Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Envi Digest Feb 20
Envi Digest Feb 20
20,2019)
Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995 impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No.
Facts : 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power,
being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands
Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of
279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211
the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the
for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279
authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint- WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the
exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources. LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O. RAMOS,
Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; H.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); R.
Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA
agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these is a exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural
guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be
failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995.
Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President
mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with
effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close
Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the
validity and constitutionality before this Court. Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued
DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by
Issue : DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid? Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA
between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on
Ruling : ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP
to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in
Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and Charter.
approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and
for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is
Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘
"license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is
by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said still pending before the Court of Appeals.
constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987,
No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large
laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which
governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the
management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise
No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. contended that the annulmentof the FTAA would violate a treaty
Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus: between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, protection of Australian investments.
other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the
ISSUES:
provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation 1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for
clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine
those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this mineral resources. 2. Whether or not the FTAA between the
petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of government and WMCP is a ―service contract that permits fully
the police power of the State. foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this
In a contract denominated as “Tampakan Option Agreement”, are evidently present in both the proceedings before the MGB and
respondent WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC), through before the trial court. The case instituted with the RTC was
its local subsidiary Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. thus correctly ordered dismissed by the appellate court on the
(WMCP), acquired the mining claims in Tampakan, South Cotabato of ground of forum shopping. Besides, not only did Lepanto commit
the Tampakan Companies. The “Tampakan Option Agreement” was forum shopping but it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies
amended by subsequent agreements under which the Tampakan by opting to go ahead in seeking reliefs from the court even while
Companies were given preferential option to acquire the shares of those same reliefs were appropriately awaiting resolution by the
WMC in WMCP and Hillcrest Inc. in the event WMC decided to sell MGB.
them. WMC, by a Sale and Purchase Agreement, sold to
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (Lepanto) its shares of stock. BENGUET CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
As the Tampakan Companies later availed of their preferential right AND NATURAL RESOURCES
under the “Tampakan Option Agreement,” a Sale and
Purchase Agreement was concluded between WMC and the G.R. No. 163101
Tampakan Companies over the same shares of stock priorly
purchased by Lepanto. Facts:
The Tampakan Companies notified the Director of the Mines and On June 1, 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a
Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR of the exercise of their RAWOP, wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four
preemptive right to buy WMC‘s equity in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc. mining claims respectively named as Bonito-I, Bonito-II, Bonito-III, and
Lepanto wrote the DENR Secretary about the invalidity of said Bonito-IV, with a total area of 288.8656 hectares, situated in Barangay
agreement and reiterated its request for the approval of its Luklukam, Sitio Barging Bayan, Municipality of Jose Panganiban,
acquisition of the disputed shares. Camarines Norte. The parties also executed a Supplemental
Agreement dated June 1, 1987. The mining claims were covered by
Lepanto subsequently filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claim
Makati a complaint against WMC, WMCP, Tampakan Companies. owner and Benguet as operator.
WMC et al. filed before the RTC a Joint Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of forum shopping. The RTC denied WCM et al.‘s Motion to Thus, on August 9, 1989, the Executive Vice-President of
Dismiss. On appeal, the CA granted the petition of respondents ruling Benguet, Antonio N. Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of
that Lepanto is guilty of forum shopping. Petitioners filed a motion for its intention to develop the mining claims. However, on February 9,
reconsideration with the CA. The CA denied said motion. 1999, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a
letter to the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was
terminating the RAWOP.
ISSUE:
In response, Benguet’s Manager for Legal Services,
Whether or not Lepanto is guilty of forum shopping Reynaldo P. Mendoza, wrote J.G. Realty a letter dated March 8, 1999,
therein alleging that Benguet complied with its obligations under the
HELD: RAWOP by investing PhP 42.4 million to rehabilitate the mines, and
that the commercial operation was hampered by the non-issuance of
It is clear from the proceedings before the DENR, specifically before a Mines Temporary Permit by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
the MGB, that the issue of which –– between petitioner and (MGB) which must be considered as force majeure, entitling Benguet
respondent Tampakan Companies –– possesses the better right to to an extension of time to prosecute such permit. On June 7, 2000,
acquire the mining rights, claims and interests held by WMC through J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of
its local subsidiary WMCP, especially with respect to the 1995 FTAA, the RAWOP with the Legaspi City POA, Region V, docketed as DENR
had been brought to the fore. The MGB cannot just assess the Case No. 2000-01 and entitled J.G. Realty v. Benguet.
qualifications of petitioner and of the Tampakan Companies as
potential transferee or assignee of the rights and obligations of On March 19, 2001, the POA issued a Decision, dwelling
WMCP under the FTAA without also resolving the issue of which has upon the issues of (1) whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction over
priority of right to become one. the case; and (2) whether Benguet violated the RAWOP justifying the
unilateral cancellation of the RAWOP by J.G. Realty. The dispositive
portion stated:
True, the questioned agreements of sale between Lepanto and WMC
on one hand and between WMC and the Tampakan Companies on the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
other pertain to transfer of shares of stock from one entity to another. June 01, 1987 [RAWOP] and its Supplemental
But said shares of stock represent ownership of mining rights or Agreement is hereby declared cancelled and
interest in mining agreements. Hence, the power of the MGB to rule without effect. BENGUET is hereby excluded from
on the validity of the questioned agreements of sale, which was raised the joint MPSA Application over the mineral
by Lepanti before the DENR, is inextricably linked to the very nature claims denominated as "BONITO-I", "BONITO-II",
of such agreements over which the MGB has jurisdiction under the "BONITO-III" and "BONITO-IV".
law. Unavoidably, there is identity of reliefs that Lepanto seeks from SO ORDERED.
both the MGB and the RTC.
Therefrom, Benguet filed a Notice of Appeal with the MAB lapse of seven years from date of institution of the original action with
on April 23, 2001, docketed as Mines Administrative Case No. R-M- the POA would be anathema to the speedy and efficient
2000-01. administration of justice.
11.01 Arbitration Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the
cancellation of the RAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal right
Any disputes, differences or disagreements between BENGUET and to participate in further developing the mining claims, was brought
the OWNER with reference to anything whatsoever pertaining to this about by its violation of the RAWOP. Hence, Benguet has no one to
Agreement that cannot be amicably settled by them shall not be cause blame but itself for its predicament.
of any action of any kind whatsoever in any court or administrative
agency but shall, upon notice of one party to the other, be referred to
a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members, one to be
selected by BENGUET, another to be selected by the OWNER and the G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006
third to be selected by the aforementioned two arbitrators so
appointed.
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B.
HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
xxxx
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
11.02 Court Action
leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper elements constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the
had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act
tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. (RA 7942).
Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers. Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for
[v]iolation of the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby
petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and
with violation of Article 91(B),4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential 96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained
Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD to be tried on the merits.
1067"),5 Section 86 of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National
Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"),7 Section 1088 of Republic The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"), 9 and Code should also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because
Article 36510 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless the common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.11 [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law
punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to
grounds: (1) the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to
of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2) property.13
petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers
of Marcopper when the incident subject of the Informations took The MTC re-scheduled petitioners’ arraignment on the remaining
place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute charges on 28 and 29 May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997,
legal excuse or justification. petitioners manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on the
charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for
The Ruling of the MTC violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated
Order in so far as it maintained the Informations for that offense.
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC12 initially After making of record petitioners’ manifestation, the MTC
deferred ruling on petitioners’ motion for lack of "indubitable ground proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of "not guilty"
for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the
petitioners’ arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners’ RPC.
motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997
("Consolidated Order"), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the
Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the
984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA
and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held: 7942. Petitioners’ petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public
respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for
to "mine tailings" which were precipitately discharged into the violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondent’s appeal was
Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian raffled to Branch 38. On public respondent’s motion, Branch 38
drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate ordered public respondent’s appeal consolidated with petitioners’
measures to prevent pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and petition in Branch 94.
Boac River systems, the very term and condition required to be
undertaken under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued The Ruling of Branch 94
on April 1, 1990.
In its Resolution14 of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence respondent’s appeal but denied petitioners’ petition. Branch 94 set
required to prove the single fact of pollution constituting violation of aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations
the Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges
evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other
proving the elements constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, respects. Branch 94 held:
issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the
terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the
were allegedly violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is opinion that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three
required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws. other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and
distinct from each other. The elements of proving each violation are
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of not the same with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping
the parties and after taking into consideration the applicable laws and mine tailings which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and
jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3) Boac rivers was the basis for the information[s] filed against the
aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of accused each charging a distinct offense. But it is also a well-
Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the established rule in this jurisdiction that –
Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the
Water Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and petitioners are for violation of four separate and distinct laws which
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an are national in character.
additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar xxxx
prosecution under the other. x x x."
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondent’s understanding that
xxxx the laws by which the petitioners have been [charged] could not
possibly absorb one another as the elements of each crime are
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact
elements of each crime are different from one another. Each of these or element which the other does not, although they stemmed from a
laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the single act. x x x
other does not although they stemmed from a single act.15
xxxx
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
alleging that Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because [T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of
(1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the evidence that would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent
Article 365 of the RPC "proceed from and are based on a single act or acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Court’s quashal of the
mine tailings" and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations Informations against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D.
contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.16 Petitioners further 984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial court’s denial of the
contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for petitioner’s motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are "the very same acts Penal Code.18
complained of" in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC,
the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied
prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.17
their motion in its Resolution of 14 March 2002.
We now go to petitioners’ claim that the resolution of the public B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR
respondent contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE CHARGES
for being violative of their right against multiple prosecutions. CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986 THAT
"AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the People’s argument with
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH
respect to the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being
THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE
charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the
NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY A
context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973
COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF
Constitution (now under Section 21 of Article III of the 1987
TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."
Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section. x x x
PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be
LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense."25 In
PETITIONERS[.]19 People v. Doriquez,26 we held that two (or more) offenses arising from
the same act are not "the same" —
The Issues
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or
The petition raises these issues: element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime
one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
other.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Property should stand; and
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements
(2) Whether Branch 94’s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of
are present.28 However, for the limited purpose of controverting
Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.
petitioners’ claim that they should be charged with one offense only,
we quote with approval Branch 94’s comparative analysis of PD 1067,
The Ruling of the Court PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of
these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one essential
The petition has no merit. element not required of the others, thus:
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be
established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the
charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 11020 of the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states: absence of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This element
is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-
Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the
Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one Revised Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a Water Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has
single punishment for various offenses. complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate,
or further, even [if] it did take the necessary precautions to prevent
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single damage to property.
Information charges more than one offense.21
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be
Under Section 3(e), Rule 11722 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal proved is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the
Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused must be
quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping
Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his of mine tailings or lack of precaution on its part to prevent damage to
defense.23 Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner property.
with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense.
Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the
outright denial. accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the
Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done
only — Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property — everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials,
because (1) all the charges filed against them "proceed from and are they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot
based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the
rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the charge for violation Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental
of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the other charges since the Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
element of "lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence,
recklessness and imprudence" is common among them. On the other hand, the additional element that must be established
in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or
The contention has no merit. adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on
the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element
is not required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a
from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to
single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely
the Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide
distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the
by the terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover,
prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.24 The only limit
COMPILED BY PRAISAH MARJOREY F. PICOT 7
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW DIGESTS (FEB. 20,2019)
the offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first
with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.29 sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from
although based on the same incident, is consistent with settled the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both
doctrine. the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set
of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception
to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against
On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under
RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA
an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently
7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala
that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x
prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA
x30 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them. Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple
prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of
double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of
People v. Relova not in Point
Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident
punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first
their prosecution contravenes this Court’s ruling in People v. Relova. sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution
In particular, petitioners cite the Court’s statement in Relova that the for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from
law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by "multiple the same incident.
prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another
are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5
sets of technical elements."
November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court
of Appeals.
This contention is also without merit.1avvphil.net
DIDIPIO EARTH-SAVERS’ MULTI-PURPOSE ASSOCIATION,
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City INCORPORATED (DESAMA), Petitioners
Fiscal in charging one Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of
electric power under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of vs.
violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of
electrical wiring, violated Opulencia’s right against double jeopardy. ELISEA GOZUN, in her capacity as SECRETARY of the DEPARTMENT
We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those two OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Respondents
laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was Facts:
punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within
the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act under This petition for prohibition and mandamus ssails the constitutionality
the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining
now Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held: Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations
issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural
The petitioner concludes that: Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-
40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
entered into on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and
"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of
Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under
Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the
the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.
Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense
is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information." Then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Executive Order No.
279 which authorized the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign
This is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or
provision involved – which reads as follows: financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of
the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act." x x x AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single
company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of
petitioner’s position is that it must be examined, not under the terms which are Australian nationals.
of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but
COMPILED BY PRAISAH MARJOREY F. PICOT 8
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW DIGESTS (FEB. 20,2019)
Petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to then DENR Secretary While this Court declares that the assailed provision is a taking
for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason that provision, this does not mean that it is unconstitutional on the ground
Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO that it allows taking of private property without the determination of
96-40 are unconstitutional. public use and the payment of just compensation.
Ponente: Panganiban Date: 1 December 2004 Nature: Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus
Parties Involved:
La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc., represented by its Chairman F’long Miguel M. Victor Ramos, DENR Sec.; Horacio Ramos, MGB-DENR Dir.; Ruben Torres, Exec. Sec.
Lumayong; et. al. (petitioner WMCP, Inc. (respondent)
- 24 January 2007: the Court en banc declared unconstitutional: (a) certain provisions of RA No. 7942 (Mining Law), (b) its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO No. 96-40, and
(c) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), mainly
on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution
- Respondents filed separate Motions for Reconsideration
Legal Issues
A. W/N case has been rendered moot by the sale of WMC shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (a Filipino corporation) and by the subsequent transfer and registration of the FTAA
from WMCP to Sagittarius.
B. W/N it is still proper to resolve constitutionality of the assailed provisions, assuming that the case has been rendered moot.
C. the proper interpretation of the phrase: Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance, contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
D. thus, W/N provisions are unconstitutional.
provides for international commercial arbitration under the auspices 2- This provision does not necessarily imply that the WMCP
of the International Chamber of Commerce, after local remedies are FTAA cannot be transferred to and assumed by a Filipino
exhausted—clearly intended to apply only to a foreign contractor] corporation like Sagittarius, in which event the said provision
3-the sale of the shares is suspect and should therefore be the subject should simply be disregarded as a superfluity.
of a case in which it validity may be properly litigated. Section 40 of
3- Section 40 expressly applies to the assignment or transfer
RA 7942 allegedly requires the President’s prior approval of a
transfer. of the FTAA, not to the sale and transfer of shares of stock in
WMCP. When the transfer of the FTAA happens to be a
Filipino corporation, the need for such safeguard is not critical.
Court’s previous decision was correct, in that the FTAA would have certainly been so unmistakably restrictive and
allowed the foreign contractor to have direct and exclusive stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone’s mind about their true
management of a mining enterprise, and vests in the foreign intent. There was a conscious and deliberate decision to
company beneficial ownership of our mineral resources. avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an
intent not to use the expression “agreements x x x
involving either technical or financial assistance” in an
exclusionary and limiting manner.
The deletion or omission from the 1987 Constitution of the term Such intent cannot be definitively and conclusively established
“service contracts” found in the 1973 Constitution sufficiently from the mere failure to carry the same expression or term over
proves the drafters’ intent to exclude foreigners from the to the new Constitution, absent amore specific, explicit and
management of the affected enterprises. unequivocal statement to that effect. Pertinent portions of the
deliberations of the members of the ConCom conclusively
show that they discussed agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance in the same breadth as
service contracts and used the terms interchangeably.
D. RA 7942, as well as its Implementing Rules and D. The gamut of requirements, regulations, restrictions and
Regulations, makes it possible for FTAA contracts to cede limitations imposed upon the FTAA contractor by the statute
full control and management of mining enterprises over to and regulations easily overturns petitioners’ contention. The
fully foreign-owned corporations, with the result that the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and
State is allegedly reduced to a passive regulator get away with it; on the contrary, it will have to follow the
dependent on submitted plans and reports, with weak government line if it wants to stay in the enterprise.
review and audit powers. The law, the implementing Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the
regulations, and the WMCP FTAA cede “beneficial government more than a sufficient degree of control and
ownership” of the mineral resources to the foreign contractor. supervision over the conduct of mining operations.
Section 3 of RA 7942—which allows a foreign contractor to The exploration permit serves a practical and legitimate
apply for and hold an exploration permit—is unconstitutional. purpose in that it protects the interests and preserves the rights
of the exploration permit grantee (the would-be contractor)—
foreign or local—during the period of time that it is spending
heavily on exploration works, without yet being able to earn
revenues to recoup any of its investments and expenditures.
The Court does not share the view that in FTAAs with
RA 7942 allegedly limits the State’s share in FTAAs with foreign contractors under RA 7942, the government’s
foreign contractors to just taxes, fees and duties, and depriving share is limited to taxes, fees and duties. The inclusion of
the State of a share in the after-tax income of the enterprise. the phrase “among other things” in the second paragraph of
Section 81 clearly and unmistakable reveals the legislative
intent to have the State collect more than just the usual taxes,
duties and fees.
Judgment
A. Because of the validity of sale and the transfer, and that the FTAA is not void per se, the case has become moot. However,
B. there is a need to resolve the unconstitutionality of the assailed provisions.
C. The phrase “agreements involving either technical and financial assistance,” as used interchangeably with the term “service contracts” by the drafters of the Constitution and as interpreted
by the court, is not exclusionary and limiting.
D. The assailed provisions are not unconstitutional.
Important Notes
- The FTAA is for the exploration, development and commercial exploitation of mineral deposits in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato, covering an area of
99,837 ha. WMC is wholly owned subsidiary of Western Mining Corporation Holdings Limited, a publicly listed major Australian mining and exploration company.
- A service contract has been defined as a contractual agreement for engaging in the exploitation and development of petroleum, mineral, energy, land and other natural resources, whereby
a government or an agency thereof, or a private person granted a right or privilege by said government, authorizes the other party—the service contractor—to engage or participate in the
exercise of such right or the enjoyment of the privilege, by providing financial or technical resources, undertaking the exploitation or production of a given resource, or directly managing
the productive enterprise, operations of the exploration and exploitation of the resources, or the disposition or marketing of said resources.
Personal Notes
“The crux of the controversy is the amount of discretion to be accorded the Executive Department, particularly the President of the Republic, in respect of negotiations over the terms of FTAAs,
particularly when it comes to the government share of financial benefits from FTAAs.”
“Verily, under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, this Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must
allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and
answer their cry or viable employment opportunities in this country.”
“Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of the government. And let not this Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily.”
- sir pointed out: although the issue is very technical, we must all go back to the basic issue of whether or not Congress, DENR and the President acted within jurisdiction. The issue is always
about jurisdiction.
> and in this case, the court found that they did act within their respective jurisdictions.