Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1 Holloway
2 Goodlad, J. I. 1984 A Place Called School: Prospects for the Future NY McGraw Hill 242
3 B&B.
4 Rowlands- Carson -4.
5 p.1 - ‘Growing Up Constructivist’, in, ‘Radical Constructivism - A Way of Knowing and Learning’.
http://www.oikos.org/radcon.htm ret May 10, 2006.
3
Von Glasersfeld draws from Jean Piaget, whose fifty years of research developed a biological
view of knowing. Knowledge is never of a real world; the real world, the world in itself, is
unknowable, like Immanuel Kant’s noumena. Knowledge is adaptation, useful to survival. Piaget
writes, “My central aim has always been the search for the mechanisms of biological adaptation
and the analysis and epistemological interpretation of that higher form of adaptation which
manifests itself as scientific thought.”6
The affinity of von Glasersfeld with Thomas Kuhn’s reconstruction of science
is clear in this paragraph:
When scientists observe, they categorize their observations by fitting them
into concepts which they have formed on the basis of prior experience. These
concepts are not given. They are the result of imaginative abstractions from a
particular way of seeing or sensing. These ways of seeing or sensing are those
of particular scientists. And when scientists explain, they do it by relating
things to one another - and the relations they use, again, are not given, but are
the result of their own abstracting from the mental operations they carried out
in order to combine what they have seen or sensed.7
“Fitting observations into concepts” is similar to the way Kuhn explained
normal science as fitting facts into a reigning paradigm. Kuhn’s 1962 book The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions overturned the idea that science accumulates
more and more data on the way to a accurate picture of reality. Instead of a
gradual accretion, discoveries or "scientific revolutions" herald the dawn of new
paradigms which supersede old facts. Von Glasersfeld’s constructions are like
Kuhn’s paradigms. Similarly, Piaget says that traditional epistemology does not
account for change or development; it is static. His account of scientific knowing
is pragmatic. Real developments in the sciences reveal their norms.8
Piaget also follows the understanding of Kant that ways of knowing are built in to the child.
The mind per Kant is not a blank slate like the empiricists said; basic categories of knowing such
as time and space are innate, and Piaget follows this understanding. As the child moves toward
the most sophisticated adaptation to the environment, structures succeed one another. Piaget’s
structures are less innate than potential. They are constructed. For example, a well-known
experiment by Piaget was to ask children to discern whether the amount of liquid in a wider glass
was the same as in a narrow glass with the liquid is at the same height in both. At the pre-
operational stage, from about age 2 to 6 or 7, children say the liquid is the same. At the
subsequent concrete operational stage, ages six to eleven or so, children recognize that a wider
glass has a bigger volume. Only after age 12 or so is a Formal Operations stage possible when the
child can reason by abstraction. Hence, Piaget called himself a genetic epistemologist. Thinking is
adapting. Education is facilitating new constructions. To Piaget and von Glasersfeld, a fact makes
sense within a pre-existing scheme – a perturbance adds to a construction, or challenges a
11 Sullivan, Syllabus
12 Rowlands 1999 p.3
13 Scholar.google.com search May 23, 2006.
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Science education should be a test case for constructivists, with its objectivist
standard of proof. In science, some constructions of reality clearly are more
adequate than others.14 Take the following as a case study:
In 1903, shortly after Roentgen discovered X-rays, the French physicist Rene
Blondlot claimed to have discovered a feeble ray called the N-ray. His discovery
was confirmed by contemporaries who also produced evidence also. But an
investigator from the journal Nature visited Blondlot’s lab and debunked the
claim.
Usually this snippet of science history is an example of pathological science or
an illustration of the self-correcting ways of science. However, a sociologist of
knowledge, Malcolm Ashmore, suggests that there can be no essential difference
between the reality claims of X-rays, radioactivity, and N-rays, and he wants to
“inject a little healthy skepticism” into standard accounts of N-rays. The science
educator Peter Slezak responded that on Ashmore’s principles, Blondlot should
be given equal time with Roentgen in physics lessons. When ultimate reality is
unknowable, it seems hard to disagree.
Further, with no objective, real-world standard, evaluation of constructivist
learning becomes a problem. The constructivist teacher sees herself as helping
along a process, aiming for appropriation of material rather than surface
answers. Since each learner’s stage is somewhat different, evaluation cannot be
done by testing all students at the same time with a standard test without
undermining the construction process.15
The problem of evaluating learning is exactly the same problem as assessment
of the adequacy of a particular construction. If reality is unknowable, and
dominant knowledge merely a function of power, what authority may judge true
constructions from false ones? This problem is not at all alleviated by objective,
empirical, results in neurology or cognitive science. Ultimate reality is
unknowable. Therefore, no basis to evaluate learning is available; whether the
learning has been educative or mis-educative, no one can say. Subjectivism
indeed situates the learning, a big relief after objectivism, but it does so at the
price of real knowledge. When Freirean constructivist bell hooks reported in her
1994 book teaching to transgress that students have given up on ethics,16 her
report was only an update of what C. S. Lewis foresaw in The Abolition of Man,
published in 1947.17
18 William J. Matthews, “Constructivism in the Classroom: Epistemology, History, and Empirical Evidence,” Teacher
Education Quarterly, Summer 2003, n.p. Retrieved from findarticles.com on June 13, 2005.
19 Matthews, “Constructivism in the Classroom,” n.p.
20 D. C. Phillips, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Many Faces of Constructivism,” Educational Researcher, Vol. 24,
No. 7, p. 5.
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Christian Belief
The constructivist Piaget, like the idealist Kant, is surely right that there is no
given fact. Against positivists of all kinds, yes, reality must be apprehended
subjectively. Humans apprehend truth subjectively. As finite beings set in limited
time and limited space, subjectivity for us is inevitable.21 Some kinds of
knowledge might even be generated by something like adaptation. Praxis, the
knowledge for craft and virtue, seems to work similarly.
However, affirming the subjective appropriation of reality is not to say that
humans never have access to big-R reality.
A truly Christian epistemology will not be sundered by the Cartesian split.
Von Glaserfeld complains that epistemologies, even Einstein, too frequently take
refuge in metaphysics, a refuge he refuses. To his mind, metaphysics is equivalent
to intellectual suicide, a sort of deus ex machina in philosophy, as incredible there
as in the theatre. In conversion to God however, Christians experience the
healing of the alienation of body and spirit, of self against scientific positivism
and so on, incipiently the divisions of mind, body, and spirit. We can claim the
ontological God as the basis of what we know, indeed, by confession we must do
so. We recognize no neutral knowledge; we reconfigure all of it. As Paul says to
the Corinthians, “We demolish arguments and every pretension that sets itself up
against the knowledge of God, and we take captive every thought to make it
obedient to Christ” (2 Cor 10:5, NIV). God's Word turns out to establish
knowledge generally. As Psalm 119 confesses, "The entrance of your words gives
light." Christianity is able to posit both subject and object, human on one side
and God and world on the other because God exists. With God, subject and object
are held together. Besides spiritual resources, Christians have intellectual
resources for a really holistic education.
Christians say that the noumenal is knowable. A degree of knowledge of the
thing-in-itself is given to us by revelation. The claim is not that the noumenal is
entirely comprehended; it is that the noumenal is sufficiently comprehended.
God has exhaustive knowledge but human knowledge via relevation is sufficient
and perspicuous. Knowledge by revelation is not exhaustive or comprehensive.
That the knowledge belongs to God first and derivatively to human beings by
revelation yields what might be called a theology of fact. Two plus two equals
four, and the fact is accessible to anyone. But the significance of the fact is also
accessible: the inviolable order 2+2 witnesses that God made an ordered
universe. Two plus two never equals five. Two plus two therefore is witness to the
21 Bill Edgar
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properly teaching. But the result of not sufficiently accounting for the subject in
his or her context is a gap between what we think we are doing and what the
students experience: more series on series of facts than life transformation.
Attention to how persons learn is an imperative for all educators including
Christian educators.
How would a reconciled subject/object look in teaching? It might look like
this. We will not construct all knowledge as if from zero. If teaching physics,
would we construct a partical accelerator and study particles directly? Would we
arrange a moon launch? Of course, no. But we will carefully construct some
knowledge in a course. We construct key aspects, perhaps introductory, perhaps
more advanced aspects. We construct not merely by telling an application but by
facilitating students’ applications. We do not depend on the Spirit to do all our
application for us. We see contextualization not as optional but as basic to our
task. We strive to see how Trinitarian theology matters for life, for, say, the idea
of the person in psychology, for persons we supervise at work. We might have to
reorder material and give space to some Christian anthropology as we teach. As
necessary, we give the objective goods -- but not all classroom hours. We seek
application both in assignments and in class time. We may or may not not ever
require academic objective-knowledge papers. We keep before us the way that
objective must meet subjective, subject must meet reality. We are aware of our
context so that that we discard the static idea of an academic field with fixed
boundaries in favor of some new, dynamic, metaphor encompassing the ever-
changing subjectivity of our students, some metaphor like the Doppelganger
effect where the observer is already within the observation. The flat field of
knowledge must rise up to meet human beings in culture. Our courses evolve to
meet the students where they have moved.
Theology is sometimes conceived as upstream from the practice of ministry;
the pure water flows down. Those who say that praxis needs to be taken into
theologizing -- Edward Farley, Rebecca Chopp, and others -- have still to register.
26 But practice can present anomalies, and the anomalies call for theoretical
26 Chopp
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The constructivist polemic against the lecture method has to tell against
Christians teaching religion or theology. Christians know about the need for
information fully grasped because we know how information can be transformed
by conversion. Surely, the desire for knowledge oriented toward worship,
doxological knowledge, or worshippers in reality, provided the motive for
university education at the inception. 27 If subject and object could be married,
education’s objective side would find its complement.
A version of this paper was presented at Canadian Evangelical Theological
Association annual meeting in the Congress of Social Sciences and Humanities,
York University, Toronto, May 27, 2006.
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