FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 8644 January 22, 2014

[Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2908]

AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS and CHARMAINE R.

CAMPOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELISEO M. CAMPOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a complain for disbarment1 on grounds of serious misconduct,

immorality and dishonesty filed against Atty. Eliseo M. Campos (Eliseo), former
presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. The
complainants herein are his wife, Aida R. Campos (Aida), and their children,
Alistair R. Campos (Alistair) and Charmaine R. Campos (Charmaine).

Antecedents

Eliseo and Aida were married in 1981. Alistair was born in 1982, and Charmaine,
in 1986.

In 1999, Eliseo purchased by installment a 936-square meter lot (the property) in

Bayugan, Agusan del Sur from a certain Renato Alimpoos. Eliseo thereafter
applied for the issuance of a title in Alistair’s name. Alistair was then a student
without an income and a capacity to buy the property. In 2006, Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. P-28258 covering the property was issued in Alistair’s name.
Meanwhile, Alistair got married and his wife and child likewise resided in Eliseo’s
house until 2008.2

On July 16, 2008, Eliseo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur, Branch 7, a Petition3for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. He
alleged that both he and Aida are psychologically incapacitated to comply with
essential marital obligations. He claimed that during the first few days of their
marriage, he realized that he finds no gratification in engaging in sexual
intercourse with his wife. He alleged that he is a homosexual. He also averred that
Aida experienced severe pain when she delivered Alistair. Consequently, Aida no
longer wanted to bear children. He likewise ascribed acts of infidelity to Aida.
On September 10, 2008, Eliseo executed an Affidavit of Loss 4 wherein he
represented himself as the owner of the property covered by OCT No. P-28258. He
declared that he unknowingly lost the owner’s certificate of title which used to be
in his files. On September 15, 2008, he caused the annotation 5 of the said affidavit
in the copy of OCT No. P-28258 kept in the Register of Deeds of Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur. In the Affidavit of No Loss6 executed on October 21, 2008 and
likewise inscribed7 in the certificate of title, Alistair refuted Eliseo’s
representations.

On November 26, 2008, Alistair filed before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur a complaint for perjury8 against Eliseo.
Alistair stated that the owner’s copy of OCT No. P-28258 was in his possession.
Eliseo was aware of such fact, but he still deliberately and maliciously asserted a
falsehood.

In Eliseo’s Counter-Affidavit,9 he insisted that he is the sole owner of the property

covered by OCT No. P-28258. Eliseo continued:

That when I applied for titling of said lot, I caused it to be registered in the name of
[Alistair], who was still single, as I have some other properties (land) under my
name;

That I never intended to give it to [Alistair] as he still has a sister;

That when the title was released, it was kept in our files;

That when I filed an annulment case against my wife which is now pending before
the [RTC] of Bayugan, I offered to my wife as a settlement to have our properties
settled. One of [these properties] is this lot, which I asked to be sold and its
proceeds be divided between us. I have learned that my wife refused to have that
property sold claiming that I could not sell the house and lot as it is in the name of
our son, herein complainant Alistair R. Campos;

xxxx

That my son’s statement in his complaint affidavit that the Owner’s Duplicate of
the Title of the Lot has long been in his actual, physical and personal possession, is
utterly false, as the title was previously in our possession in our files as the
property is undersigned's own exclusive property. x x x
That when I learned that together with my wife, he is going to apply for a loan
making the title of the lot as collateral, I decided to file a petition for cancellation
of the title under my son's name Alistair R. Campos, and asked Mrs. Azucena A.
Ortiz, to get a certified copy of the title from the Register of Deeds to be used in
the filing of a petition for cancellation of the title in my son’s name;

That I was told by Mrs. Ortiz, that she was told by the Register of Deeds, that I
have to execute an affidavit of loss so that I can be given a certified copy. Since the
title is not in my possession after I left my residence and I cannot find it from my
files, I let Mrs. Ortiz prepare an affidavit of loss and I signed it. I have also
instructed her to [cause the annotation of the affidavit on the certificate of title] to
protect my interest as the real owner of the lot, to counter or stop my wife and son
from using the titles as collateral of a loan;

x x x x.10

Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Sur dismissed
for lack of probable cause Alistair’s complaint for perjury against Eliseo.11 The
resolution, which dismissed the complaint, in part, reads:

"[W]hen [Eliseo] found out that the title of the lot he bought was missing and
could not be found in his files, he did the proper actions to protect his rights thereto
by executing an Affidavit of Loss.

x x x [W]hen [Eliseo] sensed that his wife is about to obtain a loan using the title
as collateral without his consent and to protect his right as owner of the property,
he went to the Register of Deeds to cancel his son’s ownership over the lot in
question with the intent to revert back its ownership in his name. However, when
asked to produce a copy of its duplicate original, [Eliseo] could not present the
same as it was already lost and could not be retrieved from his files. To prove its
loss, an Affidavit of Loss was executed by [Eliseo] attesting to the fact of its
unavailability.

x x x It can be deduced that the act of [Eliseo] was done in good faith. x x x The
intent of [Eliseo] in executing the Affidavit is not tainted with a corrupt assertion
of falsehood since there was a firm belief that indeed, the title is not anymore
found in his files. It could not be located and the title is kept by [Alistair] who took
sides with [Aida] who has plans to enjoy the benefits from the title using it as a
collateral in obtaining a loan from the lot covered by the said title. [Had Alistair
been truthful to Eliseo, the former could have informed the latter of the]
whereabouts of the title and could have sought permission from his father when he
took the copy of the title from [Eliseo’s] files. By not informing [Eliseo], he could
not be faulted for executing such Affidavit and neither can he be found guilty of
perjury as there was no malice on his part to do the same. x x x." 12 (Citation
omitted)

On February 11, 2009, Aida filed a Complaint13 for Legal Separation, Support and
Separation of Conjugal Properties against Eliseo. Aida alleged that Eliseo
confessed under oath that he is a homosexual. However, Eliseo, in effect,
contradicted the said confession when he admitted to Alistair and Charmaine that
he was then intimately involved with another woman. Aida likewise claimed that
Eliseo is temperamental and had stopped giving support to their family.

On April 6, 2009, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) an administrative complaint14 for serious misconduct,
immorality and dishonesty against Eliseo. Formal investigation was thereafter
conducted.

Pending the resolution of the above-mentioned administrative complaint against

Eliseo, he resigned from his judicial post on July 1, 2009.15

On September 14, 2009, after the conclusion of a hearing on Eliseo’s Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur,
Judge Eduardo Casals (Judge Casals) called the parties for a conference in his
chamber. A scuffle ensued inside the chamber. The police blotter filed promptly
after the incident indicated that Eliseo choked Charmaine and attempted to box but
failed to hit Alistair.16

On June 4, 2010, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed the instant complaint for
disbarment17 against Eliseo. They alleged that Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty,
immorality and serious misconduct in (a) causing the issuance of OCT No. P-
28258 in Alistair’s name; (b) subsequently misrepresenting himself as the real
owner of the lot covered by OCT No. P-28258; (c) falsely declaring under oath in
the Affidavit of Loss executed on September 10, 2008 that the owner’s copy of
OCT No. P-28258 is missing despite his knowledge that the said title is with
Alistair; (d) stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is
a homosexual albeit admitting to his children that he has an intimate relation with
another woman; and (e) choking and boxing his children on September 14, 2009.

After Eliseo’s submission of his comment,18 the Court referred the complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.19
In Eliseo’s Position Paper20 filed with the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), he interposed the following defenses: (a) the complainants are engaged in
forum shopping in view of pending administrative and civil cases in all of which
the issues of immorality and homosexuality have already been raised;21 (b) the
complaint is instituted merely to harass him as a consequence of his refusal to
provide a monthly support of Php60,000.00 to his wife and children; 22 (c) he has
no extra-marital relation but he once told Alistair and Charmaine in jest that due to
Aida’s infidelity, he intends to live separately with another woman who may be
more caring and loving than his wife;23 and (d) to protect his rights and prevent the
complainants from using as a collateral for a loan the house and lot covered by
OCT No. P-28258, he executed the Affidavit of Loss on September 10, 2008 as a
pre-requisite to his filing of an action in court for the registration of the property in
his name.24 Further, Eliseo refuted Alistair and Charmaine’s claims relative to the
scuffle which occurred on September 14, 2009 inside the chamber of the judge
hearing the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. Eliseo insists that if
Alistair and Charmaine’s claims were true, they could have presented independent
witnesses to corroborate their version of the incident, and medical certificates to
prove that they indeed sustained injuries. What follows is Eliseo’s account of what
had transpired:

[A]fter adjournment of the hearing of the annulment case, the judge called the
parties to his chamber for a conference. [Aida] however was reluctant to go unless
her children would join her. The judge then called all of them to the chamber. Once
there, the Judge inquired about [Eliseo’s] proposal for settlement. While [Eliseo]
was explaining to the judge, [Charmaine] reacted by raising her voice uttering
unprintable words to [Eliseo]. [Eliseo] requested her to calm down reminding her
that they were still in court. But she continued her tirade at [Eliseo] with greater
intensity even calling him a bad father, and that she despised him. x x x Charmaine
had already been ejected by the judge out of the court for lack of decorum and
respect. The order for her removal arose after she interrupted the court several
times by shouting at [Eliseo]. When she was already outside the court premises,
she was even heard by a certain Samuel Pasagdan saying that [Eliseo] should
watch out after the hearing as she was going to attack him. The prior incident
(where she was thrown out of court) made her angrier in the chamber. So when she
continued with her unpleasant and scandalous utterances by again interrupting
[Eliseo] who was asked by the judge to talk about his proposal for settlement,
[Eliseo] walked to her and held her by her shoulder to put some sense to her that
she really had to calm down out of respect [for] the judge. There was no choking of
Charmaine. But, this sight of holding Charmaine by the shoulder was viewed
differently by [Alistair] who flung with force and recklessness a bag containing an
unknown hard object to [Eliseo]. [Eliseo] was hit and in pain. At this point,
Charmaine suddenly held [Eliseo] from behind so he could not defend himself
from the onslaught of Alistaire (sic) who was poised to attack him. [Eliseo] was
forced to elbow Charmaine to break free from her hold. There was a brief
exchange of punches between Alistair and [Eliseo] before the Presiding Judge
broke the fray. This incident could not have happened if not for Charmaine’s own
misdemeanor and initial provocation.25

Aida, Alistair and Charmaine did not attend the hearing held on March 18, 2011,
but Atty. Gener Sansaet came to represent them. Eliseo appeared on his own
behalf, with Atty. Alex Bacarro as collaborating counsel.

During the hearing, Eliseo insisted that the allegations against him of (a)
immorality and psychological incapacity in having extra-marital affairs; and (b)
serious misconduct in the execution of the Affidavit of Loss need not be resolved
anymore in the instant disbarment complaint since they are already the subjects of
other pending cases.26 He also expressed his doubt that Alistair is his biological
son.27 He also alleged that Aida, who had served for three terms as a Provincial
Board Member, had a lover, who was likewise a political figure.28 Aida harbored
the impression that Eliseo’s filing of his Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage caused the downfall of the former’s political career.29

The Report and Recommendation of the CBD

On June 11, 2012, CBD Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. (Commissioner Din,
Jr.) submitted his Report and Recommendation30 to the IBP Board of Governors.
Commissioner Din, Jr. recommended the dismissal of the instant disbarment
complaint against Eliseo for lack of evidence. Commissioner Din, Jr. ratiocinated
that:

The main issue in the case at bar is whether or not [Eliseo] committed serious
misconduct sufficient to cause his disbarment. The determination of [Eliseo’s]
culpability is dependent on the following: 1. whether or not [Eliseo] was dishonest
with regards to the statements he made in his Petition for Annulment. [Corollarily]
whether or not [Eliseo] is guilty of immoral conduct; 2. Whether or not the
statements raised in the Affidavit of Loss concerning the certificate of title of the
Campos’ property were untrue; and 3. Whether or not [Eliseo] choked his
daughter, Charmaine, during the amicable settlement of the annulment case in the
(sic) Judge Casal’s (sic) chambers.
The Commission finds in the negative. Gross or serious misconduct has been
defined as "any inexcusable, shameful and flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of
the person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the
rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause, a conduct that is
generally motivated by a predetermined, obstinate or intentional purpose (Yumol,
Jr. vs. Ferrer, Sr., 456 SCRA 457).

As a consequence of finding of gross misconduct has been held to be "a ground for
the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character
is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the
continuance of such privilege." (Cham v. Atty. Paita-Moya[,] A.C. No. 7494, June
27, 2008).

In the same vein, the Supreme Court has likewise held that: "A lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good
condition precedent to the practice of law but also a good qualification for all
members of the bar (Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M. Case No. 5564, August 20,
2008).

In the case at bar, the complainants’ averments of [Eliseo’s] alleged transgressions,

i.e. the incongruence of his homosexuality and the extramarital relation of [Eliseo]
as grounds for annulment compared with the complainants’ allegation that [Eliseo]
admitted that he has a mistress; the alleged choking of [Charmaine]; and the
execution of the Affidavit of Loss despite knowledge of the fact that the certificate
of title was with [Alistair] who is the registered owner of the subject property taken
on their own is a valid ground to find [Eliseo] guilty of gross misconduct.

However, [Eliseo] has succinctly rebutted each and every single allegation of the
complainants making the case at fore a battle of opposing narration of facts.

More importantly, the pieces of evidence presented by the complainants are

insufficient to prove their claim beyond the degree of evidence required of them by
law to satisfy and overcome.

Basic and fundamental is the rule that "the burden of proof is upon the complainant
and the Court will exercise the disciplinary power only if the former establishes the
case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence."

xxxx
In the case at bar, [apart] from the allegations in the complaint, no other evidence
was presented by the complainants to bolster their claims. Aside from the
statements made in the complaint, no other corroborative or collaborating evidence
documentary or testimonial from independent, third person was presented to
convince this Commission by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof that [Eliseo]
is guilty of the allegations contained therein.31(Citation omitted)

The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

The IBP Board of Governors, however, reversed the findings of Commissioner

Din, Jr. In the Extended Resolution issued on March 20, 2013, the Board
suspended Eliseo from the practice of law for two years. Thus:

[T]he Board, upon a thorough perusal of the records, finds sufficient evidence to
sustain misconduct on the part of [Eliseo] as a lawyer, specifically his filing an
Affidavit of Loss of Title to Real Property which Title was in the name of Alistair,
his son, and which was in the latter’s possession, substantiated with annexes and
affidavits. The same holds true for the alleged choking incident in the Judge’s
chamber which was caused to be blottered, Annex "G". [Eliseo] also admitted his
infidelity albeit he postulated the defense of homosexuality. All these, taken
together, fall short of the ethical standards set forth for lawyers in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.32

Issues

Whether or not Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious

misconduct in:

I.

Causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name;

II.

Subsequently misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot covered by

OCT No. P-28258;

III.
 Falsely declaring under oath in the Affidavit of Loss executed on September
10, 2008 that the owner's copy of OCT No. P-28258 is missing despite his
knowledge that the said title is with Alistair;

IV.

Stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a

homosexual albeit admitting to his children that he has an intimate relation
with another woman; and

V.

Choking and boxing his children on September 14, 2009.

This Court’s Ruling

Of the five issues raised herein, only the allegation of Eliseo’s engagement in the
scuffle inside the chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009 shall be
resolved. Anent the foregoing, this Court is compelled to once again impose a fine
upon Eliseo for violating Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he conducted himself in a manner not befitting a member of
the bar.

This Court affirms the findings of the IBP Board of Governors that Eliseo deserves
to be sanctioned for his unbecoming behavior.

In recommending the imposition upon Eliseo of a penalty of two years of

suspension from the practice of law, the IBP Board of Governors considered all the
three charges of immorality, dishonesty and misconduct against the former.

However, this Court, on February 8, 2012, in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, had already
imposed upon Eliseo a fine of Php20,000.00 for simple misconduct in causing the
issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name when the subject property
actually belongs to the former. The charges of (a) immorality in engaging in extra-
marital affairs; and (b) dishonesty in executing the Affidavit of Loss on September
10, 2008, were, on the other hand, dismissed by the Court after finding either the
evidence of the complainants as insufficient or the issues raised being already the
subjects of Eliseo’s pending Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

It is worth emphasizing that the instant disbarment complaint and A.M. No. MTJ-
10-1761 are anchored upon almost the same set of facts, except that in the former,
the issue of occurence of the scuffle on September 14, 2009 is raised as well. This
Court does not intend to punish Eliseo twice for the same acts especially since they
pertain to his private life and were not actually committed in connection with the
performance of his functions as a magistrate before.

In Samson v. Caballero,33 the Court emphasized what "automatic conversion of

administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against
them as lawyers" means, viz:

This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a

disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with
AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of
Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who
are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and
as Members of the Philippine Bar," provides:

"Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who
are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary
action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such
other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as
grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned
as a member of the Bar. x x x. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in
one decision or resolution."

xxxx

Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." xxx In other words, an
order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he
should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but
also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic
conversion" of administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary
proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No.
02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by
treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a
disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule.
Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with
the filing of an administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of
Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level
court.34 (Citations and emphasis omitted)

The above-cited case suggests the superfluity of instituting a disbarment complaint

against a lawyer when an administrative case had been previously filed against him
or her as a magistrate. Ideally therefore, the instant disbarment complaint should
have been consolidated with A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761. However, it is well to note
that Samson v. Caballero35 was promulgated by the Court on August 5, 2009
subsequent to the filing of the instant disbarment complaint on April 6, 2009.
Further, while all the allegations in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are replicated in the
instant disbarment complaint, the last issue of engagement in the scuffle is an
addition to the latter. Hence, this Court shall now resolve the said issue to write
finis to the parties’ bickerings.

In the instant disbarment complaint, tirades and bare accusations were

exchanged.1âwphi1 It bears stressing that not one of the parties had presented even
one independent witness to prove what transpired inside the chamber of Judge
Casals on September 14, 2009. That a scuffle took place is a fact, but the question
of who started what cannot be determined with much certainty.

While admitting his engagement in the scuffle, Eliseo vigorously attempts to

justify his conduct as self-defense on his part.36

While this Court finds credence and logic in Eliseo’s narration of the incident, and
understands that the successive acts of the parties during the tussle were committed
at a time when passions ran high, he shall not be excused for comporting himself in
such an undignified manner.

Rule 7.03, Canon 737 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly

proscribes a lawyer from engaging in conduct that "adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

The case of Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong,38 on the other hand, is instructive anent

what constitutes unbecoming conduct, viz:
Unbecoming conduct "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only
of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed
method."39

Sans any descriptive sophistry, what Eliseo did was to engage in a brawl with no
less than his own children inside the chamber of a judge. This Court shall not
countenance crude social behavior. Besides, the courtroom is looked upon by
people with high respect and is regarded as a sacred place where litigants are
heard, rights and conflicts settled, and justice solemnly dispensed. 40 Misbehavior
within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity.41 Although
Alistair and Charmaine were not entirely faultless, a higher level of decorum and
restraint was then expected from Eliseo, whose conduct failed to show due respect
for the court and lend credit to the nobility of the practitioners of the legal
profession.

Further, albeit not raised as an issue, this Court views with disfavor Eliseo’s
statement during the hearing conducted by the CBD on March 18, 2011 that he
doubts Alistair to be his biologiocal son.42 As a lawyer, Eliseo is presumably aware
that ascribing illegitimacy to Alistair in a proceeding not instituted for that specific
purpose is nothing short of defamation.

All told, Eliseo violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he conducted himself in a manner not befitting a member of
the bar by engaging in the scuffle with his own children in the chamber of Judge
Casals on September 14, 2009 and recklessly expressing his doubt anent the
legitimacy of his son Alistair during the hearing before the CBD.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds that respondent Eliseo M. Campos violated Rule
7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A FINE of Five
Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) is hereby imposed upon him, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. SO
ORDERED.

B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING

EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment
of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the
years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in
1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986,
then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in
the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that
he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law
prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither
can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.

On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that
membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer
continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a
member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of
annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by
the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules
of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld
as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of
the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in
defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule
allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that
what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It
asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the
IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also
alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals
for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the
Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from
payment of the annual dues.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is
questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they
are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-
Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also
posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would
indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status
and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal
from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of
property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of
law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the
inactive lawyers-members reside.

Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from
payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that
is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad
from 1986-2003?

We rule in the negative.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong,

as distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by
which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar
is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They
are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics
or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member.5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of every
attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the lawyers.7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar8 - which power required
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to
raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the
Philippine Bar,9 thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court is attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax
purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the
Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee
for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program
without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily
carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that
the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a
member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of

which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of
dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the
lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have
informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before
he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and
his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.

As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of
Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive
status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime,
petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to
the IBP.

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on
one of his constitutional rights.

This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this
wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and
under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is
a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable
or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court
to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions,11 one of which is the payment of membership dues.
Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity
thereof warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is

DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as
membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will
merit his suspension from the practice of law. SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING

EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment
of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the
years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in
1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986,
then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in
the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that
he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law
prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither
can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.

On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that
membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer
continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a
member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of
annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by
the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules
of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld
as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of
the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in
defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule
allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that
what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It
asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the
IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also
alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals
for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the
Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from
payment of the annual dues.

In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is

questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they
are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-
Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also
posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would
indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status
and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal
from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of
property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of
law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the
inactive lawyers-members reside.

Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from
payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that
is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad
from 1986-2003?

We rule in the negative.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong,

as distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by
which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar
is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They
are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics
or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member.5

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of every
attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the lawyers.7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar8 - which power required
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to
raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the
Philippine Bar,9 thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court is attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax
purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the
Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee
for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program
without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily
carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that
the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a
member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of

which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of
dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the
lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have
informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before
he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and
his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.

As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of
Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive
status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime,
petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to
the IBP.

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on
one of his constitutional rights.

This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this
wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and
under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is
a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable
or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court
to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions,11 one of which is the payment of membership dues.
Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity
thereof warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is

DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as
membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will
merit his suspension from the practice of law. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING

INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME
COURT"

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law
professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause
Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enumerated therein.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets
this as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of
Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the said October
19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding
grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as
intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her
dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the
present decision.

With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind,
the Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was
adequate and another who manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar,
the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to the issues at
hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently
behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law professors, who are
members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the Code of
Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our
free and democratic republic.

The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are
as follows:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents
of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.

CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing
the court.

Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers
speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical
standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to
condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a decision it has
rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such decision’s
reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not
the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect
everyone’s attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by
respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent members of the Bar have
crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and speech and
violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or interference as third
parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was
respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their
Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
(Dean Leonen), for the Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of
freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth
discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that
freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for
using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be
applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely
because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould
the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of
intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.

To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is apropos

to revisit the factual antecedents of this case.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Antecedent Facts and Proceedings

On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice
Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was
promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya
Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely
the following grounds:
I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts’
(sic) assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are virtually
unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional
provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and
humanitarian standards, including those provided for in the relevant international
conventions of which the Philippines is a party.4

II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if
fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its citizens –
especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and
pertain to jus cogens norms.5

On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr.
(Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first
time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the
Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:

I.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE

COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST
THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED
IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES
SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE
INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES
EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7

They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not
only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the
plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment
for denying the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the
Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article
"A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga
Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking
the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11

On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on
July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article,
entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the
Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website
also on July 19, 2010.13

On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted,"
appeared in the Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed
that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged
in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-
Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the
post by Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the
international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry in
this wise:

The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration

filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is
available here:

http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-
the-supreme-court/

The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and
citations that are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-
authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the
petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was filed today.

Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion
is that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual
slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the
opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision is available
17
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm

On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the
Court in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration.18

In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the
Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:

Your Honours:

I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last
few days.

Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled,
as a question of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of
human rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the possible unauthorized
use of my law review article on rape as an international crime in your esteemed
Court’s Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R.
No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).

My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by
the Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative
(SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative
(MLDI), where I sit as trustee.

In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in

footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also
concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I made in the
article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic since the
article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims
of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve

Journal of International Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed
Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the
arguments I made in the article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues
raised by this letter.

With respect,

(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20

In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to
Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc
Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of
Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently
docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to
comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo.21

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity:
A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on
the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the
Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A
report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as
the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was
likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin
board allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at said college’s website.27

On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the
University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the
Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover
letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:

The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona

Chief Justice
 Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary

Your Honors:

We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by

thirty[-]eight (38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that
its points could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law

(Emphases supplied.)

The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the
actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law
professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For convenient
reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is reproduced here:

RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously
came out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort
women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their own
government as well as from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a
semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the
land.

It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College
of Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed
plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism
and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work
have been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the
integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.

In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of

another person’s work as one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best,
and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas and
expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into committing such
ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and
expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple.
A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty.
Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in
the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means.
Evidently, this is a complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.

A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that
the ponente merely copied select portions of other legal writers’ works and
interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original work. Under
the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been promulgated by the
Court, the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s.
Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any
mention of the original writers’ names and the publications from which they came,
the thing speaks for itself.

So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and
the spokesman of the Court.

It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original
articles is a reference to the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory
explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the effort
they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are precisely the
subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together with portions of their
writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides
additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’
work of organizing and analyzing those primary sources.

It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar
with all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal
unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and careful attribution and
citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence
expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.

But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors
Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents
the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the
main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that the classification
of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have
attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek
remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of
the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the
intellectual dishonesty of copying works without attribution by transforming it into
an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.

The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals

with State liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a
time of war, and the role of the injured parties’ home States in the pursuit of
remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely have such
opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino
"comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World War
made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But
instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for
almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking
justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on
misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on
polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing
to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take
up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false
sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the
most basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine
Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other
Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.

The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions
and cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct
imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very
foundation of its authority and power in a democratic society. Given the Court’s
recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of
such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only
further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the
significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but
of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse
and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to
the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.

The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without
ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is
beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only the content, but
also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible and
beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not
casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose
of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the
establishment of a higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in
the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of administration of
justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of
the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires
competence and integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance
with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed
upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of
the University of the Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire
Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system
by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal
precedents through dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence
to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice
to all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the
petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and
to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary
for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position, without
prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which
it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to
prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to
the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing
in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July
2010.

(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Dean and Professor of Law

(SGD.) FROILAN M.
(SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN
BACUNGAN
Dean (1989-1995)
Dean (1978-1983)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. (SGD.) SALVADOR T.

 MAGALLONA CARLOTA
Dean (1995-1999) Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of
Law

REGULAR FACULTY

(SGD.) JAY L.
(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON
BATONGBACAL
Professor
Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P.

(SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D.
SALVADOR DAWAY
BATTAD
Associate Dean and Associate
Assistant Professor
Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B.
(SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA
GATMAYTAN
Assistant Professor
Associate Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

LECTURERS

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A.

(SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
ALAMPAY

(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO

(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH

(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS

(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA

(SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S.

(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG
QUIMBO

(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B.

CORONEL TOMBOC

(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY

(SGD.) CONCEPCION L.
(SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
JARDELEZA

(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ

(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29

(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(Underscoring supplied.)

Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known
his sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams’
letter here:

Glasgow, 18 August 2010

Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)

Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

Your Excellency,

My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the

University of Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my
publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.

The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s

Judgment, in the section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the
table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken almost word
by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing Obligations Erga
Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that there is
a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as this is in
relation to a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect
to the substantive passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be
considered an appropriate form of referencing.

I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the
Judgment’s cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory
reading shows that my book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite: namely that
the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm place in
contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he
present study attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very mysterious’ concept and
thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding
section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the concept is now a part of
the reality of international law, established in the jurisprudence of courts and the
practice of States" (p. 309).

With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work
should have been cited to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite approach.
More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your Honourable Court’s
Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging it.

On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable

Court.

I remain

Sincerely yours

(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31

In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits during
the August 26, 2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the
Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring Integrity
Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain faculty
members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee
directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said Statement within three
days from the August 26 hearing.32

It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a
copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages
the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all.
Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81
faculty members appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual
signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous
copies of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also
appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement
although his name was not included among the signatories in the previous copies
submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible signatories to the
Statement remained at 37.

The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same
Statement, having been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010,
was already under consideration by the Court.33

In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following
observations regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation
not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed
dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary
sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of
the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for
the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional
attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by
the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of

deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of
"polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in
the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members
of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.34 x x x.
(Underscoring ours.)

In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a
free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism
only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to
become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks
and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than
objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya
case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing
the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is
not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite
resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This
runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be
the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe
fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and
underscoring supplied.)

Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan,
Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison,
Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T.
Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon
F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur
P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A.
Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza,
Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch,
Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas
Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D.
Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the
Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation
of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.37

Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01,
10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the
pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before the Ethics
Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a
true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.38

In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular

administrative matter.

Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19,

2010 Show Cause Resolution

On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court,
respondents filed the following pleadings:

(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37

respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to
the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility;

(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T.
Juan-Bautista in relation to the same charge in par. (1);

(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in
relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in
relation to the charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and

(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.

Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof.

Raul Vasquez)

Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010
a common compliance which was signed by their respective counsels (the
Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common Compliance, respondents
stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in the discharge of the
‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law,’
and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public concern and one that
is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with the purest
of intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was involved either as party or
counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note with concern" that the
Show Cause Resolution’s findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that
respondents indeed are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law
professors and officers of the Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."41

By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:

(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions

In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes42 and
the courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the
Court44 in the issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that their intention
was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to
ensure continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was
purportedly evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive
action."45 Respondents’ call in the Statement for the Court "to provide clear and
concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal
research and writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with strictures
enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development of the legal system by
initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
administration of justice’" (under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal processes" (under
Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest
and duty to vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because
these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the academe, especially
in our law schools."47

Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring

Integrity Statement as an ‘institutional attack’ x x x on the basis of its first and
ninth paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at the time the Statement was
allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not going to
take any action on the grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation."49 According to respondents, the bases for their belief were (i)
the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have said that
Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July
22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to
downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation
charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the Court’s
indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del
Castillo that impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.

(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Castillo committed
plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance with the standards of
academic writing

A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the

merits of respondents’ charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying
on University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals 52 and
foreign materials and jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue that their
position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct
view and that they are therefore justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity
Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance included, among others: (i)
the letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D., 53 sent to Chief
Justice Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise
lifted without proper attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana Salazar
Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and
from an International Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law
Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International
Human Rights Law" by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of their
charge that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper
attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
Commission on Elections.54

(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others
have likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"

In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism

and misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public issues."55 They identified
various published reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to the
stance of respondents, on the issue of plagiarism, specifically:

(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero; 56

(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
July 24, 2010;57

(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010;58

(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine
Star on July 30, 2010;59

(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian

Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60

(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the

Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8, 2010;61

(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call for the resignation of
Justice Del Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today
on July 31, 2010;62

(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the
Ateneo de Manila University School of Law on the calls for the resignation of
Justice Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the
Business Mirror on August 11, 2010;63

(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former
dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional
Association, the Judges Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines – Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16,
2010;64 and

(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65

In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out
for sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010
that they may have violated specific canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is unfair and without basis.

(d) Freedom of expression

In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed

their position that in issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be
performing their duties as members of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers
of law, but also as citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally protected in the
exercise of free speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v.
Bustos,67In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition for
Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections.69

(e) Academic freedom

In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their

Statement was also issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in
an institution of higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of the University of the
Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he national university has the
right and responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology70 which
they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a
free and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty member’s field of
study without fear of reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had they remained silent
on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised
[their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a
culture and generation of students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack
the competence and discipline for research and pleading; or, worse, [that] their
silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and
misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no
bearing or relevance to one’s conduct."71

In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the

following portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in
Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:

Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial
course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by
chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a
case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous
bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or
low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate
language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome
of a case.73

On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the
Common Compliance stated, thus:

WHEREFORE:

A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar

and officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:

1. the foregoing be noted; and

2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause
Resolution, including its conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached their
"obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, … and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice;" and [b] committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13
and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer,
respondents respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of their due
process rights, that before final judgment be rendered:

1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;

2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the
findings and conclusions of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including
especially the finding and conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that
connection, that appropriate procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted and
defined that will allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the production
of and to present testimonial, documentary, and object evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R.
No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc.
Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC); and

3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts,
reports and submissions in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses who were or could have been called in In The Matter of the
Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74

Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista

Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-
Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the
Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations in the Common
Compliance with some additional averments.

Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to
challenge the findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution.
Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect
contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished
only after charge and hearing."75

Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith
and with the best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to
resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her deep disappointment
and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the
Statement.

On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence77 which

in her view highlighted that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to
institutions of higher learning such that schools have the freedom to determine for
themselves who may teach, what may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and
who may be admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere in the
schools’ exercise of discretion in these matters in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of the
University of the Philippines and other universities on their right to determine how
lessons shall be taught.

Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of

respondents’ constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be
curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to public safety, public morale,
public health or other legitimate public interest.78

Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez

On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate
Compliance by registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance,
Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his signing of the Statement.
He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of conversation among the UP
Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it
reportedly contained citations not properly attributed to the sources; that he was
shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to
his class; and that, agreeing in principle with the main theme advanced by the
Statement, he signed the same in utmost good faith.79

In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof.
Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a
democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the attention
of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in American Jurisprudence
(AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he "never had any intention to unduly influence, nor
entertained any illusion that he could or should influence, [the Court] in its
disposition of the Vinuya case"83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the Court]
was the farthest thing on respondent’s mind when he signed the
Statement."84Unlike his colleagues, who wish to impress upon this Court the
purported homogeneity of the views on what constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez
stated in his Compliance that:

13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010,
some espoused the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is
an essential element of the same. Others, like respondent, were of the opinion that
plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the perpetrator, the way it has
always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair topic
for academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that
plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another’s work and to pass it off
as one’s own.85 (Emphases supplied.)

Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he
"might have been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the
Statement] and could have been more careful."86 He ends his discussion with a
respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully complied with the
Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner
violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.

Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon

10 in relation to his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to
this Court

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of
the UP Law Faculty Statement, which he described as follows:

"Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP
College of Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven
(37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with
the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC.
 "Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature, but
which reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty
with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and
physically posted in the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of
Restoring Integrity II was also officially received by the Honorable Court from the
Dean of the UP College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before the
filing of Restoring Integrity I.

"Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and

which presently serves as the official file copy of the Dean’s Office in the UP
College of Law that may be signed by other faculty members who still wish to. It
bears the actual signatures of the thirty- seven original signatories to Restoring
Integrity I above their printed names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition,
the actual signatures of eight (8) other members of the faculty above their
handwritten or typewritten names.87

For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity
II are relevant since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the
discrepancies in the signature pages of these two documents. Restoring Integrity III
was never submitted to this Court.

On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came
about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus:

2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the
faculty on a draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and
circulate it among the faculty members so that those who wished to may sign. For
this purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the printed draft’s
signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement,
Restoring Integrity I, come into being.

2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean
Leonen was unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s
Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had
already been filed, or that the Honorable Court was in the process of convening its
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members
of the faculty. Some faculty members visited the Dean’s Office to sign the
document or had it brought to their classrooms in the College of Law, or to their
offices or residences. Still other faculty members who, for one reason or another,
were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time, nevertheless conveyed to
Dean Leonen their assurances that they would sign as soon as they could manage.

2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had
been circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the
statement in a style and manner appropriate for posting in the College of Law.
Following his own established practice in relation to significant public issuances,
he directed them to reformat the signing pages so that only the names of those who
signed the first printed draft would appear, together with the corresponding
"(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring Integrity II thus came into being. 88

According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above

the names of non-signatories in the final draft of significant public issuances, is
meant not so much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the integrity of such
documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting statements with blanks would be
an open invitation to vandals and pranksters."90

With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the signatories
in Restoring Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean
Leonen attributed the mistake to a miscommunication involving his administrative
officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:

2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the
reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of
Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not
among those who had physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was
previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his staff to the inclusion
of the Justice’s name among the "(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.

2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to
Justice Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her,
Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement
for him as he agreed fundamentally with its contents. Also according to her, Justice
Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself
as he was leaving for the United States the following week. It would later turn out
that this account was not entirely accurate.91(Underscoring and italics supplied.)

Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer,
however, and so placed full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed
other faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to indicate that they were
signatories, even though they were at that time unable to affix their signatures
physically to the document."93

However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff
reviewed the circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza’s
signature. It would turn out that this was what actually transpired:

2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to Justice
Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the
Restoring Integrity Statement as he fundamentally agreed with its contents.
However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say that he authorized the dean to sign
the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the
dean to sign it for him as he was about to leave for the United States. The dean’s
staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the Restoring
Integrity Statement to him.

2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to

sign the Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the following
week.

2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when
he went to the College to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from
the U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign.94

According to the Dean:

2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call
he received from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza
confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement was
brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he declined to sign it because
it had already become controversial. At that time, he predicted that the Court
would take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and under those
circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a
former Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by
signing the Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)

With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of
Restoring Integrity II when he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I
and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010 letter that the
version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38 members of the
UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:

Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it

was circulated to him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean
Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II.
The dean assumed that his name was still included in the reformatted signing
pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38 members
of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96

Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of
the Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He
emphasized that the main body of the Statement was unchanged in all its three
versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This purportedly is
merely "reflective of [the Statement’s] essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto
meant to continuously draw adherents to its message, its signatory portion is
necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other printings of [the Statement]
may be made in the future, each one reflecting the same text but with more and
more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen claims
that "this is not an instance where it has been made to appear in a document that a
person has participated in an act when the latter did not in fact so participate" 98 for
he "did not misrepresent which members of the faculty of the UP College of Law
had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed
their desire to be signatories thereto."99

In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of
Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the
Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of the UP Law faculty
members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be signatories to, the
Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he
"coursed [the Statement] through the appropriate channels by transmitting the same
to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latter’s information and proper
disposition with the hope that its points would be duly considered by the
Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v.
Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required quantum of proof has not been
met in this case and that no dubious character or motivation for the act complained
of existed to warrant an administrative sanction for violation of the standard of
honesty provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility.102

Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs
as the Common Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to
the records, evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only in this case but also
in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving Justice Del Castillo.

Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)

For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not
a member of the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of
Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at the UP College
of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010. He further
alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and the
Supreme Court of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to speak means
the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila Public
School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or
speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make the intended recipients
listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of
repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of
courage and self-assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous
whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory
Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,108Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger, clear
or present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of
the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on free
speech).109 He also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the other
respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring
Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110

ISSUES

Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of

respondents, the material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of
expression?

2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic freedom as law
professors?

3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not
be disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02
and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he
should not be disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01,
10.02 and 10.03?

5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and
in relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or
presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and
the witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics
case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?

DISCUSSION

The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of
expression.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show
Cause Resolution, has interfered with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right
to free speech and expression. It appears that the underlying assumption behind
respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this Court is denying them the
right to criticize the Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to
"silence" respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they characterize as a
"legitimate public issue."

This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly
show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the
Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated
the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious
language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in
the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said
pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave
rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the
statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the
circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this
Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.

To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that
Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that
belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth" 111 when it was "[o]f public
knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the
truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution
that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. 113 The
Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring
Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked
respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the
imagination could be considered as fair or constructive, to wit:

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for
the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional
attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.

Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by
the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of

deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of
"polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in
the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members
of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x.
(Underscoring ours.)

To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of

expression when it stated that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a
free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism
only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to
become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks
and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than
objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya
case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing
the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is
not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite
resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This
runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be
the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe
fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.115 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions,
this Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be
balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the
Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics
are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed
the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the
courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the
limits of fair comment and common decency.

As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty.
Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the
following paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of
this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and
constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery
of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas.
We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want
that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas,
resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage
of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost
desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state
sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his
thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of
'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the administration of
justice.117 (Emphases supplied.)

The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor
necessary and further held that:

[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points
relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons
stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were
superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and
amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has
done, because both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction them
by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a
serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration
of questions submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion

contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein,
after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case
he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of
denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been
the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of
predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere
of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions
of the nature of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration
of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge,
occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than
contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the
part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so
devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would
maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good
reasons, that it has acted erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)

Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote
from the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned
statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the respondents
here, who are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore, do not
have any standing at all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting
respondents’ theory, Salcedo is authority for the following principle:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend
its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a
right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of
justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing,
he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and
prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests
that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious
statements in his pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the
respondents’ Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to the Court.

Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their

position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance
and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the Court indefinitely
suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great
injustice to his client committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition
was described, thus:

He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His
client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment,"
has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the
same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members
of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know
of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his
petition with a prayer that

"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession."121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on
the principle that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and
comment upon actuations of public officers, including judicial authority. However,
the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts, whether done in
court or outside of it, must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This
case engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal authorities
sustaining this view.1awphi1 To quote from that decision:

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the
judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of
the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which
are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon
his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that
of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself
"with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly
remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and
judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards
the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely
to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their
tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than
the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions
of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the
bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

xxxx

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be
an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or communications or in the course of a political
campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance,

observed that:

[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,

respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to
obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt
proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in
court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor.
Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the
fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection
and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or

unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may
be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to
the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously
erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its
decision. x x x.

xxxx

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the
adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in
many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court,
and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark
to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member
of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be
easily gleaned even from more recent jurisprudence.

In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through

the imposition of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge
in the guise of an administrative complaint and held, thus:

As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of
administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any
other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its officers. This
does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we stated in
Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he
cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an
officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562,
579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion
as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).

xxxx

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in
Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the
judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of
the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.

xxxx

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech
and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised
responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is
not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. x x x.

xxxx

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes
high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration
(Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the
integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice
by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive
language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive
language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful,
offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter
addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the
resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs.
Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]);
or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).

Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint

which is clearly unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the
lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client. x x
x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple
misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine
upon him, we had the occasion to state:

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language or behavior before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the
bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their
clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain
from all offensive personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s
language even in his pleadings must be dignified.128

Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free
speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality
of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,129 relied upon by
respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the
right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the
freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society
preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute.
It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it
should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that
press for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)

One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat
to judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate,
reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court
held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely
suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media statements
grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No

one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no
antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be
secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for
delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. x x
x.132 (Emphases supplied.)

For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents 133 that the
Statement presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.

The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic
freedom.

It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence,

guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what
they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must point out that there
is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject
matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not
inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject
lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech,
coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.

A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon
in any previous case before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are
also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative
proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence
the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.

Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in
other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by
respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is
that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may
be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts
and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To
our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of
lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad
definition in Cayetano v. Monsod,134lawyers when they teach law are considered
engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more
than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold
the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors
must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable
to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is
inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.

Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common
Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to
"participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting
efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice"
under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that
they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11
and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct
that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective
regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason
that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to
provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.

The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of Canons
1, 11 and 13.

Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of expression and

academic freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in their
submissions.

With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main ideas: (a)
the validity of their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del
Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the correct action on
said issue.

The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’ staunch
belief that Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this
Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution. No matter how
firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is simply no
excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put
the courts and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine, which we have
repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be
applied in this case with more reason, as the respondents, not parties to
the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in
a public statement using contumacious language, which with temerity they
subsequently submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."

That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the
Malaya Lolas was one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the
following paragraphs from the same:

And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of
Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the
horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly
deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted
texts.

xxxx

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence
to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice
to all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the
petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in

the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for
contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to be properly
threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly inappropriate,
if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the compliances
arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents
even go so far as to attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism charges
against Justice Del Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice
Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the filing of respondents’
submissions in this administrative case. As respondents themselves admit, they are
neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not
proper procedure for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here
especially when it has no bearing on their own administrative case.

Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was
intended for effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the
intended recipients listen."136 One wonders what sort of effect respondents were
hoping for in branding this Court as, among others, callous, dishonest and lacking
in concern for the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see how
it can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send a signal to their
students that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to
their point of view is to be offensive.

This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were
deliberately quoted in full in the narration of background facts to illustrate the
sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters and the antagonistic
irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who would
expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works.
Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still
obviously took pains to convey their objections in a deferential and scholarly
manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not do the same.
These foreign authors’ letters underscore the universality of the tenet that legal
professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due respect. The mark of
the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions logically and soberly
without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations.

As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to take
"constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its
veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for this Court’s consideration,
why was the same published and reported in the media first before it was submitted
to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption
by the general public and designed to capture media attention as part of the effort
to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents’
colleague on the UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity
and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that
the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya
decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still both sub judice or
pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized.
On this point, respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first drafted on
July 27, 2010, they did not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and
they had issued the Statement under the belief that this Court intended to take no
action on the ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant
lapse of time from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and
its publication and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics
Committee had already been convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage
was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it
became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to
prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening
event into account in the interest of fairness.

Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the
respondents’ reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the print media
and the internet as proof that they are being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary,
these same annexes to the Common Compliance show that it is not enough for one
to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary137 or
contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and
weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism
comes from persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal
issues or from individuals whose personal or other interests in making the criticism
are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However, when law
professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair
commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this
Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on
legal education in our country.

With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance,

considering that this appears to be the first time these respondents have been
involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give them
the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the
issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that where
the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good
intent can only be mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo:

In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to
offend the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are
his phrases which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in
all places where the same conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction
obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is
the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:

"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was
justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office
should always be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.)
Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this
case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind,
according to him when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make
such concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent
others, by following the bad example, from taking the same course, this court
considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it
deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should,

notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty,
under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending
matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.

With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his
Compliance compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among
the respondents who showed true candor and sincere deference to the Court. He
was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to sign the Statement.
He was candid enough to state that his agreement to the Statement was in principle
and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of discussion" among the UP Law
faculty prior to the promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought about by a division of opinion on whether or
not willful or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise
willing to acknowledge that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the effect
of the language of the Statement and could have used more care. He did all this
without having to retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for
undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without baseless insinuations
of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this Court expected
from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that they
recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this
affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the respondents
can grasp the true import of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these
reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory.

As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of
the State of Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this
Court, he should be excused from these proceedings. However, he should be
reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he
should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students
even without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even if one is not bound by
the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar, civility
and respect among legal professionals of any nationality should be aspired for
under universal standards of decency and fairness.

The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of

violation of Canon 10.

To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he
should not be disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02
and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and faithful
reproduction of the signed Statement.

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity

II was not a true and faithful reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring
Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body, there were no differences
between the two. He attempts to downplay the discrepancies in the signature pages
of the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring
Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos with
dynamic and evolving pages as more and more signatories add their imprimatur
thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not administratively liable because he did
not misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the
Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be
signatories thereto."140

To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view that the
signatures in the Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public
manifesto or not, the Statement was formally submitted to this Court at a specific
point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that point. The value
of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of
the persons who have signed it, since the Statement’s persuasive authority mainly
depends on the reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same.
Indeed, it is apparent from respondents’ explanations that their own belief in the
"importance" of their positions as UP law professors prompted them to publicly
speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.

Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is the fact
that he did not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to
this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with
its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out, according to Dean
Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages due
to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed administrative officer in the
dean’s office gave the dean inaccurate information that led him to allow the
inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II.
Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when
encoding the signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed
Restoring Integrity I.

The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a
website a signed document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be
indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing to accept that
the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate blanks is necessitated
by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a
signed document for the Court’s consideration that did not contain the actual
signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is the original signed document that is
transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of the actual signed
document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from this
practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August 11,
2010. There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I
to this Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot
claim fears of vandalism with respect to court submissions for court employees are
accountable for the care of documents and records that may come into their
custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile
that did not contain the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in
itself a display of lack of candor.

Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer. In the
course of his explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative officer’s
claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a signatory, Dean Leonen
admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only authorized him to
indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at
around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to this
Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not actually signed the same.
Contrary to Dean Leonen’s proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making it
appear to this Court that a person or persons participated in an act when such
person or persons did not.

We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection
and stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that
there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least one person to be indicated
as having actually signed the Statement when all he had was a verbal
communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had
was only hearsay information that the former intended to sign the Statement. If
Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his
dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could not have waited until all
the professors who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed
before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was
truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who
had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the
signatures that he was able to secure.

We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual
signatures before submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all
asserted, they were neither parties to nor counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics
case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement was neither a pleading with a
deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary
submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time.

In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory.

However, the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean
Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due consideration of
Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to
admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and honesty in his
dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10.

Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence

bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are
unmeritorious.

In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative

reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show
Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to
require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and
the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have
access to the records of, and evidence that were presented or may be presented in
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for access
to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen’s
separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she similarly expressed
the sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect
contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished
only after charge and hearing."141 It is this group of respondents’ premise that these
reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due process.
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.

Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this
case springs largely from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect
contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010
Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majority’s purported
failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground
for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.

However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect
contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to
this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was
docketed as an administrative matter.

The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on
disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:

SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by

the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires,
the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or
to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the
investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof,
save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation,

through a referral to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not
mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an
investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will
be followed.

As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not

require a trial type hearing. We have held that:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law
prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot
feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present
his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)

In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v.
Aparicio143 that:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated
by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office
of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)

In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81,

Romblon – On the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law,145 we
further observed that:

[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or
resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided
the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any
further investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his
unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both
the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this
regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer
and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment
of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases.
The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further
inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no

evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for
professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.

xxxx

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or
formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from
immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or
judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe
has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her
letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.146(Emphases supplied.)

Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing
and their reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings.
Neither have they shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call
for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically stated
what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their
defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.

Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and
witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the findings of
this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were made in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in
that case. This is the primary reason for their request for access to the records and
evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only

incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that
the submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring Integrity I,
as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from that fact, it bears
repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case.

To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that
the respondents issued a Statement with language that the Court deems
objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than the four corners of the
Statement itself, its various versions, news reports/columns (many of which
respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their Common Compliance) and
internet sources that are already of public knowledge.

Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language
of the Statement and the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing,
dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does not see how any witness
or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo could possibly shed light on
these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents and if
there is any evidence on these matters the same would be in their possession.

We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as early

as September 2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of
Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19, 2010 Show
Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, after being
shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the
Court would take some form of action on the Statement. By simply reading a hard
copy of the Statement, a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed"
with the Statement’s principles, could foresee the possibility of court action on the
same on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this
Court should simply let pass. This belies respondents’ claim that it is necessary for
them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine
the bases for the Show Cause Resolution.

If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their

respective compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because
they were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents’ own look-out.
Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be aware of the above
jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary
cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk they have taken.

Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and
evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.

A final word

In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have

monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as
lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound
by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not
claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the
same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established
ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees,
professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily
taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to
conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption
from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic
community or the law school to which they belong.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court
finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F.

Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador
T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad,
Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A.
Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R.
Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O.
Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose
C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B.
Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D.
Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors are
reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending
matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that
the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge
of violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further
ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer
of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty
in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these
proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and
professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this
Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, A.C. No. 8920

Complainant,

Present:

BRION, J.,*

Acting Chairperson,

- versus - DEL CASTILLO,**

 PEREZ,

MENDOZA,*** and

SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG,

Respondent. September 28, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the resolution[1] of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Melchor Battung liable for violating Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be
reprimanded. The complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The respondent, Atty.
Battung, is a member of the Bar with postal address on Aguinaldo
St., Tuguegarao City.
Background

Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment[2] with the Commission on

Discipline of the IBP against the respondent, alleging that the latter violated
Canons 11[3] and 12[4] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing
his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the
respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for
direct contempt, the respondent shouted, Then cite me![5] Judge Baculi cited him
for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.

While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and
shouted, Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of
you![6] Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the
courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the second time.

After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the hall of the
courthouse, apparently waiting for him. The respondent again shouted in a
threatening tone, Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of
you! He kept on shouting, I am not afraid of you! and challenged the judge to a
fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building.[7]
Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he continued
shouting and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court.[8]

Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil Case
No. 2640, an ejectment case.

Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No. 2640,
which he modified on December 14, 2007. After the modified decision became
final and executory, the branch clerk of court issued a certificate of finality. The
respondent filed a motion to quash the previously issued writ of execution, raising
as a ground the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction.
Judge Baculi asserted that the respondent knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases are
within the jurisdiction of First Level Courts and the latter was merely delaying the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.

The respondent filed his Answer,[9] essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi who
disrespected him.[10] We quote from his Answer:

23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law against
him once inside the court room when he was lambasting me[.]

24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not like that I
just submit the Motion for Reconsideration without oral argument because he
wanted to have an occasion to just HUMILIATE ME and to make appear to the
public that I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he said YOU JUSTIFY YOUR
NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS COURT making it an impression to the litigants
and the public that as if I am a NEGLIGENT, INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING,
and IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER.

25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.]

xxxx

28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the Motion, Judge Rene
Baculi could have just made an order that the Motion for Reconsideration is
submitted for resolution, but what he did was that he forced me to argue so that he
will have the room to humiliate me as he used to do not only to me but almost of
the lawyers here (sic).

Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.

The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through Commissioner Jose de la
Rama, Jr. In his Commissioners Report,[11]Commissioner De la Rama stated that
during the mandatory conference on January 16, 2009, both parties merely
reiterated what they alleged in their submitted pleadings. Both parties agreed that
the original copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of the incident at the courtroom would
be submitted for the Commissioners review. Judge Baculi submitted the tape and
the transcript of stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.

Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows:[12]

At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was observed that the
respondent was calm. He politely argued his case but the voice of the complainant
appears to be in high pitch. During the mandatory conference, it was also observed
that indeed, the complainant maintains a high pitch whenever he speaks. In fact, in
the TSN, where there was already an argument, the complainant stated the
following:

Court: Do not shout.

Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.

Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of voice Atty. Battung, we
are very sorry if you do not want to appear before my court, then you better attend
to your cases and do not appear before my court if you do not want to be corrected!
(TSN, July 24, 2008, page 3)

(NOTE: The underlined words we are very sorry [ were] actually uttered by Atty.
Battung while the judge was saying the quoted portion of the TSN)

That it was during the time when the complainant asked the following questions
when the undersigned noticed that Atty. Battung shouted at the presiding judge.

Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure?

Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed because we were asked to
present our evidence ex parte. Your Honor, so, if should we were ordered (sic) by
the court to follow the rules on summary procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24, 2008)
It was observed that the judge uttered the following:

Court: Do not shout.

Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.

(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)

Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at the complainant.

Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at each other.

Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge that is why he
shouted back at him. But after hearing the tape, the undersigned in convinced that
it was Atty. Battung who shouted first at the complainant.

Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting for their cases
to be called. They must have observed the incident. In fact, in the joint-affidavit
submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al., they stood as one in saying that it was really
Atty. Battung who shouted at the judge that is why the latter cautioned him not to
shout.

The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN reads as follows:

Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of P100.00.

Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court for gross
ignorance of the law.
Court: Yes, proceed.

(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)

Court: Next case.

Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.

(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)

Atty. Battung: But what we do not like (not finished)

Court: The next time

Atty. Battung: We would like to clear

Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in record. If you want to
see me, see me after the court.

Next case.

Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza vs. Teresita
Narag, et al.

(nothing follows)
Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility that requires a lawyer to observe and
maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers. The respondent also
violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. The
respondents argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given
due consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding
judge; by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be
tolerated. What the respondent should have done was to file an action before the
Office of the Court Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi did not act
according to the norms of judicial conduct.

With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found that the evidence submitted is
insufficient to support a ruling that the respondent had misused the judicial
processes to frustrate the ends of justice.

Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended from

the practice of law for six (6) months.

On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
with the modification that the respondent be reprimanded.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the IBPs finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung disrespected Judge
Baculi by shouting at him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in the
presence of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. The respondent even
came back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses,
cannot be allowed. We note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi
and acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position even after the
latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court, the
respondent returned to the courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings.
These actions were not only against the person, the position and the stature of
Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly and
flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute by the respondent.

Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed
duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a
judge, and the court that he represents. The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language or behavior before the Courts.

We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.[13] that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an

officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for
the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this guarantee,
the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latters
role, stature and position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly
berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross
ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner
tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in his
ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled
with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or
complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and
bring the justice system into disrepute.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be reprimanded,

while the Investigating Commissioner recommended a penalty of six (6) months
suspension.

We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the offense.

In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State

Prosecutor,[14] we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo for one year for violating Rule 11.05,
Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and for violating the Lawyers Oath for airing his grievances against a judge in
newspapers and radio programs. In this case, Atty. Battungs violations are no less
serious as they were committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial
proceedings where the respondent was acting as an officer of the court, and before
the litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to
the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the
judicial system itself.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is

found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year effective upon the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; the Department of Justice; and all courts in the country, for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9860 September 11, 2013

JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA,

MARY ANGELYN OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-
CALIP, and KARENOROLA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is a disbarment complaint1 filed against respondent Atty.
Joseph Ador Ramos (respondent) for his violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule
15.03) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) and Section 20(e), Rule
138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).

The Facts

Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn

Orola-Belarga (Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the
children of the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola
(Emilio).2

Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-

Orola (Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of the
above-named complainants and the son of Emilio.3
In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Roxas City, Branch 18 (RTC) and docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the
parties were represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as
counsel for and in behalf of Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and
Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad); (b) Atty.Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as
counsel for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the other heirs4 of the late Antonio
(Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty.
Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed
administrator of Trinidad’s estate. In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of
Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as
administrator and, in his stead, sought the appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel
Orola, which the RTC granted in an Order5dated September 20, 2007 (RTC Order).
Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as
collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the
reconsideration of the RTC Order.6

Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants filed the instant

disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP), claiming
that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to represent
conflicting interests in the subject case;7 and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the
Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the
Heirs of Antonio.8 Complainants further claimed that while Maricar, the surviving
spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen, consented to the withdrawal of
respondent’s appearance, the same was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after
he had already entered his appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007. 9 In this
accord, respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such,
was not able to obtain their written consent as required under the Rules.10

For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he
never appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He
pointed out that the records of the case readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad
were represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio were exclusively
represented by Atty. Azarraga.11 He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's
request to temporarily appear on her behalf as their counsel of record could not
attend the scheduled June16 and July 14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances
thereat were free of charge.12 In fact, he obtained Maricar’s permission for him to
withdraw from the case as no further communications transpired after these two
hearings. Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio
in the same case.13 He added that he had no knowledge of the fact that the late
Antonio had other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that no information was
disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance. 14 Finally, he
clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a
mediator, rather than a litigator,15 and that since no settlement was forged between
the parties, he formally withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007.16 In
support of his assertions, respondent submitted the affidavits of Maricar17 and Atty.
Azarraga18 relative to his limited appearance and his consultation with Maricar
prior to his engagement as counsel for Emilio.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation19 dated September 15, 2008submitted by IBP

Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.(Investigating Commissioner),
respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests only with respect
to Karen as the records of the cases how that he never acted as counsel for the
other complainants. The Investigating Commissioner observed that while
respondent's withdrawal of appearance was with the express conformity of
Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was
already of age and one of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of
the Code.20

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation
of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants themselves admitted that
respondent "did not acquire confidential information from his former client nor did
he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment."21Considering that it was respondent's first offense, the Investigating
Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty and, instead,
recommended that he be severely reprimanded for his act with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.22

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the
aforementioned report in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated December 11,
2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641), finding the same to be fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules but imposed against
respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-
2013-1725 dated January 3, 2013.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of
the Code, but reduced the recommended period of suspension to three (3) months.

Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND

LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS ANDTRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis
supplied)

Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from

representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated
cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good
taste.26 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.27 In Hornilla v.
Salunat28 (Hornilla), the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two

or more opposing parties. The test is" whether or not in behalf of one client, it is
the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.29 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does
not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the
client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the
client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client
and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.30

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP’s finding that
respondent represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held
administratively liable therefor.

Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar
as claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-
3639. In the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio
succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for having committed acts
prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent
Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same
case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio –
particularly, Karen – in violation of the above-stated rule.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him

cannot fully exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of
interests, as enunciated in
Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to
opposing parties in the same case.1âwphi1 In other words, a lawyer cannot change
his representation from one party to the latter’s opponent in the same case. That
respondent’s previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was
only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the
aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even
if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.31

Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a
mediator than a litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement among the
family members render the rule inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his
conduct is likewise improper since Rule 15.04,32 Canon 15 of the Code similarly
requires the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned before he may act
as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent
failed in this respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in his duty to
make a full disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilio’s counsel to all the
Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – and equally secure their express written
consent before consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out that a
lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to
it.33Accordingly, for respondent’s violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary
sanction is warranted.

In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was

increased from severe reprimand to a suspension of six(6) months by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641. However, the Court
observes that the said resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the bases of
the IBP Board of Governors’ modification; as such, it contravened Section 12(a),
Rule 139-B of the Rules which specifically mandates that "the decision of the
Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the reasons on which it is based."34 Verily, the Court looks with disfavor
the change in the recommended penalty without any ample justification therefor.
To this end, the Court is wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors of the
importance of the requirement to announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since
the requirement that its decision in disciplinary proceedings must state the facts
and the reasons on which the same is based is akin to what is required of courts in
promulgating their decisions. The reasons for handing down a penalty occupy no
lesser station than any other portion of the ratio.35

In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into
consideration the following factors:

first, respondent is a first time offender; second, it is undisputed that respondent

merely accommodated Maricar's request out of gratis to temporarily represent her
only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her lawyer's
unavailability; third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge
that the late Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he
actually acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance as counsel for and in
behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in good faith; and fourth,
complainants admit that respondent did not acquire confidential information from
the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against them any knowledge obtained in the
course of his previous employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner
prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with Emilio. Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner
v. Lakin, Jr.,36 the Court similarly imposed the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three months to the counsel therein who represented
parties whose interests are hostile to his other clients in another case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of

representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03,Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO
ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6664 July 16, 2013

FERDINAND A. SAMSON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An attorney who wittingly represents and serves conflicting interests may be

suspended from the practice of law, or even disbarred when circumstances so
warrant.

Antecedents

Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint for disbarment charging

respondent Atty. Edgardo O. Era with violation of his trust and confidence of a
client by representing the interest of Emilia C. Sison, his present client, in a
manner that blatantly conflicted with his interest.

Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding
scam perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level
Marketing Business (ICS Corporation), a corporation whose corporate officers
were led by Sison. The other officers were Ireneo C. Sison, William C. Sison,
Mimosa H. Zamudio, Mirasol H. Aguilar and Jhun Sison.

Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the
criminal prosecution of Sison and her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era
prepared the demand letter dated July 19, 2002 demanding the return or refund of
the money subject of their complaints. He also prepared the complaint-affidavit
that Samson signed and swore to on July 26, 2002. Subsequently, the complaint-
affidavit charging Sison and the other corporate officials of ICS Corporation with
several counts of estafa1was presented to the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City (OCPQC). After the preliminary investigation, the OCPQC formally
charged Sison and the others with several counts of estafa in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 96 (RTC), in Quezon City.2

In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss
the possibility of an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told
Samson and the others that undergoing a trial of the cases would just be a waste of
time, money and effort for them, and that they could settle the cases with Sison and
her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover to them of a certain property located
in Antipolo City belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange for their desistance.
They acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in turn they
received a deed of assignment covering land registered under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. R-4475 executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.3

Samson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. Era that they be given instead
a deed of absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the property among themselves.
It took some period of negotiations between them and Atty. Era before the latter
delivered to them on November 27, 2003 five copies of a deed of absolute sale
involving the property. However, Atty. Era told them that whether or not the title
of the property had been encumbered or free from lien or defect would no longer
be his responsibility. He further told them that as far as he was concerned he had
already accomplished his professional responsibility towards them upon the
amicable settlement of the cases between them and ICS Corporation.4

When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the property at the
Registry of Deeds and the Assessor’s Office of Antipolo City, they were dismayed
to learn that they could not liquidate the property because it was no longer
registered under the name of ICS Corporation but was already under the name of
Bank Wise Inc.5 Upon their urging, Atty. Era negotiated as their counsel with ICS
Corporation.

Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter, Samson and his group
wrote to him on September 8, 2004 to remind him about his guarantee and the
promise to settle the issues with Sison and her cohorts. But they did not hear from
Atty. Era at all.6

During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and
his group. This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find
out later on, however, that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as
the counsel for Sison in her other criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC
in Quezon City involving the same pyramiding scam that she and her ICS
Corporation had perpetrated.7 In this regard, they established Atty. Era’s legal
representation of Sison by submitting several certified copies of the minutes of the
proceedings in the criminal cases involving Sison and her group issued by Branch
102 and Branch 220 of the RTC in Quezon City showing that Atty. Era had
appeared as the counsel of Sison in the cases for estafa pending and being tried in
said courts.8 They also submitted a certification issued on November 3, 2004
indicating that Atty. Era had visited Sison, an inmate in the Female Dormitory in
Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City as borne out by the blotter logbook
of that unit.9

On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing

antecedents, and praying for Atty. Era’s disbarment on the ground of his violation
of the trust, confidence and respect reposed in him as their counsel.10

Upon being required by the Court to comment on the complaint against him within
10 days from notice, Atty. Era several times sought the extension of his period to
file the comment to supposedly enable him to collate documents relevant to his
comment.11 The Court granted his request and allowed him an extension totaling
40 days. But despite the lapse of the extended period, he did not file his comment.

On September 27, 2005, Samson reiterated his complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Era.12

By its resolution dated March 1, 2006,13 the Court required Atty. Era to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure
to submit his comment.

In the comment that he subsequently filed on April 11, 2006 in the Office of the
Bar Confidant,14 Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion on April 23, 2002 of the
compromise settlement between Samson and his group, on one hand, and Sison
and her ICS Corporation, on the other, had terminated the lawyer-client
relationship between him and Samson and his group; and that on September 1,
2003, he had been appointed as counsel de officio for Sison by Branch 102 of the
RTC in Quezon City only for purposes of her arraignment.

On July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.15
In his report and recommendation dated October 1, 2007, 16 the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) found Atty.
Era guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests, for failing to serve
his clients with competence and diligence, and for failing to champion his clients’
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.

The Investigating Commissioner observed that the evidence did not sustain Atty.
Era’s claim that his legal services as counsel for Samson and his group had
terminated on April 23, 2003 upon the execution of the compromise settlement of
the criminal cases; that he even admitted during the mandatory conference that
there was no formal termination of his legal services; 17 that his professional
obligation towards Samson and his group as his clients did not end upon execution
of the settlement agreement, because he remained duty-bound to see to it that the
settlement was duly implemented; that he also had the obligation to appear in the
criminal cases until their termination; and that his acceptance of the engagement to
appear in behalf of Sison invited suspicion of his double-dealing and
unfaithfulness.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Era be suspended from

the practice of law for six months, viz:

From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of misconduct for

representing conflicting interests, failing to serve his client, complainant herein,
with competence and diligence and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care and devotion. It is respectfully recommended that respondent be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act would merit a more severe
penalty.18

In Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195 passed on October 19, 2007,19 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD, with the modification that Atty. Era
be suspended from the practice of law for two years.

On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-
180,20 denying Atty. Era’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution
No. XVIII-2007-195.
The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court pursuant to
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.21

On October 17, 2012, Atty. Era filed a Manifestation and Motion (With Leave of
Court).22 However, on November 26, 2012, the Court merely noted the
manifestation, and denied the motion for its lack of merit.23

Ruling

We affirm the findings of the IBP.

In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with violating Canon 15
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests by
accepting the responsibility of representing Sison in the cases similar to those in
which he had undertaken to represent Samson and his group, notwithstanding that
Sison was the very same person whom Samson and his group had accused with
Atty. Era’s legal assistance. He had drafted the demand letters and the complaint-
affidavit that became the bases for the filing of the estafa charges against Sison and
the others in the RTC in Quezon City.

Atty. Era’s contention that the lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson and
his group entered into the compromise settlement with Sison on April 23, 2002
was unwarranted. The lawyer-client relationship did not terminate as of then, for
the fact remained that he still needed to oversee the implementation of the
settlement as well as to proceed with the criminal cases until they were dismissed
or otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is also relevant to indicate that the
execution of a compromise settlement in the criminal cases did not ipso facto cause
the termination of the cases not only because the approval of the compromise by
the trial court was still required, but also because the compromise would have
applied only to the civil aspect, and excluded the criminal aspect pursuant to
Article 2034 of the Civil Code.24

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: "A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." Atty. Era thus owed to Samson
and his group entire devotion to their genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of their rights.25 He was expected to exert his best efforts
and ability to preserve the clients’ cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to
his clients likewise served the ends of justice.26

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,27 the Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest
in this wise:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two

or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is
the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.28

The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five rationales, rendered as

follows:

x x x. First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them
with undivided loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the
client can trust. Instilling such confidence is an objective important in itself. x x x.

Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the

effectiveness of legal representation. To the extent that a conflict of interest
undermines the independence of the lawyer’s professional judgment or inhibits a
lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the client’s behalf, the client’s
expectation of effective representation x x x could be compromised.

Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the client’s
confidential information xxx.1âwphi1 Preventing use of confidential client
information against the interests of the client, either to benefit the lawyer’s
personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster an assumed public
purpose is facilitated through conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such
abuse.

Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by
inducing a client to make a gift to the lawyer xxx.

Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in

obtaining adequate presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for
example, a lawyer might appear on both sides of the litigation, complicating the
process of taking proof and compromise adversary argumentation x x x.29

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein
a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of
his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to
represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is
materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation.30 The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of
loyalty.31 Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns
all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points
of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship
must be treated as sacred and guarded with care.1âwphi1 It behooves lawyers not
only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of
justice.32 The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree.33

Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson

and his group, the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former
client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once given should
not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after
the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously
affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented
the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s confidences
acquired in the previous relation.34 In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him."

The lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all
hazards and costs even to himself.35The protection given to the client is perpetual
and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the
client’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.36

In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group after full
disclosure to them of the conflict of interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for
Atty. Era to have done was either to outrightly decline representing and entering
his appearance as counsel for Sison, or to advice Sison to engage another lawyer
for herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer the proper
sanction.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA

guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two
years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his
commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO
0. ERA and entered m his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the
Court Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
guidance. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8243 July 24, 2009

ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
This case stems from an administrative complaint1 filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr.
against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant violation of
the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.2 Complainant alleges
that respondent committed acts constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty,
influence peddling, and failure to render an accounting of all the money and
properties received by her from complainant.

On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel

Communications Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel
International Holdings Corporation (Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC
changed its name to Precedent Communications Corporation (Precedent).3

According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters

from its members and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes.
He alleges that he earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee
of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee
of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (₱30,000,000.00) deposited at Real
Bank.

Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be

a member of the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where complainant
and his wife were also active members. From then on, complainant and respondent
constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and
interests in Precedent and Precedent’s relation with Multitel. Respondent gave
legal advice to complainant and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for
creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was
established between him and respondent although no formal document was
executed by them at that time. A Retainer Agreement 4 dated January 15, 2003 was
proposed by respondent. Complainant, however, did not sign the said agreement
because respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱100,000.00) as acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon collection of the
overpayment made by Multitel to Benefon,5 a telecommunications company based
in Finland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not within
his means.6 Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.7

After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from
respondent8 asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested
by respondent’s clients in Multitel. When complainant confronted respondent
about the demand letter, the latter explained that she had to send it so that her
clients – defrauded investors of Multitel – would know that she was doing
something for them and assured complainant that there was nothing to worry
about.9

Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the

persistent demands made by Multitel investors against complainant. On these
occasions, respondent impressed upon complainant that she can closely work with
officials of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the Department of
Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportations (BID),10 and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)11 to resolve complainant’s problems. Respondent also
convinced complainant that in order to be absolved from any liability with respect
to the investment scam, he must be able to show to the DOJ that he was willing to
divest any and all of his interests in Precedent including the funds assigned to him
by Multitel.12

Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be

used only for his case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her an
initial amount of ₱900,000.00 which was received by respondent
herself.13 Sometime thereafter, complainant again gave respondent
₱1,000,000.00. Said amounts were all part of Precedent’s collections and sales
14

proceeds which complainant held as assignee of the company’s properties.15

When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several messages
from respondent sent through electronic mail (e-mail) and short messaging system
(SMS, or text messages) warning him not to return to the Philippines because
Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was arrested and that complainant may
later on be implicated in Multitel’s failed investment system. Respondent even said
that ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold departure order had been issued against
him. Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail messages from respondent
updating him of the status of the case against Multitel and promised that she will
settle the matter discreetly with government officials she can closely work with in
order to clear complainant’s name.16 In two separate e-mail messages,17 respondent
again asked money from complainant, ₱200,000 of which was handed by
complainant’s wife while respondent was confined in Saint Luke’s Hospital after
giving birth,18 and another ₱700,000 allegedly to be given to the NBI.19

Through respondent’s persistent promises to settle all complainant’s legal

problems, respondent was able to convince complainant who was still in the US to
execute a deed of assignment in favor of respondent allowing the latter to retrieve
178 boxes containing cellular phones and accessories stored in complainant’s
house and inside a warehouse.20 He also signed a blank deed of sale authorizing
respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper.21

Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his legal
problems, complainant was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When
respondent knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:

Dear Butchie,

Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your
friend and lawyer. The charges are all non-bailable but all the same as the SEC
report I told you before. The findings are the same, i.e. your company was the front
for the fraud of Multitel and that funds were provided you.

I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is willing to
return the Crosswind, laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio really helped.
Anthony na lang. Then, I will need the accounting of all the funds you received
from the sale of the phones, every employees and directors[’] quitclaim (including
yours), the funds transmitted to the clients through me, the funds you utilized, and
whatelse (sic) is still unremitted, every centavo must be accounted for as DOJ and
NBI can have the account opened.
I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the trust given
[to] you. So we can inform them [that] it was not touched by you.

I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I
know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you
hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. In this cases (sic), you
cannot be highprofile (sic) because it is the clients who will be sacrificed at the
expense of the fame of the lawyer. I have to work quietly and discreetly. No
funfare. Just like what I did for your guys in the SEC. I have to work with people I
am comfortable with. Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all
the work. He can help with all his connections. Val’s friend in the NBI is the one is
(sic) charge of organized crime who is the entity (sic) who has your warrant. My
law partner was the state prosecutor for financial fraud. Basically we have it
covered in all aspects and all departments. I am just trying to liquidate the phones I
have allotted for you s ana (sic) for your trooper kasi whether we like it or not, we
have to give this agencies (sic) to make our work easier according to Val. The
funds with Mickey are already accounted in the quit claims (sic) as attorneys (sic)
fees. I hope he will be able to send it so we have funds to work with.

As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children who (sic)
the irate clients and government officials harass and kidnap to make the individuals
they want to come out from hiding (sic). I do not want that to happen. Things will
be really easier on my side.

Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire
Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. Please trust me. I have
never let you down, have I? I told you this will happen but we are ready and
prepared. The clients who received the phones will stand by you and make you the
hero in this scandal. I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me!
That is all. You have an angel on your side. Always pray though to the best legal
mind up there. You will be ok!

Candy22

On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondent’s advice, complainant returned to the

country. On the eve of his departure from the United States, respondent called up
complainant and conveniently informed him that he has been cleared by the NBI
and the BID.23

About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and his
wife and told them that she has already accumulated ₱12,500,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and was willing to give ₱2,000,000.00 to complainant in appreciation for his
help. Respondent allegedly told complainant that without his help, she would not
have earned such amount. Overwhelmed and relieved, complainant accepted
respondent’s offer but respondent, later on, changed her mind and told complainant
that she would instead invest the ₱2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business venture.
Complainant declined and explained to respondent that he and his family needed
the money instead to cover their daily expenses as he was no longer employed.
Respondent allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her promise.24

Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that she was
able to help settle the ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold departure order issued
against complainant and narrated how she was able to defend complainant in the
said cases.25

By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading him.
Respondent would either refuse to return complainant’s call or would abruptly
terminate their telephone conversation, citing several reasons. This went on for
several months.26 In one instance, when complainant asked respondent for an
update on the collection of Benefon’s obligation to Precedent which respondent
had previously taken charge of, respondent arrogantly answered that she was very
busy and that she would read Benefon’s letter only when she found time to do so.

On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondent’s arrogance and

evasiveness, complainant wrote respondent a letter formally asking for a full
accounting of all the money, documents and properties given to the
latter.27 Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter dated December 20,
2004.28 When complainant found respondent’s explanation to be inadequate, he
wrote a latter expressing his confusion about the accounting.29Complainant
repeated his request for an audited financial report of all the properties turned over
to her; otherwise, he will be constrained to file the appropriate case against
respondent.30 Respondent replied,31 explaining that all the properties and cash
turned over to her by complainant had been returned to her clients who had money
claims against Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was able to secure
quitclaim documents clearing complainant from any liability.32 Still unsatisfied,
complainant decided to file an affidavit-complaint33 against respondent before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
seeking the disbarment of respondent.

In her Answer-Affidavit,34 respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for

Precedent. She maintained that no formal engagement was executed between her
and complainant. She claimed that she merely helped complainant by providing
him with legal advice and assistance because she personally knew him, since they
both belonged to the same religious organization.35lavvph!1

Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that
she merely mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients had against the
complainant. She also averred that the results of the settlement between both
parties were fully documented and accounted for.36 Respondent believes that her
act in helping complainant resolve his legal problem did not violate any ethical
standard and was, in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.37

To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent noted that a
complaint for estafa was also filed against her by complainant before the Office of
the City Prosecutor in Quezon City citing the same grounds. The complaint was,
however, dismissed by Assistant City Prosecutor Josephus Joannes H. Asis for
insufficiency of evidence.38 Respondent argued that on this basis alone, the
administrative case must also be dismissed.

In her Position Paper,39 respondent also questioned the admissibility of the

electronic evidence submitted by complainant to the IBP’s Commission on Bar
Discipline. Respondent maintained that the e-mail and the text messages allegedly
sent by respondent to complainant were of doubtful authenticity and should be
excluded as evidence for failure to conform to the Rules on Electronic Evidence
(A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).

After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a

Report and Recommendation40 finding that a lawyer-client relationship was
established between respondent and complainant despite the absence of a written
contract. The Investigating Commissioner also declared that respondent violated
her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to her client when she allowed herself to
represent conflicting interests and failed to render a full accounting of all the cash
and properties entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended her disbarment.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,41 but the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Recommendation42 denying the motion and adopting the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner.

The case now comes before this Court for final action.

We affirm the findings of the IBP.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:

Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.

This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste 43 and, more
importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including its weak and
strong points. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.
No opportunity must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. 44 It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double ─ dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice.45 It is for these reasons that we have described the
attorney-client relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.46

Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively
communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with
demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a
lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the inevitable
consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to
complainant was only in the form of "friendly accommodations," 47 precisely
because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already
privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the
SEC.48

Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that
no written contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her
and complainant.49 This argument all the more reveals respondent’s patent
ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of basic ethical standards expected
from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:

The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a
professional relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an
essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or
implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of
an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession.50 (Emphasis supplied.)1awphi1

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should
have done was either to advise complainant to engage the services of another
lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from
acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant.
She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing
and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,51 we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two

or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is
the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.52

Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainant’s hapless situation,

initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and
properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed upon complainant that she
had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to
him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also
doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against
Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with
Multitel. Respondent herself admitted to complainant that without the latter’s help,
she would not have been able to earn as much and that, as a token of her
appreciation, she was willing to share some of her earnings with
complainant.53 Clearly, respondent’s act is shocking, as it not only violated Rule
9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,54 but also toyed with
decency and good taste.

Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever
complained of respondent’s unethical behavior.55 This remark indubitably displays
respondent’s gross ignorance of disciplinary procedure in the Bar. As a member of
the Bar, she is expected to know that proceedings for disciplinary actions against
any lawyer may be initiated and prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors, motu
proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board of Officers of an IBP
Chapter56 even if no private individual files any administrative complaint.

Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and

recommendations of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors, on the admissibility of the electronic evidence submitted by
complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in toto.

Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
to disbar her on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and other gross misconduct,
aside from violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, has been rendered moot and academic
by voluntary termination of her IBP membership, allegedly after she had been
placed under the Department of Justice’s Witness Protection
57
Program. Convenient as it may be for respondent to sever her membership in the
integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this
administrative case against her.

The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in

order to determine the degree of her culpability and liability to complainant. The
case may not be dismissed or rendered moot and academic by respondent’s act of
voluntarily terminating her membership in the Bar regardless of the reason for
doing so. This is because membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.58 The conduct of a lawyer may make him or her civilly, if not
criminally, liable to his client or to third parties, and such liability may be
conveniently avoided if this Court were to allow voluntary termination of
membership. Hence, to terminate one’s membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is
imperative that the lawyer first prove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership
is not a ploy to further prejudice the public or to evade liability. No such proof
exists in the present case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby

DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful,
dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent’s record as a member of

the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country. SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 195002 January 25, 2012

HECTOR TREÑAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within
the limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and
render judgment thereon.1

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision dated 9 July 20102 and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a

house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged
with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant
Hector Treñas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee
and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latter’s
name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of
her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:

P20,000.00- Attorney’s fees,

P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,

P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,

P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.

Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding

receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos.
00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she
consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When
confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the
P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the
money.

To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of

Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of
P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. When
the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated
formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa
was filed against him.3

On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads
as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of
P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with
the express obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount for
expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount,
with the intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney’s fees and the
said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage
and prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the
aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel,

entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the
fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial
of the case.

On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of the
crime of Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused

Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in
the manner described in the aforementioned information. As a consequence of this
judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years
and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of
Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant
Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12%
per annum, reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.6

We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treñas and Trenas in
the pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treñas",
under which he was accused in the Information.

On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which was

denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.8

On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC. 9 The
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered
a Decision10 affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4
January 2011.11

On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File

Petition for Review on Certiorari12 before this Court. He asked for a period of 15
days within which to file a petition for review, and the Court granted his motion in
a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.

On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before
this Court, with the following assignment of errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS

TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE
BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE
REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF
ESTAFA;13

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that ₱ 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in
Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for
the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any indication of the place where
it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared
by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999.
Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually
delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were
situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must
rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City was
mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner was
dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati.
Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts
material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove
lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution
evidence.

As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually
belongs to Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she –
not Elizabeth – who was the offended party. Thus, the latter’s demand does not
satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended party in the offense of
estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been properly made by
Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000.
Finally, there is no showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner.
The signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be that of
petitioner’s.
On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latter’s Comment on the Petition. On 27 July
2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of 60
days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was granted in a
Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a
Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29
September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.

In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner
as charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of
the trial court with respect to the delivery of ₱150,000 to him, and that there was a
relationship of trust and confidence between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his
claim that the Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not
supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any. Further, petitioner
is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness,
Elizabeth. However, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance, which is not the case here.

With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid
demand" was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to
Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants alleged in the
Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof was adduced as to the
genuineness of petitioner’s signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the demand
letter.

The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for
executive clemency, in view of his advanced age and failing health.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Review of Factual Findings

While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a
review of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which
they are based.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid down
exceptions to this general rule, as follows:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures;

(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of

facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence
of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.14

In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the
place of commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the
specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and
conjectures.

The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any
finding as to where it was committed:
Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant
Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed the
offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he could misappropriate
for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital
gains tax and documentary stamp tax.

As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had

obtained the amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly
issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her
and making her believe that he had complied with his duty to pay the
aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered that said
receipts were fabricated documents.15

In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument
that it had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the
motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were based,
and by relying on conjecture, thus:

That the said amount was given to [Treñas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly
established by the prosecution. Accused Treñas, on the other hand, never appeared
in Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting
another possible scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x

Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still
not warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it
cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private
complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning the money
must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for paying
the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records
show that he did not even pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private
complainant were fake documents. Thus, his argumentation in this regard is too
specious to consider favorably.16

For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction in this wise:
It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is
offered in evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal
offer of prosecution’s evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to
substantiate his allegations that he had received the amount of P150,000.00 in
Iloilo City. Hence, Hector’s allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight.

Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which

would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome
of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made
by the trial court remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great
weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review.17

The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of
the lower courts.

Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases,
venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People, 18 this
Court explained:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the
action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try
the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case
is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was
committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the
offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.

In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the
prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of the offense took place
within the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Court ruled:

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to

establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him
with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of
the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue
in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x x

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and
tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as
follows: x x x

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati.
However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the
prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to
corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated
elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution
failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts
of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on
October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati.
Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that
NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that
Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to
Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the
elements of the offense charged had been committed in Parañaque, to wit: that on
July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque; that with the
intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is
a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that
based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum
scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a
result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was
consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Parañaque and,
by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce
Yu to part with his money.

xxx

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume
committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of
the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court
convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of
jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with
the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section
1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction
of the RTC of Makati City.

That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as
follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of
P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)20

Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the
RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does
not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed. It provides in
part:

4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY.

HECTOR TREÑAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY.
HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "B",
5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS, the
latter failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA
ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and
BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS accomplished was only
the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid property. A copy of said
Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "C",

6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued

to me a check for refund of the sum given to him less the attorney’s fee of
P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of
P120,000.00. x x x

7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-
Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x21

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented
by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed
in Makati City.

Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1)
that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or
on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.22

There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution23 that

points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the
testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place where the
offense was allegedly committed:

Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treñas to you, what happened
next?

A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to… and
she will work for the Deed of Sale.
Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?

A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q What was the amount quoted to you?

A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney’s fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for

the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary
sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.

Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did he issue a receipt?

A Yes, sir.

Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treñas for this ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the

pre-trial as exhibit "B". This appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will
you please go over this document and inform this court what relation has this to the
receipt which you said Atty. Treñas issued to you?

A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treñas.

Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to
Atty. Treñas by you, what happened next?

A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.24

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was
dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of
estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.

Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the
prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense
were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised
based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it
may be considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on
appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot
be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That
jurisdiction is conferred

by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the
manner and form prescribed by law.26

It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.27 Section 15
(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that
"[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure
that the defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court
from that of the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him
great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another
place.28 This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance
constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable
to present his defense in the charges against him.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of
that city has no jurisdiction over the case.29

As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional
Responsibility strongly militates against the petitioner’s conduct in handling the
funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:

Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.1âwphi1

Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those others kept by him.

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose
(such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he
should promptly account to the client how the money was spent.30 If he does not
use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.
His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended
purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.31

Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they
fall due or upon demand.32 His failure to return the client's money upon demand
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. 33 It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.34

In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were
later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the
initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there
be a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the funds received by him in
trust, the recommendation should include an order to immediately return the
amount of ₱ 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of interest from the
time of demand until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and
the Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is
DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of
Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5440 December 10, 2014

SPOUSES NICASIO DONELITA SAN PEDRO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

For resolution is a complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses Nicasio and Donelita
San Pedro (complainants) against Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza (respondent).1 This
case involves a determination of whether respondent violated his duty to hold in
trust all moneys and properties of the client; his duty to account for all funds and
property collected or received for or from the client; and his duty to deliver the
funds and property of the client when due or upon demand under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The facts are summarized as follows:

On or about November 21, 1996, complainants engaged the services of respondent
to facilitate the transfer of title to property, in the name of Isabel Azcarraga
Marcaida, to complainants.2 Complainants then gave respondent a check for
₱68,250.00 for the payment of transfer taxes.3 They also gave respondent a check
for ₱13,800.00 for respondent’s professional fee.4

Respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants’ repeated follow-ups.5

Several letters were sent by respondent explaining the delay in the transfer of
title.6 However, respondent still failed to produce the title.

Complainants subsequently referred the case to the barangay.7 Respondent refused

to return the amount complainants gave for the transfer taxes.8 Complainants were
then issued a certificate to file action.9 They also sent a letter demanding the refund
of the money intended for the transfer taxes.10 Respondent still did not return the
money.

On May 8, 2000, respondent sent another letter to complainants. He promised to

settle the transfer of the land title.11However, respondent reneged on this
promise.12 Complainants were then forced to obtain a loan from Philippine
American Life and General Insurance Company to secure the transfer of the title to
the property in their names.13

Respondent contested the allegations of complainants. According to him, it was

complainants who caused the three-year delay in the transfer of title to
complainants’ names. Complainants were not able to furnish respondent several
important documents: (a) original copy of the deed of extrajudicial petition; (b)
affidavit of publication with the clippings of the published item in a newspaper of
general circulation; and (c) a barangay certificate from the barangay where the
property is located as required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.14

In addition, respondent argued that complainants paid him the measly sum of
₱13,800.00 despite all the work he did for them, including facilitating the sale of
the property. These involved "being-pulled from the office four or five times to
discuss . . . the details of the transaction [with the sellers]; going twice to the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna[,] Branch 24, to expedite the . . . issuance
of a [n]ew owner’s duplicate copy of the title; going twice to the office of the
Register of Deeds for Calamba, Laguna to make verification and submit the court
[o]rder; [and facilitating the] preparation and notarization of the Deed of Absolute
Sale."15

Respondent also claimed that retention of the money is justified owing to his
receivables from complainants for the services he rendered in various cases:

1) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas,
for Forcible Entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 2004 in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Santa Rosa, Laguna. This case was dismissed by the Honorable Court for
alleged lack of jurisdiction, the issue of possession being intertwined with that of
ownership;

2) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas for
Accion Publiciana docketed as Civil Case No. B-5386 raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Biñan, Laguna[,] Branch 25;

3) In Civil Case No. B-4503 entitled Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita
San Pedro et al., for nullity of title, [r]econveyance with prayer for issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction directed specifically to herein complainant. This case was
assigned to the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna[.] Respondent, for and
in behalf of herein complainant, submitted an [a]nswer and [o]pposition to the
prayer for issuance of the injunction, which was favorably acted upon.
Consequently[,] the case was dismissed by the Court[;]

4) In Civil Case No. B-688 entitled Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita
San Pedro et al., for [r]e-partition and [r]econveyance, which was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24[;] [and]

5) Likewise, respondent represented herein complainant in [an] ESTAFA case they

[filed] against Greg Ramos and Benjamin Corsino, which case, as per reliable
source, was discontinued by complainant after the civil aspect of the same was
amicably settled.16 Respondent further alleged that complainants challenged him to
prove his worth as a lawyer by doing away with the requirements and expediting
the cancellation of the Marcaidas’ title.17

The present administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.18 The parties were
then called to a mandatory conference before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline.19 They were required to submit their position papers.20 Respondent did
not submit his position paper.21

On July 8, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Salvador B. Hababag,

submitted his findings and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner
found that respondent violated Canon 16, Rules 16.0122 and 16.0323 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Investigating Commissioner found that both checks issued to respondent were
encashed despite respondent’s failure to facilitate the release of the title in the
name of complainants.24 Complainants had to obtain a loan to facilitate the transfer
of title in their names.25

Moreover, respondent admitted his liability in his letters to

complainants.26 Complainant Nicasio San Pedro’s affidavit of desistance is
immaterial.27

The Investigating Commissioner recommended the disciplinary action of "censure

and warning," hence:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that the

disciplinary sanction of CENSURE and WARNING be given the respondent with
the admonition that he be extremely careful of his acts to forego severe penalty in
the future.28

In the Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted with modification the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner. It held:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED

and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent’s
violation of Canon 16, [Rule] 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he failed to effect the transfer of property despite encashment
of the two checks, Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months and Ordered to Returnthe amount of Sixty
Eight Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (₱68,250.00) Pesos to complainants within
thirty days from receipt of notice.29 (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring in the
original)

On November 14, 2008, respondent filed his motion for reconsideration.30 The IBP
Board of Governors denied respondent’s motion in the Notice of Resolution No.
XX-2013-839 dated June 22, 2013:

RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration,

there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it
being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and
taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14,
2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.31 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

On December 11, 2013, this court resolved to note the following: (a) Notice of
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008 of the IBP Board of
Governors; (b) Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated June 22, 2013 of the
IBP Board of Governors;and (c) IBP’s letter dated October 7, 2013 transmitting the
documents pertaining to the case.32

In the manifestation and motion dated October 25,2013, respondent requested for a
formal hearing, reasoning that he "wants to exercise his right to confront his
accusers [to] cross[-]examine them and that of their witness."33 The manifestation
and motion was denied by this court in the resolution dated September 22, 2014. 34

The main issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for failing to hold in trust the money of his
clients.

After considering the parties’ arguments and the records of this case, this court
resolves to adopt and approve the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated
June 22, 2013 of the IBP Board of Governors.

It has been said that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who
meet the high standards oflegal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that shows
a violation of the norms and values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability."35
An examination of the records reveals that respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those of others kept by him.

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so
much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for
in the Rules of Court.

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney

unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he
may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in
his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a
criminal prosecution.

A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is

clear:

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or
from the client[,] [thus] . . . [w]hen a lawyer collects or receives money from his
client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees,
transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how
the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he
must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting
or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize)
constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

[The lawyer’s] failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and
in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.36(Emphasis supplied)

Respondent admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property to
complainants’ name.1âwphi1 He continuously assured complainants that he would
still fulfill his duty. However, after three (3) years and several demands from
complainants, respondent failed to accomplish the task given to him and even
refused to return the money. Complainants’ alleged failure to provide the necessary
documents to effect the transfer does not justify his violation of his duty under the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent’s assertion of a valid lawyer’s lien is also untenable. A valid retaining

lien has the following elements:

An attorney’s retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following

elements concur: (1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the
client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees.
Further, the attorney’s retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account
between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds of the
client which may come into the attorney’s possession in the course of his
employment.37

Respondent did not satisfy all the elements of a valid retaining lien. He did not
present evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. The enumeration of
cases he worked on for complainants remains unsubstantiated. When there is no
unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot validly retain their client’s
funds or properties.38
Furthermore, assuming that respondent had proven all the requisites for a valid
retaining lien, he cannot appropriate for himself his client's funds without the
proper accounting and notice to the client. The rule is that when there is "a
disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer . . . the
lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of
his fees .... "39

We also note that despite complainant Nicasio San Pedro's affidavit of desistance
dated March 14, 2008, both complainants signed their comment to respondent's
motion for reconsideration and prayed that the motion be dismissed for lack of
merit.40

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza is SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for three (3) months. He is also ordered to RETURN to
complainants the amount of ₱68,250.00 with 6% legal interest from the date of
finality of this judgment until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to
submit to this court proof of payment of the amount within 10 days from payment.
Let a copy of this resolution be entered in respondent Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza's
personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9872 January 28, 2014

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by
Natividad P. Navarro (Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty.
Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we gathered the following
facts of the case:

On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow

up the release of the payment for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property located in
Bacolod which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The agreement also included the payment
of the debts of Presbitero’s late husband to the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
the sale of the retained areas of the property, and the collection of the rentals due
for the retained areas from their occupants. It appeared that the DAR was supposed
to pay ₱700,000 for the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late
husband to PNB for ₱1,200,000. Presbitero alleged that PNB’s claim had already
prescribed, and she engaged the services of respondent to represent her in the
matter. Respondent proposed the filing of a case for quieting of title against PNB.
Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10% of the proceeds from
the VOS or the sale of the property, with the expenses to be advanced by
Presbitero but deductible from respondent’s fees. Respondent received ₱50,000
from Presbitero, supposedly for the expenses of the case, but nothing came out of
it.

In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged
respondent’s services to handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in
Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro,
to finance the expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent undertook
to register the property in consideration of 30% of the value of the property once it
is registered. Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from Navarro for the registration
expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration decree over the property was
already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would
not have spent for the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her
of the real situation of the property.

On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to

finance his sugar trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a
period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of 10% per month; and (c)
shall be secured by a real estate mortgage over a property located in Barangay
Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688. They
also agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal
amount of the loan as well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks
to Navarro, drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and
signed them in the presence of Navarro.

In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro,

covered by a second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA.
Respondent sent Navarro, through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against an
account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise
discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with Victorias
Milling Company, Inc. but no agreement was signed.

At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero

covered by a third MOA, except that the real estate mortgage was over a 263-
square-meter property located in Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent
sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod
City Branch.

Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property

mortgaged under the third MOA, and respondent promised to execute a real estate
mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-
meter property he mortgaged to Navarro.

However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security.

Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay
complainants a total of ₱900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal
amount or the interest thereon. In September 2006, the checks issued by
respondent to complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts
against which they were drawn were already closed. When complainants called
respondent’s attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for September and
October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding
months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand,
Presbitero terminated the services of respondent as counsel. Complainants then
filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of the mortgages executed by respondent
in their favor. Respondent countered that the 10% monthly interest on the loan was
usurious and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.

Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering
very high interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out
to be drawn against his son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that
respondent deceived them regarding the identity and value of the property he
mortgaged because he showed them a different property from that which he
owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter
property to her for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold it for only ₱150,000.

Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty
business and that it was Yulo who convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him
loans. Yulo also assured him that Presbitero would help him with the refining of
raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc. Respondent alleged that
Navarro fixed the interest rate and he agreed because he needed the money. He
alleged that their business transactions were secured by real estate mortgages and
covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied that the property he mortgaged to
Presbitero was less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold the
property because the sale was actually rescinded. Respondent claimed that the
property he mortgaged to Navarro was valuable and it was actually worth more
than ₱8,000,000.

Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good
but he was unable to continue paying when the price of sugar went down and when
the business with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. did not push through because
Presbitero did not help him. Respondent also denied that he was hiding from
complainants.

Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him ₱530,000 as interest
due for September to December 2005. He denied making any false representations.
He claimed that complainants were aware that he could no longer open a current
account and they were the ones who proposed that his wife and son issue the
checks. Respondent further alleged that he already started with the titling of Yulo’s
lot but his services were terminated before it could be completed.

A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases

while under suspension. In response, respondent alleged that he accepted
Presbitero’s case in February 2006 and learned of his suspension only in May
2006.

After conducting a hearing and considering the position papers submitted by the
parties, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed ₱2,000,000 from Navarro and
₱1,000,000 from Presbitero which he failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs
he executed. The IBP-CBD found that based on the documents presented by the
parties, respondent did not act in good faith in obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD
found that respondent either promised or agreed to pay the very high interest rates
of the loans although he knew them to be exorbitant in accordance with
jurisprudence. Respondent likewise failed to deny that he misled Navarro and her
husband regarding the identity of the property mortgaged to them. Respondent also
mortgaged a property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but documents showed that its
value was only ₱300,000. Documents also showed that he sold that property for
only ₱150,000. Respondent conspired with Yulo to secure loans by promising her
a 10% commission and later claimed that they agreed that Yulo would "ride" on
the loan by borrowing ₱300,000 from the amount he obtained from Navarro and
Presbitero. Respondent could not explain how he lost all the money he borrowed in
three months except for his claim that the price of sugar went down.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and Presbitero regarding the
issuance of the postdated checks, and there was nothing in the records that would
show that he informed them that it would be his wife or son who would issue the
checks. The IBP-CBD also found that respondent had not been transparent in
liquidating the money he received in connection with Presbitero’s VOS with DAR.
He was also negligent in his accounting regarding the registration of Yulo’s
property which was financed by Navarro.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts:

(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his
own account;

(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;

(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he

mortgaged to her;

(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;

(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it
was exorbitant; and

(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the
accounts were already closed.

The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility when he failed to properly account for the
various funds he received from complainants.

In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money from a client unless
the client’s interest is fully protected or the client is given independent advice.

On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that
the records were not clear whether the notice of suspension respondent received on
29 May 2006 was the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD or the final
decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise found that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that respondent mishandled his cases.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of disbarment.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by
reducing the recommended penalty from disbarment to suspension from the
practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of Governors likewise ordered
respondent to return the amount of his unpaid obligation to complainants.
Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the penalty of
disbarment be instead imposed upon respondent.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to
pay a high interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet,
when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he
drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also
established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero
for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only ₱150,000, showing that he
deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s
allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that
he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.

Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to
Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his
name. He only claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer open a
current bank account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the
checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding
that he made complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In fact,
respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to
Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third
batch of checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that
the checks belonged to accounts in respondent’s name.

It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. We have ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to
the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties.1 A lawyer may be disciplined
for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. 2 The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity,
and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court.3

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private
capacity. Although Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and
Navarro had no lawyer-client relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero’s
counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was established that respondent
misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for his
loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of
Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional
collateral but he failed to do so.

Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both

in his professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private
capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro
allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted
the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his
knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He
issued checks that were drawn from his son’s account whose name was similar to
his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that
will show that respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from
complainants.

Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes
on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received
for or from his client.4 We agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill
this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received various
amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of them.

Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that
respondent received ₱265,000 from her. Respondent countered that ₱105,000 was
paid for real estate taxes but he could not present any receipt to prove his claim.
Respondent also claimed that he paid ₱70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt was
only for ₱15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid ₱50,000 for filing fee,
publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not substantiate his claims
with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had been less than
diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the registration of
Yulo’s property.

Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting
to Yulo who had since passed away.

As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that

respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the
records do not show how respondent spent the funds because he was not
transparent in liquidating the money he received from Presbitero.

Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he
received from his client, Presbitero.1âwphi1Indeed, his failure to return the excess
money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated
it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by, the client.5

Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client
Presbitero. At the time he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained
counsel of Presbitero.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks
and real estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of
the property he mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn from his
account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of
the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed on
his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero
were dishonored because the accounts were already closed. The interest of his
client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent
violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes
that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation.6 In his dealings with his client
Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the
trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.

We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on

respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years. Given
the facts of the case, we see no reason to deviate from the recommendation of the
IBP-CBD imposing on respondent the penalty of disbarment. Respondent failed to
live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing
required of him as a member of the legal profession. 7 Instead, respondent
employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of his client to
secure undue gains for himself8 that warrants his removal from the practice of law.
Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP Board of Governors’ recommendation
ordering respondent to return his unpaid obligation to complainants, except for
advances for the expenses he received from his client, Presbitero, that were not
accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of
the Bar.9 Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative
liability.10

Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties
may choose to file against each other.11 Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives
money from a client for a particular purpose involving the client-attorney
relationship, he is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for that particular purpose.12 If the lawyer does not use the
money for the intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to his
client.13 Respondent was given an opportunity to render an accounting, and he
failed. He must return the full amount of the advances given him by Presbitero,
amounting to ₱50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating
Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law
effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.

Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S.

Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant
his compliance with this order within thirty days from finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let
a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V.

AGTANG, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of
respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1)
year for ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to
complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster
(complainant) against respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer
within 15 days from receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and
complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011,
the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory
conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or
five (5) days before the scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified
Answer.6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared.
She submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of which were
furnished the respondent. The Investigating Commissioner7 indicated that the said
documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a
need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for
resolution based on the documents on file. The Minutes 8 of the mandatory
conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or after
the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012
Decisions9 of the Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and
2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and her
husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the
rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit. 10

Complainant’s Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in

connection with her legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered
into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their discussion,
complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate
case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent
P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses. 11

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision

in relation to the legal problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter
in her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for
the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being
her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory
note13 evidenced the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting
to transfer to its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter
to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of
contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter
received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee. 14 When asked
about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the
sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the
summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees
paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra
Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court
records.15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered

that respondent was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the
civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied that he
would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a
copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed
that: 1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not
alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not
attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not
the point of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of
were not mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be
brought up during the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter
extend to him the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency
or emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of
P22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the
sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a
favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she
eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a
receipt,17 stating that “it is understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid
later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November 2, 2010,
respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the
next hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance.
Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00. 18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been
notified by respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14,
2010, when she personally checked the status of the case with the court. She went
to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff
gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the
motion for reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see
respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra
Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts because the
Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents unless these were
amended; and to make the additional averment that the defendant was using false
documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the

reply with a message from him that the matters she requested to be included were
mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however, complainant discovered that
these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for
P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle
of wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was also told that oral
arguments on the case had been set the following month.19
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent
as her counsel and wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her
copies of documents showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra
Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent,
requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee
and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged
in the practice of law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte
Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of
Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid
his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant
for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00
for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was
complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him
for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was
declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards
the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the
said amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in
covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having said
that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their hotel
accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the same
vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received
P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would
be discussed with the judge who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing.
Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the possibility that the other
party would befriend the judge. He never said that he would personally present a
bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of

Tierra Realty in the past. Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since
complainant was fully aware that another counsel was assisting him in the handling
of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and the
consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on
reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent demanded
just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the
complainant.

Reply of Complainant

In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making

reference to the receipts in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted
the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that
respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While
respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial
Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several
documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio,
who likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of
P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered as “no loan.”

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies

of the Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent for estafa.23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner

found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with
modification the recommendation of suspension by the Investigating
Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of
P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he
filed a motion for reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto,
informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging respondent for estafa had
already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had been
issued.26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for
reconsideration but modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law
by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise
ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant
amounting to P127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner with respect to respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR.
The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15,
on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a
lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance of his professional duties. A
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or
private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct,

both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled
complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than
the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of
the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In
other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and
dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth,
the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who
suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation,
would propose such amount that would further burden her financial resources.
Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant
amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should
not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be
knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to
disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty
and good faith expected of all members of the legal profession.

Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his
client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client.”28Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A
lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received
various amounts from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse,
he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon
demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other
expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated
it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by, the client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not
use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to the client.31
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts
from his client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for
the amount of P50,000.00 as “representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of
the judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent
himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00
and, worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at
the time the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount
to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a
bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s
trust but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal
profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of
the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration
of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the
image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be
overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that
the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The
absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment.
To tolerate respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the
courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010.
At this juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed
to inform his client of the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire
with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also
remiss in his duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records
reveal that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that
“[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.” In his
private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of
considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and
borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her
to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or
emergency” but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions
were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was
never questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his
private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but
were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence
reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses
raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions
provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Respondent’s
assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality of complainant
and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his inappropriate
behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and
thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of
fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to
complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just
debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations.32

Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the
reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any misconduct
which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on
both scores.
With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the
Court finds it proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner
who concluded that complainant presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s
“lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client
should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the
standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the
client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer
of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of
the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting
interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake,
a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the
violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception
provided in the rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to
hold respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of
complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services
in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having
notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in
complainant’s case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that the
complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said
contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof
were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription
was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the
complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and
the clear admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed
document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document or the
intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of
prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he
was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his
unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse
him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients
who had close dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no record of
any written consent from any of the parties involved.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the

relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree,
but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has
the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession
suffers.”34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his
office as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the
ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of law is
“a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those
who are qualified and who possess good moral character.”36 The appropriate
penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar
may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath;
(6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful
appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred
or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a
lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three (3) months
recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable
acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice
and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling
indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging
in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for
undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire
judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less
than the penalty of disbarment.38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from
complainant in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that
it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a
private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on
liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of
the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only
concern of the Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability.
Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties
may choose against each other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since
administrative cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of
evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required
in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required.
Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.” 40 In
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence,
which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable.41Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive
period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a
rule, imprescriptible.42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of
P127,590.00 representing the balance of the filing fees he received from
complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship
between them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent
received from complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the civil
case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were
connected to his professional relationship with the complainant. While
respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the
judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same
as it was borne out of their professional relationship. As to his other obligations,
respondent was already adjudged as liable for the personal loans he contracted with
complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession.”43 The Court likewise
aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by “purging the
profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.” 44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of

gross misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the
complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and
P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be
circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 194122 October 11, 2012

HECTOR HERNANDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
SUSAN SAN PEDRO AGONCILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court are the April 29, 2010 Decision1 and October 12, 2010 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108801.

The instant petition arose from a Complaint for Damages filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parafiaque City against herein petitioner and
one Freddie Apawan Verwin by herein respondent, alleging as follows:

xxxx

2. x x x Defendant Hector Hernandez is x x x the owner of the delivery van which

is the subject matter of the above-entitled case. He is doing business under the
name of Cargo Solution Innovation and is the employer of Defendant Fredie
Apawan Verwin;

3. That on October 5, 2006 at around 12:15 in the afternoon, Defendant Fredie

Apawan Verwin was driving a delivery van belonging to a certain Hector
Hernandez, bearing plate number RBB-510, along Buendia Avenue Flyover, South
Super-Highway (Osmeña Avenue), and negligently backed against a Honda City
model with plate number XMF-496, owned and driven by the Plaintiff at the time
of the incident;

4. That at the time of the incident, the traffic condition at the Buendia Avenue
Flyover was bumper-to-bumper and that Plaintiff's and Defendant's vehicles were
in an ascending position;

5. That Defendant driver alighted from his van and so did the Plaintiff to assess the
damage done. Plaintiff observed that the pedestal of the van totally engaged and
hooked the front bumper of her Honda car;

6. That after a brief discussion of the incident, Defendant driver went back to his
van and stepped on the gas which caused the van to move abruptly forward and
resulted to the disengagement of the bumper of Plaintiff's car and damage to the
car radiator, and as a consequence, the Plaintiff's car was towed. Plaintiff paid
P1,700 as towing fee. x x x

7. Right after the incident, Plaintiff made various demands from Defendants, thru
the secretary of the Cargo Solution Innovation or C.S.I., the company which the
driver of the van was working for, to pay the actual damages sustained, but to
Plaintiff's dismay her demands were unheeded;

8. That defendant Hector Hernandez never talked nor appeared to the Plaintiff
despite several requests made by the latter. Instead, he made a person appear
having the name of Mr. De Ocampo before the Plaintiff in her clinic at Medical
Center Manila, sometime on October 11, 2006 and acted in representation of
Hector Hernandez and made a number of inquiries regarding the accident that
transpired;

9. That sometime after, Plaintiff contacted Mr. De Ocampo for feedback regarding
Defendant's position about the incident, and Mr. De Ocampo spoke that the
Defendants are still waiting for the police report and ever since that conversation,
no communication transpired between the parties regarding any agreement or
settlement about the accident;
10. That as a direct consequence of the foregoing, Plaintiff's vehicle sustained
heavy damage and the repair of which amounted to P130,602.53. A copy of the
official receipt given by Honda Makati is hereby attached as Annex "D";

11. Plaintiff was unable to use her vehicle in going to work for five (5) weeks and
led her to commute by means of a taxi every time her duty called her in Medical
Center Manila in United Nations Avenue, Manila costing her P500-1000/day;

12. Considering the character of Defendant driver's negligence, together with the
malicious refusal to pay actual damages of both Defendants and Plaintiff's
experience of sleepless nights and anxiety because of the incident, Defendants
should be held liable for moral damages in an amount of not less than P50,000.00;

13. Forced to litigate, Plaintiff engaged the services of a lawyer and have agreed to
pay attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00 plus P2,500.00 per appearance.3

On May 31, 2007, the MeTC issued a Summons Under Summary

Procedure4 which was served upon and received by petitioner on June 18, 2007.
However, the summons was not served on the other defendant. The case then
proceeded only against petitioner.

On July 6, 2007, petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File
His Answer claiming that he just engaged the services of his counsel. He prayed
that he be granted an additional period of fifteen (15) days or until July 21, 2007
within which to file his responsive pleading.5

On July 18, 2007, the MeTC issued an Order6 denying petitioner's Ex Parte Motion
for Extension of Time holding that the said Motion was filed beyond the
reglementary period provided for by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and
that it is likewise a prohibited pleading under the said Rule.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration7 on August 17, 2007. Meanwhile,

petitioner, nonetheless, filed his Answer with Affirmative and Negative Defenses
and Compulsory Counterclaims8 on July 26, 2007.

Respondent opposed petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.9 In the meantime, she

filed a Motion to Render Judgment10 on August 24, 2007, on the ground that
petitioner failed to file his answer within the time prescribed by the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure.

On September 7, 2007, the MeTC issued an Order11 ruling that in view of the fact
that the amount being claimed by respondent exceeds P200,000.00, the case shall
be governed by the "Rules on Regular Procedure." In the same Order, the MeTC
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and directed him to file his
Comment/Opposition to respondent's Motion to Render Judgment.

Petitioner filed his Opposition12 on September 14, 2007.

On October 23, 2007, the MeTC issued an Order13 denying respondent's Motion to
Render Judgment reiterating its ruling that the case does not fall under the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure.

On November 14, 2007, respondent filed a Motion to Declare Defendant (herein

petitioner) Hector Hernandez in Default and to Render Judgment.14

Petitioner opposed contending that he has already filed his Answer prior to
respondent's Motion to declare him in default and that he had actively participated
in the case by filing various pleadings.15

On December 4, 2007, the MeTC issued an Order16 declaring petitioner in default

and directing respondent to present evidence ex parte.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default,17 but the MeTC denied it in
its Order18 dated February 8, 2008.

After respondent's evidence ex parte was presented, the MeTC rendered its
Decision19 dated August 6, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Susan San

Pedro Agoncillo and against the defendant Hector Hernandez, ordering him,

a) To pay the plaintiff the amount of One Hundred Thirty-Two Thousand Three
Hundred Two Pesos and 53/100 (Php 132,302.53) for the actual damages for the
repair of the car and the towing fee;

b) Attorney's fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php 10,000.00)

c) And costs.

The case as against defendant Fredie Apawan Verwin is dismissed without

prejudice as summons was not validly served upon him.

SO ORDERED.20

The MeTC held that respondent was able to sufficiently establish her cause of
action against petitioner in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.

Petitioner appealed to the RTC which, however, denied the same in its Decision
dated February 18, 2009. The RTC affirmed the findings and conclusions of the
MeTC. As to the procedural aspect, the RTC ruled that the MeTC correctly denied
due course to petitioner's Answer as the Motion for Extension to file the same was
filed out of time and that the said Answer was, in fact, filed beyond the extended
period requested in the Motion for Extension.

Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA. On April 29, 2010, the CA
rendered its assailed Decision denying the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated October
12, 2010.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising a sole issue, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IS

IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT, SPECIFICALLY THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT'S RULING IN SABLAS vs. SABLAS (526 SCRA 292 2007).21

Petitioner's basic contention is that, pursuant to this Court's ruling in Sablas v.

Sablas,22 the MeTC should have admitted his Answer as his pleading was filed
before he was declared in default.

The petition is without merit.

It is true that this Court held in Sablas that where the Answer is filed beyond the
reglementary period but before the defendant is declared in default and there is no
showing that defendant intends to delay the case and no prejudice is caused to the
plaintiff, the Answer should be admitted.23

It must be emphasized, however, that it is not mandatory on the part of the trial
court to admit an Answer which is belatedly filed where the defendant is not yet
declared in default. Settled is the rule that it is within the discretion of the trial
court to permit the filing of an answer even beyond the reglementary period,
provided that there is justification for the belated action and there is no showing
that the defendant intended to delay the case.24

In the instant case, the MeTC found it proper not to admit petitioner's Answer and
to subsequently declare him in default, because petitioner's Ex Parte Motion for
Extension of Time to File His Answer was filed out of time; that petitioner filed his
Answer beyond the period requested in the Motion for Extension; and that
petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on respondent's Motion to
declare him in default.

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the above ruling of the MeTC, as
affirmed by the RTC and the CA.

Sablas differs from the instant case on two aspects, to wit: first, in Sablas, the
petitioners' motion for extension to file their answer was seasonably filed while in
the present case, petitioner's Motion for Extension to File His Answer was filed
beyond the 15-day period allowed by the Rules of Court; second, in Sablas, since
the trial court admitted the petitioners' Answer, this Court held that the trial court
was correct in denying the subsequent motion of the respondent to declare the
petitioners in default while, in the instant case, the MeTC denied due course to
petitioner's Answer on the ground that the Motion for Extension was not
seasonably filed and that the Answer was filed beyond the period requested in the
Motion for Extension, thus, justifying the order of default. Thus, the principle
enunciated in Sablas is not applicable in the present case.

In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA in its ruling that procedural rules are
not to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.

Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.25 Courts and
litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. 26 While in certain
instances, the Court allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, there is no
intention to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity.27 The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper
cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.28 While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. 29 Party
litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by – rather than flaunt –
procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the
pursuit of justice.30

Moreover, while the Court frowns upon default judgments, it does not condone
gross transgressions of the rules.31The Court is duty-bound to observe its rules and
procedures and uphold the noble purpose behind their issuance. Rules are laid
down for the benefit of all and should not be made dependent upon a suitor’s sweet
time and own bidding.32

Petitioner's negligence in the present case is inexcusable, because aside from the
belated filing of his Motion for Extension to File His Answer, he also failed to file
his Answer within the period requested in his Motion without offering any
justifiable excuse. Moreover, as observed by the MeTC in its Order dated February
8, 2008, petitioner also failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on
respondent's Motion to Declare Him in Default. Furthermore, petitioner did not
deny respondent's allegation that he also failed to appear during his requested date
of hearing of his Motion to Set Aside the Order of Default. From these
circumstances, the Court finds no compelling ground to depart from the findings of
the CA that petitioner is guilty of deliberately employing delay in the prosecution
of the civil case against him.

Aside from petitioner's abovementioned breach of procedural rules, the Court notes
that petitioner and his counsel once again committed another violation when they
failed to comply with this Court's Resolution dated March 16, 2011 requiring
petitioner to file his Reply to respondent's Comment-Opposition to the present
petition. It is true that this Court set aside its Resolution dated July 27, 2011 which
dismissed the instant petition on the basis of this infraction committed by
petitioner. However, it cannot be denied that this infringement affirms petitioner's
propensity to ignore at will not only the rules of procedure but also the lawful order
of the Court.

The Court agrees with respondent's observation that in his Memorandum filed with
the RTC, petitioner reasoned out that his failure to seasonably file his Answer was
due to the inadvertence and pressure of work on the part of his counsel.

In their Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's July 27, 2011 Resolution,
petitioner, through his counsel, again used as excuse for their failure to file the
required pleading the allegation that the counsel had voluminous workload.
However, petitioner's counsel cannot hide from this pretense as he himself claimed
that they, in fact, had no intention to file a Reply. Instead, they intended to simply
file a Manifestation indicating their desire to waive their right to reply and that
they are adopting the arguments in their Petition as their Reply to respondent's
Comment. If that, indeed, was the case, then the preparation of the intended
manifestation could have taken just a few minutes. In fact, a perusal of petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation shows that it is a mere
recapitulation of his arguments raised in his petition.33 Yet, petitioner failed to file
his Manifestation on time, which is within a period of ten (10) days from his
receipt of the Resolution requiring his reply. Indeed, petitioner's counsel admitted
that they received the Resolution requiring petitioner to file his Reply on April 26,
2011. However, petitioner ignored this Resolution and it was only on September
16, 2011, or almost five months after, that petitioner filed his Motion for
Reconsideration with Manifestation. Notably, the said Motion for Reconsideration
with Manifestation was filed only when this Court issued another Resolution
dismissing the instant petition for petitioner's failure to comply with the order of
this Court directing him to file his reply. This only indicates that were it not for the
dismissal of his petition, petitioner and his counsel would have continued to ignore
this Court's lawful order.

Truly, the conduct of petitioner and his counsel can never be a case of excusable
neglect. On the contrary, it smacks of a blatant disregard of the rules and lawful
directives of the court. Thus, giving in to petitioner's maneuvering is tantamount to
putting premium on a litigant's naked indolence and sanctioning a scheme of
prolonging litigation.
It bears stressing that a lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring and keeping
track of the period of time left to file pleadings, and to see to it that said pleadings
are filed before the lapse of the period.34 If he fails to do so, his client is bound by
his conduct, negligence and mistakes.35 In the present case, petitioner and his
counsel knew and should have known of the periods within which they are to file
their pleadings. In fact, with respect to their Answer, they should be aware that
they had only until July 21, 2007 to file the same because they were the ones who
requested for an extension of time to file the said Answer. It was incumbent on
petitioners’ counsel to arrange his workload and attend to important and pressing
matters such that pleadings are filed within the prescribed period therefor.36 If the
failure of the petitioners’ counsel to cope with his heavy workload should be
considered a valid justification to sidestep the reglementary period, there would be
no end to litigations so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or
experienced.37

Time and again, this Court has cautioned lawyers to handle only as many cases as
they can efficiently handle.38 The zeal and fidelity demanded of a lawyer to his
client’s cause require that not only should he be qualified to handle a legal matter,
he must also prepare adequately and give appropriate attention to his legal
work.39 Since a client is, as a rule, bound by the acts of his counsel, a lawyer, once
he agrees to take a case, should undertake the task with dedication and care.40 This
Court frowns upon a lawyer’s practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to
file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse without submitting any
pleading or even any explanation or manifestation for his omission. 41 Failure of a
lawyer to seasonably file a pleading constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part.

On the other hand, it would not also be amiss to remind petitioner of the settled
rule that litigants, represented by counsel, should not expect that all they need to do
is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.42 Instead, they should give
the necessary assistance to their counsel and exercise due diligence to monitor the
status of the case for what is at stake is their interest in the case.43 This petitioner
failed to do.

In any case, respondent was. granted favorable relief only after the MeTC has
ascertained that such relief is warranted by the evidence presented and the facts
proven by the respondent. The Court agrees with the CA in holding that even if he
was declared in default, petitioner was not deprived of his right to appeal. In fact,
he appealed his case to the RTC, which ruled squarely on the merits of
respondent's complaint and found sufficient evidence to sustain the ruling of the
MeTC in respondent's favor.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The April 29,
2010 Decision and the October 12, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6166 October 2, 2009

MARIA EARL BEVERLY C. CENIZA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a verified complaint1 dated July 25, 2003 filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with
grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and falsification of public
documents.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On May 3, 2002, complainant sought the legal services of the respondent in regard
to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. As
she had no money to pay for attorney’s fees since her mother-in-law would arrive
from the United States only in June 2002, respondent made her sign a promissory
note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo Natavio. After her
mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished them a copy of the
complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing legitime
but with no docket number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the
complaint. However, three months lapsed before respondent informed them that it
was already filed in court. It was then that they received a copy of the complaint
with "Civil Case No. 4198" and a rubber stamped "RECEIVED" thereon.
However, when complainant verified the status of the case with the Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with
said title and docket number was filed.2

Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for intending to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be
recovered were located in Koronadal, South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani
Province, in violation of the rule on venue that real actions shall be filed in the
place where the property is situated. Complainant also alleged that respondent
forged the signature of her husband, Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss
attached to a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate of title
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 20, in Misc. Case
No. 114-2202.3

In her comment, respondent assailed the personality of the complainant to institute

the administrative complaint for disbarment as she was not a party to the action for
partition and recovery of ownership/possession. As such, her allegations in the
administrative complaint were all hearsay, self-serving and unsubstantiated.
Further, the charge of forgery of the Affidavit of Loss was belied by the March 3,
2003 decision of the trial court, wherein Carlito C. Ceniza affirmed his statements
in the said affidavit when he was called to testify.4

On February 2, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On April 29, 2004, respondent filed a Supplemental Comment explaining the

rubber stamped "RECEIVED" on the complaint. According to her, when her staff
Jan Kirt Lester Soledad was at the RTC Office of the Clerk of Court, she called
him through cellular phone and directed him to stop the filing of the complaint as
the same lacked certain attachments. However, one copy thereof was already
stamped "RECEIVED" by the receiving court personnel, who also assigned a
docket number. She kept the copies of the complaint, including the one with the
stamp, to be filed later when the attachments are complete.

Meanwhile, on November 7, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation with Urgent

Motion praying that the administrative complaint be likewise dismissed in view of
the dismissal of the criminal case due to complainant’s apparent lack of interest to
prosecute.

On January 19, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that

respondent be found guilty of falsification of public document and be meted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three years. The
report reads in part, as follows:

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action, where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. It involved
no private interest. The complainant or person who called the attention of the court
to the attorney’s misconduct is in no sense a party and has generally no interest in
its outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. It affords no redress for private grievance. (Tejan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154)

Prescinding from the aforequoted ruling, it is therefore irrelevant and immaterial if

herein complainant is not a party to the subject civil complaint prepared by the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest
or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether on the basis of the
facts borne out by the record, the charge has been proven.

On the payment of the acceptance fee in the amount of P32,000.00, respondent’s

contention that she acted as guarantor of Carlos Ceniza, complainant’s husband,
when he borrowed money from a money lender, Domingo Natavio, the amount
representing the acceptance, does not inspire belief. The promissory note dated
May 3, 2002, appended as Annex "A" of the complaint-affidavit eloquently shows
that consistent with the complainant’s allegation, she was made to borrow said
amount to be paid as respondent’s acceptance fee. It bears stress that the date of the
promissory note is the same date when respondent’s services were engaged leading
to the preparation of the subject civil complaint. Complainant’s allegation is
further enhanced by the fact that such promissory note was even notarized by the
respondent.

On the alleged filing of the subject civil complaint, it is undisputed that the same
was not filed before the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Davao Del Sur, as
evidenced by a Certification from the said office appended as Annex "A" of
complainant’s Manifestation dated October 14, 2005. Thus, the claim of
complainant that respondent falsified or caused it to falsify the stamp marked
received dated May 10, 2002 including the case number "4198", finds factual and
legal bases.

It bears stress that a copy of the subject civil complaint was obtained by
complainant from the respondent herself who tried to impress upon the former that
contrary to her suspicion, the subject civil complaint was already filed in court.
However, inquiry made by the complainant shows otherwise.

Respondent’s contention that after one copy of the complaint was already stamped
by court personnel in preparation for receiving the same and entering in the court’s
docket, she caused it to be withdrawn after realizing that the same lacked certain
attachments, is bereft of merit.

In the first place, respondent miserably failed to mention these lacking attachments
that allegedly caused the withdrawal of the complaint. Secondly, and assuming
arguendo that the withdrawal was due to lacking attachments, how come the same
was not filed in the next office day complete with attachments. And lastly, the
Certification of the Clerk of Court clearly states that Civil Case No. 4188 is not the
case of Mercedes Callejo vda. De Ceniza, et al. vs. Charlotte Ceniza, et al.

xxxx

The fact that the City Prosecutor’s Office of Digos, upon motion for
reconsideration of the respondent, dismissed a similar complaint filed by herein
complainant will not in anyway affect the above captioned administrative
complaint.

The pendency of a criminal action against the respondent, from the facts of which
the disciplinary proceeding is predicated, does not pose prejudicial question to the
resolution of the issues in the disbarment case. (Calo vs. Degano, 20 SCRA 447)
His conviction is not necessary to hold the lawyer administratively liable because
the two proceedings and their objectives are different and it is not sound public
policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before the court act on a
complaint against a lawyer as it may emasculate the disciplinary power of the
court. (In re Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1) Nor is his acquittal, by this fact alone, a bar to
an administrative complaint against him. (Piatt vs. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350).
The other allegations in the complaint about ignorance of the law are found to be
without basis.

RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that herein respondent Atty.

Vivian C. Rubia, be found guilty of the charge of falsification of public document
and be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) years.

On May 31, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting
the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation with modification, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237

Adm. Case No. 6166

Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.

Atty. Vivian G. Rubia

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent’s falsification of public document, Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is hereby
DISBARRED.

However, in its December 11, 2008 Resolution, the Board of Governors

reconsidered its May 31, 2007 Resolution by reducing the recommended penalty of
disbarment to five years suspension from the practice of law, thus:

RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2008-715

Adm. Case No. 6166

Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.

Atty. Vivian G. Rubia
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Recommendation of the Board of Governors First Division of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with
modification, that Resolution RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237 of the Board of
Governors dated 31 May 2007 recommending the Disbarment of Atty. Vivian G.
Rubia is reduced to Five (5) years Suspension from the practice of law.

On April 20, 2009, the IBP forwarded the instant case to this Court as provided
under Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court.

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent from the practice of law for gross
misconduct, ignorance of the law and for falsification of public document. In
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for
the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must
be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court
has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.5

The sole issue in this case is whether or not there is preponderant evidence to
warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against the respondent.

In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant alleged

that respondent misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court,
when in fact, upon verification with the RTC Clerk of Court, it was not. Such
misrepresentation is shown by the copy of the complaint with a stamped
"RECEIVED" and docket number thereon. Apart from said allegations,
complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent
deliberately falsified a public document.

A perusal of the records shows that complainant’s evidence consists solely of her
Affidavit-Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all
the mandatory conferences set by the investigating commissioner in order to give
respondent the chance to test the veracity of her assertions. It is one thing to allege
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or falsification of public document and
another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the same.

Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances behind

the filing of the complaint by respondent’s staff because she was not present when
the same was filed with the trial court. Complainant failed to disprove by
preponderant evidence respondent’s claim that the case was not filed but was in
fact withdrawn after it was stamped with "RECEIVED" and assigned with a docket
number. We find this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering that the
stamp did not bear the signature of the receiving court personnel, which is
normally done when pleadings are received by the court.

Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the complaint was not
filed and that "CIVIL CASE NO. 4198" pertained to another case, did not diminish
the truthfulness of respondent’s claim, but even tended to bolster it. Necessarily, as
the complaint was not filed, docket number "4198" indicated in the copy of the
complaint was assigned to another case thereafter filed in court.

Thus, for lack of preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioner’s ruling

that respondent was guilty of falsification of public document, as adopted by the
IBP Board of Governors, has no factual basis to stand on.1avvphi1

However, we find that respondent committed some acts for which she should be
disciplined or administratively sanctioned.

We find nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondent’s act of charging an

acceptance fee of P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable under the
circumstances. The impropriety lies in the fact that she suggested that complainant
borrow money from Domingo Natavio for the payment thereof. This act impresses
upon the Court that respondent would do nothing to the cause of complainant’s
mother-in-law unless payment of the acceptance fee is made. Her duty to render
legal services to her client with competence and diligence should not depend on the
payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to be paid upon the
arrival of complainant’s mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a month after
respondent accepted the case.
Respondent’s transgression is compounded further when she severed the lawyer-
client relationship due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer
Nakayama Group of Companies, which constrained her to return the money
received as well as the records of the case, thereby leaving her client with no
representation. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the
withdrawal of her services.

Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line of communication with her

client regarding the status of their complaint.

Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath which imposes upon every
member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice, Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of Canon 18, and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE

AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR

GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.

When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he
undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it, regardless of its
significance. Thus, his client, whether rich or poor, has the right to expect that he
will discharge his duties diligently and exert his best efforts, learning and ability to
prosecute or defend his (client’s) cause with reasonable dispatch. Failure to fulfill
his duties will subject him to grave administrative liability as a member of the Bar.
For the overriding need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the
legal profession demands that an erring lawyer should be sanctioned.6
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is
found GUILTY of violation of Rule 18.03 and Canon 22 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that similar
infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of
this Decision, and be it duly recorded in the personal file of respondent Atty.
Vivian G. Rubia.

SO ORDERED.

Adm. Case No. 5530 January 28, 2013

SPOUSES ARCING AND CRESING BAUTISTA, EDAY RAGADIO and

FRANCING GALGALAN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ARTURO CEFRA, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by spouses Arcing and Cresing

Bautista, Eday Regadio1 and Francing Galgalan (complainants) against Atty.
Arturo Cefra for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rules 138 and 139 of the Rules of Court.

The Facts

The complainants were the defendants in Civil Case No. U-6504 an action for
quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.2 The complainants engaged
the services of Atty. Cefra to represent them in the proceedings. According to the
complainants, they lost in Civil Case No. U-6504 because of Atty. Cefra’s
negligence in performing his duties as their counsel. First, Atty. Cefra only
presented testimonial evidence and disregarded two (2) orders of the RTC directing
him to submit a formal offer of documentary exhibits. Second, Atty. Cefra
belatedly submitted the formal offer of documentary exhibits after the
complainants had been declared to have waived their right to make a submission.
Third, Atty. Cefra did not file a motion or appeal and neither did he file any other
remedial pleading to contest the RTC’s decision rendered against them.

The Court ordered Atty. Cefra to comment on the complaint. Despite the
extensions of time given by the Court, Atty. Cefra did not file any comment. He
did not also comply with the Court’s Minute Resolutions,3 dated December 14,
2005 and March 22, 2006, directing him to pay a ₱2,000.00 fine and to submit the
required comment.

On July 16, 2008, we held Atty. Cefra in contempt of court, ordering his detention
for five (5) days. We also reiterated the order for Atty. Cefra to pay a ₱2,000.00
fine and to submit a comment on the complaint.4

On August 4, 2008, Atty. Cefra filed his Comment,5 denying the allegations in the
complaint. He claimed that the complainants misunderstood the RTC’s decision:

2. That Respondent denies the allegation in Paragraphs (sic) 7 of the complaint that
defendants miserably lost the case because the Decision itself confirmed and
affirmed our stand that defendants do not contest the ownership of x x x Serlito
Evangelista x x x.

3. That it was defendants (sic) failure to fully understand the Decision which led to
the filing of this administrative case and which subsequent events have proven that
in the implementation of the Writ of Execution the land owned by the defendants
covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles were not affected.6

In a Minute Resolution7 dated September 24, 2008, we referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation/decision.

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On June 11, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner8 recommended the dismissal of

the complaint. The Investigating Commissioner opined:

The administrative complaint failed to show sufficient evidence to warrant

disciplinary action against respondent. Complainants filed this complaint because
they believed that they lost their case, however, their claim over their properties
was not affected by the Decision of the court.9

In Resolution No. XIX-2010-285 dated April 16, 2010, the IBP Board of
Governors reversed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP
Board of Governors found Atty. Cefra negligent in handling the complainants’
case and unanimously approved his suspension from the practice of law for six (6)
months.

Atty. Cefra filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 14, 2012, in Resolution
No. XX-2012-24, the IBP Board of Governors partially granted Atty. Cefra’s
motion in this wise:

RESOLVED to PARTIALLY GRANT Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration

and unanimously MODIFY Resolution No. XIX-2010-285 dated April 16, 2010
Suspending Atty. Arturo B. Cefra from the practice of law for six (6) months to
REPRIMANDED considering that the failure was not material to the case and that
complainants were not prejudice. [emphasis supplied]

The Court’s Ruling

Except for the recommended penalty, we agree with the IBP Board of Governors
that Atty. Cefra has been guilty of negligence in handling the complainants’ case.
His actuations in the present administrative case also reveal his lack of diligence in
performing his duties as an officer of the Court.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence."10

It further states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." 11 In addition, a
lawyer has the corresponding duty to "keep the client informed of the status of his
case."12

In Jardin v. Villar, Jr.,13 the Court held:

Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free.
Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the
profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyer’s lethargy from the perspective of
the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical.

Atty. Cefra failed to live up to these standards. Interestingly, he did not deny the
complainants’ allegations and impliedly admitted his actions in the proceedings in
Civil Case No. U-6504.

The records further substantiate clear acts of negligence on Atty. Cefra’s part in
handling the complainants’ case.

First, Atty. Cefra failed to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence within
the period given by the RTC. Atty. Cefra submitted a formal offer of documentary
evidence five (5) months after the RTC’s first order directing him to make a formal
offer. The formal offer of evidence was only made after the complainants had been
declared by the RTC to have waived their right to submit a formal offer of
documentary evidence.

Second, Atty. Cefra failed to comply with the two (2) orders of the RTC directing
him to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence. He made no effort to
submit the required formal offer of documentary evidence within the prescribed
period. Neither did he give his reasons, within the required period, on why he
could not make the required formal offer of documentary evidence. In fact, Atty.
Cefra’s belated explanation for this omission was only done in a motion for
reconsideration (with motion to admit the formal offer of documentary evidence)
that he subsequently filed, which motion the RTC denied for lack of merit.

Third, Atty. Cefra failed to file an appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any
remedial measure to contest the RTC’s decision. His claim that the complainants
had not been prejudiced by the RTC’s decision is incorrect. The dispositive portion
of the RTC’s decision clearly adjudged the complainants liable to pay ₱30,000.00
moral damages.14 Considering the pecuniary consequence of the RTC’s decision to
his clients, Atty. Cefra should have filed a motion for reconsideration before the
RTC or appealed the RTC’s decision with the Court of Appeals, or he should have
at least immediately explained to his clients his reasons for not taking remedial
action. The failure to avail of available remedial measures apparently prejudiced
his clients. As matter now stands, the complainants’ liability under the RTC’s
decision is already final and executory.
Fourth, Atty. Cefra’s allegations in his Comment show his failure to effectively
communicate with the complainants. As Atty. Cefra puts it, the administrative
complaint was the result of the complainants’ failure to fully understand the RTC’s
decision. In other words, he admits that the present case would have been averted
had he exerted reasonable efforts to inform the complainants of the legal
implications of the RTC’s decision and to explain to them the material
developments in the case.

We significantly note that even before this Court, Atty. Cefra’s conduct was less
than what is expected of an officer of the Court. He was held in contempt for his
cavalier and indifferent attitude in complying with the Court’s directives.

In sum, the above actuations showing Atty. Cefra’s lack of diligence and
inattention to his duties as a lawyer warrant disciplinary sanction. We have
repeatedly held that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it.

Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency
and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform
their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.15

Under the circumstances, the IBP Board of Governors’ recommended penalty of

simple reprimand is not commensurate with the gravity of Atty. Cefra’s
infractions. As the complainants incurred pecuniary damage by reason of Atty.
Cefra’s negligence, a suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law is in
order.16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Arturo Cefra guilty of

negligence, in violation of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9149 September 4, 2013

JULIAN PENILLA, COMPLAINANT,

vs.
ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR., RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed against respondent Atty.

Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and for gross misconduct in the performance of his
duty as a lawyer.

The antecedent facts follow:

Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Rey and
Evelyn Garin (the spouses) for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile. Despite
full payment, the spouses defaulted in their obligation. Thus, complainant decided
to file a case for breach of contract against the spouses where he engaged the
services of respondent as counsel.

Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of
complainant’s payment. When the spouses failed to return the payment, respondent
advised complainant that he would file a criminal case for estafa against said
spouses. Respondent charged ₱30,000 as attorney’s fees and ₱10,000 as filing fees.
Complainant turned over the relevant documents to respondent and paid the fees in
tranches. Respondent then filed the complaint for estafa before Asst. City
Prosecutor Jose C. Fortuno of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Respondent attended the hearing with complainant but the spouses did not appear.
After the hearing, complainant paid another ₱1,000 to respondent as appearance
fee. Henceforth, complainant and respondent have conflicting narrations of the
subsequent events and transactions that transpired.

Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution, respondent
told him that they have to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor
Fortuno to expedite a favorable resolution of the case. Complainant claims that
despite initial reservations, he later acceded to respondent’s suggestion, bought a
bottle of Carlos Primero I for ₱950 and delivered it to respondent’s office.

Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa case
against the spouses. Respondent allegedly told complainant that a motion for
reconsideration was "needed to have [the resolution] reversed."2Respondent then
prepared the motion and promised complainant that he would fix the problem. On
February 18, 2002, the motion was denied for lack of merit. Respondent then told
complainant that he could not do anything about the adverse decision and
presented the option of filing a civil case for specific performance against the
spouses for the refund of the money plus damages. Complainant paid an additional
₱10,000 to respondent which he asked for the payment of filing fees. After
complainant signed the complaint, he was told by respondent to await further
notice as to the status of the case. Complainant claims that respondent never gave
him any update thereafter.

Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-

up the status of the case and meet with respondent at his office. He admits,
however, that in one instance he was able to talk to respondent who told him that
the case was not progressing because the spouses could not be located. In the same
meeting, respondent asked complainant to determine the whereabouts of the
spouses. Complainant returned to respondent’s office on January 24, 2005, but
because respondent was not around, complainant left with respondent’s secretary a
letter regarding the possible location of the spouses.

Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several letters
conveying his disappointment and requesting for the return of the money and the
documents in respondent’s possession. Complainant then sought the assistance of
the radio program "Ito ang Batas with Atty. Aga" to solve his predicament.
Following the advice he gathered, complainant went to the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Complainant learned that a civil case for Specific Performance and
Damages was filed on June 6, 20023 but was dismissed on June 13, 2002. He also
found out that the filing fee was only ₱2,440 and not ₱10,000 as earlier stated by
respondent. Atty. Aga of the same radio program also sent respondent a letter
calling his attention to complainant’s problem. The letter, like all of complainant’s
previous letters, was unheeded.

On January 9, 2006, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant administrative case praying
that respondent be found guilty of gross misconduct for violating the Lawyer’s
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for appropriate
administrative sanctions to be imposed.

Respondent harps a different tale.

In an Answer4 filed on January 30, 2006, respondent prayed that the case be
dismissed for lack of merit. He denied charging complainant ₱10,000 as filing fees
for the estafa case and claimed that he charged and received only ₱2,000. He also
countered that the payment of ₱30,000 made by the complainant was his
acceptance fee for both the estafa case and civil case. Respondent likewise denied
the following other allegations of complainant: that he assured the success of the
case before the prosecutor; that he asked complainant to give a bottle of Carlos
Primero I to the prosecutor; that he promised to fix the case; and that he charged
₱10,000, as he only charged ₱5,000, as filing fee for the civil case.

Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when he
failed to inform petitioner of the status of the case. In fact, he was willing to return
the money and the documents of complainant. What allegedly prevented him from
communicating with complainant was the fact that complainant would go to his
office during days and times that he would be attending his daily court hearings.

The IBP-CBD called for a mandatory conference on April 28, 2006. Only
complainant and his counsel attended.5The conference was reset and terminated on
June 9, 2006. The parties were directed to file their verified position papers within
15 days,6 to which complainant and respondent complied.7
On July 18, 2006, respondent filed a Reply8 praying for the dismissal of the case
for lack of factual and legal bases. He stated that he had performed his duties as
complainant’s counsel when he filed the criminal case before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and the civil case before the RTC of Caloocan City. He
averred that he should not be blamed for the dismissal of both cases as his job was
to ensure that justice is served and not to win the case. It was unethical for him to
guarantee the success of the case and resort to unethical means to win such case for
the client. He continued to deny that he asked complainant to give the prosecutor a
bottle of Carlos Primero I and that the filing fees he collected totalled ₱20,000.
Respondent argued that it is incredulous that the total sum of all the fees that he
had allegedly collected exceeded ₱30,000 – the amount being claimed by
complainant from the spouses.

In its Report and Recommendation9 dated September 12, 2008, the IBP-CBD
recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six months
"for negligence within the meaning of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility," viz:

In the case under consideration, there are certain matters which keep sticking out
like a sore thumb rendering them difficult to escape notice.

One is the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa arising out of a violation of the
contract for repair of the Volks Wagon (sic) car. It is basic that when an act or
omission emanates from a contract, oral or written, the consequent result is a
breach of the contract, hence, properly actionable in a civil suit for damages. As
correctly pointed out by the Investigating Prosecutor, the liability of the respondent
is purely civil in nature because the complaint arose from a contract of services and
the respondent (spouses Garin) failed to perform their contractual obligation under
the contract.

xxxx

Another one is the filing of a civil complaint for specific performance and damages
(after the dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa) in the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City where the actual damages claimed is ₱36,000.00.
It is also basic that the civil complaint for ₱36,000.00 should have been filed with
the MTC [which] has jurisdiction over the same. One of the "firsts" that a lawyer
ascertains in filing an action is the proper forum or court with whom the suit or
action shall be filed. In June 2002 when the civil complaint was filed in court, the
jurisdiction of the MTC has already expanded such that the jurisdictional amount
of the RTC is already ₱400,000.00.

xxxx

Another thing is the various follow-ups made by respondent’s client as evidenced

by the letters marked as Exhibits "D", "E", "F", "G" and "H" which were all
received by complainant’s secretary, except for Exhibit "H" which was received by
Atty. Asong, not to mention Exhibit "M" which was sent by "Atty. Aga". These
efforts of the complainant were not reciprocated by the respondent with good faith.
Respondent chose to ignore them and reasoned out that he is willing to meet with
the complainant and return the money and documents received by reason of the
legal engagement, but omitted to communicate with him for the purpose of fixing
the time and place for the meeting. This failure suggests a clear disregard of the
client’s demand which was done in bad faith on the part of respondent.10

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-646, adopting and approving the recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The
Resolution11 reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Canon 18 and
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty.
Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months.

On April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration12 and asked that the penalty
of suspension be reduced to warning or reprimand. After three days, or on April
27, 2009, respondent filed a "Motion to Admit Amended ‘Motion for
Reconsideration’ Upon Leave of Office."13 Respondent asserted that the failure to
inform complainant of the status of the cases should not be attributed to him alone.
He stressed that complainant had always been informed that he only had time to
meet with his clients in the afternoon at his office in Quezon City. Despite such
notice, complainant kept going to his office in Tandang Sora. He admitted that
though he committed lapses which would amount to negligence in violation of
Canon 18 and Rule 18.04, they were done unknowingly and without malice or bad
faith. He also stressed that this was his first infraction.

In its Resolution No. XIX-2011-473 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. 14 On
August 15, 2011, respondent filed a second Motion for Reconsideration 15which
was no longer acted upon due to the transmittal of the records of the case to this
Court by the IBP on August 16, 2011.16

On September 14, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution17 and noted the
aforementioned Notices of Resolution dated December 11, 2008 and June 26,
2011. On December 14, 2011, it issued another Resolution18 noting the
Indorsement dated August 16, 2011 of Director Alicia A. Risos-Vidal and
respondent’s second Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 2011.

We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent committed professional

negligence under Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, with a modification that we also find respondent guilty of violating
Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyer’s Oath.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer
must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only
conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands
for his continued membership therein.19

The Complaint before the IBP-CBD charged respondent with violation of his oath
and the following provisions under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

a)

Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his client;
b)

Rule 15.[06, Canon 15 – A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body;

c)

Rule 16.01[, Canon 16 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from his client;

d)

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him;

e)

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;

f)

Rule 18.03[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable; and

g)

Rule 18.04[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.20

A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that
respondent violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Complainant correctly alleged that respondent
violated his oath under Canon 18 to "serve his client with competence and
diligence" when respondent filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the
case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be
sure, after the complaint for estafa was dismissed, respondent committed another
similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and damages before
the RTC. The complaint, having an alternative prayer for the payment of damages,
should have been filed with the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction over
complainant’s claim which amounts to only ₱36,000. As correctly stated in the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[,] as amended by R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on
April 15, 1994[,] vests in the MTCs of Metro Manila exclusive original jurisdiction
of civil cases where the amount of demand does not exceed ₱200,000.00 exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs
(Sec. 33), and after five (5) years from the effectivity of the Act, the same shall be
adjusted to ₱400,000.00 (Sec. 34).21

The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy
adopted in the criminal complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint
were so basic and could have been easily averted had he been more diligent and
circumspect in his role as counsel for complainant. What aggravates respondent’s
offense is the fact that his previous mistake in filing the estafa case did not
motivate him to be more conscientious, diligent and vigilant in handling the case of
complainant. The civil case he subsequently filed for complainant was dismissed
due to what later turned out to be a basic jurisdictional error.

That is not all. After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was
plainly negligent and did not apprise complainant of the status and progress of both
cases he filed for the latter. He paid no attention and showed no importance to
complainant’s cause despite repeated follow-ups. Clearly, respondent is not only
guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in
dealing with complainant is also gross and inexcusable. In what may seem to be a
helpless attempt to solve his predicament, complainant even had to resort to
consulting a program in a radio station to recover his money from respondent, or at
the very least, get his attention.

Respondent’s negligence under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 is also beyond contention.
A client pays his lawyer hard-earned money as professional fees. In return,
"[e]very case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to ‘neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.’ He must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions
or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. He is expected to be acquainted
with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has
the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence
but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause."22 Similarly, under Rule
18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments of
the case and all other information relevant thereto. He must be consistently mindful
of his obligation to respond promptly should there be queries or requests for
information from the client.

In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the
status of the cases he filed because their time did not always coincide. The excuse
proffered by respondent is too lame and flimsy to be given credit. Respondent
himself admitted that he had notice that complainant had visited his office many
times. Yet, despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance exhibited by complainant,
respondent neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules 18.03 and
18.04 to keep his client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Finally, respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that "[a]
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him." The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere
duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal
and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest. The most thorough groundwork
and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The
honor bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon
taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor
attaches to him for the entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the
consequent responsibility of not only satisfying the basic requirements but also
going the extra mile in the protection of the interests of the client and the pursuit of
justice. Respondent has defied and failed to perform such duty and his omission is
tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer’s Oath.

All said, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, it is

the complainant who has the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence 23 the
allegations in the complaint. In the instant case, complainant was only able to
prove respondent’s violation of Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath. Complainant
failed to substantiate his claim that respondent violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.06
of the Code of Professional Responsibility when respondent allegedly instructed
him to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno in order to
get a favorable decision. Similarly, complainant was not able to present evidence
that respondent indeed violated Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 by allegedly collecting
money from him in excess of the required filing fees.

As to respondent’s proven acts and omissions which violate Canons 17 and 18 and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Lawyer’s Oath, we find the same to constitute gross misconduct for which he may
be suspended under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and

approving the Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED
with a MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby
found GUILTY of gross misconduct for violating Canons 17 and 18, and Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the
Lawyer’s Oath. This Court hereby imposes upon respondent the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS to
commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision. Respondent is further
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of his
clients, and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator to
be disseminated to all courts throughout the country, to the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr.’s personal records, and to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014

JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,

vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint1 for disbarment dated

February 1, 2008 filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against
respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for fabricating and using a
spurious court order, and for failing to keep his client informed of the status of the
case.

The Facts

On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the

late Luis Tan, secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for
partition of property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad
Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the engagement, respondent filed the corresponding
complaint3 before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC),
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed by
the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action and
insufficiency of evidence.5 While respondent was notified of such dismissal as
early as August 14, 2007,6 complainant learned of the same only on August 24,
2007 when he visited the former’s office.7 On such occasion, respondent allegedly
asked for the amount of ₱10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other costs,
but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that time, respondent,
instead, asked and was given the amount of ₱500.00 purportedly as payment of the
reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC. 8 On September
12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date,
filed a notice of appeal9 before the RTC.10

In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by law.
Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant
an Order12 dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9,
2007 Order) directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his
filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the notice. Considering
the technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the
RTC and requested for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then
that he discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by
the RTC’s Clerk of Court.13 Complainant also found out that, contrary to the
representations of respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed. 14 Aggrieved, he
filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent.

In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it

was complainant’s failure to timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the
appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him, he
informed complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, but the
latter insisted in pursuing the same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant
"not for money or malice" but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the
court’s unfavorable decision.16

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent
administratively liable, and accordingly recommended that the penalty of
suspension for a period of one (1) year be meted out against him.18

The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against

respondent to be well-founded, observing that instead of meeting complainant’s
allegations squarely, particularly, the issue of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of
the partition case, respondent sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly had
an effect on the issues at hand.19

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondent’s

accusation that the spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant,
ratiocinating that it was respondent who was motivated to fabricate the same to
cover up his lapses that brought about the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and
make it appear that there is still an available relief left for Tan.20

In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation.21

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings,
subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon
respondent.

Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client
constantly updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining
the latter’s confidence, to wit:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE

AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of

whatever important information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case.
He should notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide
whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the
developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and
confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer
must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be
binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted
with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has
the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence
but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.23

In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already
knew of the dismissal of complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this
fact, he never bothered to inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only
knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office. To add
insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing complainant’s
appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period
therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to
exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly
possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment.24

Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by

fabricating the November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing
to make it appear that complainant’s appeal had been given due course, when in
truth, the same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and
unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing, 25 failing
in which whether in his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to
continue his practice of law.26 A lawyer’s inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s
interests with utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect should
never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.

In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing a crooked and

deceitful scheme to keep complainant in the dark and conceal his case’s true status
through the use of a falsified court order evidently constitutes Gross
Misconduct.27 His acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are
disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit
to practice law.28 In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement in Sebastian v.
Calis29 is instructive, viz.:

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable.
They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer.1âwphi1 They are unacceptable practices. A
lawyer’s relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of
good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The
lawyer’s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that
must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires
that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a
condition precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly
warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or
private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar,
and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their
clients of the status of their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period
of six (6) months. In Mejares v. Romana,31 the Court suspended the lawyer for the
same period for his failure to timely and adequately inform his clients of the
dismissal of their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr., 32 the same
penalty was imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed to update his client of
the status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.

However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful

conduct by falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct
and disbarred them. In Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the lawyer who
falsified a special power of attorney in order to mortgage and sell his client’s
property. Also, in Embido v. Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against
the lawyer who falsified an in existent court decision for a fee.

As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to

misrepresent to his client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in
his case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed for failure to timely file
an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent’s
acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting
his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His
actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession.
Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and
prejudice caused to his client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of
disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross

Misconduct and violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF
from the roll of attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in

this Court. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7337 September 29, 2014

ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is a verified Complaint for Disbarment/Gross Immoral Conduct 1 filed with

this Court on September 18, 2006 by complainant Rolando Viray (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas (respondent).

Factual Antecedents

Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor

case2 he filed against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On
February 26, 2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and disposed of
the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering

respondents Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III to pay complainant Rolando Viray
of the following, to wit:

1. Backwages ........................... ₱146,726.67

2. Separation Pay ......................... 24,000.00

3. Service Incentive Leave Pay ......... .1,538.46

4. Attorney's Fees ........................ .17,226.51

or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Fom Hw1dred Ninety
One Pesos & 64/100 (Pl89,491.60) [sic] to be deposited with the Cashier of this
Office, wjthin ten (10) days from receipt hereof

All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.3

Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued relative to aforesaid

decision. During the implementation of said writ, however, complainant
discovered that respondent had already collected the total amount of ₱95,000.00
from spouses Lopez. Respondent received said amount in the following manner:

Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose

0210512004 7802 ₱20,000.00 Attorney's fees

02/13/2004 7833 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

0212612004 7848 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

03/12/2004 7894 20,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

0410212004 7932 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

0410612004 7941 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

04/13/2004 7944 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

04/16/2004 7954 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

0413012004 7977 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

Total Amount: ₱95,000.00

Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that

he is authorized to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is
not. Consequently, complainant made several verbal demands to the respondent to
remit to him the amount of ₱95,000.00, less his attorney's fees of ₱20,000.00. But
respondent did not budge. Thus, complainant lodged a complaint before the Office
of the Punong Barangay of Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod City. Respondent, however,
ignored the summons to attend a conference before the barangay to resolve the
issues.
In his Comment,5 respondent admits that he received ₱95,000.00 from spouses
Lopez on installments, but denies that he was not authorized to accept it. He
explains that complainant agreed to pay him additional attorney's fees equivalent to
25o/o of the total monetary award, on top of the attorney's fees that may be
awarded by the labor tribunal, and to refund all expenses respondent incurred
relative to the case. Thus, from the total award of ₱189,491.60, the sum of
₱17,226.57 representing respondent's professional fees has to be deducted, leaving
a balance of ₱172,275.13.6 Then from said amount, complainant proposed that he
will get ₱100,000.00 and the balance of ₱72,275.13 shall belong to respondent as
and for his additional 25o/o attorney's fees and reimbursement for all expenses he
incurred while handling the case. However, after receiving the amount of
₱95,000.00 and deducting therefrom the amounts of ₱20,000.00 7 attorney's fees,
₱17,000.00 earlier given to complainant, and ₱2,000.00 paid to the sheriff, what
was left to respondent was only ₱56,000.00. Respondent whines that this amount is
way below the promised 25o/o attorney's fees and refund of expenses in the total
amount of ₱72,275.13.

Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will still be receiving a sum
greater than what he expects to receive. He avers that complainant is still entitled
to receive from spouses Lopez the sum of ₱93,491.60. Adding the Pl 7,000.00
respondent previously remitted to complainant, the latter will get a total amount of
₱110,491.60. This amount, according to respondent, exceeds the amount of
₱100,000.00 complainant agreed to and expected to receive.

IBP's Report and Recommendation

On February 26, 2007,8 we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On January 31,
2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
9
Recommendation with the following recommendation:

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be

meted the penalty of two (2) years suspension. Respondent is also ordered to
return, in restitution all the amounts in his possession which are due to
complainant, less his rightful attorney's fees.10 On October 28, 2011, the IBP Board
of Governors adopted Resolution No. XX-2011-139,11 which approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner suspending respondent
from the practice of law for two years, but with the modification that respondent
should restitute the sum of ₱85,500.0012 to the complainant.

Issue

The essential issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct for his failure to promptly account to his client the funds received in
the course of his professional engagement and return the same upon demand.

The Court's Ruling

"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity

and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their
fiduciary relationship."13 Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the
lawyer the duty to "account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client." Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand, mandates that "[a] lawyer
shall deliver the funds xx x of his client when due or upon demand."

In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from February 5, 2004 to April
30, 2004 received payments for attorney's fees and partial payments for monetary
awards on behalf of complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite the number of
times over close to three months he had been receiving payment, respondent
neither informed the complainant of such fact nor rendered an accounting thereon.
It was only when an Alias Writ of Execution was issued and being implemented
when complainant discovered that spouses Lopez had already given respondent the
total amount of ₱95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary awards granted to
him by the labor tribunal.

To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the

complainant said amount, which he merely received on behalf of his client, even
after demand. Complainant brought the matter before the barangay, but respondent
simply ignored the same. Such failure and inordinate refusal on the part of the
respondent to render an accounting and return the money after demand raises the
presumption that he converted it to his own use.14 His unjustified withholding of
the funds also warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against him.15
Respondent justifies his action by asserting that complainant authorized him to
receive payment. He implies that he is also authorized to apply the sum of money
he received from spouses Lopez to his additional 25o/o attorney's fees and
reimbursement for all expenses he incurred for the case, in the total amount of
₱72,275.13. However, after deducting from the amount of ₱95,000.00 the amounts
of ₱20,000.00, ₱17,000.00, and ₱2,000.00, what was left to respondent, to his
dismay was only ₱56,000.00.

The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner,

other than his self-serving statements, there is nothing in the records which would
support respondent's claim that he was authorized to receive the payments. Neither
is there proof that complainant agreed to pay him additional 25% attorney's fees
and reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly incurred in connection with the
case. Respondent did not present any document, retainer's agreement, or itemized
breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim.1âwphi1 In any
event, even assuming that respondent was authorized to receive payments, the
same does not exempt him from his duty of promptly informing his client of the
amounts he received in the course of his professional employment. "The fiduciary
nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty
to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client.
He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has
collected for his client."16 "The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees
on the money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the
obligation to make a prompt accounting."17Moreover, a lawyer has no right "to
unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact alone that
the client owes him attorney's fees."18

In sum, "[r]espondent's failure to immediately account for and return the money
when due and upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his
lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warrants the imposition of disciplinary
action."19

The Penalty

"The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite
demand of a lawyer to account for and to return money or property belonging to a
client has been suspension from the practice of law for two years." 20Thus, the IBP
Board of Governors did not err in recommending the imposable penalty.
Considering, however, that this is respondent's first offense and he is already a
nonagenarian,21 the Court, in the exercise of its compassionate judicial discretion,
finds that a penalty of one year suspension is sufficient. WHEREFORE, the Court
finds respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas GUILTY of gross misconduct and
accordingly SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year upon the
finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act or offense shall be dealt with more severly.

Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within 90 days from finality of

this Resolution, the net amount of ₱85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from finality of this Resolution until the full amount is returned. Failure to
comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe
penalty.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and
noted in Atty. Sanicas' record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9532 October 8, 2013

MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court s resolution is an administrative complaint 1 filed by Maria Cristina

Zabaljauregui Pitcher (complainant) against Atty. Rustico B. Gagate (respondent),
. charging him for gross ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law.

The facts
Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher (David), 2 a British
national who passed away on June 18, 2004.3 Prior to his death, David was
engaged in business in the Philippines and owned, among others, 40% of the
shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc.4 (Consulting Edge), a domestic corporation.
In order to settle the affairs of her deceased husband, complainant engaged the
services of respondent.5

On June 22, 2004, complainant and respondent met with Katherine Moscoso
Bantegui Bantegui),6 a major stockholder of Consulting Edge,7 in order to discuss
the settlement of David’s interest in the company.8 They agreed to another meeting
which was, however, postponed by Bantegui. Suspecting that the latter was merely
stalling for time in order to hide something, respondent insisted that the
appointment proceed as scheduled.9

Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company premises on June 28, 2004.
However, prior to the scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by
respondent to put a paper seal on the door of the said premises, assuring her that
the same was legal.10

On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed disappointment over the actions of

complainant and respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter for the
court to settle. She then asked them to leave, locked the office and refused to give
them a duplicate key.11

Subsequently, however, respondent, without the consent of Bantegui, caused the

change in the lock of the Consulting Edge office door,12 which prevented the
employees thereof from entering and carrying on the operations of the company.
This prompted Bantegui to file before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
(Prosecutor’s Office) a complaint for grave coercion against complainant and
respondent.13 In turn, respondent advised complainant that criminal and civil cases
should be initiated against Bantegui for the recovery of David's personal
records/business interests in Consulting Edge.14 Thus, on January 17, 2005, the two
entered in Memorandum of Agreement,15 whereby respondent undertook the filing
of the cases against Bantegui, for which complainant paid the amount of
₱150,000.00 as acceptance fee and committed herself to pay respondent ₱1,000.00
for every court hearing.16
On November 18, 2004, the Prosecutor’s Office issued a Resolution 17 dated
October 13, 2004, finding probable cause to charge complainant and respondent
for grave coercion. The corresponding Information was filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 337985 (grave coercion case), and, as a matter of course, warrants of arrest
were issued against them.18 Due to the foregoing, respondent advised complainant
to go into hiding until he had filed the necessary motions in court. Eventually,
however, respondent abandoned the grave coercion case and stopped
communicating with complainant.19 Failing to reach respondent despite diligent
efforts,20 complainant filed the instant administrative case before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD
Case No. 06-1689.

Despite a directive21 from the IBP-CBD, respondent failed to file his answer to the
complaint. The case was set for mandatory conference on November 24,
2006,22 which was reset twice,23 on January 12, 2007 and February 2, 2007, due to
the absence of respondent. The last notice sent to respondent, however, was
returned unserved for the reason "moved out."24 In view thereof, Investigating
Commissioner Tranquil S. Salvador III declared the mandatory conference
terminated and required the parties to submit their position papers, supporting
documents, and affidavits.25

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On March 18, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr.

(Commissioner Magpayo) issued a Report and Recommendation,26 observing that
respondent failed to safeguard complainant's legitimate interest and abandoned her
in the grave coercion case. Commissioner Magpayo pointed out that Bantegui is
not legally obliged to honor complainant as subrogee of David because
complainant has yet to establish her kinship with David and, consequently, her
interest in Consulting Edge.27 Hence, the actions taken by respondent, such as the
placing of paper seal on the door of the company premises and the changing of its
lock, were all uncalled for. Worse, when faced with the counter legal measures to
his actions, he abandoned his client's cause.28 Commissioner Magpayo found that
respondent’s acts evinced a lack of adequate preparation and mastery of the
applicable laws on his part, in violation of Canon 529 of the Code of Professional
Responsibity (Code), warranting his suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six months.30

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforementioned Report and
Recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-261 dated November 19, 2011
(November 19, 2011 Resolution), finding the same to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules.31

In a Resolution32 dated October 8, 2012, the Court noted the Notice of the IBP’s
November 19, 2011 Resolution, and referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.33

The OBC's Report and Recommendation

On February 11, 2013, the OBC submitted a Report and Recommendation 34 dated
February 6, 2013, concluding that respondent grossly neglected his duties to his
client and failed to safeguard the latter's rights and interests in wanton disregard of
his duties as a lawyer.35 It deemed that the six-month suspension from the practice
of law as suggested by the IBP was an insufficient penalty and, in lieu thereof,
recommended that respondent be suspended for three years.36 Likewise, it ordered
respondent to return the ₱150,000.00 he received from complainant as acceptance
fee.37

The Court's Ruling

After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the
findings and conclusions of the OBC.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and
his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are
led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the
lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and
to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.38 To this end, he is
enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. 39 These
principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of
Canon 19 of the Code which respectively state:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

xxxx

CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the
law.

Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.

xxxx

Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise
the required diligence in handling complainant’s cause since he: first, failed to
represent her competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional
advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and, second, abandoned his client’s cause
while the grave coercion case against them was pending.

Anent the first infraction, it bears emphasis that complainant's right over the
properties of her deceased husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently established.
As such, the high-handed action taken by respondent to enforce complainant's
claim of ownership over the latter’s interest in Consulting Edge – i.e., causing the
change of the office door lock which thereby prevented the free ingress and egress
of the employees of the said company – was highly improper. Verily, a person
cannot take the law into his own hands, regardless of the merits of his theory. In
the same light, respondent's act of advising complainant to go into hiding in order
to evade arrest in the criminal case can hardly be maintained as proper legal advice
since the same constitutes transgression of the ordinary processes of law. By virtue
of the foregoing, respondent clearly violated his duty to his client to use peaceful
and lawful methods in seeking justice, 40 in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code as above-quoted. To note further, since such courses of action were not
only improper but also erroneous, respondent equally failed to serve his client with
competence and diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the Code. In the same
regard, he also remained unmindful of his client’s trust in him – in particular, her
trust that respondent would only provide her with the proper legal advice in
pursuing her interests – thereby violating Canon 17 of the Code.

With respect to the second infraction, records definitively bear out that respondent
completely abandoned complainant during the pendency of the grave coercion case
against them; this notwithstanding petitioner’s efforts to reach him as well as his
receipt of the ₱150,000.00 acceptance fee. It is hornbook principle that a lawyer’s
duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases
entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled
cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without prodding
from the client or the court.41 Hence, considering respondent’s gross and
inexcusable neglect by leaving his client totally unrepresented in a criminal case, it
cannot be doubted that he violated Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule
19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code.

In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed to file his answer to the
complaint despite due notice.1âwphi1 This demonstrates not only his lack of
responsibility but also his lack of interest in clearing his name, which, as case law
directs, is constitutive of an implied admission of the charges leveled against
him.42 In fine, respondent should be held administratively liable for his infractions
as herein discussed. That said, the Court now proceeds to determine the
appropriate penalty to be imposed against respondent.

Several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for
infractions similar to those committed by respondent were suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two years. In Jinon v. Jiz, 43 a lawyer who neglected
his client's case, misappropriated the client's funds and disobeyed the IBP’s
directives to submit his pleadings and attend the hearings was suspended from the
practice of law for two years. In Small v. Banares,44 the Court meted a similar
penalty against a lawyer who failed to render any legal service even after receiving
money from the complainant; to return the money and documents he received
despite demand; to update his client on the status of her case and respond to her
requests for information; and to file an answer and attend the mandatory
conference before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva v. Gonzales,45 a lawyer who
neglected complainant’s cause; refused to immediately account for his client’s
money and to return the documents received; failed to update his client on the
status of her case and to respond to her requests for information; and failed to
submit his answer and to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP was
suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, the Court observes
that, in the present case, complainant was subjected to a graver injury as she was
prosecuted for the crime of grave coercion largely due to the improper and
erroneous advice of respondent. Were it not for respondent’s imprudent
counseling, not to mention his act of abandoning his client during the proceedings,
complainant would not have unduly suffered the harbors of a criminal prosecution.
Thus, considering the superior degree of the prejudice caused to complainant, the
Court finds it apt to impose against respondent a higher penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for a period of three years as recommended by the OBC.

In the same light, the Court sustains the OBC’s recommendation for the return of
the ₱150,000.00 acceptance fee received by respondent from complainant since the
same is intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. While the Court has
previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil
liability,46 it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed
liabilities which are purely civil in nature – for instance, when the claim involves
moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct
and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement (such as the acceptance
fee in this case). Hence, considering further that the fact of respondent’s receipt of
the ₱150,000.00 acceptance fee from complainant remains undisputed, 47 the Court
finds the return of the said fee, as recommended by the OBC, to be in order.

WHEREFORE respondent Atty. Rustico B. Gagate is found guilty of violating

Canon 17 Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three 3) years, effective upon the finality of this
Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.

Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Maria Cristina

Zabaljauregui Pitcher the ₱150,000.00 acceptance fee he received from the latter
within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with
the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007

MA. LUISA HADJULA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors,

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for disbarment
filed by herein complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F.
Madianda.

The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT1 bearing date September

7, 2002 and filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant
charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda with violation of Article 2092 of the Revised
Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be

friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat
respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the
Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime in
1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further
alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept
confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage
contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by
the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It
was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her
case only after she had already heard her secrets.

Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after
her filing, in the later part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the
latter. What, per complainant's account, precipitated the filing was when
respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board, demanded a cellular
phone in exchange for the complainant's promotion.

According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid

actions, filed a COUNTER COMPLAINT3 with the Ombudsman charging her
(complainant) with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No.
3019,4 falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges being
based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the
basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was
also instituted against her before the Professional Regulation Commission.

Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's
act of disclosing personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the
course of seeking respondent's legal advice.

In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required
respondent to file her answer to the complaint.

In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,5 respondent denied giving legal

advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation
that the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact
matters of common knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of the answer
read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in
paragraph 4 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS
MY CLIENT nor we ever had any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever
existed ever since and that never obtained any legal advice from me regarding her
PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never
delivered to me legal documents much more told me some confidential information
or secrets. That is because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or
CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a
LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not allowed to privately
practice law and it might also result to CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of
fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL MATTERS referred to me, I just referred
them to private law practitioners and never entertain the same, NOR listen to their
stories or examine or accept any document.

9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in

paragraph 8 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her
ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the
Bureau of Fire Protection since she also filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her
lover … where she has a child ….

Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime

in 1998, are all part of public records ….

Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to
get even with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED
AGAINST HER since she knows that she will certainly be DISMISSED FROM
SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC ROLL and CRIMINALLY
CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS.

On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on

Bar Discipline came out with a Report and Recommendation, stating that the
information related by complainant to the respondent is "protected under the
attorney-client privilege communication." Prescinding from this postulate, the
Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics
when she "[revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation," and
accordingly recommended that respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that
respondent Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the
complainant.

On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-
2004-472 reading as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and ,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering the actuation of revealing information
given to respondent during a legal consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is
hereby REPRIMANDED.

We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.

As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also

then a friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant
approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-
client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the
lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among
the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this
instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during
legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to
handle the client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact
that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make
any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to
memorialize the relationship. As we said in Burbe v. Magulta,6 -

A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment

complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.

It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer

with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional
employments is established.

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal

relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the
former's fees.

Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-
client privilege communication, viz:

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived.7

With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of
preserving the confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, the documents shown and the information revealed in confidence
to the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in question, were used as
bases in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the
complainant.

The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from
possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.

The seriousness of the respondent's offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that
there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent
acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the error of respondent's ways,
what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies
and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever
convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal
information respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became
handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us
that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that,
in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on
confidentiality.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is

hereby REPRIMANDED and admonished to be circumspect in her handling of
information acquired as a result of a lawyer-client relationship. She is
also STERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act
complained of.

SO ORDERED.

IPI No. 12–205–CA–J, December 10, 2013

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF TOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON.

VICENTE S.E. VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No. 119461.

[A.C. No. 10300]

RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12–205–

CA–J AGAINST ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution1 dismissing the administrative

complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same Resolution, we also directed Atty. Homobono
Adaza II, Merdegia’s counsel, to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt.
After considering Atty. Adaza’s explanation,2 we find his account insufficient,
and find him guilty of indirect contempt.

According to Atty. Adaza, he should not be punished for indirect contempt as he

was merely performing his duty as Merdegia’s counsel when he assisted him in
preparing the administrative complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza
asserted that both he and his client observed Justice Veloso’s partiality during the
oral arguments, but instead of immediately filing an administrative complaint
against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso
from the case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit
himself, Merdegia repeated his request to file an administrative complaint against
Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he
should not be faulted for assisting his client, especially when he also believes in the
merits of his client’s case.

Atty. Adaza’s explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case,
fails to convince us of his innocence from the contempt charge.

As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative

complaint after Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself from a case he was
handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition were both based on the same
main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments of
Merdegia’s case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have
disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso’s bias. While we do not discount the fact
that it was Justice Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for
inhibition, we note that he was allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals.3Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this
resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari
assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The settled rule is that
administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for
appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. 4

While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within
the bounds provided by law.5 He is also duty–bound to impress upon his client the
propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage
compliance with the law and legal processes.6

A reading of Merdegia’s administrative complaint7 shows an apparent failure to

understand that cases are not always decided in one’s favor, and that an allegation
of bias must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the
merits and the developments in the case.8 In this light, we cannot but attribute to
Atty. Adaza the failure to impress upon his client the features of our adversarial
system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and
his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the
Court demand of him in acting for his client before our courts.

To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task.
We have to strike a balance between the need for accountability and integrity in the
Judiciary, on the one hand, with the need to protect the independence and
efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive and enterprising litigants, on the other.
Courts should not be made to bow down to the wiles of litigants who bully judges
into inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither should we
shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of
people who decide the outcome of their cases. Indeed, litigants who feel unjustly
injured by malicious and corrupt acts of erring judges and officials should not be
punished for filing administrative cases against them; neither should these litigants
be unjustly deterred from doing so by a wrong signal from this Court that they
would be made to explain why they should not be cited for contempt when the
complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient cause.

What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts
of the case that, when read together with the administrative complaint he prepared,
shows that his complaint is merely an attempt to malign the administration of
justice. We note Atty. Adaza’s penchant for filing motions for inhibition
throughout the case: first, against Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order unfavorable to his
client; and second, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing
his appeal, for alleged bias during the oral arguments on his case. These indicators,
taken together with the baseless administrative complaint against Justice Veloso
after he penned an order adverse to Atty. Adaza’s client, disclose that there was
more to the administrative complaint than the report of legitimate grievances
against members of the Judiciary.

In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc.,9 we cited a litigant in

indirect contempt of court for his predisposition to indiscriminately file
administrative complaints against members of the Judiciary. We held that this
conduct degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due performance of their
work for the Judiciary, and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court. Applying
this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adaza’s acts constitute an
improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus
punishable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

As a final note, Atty. Adaza’s contemptuous conduct may also be subject to

disciplinary sanction as a member of the bar.10 If we do not now proceed at all
against Atty. Adaza to discipline him, we are prevented from doing so by our
concern for his due process rights. Our Resolution of October 8, 2013 only asked
him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt, and not why he should
not be administratively penalized. To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction
against Atty. Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due
process as a disciplinary action is independent and separate from a proceeding for
contempt. A person charged of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal
proceeding, must be informed of the nature of the charge against him, and given
ample opportunity to explain his side.11cralawred

While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other,12 a
contempt proceeding cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring
lawyers,13 and vice versa. There can be no substitution between the two
proceedings, as contempt proceedings against lawyers, as officers of the Court, are
different in nature and purpose from the discipline of lawyers as legal
professionals. The two proceedings spring from two different powers of the Court.

The Court, in exercising its power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent
power granted to courts in general.14 Its existence is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings; to the enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates of courts; and, consequently, in the administration of justice; 15 thus, it
may be instituted against any person guilty of acts that constitute contempt of
court.16Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal and
summary in nature; hence, legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also
apply to contempt proceedings. A judgment dismissing the charge of contempt, for
instance, may no longer be appealed in the same manner that the prohibition
against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an accused’s acquittal.17

In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in

nature; it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution,
a disciplinary proceeding is not intended to inflict punishment, but to determine
whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privilege of practicing law. It involves
an investigation by the Court of the conduct of its officers, and has, for its primary
objective, public interest.18 Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the acquittal of the
lawyer from a disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an interested party from seeking
reconsideration of the ruling. Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt
operate as res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct.19

Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different

procedures. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by
Rules 138 and 139 thereof.20

IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF

INDIRECT CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit against Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and hereby sentences him to pay, within the
period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P5,000.00.
The respondent is also WARNED that further similar misbehavior on his part may
be a ground for the institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143365 December 4, 2008

GENEROSO SALIGUMBA, ERNESTO SALIGUMBA, and HEIRS OF

SPOUSES VALERIA SALIGUMBA AND ELISEO SALIGUMBA,
SR., petitioners,
vs.
MONICA PALANOG, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 24 May 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 5) in Civil Case No. 5288 for
Revival of Judgment. The case is an offshoot of the action for Quieting of Title
with Damages in Civil Case No. 2570.

The Facts

Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino Palanog (spouses Palanogs),

filed a complaint dated 28 February 1977 for Quieting of Title with Damages
against defendants, spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses
Saligumbas), before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-
Branch 3). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2570. In the complaint,
spouses Palanogs alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and
continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land located
in Solido, Nabas, Aklan. The spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from
entering and residing on the subject premises and had destroyed the barbed wires
enclosing the land. Spouses Palanogs prayed that they be declared the true and
rightful owners of the land in question.

When the case was called for pre-trial on 22 September 1977, Atty. Edilberto
Miralles (Atty. Miralles), counsel for spouses Saligumbas, verbally moved for the
appointment of a commissioner to delimit the land in question. Rizalino Go,
Deputy Sheriff of Aklan, was appointed commissioner and was directed to submit
his report and sketch within 30 days.1 Present during the delimitation were spouses
Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas, and Ernesto Saligumba, son of spouses
Saligumbas.2

After submission of the Commissioner’s Report, spouses Palanogs, upon motion,

were granted 10 days to amend their complaint to conform with the items
mentioned in the report.3

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. At the hearing on 1 June 1984, only the
counsel for spouses Palanogs appeared. The trial court issued an order resetting the
hearing to 15 August 1984 and likewise directed spouses Saligumbas to secure the
services of another counsel who should be ready on that date.4 The order sent to
Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. was returned to the court unserved with the notation "Party–
Deceased" while the order sent to defendant Valeria Saligumba was returned with
the notation "Party in Manila."5

At the hearing on 15 August 1984, spouses Palanogs’ direct examination was

suspended and the continuation of the hearing was set on 25 October 1984. The
trial court stated that Atty. Miralles, who had not withdrawn as counsel for spouses
Saligumbas despite his appointment as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge, would
be held responsible for the case of spouses Saligumbas until he formally withdrew
as counsel. The trial court reminded Atty. Miralles to secure the consent of spouses
Saligumbas for his withdrawal.6 A copy of this order was sent to Valeria
Saligumba but the same was returned unserved with the notation "Party in
Manila."7

The hearing set on 25 October 1984 was reset to 25 January 1985 and the trial
court directed that a copy of this order be sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. at COA,
PNB, Manila.8

The presentation of evidence for spouses Palanogs resumed on 25 January 1985

despite the motion of Atty. Miralles for postponement on the ground that his client
was sick. The exhibits were admitted and plaintiffs spouses Palanogs rested their
case. Reception of evidence for the defendants spouses Saligumbas was scheduled
on 3, 4, and 5 June 1985.9
On 3 June 1985, only spouses Palanogs and counsel appeared. Upon motion of the
spouses Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas were deemed to have waived the
presentation of their evidence.

On 3 August 1987, after a lapse of more than two years, the trial court considered
the case submitted for decision.

On 7 August 1987, RTC-Branch 3 rendered a judgment in Civil Case No. 2570

declaring spouses Palanogs the lawful owners of the subject land and ordering
spouses Saligumbas, their agents, representatives and all persons acting in privity
with them to vacate the premises and restore possession to spouses Palanogs.

The trial court, in a separate Order dated 7 August 1987, directed that a copy of the
court’s decision be furnished plaintiff Monica Palanog and defendant Valeria
Saligumba.

Thereafter, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was
filed but the trial court, in its Order dated 8 May 1997, ruled that since more than
five years had elapsed after the date of its finality, the decision could no longer be
executed by mere motion.

Thus, on 9 May 1997, Monica Palanog (respondent), now a widow, filed a

Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil
Case No. 2570 which she claimed has not been barred by the statute of limitations.
She impleaded petitioners Generoso Saligumba and Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs
and children of the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 5288 before the RTC-Branch 5.

Petitioner Generoso Saligumba, for himself and in representation of his brother

Ernesto who was out of the country working as a seaman, engaged the services of
the Public Attorney’s Office, Kalibo, Aklan which filed a motion for time to allow
them to file a responsive pleading. Petitioner Generoso Saligumba filed his
Answer10 alleging that: (1) respondent had no cause of action; (2) the spouses
Saligumbas died while Civil Case No. 2570 was pending and no order of
substitution was issued and hence, the trial was null and void; and (3) the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the heirs of the spouses Saligumbas and therefore, the
judgment was not binding on them.
Meanwhile, on 19 December 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to
implead additional defendants namely, Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo
Saligumba, who are also the heirs and children of spouses Saligumbas.11 They
were, however, declared in default on 1 October 1999 for failure to file any
responsive pleading.12

The Trial Court’s Ruling

On 24 May 2000, the RTC-Branch 5 rendered a decision in favor of respondent

ordering the revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 2570. The trial court ruled that
the non-substitution of the deceased spouses did not have any legal significance.
The land subject of Civil Case No. 2570 was the exclusive property of defendant
Valeria Saligumba who inherited the same from her deceased parents. The death of
her husband, Eliseo Saligumba, Sr., did not change the complexion of the
ownership of the property that would require his substitution. The spouses
Saligumbas’ children, who are the petitioners in this case, had no right to the
property while Valeria Saligumba was still alive. The trial court further found that
when defendant Valeria Saligumba died, her lawyer, Atty. Miralles, did not inform
the court of the death of his client. The trial court thus ruled that the non-
substitution of the deceased defendant was solely due to the negligence of counsel.
Moreover, petitioner Ernesto Saligumba could not feign ignorance of Civil Case
No. 2570 as he was present during the delimitation of the subject land. The trial
court likewise held that the decision in Civil Case No. 2570 could not be the
subject of a collateral attack. There must be a direct action for the annulment of the
said decision.

Petitioners elevated the matter directly to this Court. Hence, the present petition.

The Court’s Ruling

The instant case is an action for revival of judgment and the judgment sought to be
revived in this case is the decision in the action for quieting of title with damages
in Civil Case No. 2570. This is not one for annulment of judgment.

An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing

the execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage
of five years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is
not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor’s case
nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.13 An action for revival of
judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct from either the
recovery of property case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is
the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought
to be enforced is rendered.14Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption
that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by independent action, is
already final and executory.15

The RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 had been
rendered final and executory by the lapse of time with no motion for
reconsideration nor appeal having been filed. While it may be true that the
judgment in Civil Case No. 2570 may be revived and its execution may be had, the
issue now before us is whether or not execution of judgment can be issued against
petitioners who claim that they are not bound by the RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated
7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570.

Petitioners contend that the RTC-Branch 3 Decision of 7 August 1987 in Civil

Case No. 2570 is null and void since there was no proper substitution of the
deceased spouses Saligumbas despite the trial court’s knowledge that the deceased
spouses Saligumbas were no longer represented by counsel. They argue that they
were deprived of due process and justice was not duly served on them.

Petitioners argue that the trial court even acknowledged the fact of death of
spouses Saligumbas but justified the validity of the decision rendered in that case
despite lack of substitution because of the negligence or fault of their counsel.
Petitioners contend that the duty of counsel for the deceased spouses Saligumbas to
inform the court of the death of his clients and to furnish the name and address of
the executor, administrator, heir or legal representative of the decedent under Rule
3 presupposes adequate or active representation by counsel. However, the relation
of attorney and client was already terminated by the appointment of counsel on
record, Atty. Miralles, as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge even before the
deaths of the spouses Saligumbas were known. Petitioners invoke the Order of 1
June 1984 directing the spouses Saligumbas to secure the services of another
lawyer to replace Atty. Miralles. The registered mail containing that order was
returned to the trial court with the notation that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. was
"deceased." Petitioners thus question the decision in Civil Case No. 2570 as being
void and of no legal effect because their parents were not duly represented by
counsel of record. Petitioners further argue that they have never taken part in the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 2570 nor did they voluntarily appear or participate
in the case. It is unfair to bind them in a decision rendered against their deceased
parents. Therefore, being a void judgment, it has no legal nor binding effect on
petitioners.

Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an
action involving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 8716 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. And when a
party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court17 provides for the procedure, thus:

Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative
fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure
the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be
specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The
heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper
notice, it is the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir of the
deceased to appear for the deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court,
after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation in the envelopes,
failed to order the appearance of the legal representative or heir of the deceased.
There was no court order for deceased’s legal representative or heir to appear, nor
did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for the
deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment of such legal
representative, nor did the heirs ever ask to be substituted.
It appears that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while Valeria
Saligumba died on 2 February 1985. No motion for the substitution of the spouses
was filed nor an order issued for the substitution of the deceased spouses
Saligumbas in Civil Case No. 2570. Atty. Miralles and petitioner Eliseo
Saligumba, Jr., despite notices sent to them to appear, never confirmed the death of
Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. The record is bereft of any evidence
proving the death of the spouses, except the mere notations in the envelopes
enclosing the trial court’s orders which were returned unserved.

Section 17 is explicit that the duty of the court to order the legal representative or
heir to appear arises only "upon proper notice." The notation "Party-Deceased" on
the unserved notices could not be the "proper notice" contemplated by the rule. As
the trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of
a party without the proper manifestation from counsel, the trial court was well
within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. Moreover, there is no
showing that the court’s proceedings were tainted with irregularities.18

Likewise, the plaintiff or his attorney or representative could not be expected to

know of the death of the defendant if the attorney for the deceased defendant did
not notify the plaintiff or his attorney of such death as required by the rules. 19 The
judge cannot be blamed for sending copies of the orders and notices to defendants
spouses in the absence of proof of death or manifestation to that effect from
counsel.20

Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court likewise expressly provides:

SEC. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of party. -

Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it
shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death,
incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative.

It is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the death of his
client. The failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to

inform the court of the death of his client and the non-substitution of such party
will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives
the death of such party. The decision rendered shall bind the party’s successor-in-
interest.21

The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is in a
better position than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of
his client and to inform the court of the name and address of his legal
representative.22

Atty. Miralles continued to represent the deceased spouses even after the latter’s
demise. Acting on their behalf, Atty. Miralles even asked for postponement of the
hearings and did not even confirm the death of his clients nor his appointment as
Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge. These clearly negate petitioners’ contention
that Atty. Miralles ceased to be spouses Saligumbas’ counsel.

Atty. Miralles still remained the counsel of the spouses Saligumbas despite the
alleged appointment as judge. Records show that when Civil Case No. 2570 was
called for trial on 25 October 1984, Atty. Miralles appeared and moved for a
postponement. The 25 October 1984 Order reads:

ORDER

Upon petition of Judge Miralles who is still the counsel on record of this case and
who is held responsible for anything that will happen in this case, postpone the
hearing of this case to JANUARY 25, 1985 AT 8:30 in the morning. x x x23

The trial court issued an Order dated 1 June 1984 directing the defendants to
secure the services of another counsel. This order was sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Sr.
by registered mail but the same was returned with the notation "Party-Deceased"
while the notice to Valeria Saligumba was returned with the notation "Party in
Manila."24Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984. When Atty. Miralles
appeared in court on 25 October 1984, he did not affirm nor inform the court of the
death of his client. There was no formal substitution. The trial court issued an order
resetting the hearing to 25 January 1985 and directed that a copy of the order be
furnished petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. at COA, PNB, Manila by registered
mail.25 When the case was called on 25 January 1985, Atty. Miralles sought for
another postponement on the ground that his client was sick and under medical
treatment in Manila.26 Again, there was no manifestation from counsel about the
death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. The trial court issued an Order dated 25 January
1985 setting the reception of evidence for the defendants on 3, 4, and 5 June 1985.
A copy of this order was sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. by registered mail.
Nonetheless, as the trial court in Civil Case No. 5288 declared, the non-substitution
of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. did not have any legal significance as the land subject of
Civil Case No. 2570 was the exclusive property of Valeria Saligumba who
inherited it from her deceased parents.

This notwithstanding, when Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February 1985, Atty.

Miralles again did not inform the trial court of the death of Valeria Saligumba.
There was no formal substitution nor submission of proof of death of Valeria
Saligumba. Atty. Miralles was remiss in his duty under Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The counsel of record is obligated to protect his client’s
interest until he is released from his professional relationship with his client. For its
part, the court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client
except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.27

An attorney must make an application to the court to withdraw as counsel, for the
relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record; at least,
so far as the opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the
end of the litigation.28 Unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the
conduct of the case.29 Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer
remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to
do what the interests of his client require. He must still appear on the date of
hearing for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a
withdrawal of record.30

Petitioners should have questioned immediately the validity of the proceedings

absent any formal substitution. Yet, despite the court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction
over the persons of petitioners, petitioners never bothered to challenge the same,
and in fact allowed the proceedings to go on until the trial court rendered its
decision. There was no motion for reconsideration, appeal or even an action to
annul the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570. Petitioners themselves could not feign
ignorance of the case since during the pendency of Civil Case No. 2570, petitioner
Ernesto Saligumba, son of the deceased spouses, was among the persons present
during the delimitation of the land in question before the Commissioner held on 5
November 1977.31 Petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. was likewise furnished a copy
of the trial court’s orders and notices. It was only the Answer filed by petitioner
Generoso Saligumba in Civil Case No. 5288 that confirmed the dates when the
spouses Saligumbas died and named the latter’s children. Consequently, Atty.
Miralles was responsible for the conduct of the case since he had not been properly
relieved as counsel of record. His acts bind his clients and the latter’s successors-
in-interest.

In the present case for revival of judgment, the other petitioners have not shown
much interest in the case. Petitioners Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba
were declared in default for failure to file their answer. Petitioner Ernesto
Saligumba was out of the country working as a seaman. Only petitioner Generoso
Saligumba filed an Answer to the complaint. The petition filed in this Court was
signed only by petitioner Generoso Saligumba as someone signed on behalf of
petitioner Ernesto Saligumba without the latter’s authority to do so.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 24 May

2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5288.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179892-93 January 30, 2009

ATTY. VICTORIANO V. OROCIO, Petitioner,

vs.
EDMUND P. ANGULUAN, LORNA T. DY and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court seeking to set aside the Resolution2 dated 31 October 2006, Decision3 dated
29 January 2007, and Resolution4 dated 27 September 2007, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946.

The facts culled from the records are as follows:

On 26 September 1978, the National Power Corporation Board of Directors
(NAPOCOR Board), pursuant to its specific power and duty to fix the
compensation, allowance and benefits of the NAPOCOR employees under Section
6(c) of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, passed Resolution No. 78-119
approving the grant of a monthly welfare allowance equivalent to 10% of an
employee’s basic pay to all NAPOCOR employees effective 1 October
1978.5Pursuant thereto, the NAPOCOR Welfare Plan Committee, renamed and
reconstituted later on as the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund Board of Trustees
(NAPOCOR-WFBT), issued and promulgated a charter for the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund which includes the following provisions:

ARTICLE VII
TERMINATION/AMENDMENT OF THE PLAN

"Section 1. Termination/Amendment of the Plan – The Board of Directors may

amend, revise, repeal any or all of the provisions herein contained and/or terminate
the Plan, subject to the pertinent provisions of the Trust Agreement.

Section 2. Payment of Member’s share – In the event of termination of the Plan,

the balance to the credit of each member and the General Reserve for Employee
Benefits shall be paid to the members in full. The accumulated amount in the
General Reserve for Employee Benefits shall be distributed among the members in
the proportion to the amount outstanding to their credit as of the time of
termination.6

The NAPOCOR Board subsequently passed Resolution No. 82-172 fixing a

NAPOCOR employee’s contribution to the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund in a sum
equivalent to 5% of his basic pay.7

Almost two decades thereafter, on 8 June 2001, Congress passed Republic Act No.
9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA).
EPIRA directed the restructuring of the power industry which includes the
reorganization of NAPOCOR. Following the directive of EPIRA, the NAPOCOR
Board passed Resolution No. 2003-43 on 26 March 2003 abolishing the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund Department and other departments, and dissolving the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund upon the effectivity of EPIRA on 26 June
2001.8 Consequently, some of the employees in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund
Department and in other departments (who were also members of the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund) resigned, retired or separated from service. Thereafter, the
liquidation and dissolution process for the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund commenced.

On 11 May 2004, the NAPOCOR-WFBT, with authority from the Commission on

Audit, approved Resolution No. 2004-001 authorizing the release of ₱184 million
(which represented 40% of the liquid assets of NAPOCOR Welfare Fund in the
total amount of ₱462 million as of 16 April 2004) for distribution to the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund members who resigned, retired, or separated upon the
effectivity of EPIRA on 26 June 2001 (EPIRA separated members).9

Pursuant to Resolution No. 2004-001, herein respondent Edmund P. Anguluan

(Anguluan), as Ex-Officio Chairman of NAPOCOR-WFBT, issued a memorandum
on 17 May 2004 to implement the release of ₱184 million only to the EPIRA
separated members to the exclusion of the NAPOCOR employees (who were also
members of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund) who have resigned, retired, or
separated prior to the effectivity of EPIRA (non-EPIRA separated members).10

This prompted Mrs. Perla A. Segovia (Segovia), former Vice-President of Human

Resources and Administration and former Ex-Officio Chairman of the NAPOCOR-
WFBT, in behalf of the 559 non-EPIRA separated members and in her own
personal capacity, to write a letter to Mr. Rogelio M. Murga, then NAPOCOR
President, demanding their equal shares in the remaining assets of the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund and access to information and records thereof.11

On 13 July 2004, there being no action or response on her letter, Segovia, together
with Mrs. Emma C. Baysic (Baysic), former President of the NAPOCOR
Employees Association and former member of the NAPOCOR-WFBT, in their
personal capacities and on behalf of the 559 non-EPIRA separated members, filed
with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 217, a Petition
for Mandamus, Accounting and Liquidation with a Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction against respondents NAPOCOR, the
NAPOCOR Board, Anguluan (as NAPOCOR Vice-President, Human Resources,
Administration and Finance Department) and Lorna T. Dy (as NAPOCOR Senior
Department Manager on Finance).12 The Petition was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q04-53121.
Segovia, Baysic and the 559 non-EPIRA separated members were represented in
Civil Case No. Q04-53121 by petitioner Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio under a "Legal
Retainer Agreement"13 dated 1 September 2004, pertinent portions of which are
reproduced below:

SUBJECT: Petition for Mandamus with Damages Temporary Restraining

Order/Injunction, etc. with the Court "NPC RETIREES versus NPC, NP Board of
Directors, et. al. before the RTC Quezon City for the payment/settlement of their
claims for NPC Welfare Fund (P462 Million assets and other assets liquid or non-
liquid).

Dear Ms. Segovia and Ms. Baysic:

In connection with the above-stated subject, hereunder are our terms and
conditions, to wit:

1. No acceptance fee;

2. All costs of litigation ([filing] and docket fees, etc.), miscellaneous and out-of-
pocket expenses the prosecution of said action shall be for the account of the
clients;

3. No appearance/meeting fee;

4. Contingency or success fees of fifteen percent (15%) of whatever amounts/value

of assets (liquid and/or non-liquid) are recovered;

5. This Retainer Agreement serves as Legal Authority for the Law Firm to receive
and/or collect its contingency/success fee without further demand.

On 22 February 2006, the parties in the above-mentioned case, duly assisted by

their respective counsels, executed a Compromise Agreement14 whereby they
agreed to amicably settle their dispute under the following terms and conditions:

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

xxxx

WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to settle the instant case amicably.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the parties herein have agreed as follows:

1. Both the NPC EPIRA separated members (those members of the Welfare
Fund affected by the EPIRA law and ceased to be members of the Welfare
Fund anytime from June 26, 2001 [effectivity of the EPIRA LAW] to March 1,
2003 [implementation of the EPIRA law and date of abolition of the Welfare
Fund]) and NPC non-EPIRA separated members (those who ceased to be
members of the Fund prior to June 26, 2001) are entitled to "Earnings
Differential" of the NPC Welfare Fund;

2. "Corrected Earnings Differential" refers to a benefit which is a result of re-

computation of Member’s Equity Contributions and Earnings using the
correct rates of return vis-à-vis what was used when they were separated.
Period covered by the discrepancy is from 1989 to 2003. Hence, affected are
WF members separated anytime within the period 1989 to 2003;

xxxx

4. The Corrected Earnings Differential of all affected WF separated members shall

earn 6% legal interest per annum computed from the separation of the members
from service up to March 31, 2006 for all the non-EPIRA separated members and
May 31, 2006 for the EPIRA separated members;

5. As of March 2006, the estimated Corrected Earnings Differential for the

non-EPIRA separated members is ₱119.196 Million while for the EPIRA
separated members is ₱173.589 Million or a total of ₱292.785 Million,
inclusive of the 6% legal interest;

6. In conformity with the Retainer Agreement dated September 1, 2004

between Mrs. Perla A. Segovia, Mrs. Emma Y. Baysic and Atty. Victoriano V.
Orocio; and Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney dated July 20, 2005
executed by Mrs. Perla A. Segovia and Mrs. Emma Y. Baysic in favor of Atty.
Victoriano V. Orocio, counsel for petitioners, (copies attached as Annexes "A"
and "B" respectively), 15% attorney’s fees shall be deducted from the
corresponding Corrected Earnings Differential of those non-EPIRA separated
members who have already executed the corresponding Special Power of
Attorney/Written Authority for the deduction/payment of said attorney’s fees,
and shall be paid to V.V. Orocio and Associates Law Office, represented by
Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio, as compensation for his legal services as counsel
for the non-EPIRA separated members subject to deduction of applicable
taxes;

xxxx

15. The parties herein shall exert their best effort in order that the terms and
conditions of this agreement are implemented and complied with in the spirit of
fairness, transparency and equity;

16. This Agreement is not contrary to law, good customs, public order or public
policy and is voluntarily entered into by the parties of their own free will.15

The parties filed with the RTC the very next day, 23 February 2006, a Joint Motion
before the RTC for the approval of their Compromise Agreement.16 The RTC
rendered a Decision on 3 April 2006 granting the parties’ Joint Motion and
approving the said Compromise Agreement.17

On 10 April 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Approval of
Charging (Attorney’s) Lien. Petitioner asked the RTC to issue an order declaring
him entitled to collect an amount equivalent to 15% of the monies due the non-
EPIRA separated members as his attorney’s fees in conformity with the
Compromise Agreement.18 In an Order dated 15 May 2006, the RTC granted
petitioner’s motion and decreed that he is entitled to collect the amount so
demanded.19

On 20 June 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Execution of the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006.20 Respondents opposed the
motion on the ground that there was no stipulation in the Compromise Agreement
to the effect that petitioner is entitled to collect an amount equivalent to 15% of the
monies due the non-EPIRA separated members. Respondents contended that the
amount of ₱119,196,000.00 due the non-EPIRA separated members under the
compromise agreement was a mere estimate and, as such, cannot be validly used
by petitioner as basis for his claim of 15% attorney’s fees.21

The RTC issued an Order on 25 July 2006 granting petitioner’s Motion22 and,
accordingly, a Writ of Execution of the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006 was issued
on 26 July 2006. Pursuant to the said Writ of Execution, RTC Branch Sheriff
Reynaldo B. Madoloria (Sheriff Madoloria) issued a Notice of Garnishment to Ms.
Aurora Arenas (Arenas), Assistant Vice-President and Business Manager of the
Philippine National Bank (PNB)-NAPOCOR Extension Office, Diliman, Quezon
City, and to Mr. Emmanuel C. Mendoza (Mendoza), Unit Head of the Landbank of
the Philippines-NAPOCOR Extension Office, Diliman, Quezon City.23

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated 25 July
2006.24

On 12 August 2006, Sheriff Madoloria served to Arenas an "Order for Delivery of

Money."25

Respondents Anguluan and Dy filed before the Court of Appeals on 22 August

2006 a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 95786, assailing the RTC Order dated 25 July 2006 and praying
that a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining the implementation of the said RTC order.26 Respondent NAPOCOR
filed with the Court of Appeals on the same date another Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
95946, also challenging the RTC Order dated 25 July 2006 and praying that it be
set aside and a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued prohibiting the RTC from enforcing the said order and the corresponding
writ of execution and notice of garnishment.27 Subsequently, respondent
NAPOCOR filed a Motion to Consolidate CA-G.R. SP No. 95946 with CA-G.R.
SP No. 95786 which was granted by the appellate court.28

On 31 October 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting

respondents’ application for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. It enjoined
the RTC from implementing its Order dated 25 July 2006 and the corresponding
writ of execution and notice of garnishment during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP
No. 95946 and No. 95786. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution.29

On 29 January 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision annulling and
setting aside: (1) the RTC Order dated 25 July 2006; (2) the corresponding Writ of
Execution dated 26 July 2006; (3) the Notice of Garnishment dated 28 July 2006;
and (4) Order for Delivery of Money dated 10 August 2006. It also held that
petitioner was entitled only to an amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees on
the basis of quantum meruit.

The Court of Appeals held that the amount of ₱17,794,572.70 sought to be

collected by petitioner as attorney’s fees, equivalent to 15% of the
₱119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential for non-EPIRA
separated members, was excessive based on the following reasons: (1) the
corrected earnings differential in the amount of ₱119,196,000.00 due the non-
EPIRA separated members was a mere estimate and was hypothetical. Thus,
petitioner was unjustified in using said amount as basis for his 15% attorney’s
fees; (2) there was hardly any work by petitioner since (a) the compromise
agreement was reached without trial or hearing on the merits; (b) there was no
issue regarding the release and distribution of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund to the
non-EPIRA separated members as the enactment of EPIRA, not the efforts of
petitioner, made such distribution possible; (c) there was no issue on how much
each non-EPIRA separated members would receive because the amount of their
respective contribution was duly recorded by the respondents; (d) respondents have
already distributed the corrected earnings differential to some non-EPIRA
separated members, and have given petitioner his corresponding partial attorney’s
fees amounting to ₱3,512,007.32; (e) most of the non-EPIRA separated members
have not yet received their share under the compromise agreement but petitioner,
who was merely their agent, was already given partial payment as attorney’s fees;
(f) the amount of ₱17,794,572.70 represents "only less than one fourth partial
release of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund which means that the equivalent of three-
fourths more would be demanded [by petitioner] in the future;" and (3) the money
claim of the non-EPIRA separated members was settled through a compromise
agreement and not won by petitioner in a trial on the merits.

The Court of Appeals determined that petitioner was entitled only to an amount of
₱1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit. However, since
petitioner already received ₱3,512,007.32 from respondents as partial payment of
his supposed 15% attorney’s fees, it ruled that such amount was more than
sufficient and petitioner was not entitled to claim anymore the additional amount
of ₱14,282,565.38. The fallo of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed July 25, 2006 Order, the July
26, 2006 Writ of Execution, the July 28, 2006 Notice of Garnishment, and the
August 10, 2006 Order of Delivery of Money are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE, and a new one is ordered, CAPPING at ₱3,512,007.32, the amount
manifested to have already been received from the welfare fund as attorneys fees,
as the maximum amount that may be billed or collected as attorneys fees from the
whole welfare fund – which amount is NOTED to have already exceeded what this
court had fixed at ₱1,000,000.00 as the reasonable amount, on quantum
meruit, that may be collected as attorneys’ fees, pursuant to the guidelines codified
in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.30

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision but

this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 27 September
2007.31

Hence, petitioner brought the instant petition before us assigning the following
errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS

EDMUND P. ANGULUAN, LORNA T. DY AND NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION (NPC) ARE ENTITLED TO [PRELIMINARY] INJUNCTION
AS THEY HAVE MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS, WHICH ARE
CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE, i.e. RIGHTS OF BEING CLIENTS TO
QUESTION THE REASONABLENESS OF THE ATTORNEY’S FEES OF A
LAWYER. THIS ALLEGED RIGHT IS NON-EXISTENT AND IN FACT
FABRICATED CONSIDERING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT THE
CLIENTS AT ALL OF PETITIONER, ATTY. VICTORIANO V. OROCIO;

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FIFTEEN

PERCENT (15%) CONTINGENCY/SUCCESS FEE OF PETITIONER
VICTORIANO V. OROCIO IS UNCONSCIONABLE AND UNREASONABLE
DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE SAID ATTORNEY’S FEES
IS AMONG THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A JUDICIALLY
APPROVED COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND COURT ORDER
APPROVING HIS CHARGING LIEN, WHICH AGREEMENT AND ORDER
HAVE ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.32

In his first assigned error, petitioner assails the Resolution dated 31 October 2006
of the Court of Appeals granting respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.lawphil.net He claims that the Court of Appeals issued a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of respondents because petitioner allegedly violated
respondents’ material and substantial right as petitioner’s clients to pay only
reasonable attorney’s fees. Petitioner asserts that none of the respondents is his
client in the present case; that even respondents themselves have not alleged or
claimed that they are his clients; that the amount of attorney’s fees he claimed was
chargeable on a portion of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund due his clients, the non-
EPIRA separated employees; that if anyone would be injured by his claim of
attorney’s fees, it would be his clients, the non-EPIRA separated employees, and
not respondents; that none of his clients has questioned or complained about the
amount of attorney’s fees he is claiming; that respondents are not the real parties-
in-interest and at most are merely nominal parties-in-interest; that as mere nominal
parties-in-interest, respondents are not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction
under the Rules of Court; and that the requisites for the proper issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction are lacking in the instant case.33

In its Resolution dated 31 October 2006, the Court of Appeals granted

respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction based on the
following reasons:

This Court finds that [herein respondents] have prima facie established [their]
compliance with strict requirements for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
in this case. Under the leading case of Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA
72 (2001), the requisites of preliminary injunction are as follows: (a) the invasion
of the right of [herein respondents] is material and substantial; (b) the right of
[herein respondents] is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious irreparable damage to [herein
respondents].
The right of [herein respondents] alleged to have been invaded is that a client
has the right to pay only a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and only for
services actually rendered – which is clearly and unmistakably available to all
clients. What [herein respondents] are claiming is a material and substantial right.
This Court finds that [herein respondents] have prima facie established an urgent
and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for, to avoid irreparable injury to [herein respondents]. x x x.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the basis of the Court of Appeals in granting
the writ was petitioner’s alleged violation or invasion of respondents’ right, as
petitioner’s clients, to pay only a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to, and only
for services actually rendered by, petitioner.

The Court of Appeals is clearly mistaken.

It should be made clear that petitioner is the counsel for the non-EPIRA separated
members in the latter’s quest to claim their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare
Fund. Petitioner was never hired or employed by respondents as their counsel in
the cases at bar. Respondents themselves do not claim or allege that they are clients
of petitioner. In fact, petitioner is representing the non-EPIRA separated members,
the opposing party to the respondents in the present cases.

Further, the amount of attorney’s fees being claimed by petitioner is chargeable to

the ₱119,196,000.00 corrected earnings differential of his clients, the non-EPIRA
separated members. Respondents have actually partially distributed such amount to
some non-EPIRA separated members pursuant to the Compromise Agreement. In
other words, the non-EPIRA separated members are the lawful
owners/beneficiaries of the amount from which petitioner’s attorney’s fees had
been and shall be taken.

Hence, if anyone would be injured by petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees, it

would be his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members, and not respondents. It
appears, however, that none of the non-EPIRA separated members has questioned
or complained about petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding

prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person
to refrain from a particular act or acts.34 A writ of preliminary injunction is a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit, as well as a preservative remedy
issued to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations
between the parties during the pendency of the suit.35For a writ of preliminary
injunction to issue, the applicant is tasked to establish and convincingly show the
following: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a
violation of that right; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.36

A clear legal right means one clearly founded on or granted by law or is

enforceable as a matter of law.37 The existence of a right violated is a prerequisite
to the granting of a writ of preliminary injunction.38 A writ of preliminary
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never
arise.39 It may be issued only if the applicant has clearly shown an actual existing
right that should be protected during the pendency of the principal action.40 In the
absence of a clear legal right, or when the applicant’s right or title is doubtful or
disputed, preliminary injunction is not proper.41

It is evident from the foregoing that respondents do not have a clear right or right
in esse to pay only a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to the petitioner because
such right belongs solely to petitioner’s clients, the non-EPIRA separated
members. There can be no violation of a right which does not exist in the first
place. Also, there was no necessity for the writ of preliminary injunction since the
non-EPIRA separated members do not claim any damage or injury caused by the
execution of the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006. Even assuming that respondents
would probably suffer damages as administrators or custodians of the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund if the writ of preliminary injunction was not granted, our ruling
would still be the same. We have held that the possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.42Given these considerations, we hold that the issuance by
the Court of Appeals of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondents in
its Resolution, dated 31 October 2006, was improper.lawphil.net

With regard to his second assigned error, petitioner maintained that his claim for
attorney’s fees equivalent to 15% of the ₱119,196,000.00 estimated corrected
earnings differential due the non-EPIRA separated members was not unreasonable
or unconscionable because such amount was expressly agreed upon in the
Compromise Agreement between the non-EPIRA separated members and
respondents. The Compromise Agreement was submitted to the RTC for approval
through the joint motion of the non-EPIRA separated members and respondents,
and the RTC had rendered a final and executory decision approving the same. By
virtue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals cannot alter or change the terms of the
Compromise Agreement by prohibiting petitioner from collecting his stipulated
amount of attorney’s fees.43

Petitioner also avers that the amount of ₱17,794,572.70, which is equivalent to

15% of the ₱119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential due the non-
EPIRA separated members from the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund is already the total,
not partial, amount he is claiming as attorney’s fees; that the ₱119,196,000.00
estimated corrected earnings differential due the non-EPIRA separated members
from the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund is not hypothetical, such amount having been
actually computed and fixed by respondents themselves without the participation
of petitioner and his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members; that he did a lot of
legal work and utilized his legal skills on discovery procedures to force
respondents to enter into the Compromise Agreement with the non-EPIRA
separated members; that the passage of EPIRA merely paved the way for the
distribution of the remaining assets of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; that if not for
his legal work and skills, the non-EPIRA separated members would not have
received their lawful shares in the remaining assets of the NAPOCOR Welfare
Fund; and that his claim for 15% attorney’s fees is supported by jurisprudence.44

An attorney’s fee, in its ordinary concept, refers to the reasonable compensation

paid to a lawyer for the legal services he has rendered to a client.45 The client and
his lawyer may enter into a written contract whereby the latter would be paid
attorney’s fees only if the suit or litigation ends favorably to the client. This is
called a contingency fee contract. The amount of attorney’s fees in this contract
may be on a percentage basis, and a much higher compensation is allowed in
consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. 46 In the
case at bar, the non-EPIRA separated members and petitioner voluntarily entered
into a contingency fee contract whereby petitioner did not receive any acceptance
fee or appearance/meeting fee. The non-EPIRA separated members expressly
agreed to pay petitioner "contingency or success fees of fifteen percent (15%) of
whatever amount/value of assets (liquid and/or non-liquid)" recovered; and
authorized petitioner’s law firm "to receive and/or collect its contingency/success
fee without further demand."

Contingent fee contracts are permitted in this jurisdiction because they redound to
the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases where the client
has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal services
unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be
paid out of the proceeds of litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement is
the only means by which the poor clients can have their rights vindicated and
upheld." Further, such contracts are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics.47

However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to
the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and
reasonable fees.48

A stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a written contract for professional

services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be
allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount to be unreasonable or
unconscionable. If the stipulated amount for attorney’s fees is excessive, the
contract may be disregarded even if the client expressed their conformity
thereto.49 Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice,
decency or reasonableness, or if they are so disproportionate to the value of the
services rendered. In such a case, courts are empowered to reduce the attorney’s
fee or fix a reasonable amount thereof taking into consideration the surrounding
circumstances and the established parameters.50

The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may be a basis for
determining the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. Quantum meruit is a device
to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a
person to retain benefit without paying for it. It is applicable even if there was a
formal written contract for attorney’s fees as long as the agreed fee was found by
the court to be unconscionable. In fixing a reasonable compensation for the
services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, factors such as the
time spent, and extent of services rendered; novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved; importance of the subject matter; skill demanded; probability of losing
other employment as a result of acceptance of the proferred case; customary
charges for similar services; amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client; certainty of compensation; character of employment; and
professional standing of the lawyer, may be considered.51

It appears that the non-EPIRA separated members chose petitioner as their counsel
because the latter, as former member of the NAPOCOR-WFBT for two terms or
four years, is familiar and knowledgeable on the operation of the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund.52 Yet, according to the contingency fee contract agreement between
petitioner and the non-EPIRA separated members, petitioner received no
acceptance fee and appearance/meeting fee when he took on the non-EPIRA
separated members’ case. Petitioner’s attorney’s fees were absolutely dependent on
the success of non-EPIRA separated members’ claim on the NAPOCOR Welfare
Fund. Despite these circumstances, petitioner worked diligently in advocating the
claims of the non-EPIRA separated members against respondents as shown by the
following: (1) petitioner took pains in verifying the identity and claim of each of
the 559 non-EPIRA separated members on the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; (2)
petitioner prepared and filed a well-researched and well-argued petition with the
RTC for the claims of the non-EPIRA separated members;53 (3) he prepared and
presented several witnesses and numerous pertinent documents before the RTC in
support of their application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction against respondents’ plan to exclude the non-EPIRA
separated members from receiving their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund;
(4) he participated, as non-EPIRA separated members’ counsel, in the conduct of
several hearings regarding the said application for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction;54 (5) he obtained a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction from the RTC
which enjoined/prohibited respondents from excluding the non-EPIRA separated
members from their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund;55 (6) he held
numerous conferences with the non-EPIRA separated members wherein he
apprised the latter of the status of their claims and his legal strategies pertinent
thereto;56 and (7) he exerted utmost efforts which eventually led to the execution of
the Compromise Agreement between the non-EPIRA separated members and
respondents.

By reason of petitioner’s dedication and persistence as can be gleaned above,

respondents finally agreed to settle amicably with the non-EPIRA separated
members as regards the latter’s claim for shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund
by virtue of the Compromise Agreement.

Undoubtedly, were it not for petitioner’s vigilance and zeal, respondents would not
have executed the Compromise Agreement with the non-EPIRA separated
members. Hence, it is fair to conclude that petitioner was entitled to a reasonably
high compensation.

However, petitioner’s attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱17,794,572.70 or

equivalent to 15% of the ₱ 119,196,000.00 corrected earnings differential of the
non-EPIRA separated members should be equitably reduced.

In NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) v. The National Power
Corporation (NPC),57 we awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement plus
backwages to several NPC employees because they were illegally dismissed by the
NPC. The NPC employees were represented by a certain Atty. Cornelio P. Aldon
(Atty. Aldon) and Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio, (the petitioner in the instant cases)
under a legal retainer agreement which provides: (1) no acceptance fee; (2)
miscellaneous/out of pocket expenses in the amount of ₱25,000.00; and (3) twenty-
five percent (25%) of whatever amounts/monies are recovered in favor of said
NPC personnel contingent on the success of the case. Atty. Aldon and Atty. Orocio
filed a Motion for Approval of Charging (Attorney’s) Lien pursuant to the legal
retainer agreement. Although we granted the said motion, we reduced the amount
of attorney’s fees which was chargeable on the monies recoverable by the NPC
employees from 25% to 10% because:

While we duly recognize the right of Atty. Aldon and Atty. Orocio to a charging
lien on the amounts recoverable by petitioners pursuant to our 26 September 2006
Decision, nevertheless, we deem it proper to reduce the same. Under Section 24,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable. The amounts which petitioners may recover as the logical and
necessary consequence of our Decision of 26 September 2006, i.e., backwages and
separation pay (in lieu of reinstatement), are essentially the same awards which we
grant to illegally dismissed employees in the private sector. In such cases, our
Labor Code explicitly limits attorney’s fees to a maximum of 10% of the recovered
amount. Considering by analogy the said limit on attorney’s fees in this case of
illegal dismissal of petitioners by respondent NPC, a government-owned and
controlled corporation; plus the facts that petitioners have suffered deprivation of
their means of livelihood for the last five years; and the fact that this case was
originally filed before us, without any judicial or administrative proceedings
below; as well as the fundamental ethical principle that the practice of law is a
profession and not a commercial enterprise, we approve in favor of Atty. Aldon
and Atty. Orocio a charging lien of 10% (instead of 25%) on the amounts
recoverable by petitioners from NPC pursuant to our Decision dated 26 September
2006.

The abovementioned case may be reasonably applied by analogy in the instant case
since they have substantially similar circumstances. In the case before us, although
the non-EPIRA separated members were not illegally dismissed, they were,
nevertheless, separated from work by reason of EPIRA. In addition, the non-
EPIRA separated members had a legal retainer agreement/contingency fee contract
with petitioner as their counsel.

It should also be emphasized that the practice of law is a profession not a

moneymaking venture. A lawyer is not merely the defender of his client’s cause
and a trustee of his client’s cause of action and assets; he is also, and first and
foremost, an officer of the court and participates in the fundamental function of
administering justice in society. It follows that a lawyer’s compensation for
professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not just to
guarantee that the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and
commensurate with the services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession to which he belongs. Upon taking his attorney’s
oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority of the
courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees.58

Thus, taking into account the foregoing circumstances and recognized principles,
the 15% attorney’s fees of petitioner should be reduced to 10%. As such,
petitioner is entitled to collect only, as attorney’s fees, an amount equivalent
to 10% of the ₱119,196,000.00 or ₱11,919,600.00.

We note, however, that the compromise agreement was partially implemented in

the first week of April 2006 with the payment of ₱23,416,000.00 to some non-
EPIRA separated members.59 Petitioner admitted having already received an
amount of ₱3,512,007.32 as his attorney’s fees on the said partial payment of
₱23,416,000.00.60 Accordingly, the amount of ₱3,512,007.32 received by
petitioner as attorney’s fees should be deducted from the fixed 10% attorney’s fees
or the amount of ₱11,919,600.00. Per computation, petitioner is entitled to recover
the amount of ₱8,407,592.68 as attorney’s fees.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals

dated 31 October 2006 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946 granting the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision and Resolution, dated 29 January 2007 and 27 September 2007,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946 are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is entitled to
recover attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱8,407,592.68 on the corrected earnings
differential of the non-EPIRA separated members. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9091 December 11, 2013

CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA

EULALIO-RAMOS, SOLEDAD A. FAJARDO AND ENCARNACION A.
FERNANDEZ, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN B. BAÑEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land located in Dinalupihan,

Bataan.1 n 4 September 2002, they entered into an agreement, they stood to be paid
₱35,000.000 for all the lots that would be sold in the subdivision. 2For that purpose,
they executed a Pecial Power of Attorney authorizing Fevidal to enter into all
agreements concerning the parcels of land and to sign those agreements on their
behalf.3

Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of the subdivision project and
failed to accout for the titles to the subdivided land.4 Complainants also found that
he had sold a number of parcels to third parties, but that he did not turn the
proceeds over to them. Neither were complainants invited to the ceremonial
opening of the subdivision project.5

Thus, on 23 August 2005, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney they had
previously executed in his favor.6

Complainants subsequently agreed to settle with Fevidal for the amount of

₱10,000,000, but the latter again failed to pay them.7

Complainants engaged the professional services of respondent for the purpose of

assisting them in the preparation of a settlement agreement.8

Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute

actions against Fevidal in order to recover their properties. Complainants then
signed a contract of legal services,9 in which it was agreed that they would not pay
acceptance and appearance fees to respondent, but that the docket fees would
instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants would pay
respondent 50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties. In preparation
for the filing of an action against Fevidal, respondent prepared and notarized an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to annotate the claim of complainants to at
least 195 titles in the possession of Fevidal.10

A certain Luzviminda Andrade (Andrade) was tasked to submit the Affidavit of

Adverse Claim to the Register of Deeds of Bataan.11

The costs for the annotation of the adverse claim were paid by respondent.
Unknown to him, the adverse claim was held in abeyance, because Fevidal got
wind of it and convinced complainants to agree to another settlement.12
Meanwhile, on behalf of complainants, and after sending Fevidal a demand letter
dated 10 July 2006, respondent filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and
revalidation of titles, and damages against Fevidal before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bataan on 13 October 2006.13

Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they
terminated the services of respondent on 8 June 2007, withdrew their complaint
against Fevidal on 9 June 2007, and finalized their amicable settlement with him
on 5 July 2007.14

Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition15 dated 20 July 2007 before the
RTC, alleging that the termination of his services and withdrawal of the complaint
had been done with the intent of defrauding counsel. On the same date, he filed a
Motion for Recording of Attorney’s Charging Lien in the Records of the Above-
Captioned Cases.16

When the RTC granted the withdrawal of the complaint,17 he filed a Manifestation
and Motion for Reconsideration.18

After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal, with the latter
denying the former’s allegation of collusion,19 complainants sought the
suspension/disbarment of respondent through a Complaint 20 filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 14 November 2007. Complainants
alleged that they were uneducated and underprivileged, and could not taste the
fruits of their properties because the disposition thereof was "now clothed with
legal problems" brought about by respondent.21

In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons

1.01,22 1.03,23 1.04,24 12.02,25 15.05,26 18.04,27and 20.0428 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On 14 August 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation29 of the
investigating commissioner. It suspended respondent from the practice of law for a
period of one year for entering into a champertous agreement.30

On 26 June 2011, it denied his motion for reconsideration. On 26 November 2012,

this Court noted the Indorsement of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, as
well as respondent’s second motion for reconsideration. We find that respondent
did not violate any of the canons cited by complainants. In fact, we have reason to
believe that complainants only filed the instant complaint against him at the
prodding of Fevidal.

Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file an action against

Fevidal to recover their properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement of
₱10,000,000 – a measly amount compared to that in the original agreement, under
which Fevidal undertook to pay complainants the amount of ₱35,000,000. Lawyers
have a sworn duty and responsibility to protect the interest of any prospective
client and pursue the ends of justice.31

Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal
under the circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative complaint
against a lawyer only because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath.
The claim of complainants that they were not informed of the status of the case is
more appropriately laid at their door rather than at that of respondent. He was
never informed that they had held in abeyance the filing of the adverse claim.
Neither was he informed of the brewing amicable settlement between complainants
and Fevidal. We also find it very hard to believe that while complainants received
various amounts as loans from respondent from August 2006 to June 2007, 32 they
could not spare even a few minutes to ask about the status of the case. We shall
discuss this more below. As regards the claim that respondent refused to "patch up"
with Fevidal despite the pleas of complainants, we note the latter’s Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated 24 September 2007, in which they admitted that they could not
convince Fevidal to meet with respondent to agree to a settlement.33

Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent for the

recording of his attorney’s charging lien as the "legal problem" preventing them
from enjoying the fruits of their property. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect his rights concerning the
payment of his compensation. According to the discretion of the court, the attorney
shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case
in which his services have been retained by the client. We recently upheld the right
of counsel to intervene in proceedings for the recording of their charging lien. In
Malvar v. KFPI,34 we granted counsel’s motion to intervene in the case after
petitioner therein terminated his services without justifiable cause. Furthermore,
after finding that petitioner and respondent had colluded in order to deprive
counsel of his fees, we ordered the parties to jointly and severally pay counsel the
stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the determination of whether respondent is
entitled to the charging lien is based on the discretion of the court before which the
lien is presented. The compensation of lawyers for professional services rendered
is subject to the supervision of the court, not only to guarantee that the fees they
charge remain reasonable and commensurate with the services they have actually
rendered, but to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession as well. 35

In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for his

services.36

That he had pursued its payment in the appropriate venue does not make him liable
for disciplinary action.1âwphi1Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not
without fault. Indeed, we find that the contract for legal services he has executed
with complainants is in the nature of a champertous contract – an agreement
whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce
the client’s rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in
dispute.37

Such contracts are contrary to public policy38 and are thus void or inexistent.39

They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the
interest of justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they
are handling for the client. A reading of the contract for legal services40 shows that
respondent agreed to pay for at least half of the expense for the docket fees. He
also paid for the whole amount needed for the recording of complainants’ adverse
claim. While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal matter they
are handling in order to safeguard their client’s rights, it is imperative that the
advances be subject to reimbrusement.41 The purpose is to avoid a situation in
which a lawyer acquires a personal stake in the clients cause. Regrettably, nowhere
in the contract for legal services is it stated that the expenses of litigation advanced
by respondents shall be subject to reimbursement by complainants.

In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali), gasoline and
transportation allowance to them for the duration of their attorney-client
relationship. In fact, he admits that the cash advances were in the nature of
personal loans that he extended to complainants.42

Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in balancing the

clients interests with the ethical standards of his profession. Considering the
surrounding circumstances in this case, an admonition shall suffice to remind him
that however dire the needs of the clients, a lawyer must always avoid any
appearance of impropriety to preserve the integrity of the profession.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Juan B. Bañez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for

advancing the litigation expenses in a legal matter her handled for a client without
providing for terms of reimbursement and lending money to his client, in violation
of Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He us sternly warned
that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severly.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Bañez, Jr.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176425

HEIRS OF MANUEL UY EK LIONG, represented by BELEN LIM VDA.

DE UY, Petitioners,
vs.
MAURICIA MEER CASTILLO, HEIRS OF BUENAFLOR C. UMALI,
represented by NANCY UMALI, VICTORIA H. CASTILLO, BERTILLA C.
RADA, MARIETTA C. CAVANEZ, LEOVINA C. JALBUENA and PHILIP
M. CASTILLO, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the Decision1dated 23 January 2007 rendered by the Fifteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84687,2 the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed January 27, 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 59, in Civil Case No. 93-176, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered declaring the
AGREEMENT and the KASUNDUAN void ab initio for being contrary to law and
public policy, without prejudice to the attorney’s filing a proper action for
collection of reasonable attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit and without
prejudice also to administrative charges being filed against counsel for counsel’s
openly entering into such an illegal AGREEMENT in violation of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility which action may be instituted with the Supreme Court
which has exclusive jurisdiction to impose such penalties on members of the bar.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.3 (Italics and Underscore Ours)

The Facts

Alongside her husband, Felipe Castillo, respondent Mauricia Meer Castillo was the
owner of four parcels of land with an aggregate area of 53,307 square meters,
situated in Silangan Mayao, Lucena City and registered in their names under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-42104, T-32227, T-31752 and T-42103.
With the death of Felipe, a deed of extrajudicial partition over his estate was
executed by his heirs, namely, Mauricia, Buenaflor Umali and respondents
Victoria Castillo, Bertilla Rada, Marietta Cavanez, Leovina Jalbuena and Philip
Castillo. Utilized as security for the payment of a tractor purchased by Mauricia’s
nephew, Santiago Rivera, from Bormaheco, Inc., it appears, however, that the
subject properties were subsequently sold at a public auction where Insurance
Corporation of the Philippines (ICP) tendered the highest bid. Having consolidated
its title, ICP likewise sold said parcels in favor of Philippine Machinery Parts
Manufacturing Co., Inc. (PMPMCI) which, in turn, caused the same to be titled in
its name.4

On 29 September 1976, respondents and Buenaflor instituted Civil Case No. 8085
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Quezon, for the purpose of seeking
the annulment of the transactions and/or proceedings involving the subject parcels,
as well as the TCTs procured by PMPMCI.5 Encountering financial difficulties in
the prosecution of Civil Case No. 8085, respondents and Buenaflor entered into an
Agreement dated 20 September 1978 whereby they procured the legal services of
Atty. Edmundo Zepeda and the assistance of Manuel Uy Ek Liong who, as
financier, agreed to underwrite the litigation expenses entailed by the case. In
exchange, it was stipulated in the notarized Agreement that, in the event of a
favorable decision in Civil Case No. 8085, Atty. Zepeda and Manuel would be
entitled to "a share of forty (40%) percent of all the realties and/or monetary
benefits, gratuities or damages" which may be adjudicated in favor of respondents.6

On the same date, respondents and Buenaflor entered into another notarized
agreement denominated as a Kasunduan whereby they agreed to sell their
remaining sixty (60%) percent share in the subject parcels in favor of Manuel for
the sum of ₱180,000.00. The parties stipulated that Manuel would pay a
downpayment in the sum of ₱1,000.00 upon the execution of the Kasunduan and
that respondents and Buenaflor would retain and remain the owners of a 1,750-
square meter portion of said real properties. It was likewise agreed that any party
violating the Kasunduan would pay the aggrieved party a penalty fixed in the sum
of ₱50,000.00, together with the attorney’s fees and litigation expenses incurred
should a case be subsequently filed in court. The parties likewise agreed to further
enter into such other stipulations as would be necessary to ensure that the sale
would push through and/or in the event of illegality or impossibility of any part of
the Kasunduan.7

With his death on 19 August 1989,8 Manuel was survived by petitioners, Heirs of
Manuel Uy Ek Liong, who were later represented in the negotiations regarding the
subject parcels and in this suit by petitioner BelenLim Vda. de Uy. The record also
shows that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 8085 culminated in this Court’s
rendition of a 13 September 1990 Decision in G.R. No. 895619 in favor of
respondents and Buenaflor.10 Subsequent to the finality of the Court’s Decision,11 it
appears that the subject parcels were subdivided in accordance with the
Agreement, with sixty (60%) percent thereof consisting of 31,983 square meters
equally apportioned among and registered in the names of respondents and
Buenaflor under TCT Nos. T-72027, T-72028, T-72029, T-72030, T-72031, T-
72032 and T-72033.12 Consisting of 21,324 square meters, the remaining forty
(40%) percent was, in turn, registered in the names of petitioners and Atty. Zepeda
under TCT No. T-72026.13
Supposedly acting on the advice of Atty. Zepeda, respondents wrote petitioners a
letter dated 22 March 1993, essentially informing petitioners that respondents were
willing to sell their sixty (60%) percent share in the subject parcels for the
consideration of ₱500.00 per square meter.14 Insisting on the price agreed upon in
the Kasunduan, however, petitioners sent a letter dated 19 May 1993, requesting
respondents to execute within 15 days from notice the necessary Deed of Absolute
Sale over their 60% share as aforesaid, excluding the 1,750-square meter portion
specified in their agreement with Manuel. Informed that petitioners were ready to
pay the remaining ₱179,000.00 balance of the agreed price, 15 respondents wrote a
28 May 1993 reply, reminding the former of their purported refusal of earlier
offers to sell the shares of Leovina and of Buenaflor who had, in the meantime,
died.16 In a letter dated 1 June 1993, respondents also called petitioners’ attention
to the fact, among others, that their right to ask for an additional consideration for
the sale was recognized under the Kasunduan.17

On 6 October 1993, petitioners commenced the instant suit with the filing of their
complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondents and
respondent Heirs of Buenaflor, as then represented by Menardo Umali. Faulting
respondents with unjustified refusal to comply with their obligation under the
Kasunduan, petitioners prayed that the former be ordered to execute the necessary
Deed of Absolute Sale over their shares in the subject parcels, with indemnities for
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
the costs of the suit.18 Served with summons, respondents filed their Answer with
Counterclaim and Motion to File Third Party Complaint on 3 December 1993.
Maintaining that the Agreement and the Kasunduan were illegal for being
unconscionable and contrary to public policy, respondents averred that Atty.
Zepeda was an indispensable party to the case. Together with the dismissal of the
complaint and the annulment of said contracts and TCT No. T-72026, respondents
sought the grant of their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.19

The issues thereby joined, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Lucena
City, proveeded to conduct the mandatory preliminary conference in the
case.20 After initially granting respondents’ motion to file a third party complaint
against Atty. Zepeda,21 the RTC, upon petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration,22 went on to issue the 18 July 1997 Order disallowing the filing of
said pleading on the ground that the validity of the Agreement and the cause of
action against Atty. Zepeda, whose whereabouts were then unknown, would be
better threshed out in a separate action.23 The denial24 of their motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing order25 prompted respondents to file a notice of
appeal26 which was, however, denied due course by the RTC on the ground that the
orders sought to be appealed were non-appealable.27 On 14 December 1997,
Menardo died28 and was substituted by his daughter Nancy as representative of
respondent Heirs of Buenaflor.29

In the ensuing trial of the case on the merits, petitioners called to the witness stand
Samuel Lim Uy Ek Liong30whose testimony was refuted by Philip31 and
Leovina32 during the presentation of the defense evidence. On 27 January 2005, the
RTC rendered a decision finding the Kasunduan valid and binding between
respondents and petitioners who had the right to demand its fulfillment as
Manuel’s successors-in-interest. Brushing aside Philip’s testimony that
respondents were forced to sign the Kasunduan, the RTC ruled that said contract
became effective upon the finality of this Court’s 13 September 1990 Decision in
G.R. No. 89561 which served as a suspensive condition therefor. Having benefited
from the legal services rendered by Atty. Zepeda and the financial assistance
extended by Manuel, respondents were also declared estopped from questioning
the validity of the Agreement, Kasunduan and TCT No. T-72026. With the
Kasunduan upheld as the law between the contracting parties and their
privies,33 the RTC disposed of the case in the following wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds for the petitioners and
hereby:

1. Orders the respondents to execute and deliver a Deed of Conveyance in favor of

the petitioners covering the 60% of the properties formerly covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-3175, 42104, T-42103, T-32227 and T-42104 which
are now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-72027, T-72028, T-
72029, T-72030, T-72031, T-72032, T-72033 and T-72026, all of the Registry of
Deeds of Lucena City, for and in consideration of the amount of ₱180,000.00 in
accordance with the provisions of the KASUNDUAN, and
2. Orders the petitioners to pay and deliver to the respondents upon the latter’s
execution of the Deed of Conveyance mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the
amount of ₱179,000.00 representing the balance of the purchase price as provided
in the KASUNDUAN, and

3. Orders the respondents to pay the petitioners the following amounts:

a). ₱50,000.00 as and for moral damages;

b). ₱50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and

c). ₱50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.

and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.34

Dissatisfied with the RTC’s decision, both petitioners35 and respondents perfected
their appeals36 which were docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. CV No. 84687.
While petitioners prayed for the increase of the monetary awards adjudicated a
quo, as well as the further grant of liquidated damages in their favor, 37 respondents
sought the complete reversal of the appealed decision on the ground that the
Agreement and the Kasunduan were null and void.38 On 23 January 2007, the CA
rendered the herein assailed decision, setting aside the RTC’s decision, upon the
following findings and conclusions, to wit: (a) the Agreement and Kasunduan are
byproducts of the partnership between Atty. Zepeda and Manuel who, as a non-
lawyer, was not authorized to practice law; (b) the Agreement is void under Article
1491 (5) of the Civil Code of the Philippines which prohibits lawyers from
acquiring properties which are the objects of the litigation in which they have taken
part; (c) jointly designed to completely deprive respondents of the subject parcels,
the Agreement and the Kasunduan are invalid and unconscionable; and (d) without
prejudice to his liability for violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility,
Atty. Zepeda can file an action to collect attorney’s fees based on quantum
meruit.39

The Issue

Petitioners seek the reversal of the CA’s decision on the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTEENTH
DIVISION, COMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE RTC BRANCH 59, LUCENA CITY, IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 93-176 DECLARING THE AGREEMENT AND
KASUNDUAN VOID AB INITIO FOR BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF ART. 1491 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE AND THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.40

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition impressed with partial merit.

At the outset, it bears pointing out that the complaint for specific performance filed
before the RTC sought only the enforcement of petitioners’ rights and respondents’
obligation under the Kasunduan. Although the answer filed by respondents also
assailed the validity of the Agreement and TCT No. T-72026, the record shows
that the RTC, in its order dated 18 July 1997, disallowed the filing of a third-party
complaint against Atty. Zepeda on the ground that the causes of action in respect to
said contract and title would be better threshed out in a separate action. As Atty.
Zepeda’s whereabouts were then unknown, the RTC also ruled that, far from
contributing to the expeditious settlement of the case, the grant of respondents’
motion to file a third-party complaint would only delay the proceedings in the
case.41 With the 1 October 1998 denial of their motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing order, respondents subsequently filed a notice of appeal which was,
however, denied due course on the ground that the orders denying their motion to
file a third-party complaint and their motion for reconsideration were interlocutory
and non-appealable.42

Absent a showing that the RTC’s ruling on the foregoing issues was reversed and
set aside, we find that the CA reversibly erred in ruling on the validity of the
Agreement which respondents executed not only with petitioners’ predecessor-in-
interest, Manuel, but also with Atty. Zepeda. Since it is generally accepted that no
man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, 43 the rule is
settled that a court must first acquire jurisdiction over a party – either through valid
service of summons or voluntary appearance – for the latter to be bound by a court
decision.44 The fact that Atty. Zepeda was not properly impleaded in the suit and
given a chance to present his side of the controversy before the RTC should have
dissuaded the CA from invalidating the Agreement and holding that attorney’s fees
should, instead, be computed on a quantum meruit basis. Admittedly, Article 1491
(5)45 of the Civil Code prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase or assignment
the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they
intervene by virtue of their profession. The CA lost sight of the fact, however, that
the prohibition applies only during the pendency of the suit46 and generally does
not cover contracts for contingent fees where the transfer takes effect only after the
finality of a favorable judgment.47

Although executed on the same day, it cannot likewise be gainsaid that the
Agreement and the Kasunduan are independent contracts, with parties, objects and
causes different from that of the other. Defined as a meeting of the minds between
two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other to give
something or to render some service,48 a contract requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain which
is the subject matter of the contract; and, (c) cause of the obligation which is
established.49 Executed in exchange for the legal services of Atty. Zepeda and the
financial assistance to be extended by Manuel, the Agreement concerned
respondents’ transfer of 40% of the avails of the suit, in the event of a favorable
judgment in Civil Case No. 8085. While concededly subject to the same
suspensive condition, the Kasunduan was, in contrast, concluded by respondents
with Manuel alone, for the purpose of selling in favor of the latter 60% of their
share in the subject parcels for the agreed price of ₱180,000.00. Given these clear
distinctions, petitioners correctly argue that the CA reversibly erred in not
determining the validity of the Kasunduan independent from that of the
Agreement.

Viewed in the light of the autonomous nature of contracts enunciated under Article
130650 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, we find that the Kasunduan was
correctly found by the RTC to be a valid and binding contract between the parties.
Already partially executed with respondents’ receipt of ₱1,000.00 from Manuel
upon the execution thereof, the Kasunduan simply concerned the sale of the
former’s 60% share in the subject parcel, less the 1,750-square meter portion to be
retained, for the agreed consideration of ₱180,000.00. As a notarized document
that carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution,51 the Kasunduan was shown to have been signed by respondents with
full knowledge of its contents, as may be gleaned from the testimonies elicited
from Philip52 and Leovina.53

Although Philip had repeatedly claimed that respondents had been forced to sign
the Agreement and the Kasunduan, his testimony does not show such vitiation of
consent as would warrant the avoidance of the contract. He simply meant that
respondents felt constrained to accede to the stipulations insisted upon by Atty.
Zepeda and Manuel who were not otherwise willing to push through with said
contracts.54

At any rate, our perusal of the record shows that respondents’ main objection to the
enforcement of the Kasunduan was the perceived inadequacy of the ₱180,000.00
which the parties had fixed as consideration for 60% of the subject parcels. Rather
than claiming vitiation of their consent in the answer they filed a quo, respondents,
in fact, distinctly averred that the Kasunduan was tantamount to unjust enrichment
and "a clear source of speculative profit" at their expense since their remaining
share in said properties had "a current market value of ₱9,594,900.00, more or
less."55 In their 22 March 1993 letter to petitioners, respondents also cited prices
then prevailing for the sale of properties in the area and offered to sell their 60%
share for the price of ₱500.00 per square meter56 or a total of ₱15,991,500.00. In
response to petitioners’ insistence on the price originally agreed upon by the
parties,57respondents even invoked the last paragraph58 of the Kasunduan to the
effect that the parties agreed to enter into such other stipulations as would be
necessary to ensure the fruition of the sale.59

In the absence of any showing, however, that the parties were able to agree on new
stipulations that would modify their agreement, we find that petitioners and
respondents are bound by the original terms embodied in the Kasunduan.
Obligations arising from contracts, after all, have the force of law between the
contracting parties60 who are expected to abide in good faith with their contractual
commitments, not weasel out of them.61 Moreover, when the terms of the contract
are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the rule is
settled that the literal meaning of its stipulations should govern. In such cases,
courts have no authority to alter a contract by construction or to make a new
contract for the parties. Since their duty is confined to the interpretation of the one
which the parties have made for themselves without regard to its wisdom or folly,
it has been ruled that courts cannot supply material stipulations or read into the
contract words it does not contain.62 Indeed, courts will not relieve a party from the
adverse effects of an unwise or unfavorable contract freely entered into.63

Our perusal of the Kasunduan also shows that it contains a penal clause 64 which
provides that a party who violates any of its provisions shall be liable to pay the
aggrieved party a penalty fixed at ₱50,000.00, together with the attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses incurred by the latter should judicial resolution of the matter
becomes necessary.65 An accessory undertaking to assume greater liability on the
part of the obligor in case of breach of an obligation, the foregoing stipulation is a
penal clause which serves to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and
provides for liquidated damages for such breach.66 "The obligor would then be
bound to pay the stipulated indemnity without the necessity of proof of the
existence and the measure of damages caused by the breach."67Articles 1226 and
1227 of the Civil Code state:

Art. 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the
indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of noncompliance, if
there is no stipulation to the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the
obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the
obligation.

The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.

Art. 1227. The debtor cannot exempt himself from the performance of the
obligation by paying the penalty, save in the case where this right has been
expressly reserved for him. Neither can the creditor demand the fulfillment of the
obligation and the satisfaction of the penalty at the same time, unless this right has
been clearly granted to him. However, if after the creditor has decided to require
the fulfillment of the obligation, the performance thereof should become
impossible without his fault, the penalty may be enforced."

In the absence of a showing that they expressly reserved the right to pay the
penalty in lieu of the performance of their obligation under the Kasunduan,
respondents were correctly ordered by the RTC to execute and deliver a deed of
conveyance over their 60% share in the subject parcels in favor of petitiOners.
Considering that the Kasunduan stipulated that respondents would retain a portion
of their share consisting of 1,750 square meters, said disposition should, however,
be modified to give full effect to the intention of the contracting parties. Since the
parties also fixed liquidated damages in the sum of ₱50,000.00 in case of breach,
we find that said amount should suffice as petitioners' indemnity, without further
need of compensation for moral and exemplary damages. In obligations with a
penal clause, the penalty generally substitutes the indemnity for damages and the
payment of interests in case of non-compliance.68 Usually incorporated to create an
effective deterrent against breach of the obligation by making the consequences of
such breach as onerous as it may be possible, the rule is settled that a penal clause
is not limited to actual and compensatory damages69

The RTC's award of attorney's fees in the sum of ₱50,000.00 is, however,
proper.1âwphi1 Aside from the fact that the penal clause included a liability for
said award in the event of litigation over a breach of the Kasunduan, petitioners
were able to prove that they incurred said sum in engaging the services of their
lawyer to pursue their rights and protect their interests.70

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals' assailed 23 January

2007 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the RTC's 27
January 2005 Decision is REINSTATED subject to the following
MODIFICATIONS: (a) the exclusion of a 1,750-square meter portion from the
60% share in the subject parcel respondents were ordered to convey in favor of
petitioners; and (b) the deletion of the awards of moral and exemplary damages.
The rights of the parties under the Agreement may be determined in a separate
litigation.

SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 8383 December 11, 2012

AMPARO BUENO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. RAÑESES, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment1 against Atty. Ramon Rañeses
filed on March 3, 1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Commissioner Agustinus
V. Gonzaga, and subsequently Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez- de los Reyes,
conducted the fact-finding investigation on the complaint.

Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco submitted a Report and Recommendation 2 dated

September 29, 2008 to the IBP Board of Governors which approved it in a
resolution dated December 11, 2008.

In a letter3 dated August 12, 2009, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-
Vidal transmitted to the Office of Chief Justice Reynato Puno (retired) a Notice of
Resolution4 and the records of the case.

Factual Antecedents

In her complaint,5 Bueno related that she hired Atty. Rañeses to

represent her in Civil Case No. 777. In consideration for his services, Bueno

paid Atty. Rañeses a retainer fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay him

P300.00 for every hearing he attended. No receipt was issued for the retainer

fee paid.

Atty. Rañeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended
hearings. On several occasions, Atty. Rañeses would either be absent or late.

Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Rañeses asked for P10,000.00.
This amount would allegedly be divided between him and Judge Nidea, the judge
hearing Civil Case No. 777, so that they would not lose the case. Atty. Rañeses
told Bueno not to tell anyone about the matter. She immediately sold a pig and a
refrigerator to raise the demanded amount, and gave it to Atty. Rañeses.

According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in

December 1988, because the amount she had previously given was inadequate.
Bueno then sold her sala set and colored television to raise the demanded amount,
which she again delivered to Atty. Rañeses.

Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Rañeses to comment
on the adverse party’s offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the
case, but Atty. Rañeses failed to comply with the court’s directive. According to
Bueno, Atty. Rañeses concealed this development from her. In fact, she was
shocked when a court sheriff arrived sometime in May 1991 to execute the
decision against them.

Bueno went to Atty. Rañeses’ office to ask him about what happened to the case.
Atty. Rañeses told her that he had not received any decision. Bueno later
discovered from court records that Atty. Rañeses actually received a copy of the
decision on December 3, 1990. When she confronted Atty. Rañeses about her
discovery and showed him a court-issued certification, Atty. Rañeses simply
denied any knowledge of the decision.

In a separate affidavit,6 Bueno related another instance where Atty. Rañeses asked
his client for money to win a case. Sometime in June 1991, Atty. Rañeses allegedly
asked her to deliver a telegram from Justice Buena of the Court of Appeals to her
aunt, Socorro Bello. He told her to tell Bello to prepare P5,000.00, an amount that
Justice Buena purportedly asked for in relation to Criminal Case No. T-1909 that
was then on appeal with the Court of Appeals.

According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses went to Bello’s residence two weeks later. In
her (Bueno’s) presence, Bello paid Atty. Rañeses P5,000.00. Bello demanded a
receipt but Atty. Rañeses refused to issue one, telling her that none of his clients
ever dared to demand a receipt for sums received from them.

Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer against Bueno’s complaint. He repeatedly

failed to attend the hearings scheduled by Commissioner Gonzaga on March 20,
2000,[7] on May 11, 20008 and on October 2, 2000.9 During the hearing on
October 2, 2000, Commissioner Gonzaga issued an Order 10 declaring Atty.
Rañeses in default. Bueno presented her evidence and was directed to file a formal
offer.

On October 10, 2000, the IBP-CBD received a "Time Motion and Request for
Copies of the Complaint and Supporting Papers"11 (dated September 30, 2000)
filed by Atty. Rañeses. Atty. Rañeses asked in his motion that the hearing on
October 2, 2000 be reset to sometime in December 2000, as he had prior
commitments on the scheduled day. He also asked for copies of the complaint and
of the supporting papers, claiming that he had not been furnished with these. In the
interest of substantial justice, Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled a clarificatory
hearing on November 16, 200012

Atty. Rañeses failed to attend the hearing on November 16, 2000. In the same
hearing, Commissioner Gonzaga noted that the registry return card refuted Atty.
Rañeses’ claim that he did not receive a copy of the complaint. Commissioner
Gonzaga scheduled another clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2001. He stated
that if Atty. Rañeses failed to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution after the complainant submits her memorandum.13

Atty. Rañeses did not attend the January 17, 2001 hearing. On the same day,
Commissioner Gonzaga declared the case deemed submitted for resolution after
the complainant’s submission of her memorandum.14

At some point, the case was reassigned to Commissioner De los Reyes who
scheduled another hearing on March 14, 2003.15 During the hearing, only Bueno
and her counsel were present. The Commissioner noted that the IBP-CBD received
a telegram from Atty. Rañeses asking for the hearing’s resetting because he had
prior commitments. The records, however, showed that Atty. Rañeses never filed
an answer and the case had already been submitted for resolution. Thus,
Commissioner De los Reyes issued an Order16 directing Bueno to submit her
formal offer of evidence and her documentary evidence, together with her
memorandum.
The IBP-CBD received Bueno’s Memorandum17 on May 27, 2003, but she did not
file any formal offer, nor did she submit any of the documentary evidence
indicated as attachments to her complaint.

The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings

In his report18 to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Limpingco

recommended that Atty. Rañeses be absolved of the charge of negligence, but
found him guilty of soliciting money to bribe a judge.

Commissioner Limpingco noted that Bueno failed to provide the court records and
certifications that she indicated as attachments to her complaint. These would have
proven that Atty. Rañeses had indeed been negligent in pursuing her case. Without
these documents, which are not difficult to procure from the courts, Commissioner
Limpingco concluded that he would only be left with Bueno’s bare allegations
which could not support a finding of negligence.

Commissioner Limpingco, however, found Bueno’s allegation that Atty. Rañeses

solicited money to bribe judges to be credible. According to Commissioner
Limpingco, the act of soliciting money to bribe a judge is, by its nature, done in
secret. He observed that Bueno had consistently affirmed her statements in her
affidavit, while Atty. Rañeses did nothing to refute them.

Commissioner Limpingco also noted that Atty. Rañeses even made a false claim
before the investigating commissioners, as he alleged in his "Time Motion and
Request for Copies of the Complaint and Supporting Papers" that he did not
receive the complaint against him, a fact belied by the registry receipt card
evidencing his receipt.

Thus, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Rañeses be disbarred for

failure to maintain his personal integrity and for failure to maintain public trust.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating

Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, but reduced the penalty to
indefinite suspension from the practice of law.19

The Court’s Ruling

The Court approves the IBP’s findings but resolves to disbar Atty. Rañeses from
the practice of law in accordance with Commissioner Limpingco’s
recommendation and based on our own observations and findings in the case.

The charge of negligence

According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should

serve their clients with competence and diligence. Specifically, Rule 18.02
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation." Rule 18.03, on the other hand, states that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall
render him liable."

"Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them." 20 A
client is entitled to the benefit of all remedies and defenses authorized by law, and
is expected to rely on his lawyer to avail of these remedies or defenses.21

In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a counsel’s failure to file an
appellant’s brief amounts to inexcusable negligence.22 In Garcia v. Bala,23 the
Court even found the respondent lawyer guilty of negligence after availing of an
erroneous mode of appeal. To appeal a decision of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the respondent therein filed a notice of
appeal with the DARAB, instead of filing a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. Because of his error, the prescribed period for filing the petition
lapsed, prejudicing his clients.

In this case, Atty. Rañeses’ alleged failure to file a comment on the adverse party’s
offer of evidence and to submit the required memorandum would have amounted
to negligence. However, as noted by Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did not
support her allegations with court documents that she could have easily procured.
This omission leaves only Bueno’s bare allegations which are insufficient to prove
Atty. Rañeses’ negligence. We support the Board of Governors’ ruling on this
point.

The charge of soliciting money

In Bildner v. Ilusorio,24 the respondent lawyer therein attempted to bribe a judge to
get a favorable decision for his client. He visited the judge’s office several times
and persistently called his residence to convince him to inhibit from his client’s
case. The Court found that the respondent lawyer therein violated Canon 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility – the rule that instructs lawyers to refrain from
any impropriety tending to influence, or from any act giving the appearance of
influencing, the court. The respondent lawyer therein was suspended from the
practice of law for one year.

In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. As explained below,
he committed a fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the judge
and the Judiciary. These are exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP
during the investigation of his case; he practically disregarded its processes and
even lied to one of the Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices given
him about the case.

While the only evidence to support Bueno’s allegations is her own word, the
Investigating Commissioner found her testimony to be credible. The Court
supports the Investigating Commissioner in his conclusion. As Commissioner
Limpingco succinctly observed:

By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would
necessarily take place in secrecy with only respondent Atty. Rañeses and
complainant Bueno privy to it. Complainant Amparo Bueno has executed sworn
statements and had readily affirmed her allegations in this regard in hearings held
before the IBP Investigating Commissioners. Respondent Atty. Rañeses, for his
part, has not even seen it fit to file any answer to the complaint against him, much
less appear in any hearings scheduled in this investigation.25

Further, the false claim made by Atty. Rañeses to the investigating commissioners
reveals his propensity for lying. It confirms, to some extent, the kind of lawyer that
Bueno’s affidavits depict him to be.

Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court
believes that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of
disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he did;
by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer’s
relations to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.

First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and
fraudulent.1âwphi1 It is false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty.
Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the
exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the
Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but
through deceitful means – a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but
not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude
towards its disciplinary proceedings.

From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on
the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member.
The Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed.
Let this be a signal to one and all – to all lawyers, their clients and the general
public – that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given
to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions
composing it, and to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or
misguided members of the Bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is

hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from
the Roll of Attorneys. Costs against the respondent.

Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, be notified of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4549 December 2, 2013

NESTOR FELIPE, ALBERTO V. FELIPE, AURORA FELIPE-ORANTE,

ASUNCION FELIPE-DOMINGO, MILAGROS FELIPE CABIGTING, and
RODOLFO V. FELIPE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CIRIACO A. MACAPAGAL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On March 5, 1996, a Petition1 for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty.
Ciriaco A. Macapagal, docketed as A.C. No. 4549. In A Resolution 2 dated June 19,
1996, we required respondent to comment. Respondent received a copy of the
Resolution on July 16, 1996.3 On August 15, 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion For Extension Of Tme To File Comment.4 He requested for
additional period of 30 days within which to file his comment citing numerous
professional commitments. We granted said request in our October 2, 1996
Resolution.5 The extended deadline passed sans respondent’s comment. Thus on
January 29, 1997, complainants file an Urgent Motion To Submit The
Administrative Case For Resolution Without Comment Of Respondent 6 claiming
the respondent is deemed to have waived his right to file comment.

On February 24, 1997, we referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.7

The case was initially assigned to Investigating Commissioner Elizabeth

Hermosisima-Palma who set the hearing on October 22, 1997 at 9:00 a.m.8

The Minutes of the Hearing9 showed that both parties were present.1âwphi1 The
next hearing was set on November 6, 199710 but was postponed upon request of the
complainants' counsel.11

Noting that more than five months had lapsed after the postponement of the last
hearing, complainants moved to calendar the case.12

The new Investigating Commissioner, Arturo C. Delos Reyes, set the hearing of
the case on January 12, 1999.13

During the scheduled hearing, complainants appeared and were directed to submit
their Position Paper.1âwphi1Respondent failed to attend despite receipt of notice.14
Complainants submitted their Position Paper 15 on January 28, 1999.16

It took 11 years, more particularly on February 26, 2010, before the IBP, thru
Investigating Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and
Recommendation.17

In his Report, the Investigating Commissioner quoted verbatim the allegations in

the Petition; he then narrated the proceedings undertaken by the IBP.
Unfortunately, no discussion was made regarding the merits of the complaint.
However, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) month. In Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated November 19, 2011,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one (1) year. In their Petition, complainants alleged that they
are co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 pending before Branch 216 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City while respondent is the counsel for the
defendants therein; that respondent committed dishonesty when he stated in the
defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are
strangers to each other despite knowing that the defendants are half-brothers and
half-sisters of complainants; and that they filed a criminal case for Perjury [against
the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906] docketed as Criminal Case No.
41667 pending before Branch 36 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila. Complainants also alleged that respondent introduced a falsified
Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and
that they filed another Perjury charge [against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-
95-22906] before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as
I.S. No. 95-15656-A. Next, complainants averred that respondent knowingly filed
a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution
of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction; that said pleading is not in accordance with
the rules of procedure; that the said filing delayed the proceedings in Civil Case
No. A-95-22906; and that they filed a Vigorous Opposition to the said pleading.
Complainants insisted that by the foregoing actuations, respondent violated his
duty as a lawyer and prayed that he be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants
the amount of ₱500,000 representing the damages that they suffered. In fine,
complainants charged respondent with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the
defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are
strangers to each other; (2) when he introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage
as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when he knowingly
filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the same case. At the outset, we
note that in order to determine whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty, we will
have to delve into the issue of whether the complainants are indeed related to the
defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 being half-brothers and half-sisters. We
would also be tasked to make an assessment on the authenticity of the Certificate
of Marriage which respondent submitted in the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-
95-22906. Similarly, we will have to make a ruling on whether the Urgent Motion
to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction which respondent
filed was indeed baseless and irrelevant to the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-
22906. Clearly, these prerequisites cannot be accomplished in this administrative
case. The resolution of whether the parties are related to each other appears to be
one of the issues brought up in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 which is a complaint
for Partition, Reconveyance, Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Damages.
The complainants claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Gregorio
V. Felipe, Sr. This was rebutted by the defendants therein, as represented by the
respondent, who denied their filiation with the complainants. Clearly, the issue of
filiation must be settled in those proceedings, and not in this administrative case.
The same is true with regard to the issue of authenticity of the Marriage Certificate
which was submitted in evidence as well as the relevance of the Urgent Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Besides, as complainants have asserted, a criminal case for Perjury had already
been filed against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 41667 pending before Branch 36 of the Manila MeTC for their
alleged "untruthful" statement that they are strangers to each other. They had also
filed another Perjury charge against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-
15656-A for allegedly submitting in evidence a falsified Marriage Certificate.
Moreover, they already filed a Vigorous Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Recall
Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by the respondent. In
fine, these issues are proper subjects of and must be threshed out in a judicial
action. We held in Anacta v. Resurreccion18 that -
x x x it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the
disciplinary authority of the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of
judicial action against lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyer's
oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court's disciplinary authority.
However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liablity, and
which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then
the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably
outside the purview of the Court's disciplinary authority. x x x19

Similarly, we held in Virgo v. Amorin,20 viz:

While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a

respondent to remain as a member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of
a related case, the Court, in this instance, however, cannot ascertain whether Atty.
Amorin indeed committed acts in violation of his oath as a lawyer concerning the
sale and conveyance of the Virgo Mansion without going through the factual
matters that are subject of the aforementioned civil cases, x x x. As a matter of
prudence and so as not to preempt the conclusions that will be drawn by the court
where the case is pending, the Court deems it wise to dismiss the present case
without prejudice to the filing of another one, depending on the final outcome of
the civil case.21 Thus, pursuant to the above pronouncements, the Petition filed by
complainants must be dismissed without prejudice. However, we cannot end our
discussion here. It has not escaped our notice that despite receipt of our directive,
respondent did not file his comment. Neither did he file his Position Paper as
ordered by the IBP. And for this, he must be sanctioned.

Respondent's unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is
not only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his
fellow lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are
particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to
stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the
court. As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution
of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with
promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the
investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers. 22
Under the circumstances, we deem a reprimand with warning commensurate to the
infraction committed by the respondent.23

ACCORDINGLY , respondent Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal is REPRIMANDED

for failing to give due respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. He is WARNED that commission of a similar infraction will be dealt
with more severely. Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated November 19, 2011 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is SET ASIDE. A.C. No. 4549 is DISMISSED
without prejudice. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records
of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153031 December 14, 2006

PCL SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. and U-MING MARINE TRANSPORT

CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and STEVE
RUSEL, respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 18,
2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59976, which affirmed the Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 22, 2000 in NLRC NCR CA
No. 018120-99; and the Resolution of the CA dated April 10, 2002, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.2

The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:

In April 1996, Rusel was employed as GP/AB seaman by manning agency, PCL
Shipping Philippines, Inc. (PCL Shipping) for and in behalf of its foreign principal,
U-Ming Marine Transport Corporation (U-Ming Marine). Rusel thereby joined the
vessel MV Cemtex General (MV Cemtex) for the contract period of twelve (12)
months with a basic monthly salary of US$400.00, living allowance of US$140.00,
fixed overtime rate of US$120.00 per month, vacation leave with pay of US$40.00
per month and special allowance of US$175.00.

On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped, and as
a consequence thereof, he suffered a broken and/or sprained ankle on his left foot.
A request for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain of the vessel.
On August 13, 1996, feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the
vessel using a life jacket and swam to shore. He was brought to a hospital where he
was confined for eight (8) days.

On August 22, 1996, a vessel's agent fetched Rusel from the hospital and was
required to board a plane bound for the Philippines.

On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment
of wages, overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages
against PCL Shipping and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the
NLRC. In their answer, the latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by
jumping off the vessel.

On July 21, 1998, the labor arbiter rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
Wherefore, above premises duly considered we find the respondent liable for
unjust repatriation of the complainant.

Accordingly, the following award is hereby adjudged against the respondent:

1. The amount of $2,625.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment

representing three (3) months salary of the complainant due to his illegal dismissal.

2. The amount of $1,600.00 or its peso equivalent, representing sick wage benefits.

3. The amount of $550.00 or its peso equivalent, representing living allowance,

overtime pay and special allowance for two (2) months.

4. The amount of $641.66 or its peso equivalent, representing unpaid wages from
August 11 to 22, 1996.

5. Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.

The rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.3

Aggrieved by the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, herein petitioners appealed to the
NLRC. In its Decision dated March 22, 2000, the NLRC affirmed the findings of
the Labor Arbiter but modified the appealed Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is as it is hereby

ordered MODIFIED in that the amount representing three months salary of the
complainant due to his illegal dismissal is reduced to US$1,620.00. Further the
award of sick wage benefit is deleted.

All other dispositions are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same in its
Decision of May 3, 2000.5

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.6 In its Decision dated
December 18, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the NLRC
Decision.7
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated April 10, 2002.8

Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:

I. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent was illegally
dismissed from employment.

xxxx

II. Likewise, the Court of Appeals erred in not upholding petitioners' right to pre-
terminate private respondent's employment.

xxxx

III. The private respondent is not entitled to other money claims, particularly as to
the award of attorney's fees.9

As to their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the CA erred in affirming
the findings of the NLRC that Rusel's act of jumping ship does not establish any
intent on his part to abandon his job and never return. Petitioners argue that Rusel's
very act of jumping from the vessel and swimming to shore is evidence of highest
degree that he has no intention of returning to his job. Petitioners further contend
that if Rusel was indeed suffering from unbearable and unmitigated pain, it is
unlikely that he is able to swim two (2) nautical miles, which is the distance
between their ship and the shore, considering that he needed to use his limbs in
swimming. Petitioners further assert that it is error on the part of the CA to
disregard the entries contained in the logbook and in the Marine Note Protest
evidencing Rusels' offense of desertion because while these pieces of evidence
were belatedly presented, the settled rule is that additional evidence may be
admitted on appeal in labor cases. Petitioners also contend that Rusel's act of
desertion is a grave and serious offense and considering the nature and situs of
employment as well as the nationality of the employer, the twin requirements of
notice and hearing before an employee can be validly terminated may be dispensed
with.

As to their second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming, for the sake of
argument, that Rusel is not guilty of desertion, they invoked the alternative defense
that the termination of his employment was validly made pursuant to petitioners'
right to exercise their prerogative to pre-terminate such employment in accordance
with Section 19(C) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which
provision was incorporated in Rusel's Contract of Employment with petitioners.
Petitioners assert that despite the fact that this issue was raised before the CA, the
appellate court failed to resolve the same.

Anent the last assigned error, petitioners argue that it is error on the part of the CA
to affirm the award of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special
allowance for two months because Rusel failed to submit substantial evidence to
prove that he is entitled to these awards. Petitioners further argue that these money
claims, particularly the claim for living allowance, should not be granted because
they partake of the nature of earned benefits for services rendered by a seafarer.
Petitioners also contend that the balance of Rusel's wages from August 11-22, 1996
should be applied for the payment of the costs of his repatriation, considering that
under Section 19(E) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, when a
seafarer is discharged for any just cause, the employer shall have the right to
recover the costs of his replacement and repatriation from the seafarer's wages and
other earnings. Lastly, petitioners argue that the award of attorney's fees should be
deleted because there is nothing in the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC
which states the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded.

In his Comment, private respondent contends that petitioners are raising issues of
fact which have already been resolved by the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA.
Private respondent argues that, aside from the fact that the issues raised were
already decided by three tribunals against petitioners' favor, it is a settled rule that
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, private
respondent contends that the instant case does not fall under any of these
exceptions. Private respondent asserts that petitioners failed to substantiate their
claim that the former is guilty of desertion. Private respondent further contends that
the right to due process is available to local and overseas workers alike, pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution on labor and equal protection as well as the
declared policy contained in the Labor Code. Private respondent argues that
petitioners' act of invoking the provisions of Section 19(C) of the POEA Contract
as an alternative defense is misplaced and is inconsistent with their primary
defense that private respondent was dismissed on the ground of desertion. As to the
award of attorney's fees, private respondent contends that since petitioners' act
compelled the former to incur expenses to protect his interest and enforce his
lawful claims, and because petitioners acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy private respondent's lawful claims, it is only proper that
attorney's fees be awarded in favor of the latter. Anent the other monetary awards,
private respondent argues that these awards are all premised on the findings of the
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that private respondent's dismissal was improper
and illegal.

The Court finds the petition without merit.

Anent the first assigned error, it is a settled rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only questions of law may be raised in this Court.10 Judicial review by this
Court does not extend to a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon
which the proper labor tribunal has based its determination. 11 Firm is the doctrine
that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor
cases.12 Factual issues may be considered and resolved only when the findings of
facts and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the
NLRC and the CA.13 The reason for this is that the quasi-judicial agencies, like the
Arbitration Board and the NLRC, have acquired a unique expertise because their
jurisdiction are confined to specific matters.14 In the present case, the question of
whether private respondent is guilty of desertion is factual. The Labor Arbiter,
NLRC and the CA are unanimous in their findings that private respondent is not
guilty of desertion and that he has been illegally terminated from his employment.
After a review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason
to depart from the findings of these tribunals.

Petitioners assert that the entries in the logbook of MV Cemtex General15 and in the
Marine Note Protest16 which they submitted to the NLRC confirm the fact that
private respondent abandoned the vessel in which he was assigned. However, the
genuineness of the Marine Note Protest as well as the entries in the logbook are put
in doubt because aside from the fact that they were presented only during
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed with the NLRC, both the Marine Note
Protest and the entry in the logbook which were prepared by the officers of the
vessel were neither notarized nor authenticated by the proper authorities.
Moreover, a reading of these entries simply shows that private respondent was
presumed to have deserted his post on the sole basis that he was found missing
while the MV Cemtex General was anchored at the port of Takehara, Japan. Hence,
without any corroborative evidence, these documents cannot be used as bases for
concluding that private respondent was guilty of desertion.

Petitioners also question the findings and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC that what caused private respondent in jumping overboard was the
unmitigated pain he was suffering which was compounded by the inattention of the
vessel's captain to provide him with the necessary treatment inspite of the fact that
the ship was moored for about two weeks at the anchorage of Takehara, Japan;
and, that private respondent's act was a desperate move to protect himself and to
seek relief for his physical suffering. Petitioners contend that the findings and
conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which were affirmed by the CA
are based on conjecture because there is no evidence to prove that, at the time he
jumped ship, private respondent was really suffering from an ankle injury.

It is true that no substantial evidence was presented to prove that the cause of
private respondent's confinement in a hospital in Takehara, Japan was his ankle
injury. The Court may not rely on the letter marked as Annex "B" and attached to
private respondent's Position Paper because it was unsigned and it was not
established who executed the same.17 However, the result of the x-ray examination
conducted by the LLN Medical Services, Inc. on August 26, 1996, right after
private respondent was repatriated to the Philippines, clearly showed that there is a
soft-tissue swelling around his ankle joint.18 This evidence is consistent with
private respondent's claim that he was then suffering from an ankle injury which
caused him to jump off the ship.

As to petitioners' contention that private respondent could not have traversed the
distance between the ship and the shore if he was indeed suffering from unbearable
pain by reason of his ankle injury, suffice it to say that private respondent is an
able-bodied seaman and that with the full use of both his arms and the help of a life
jacket, was able to reach the shore.
As correctly defined by petitioners, desertion, in maritime law is:

The act by which a seaman deserts and abandons a ship or vessel, in which he had
engaged to perform a voyage, before the expiration of his time, and without leave.
By desertion, in maritime law, is meant, not a mere unauthorized absence from the
ship, without leave, but an unauthorized absence from the ship with an intention
not to return to her service; or as it is often expressed, animo non revertendi, that
is, with an intention to desert.19 (emphasis supplied)

Hence, for a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there

be evidence to prove that if he leaves the ship or vessel in which he had engaged to
perform a voyage, he has the clear intention of abandoning his duty and of not
returning to the ship or vessel. In the present case, however, petitioners failed to
present clear and convincing proof to show that when private respondent jumped
ship, he no longer had the intention of returning. The fact alone that he jumped off
the ship where he was stationed, swam to shore and sought medical assistance for
the injury he sustained is not a sufficient basis for petitioners to conclude that he
had the intention of deserting his post. Settled is the rule that in termination cases,
the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just
and valid cause.20 The case of the employer must stand or fall on its own merits
and not on the weakness of the employee's defense.21 In the present case, since
petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving that private respondent is
guilty of desertion, the Court finds no reason to depart from the conclusion of the
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that private respondent's dismissal is illegal.

In their second assigned error, petitioners cite Section 19(C) of POEA

Memorandum Circular No. 055-9622 known as the Revised Standard Employment
Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board
Ocean-Going Vessels as their alternative basis in terminating the employment of
private respondent. Said Section provides as follows:

Section 19. REPATRIATION

xxxx

C. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three months before
the expiration of his contract, the master/ employer may repatriate the seafarer
from such port provided that the seafarer shall be paid all his earned wages. In
addition, the seafarer shall also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract period
plus a termination pay equivalent to one (1) month of his basic pay, provided,
however, that this mode of termination may only be exercised by the
master/employer if the original contract period of the seafarer is at least ten (10)
months; provided, further, that the conditions for this mode of termination shall not
apply to dismissal for cause.

The Court is not persuaded. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 took effect
on January 1, 1997 while the contract of employment entered into by and between
private respondent and petitioners was executed on April 10, 1996. Hence, it is
wrong for petitioners to cite this particular Memorandum because at the time of
petitioners' and private respondent's execution of their contract of employment
Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 was not yet effective.

What was in effect at the time private respondent's Contract of Employment was
executed was POEA Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989. It is clearly
provided under the second paragraph of private respondent's Contract of
Employment that the terms and conditions provided under Memorandum Circular
No. 41, Series of 1989 shall be strictly and faithfully observed. Hence, it is
Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989 which governs private respondent's
contract of employment.

Section H (6), Part I of Memorandum Circular No. 41, which has almost identical
provisions with Section 19 (C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96, provides as
follows:

SECTION H. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

xxxx

6. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three (3) months
before the expiration of the Contract, the master/employer may repatriate the
seaman from such port provided that the seaman shall be paid all his earned wages.
In addition, the seaman shall also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract
period plus a termination pay equivalent to one (1) month of his basic pay,
provided, however, that this mode of termination may only be exercised by the
master/employer if the original contact period of the seaman is at least ten (10)
months; provided, further, that the conditions for this mode of termination shall not
apply to dismissal for cause.

The Court agrees with private respondent's contention that petitioners' arguments
are misplaced. Petitioners may not use the above-quoted provision as basis for
terminating private respondent's employment because it is incongruent with their
primary defense that the latter's dismissal from employment was for cause.
Petitioners may not claim that they ended private respondent's services because he
is guilty of desertion and at the same time argue that they exercised their option to
prematurely terminate his employment, even without cause, simply because they
have the right to do so under their contract. These grounds for termination are
inconsistent with each other such that the use of one necessarily negates resort to
the other. Besides, it appears from the records that petitioners' alternative defense
was pleaded merely as an afterthought because it was only in their appeal with the
NLRC that they raised this defense. The only defense raised by petitioners in their
Answer with Counterclaim filed with the office of the Labor Arbiter is that private
respondent was dismissed from employment by reason of desertion.23Under the
Rules of Court,24 which is applicable in a suppletory character in labor cases before
the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC pursuant to Section 3, Rule I of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC25, defenses which are not raised either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.26

Granting, for the sake of argument, that petitioners may use Section H (6), Part I of
Memorandum Circular No. 41 or Section 19(C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-
96 as basis for terminating private respondent's employment, it is clear that one of
the conditions before any of these provisions becomes applicable is when the
vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three (3) months before the
expiration of the contract of employment. In the present case, private respondent's
contract was executed on April 10, 1996 for a duration of twelve months. He was
deployed aboard MV Cemtex General on June 25, 1996 and repatriated to the
Philippines on August 22, 1996. Hence, it is clear that petitioners did not meet this
condition because private respondent's termination was not within a period of three
months before the expiration of his contract of employment.
Moreover, the Court finds nothing in the records to show that petitioners complied
with the other conditions enumerated therein, such as the payment of all of private
respondent's earned wages together with his leave pay for the entire contract period
as well as termination pay equivalent to his one month salary.

Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the
charges against him and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give
him opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners contend that the twin
requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly only when the employment is
within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in cases of
international maritime or overseas employment.

The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor
Code which afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether
working within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci
contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this
jurisdiction.27 In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of
Employment entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was
executed here in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its
implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this
case.28 Accordingly, as to the requirement of notice and hearing in the case of a
seafarer, the Court has already ruled in a number of cases that before a seaman can
be dismissed and discharged from the vessel, it is required that he be given a
written notice regarding the charges against him and that he be afforded a formal
investigation where he could defend himself personally or through a
representative.29 Hence, the employer should strictly comply with the twin
requirements of notice and hearing without regard to the nature and situs of
employment or the nationality of the employer. Petitioners failed to comply with
these twin requirements.

Petitioners also contend that the wages of private respondent from August 11-22,
1996 were applied to the costs of his repatriation. Petitioners argue that the off-
setting of the costs of his repatriation against his wages for the aforementioned
period is allowed under the provisions of Section 19(E) of Memorandum Circular
No. 055-96 which provides that when the seafarer is discharged for any just cause,
the employer shall have the right to recover the costs of his replacement and
repatriation from the seafarer's wages and other earnings.

The Court does not agree. Section 19(E) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 has
its counterpart provision under Section H (2), Part II of Memorandum Circular No.
41, to wit:

SECTION H. REPATRIATION

xxxx

2. When the seaman is discharged for disciplinary reasons, the employer shall have
the right to recover the costs of maintenance and repatriation from the seaman's
balance of wages and other earnings.

xxxx

It is clear under the above-quoted provision that the employer shall have the right
to recover the cost of repatriation from the seaman's wages and other earnings only
if the concerned seaman is validly discharged for disciplinary measures. In the
present case, since petitioners failed to prove that private respondent was validly
terminated from employment on the ground of desertion, it only follows that they
do not have the right to deduct the costs of private respondent's repatriation from
his wages and other earnings.

Lastly, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention that the private
respondent is not entitled to his money claims representing his living allowance,
overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance as well as attorney's fees because
he failed to present any proof to show that he is entitled to these awards.

However, the Court finds that the monetary award representing private
respondent's three months salary as well as the award representing his living
allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance should be modified.

The Court finds no basis in the NLRC's act of including private respondent's living
allowance as part of the three months salary to which he is entitled under Section
10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995." The pertinent provisions of the said Act provides:
Sec. 10. Money Claims –

xxxx

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized

cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

xxxx

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what is included in the computation
of the amount due to the overseas worker are only his salaries. Allowances are
excluded. In the present case, since private respondent received a basic monthly
salary of US$400.00, he is, therefore, entitled to receive a sum of US$1200.00,
representing three months of said salary.

As to the awards of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special
allowance, it is clearly provided under private respondent's Contract of
Employment that he is entitled to these benefits as follows: living allowance of
US$140.00/month; vacation leave with pay equivalent to US$40.00/month;
overtime rate of US$120.00/month; and, special allowance of US$175.00/month.30

With respect, however, to the award of overtime pay, the correct criterion in
determining whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not whether they
were on board and can not leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours a
day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of
hours.31 In the present case, the Court finds that private respondent is not entitled to
overtime pay because he failed to present any evidence to prove that he rendered
service in excess of the regular eight working hours a day.

On the basis of the foregoing, the remaining benefits to which the private
respondent is entitled is the living allowance of US$140.00/month, which was
removed in the computation of private respondent's salary, special allowance of
US$175.00/month and vacation leave with pay amounting to US$40.00/month.
Since private respondent rendered service for two months these benefits should be
doubled, giving a total of US$710.00.
As to the award of attorney's fees, this Court ruled in Reyes v. Court of
Appeals,32 as follows:

x x x [T]here are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called
ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment
by and his agreement with the client. In its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees
are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing
party in a litigation. The instances where these may be awarded are those
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically par. 7 thereof which
pertains to actions for recovery of wages, and is payable not to the lawyer but to
the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as
additional compensation or as part thereof. The extraordinary concept of attorney's
fees is the one contemplated in Article 111 of the Labor Code, which provides:

Art. 111. Attorney's fees. – (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the
culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the
amount of wages recovered x x x

The afore-quoted Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict

construction in the awarding of attorney's fees. Although an express finding of
facts and law is still necessary to prove the merit of the award, there need not
be any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it
withheld the wages. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were
not paid accordingly, as in this case.

In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing
regulations, the employee's welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the
liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided in Article 4 of the Labor
Code which states that "[a]ll doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of [the Labor] Code including its implementing rules and regulations,
shall be resolved in favor of labor", and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which
provides that "[i]n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall
be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer." 33 (Emphasis
supplied)

In the present case, it is true that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC failed to state the
reasons why attorney's fees are being awarded. However, it is clear that private
respondent was illegally terminated from his employment and that his wages and
other benefits were withheld from him without any valid and legal basis. As a
consequence, he is compelled to file an action for the recovery of his lawful wages
and other benefits and, in the process, incurred expenses. On these bases, the Court
finds that he is entitled to attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals'

Decision dated December 18, 2001 and Resolution dated April 10, 2002
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that the award of
US$1620.00 representing private respondent's three months salary is reduced to
US$1200.00. The award of US$550.00 representing private respondent's living
allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance for two months is
deleted and in lieu thereof, an award of US$710.00 is granted representing private
respondent's living allowance, special allowance and vacation leave with pay for
the same period. No costs. SO ORDERED.