   observes  
may  be  evidence  of  a  crime,  contraband  or  otherwise  subject  to  seizure.  The  law  enforcement  
officer   must   lawfully   make   an   initial   intrusion   or   properly   be   in   a   position   from   which   he   can  
particularly  view  the  area.  In  the  course  of  such  lawful  intrusion,  he  came  inadvertently  across  a  
piece  of  evidence  incriminating  the  accused.  The  object  must  be  open  to  eye  and  hand  and  its  
discovery  inadvertent.  (cited  in  Miclat  v.  People,  Peralta,  J)  
 
14.   Dela   Cruz   was   an   on-­‐the-­‐job   trainee   of   an   inter-­‐island   vessel.   He   frequently   travelled,  
"coming  back  and  forth  taking  a  vessel.”  Dela  Cruz  was  at  a  pier  of  the  Cebu  Domestic  Port  to  

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go  home  to  Iloilo.  While  buying  a  ticket,  he  allegedly  left  his  bag  on  the  floor  with  a  porter.  It  
took  him  around  15  minutes  to  purchase  a  ticket.  
Dela   Cruz   then   proceeded   to   the   entrance   of   the   terminal   and   placed   his   bag   on   the   x-­‐ray  
scanning   machine   for   inspection.   The   operator   of   the   x-­‐ray   machine   saw   firearms   inside   Dela  
Cruz’s  bag.  Dela  Cruz  was  then  arrested  and  informed  of  his  violation  of  a  crime  punishable  by  
law.  He  was  also  informed  of  his  constitutional  rights.  
Did  the  petitioner  waive  his  right  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures?  
Answer:   Yes.   In   cases   involving   the   waiver   of   the   right   against   unreasonable   searches   and  
seizures,  events  must  be  weighed  in  its  entirety.  The  trial  court’s  findings  show  that  petitioner  
presented   his   bag   for   scanning   in   the   x-­‐ray   machine.   When   his   bag   went   through   the   x-­‐ray  
machine  and  the  firearms  were  detected,  he  voluntarily  submitted  his  bag  for  inspection  to  the  
port  authorities.  
The   Constitution   safeguards   a   person’s   right   against   unreasonable   searches   and   seizures.   A  
warrantless   search   is   presumed   to   be   unreasonable.   However,   this   court   lays   down   the  
exceptions   where   warrantless   searches   are   deemed   legitimate:   (1)   warrantless   search  
incidental   to   a   lawful   arrest;   (2)   seizure   in   "plain   view";   (3)   search   of   a   moving   vehicle;   (4)  
consented   warrantless   search;   (5)   customs   search;   (6)   stop   and   frisk;   and   (7)   exigent   and  
emergency   circumstances.   (ERWIN   LIBO-­‐ON   DELA   CRUZ   vs.   PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,  
January  11,  2016,  G.R.  No.  209387)  
 
15.  Assuming  that  there  was  no  waiver,  was  there  a  valid  search  and  seizure  in  this  case?  
Answer:  Yes,  there  was  a  valid  seizure  and  seizure.  There  is  a  reasonable  reduced  expectation  
of  privacy  when  coming  into  airports  or  ports  of  travel.  Persons  may  lose  the  protection  of  the  
search  and  seizure  clause  by  exposure  of  their  persons  or  property  to  the  public  in  a  manner  
reflecting  a  lack  of  subjective  expectation  of  privacy,  which  expectation  society  is  prepared  to  
recognize   as   reasonable.   Such   recognition   is   implicit   in   airport   security   procedures.   With  
increased   concern   over   airplane   hijacking   and   terrorism   has   come   increased   security   at   the  
nation’s   airports.   (ERWIN   LIBO-­‐ON   DELA   CRUZ   vs.   PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   January   11,  
2016,  G.R.  No.  209387)  
 
16.  Cite  instances  where  intrusions  to  privacy  were  done  on  the  bag  of  Dela  Cruz?  
Answer:  The  first  point  of  intrusion  occurred  when  petitioner  presented  his  bag  for  inspection  
to   port   personnel—the   x-­‐ray   machine   operator   and   baggage   inspector   manning   the   x-­‐ray  
machine   station.   With   regard   to   searches   and   seizures,   the   standard   imposed   on   private  
persons  is  different  from  that  imposed  on  state  agents  or  authorized  government  authorities.  
The   Bill   of   Rights   does   not   govern   relationships   between   individuals;   it   cannot   be   invoked  
against   the   acts   of   private   individuals.   The   Philippine   Ports   Authority   was   subsequently   given  
police  authority  through  Executive  Order  No.  513.  
 The   second   point   of   intrusion   was   when   the   baggage   inspector   opened   petitioner’s   bag   and  
called  the  attention  of  the  port  police  office    The   port   personnel’s   actions   proceed   from   the  
authority  and  policy  to  ensure  the  safety  of  travelers  and  vehicles  within  the  port.  At  this  point,  
petitioner  already  submitted  himself  and  his  belongings  to  inspection  by  placing  his  bag  in  the  
x-­‐ray  scanning  machine.  
The  presentation  of  petitioner’s  bag  for  x-­‐ray  scanning  was  voluntary.  Petitioner  had  the  choice  
of  whether  to  present  the  bag  or  not.  He  had  the  option  not  to  travel  if  he  did  not  want  his  bag  
scanned   or   inspected.   X-­‐ray   machine   scanning   and   actual   inspection   upon   showing   of   probable  
cause  that  a  crime  is  being  or  has  been  committed  are  part  of  reasonable  security  regulations  
to  safeguard  the  passengers  passing  through  ports  or  terminals.    
A  third  point  of  intrusion  to  petitioner’s  right  to  privacy  occurred  during  petitioner’s  submission  
to   port   security   measures.   This   court   should   determine   whether   the   requirements   for   a   valid  
waiver   against   unreasonable   searches   and   seizures   were   met.   The   Constitution   safeguards   a  
person’s  right  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures.  A  warrantless  search  is  presumed  to  
be  unreasonable.    
   
17.  What  is  chain  of  custody?  
Answer:   Chain   of   Custody   means   the   duly   recorded   authorized   movements   and   custody   of  
seized   drugs   or   controlled   chemicals   or   plant   sources   of   dangerous   drugs   or   laboratory  
equipment   of   each   stage,   from   the   time   of   seizure/confiscation   to   receipt   in   the   forensic  

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laboratory  to  safekeeping  to  presentation  in  court  for  destruction.  Such  record  of  movements  
and   custody   of   seized   item   shall   include   the   identity   and   signature   of   the   person   who   held  
temporary  custody  of  the  seized  item,  the  date  and  time  when  such  transfer  of  custody  were  
made  in  the  course  of  safekeeping  and  use  in  court  as  evidence,  and  the  final  disposition.  (cited  
in  People  v.  Climaco,  G.R.  No.  199403,  Carpio,  J.)  
 
 
18.  What  is  the  purpose  of  the  chain  of  custody?  
Answer:  In  Malillin  v.  People,1[22]  the  Court  explained  the  importance  of  the  chain  of  custody:  
“Prosecutions  for  illegal  possession  of  prohibited  drugs  necessitates  that  the  elemental  act  of  
possession  of  a  prohibited  substance  be  established  with  moral  certainty,  together  with  the  fact  
that  the  same  is  not  authorized  by  law.  The  dangerous  drug  itself  constitutes  the  very  corpus  
delicti  of  the  offense  and  the  fact  of  its  existence  is  vital  to  a  judgment  of  conviction.  Essential  
therefore  in  these  cases  is  that  the  identity  of  the  prohibited  drug  be  established  beyond  doubt.  
Be   that   as   it   may,   the   mere   fact   of   unauthorized   possession   will   not   suffice   to   create   in   a  
reasonable  mind  the  moral  certainty  required  to  sustain  a  finding  of  guilt.  More  than  just  the  
fact  of  possession,  the  fact  that  the  substance  illegally  possessed  in  the  first  place  is  the  same  
substance   offered   in   court   as   exhibit   must   also   be   established   with   the   same   unwavering  
exactitude   as   that   requisite   to   make   a   finding   of   guilt.   The   chain   of   custody   requirement  
performs  this  function  in  that  it  ensures  that  unnecessary  doubts  concerning  the  identity  of  the  
evidence  are  removed.”  
 
19.   What   are   the   ostensible   objectives   of   resorting   to   a   "stop-­‐and-­‐frisk"   practice   also   known   as  
Terry  Search?    
Answer:    A  stop-­‐and-­‐frisk  serves  a  two-­‐fold  interest:  (1)  the  general  interest  of  effective  crime  
prevention   and   detection,   which   underlies   the   recognition   that   a   police   officer   may,   under  
appropriate   circumstances   and   in   an   appropriate   manner,   approach   a   person   for   purposes   of  
investigating  possible  criminal  behavior  even  without  probable  cause;  and  (2)  the  more  pressing  
interests  of  safety  and  self-­‐preservation  which  permit  the  police  officer  to  take  steps    
   
20.   The   Constitution   has   enshrined   the   family   as   a   basic   autonomous   social   institution   under  
Sections  12  and  13,  Art.  II  and  Art.  XV-­‐  The  Family.  May  Congress  intrude  into  this  basic  social  
institution?  
Answer:  The  Court  has  recognized  that  under  Art.  52  of  the  Civil  Code,  marriage  is  not  a  mere  
contract  but  an  inviolable  social  institution.  In  Imbong  v.  Ochoa  (April  8,  2014),  the  Supreme  
Court  upheld  the  constitutionality  of  the  RH  Bill  as  a  valid  exercise  of  police  power.    
 
21.  What  other  issues  were  resolved  by  the  Court  in  Imbong  v.  Ochoa?  
Answer:  The  following  issues  were  resolved  by  the  Court:  
A.  Issue  on  Right  to  Privacy:    Section  23(a)  (2)  (i)  of  the  RH  Law  intrudes  into  martial  privacy  
and  autonomy  and  goes  against  the  constitutional  safeguards  for  the  family  as  the  basic  social  
institution.  Particularly,  Section  3,  Article  XV  of  the  Constitution  mandates  the  State  to  defend:  
(a)   the   right   of   spouses   to   found   a   family   in   accordance   with   their   religious   convictions   and   the  
demands   of   responsible   parenthood   and   (b)   the   right   of   families   or   family   associations   to  
participate  in  the  planning  and  implementation  of  policies  and  programs  that  affect  them.  The  
RH   Law   cannot   infringe   upon   this   mutual   decision-­‐making,   and   endanger   the   institutions   of  
marriage  and  the  family.  
B.  Issue  on  violation  of  Freedom  of  Religion:  The  provision  which  obliges  a  hospital  or  medical  
practitioner   to   immediately   refer   a   person   seeking   health   care   and   services   under   the   law   to  
another   accessible   healthcare   provider   despite   their   conscientious   objections   based   on  
religious  or  ethical  beliefs  violate  the  religious  belief  and  conviction  of  a  conscientious  objector.  
They   are   contrary   to   Section   29(2),   Article   VI   of   the   Constitution   or   the   Free   Exercise   Clause,  
whose  basis  is  the  respect  for  the  inviolability  of  the  human  conscience.  
C.   Issue   on   violation   of   Equal   Protection   Clause:   Excluding   public   health   officers   from   being  
conscientious  objectors  (under  Sec.  5.24  of  the  IRR)  also  violates  the  equal  protection  clause.  
There   is   no   perceptible   distinction   between   public   health   officers   and   their   private  
                                                                                                                       
 

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counterparts.   In   addition,   the   freedom   to   believe   is   intrinsic   in   every   individual   and   the  
protection  of  this  freedom  remains  even  if  he/she  is  employed  in  the  government.  
D.   Issue   on   Right   of   the   State   to   impose   Penalties:   Using   the   compelling   state   interest   test,  
there   is   no   compelling   state   interest   to   limit   the   free   exercise   of   conscientious   objectors.   There  
is  no  immediate  danger  to  the  life  or  health  of  an  individual  in  the  perceived  scenario.  While  
penalties  may  be  imposed  by  law  to  ensure  compliance  to  it,  a  constitutionally-­‐protected  right  
must  prevail  over  the  effective  implementation  of  the  law.    
 
22.  What  are  the  elements  of  freedom  of  religion?  
Answer:  Freedom  of  religion  includes  the  right  to  believe  and  the  right  to  profess  one’s  belief.  
 
23.   What   is   the   non-­‐establishment   clause   under   the   constitutional   guarantee   of   freedom   of  
religion?  
Answer:   The   Constitution   provides   in   Article   III,   Section   5   that   "[n]o   law   shall   be   made   respecting   an  
establishment   of   religion,   or   prohibiting   the   free   exercise   thereof."   At   bottom,   what   the   non-­‐
establishment  clause  calls  for  is  "government  neutrality  in  religious  matters.  (Ang  Ladlad  v.  COMELEC)  
 
24.  What  is  benevolent  neutrality?  
Answer:  Benevolent  neutrality  recognizes  that  government  must  pursue  its  secular  goals  and  interests  
but   at   the   same   time   strive   to   uphold   religious   liberty   to   the   greatest   extent   possible   within   flexible  
constitutional   limits.   Thus,   although   the   morality   contemplated   by   laws   is   secular,   benevolent   neutrality  
could   allow   for   accommodation   of   morality   based   on   religion,   provided   it   does   not   offend   compelling  
state  interests.  
 
25. Can  professors  of  law  claim  that  their  allegations  against  a  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  for  
plagiarism  was  protected  by  free  speech?  
Answer:  No.  In  a  decided  case,  the  Court  held  that  the  right  to  criticize  the  courts  and  judicial    
officers  must  be  balanced  against  the  equally  primordial  concern  that  the  independence  of  the    
Judiciary  be  protected  from  due  influence  or  interference.  In  cases  where  the  critics  are  not  
only  citizens  but  members  of  the  Bar,  jurisprudence  has  repeatedly  affirmed  the  authority  of  
this  Court  to  discipline  lawyers  whose  statements  regarding  the  courts  and  fellow  lawyers,  
whether  judicial  or  extrajudicial,  have  exceeded  the  limits  of  fair  comment  and  common  
decency.  The  accusatory  and  vilifying  nature  of  certain  portions  of  the  Statement  exceeded  the  
limits  of  fair  comment  and  cannot  be  deemed  as  protected  free  speech.  (RE:  LETTER  OF  THE  UP  
LAW  FACULTY  ENTITLED  “RESTORING  INTEGRITY:  A  STATEMENT  BY  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  
COLLEGE  OF  LAW  ON  THE  ALLEGATIONS  OF  PLAGIARISM  AND  MISREPRESENTATION  IN  THE  
SUPREME  COURT,  A.M.  No.  10-­‐10-­‐4-­‐  SC,  2010)  
 
26.  What  is  the  theory  behind  freedom  of  expression?  
Answer:    “T]he  theory  of  freedom  of  expression  involves  more  than  a  technique  for  arriving  at    
better  social  judgments  through  democratic  procedures.  It  comprehends  a  vision  of  society,  a    
faith  and  a  whole  way  of  life.  The  theory  grew  out  of  an  age  that  was  awakened  and    
invigorated  by  the  idea  of  new  society  in  which  man's  mind  was  free,  his  fate  determined  by  his    
own  powers  of  reason,  and  his  prospects  of  creating  a  rational  and  enlightened  civilization    
virtually  unlimited.  It  is  put  forward  as  a  prescription  for  attaining  a  creative,  progressive,    
exciting  and  intellectually  robust  community.  It  contemplates  a  mode  of  life  that,  through    
encouraging  toleration,  skepticism,  reason  and  initiative,  will  allow  man  to  realize  his  full    
potentialities.  It  spurns  the  alternative  of  a  society  that  is  tyrannical,  conformist,  irrational  and    
stagnant.”    (THE  DIOCESE  OF  BACOLOD  v.  COMELEC,  G.R.  No.  205728,  January  21,  2015)    
 
27.  What  tests  are  normally  applied  in  cases  involving  freedom  of  speech,  expression  and  of  the  
press?  
Answer:  The  following  tests  may  be  applied:  
O’Brien   Test   on   Content-­‐Neutral   Restrictions:   Social   Weather   Station   v.   COMELEC,   357   SCRA  
504  (2001)  (simple  public  disclosure  of  survey  results)  
Miller  Test  on  Indecent  Speech:Soriano  v.  Laguardia,  587  SCRA  79  (safeguard  community  values  
and  morals)  
Roth  Test  on  Obscenity:  Gonzales  v.  Kalaw-­‐  Katigbak,  137  SCRA  717  (Movie  Classification)  

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Clear  and  Present  Danger  Test:  David  v.  President  Gloria  Macapgal  Arroyo  and  Bayan  Muna  v.  
Ermita,  and  IBP  v.  Mayor  Atienza  (Freedom  of  Assembly)  
Please   note:   A   limitation   on   the   freedom   of   expression   may   be   justified   only   by   a   danger   of  
such  substantive  character   that   the  state   has   a   right   to   prevent.   Unlike   in   the   "dangerous  
tendency"   doctrine,   the   danger   must   not   only   be   clear   but   also   present.   "Present"   refers   to   the  
time   element;   the   danger   must   not   only   be   probable   but   very   likely   to   be   inevitable.  The   evil  
sought  to  be  avoided  must  be  so  substantive  as  to  justify  a  clamp     over   one's   mouth   or   a  
restraint  of  a  writing  instrument.

28.  May  a  person  who  voluntarily  surrendered  invoke  the  Miranda  rights?  
Answer:  No.  A  person  may  only  invoke  the  protection  of  Miranda  Rights  if  his  liberty  is    
restrained  by  law  enforcers.  
Miranda  Rights  will  apply  only  if  the  following  elements  are  present  –  
1. One  must  be  in  the  custody  of  law  enforcers;  
2. One  must  be  under  investigation  for  a  commission  of  an  offense;  and  
3. The  information  sought  is  testimonial  in  nature.  
 
29.  What  is  the  exclusionary  rule  governing  an  extrajudicial  confession?  
Answer:  Infraction  of  the  rights  of  an  accused  during  custodial  investigation  or  the  so-­‐called  
Miranda  Rights  render  inadmissible  only  the  extrajudicial  confession  or  admission  made  during  
such  investigation.  "The  admissibility  of  other  evidence,  provided  they  are  relevant  to  the  issue  
and  is  not  otherwise  excluded  by  law  or  rules,  is  not  affected  even  if  obtained  or  taken  in  the  
course  of  custodial  investigation."  (Ho  Wai  Ping  v.  People,  G.R.  No.  176229,  October  19,  2011)  
 
30.   De  Leon  was  charged  with  Grave  Oral  Defamation  before  the  MeTC.  Upon  arraignment,  De  
Leon  entered  a  plea  of  not  guilty.  The  MeTC  found  De  Leon  guilty  beyond  reasonable  doubt  of  
Grave   Oral   Defamation.   The   verdict   being   unacceptable   to   him,   De   Leon   filed   his   Notice   of  
Appeal.  The  RTC  issued  the  Order  directing  De  Leon  to  file  his  appeal  memorandum.  De  Leon,  
however,   failed   to   comply.   For   his   failure   to   file   the   same,   the   RTC   issued   another   Order  
dismissing  his  appeal.  De  Leon  then  filed  a  motion  for  reconsideration,  which  was  granted  by  
the  RTC  in  its  Order.  De  Leon  filed  his  appeal  memorandum  and  argued,  among  others,  that  the  
MeTC   decision   lacked   the   necessary   constitutional   and   procedural   requirements   of   a   valid  
decision.  
Question:   Did   the   Decision   of   the   MeTC   fail   to   include   the   facts   and   the   law   upon   which   the  
decision  was  based?  
Answer:   No.   There   was   no   breach   of   the   constitutional   mandate   that   decisions   must   express  
clearly   and   distinctly   the   facts   and   the   law   on   which   they   are   based.   The   CA   correctly   stated  
that  the  MeTC  clearly  emphasized  in  its  decision,  the  factual  findings,  as  well  as  the  credibility  
and   the   probative   weight   of   the   evidence   for   the   defense   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   the   evidence   of   the  
prosecution.   The   MeTC   presented   both   the   version   of   the   prosecution   and   that   of   the   defense.  
De  Leon  was  not  left  in  the  dark.  He  was  fully  aware  of  the  alleged  errors  of  the  MeTC.  The  RTC,  
as  an  appellate  court,  found  no  reason  to  reverse  the  decision  of  the  MeTC.  (ENRIQUE  G.  DE  
LEON,   Petitioners,   vs.   PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES   and   SPO3   PEDRITO   L.   LEONARDO,  
Respondents. January  11,  2016,  G.R.  No.  212623)  

31.  What  is  transactional  immunity?  

Answer:  Government  may  enter  into  an  agreement  to  grant  immunity  provided  grantee  will  
become  a  state  witness.    
There   are   two   kinds   of   statutory   criminal   immunity   available   to   a   witness:   transactional  
immunity  and  the  use-­‐and-­‐derivative-­‐use     immunity.  Transactional  immunity  is  broader  in  the  
scope   of   its   protection.   By   its   grant,   a   witness   can   no   longer   be   prosecuted   for   any   offense  
whatsoever  arising  out  of  the  act  or  transaction  to  which  the  testimony  relates.  In  contrast,  by  
the  grant  of  use-­‐and-­‐derivative-­‐use  immunity,  a  witness  is  only  assured  that     his   or   her  
particular   testimony   and   evidence   derived   from   it   will   not   be   used   against   him   or   her   in   a  
subsequent  prosecution.  (Tanchanco  v.  Sandiganbayan,  476  SCRA  202,  2005)  
 
32.   If   one   has   been   convicted   for   violation   of   an   ordinance,   may   be   held   accountable   again  
under  a  national  law?  

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No.  Requisites  of  Double  Jeopardy  (Ivler  v.  San  Pedro,  G.R.  No.  172716,  November  17,  2010):  
1. Identity  of  the  elements  of  the  crime  committed  as  set  forth  in  the  information.  
2. Accused  has  entered  his  plea.  
3. Prosecution  and  the  defense  have  presented  evidence.  
4. The  court  has  ruled  on  the  merits.  
 
33.  What  is  the  rule  on  demurrer  to  evidence?  
Answer:   In   People   v.   Sandiganbayan,   the   Supreme   Court   explained   the   general   rule   that   the  
grant  of  a  demurrer  to  evidence  operates  as  an  acquittal  and  is,  thus,  final  and  unappealable.  
The  demurrer  to  evidence  in  criminal  cases  is  "filed  after  the  prosecution  had  rested  its  case,"  
and   when   the   same   is   granted,   it   calls   "for   an   appreciation   of   the   evidence   adduced   by   the  
prosecution   and   its   sufficiency   to   warrant   conviction   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   resulting   in   a  
dismissal  of  the  case  on  the  merits,  tantamount  to  an  acquittal  of  the  accused.  (People  v.  Dante  
Tan  G.R.  No.  167526,  July  26,  2010)  
 
34.  What  is  the  extent  of  the  interest  of  a  prívate  party  in  a  criminal  case?  
 Answer:   It   is   well-­‐settled   that   in   criminal   cases   where   the   offended   party   is   the   State,   the  
interest  of  the  private  complainant  or  the  private  offended  party  is  limited  to  the  civil  liability.  
Thus,  in  the  prosecution  of  the  offense,  the  complainant's  role  is  limited  to  that  of  a  witness  for  
the  prosecution.  If  a  criminal  case  is  dismissed  by  the  trial  court  or  if  there  is  an  acquittal,  only  
the  OSG,  and  not  the  private  offended  party,  has  the  authority  to  question  the  order  granting  
the   demurrer   to   evidence   in   a   criminal   case.   (Bangayan,   Jr.,   v.   Bangayan,   G.R.   No.   172777,  
October  19,  2011)  
 
35.  May  the  state  appeal  an  acquittal?  
Answer:   It   has   been   consistently   held   that   in   criminal   cases,   the   acquittal   of   the   accused   or   the  
dismissal  of  the  case  against  him  can  only  be  appealed  by  the  Solicitor  General,  acting  on  behalf  
of   the   State.  The   private   complainant   or   the   offended   party   may   question   such   acquittal   or  
dismissal   only   insofar   as   the   civil   liability   of   the   accused   is   concerned.  
The   exception   where   the   acquittal   may   be   questioned   based   on   denial   of   the   State's   right   to  
due  process  can  be  found  in  Galman  v.  Sandiganbayan  (1986)  
Exception,  when  invoked:  Lejano  v.  People,  G.R.  Nos.  176389  and  176864,  January  18,  2011:  
To  reconsider  a  judgment  of  acquittal  places  the  accused  twice  in  jeopardy  of  being  punished  
for  the  crime  of  which  he  has  already  been  absolved.  There  is  reason  for  this  provision  of  the  
Constitution.  In  criminal  cases,  the  full  power  of  the  State  is  ranged  against  the  accused.    
 
36.   CTRM,   an   office   under   the   National   Economic   Development   Authority   (NEDA),   held   a  
meeting   in   which   it   resolved   to   recommend   to   President   Gloria   Macapagal-­‐Arroyo   the   lifting   of  
the  suspension  of  the  tariff  reduction  schedule  on  petrochemicals  and  certain  plastic  products,  
thereby   reducing   the   Common   Effective   Preferential   Tariff   (CEPT)   rates   on   products   covered   by  
Executive  Order  (E.O.)  No.  161  from  7%  or  10%  to  5%  starting  July  2005.  
May  the  CTRM  be  compelled  by  mandamus  to  furnish  the  petitioner  with  a  copy  of  the  minutes  
of   the   meeting   based   on   the   constitutional   right   to   information   on   matters   of   public   concern  
and  the  State’s  policy  of  full  public  disclosure?  
Answer:  No.  Section  28  of  Article  II  of  the  1987  Constitution  provides  that  subject  to  reasonable  
conditions   prescribed   by   law,   the   State   adopts   and   implements   a   policy   of   full   public   disclosure  
of  all  its  transactions  involving  public  interest.  Section  7  of  Article  III  of  the  1987  Constitution:  
The  right  of  the  people  to  information  on  matters  of  public  concern  shall  be  recognized.  Access  
to   official   records,   and   to   documents,   and   papers   pertaining   to   official   acts,   transactions,   or  
decisions,  as  well  as  to  government  research  data  used  as  basis  for  policy  development,  shall  be  
afforded  the  citizen,  subject  to  such  limitations  as  may  be  provided  by  law.  
In   Senate   of   the   Philippines   v.   Ermita,   executive   privilege   is   properly   invoked   in   relation   to  
specific   categories   of   information,   not   to   categories   of   persons.   What   should   determine  
whether  or  not  information  was  within  the  ambit  of  the  exception  from  the  people’s  right  to  
access  to  information  was  not  the  composition  of  the  body,  but  the  nature  of  the  information  
sought  to  be  accessed.    
In  case  of  conflict,  there  is  a  need  to  strike  a  balance  between  the  right  of  the  people  and  the  
interest   of   the   Government   to   be   protected.   In   the   case   above   (Mario   Sereno   vs   CTRM),   the  

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need  to  ensure  the  protection  of  the  privilege  of  non-­‐disclosure  is  necessary  to  allow  the  free  
exchange   of   ideas   among   Government   officials   as   well   as   to   guarantee   the   well-­‐considered  
recommendation   free   from   interference   of   the   inquisitive   public.   (MARIO   JOSE   E.   SERENO,  
EXECUTIVE   DIRECTOR   OF   THE   ASSOCIATION   OF   PETROCHEMICAL   MANUFACTURERS   OF   THE  
PHILIPPINES,   INC.   (APMP),   vs.   COMMITTEE   ON   TRADE   AND   RELATED   MATTERS   (CTRM)   OF  
THE  NATIONAL  ECONOMIC  AND  DEVELOPMENT  AUTHORITY  (NEDA), February  1,  2016,  G.R.  
No.  175210)  
 
37.  What  are  the  elements  that  would  allow  issuance  of  Writ  of  Mandamus  under  the  right  to  
information?  
Answer:  Two  requisites  must  concur  before  the  right  to  information  may  be  compelled  by  writ  
of  mandamus.    
(1)  the  information  sought  must  be  in  relation  to  matters  of  public  concern  or  public  interest;  
and  
(2)  it  must  not  be  exempt  by  law  from  the  operation  of  the  constitutional  guarantee.  
 
38.   Petitioner   entered   said   land   without   the   knowledge   or   consent   of   respondents,   without  
properly   initiating   expropriation   proceedings,   and   without   any   compensation   to   respondents-­‐
landowners.  Because  of  said  transmission  lines,  respondents  alleged  that  they  could  no  longer  
use   their   land   as   part   of   a   subdivision   project   as   originally   intended,   which   ultimately   caused  
financial  loss  to  their  family.  
Respondents  filed  a  complaint  against  petitioner  and  its  officers  with  the  Regional  Trial  Court  of  
Naga  City  (RTC).  Respondents  demanded  the  removal  of  the  power  lines  and  its  accessories  and  
payment   of   damages,   or   in   the   alternative,   payment   of   the   fair   market   value   of   the   affected  
areas  totaling  26,000  square  meters  of  respondents'  land  at  P800.00  per  square  meter.  The  trial  
court  included  inflation  rate  in  the  determination  of  inflation  rate.  
Question:  
Did   the   Court   commit   an   error   when   it   included   the   inflation   rate   of   the   Philippine   Peso   in  
determining  the  just  compensation  due  to  respondents?  
 
Answer:   Yes.   The   formula   for   determination   of   just   compensation   to   landowners   does   not  
include  the  factor  for  inflation  rate,  as  inflation  is  properly  accounted  for  through  payment  of  
interest  on  the  amount  due  to  the  landowner,  and  through  the  award  of  exemplary  damages  
and  attorney's  fees  in  cases  where  there  was  irregularity  in  the  taking  of  property.  
 
39.   Santos   owned   three   (3)   parcels   of   agricultural   land   devoted   to   corn.   In   1984,   the   subject  
lands   were   placed   under   the   government's   Operation   Land   Transfer   Program.   Finding   the  
valuation  unreasonable,  Santos  filed  an  action  before  the  trial  court.  
The  RTC  directed  the  LBP  to  submit  a  revaluation  for  Lands  1,  2,  and  3  in  accordance  with  the  
factors   set   forth   under   Republic   Act   (RA)   No.   6657   otherwise   known   as   the   "Comprehensive  
Agrarian   Reform   Law   of   1988.”   The   trial   court   imposed   a   12%   on   the   unpaid   just   compensation  
for  Land  3.  
Question:  Whether  the  RTC  acted  with  grave  abuse  of  discretion  in  holding  LBP  liable  for  twelve  
percent  (12%)  interest  on  the  unpaid  just  compensation  for  Land  3.  
Answer:  No,  the  RTC  did  not  act  with  grave  abuse  of  discretion  in  holding  LBP  liable  for  twelve  
percent  (12%)  interest  on  the  unpaid  just  compensation  for  Land  3.  With  respect  to  the  award  
of  twelve  percent  (12%)  interest  on  the  unpaid  just  compensation  for  Land  3,  the  Court  finds  
untenable  the  LBP's  contention  that  the  same  was  bereft  of  factual  and  legal  bases,  grounded  
on  its  having  promptly  paid  Santos  the  initial  valuation.    
Interest   is   imposed   if   there   is   delay   in   the   payment   of   just   compensation   to   the   landowner   since  
the  obligation  is  deemed  to  be  an  effective  forbearance  on  the  part  of  the  State.  Such  interest  
shall  be  pegged  at  the  rate  of  twelve  percent  (12%)  per  annum  on  the  unpaid  balance  of  the  just  
compensation,  reckoned  from  the  time  of  taking,  or  the  time  when  the  landowner  was  deprived  
of   the   use   and   benefit   of   his   property   such   as   when   title   is   transferred   to   the   Republic,   or  
emancipation  patents  are  issued  by  the  government,  until  full  payment.    
 
 

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40.  What  is  just  compensation?  
Answer:   Just   compensation   is   defined   as   the   full   and   fair   equivalent   of   the   property   taken   from  
its   owner   by   the   expropriator.   It   has   been   repeatedly   stressed   by   this   Court   that   the   true  
measure   is   not   the   taker's   gain   but   the   owner's   loss.   The   word   'just"   is   used   to   modify   the  
meaning  of  the  word  "compensation"  to  convey  the  idea  that  the  equivalent  to  be  given  for  the  
property  to  be  taken  shall  be  real,  substantial,  full,  and  ample.  
 
41.  What  is  an  out-­‐of-­‐court  identification/Police  Line-­‐Up?  
Answer:  Out-­‐of-­‐court  identification  is  conducted  by  the  police  in  various  ways.  It  is  done  thru  
show-­‐ups   where   the   suspect   alone   is   brought   face   to   face   with   the   witness   for   identification.   It  
is   done   thru   mug   shots   where   photographs   are   shown   to   the   witness   to   identify   the   suspect.   It  
is  also  done  thru  lineups  where  a  witness  identifies  the  suspect  from  a  group  of  persons  lined  up  
for  the  purpose  x  x  x  In  resolving  the  admissibility  of  and  relying  on  out-­‐of-­‐court  identification  of  
suspects,   courts   have   adopted   the   totality   of   circumstances   test   where   they   consider   the  
following  factors,  viz:  (1)  the  witness'  opportunity  to  view  the  criminal  at  the  time  of  the  crime;  
(2)   the   witness'   degree   of   attention   at   that   time;   (3)   the   accuracy   of   any   prior   description   given  
by  the  witness;  (4)  the  level  of  certainty  demonstrated  by  the  witness  at  the  identification;  (5)  
the  length  of  time  between  the  crime  and  the  identification;  and  (6)  the  suggestiveness  of  the  
identification  procedure.  
 
42.   For   allegedly   stoning,   hitting   and   stabbing   Rodolfo   M.   Lebria   (Rodolfo),   the   petitioners  
together   with   their   co-­‐accused,   Boyet   Ibañez   (Boyet)   and   David   Ibañez   (David),   who   have  
remained  at  large,  were  charged  with  the  crime  of  frustrated  homicide.  
During   the   arraignment,   Ronald   and   Bobot   were   assisted   by   Atty.   Bibiano   Colasito,   who   was  
selected  as  their  counsel  de  officio  only  for  that  occasion.  At  his  arraignment,  Emilio  appeared  
with  the  assistance  of  Atty.  Antonio  Manzano  (Atty.  Manzano),  who  was  then  appointed  by  the  
trial   court   as   counsel   de   oficio   for   all   the   accused.   In   the   pre-­‐trial   conference   that   followed,  
Atty.  Manzano  appeared  for  the  petitioners.  Atty.  Manzano  was  informed  that  the  trial  for  the  
presentation  of  prosecution  evidence  was  set  on  June  18,  2003.  
Petitioners  alleged  that  they  were  deprived  of  their  right  to  counsel.  
Question:  Whether  the  petitioners  were  deprived  of  their  constitutionally  guaranteed  right  to  
counsel.  
Answer:   No.   There   was   no   denial   of   right   to   counsel   as   evinced   by   the   fact   that   the   petitioners  
were   not   only   assisted   by   a   counsel   de   oficio   during   arraignment   and   pre-­‐trial   but   more   so,  
their  counsel  de  oficio  actively  participated  in  the  proceedings  before  the  trial  court  including  
the   direct   and   cross-­‐   examination   of   the   witnesses.   Mere   opportunity   and   not   actual   cross-­‐
examination   is   the   essence   of   the   right   to   cross-­‐examine.(RONALD   IBAÑEZ,   EMILIO   IBAÑEZ,  
and   DANIEL   "BOBOT"   IBAÑEZ   vs.   PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   January   27,   2016,   G.R.  
No.190798)  
 
43.  The  Prosecutor  charged  petitioner  with  Reckless  Imprudence  Resulting  to  Multiple  Serious  
Physical  Injuries  and  Damage  to  Property  
Upon  being  arraigned,  the  petitioner,  with  the  assistance  of  his  counsel,  pleaded  not  guilty  to  
the  Information  in  this  case.  
Trial   ensued.   However,   after   the   initial   presentation   of   evidence   for   the   petitioner,   he   resigned  
from  his  employment  and  transferred  residence.  His  whereabouts  allegedly  became  unknown  
so  his  new  counsel  did  not  present  him  as  a  witness.  
The  RTC  rendered  its  Decision  in  absentia  convicting  the  petitioner  of  the  crime  charged.  The  
Court  of  Appeals  affirmed  the  conviction.  
Question:  Whether  or  not  the  RTC  and  the  CA  erred  in  denying  the  motion  for  new  trial  or  to  
re-­‐open  the  same  in  order  to  allow  the  petitioner  to  present  evidence  on  his  behalf.  
Answer:  No.  The  Court  finds  that  no  errors  of  law  or  irregularities,  prejudicial  to  the  substantial  
rights  of  the  petitioner,  have  been  committed  during  trial.  
The   holding   of   trial   in   absentia   is   authorized   under   Section   14(2),   Article   III   of   the   1987  
Constitution   which   provides   that   after   arraignment,   trial   may   proceed   notwithstanding   the  
absence   of   the   accused   provided   that   he   has   been   duly   notified   and   arraignment,   trial   may  
proceed  notwithstanding  the  absence  of  the  accused  provided  that  he  has  been  duly  notified  

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and  his  failure  to  appear  is  unjustifiable.  It  is  established  that  notices  have  been  served  to  the  
counsel  of  the  petitioner  and  his  failure  to  inform  his  counsel  of  his  whereabouts  is  the  reason  
for  his  failure  to  appear  on  the  scheduled  date.  Thus,  the  arguments  of  the  petitioner  against  
the  validity  of  the  proceedings  and  promulgation  of  judgment  in  absentia  for  being  in  violation  
of  the  constitutional  right  to  due  process  are  doomed  to  fail.  
 
44.  Cite  instances  when  the  freedom  of  movement  may  be  restricted.  
Answer:  The  following  instances  illustrate  that  the  freedom  of  movement  may  be  restricted.    
Gudani   v.   Senga:   the   power   of   the   President   as   Commander   in   Chief   was   sustained   in  
restraining  officers  from  testifying  before  the  Senate.  
Fr.   Roberto   P.   Reyes   v.   Gonzalez:   Writ   of   Amparo   will   not   lie   to   overcome   a   Hold   Departure  
Order.   The   Writ   of   Amparo   was   intended   to   address   the   intractable   problem   of   “extrajudicial  
killings”  and  “enforced  disappearances.”    
OCA  v.  Judge  Ignacio  B.  Macarine,  A.M.  No.  MTJ-­‐10-­‐1770,  July  18,  2012.  The  Court  may  impose  
travel  restrictions  on  judges.    
Marcos   v.   Sandiganbayan:   humanitarian   a   person’s   right   to   travel   is   subject   to   the   usual  
constraints  imposed  by  the  very  necessity  of  safeguarding  the  system  of  justice.  In  such  cases,  
whether  the  accused  should  be  permitted  to  leave  the  jurisdiction  for  reasons  is  a  matter  of  the  
court’s  sound  discretion.  
 
OTHER   RELEVANT   RULINGS   ON:   FREEDOM   OF   ABODE   AND   FREEDOM   OF   MOVEMENT:   THE  
RIGHT  TO  CHOOSE  ONE’S  DOMICILE;  RIGHT  TO  TRAVEL.  
Marcos   v.   COMELEC:   the   surviving   spouse   has   the   right   to   choose   her   residence   other   than   the  
conjugal  home.  
Aquino  v.  COMELEC:  a  lease  contract  is  not  conclusive  proof  of  length  of  residence  to  meet  the  
requirements  to  run  for  public  office.  
Villavicencio  v.  Lukban:  the  Mayor’s  order  that  some  170  individuals  be  put  in  custody  and  be  
dispatched   to   Davao   City   for   work   is   a   valid   subject   of   a   writ   of   habeas   corpus.   Freedom   of  
abode  is  guaranteed  “for  ours  is  a  government  of  laws  and  not  of  men.”  
 
45.  Lolita  is  a  flight  attendant  who  has  exceeded  the  prescribed  weight  of  the  airline  company.  
Despite   repeated   warnings,   she   failed   to   meet   the   prescribed   weight   and   was   accordingly  
dismissed   by   the   airline   company.     She   filed   an   action   before   the   NLRC   for   illegal   dismissal  
because  she  was  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  law.  Will  the  action  prosper?  
Answer:  No.:  The  claim  of  denial  of  the  equal  protection  clause  may  only  be  invoked  against  the  
state.  (Ysaregui  v.  NLRC  and  PAL)  
 
Other  relevant  rulings  on  equal  protection  clause:  
Garcia   v.   Hon.   Drilon   et   al.,   G.R.   No.   179267,   June   25,   2013.   R.A.   9262   does   not   violate   the  
equal   protection   clause   for   the   following   reasons:   the   classification   rests   on   substantial  
distinctions;  the  classification  is  germane  to  the  purpose  of  the  law;  and  the  classification  is  not  
limited  to  existing  conditions  only  and  apply  equally  to  all  members.  
Biraogo   v.   The   Philippine   Truth   Commission   of   2010   et   al.,   G.R.Nos.192935   and   193036,  
December   7,   2010:   E.O.   is   unconstitutional   for   singling   out   President   Arroyo’s   administration  
only.      
 
46.   What   are   the   standards   of   review   employed   by   the   Court   for   constitutionally   protected  
rights?  
Answer:  The  Standards  of  Review  are:  
Deferential   or   Rational   Basis   Scrutiny   which   establishes   a   rational   connection   to   serve  
legitimate  state  interest;  
Middle   Tier   or   Intermediate   Scrutiny:   Challenged   classification   serves   important   an  
important  state  interest;  and  
Strict   Judicial   Scrutiny:   Burden   is   on   the   state   to   prove   that   classification   achieves   a  
compelling  state  interest.  
 
 
 

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47.  As  counsel  of  a  complainant,  how  will  ensure  that  you  can  obtain  a  valid  search  warrant?  
The  Supreme  Court  has  consistently  held  that  the  validity  of  the  issuance  of  a  search  warrant  
rests   upon   the   following   factors:   (1)   it   must   be   issued   upon   probable   cause;   (2)   the   probable  
cause  must  be  determined  by  the  judge  himself  and  not  by  the  applicant  or  any  other  person;  
(3)  in  the  determination  of  probable  cause,  the  judge  must  examine,  under  oath  or  affirmation,  
the  complainant  and  such  witnesses  as  the  latter  may  produce;  and  (4)  the  warrant  issued  must  
particularly   describe   the   place   to   be   searched   and   persons   and   things   to   be   seized.   (HPS  
Software   and   Communication   Corp.   and   Yap   v.   PLDT,   et   al.,   G.R.   No.   170217,   170694,  
December  10,  2012)  
 
48.   While   serving   the   search   warrant,   the   law   enforcers   sensed   that   more   unclicensed   firearms  
were  kept  in  the  locked  cabinets.  They  forced  open  the  cabinets  and  true  enough  several  high  
powered  firearms  were  seized  but  were  not  covered  by  the  warrant.  Can  the  accused  move  for  
the  exclusion  of  the  seizure  of  the  firearms  not  covered  by  the  search  warrant?  
Answer:   Yes.   In   People   v.   Nunez,   the   Court   held   that   the   seizure   of   items   not   particularly  
described   in   the   search   warrant   for   violation   of   the   Dangerous   Drugs   Act   of   1972   must   be  
returned  to  the  accused  unless  they  are  illegal  and  will  be  destroyed  by  the  state.  
UNILAB  v.  Isip:  Plain  view  doctrine  will  not  apply  when  the  following  cannot  be  proved:  prior  
intrusion   must   be   legal;   officer   must   discover   the   incriminating   evidence   inadvertently;   and   the  
object  must  be  immediately  apparent.  
Exceptions:   search   incident   to   a   lawful   arrest   (in   flagrante   delicto,   hot   pursuit   and   escaped  
prisoners),   search   of   moving   vehicles,   plain   view   doctrine   and   airport   searches;   and   all  
circumstances  set  forth  in  the  Rules  in  Criminal  Procedure.  
 
XI.  LOCAL  GOVERNMENTS  AND  THE  CONCEPT  OF  LOCAL  AUTONOMY  
 
1.   One   of   the   salient   features   of   the   Constitution   is   the   recognition   of   the   autonomy   of   local  
governments  under  Section  25  and  Art.  X.  What  are  the  political  subdivisions  under  Section1  of  
Article  X?  
Answer:  The  following  are  the  territorial  and  political  subdivisions  of  the  Philippines:  provinces,  
cities,  municipalities  and  barangays  as  well  as  the  autonomous  regions  of  ARMM  and  CAR.  
 
2.  What  are  the  mandatory  requirements  to  create  a  local  government  unit?  
Answer:  Factors  to  be  considered  in  the  creation  of  local  government  unit:      
(1).   Population   to   be   authenticated   by   the   National   Statistics   Office   (now   Philippine  
Statistics  Authority);  population  must  be  actual  and  certification  can  only  be  issued  by  
the  Chief  Statistician  (Aldaba  v.  COMELEC,  2010);  
(2).   Income:   Average   of   two-­‐year   of   the   local   government   unit   to   be   certified   by   the  
Department   of   Finance.   Note   that   all   treasurers   of   all   local   government   units   are  
appointed  by  the  Secretary  of  Finance.    
The  share  of  the  local  government  in  the  IRA  is  included  in  the  computation  of  income.  
(Alvarez  v.  Guingona,  1996)  
(3).   Land   Area:   Area   must   be   contiguous   except   for   provinces   comprising   of   islands.   The  
land   area   must   be   authenticated   by   the   Land   Management   Bureau   of   the   DENR.  
(Navarro   v.   Ermita,2011),   where   the   Court   ruled   in   favor   of   the   constitutionality   of  
Dinagat  as  a  province  despite  the  fact  that  it  did  not  meet  the  prescribed  2,000  square  
meter   area.   It   is   impossible   to   achieve   the   minimum   area   requirement   since   the  
province  of  Dinagat  is  composed  of  islands  and  cannot  be  contiguous.  
 
Rule  on  creation  of  local  government  units  and  additional  congressional  districts:  a  plebiscite  
is   required   in   the   creation   of   local   government   units   but   not   in   the   creation   of   additional  
congressional  districts.  
Sema  v.  COMELEC:  The  ARMM  Legislative  Assembly  cannot  create  provinces  and  the  grant  of  
such   power   under   the   ARMM   Organic   Act   is   deemed   unconstitutional.   It   is   not   a   valid  
delegation   of   power.   The   creation   of   local   government   units   in   provinces,   cities,   municipalities,  
and   other   political   subdivision   is   a   congressional/legislative   prerogative   while   the   creation   of  
barangays    shall  be  done  by  local  ordinances  in  cities  and  provinces  (for  component  cities  and  

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municipalities)   through   the   Sangguniang   Panglungsod   and   Sangguniang   Panlalawigan   as   the  
case  may  be.        
League  of  Cities  of  the  Philippines  v.  COMELEC  (2010).  In  upholding  the  legality  of  the  creation  
of   additional   16   cities,   the   Court   held   that   Congress   may   apply   the   revised   requirements   in   a  
new   law   during   the   pendency   of   the   approval   of   all   the   bills   creating   such   new   local  
government  units.  
 
3.  How  are  boundary  disputes  among  local  government  units  resolved?  
Answer:  Jurisdiction  of  boundary  disputes:  
Regional   trial   courts   exercise   original   jurisdiction   over   boundary   disputes   in   involving   a  
MUNICIPALITY  and  an  independent  component  city.  
Sangguniang  Panlalawigan  exercises  original  jurisdiction  over  boundary  disputes  involving  two  
municipalities  of  the  same  province.  
Joint  Sangguniang  Panlalawigan  exercises  original  jurisdiction  over  boundary  disputes  involving  
two  municipalities  of  the  different  provinces.  
Sangguniang   Panlungsod   exercises   original   jurisdiction   over   boundary   disputes   involving   two  
barangays  of  the  same  city.  
Joint   Sangguniang   Panlungsod   exercises   original   jurisdiction   over   boundary   disputes   involving  
two  barangays  of  two  different  cities.  
The   regional   trial   court   exercises   APPELLATE   jurisdiction   over   boundary   disputes   among   local  
government  units.  
 
4.  May  a  barangay  order  the  closure  of  streets  in  a  private  subdivision?  
Answer:  Yes.  In  the  case  of  Sun  Valley  Homeowners  Assn.,  Inc.  v.  Sanggguniang  Barangay  of  
Sun  Valley  (July  2011),  Petitioner  wants  the  Court  to  recognize  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  
residents  of  Sun  Valley  Subdivision  but  it  miserably  failed  to  establish  the  legal  basis,  such  as  its  
ownership   of   the   subject   roads.   Section   21   of   the   Local   Government   Code   requires   the   passage  
of  an  ordinance  by  a  local  government  unit  to  effect  the  opening  of  a  local  road.  The  Court  held  
that   the   subject   provision   can   have   no   applicability   to   the   instant   case   since   the   subdivision  
road  lots  sought  to  be  opened  to  decongest  traffic  in  the  area  -­‐  namely  Rosemallow  and  Aster  
Streets   -­‐   have   already   been   donated   by   the   Sun   Valley   Subdivision   to,   and   the   titles   thereto  
already   issued   in   the   name   of,   the   City   Government   of   Paranaque   since   the   year   1964.   The  
Court   also   noted   that   the   action   of   the   Petitioner   was   premature   for   failure   to   exhaust  
administrative  remedies  because  the  issues  presented  before  which  could  have  been  resolved  
by  the  Mayor’s  office.  
Barangay  Sindalan,  San  Fernando,  Pampanga  v.  C.A.  (2007):  The  Court  also  held  that  no  public  
funds   may   be   used   to   construct   an   access   road   which   would   benefit   solely   the   residents   of   a  
newly-­‐developed  subdivision.  
City   of   Manila   v.   Chinese   Community   (1919):   A   local   government   may   not   takeover   a   property  
for  expansion  of  a  public  street  when  such  property  (cemetery)  already  serves  a  public  purpose.  
MMDA   v.   Bel-­‐Air   Village   Homeowners   Assn.,   Inc.:   MMDA   cannot   require   the   opening   of  
certain   streets   inside   a   private   subdivision   since   it   cannot   make   an   ordinance   because   it   has   no  
rule-­‐making  powers.  The  opening  of  a  street  is  a  way  of  regulating  use  of  property.  Therefore,  
MMDA  cannot  also  validly  exercise  police  power.  
Sanggalang   v.   IAC   (176   SCRA   716):   Through   the   enactment   of   an   ordinance   which   has  
reclassified   Jupiter   St.,   Bel   Air   Village,   the   local   government   may   allow   the   use   of   former  
residential  lots  along  the  street  for  commercial  purposes.  
Albon   v.   Mayor   Fernando:   No   public   funds   may   be   spent   for   the   upgrading   of   private  
subdivision  roads  unless  they  are  turned  over  to  the  local  government  unit.  
 
5.  May  a  local  government  unit  reclassify  the  use  of  land  which  would  violate  the  provisions  of  
the  Comprehensive  Agrarian  Reform  Law?  
Answer:   The   local   government   has   authority   to   reclassify   lands   but   not   when   such  
reclassification   violates   the   Comprehensive   Agrarian   Reform   Law.   The   exception   to   this   general  
rule   is   when   the   local   government   unit   had   already   reclassified   the   subject   land   before   the  
effectivity  of  the  Comprehensive  Agrarian  Reform  Law.  
Buklod   ng   Magbubukid   sa   Lupaing   Ramos,   Inc.   v.   E.MM.   Ramos,   Inc.   (2011):   The   ordinance  
reclassifying  the  land  in  question  shall  prevail  over  the  opposition  of  the  Petitioner.  The  Court  

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held    Section  3(c),  Chapter  I  of  the  CARL  further  narrows  down  the  definition  of  agricultural  land  
that  is  subject  to  CARP  to  "land  devoted  to  agricultural  activity  as  defined  in  this  Act”  and  not  
classified  otherwise.    
The   CARL   took   effect   on   June   15,   1988.   To   be   exempt   from   the   CARP,   the   subject   property  
should   have   already   been   reclassified   as   residential   prior   to   said   date.   The   ordinance   was  
enacted  prior  to  the  effectivity  of  CARL.  
Davao  New  Town  Development  Corp.  v.    Spouses  Espino  et  al  (2013):    The  Court  held  that  the  
subject  property  had  been  reclassified  as  non-­‐agricultural  prior  to  June  15,  1988;  hence,  they  
are  no  longer  covered  by  R.A.  No.  6657.    
 
6.  May  a  zoning  ordinance  prevail  over  a  restriction  in  the  Transfer  Certificate  of  Title  which  the  
Ayala  Alabang  Homeowners  Association  seeks  to  impose  on  the  property  owner?  
Answer:   No.   The   annotation   at   the   back   of   TCT   No.   149166   covering   the   subject   property  
provides:  “PE-­‐222/T-­‐134042  -­‐  RESTRICTIONS  -­‐  The  property  cannot  be  subdivided  for  a  period  
of   fifty   (50)   years   from   the   date   of   sale.     The   property   shall   be   used   exclusively   for   the  
establishment   and   maintenance   thereon   of   a   preparatory   (nursery   and   kindergarten)   school  
which   may   include   such   installations   as   an   office   for   school   administration,   playground   and  
garage  for  school  vehicles.    x  x.”  
The   Court   held   that   the   above   restriction   limits   the   use   of   the   subject   property   for   preparatory  
(nursery   and   kindergarten)   school,   without   regard   to   the   number   of   classrooms.   The   Court  
affirmed   the   judgement   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   which   ordered   the   Petitioner   to     cease   and  
desist  from  the  operation  of  the  Learning  Child  School  beyond  nursery  and  kindergarten  classes  
with   a   maximum   of   two   classrooms   with   the   MODIFICATION   that   (1)   the   two-­‐classroom  
restriction   is   deleted,   and   (2)   the   current   students   of   the   School   of   the   Holy   Cross,   the   Learning  
Child   School's   grade   school   department,   be   allowed   to   finish   their   elementary   studies   in   said  
school   up   to   their   graduation   in   their   Grade   7.     The   enrolment   of   new   students   to   the   grade  
school  shall  no  longer  be  permitted.”  
 
7.   The   local   government   of   Manila   enacted   an   ordinance   which   granted   ABC   Corporation   to  
operate   a   jai   alai   in   the   City   of   Manila.   The   newly-­‐elected   Mayor   refused   to   grant   a   business  
permit   to   ABC   Corporation   on   the   ground   that   the   ordinance   cannot   prevail   over   a   Presidential  
Decree  which  required  that  the  grant  of  franchise  to  operate  jai  alai  is  invested  in  the  Games  
and   Amusement   Board.   ABC   Corporation   asked   the   Manila   RTC   to   issue   a   writ   of   mandamus  
ordering  the  newly-­‐elected  Mayor  to  issue  the  business  permit  to  ABC  Corporation.  As  judge,  
will  you  issue  the  writ?  
Answer:  No.  Lim  v.  Pacquing,  240  SCRA  649:  Former  Chief  Justice  Puno  in  his  Dissenting  Opinion  
in  this  1995  case  said  that  the  exercise  of  police  power  is  not  without  limit.  He  said  that  while  it  
is  the  “prerogative  of  the  State  to  promote  the  general  welfare  of  the  people  thru  the  use  of  
police   power;   on   the   opposite   end   is   the   right   of   an   entity   to   have   its   property   protected  
against   unreasonable   impairment   by   the   State.   Courts   accord   the   State   wide   latitude   in   the  
exercise  of  its  police  power  to  bring  about  the  greatest  good  of  the  greatest  number.  But  when  
its  purpose  is  putrefied  by  private  interest,  the  use  of  police  power  becomes  a  farce  and  must  
be  struck  down  just  as  every  arbitrary  exercise  of  government  power  should  be  stamped  out.”    
 
8.  When  may  the  exercise  of  police  power  may  be  questioned?    
Answer:  In  MMDA  v.  Bel-­‐Air  Village  Assn.  (328  SCRA  836),  the  Court  held  that  where  is  there  is  
no  explicit  grant  of  power,  a  government  agency  cannot  exercise  police  power.    The  Court  said:    
“Clearly,  the  MMDA  is  not  a  political  unit  of  government.  The  power  delegated  to  the  MMDA  is  
that   given   to   the   Metro   Manila   Council   to   promulgate   administrative   rules   and   regulations   in  
the   implementation   of   the   MMDA’s   functions.   There   is   no   grant   of   authority   to   enact  
ordinances  and  regulations  for  the  general  welfare  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  metropolis.”  
 
9.    The  municipality  of  Teresa,  Rizal  enacted  an  ordinance  which  sought  the  expropriation  of  a  
property   upon   which   it   will   build   an   evacuation   center   as   part   of   its   Disaster   Preparedness  
Program.  The  Sangguniang  Panlalawigan  disapproved  the  ordinance.  May  the  municipality  still  
exercise  the  power  of  eminent  domain  despite  the  disapproval  of  its  proposed  ordinance?  
Answer:  Yes.  The  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  is  a  power  delegated  by  Congress  to  
political  subdivisions.  

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Moday   v.   C.   A.   268   SCRA   586:   The   Court   reiterated   the   limitations   on   the   power   of   eminent  
domain  are  that  the  use  must  be  public,  compensation  must  be  made  and  due  process  of  law  
must   be   observed.   The   Supreme   Court,   taking   cognizance   of   such   issues   as   the   adequacy   of  
compensation,  necessity  of  the  taking  and  the  public  use  character  or  the  purpose  of  the  taking,    
has   ruled   that   the   necessity   of   exercising   eminent   domain   must   be   genuine   and   of   a   public  
character.  Government  may  not  capriciously  choose  what  private  property  should  be  taken.  
 
10.   Iloilo   City   initiated   expropriation   proceedings   against   Spouses   Espinosa.   During   the  
pendency  of  the  case,  the  city  government  and  the  property  owner  agreed  to  settle  the  case  
through   a   compromise   agreement.   The   Court   approved   the   compromise   agreement   between  
the   parties.   Before   fully   paying   for   the   property,   the   city   government   questioned   the  
compromise   agreement   arguing   that   it   was   not   the   court   which   fixed   the   just   compensation.   Is  
the  argument  of  the  city  government  valid?  
Answer:  No.  A  compromise  agreement  is  valid  since  it  has  the  effect  of  a  ruling  on  the  merit.  
The   city   government   is   also   precluded   to   question   such   ruling   of   the   trial   court   because   it  
voluntary  submitted  itself  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.  (City  of  Manila  v.  Alegar  Corporation  
et.  al.  June  25,  2012)  
 
Public  Purpose  –  
Housing  for  the  poor:  Ortega  v.  City  of  Cebu,  602  SCRA  601  (2009)  
Taking   for   a   cultural/historical   purpose:   Manosca   v   C.A.,   G.R.   No.   106440,   January   29,   1996  
Taking   is   not   justified   when   a   similar   facility   within   the   vicinity   already   serves   the   same  
purpose:  Masikip  v.  Pasig  City,  497  SCRA  391(2006)  
 
Just  Compensation  –  
Principal  criterion  to  determine  just  compensation  will  be  the  character  and  use  of  the  land  at  
the  time  of  taking:  Tinio  et  al.  v.  NAPOCOR,  G.R.  160923,  January  24,  2011  
Compensation  based  on  R.A.  6657  is  required  in  the  determination  of  just  compensation  if  the  
property  is  covered  by  CARP:  LBP  v.  Ferrer  et  al.,  G.R.  No.  172230,  February  2,  2011  
Recognition   of   Fair   Market   Value   will   form   part   of   the   basis   of   just   compensation:   EPZA   v.  
Estate  of  Salud  Jimenez,  et  al.,  G.R.  No.  188995,  August  24,  2011  
Interest  rate  on  just  compensation  is  6%  per  annum:  Apo  Fruits  Corp.  et  al.  v  LBP,  G.R.  No.  164,  
October  12,  2010  
 
Reconveyance  –    
If   government   does   not   use   the   property   for   an   unreasonable   period   of   time   for   the   public  
purpose  it  acquired  the  property,  the  property  owner  can  ask  for  reconveyance  of  the  same.  
If  there  is  unreasonable  delay  (5  years)  of  payment  of  just  compensation,  the  property  owner  
can  ask  for  possession  of  property  until  just  compensation  is  fully  settled.  
 
XII.  LAW  ON  PUBLIC  OFFICERS  AND  PUBLIC  ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
1.  Whether  a  barangay  official  has  the  power  and  duty  as  a  public  officer  for  summarily  abating  
the  basketball  ring,  which  she  considers  as  a  nuisance?  is  this  an  abatement  of  a  nuisance  per  
se?  
 
Answer:  No,  an  abatement  of  a  public  nuisance,  the  same  was  done  summarily  while  failing  to  
follow  the  proper  procedure.  Prevailing  jurisprudence  holds  that  unless  a  nuisance  is  a  nuisance  
per  se,  it  may  not  be  summarily  abated.  The  power  to  order  the  demolition  of  a  nuisance  per  se  
rests  on  the  Mayor.  (NATIVIDAD  C.  CRUZ  and  BENJAMIN  DELA  CRUZ,  vs.  PANDACAN  HIKER'S  
CLUB,  INC.,  January  11,  2016,  G.R.  No.  188213)  
 
2.   Molina   was   a   subject   of   an   administrative   investigation   for   letter   entitled   “Is   it   True.”   The  
letter  maligned  the  GSIS  General  Manager  Garcia.  The  respondent  sought  the  dismissal  of  the  
charge  on  the  ground  of  its  being  baseless;  and  requested  the  conduct  of  a  formal  investigation  
by  an  impartial  body.  He  was  ever  found  to  have  committed  grave  misconduct  and  was  he  given  
a  60-­‐day  suspension.  
The   respondent   instituted   in   the   Court   of   Appeals     a   special   civil   action   for   certiorari   to  

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challenge  the  legality  of  the  Memorandum  which  found  him  guilty  of  grave  misconduct  .  The  CA  
promulgated   its   assailed   decision   nullifying   the   Memorandum   issued   by   Garcia.     Garcia  
appealed  the  C.A.  decision.  
Question:    Is  Molina  guilty  of  grave  misconduct?  
Answer:  No.    Misconduct  in  office,  by  uniform  legal  definition,  is  such  misconduct  that  affects  
his  performance  of  his  duties  as  an  officer  and  not  such  only  as  affects  his  character  as  a  private  
individual.   To   warrant   removal   from   office,   it   must   have   direct   relation   to   and   be   connected  
with   the   performance   of   official   duties   amounting   either   to   maladministration   or   willful,  
intentional   neglect   and   failure   to   discharge   the   duties   of   the   office.   Moreover,   it   is   "a  
transgression   of   some   established   and   definite   rule   of   action,   more   particularly,   unlawful  
behavior   or   gross   negligence   by   a   public   officer."   It   becomes   grave   if   it   "involves   any   of   the  
additional   elements   of   corruption,   willful   intent   to   violate   the   law   or   to   disregard   established  
rules,  which  must  be  established  by  substantial  evidence."  
The   record   contains   nothing   to   show   that   the   respondent's   act   constituted   misconduct.   The  
passing  of  the  letter  to  Caretero  did  not  equate  to  any  "transgression"  or  "unlawful  behavior,"  
for   it   was   an   innocuous   act   that   did   not   breach   any   standard,   norm   or   rule   pertinent   to   his  
office.   Neither   could   it   be   regarded   as   "circulation"   of   the   letter   inasmuch   as   the   letter   was  
handed   only   to   a   single   individual   who   just   happened   to   be   curious   about   the   paper   the  
respondent   was   then   holding   in   his   hands.   (WINSTON   F.   GARCIA,   IN   HIS   CAPACITY   AS  
PRESIDENT   AND   GENERAL   MANAGER   OF   THE   GOVERNMENT   SERVICE   INSURANCE   SYSTEM  
(GSIS)  vs.  MARIO  I.  MOLINA, January  11,  2016,  G.R.  No.  165223  
 
3.   Petitioners   are   all   charged   as   co-­‐conspirators   for   their   respective   participations   in   the  
anomalous  Priority  Development  Assistance  Fund  (PDAF)  scam.  
The   Ombudsman   issued   the   assailed   144-­‐page   Joint   Resolution   dated   March   28,   2014   finding  
probable   cause   against,   inter   alia,   Reyes,   Janet   Napoles,   and   De   Asis   of   one   (1)   count   of  
Plunder,   and   against   Reyes,   Janet   Napoles,   De   Asis,   and   the   Napoles   siblings   for   fifteen   (15)  
counts   of   violation   of   Section   3   (e)   of   RA   3019.   Accordingly,   separate   motions   for  
reconsideration  were  timely  filed  by  Reyes,  Janet  Napoles,  the  Napoles  siblings,  and  De  Asis.  
Question:   Did   the   Ombudsman   and/or   the   Sandiganbayan   commit   any   grave   abuse   of  
discretion   in   rendering   the   assailed   resolutions   ultimately   finding   probable   cause   against  
petitioners  for  the  charges  against  them.  
Answer:  No.  Once  the  public  prosecutor  (or  the  Ombudsman)  determines  probable  cause  and  
thus,   elevates   the   case   to   the   trial   court   (or   the   Sandiganbayan),   a   judicial   determination   of  
probable  cause  is  made  in  order  to  determine  if  a  warrant  of  arrest  should  be  issued  ordering  
the   detention   of   the   accused.   The   Court,   in   People   v.   Castillo,   delineated   the   functions   and  
purposes   of   a   determination   of   probable   cause   made   by   the   public   prosecutor,   on   the   one  
hand,   and   the   trial   court,   on   the   other.   .   (JOHN   RAYMUND   DE   ASIS,   v.   CONCHITA   CARPIO  
MORALES,   IN   HER   OFFICIAL   CAPACITY   AS   OMBUDSMAN,   PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   AND  
SANDIGANBAYAN)      
 
4.  What  are  the  two  types  of  determination  of  probable  cause?  
Answer:   There   are   two   kinds   of   determination   of   probable   case:   executive   and   judicial.   The  
executive  determination  of  probable  cause  is  one  made  during  preliminary  investigation.  It  is  a  
function   that   properly   pertains   to   the   public   prosecutor   who   is   given   a   broad   discretion   to  
determine   whether   probable   cause   exists   and   to   charge   those   whom   he   believes   to   have  
committed  the  crime  as  defined  by  law  and  thus  should  be  held  for  trial.  Otherwise  stated,  such  
official   has   the   quasi-­‐   judicial   authority   to   determine   whether   or   not   a   criminal   case   must   be  
filed   in   court.   Whether   or   not   that   function   has   been   correctly   discharged   by   the   public  
prosecutor,   i.e.,   whether   or   not   he   has   made   a   correct   ascertainment   of   the   existence   of  
probable   cause   in   a   case,   is   a   matter   that   the   trial   court   itself   does   not   and   may   not   be  
compelled  to  pass  upon.  
The  judicial  determination  of  probable  cause,  on  the  other  hand,  is  one  made  by  the  judge  to  
ascertain   whether   a   warrant   of   arrest   should   be   issued   against   the   accused.   The   judge   must  
satisfy   himself   that   based   on   the   evidence   submitted,   there   is   necessity   for   placing   the   accused  
under  custody  in  order  not  to  frustrate  the  ends  of  justice.  If  the  judge  finds  no  probable  cause,  
the   judge   cannot   be   forced   to   issue   the   arrest   warrant.   (JOHN   RAYMUND   DE   ASIS,   v.  
CONCHITA  CARPIO  MORALES,  IN  HER  OFFICIAL  CAPACITY  AS  OMBUDSMAN,  PEOPLE  OF  THE  

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PHILIPPINES,  AND  SANDIGANBAYAN)      
 
5.  Twelve  new  positions  were  created  by  a  local  government  but  no  ordinance  was  enacted  to  
fund   the   newly-­‐created   positions.   Subsequently,   the   Mayor   sought   approval   of   an   ordinance  
which   would   allow   the   persons   occupying   the   newly-­‐appointed   positions   to   draw   their   salaries.  
A  taxpayer  filed  an  action  against  the  Mayor  before  the  Office  of  the  Ombudsman.  Will  the  case  
prosper?  
Answer:  No.  Whatever  defect  there  may  have  been  in  the  approval  of  unappropriated  positions  
was   cured   subsequently   by   the   creation   of   said   position   and   the   revalidation   of   respondent’s  
appointment.  That  appointment  was  ultimately  approved  by  the  Civil  Service  Commission  thus  
giving   it   finality.   The   Court   reiterated   that   elementary   is   the   rule   that   the   findings   of   fact   of   the  
Office   of   the   Ombudsman   are   conclusive   when   supported   by   substantial   evidence   and   are  
accorded  due  respect  and  weight,  especially  when  they  are  affirmed  by  the  CA.  It  is  only  when  
there  is  grave  abuse  of  discretion  by  the  Ombudsman  that  a  review  of  factual  findings  may  aptly  
be  made.  (TOLENTINO  v.  Mayor  LOYOLA  et.  al.  (G.R.  No.  153809,  2011).  
 
NATIONAL  ARTIST  VIRGILIO  ALMARIO  v.  EXECUTIVE  SECRETARY  (G.R.  No.  189028,  January  16,  
2013).  There  is  grave  abuse  of  discretion  when  an  act  is:    
1)  done  contrary  to  the  Constitution,  the  law  or  jurisprudence  or    
2)  executed  whimsically,  capriciously  or  arbitrarily,  out  of  malice,  ill  will  or  personal  bias.    
 
6.   Congress   enacted   the   General   Appropriations   Act   (“GAA”)   which   included   a   provision  
allowing   the   President   to   distribute   a   lump   sum   amount   to   all   members   of   the   legislative  
branch.   The   GAA   allowed   the   President   to   prescribe   the   criteria   for   the   distribution   of   such  
amounts   needed   by   the   members   of   Congress.   Special   requirements   were   allowed   at   the  
congressional  district  level.  May  Pedro  Reyes  and  other  taxpayers  question  the  constitutionality  
of  the  subject  provision  of  the  GAA?    
Answer:   Yes.   The   provision   violates   the   principle   of   checks   and   balances.   This   principle   in  
constitutional   law   where   there   is   a   system-­‐based   regulation   that   allows   one   branch   to   limit  
actions  of  another  branch  in  keeping  with  the  doctrine  of  separation  of  powers.    
(Consolidated   Petitions:   Belgica   et.   al.   v.   Executive   Secretary   et.   al.,   G.R.No.   208566,  
Alcantara  et.  al.  v.  Drilon  et.  al.  G.R.  No.  208493,  and  Nepomuceno  et.  al.  v.  Pres.  Aquino  et.  
al.,  G.R.  No.209251,  Nov.  19,  2013)    
 
7.  Is  the  case  subject  to  judicial  review?    
Answer:  Yes,  there  is  a  question  raised  on  the  constitutionality  of  the  provision  of  PDAF  in  the  
General  Appropriations  Act.  This  is  a  justiciable  issue.  
 
8.  Do  the  petitioners  have  legal  standing  to  sue?    
Answer:  Yes,  as  taxpayers  there  are  qualified  to  raise  the  issue  of  the  constitutionality  of  PDAF.  
As  taxpayers  they  stand  to  suffer  material  injury  because  the  funds  covered  under  the  General  
Appropriations  Act  come  from  revenues  collected  from  taxpayers.  
 
9.  Was  there  a  violation  of  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers?    
Answer:  Yes,  the  executive  branch  encroached  upon  the  power  of  the  legislative  branch  when  
it  determined  how  the  PDAF  will  be  distributed.  The  legislative  branch  also  exercised  the  power  
of  implementation  when  it  identified  priority  projects  in  their  jurisdiction.    
 
10.  Was  there  a  violation  of  the  principle  of  checks  and  balances  in  the  implementation  of  the  
projects  under  PDAF?    
Answer:   Yes,   it   deprives   the   President   of   his   item   veto   power   under   the   constitution   Section  
27(2),   Article   VI   of   the   1987   Constitution   because   the   appropriations   are   general   (lump   sum)  
instead  of  being  itemized.    
 
11.  Was  there  violation  of  the  principle  of  non-­‐delegability  of  legislative  power?    
Answer:  Yes,  the  legislative  branch  allowed  the  executive  branch  to  define  the  parameters  as  to  
how  the  PDAF  can  be  availed  of  by  the  members  of  Congress.  The  Department  of  Budget  and  
Management  provided  for  a  ‘menu”  where  the  funds  may  be  spent.  

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12.  Was  there  a  violation  of  the  constitutional  provision  on  political  dynasty?    
Answer:   While   portions   of   the   PDAF   were   meant   to   enhance   the   continued   stay   in   power   of  
incumbent   politicians,   the   constitutional   provision   prohibiting   political   dynasty,   the   same   is   not  
self-­‐executing.  To  date,  Congress  has  not  enacted  a  law  to  put  the  provision  into  effect.  Thus,  
there  is  no  violation  of  the  constitutional  provision.  
 
13.  Was  there  a  violation  of  the  principle  of  local  autonomy?    
Answer:   Yes,   when   the   incumbent   members   of   Congress   dictated   which   projects   would   be  
implemented   at   the   local   level   without   the   participation   of   the   local   government   units,   it  
violated  the  essence  of  local  autonomy  under  Article  X  of  the  Constitution.  
 
14.   Congress   enacted   a   law   which   created   the   Philippine   Competition   Commission   (“PCC”)  
under   the   supervision   of   the   Secretary   of   Finance.   Without   awaiting   the   appointments   of   the  
Chairman  and  the  four  Associate  Commissioners  of  the  PCC,  the  Secretary  of  Finance  published  
the   Implementing   Rules   and   Regulations   of   the   PCC.   Is   the   act   of   the   Secretary   of   Finance  
proper?  
Answer:   No.   The   act   of   the   Secretary   of   Finance   violated   the   principle   of   separation   of   powers.  
He  should  have  first  allowed  the  President  to  appoint  all  the  five  members  of  PCC.  
 
15.  How  law-­‐making  power  is  delegated?  
Answer:  Congress  may  validly  delegate  law-­‐making  power  by  allowing  administrative  agencies  
to   formulate   suppletory   rules   (filling   in   details   to   ensure   enforcement   of   the   law)   and  
contingent  rules  (ascertaining  the  facts  to  bring  the  law  into  operation)        
 
16.   The   President   reorganized   the   Office   of   the   Press   Secretary.   In   the   process   some   of   the  
employees   were   given   new   assignments.   The   affected   employees   questioned   the  
reorganization   arguing   that   it   violated   their   security   of   tenure.   Is   the   legal   argument   of   the  
affected  employees  tenable?  
Answer:   No.   EIIB   v.   Zamora   (July   10,   2001).     The   Court   held:   “It   having   been   duly   established  
that  the  President  has  the  authority  to  carry  out  reorganization  in  any  branch  or  agency  of  the  
executive  department,  what  is  then  left  for  us  to  resolve  is  whether  or  not  the  reorganization  is  
valid.   In   this   jurisdiction,   reorganizations   have   been   regarded   as   valid   provided   they   are  
pursued   in   good   faith.   Reorganization   is   carried   out   in   good   faith   if   it   is   for   the   purpose   of  
economy   or   to   make   bureaucracy   more   efficient.   Pertinently,   Republic   Act   No.   6656   provides  
for  the  circumstances  which  may  be  considered  as  evidence  of  bad  faith  in  the  removal  of  civil  
service   employees   made   as   a   result   of   reorganization,   to   wit:   (a)   where   there   is   a   significant  
increase   in   the   number   of   positions   in   the   new   staffing   pattern   of   the   department   or   agency  
concerned;   (b)   where   an   office   is   abolished   and   another   performing   substantially   the   same  
functions   is   created;   (c)   where   incumbents   are   replaced   by   those   less   qualified   in   terms   of  
status  of  appointment,  performance  and  merit;  (d)  where  there  is  a  classification  of  offices  in  
the   department   or   agency   concerned   and   the   reclassified   offices   perform   substantially   the  
same   functions   as   the   original   offices,   and   (e)   where   the   removal   violates   the   order   of  
separation.”  
 
17.   Considering   that   the   positions   of   the   Deputy   Ombudsman   and   the   Special   Prosecutor   are  
provided   in   the   Constitution.   May   the   President   relying   solely   on   his   judgment   remove   them  
from  office?  
Answer:  The  Court  held  that  the  Office  of  the  President  has  the  power  to  discipline  and  even  
dismiss  the  overall  deputy  Ombudsman  and  the  other  deputies  provided  under  the  Constitution  
as   well   as   the   Special   Prosecutor.   The   Court   said   that   the   Ombudsman   is   vested   with   broad  
investigative   and   disciplinary   powers.   These   powers   include   the   scrutiny   of   all   acts   of  
malfeasance,   misfeasance,   and   nonfeasance   of   all   public   officials,   including   Members   of   the  
Cabinet  and  key  Executive  officers,  during  their  tenure.  Under  Section  12,  Article  XI  of  the  1987  
Constitution,   the   Office   of   the   Ombudsman   is   envisioned   to   be   the   “protector   of   the   people”  
against   the   inept,   abusive,   and   corrupt   in   the   government,   to   function   essentially   as   a  
complaints  and  action  bureau.  This  constitutional  vision  of  a  Philippine  Ombudsman  practically  
intends   to   make   the   Ombudsman   an   authority   to   directly   check   and   guard   against   the   ills,  

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abuses,   and   excesses   of   the   bureaucracy.   As   the   Ombudsman   is   expected   to   be   an   ”activist  
watchman”,   the   Court   has   upheld   its   actions,   although   not   squarely   falling   under   the   broad  
powers  granted  it  by  the  Constitution  and  by  R.A.  No.  6770,  if  these  actions  are  reasonably  in  
line   with   its   official   function   and   consistent   with   the   law   and   the   Constitution.   Gonzales   III   v.  
Office  of  the  President  at  al/  Bareras  –Sulit  v.  Ochoa  et  al  (2014)  
 
18.  May  the  President  appoint  a  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  when  an  election  ban  is  in  effect?  
Answer:   Yes.   Midnight   appointments:   The   outgoing   President   must   refrain   from   filling  
vacancies   to   give   the   new   President   opportunity   to   consider   names   in   the   light   of   his   new  
policies  especially  so  when  he  ran  on  a  platform  approved  by  the  electorate.(  Art.  VII,  Sec.15)  
De   Castro   v.   JBC,   G.R.   No.   191002,   March   17,   2010:   This   case   questioned   the   power   of   the  
President   to   appoint   the   Chief   Justice   during   the   prohibitive   period.   The   S.C.   held   that   the  
appointment   of   the   members   of   the   judiciary   is   not   covered   by   the   prohibition   on   midnight  
appointments.  
Power  of  Removal:  For  appointees  who  serve  at  the  pleasure  of  the  President,  they  may  also  
be   removed   if   there   is   loss   of   trust   and   confidence   in   them.   Other   public   servants   may   be  
removed  for  cause  provided  for  by  law.  
 
19.   May   the   representative   of   the   Committee   of   Justice   of   the   Senate   and   the   House   of  
Representatives  simultaneously  represent  the  Congress  in  the  Judicial  and  Bar  Council?  
Answer:  No.  The  Congress  is  entitled  only  to  one  representative  in  the  JBC  and  not  one  for  each  
from  the  House  of  Representatives  and  the  Senate.  (Chavez  v.  JBC)  
Recent  rulings  related  to  the  JBC:  
Villanueva  v.  JBC  (2015):  A  first  level  trial  court  must  await  a  5-­‐year  period  before  he  can  be  
promoted   as   RTC   judge.   The   Court   sustained   the   power   of   the   JBC   to   prescribe   rules   in   the  
screening   of   qualified   candidates   to   the   judiciary   to   ensure   that   only   men   of   proven  
competence,  integrity,  probity  and  independence  will  be  appointed  to  the  bench.  
Jardeleza  vs.  Chief  Justice  Sereno  and  JBC  (2015):  Having  been  denied  due  process,  Jardeleza  
should  be  included  in  the  list  of  nominees  to  be  appointed  as  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court.  An  
issue  about  his  integrity  was  raised  in  the  selection  process  but  Jardeleza  was  never  given  the  
opportunity  to  be  heard  to  overturn  the  allegation  against  him.  
 
20.  With  the  recently  SAF  44  incident,  a  newly-­‐elected  member  of  the  House  of  Representatives  
proposed   that   Congress   amend   the   Philippine   National   Police   to   include   for   confirmation   the  
Chief  PNP  by  the  Commission  on  Appointments.  Is  the  proposal  valid?  
Answer:   No.     Article   VII,   Section   16   of   the   1987   Constitution   reads:   "The   President   shall  
nominate  and,  with  the  consent  of  the  Commission  on  Appointments,  appoint  the  heads  of  the  
executive   departments,   ambassadors,   other   public   ministers   and   consuls,   or   officers   of   the  
armed  forces  from  the  rank  of  colonel  or  naval  captain,  and  other  officers  whose  appointments  
are  vested  in  him  in  this  Constitution.  He  shall  also  appoint  all  other  officers  of  the  Government  
whose   appointments   are   not   otherwise   provided   for   by   law,   and   those   whom   he   may   be  
authorized  by  law  to  appoint.  The  Congress  may,  by  law,  vest  the  appointment  of  other  officers  
lower  in  rank  in  the  President  alone,  in  the  courts,  or  in  the  heads  of  departments,  agencies,  
commissions,  or  boards.  
Sarmiento  v.  Mison,  156  SCRA  549  (1987):  Appointment  of  Bureau  of  Customs  Commissioner  
does  not  need  confirmation  of  the  Commission  on  Appointments.    
Tatad   v.   Commission   on   Appointments,   G.R.   No.   183171,   August   11,   2008:   With   the  
resignation  of  the  nominee,  there  is  no  longer  an  actually  justiciable  controversy.    
   
21.   Gregorio,   a   police   officer,   was   charged   for   violation   of   the   VAWC   law   and   an   administrative  
complaint   was   likewise   filed   against   him   before   the   People’s   Law   Enforcement   Board.   Can  
Gregorio   move   for   the   dismissal   of   the   criminal   case   against   him   due   to   the   pendency   of   his  
administrative  complaint  before  the  PLEB?    
Answer:   No.   In   administrative   proceedings,   procedural   due   process   has   been   recognized   to  
include   the   following:   (1)   the   right   to   actual   or   constructive   notice   of   the   institution   of  
proceedings   which   may   affect   a   respondent’s   legal   rights;   (2)   a   real   opportunity   to   be   heard  
personally  or  with  the  assistance  of  counsel,  to  present  witnesses  and  evidence  in  one’s  favor,  
and   to   defend   one’s   rights;   (3)   a   tribunal   vested   with   competent   jurisdiction   and   so   constituted  

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as   to   afford   a   person   charged   administratively   a   reasonable   guarantee   of   honesty   as   well   as  
impartiality;   and   (4)   a   finding   by   said   tribunal   which   is   supported   by   substantial   evidence  
submitted  for  consideration  during  the  hearing  or  contained  in  the  records  or  made  known  to  
the  parties  affected.  (Acuzar  v.  Jarolan  and  Apresa  PLEB,  G.R.  No.  177878,  April  7,  2010)  
 
XIII.  SOCIAL  JUSTICE  AND  EDUCATION,  SCIENCE,  TECHNOLOGY,  ARTS,  CULTURE  AND  SPORTS  
 
1.  What  is  social  justice?  
Answer:  Calalang  v.  Williams,  70  Phil.  726  (1940).  In  this  case  the  Court  defined  social  justice  in  
this  wise:  “Social  justice  is  "neither  communism,  nor  despotism,  nor  atomism,  nor  anarchy,"  but  
the   humanization   of   laws   and   the   equalization   of   social   and   economic   forces   by   the   State   so  
that   justice   in   its   rational   and   objectively   secular   conception   may   at   least   be   approximated.  
Social   justice   means   the   promotion   of   the   welfare   of   all   the   people,   the   adoption   by   the  
Government  of  measures  calculated  to  insure  economic  stability  of  all  the  competent  elements  
of   society,   through   the   maintenance   of   a   proper   economic   and   social   equilibrium   in   the  
interrelations   of   the   members   of   the   community,   constitutionally,   through   the   adoption   of  
measures  legally  justifiable,  or  extra-­‐constitutionally,  through  the  exercise  of  powers  underlying  
the   existence   of   all   governments   on   the   time-­‐honored   principle   of   salus   populi   est   suprema  
lex.”  
Note:  The  precept  of  social  justice  is  interlinked  with  the  exercise  of  police  power.  In  the  same  
case,  the  Court  further  said  that:  “Social  justice,  therefore,  must  be  founded  on  the  recognition  
of   the   necessity   of   interdependence   among   divers   and   diverse   units   of   a   society   and   of   the  
protection  that   should   be  equally  and   evenly   extended   to   all   groups   as   a   combined   force   in   our  
social  and  economic  life,  consistent  with  the  fundamental  and  paramount  objective  of  the  state  
of  promoting  the  health,  comfort,  and  quiet  of  all  persons,  and  of  bringing  about  the  greatest  
good  to  the  greatest  number.”  
 
2.  Will  the  writ  of  habeas  data  lie  against  an  academic  institution?  
Answer:  In    Viveres  and  Suzara  v.  St.  Theresa’s  College-­‐Cebu  City,  the  Court  held  that  the  writ  
of   habeas   data   will   not   lie   since   the   respondent   school   is   not   in   the   business   of   collecting   data.  
The  Court  upheld  the  right  of  the  school  not  to  allow  its  students  to  graduate  for  violating  the  
standing   policy   of   the   school   on   wearing   immodest   apparel   and   having   their   photographs  
posted  in  social  media.  
 
3.  Does  the  school  have  the  power  to  suspend  its  students?  
Answer:    In  Miriam  College  v.  CA  348SCRA  215,  the  Court  held  that  the  school  has  the  power  to  
suspend  students  for  use  of  vulgar  language  in  the  school’s  official  organ.  The  Court  upheld  the  
right  of  a  school  to  prescribe  rules  governing  discipline  of  students.    
University  of  San  Agustin  v.  CA  270  SCRA  761:  The  Court  held  that  their  students  are  governed  
by  the  rules  set  forth  in  the  student  handbook.  The  failure  of  students  to  meet  the  academic  
standards  set  in  the  Student  Handbook  is  a  ground  for  disciplinary  action.  
Ateneo   v.   Capulong   222   SCRA   643.   The   Court   upheld   the   authority   of   the   school   to   suspend  
students  who  were  alleged  to  have  participated  in  a  hazing  activity  which  resulted  to  the  death  
of   one   of   its   students.   In   this   case,   the   Court   took   the   occasion   to   say   that   it   is   the   national  
government   that   shall   provide   the   overall   policy   on   education   to   meet   national   goals.   The  
discipline  of  students  pursuing  legal  career  is  a  matter  which  exacts  rigid  scrutiny.  
 
 
XIV.  ELECTION  LAW  
 
1.  What  are  the  remedies  available  to  disqualify  a  person  from  running  in  an  electoral  race?  
Answer:   There   are   two   remedies   available   under   existing   laws   to   prevent   a   candidate   from  
running   in   an   electoral   race.   One   is   by   petition   for   disqualification,   and   the   other   by   petition   to  
deny   due   course   to   or   to   cancel   his   certificate   of   candidacy.   In   Fermin   v.   Commission   on  
Elections,   the   Court   has   differentiated   the   two   remedies   in   the   following   manner:   “   [A]   petition  
for   disqualification,   on   the   one   hand,   can   be   premised   on   Section   12   or   68   of   the   OEC,   or  
Section   40   of   the   LGC.   On   the   other   hand,   a   petition   to   deny   due   course   to   or   cancel   a   CoC   can  
only   be   grounded   on   a   statement   of   a   material   representation   in   the   said   certificate   that   is  

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false.  The  petitions  also  have  different  effects.  While  a  person  who  is  disqualified  under  Section  
68   is   merely   prohibited   to   continue   as   a   candidate,   the   person   whose   certificate   is   cancelled   or  
denied   due   course   under   Section   78   is   not   treated   as   a   candidate   at   all,   as   if   he/she   never   filed  
a  CoC.    
Section  78  of  the  Omnibus  Election  Code  states:  Section  78.  Petition  to  deny  due  course  to  or  
cancel  a  certificate  of  candidacy.  -­‐  A  verified  petition  seeking  to  deny  due  course  or  to  cancel  a  
certificate  of  candidacy  may  be  filed  by  the  person  exclusively  on  the  ground  that  any  material  
representation  contained  therein  as  required  under  Section  74  hereof  is  false.  The  petition  may  
be   filed   at   any   time   not   later   than   twenty-­‐five   days   from   the   time   of   the   filing   of   the   certificate  
of   candidacy   and   shall   be   decided,   after   due   notice   and   hearing,   not   later   than   fifteen   days  
before  the  election.”  (Arsenio  Agustin  vs.  Commission  on  Elections  and  Salvador  Pillos  ,  G.R.  
No.  207105,  November  10,  2015,  Bersamin,  J.  )  

2.   May   a   proclaimed   candidate   in   a   congressional   seat   ask   the   Court   to   enjoin   the   election  
protest  filed  against  him  before  the  House  of  Representatives  Electoral  Tribunal?  
Answer:  No.  This  violates  the  doctrine  of  separation  of  powers.  The  doctrine  of  separation  of  
powers  is  a  principle  of  government  under  which  three  separate  branches  of  government  are  
empowered  to  carry  out  functions  without  interference  or  encroachment  from  another  branch.  
Angara   v.   Electoral   Tribunal,   63   Phil.   139,   158   (1936):   The   Court   cannot   interfere   with   an  
independent  body  like  the  Electoral  Tribunal  under  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers.  It  is  
premature   for   the   Court   to   exercise   its   power   of   judicial   review   until   after   the   tribunal   has  
terminated  its  proceedings.  
How   principle   is   violated:   interference   and   assumption   to   another   branch’s   functions   often  
referred  to  as  encroachment  
 
3.    When  can  the  House  of  Representative  Electoral  Tribunal  take  jurisdiction  over  an  election  
contest?  
Answer:  The  HRET  may  take  cognizance  of  any  matter  raised  by  a  losing  candidate  related  to  
the   election,   returns   and   qualifications   (ERQ)   as   soon   as   the   COMELEC   proclaims   the   winning  
candidate   and   the   latter   shall   have   taken   his   oath   as   a   member   of   the   House   of  
Representatives.  
Please   take   note   of   the   following   rulings   on   the   three   electoral   tribunals   enshrined   in   the  
Constitution:  
Reyes  v.  COMELEC  and  Tan,  G.R.  No.  207264,  June  25,  2013:  To  be  considered  a  member  of  
Congress,  there  must  be  concurrence  of  the  following  requisites:    a  valid  proclamation;  a  proper  
oath;   and   assumption   to   duty.   Absent   any   of   the   foregoing,   the   COMELEC   retains   jurisdiction  
over  said  contest.  
Duenas  v.  HRET,  593  SCRA  3166:  HRET  has  the  competence  to  examine  questioned  ballots;  a  
resolution  signed  by  the  majority  of  the  members  is  sufficient.  
Vinzons-­‐Chato   v.   HRET   and   Panotes,   G.R.   No.   199149,   January   22,   2013:   digital   images   are  
functional  equivalent  of  the  paper  ballots  
Martinez   v.   HRET,   G.R.   No.   189034,   January   11,   2010:   nuisance   candidates;   mockery   of  
election  process    
Senate  Electoral  Tribunal  (SET):   composed   of   3   Justices   of   the   Supreme   Court   to   be   designated  
by   the   Chief   Justice   and   6   members   of   the   Senate   based   on   proportional   representation;   the  
Senior  Justice  acts  as  the  Chairman.  
House   of   Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal   (HRET):   composed   of   3   Justices   of   the   Supreme  
Court   to   be   designated   by   the   Chief   Justice   and   6   members   of   the   House   of   Representatives  
based  on  proportional  representation;  the  Senior  Justice  acts  as  the  Chairman.  
Jurisdiction   of   Electoral   Contests   before   the   SET   and   the   HRET:   All   matters   pertaining   to   the  
election,   returns   and   qualifications   of   a   member,   including   issues   involving   citizenship   and  
appreciation  of  ballots.  
Pimentel  v.  COMELEC,  G.R.  No.  178413,  March  13,  2008:  Once  COMELEC  has  proclaimed  the  
winner,   it   loses   jurisdiction   on   all   issues   involving   the   election,   returns   and   qualifications   of   a  
member  of  the  Senate;  the  losing  party  must  file  the  protest  before  the  SET.  
Legarda  v.  de  Castro:  Petitioner  can  no  longer  pursue  her  election  protest  because  she  run  for  
the   Senate   during   the   pendency   of   the   case   and   after   having   been   proclaimed   winner   in   the  
senatorial  race,  she  took  her  oath.  To  allow  her  to  pursue  the  case  will  result  to  absurdity.  She  

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cannot   be   Vice   President   (executive   branch)   and   be   Senator   (legislative   branch)   at   the   same  
time.  This  will  result  into  incompatibility  of  offices.  
Note:  As  members  of  the  PET,  the  justices  of  the  Supreme  Court  are  triers  of  facts  and  law  
and  parties  may  seek  relief  to  the  Supreme  Court  if  they  are  not  satisfied  with  the  findings  of  
the  SET.    
 
4.   If   members   of   the   Senate   and   party   list   members   of   the   House   of   Representatives   are  
proclaimed  by  the  COMELEC,  what  body  undertakes  the  canvass  of  votes  and  proclamation  of  
the  President  and  the  Vice  President?  
Answer:  Congress  acts  as  the  Board  of  Canvassers  in  presidential  election.  
 Pimentel  v.  Joint  Committee  of  Congress,  G.R.  No.  163783,  June  22,  2004.  The  Congress  is  a  
continuing  body  and  must  fulfil  its  constitutional  mandate  to  conduct  the  presidential  canvass  
of  votes  even  it  if  is  in  recess.    The  Senate  shall  convene  in  joint  session  during  any  voluntary  or  
compulsory   recess   to   canvass   the   votes   for   President   and   Vice-­‐President   not   later   than   thirty  
days  after  the  day  of  the  elections  in  accordance  with  Section  4,  Article  VII  of  the  Constitution.  
Lopez  v.  Senate,  G.R.  No.  163556,  June  8,  2004:  Senate  is  a  continuing  body  only  on  this  matter  
and  committee  hearings  and  not  to  consider  bills.  
 
5.  Can  a  losing  candidate  as  kagawad  of  a  barangay  file  an  election  protest?  
Answer:   Yes.   The   Municipal   Trial   Courts   have   jurisdiction   over   election   contests   involving  
elective  positions  at  the  barangay  level.  A  party  not  satisfied  with  the  ruling  of  the  trial  court,  
may  file  an  appeal  before  the  COMELEC.  A  division  of  the  COMELEC  is  assigned  to  review  the  
appeal.   If   parties   are   not   satisfied   with   the   ruling   of   the   Division,   they   can   file   an   appeal   before  
COMELEC  en  banc  and  parties  may  ask  the  Supreme  Court  en  banc  to  review  the  decision  of  the  
COMELEC  en  banc.  
Please   note   that   all   decisions   of   the   Civil   Service   Commission,   the   Commission   on   Elections   and  
the  Commission  on  Audit  may  be  reviewed  by  the  Supreme  Court  en  banc.  
 
6.  In  case  of  vacancy  in  the  Office  of  the  President,  is  a  special  election  necessary?  
Answer:   No.   Section   9   of   Article   VII   provides   that   in   such   an   instance,   the   President   shall  
nominate   a   Vice-­‐President   from   among   the   members   of   the   Senate   and   House   of  
Representatives   who   shall   assume   the   office   upon   confirmation   by   the   majority   vote   of   all  
members  of  both  Houses  of  Congress  voting  separately.    
 
XV.  PUBLIC  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  
 
1. Is   the   non-­‐submission   of   the   EDCA   agreement   for   concurrence   by   the   Senate   violates   the  
Constitution?  
Answer:    No.    The  EDCA  need  not  be  submitted  to  the  Senate  for  concurrence  because  it  is  in  
the  form  of  a  mere  executive  agreement,  not  a  treaty.      Under  the  Constitution,  the  President  is  
empowered  to  enter  into  executive  agreements  on  foreign  military  bases,  troops  or  facilities  if  
(1)   such   agreement   is   not   the   instrument   that   allows   the   entry   of   such   and   (2)   if   it   merely   aims  
to  implement  an  existing  law  or  treaty.
EDCA  is  in  the  form  of  an  executive  agreement  since  it  merely  involves  “adjustments  in  detail”  
in  the  implementation  of  the  Mutual  Defense  Treaty  and  the  Visiting  Forces  Agreement.    These  
are  existing  treaties  between  the  Philippines  and  the  U.S.  that  have  already  been  concurred  in  
by  the  Philippine  Senate  and  have  thereby  met  the  requirements  of  the  Constitution  under  Art  
XVIII,  Sec  25.    Because  of  the  status  of  these  prior  agreements,  EDCA  need  not  be  transmitted  
to  the  Senate.  (Saguisag  vs.  Ochoa,  Jr. 779  SCRA  241,  G.R.  No.  212426,  G.R.  No.  212444  
January  12,  2016)  

2.  The  Philippine  Constitution  has  several  provisions  on  respect  for  human  dignity  and  human  
rights   (Art.   II,   Sec.   11,   Art.   III,   Sections   17-­‐19,   and   Art.   XVI,   Sec.   5(2)).   Is   the   Philippine  
government  a  signatory  to  any  international  agreement  on  human  rights?  
Answer:  Yes.  The  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  (UDHR)  is  a  declaration  adopted  by  the  
United   Nations   General   Assembly   as   an   offshoot   of   the   aftermath   of   World   War   II.   The  
International   Bill   of   Human   Rights   consists   of   the   Universal   Declaration   of   Human   Rights,   the  

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International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights,  and  the  International  Covenant  
on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  and  its  two  Optional  Protocols.  In  a  strict  sense,  the  Declaration  is  
not   treaty   but   it   has   been   considered   as   a   constitutive   document   for   the   purpose   of   defining  
“fundamental  freedoms  “  and  human  rights.”  
 
3.  A  number  of  Filipinos  are  considered  “economic”  migrants.  What  efforts  has  the  government  
done  to  ensure  the  protection  of  Overseas  Filipino  Workers?  
Answer:   The   Philippines   is   a   signatory   to   the   International   Convention   on   the   Protection   of   the  
Rights   of   All   Migrant   Workers   and   Members   of   Their   Families.   This   instrument   is   multilateral  
treaty   governing   the   protection   of   migrant   workers   and   families.   Concluded   on   18   December  
1990,  the  Convention  entered  into  force  on  1  July  2003  after  the  threshold  of  20  ratifying  States  
was   reached   in   March   2003.   The   Committee   on   Migrant   Workers   (CMW)   monitors  
implementation   of   the   convention,   and   is   one   of   the   seven   UN-­‐linked   human   rights   treaty  
bodies.  
 
4.  What  other  rights  do  Overseas  Filipino  Workers  enjoy?  
Answer:   In   Nicolas-­‐Lewis   v.   COMELEC,   the   Court   held   that   the   holding   of   the   2004   elections  
had,  as  the  OSG  pointed  out,  indeed  rendered  the  petition  moot  and  academic,  but  insofar  only  
as   petitioners   participation   in   such   political   exercise   is   concerned.   The   broader   and  
transcendental   issue   tendered   or   subsumed   in   the   petition,   i.e.,   the   propriety   of   allowing   duals  
to   participate   and   vote   as   absentee   voter   in   future   elections,   however,   remains   unresolved.  
Observing   the   petitioners   and   the   COMELECs   respective   formulations   of   the   issues,   the   same  
may   be   reduced   into   the   question   of   whether   or   not   petitioners   and   others   who   might   have  
meanwhile  retained  and/or  reacquired  Philippine  citizenship  pursuant  to  R.A.  9225  may  vote  as  
absentee  voter  under  R.A.  9189.The  Court  resolved  the  poser  in  the  affirmative.    The  Court  held  
that   those   who   retain   or   re   acquire   Philippine   citizenship   under   Republic   Act   No.   9225,   the  
Citizenship  Retention  and  Re  Acquisition  Act  of  2003,  may  exercise  the  right  to  vote  under  the  
system   of   absentee   voting   in   Republic   Act   No.   9189,   the   Overseas   Absentee   Voting   Act   of   2003  
pursuant   to   Sec   2   of   Article   V   of   the   Constitution   which   mandates   that   Congress   shall   provide  a  
system  for  absentee  voting  by  qualified  Filipinos  abroad.  
 
5.  What  is  the  nature  of  a  tax  treaty?  
Answer:     In   negotiating   tax   treaties,   the   underlying   rationale   for   reducing   the   tax   rate   is   that  
the   Philippines   will   give   up   a   part   of   the   tax   in   the   expectation   that   the   tax   given   up   for   this  
particular  investment  is  not  taxed  by  the  other  country.  
 
6.  How  is  double  taxation  eliminated  in  a  tax  treaty?  
Answer:   In   order   to   eliminate   double   taxation,   a   tax   treaty   resorts   to   several   methods.     First,   it  
sets   out   the   respective   rights   to   tax   of   the   state   of   source   or   situs   and   of   the   state   of   residence  
with  regard  to  certain  classes  of  income  or  capital.  The  second  method  for  the  elimination  of  
double   taxation   applies   whenever   the   state   of   source   is   given   a   full   or   limited   right   to   tax  
together   with   the   state   of   residence.     In   this   case,   the   treaties   make   it   incumbent   upon   the  
state  of  residence  to  allow  relief  in  order  to  avoid  double  taxation.      
Power   of   Taxation:   rule   on   taxation:   must   be   uniform   and   equitable;   Congress   to   evolve   a  
progressive   system   of   taxation-­‐   The   Constitution   does   not   really   prohibit   the   imposition   of  
indirect   taxes   which,   like   the   VAT,   are   regressive.   What   it   simply   provides   is   that   Congress   shall  
"evolve  a  progressive  system  of  taxation."  The  constitutional  provision  has  been  interpreted  to  
mean   simply   that   "direct   taxes   are   .   .   .   to   be   preferred   [and]   as   much   as   possible,   indirect   taxes  
should  be  minimized."  (E.  FERNANDO,  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  221  (Second  ed.  
(1977)  (Tolentino  v.  Secretary  of  Finance,  1995).  
YMCA   v.   Collector   of   Internal   Revenue,   33   Phil.   217(1916):   taxpayer   has   burden   of   proof   to  
claim  tax  exemption  
Quezon   City   v.   ABS-­‐CBN,   G.R.   No.   166408,   Oct.   6,   2008:   LGUs   have   power   to   collect   local  
franchise  tax  
Del  Mar  v.  PAGCOR,  346  SCRA  484  (2000):  only  Congress  has  the  power  to  grant  franchise  
Nursery  Care  Products  Corporation  v.  Treasurer  Acevedo:  elements  of  double  taxation  
 
Tanada  v.  Tuvera,  136  SCRA  27(1985):  effectivity  of  laws  

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