NEGLIGENCE

BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo

G.r. No. 161151, March 24, 2014
First Division

Bersamin, J.:

DOCTRINE: The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has
the burden to establish the allegation with competent evidence. If the action based on
negligence is civil in nature, the proof required is preponderance of evidence.

FACTS:

Nena E. Lanuzo filed a complaint for damages against BJDC Construction, the contractor
of the re–blocking project to repair the damaged portion of one lane of a national
highway. Nena alleged that she was the surviving spouse of the late Balbino Los Baños
Lanuzo who figured in the accident that transpired at the site of the re–blocking work,
and that the company’s failure to place illuminated warning signs on the site of the
project, especially during night time, was the proximate cause of Balbino’s death.

The company denied Nena’s allegations of negligence, alleging that the death of Balbino
was an accident brought about by his own negligence, as confirmed by the police
investigation report that stated that Balbino was not wearing any helmet at that time, and
the accident occurred while Balbino was overtaking another motorcycle. The police
report also stated that the road sign/barricade installed on the road had a light.

ISSUE:

Is BJDC liable for damages?

RULING:

No. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
Whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not
evidence. Generally, the party who denies has no burden to prove. In civil cases, the
burden of proof is preponderance of evidence, which means that the evidence as a whole
adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.

In this case, the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not establish
by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the
proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino. According to Dr. Abilay, the cause of
death of Balbino was the fatal depressed fracture at the back of his head, an injury that
Dr. Abilay opined to be attributable to his head landing on the cemented road after being
thrown off his motorcycle. Considering that it was shown that Balbino was not wearing
any protective head gear or helmet at the time of the accident, he was guilty of negligence
in that respect. On the other hand, the company was not negligent in ensuring safety at
the project site. All the established circumstances showed that the proximate and
immediate cause of the death of Balbino was his own negligence. Hence, the Lanuzo
heirs could not recover damages.
 Bignay EX-IM Philippines, Inc. v. Union Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 171590, February 12, 2014
Second Division

Del Castillo, J.:

DOCTRINE: The gross negligence of the seller in defending its title to the property
subject matter of the sale – thereby contravening the express undertaking under the deed
of sale to protect its title against the claims of third persons resulting in the buyer’s
eviction from the property – amounts to bad faith, and the buyer is entitled to the
remedies afforded under Article 1555 of the Civil Code.

FACTS:

Alfonso de Leon mortgaged in favor of Union Bank of the Philippines real property
which was registered in his and his wife Rosario’s name and covered by TCT No.
286130. The property was foreclosed and sold at auction to Union Bank. After the
redemption period expired, the bank consolidated its ownership, whereupon TCT 362405
was issued in its name.

In 1988, Rosario filed against Alfonso and Union Bank, Civil Case No. Q–52702 for
annulment of the mortgage, claiming that Alfonso mortgaged the property without her
consent, and for reconveyance. Meanwhile, Bignay Ex–Im Philippines, Inc. offered to
purchase the property. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between Union Bank and
Bignay. Bignay then mortgaged the property to Union Bank, presumably to secure a loan
obtained from the latter.

The court subsequently ruled in Civil Case No. Q–52702 that defendant Alfonso de Leon,
Jr. had alone executed the mortgage on their conjugal property upon a forged signature of
his wife Rosario. As such, Rosario was still the owner of the undivided 1/2 of the subject
property. As a result, Bignay was evicted from the property.

ISSUE:

Was there breach of warranty against eviction?

RULING:

Yes. Bignay purchased the property without knowledge of the pending Civil Case No. Q–
52702. Union Bank is therefore answerable for its express undertaking under the deed of
sale to “defend its title to the Parcel/s of Land with improvement thereon against the
claims of any person whatsoever.”

By this warranty, Union Bank represented to Bignay that it had title to the property, and
by assuming the obligation to defend such title, it promised to do so at least in good faith
and with sufficient prudence, if not to the best of its abilities. The record reveals,
however, that Union Bank was grossly negligent in the handling and prosecution of Civil
Case No. Q–52702. Union Bank’s negligence in the handling of the case is far from
coincidental; it is decidedly glaring, and amounts to bad faith. In culpa contractual or
breach of contract, gross negligence of a party amounting to bad faith is a ground for the
recovery of damages by the injured party.
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Guariña Agricultural and Realty
Development Corporation
G.R. No. 160758, January 15, 2014
First Division

Bersamin, J.:

DOCTRINE: The foreclosure of a mortgage prior to the mortgagor's default on the

principal obligation is premature, and should be undone for being void and ineffectual.
The mortgagee who has been meanwhile given possession of the mortgaged property by
virtue of a writ of possession issued to it as the purchaser at the foreclosure sale may be
required to restore the possession of the property to the mortgagor and to pay reasonable
rent for the use of the property during the intervening period.

FACTS:

Guariña Corporation applied for a loan from DBP to finance the development of its resort
complex. It executed a promissory note and a real estate mortgage, as well as a chattel
mortgage over the personal properties existing at the resort complex. The loan was
released in several instalments and Guariña used the proceeds to defray the cost of
additional improvements in the resort complex. The amount released totalled
₱3,003,617.49, from which DBP withheld ₱148,102.98 as interest. When Guariña
Corporation demanded the release of the balance of the loan, DBP refused and instead
directly paid some suppliers of Guariña over the latter's objection.

DBP then demanded that Guariña expedite the completion of the project. When Guariña
did not comply, DBP initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Consequently,
Guariña Corporation sued DBP in the RTC to demand specific performance of the latter's
obligations under the loan agreement, and to stop the foreclosure of the mortgages.
ISSUE:

Was the foreclosure of the mortgages proper?

RULING:

No. The agreement between DBP and Guariña Corporation was a loan. Under the law, a
loan requires the delivery of money or any other consumable object by one party to
another who acquires ownership thereof, on the condition that the same amount or quality
shall be paid. Loan is a reciprocal obligation, as it arises from the same cause where one
party is the creditor, and the other the debtor. The obligation of one party in a reciprocal
obligation is dependent upon the obligation of the other, and the performance should
ideally be simultaneous. This means that in a loan, the creditor should release the full
loan amount and the debtor repays it when it becomes due and demandable.

Considering that it had yet to release the entire proceeds of the loan, DBP could not yet
make an effective demand for payment upon Guariña Corporation to perform its
obligation under the loan. Hence, Guariña Corporation was not yet in default. Under the
circumstances, DBP's foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the mortgaged
properties at its instance were premature, and, therefore, void and ineffectual.
 Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., and Mitsui
Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.
G.R. No. 193986, January 15, 2014
First Division

Perez, J.:

DOCTRINE: In maritime transportation, a bill of lading is issued by a common carrier

as a contract, receipt and symbol of the goods covered by it. If it has no notation of any
defect or damage in the goods, it is considered as a “clean bill of lading.” A clean bill of
lading constitutes prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the goods as
therein described.

FACTS:

BPI/MS and Mitsui alleged that Sumitomo Corporation shipped on board ESLI’s vessel
M/V “Eastern Venus 22” 22 coils of various Steel Sheet in good condition for
transportation to and delivery at the port of Manila in favor of consignee Calamba Steel
Center, Inc. Upon withdrawal of the shipment by the Calamba Steel’s representative, it
was found out that part of the shipment was damaged. Calamba Steel rejected the
damaged shipment for being unfit for the intended purpose. Later, Sumitomo Corporation
again shipped on board ESLI’s vessel M/V “Eastern Venus 25” 50 coils in various Steel
Sheet, and again, these arrived in bad condition.

Calamba Steel attributed the damages on both shipments to ESLI as the carrier and ATI
as the arrastre operator in charge of the handling and discharge of the coils and filed a
claim against them. When ESLI and ATI refused to pay, Calamba Steel filed an insurance
claim for the total amount of the cargo against BPI/MS and Mitsui as cargo insurers.

ISSUE:
Who is liable for the damaged cargo?

RULING:

ESLI is liable. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and on public policy
considerations, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods transported by them. In maritime transportation, a bill of lading is issued by a
common carrier as a contract, receipt and symbol of the goods covered by it. If it has no
notation of any defect or damage in the goods, it is considered as a “clean bill of lading.”
A clean bill of lading constitutes prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the
goods as therein described.

Based on the bills of lading issued, it is undisputed that ESLI received the two shipments
of coils from shipper Sumitomo Corporation in good condition. However, upon arrival at
the port of Manila, some coils from the two shipments were partly dented and crumpled
as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order. Mere proof of delivery of the goods
in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their destination
constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the carrier. If no adequate
explanation is given as to how the deterioration, loss, or destruction of the goods
happened, the transporter shall be held responsible. From the foregoing, the fault is
attributable to ESLI.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/NEGLIGENCE

Solidum v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014
First Division

Bersamin, J.:

DOCTRINE: Res ipsa loquitur has the following essential requisites: (1) the accident
was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution of the person injured. The doctrine can be invoked when direct
evidence is absent and not readily available.

FACTS:

Gerald Albert Gercayo was born with an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth,
Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine
out through the abdominal wall. When he was three years old, he was admitted at the
Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the
surgical team, and was assisted by 3 other doctors. The anesthesiologists included Dr.
Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum. During the
operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two
weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or
move.

His mother Ma. Luz Gercayo lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries. Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office
filed an information solely against Dr. Solidum.
ISSUE:
Is res ipsa loquitur applicable to make Dr. Solidum liable?

RULING:

No. Although the second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic
agent and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that
the patient, being then unconscious, could not have been guilty of contributory
negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of
oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed
as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or
during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove
that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had
caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course
of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal
reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the patient.

The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued
for negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does not depend on any individual
physician’s own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may
determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the
patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is
required. Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical
qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care
was applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine
whether the first three elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Thus, Dr. Solidum was acquitted.
 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Kho
G.R. No. 205839, July 7, 2016
Second Division

Brion, J.:

DOCTRINE: The business of banking is imbued with public interest; it is an industry

where the general public's trust and confidence in the system is of paramount importance.
Consequently, banks are expected to exert the highest degree of, if not the utmost,
diligence.

FACTS:

Narciso Kho is the sole proprietor of United Oil Petroleum. He entered into a verbal
agreement to purchase lubricants from Red Orange International Trading, through Rudy
Medel, who insisted that it would only accept a Land Bank manager's check as payment.
Kho then opened a savings account with Land Bank, and deposited 3 managers checks
with the total amount of P25 million. He then purchased Land Bank Manager’s Check
No. 07140 in the amount of P25 million, and sent a photocopy thereof to Red Orange as
proof of his ability to pay. However, his deal with Red Orange did not push through.

Sometime later, BPI called Land Bank to inform them that Red Orange had deposited
Check No. 07140 for payment. It was later cleared for payment. When Kho found out
that the check had been cleared and paid by BPI, he was shocked because the check was
still in his possession. They discovered that what was deposited and encashed with BPI
was a spurious manager’s check.

ISSUE:

Is Land Bank liable for the loss?

RULING:

A manager's check is a bill of exchange drawn by a bank upon itself, and is accepted by
its issuance. It is an order of the bank to pay, drawn upon itself, committing in effect its
total resources, integrity, and honor behind its issuance. The genuine Check No.
07410 remained in Kho's possession the entire time and Land Bank admits that the check
it cleared was a fake.

When Land Bank's Central Clearing Department forwarded the deposited check to its
Araneta branch for inspection, its officers had every opportunity to recognize the forgery
of their signatures or the falsity of the check. Whether by error or neglect, the bank failed
to do so, which led to the withdrawal and eventual loss of the P25,000,000.00. This is the
proximate cause of the loss. Land Bank breached its duty of diligence and assumed the
risk of incurring a loss on account of a forged or counterfeit check. Hence, it should
suffer the resulting damage.
 Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Company
G.R. No. 164749, March 15, 2017
Third Division

Bersamin, J.:

DOCTRINE: Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by any new cause, produces an event, and without which the event would not
have occurred."

FACTS:

Cosmos, jointly with Intergames, organized an endurance running contest billed as the
"1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon", plotting a 10-kilometer course that runs through public
roads and streets. Plaintiffs' son Rommel joined the marathon, but he was bumped by a
jeepney that was then running along the route of the marathon. He died that same day due
to severe head injuries.

ISSUE:

Is Cosmos liable for Rommel’s death?

RULING:

The participants of the 1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon were mostly minors aged 14 to 18
years joining a race of that kind for the first time. The combined factors of their youth,
eagerness and inexperience ought to have put a reasonably prudent organizer on higher
guard as to their safety and security needs during the race. A higher degree of diligence
was required given that practically all of the participants were children or minors like
Rommel. In that respect, Intergames did not observe the degree of care necessary as the
organizer, rendering it liable for negligence.

The negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause of Rommel’s death despite the
intervening negligence of the jeepney driver. The negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit
an intervening cause, was not efficient enough to break the chain of connection between
the negligence of Intergames and the injurious consequence suffered by Rommel. An
intervening cause, to be considered efficient, must be "one not produced by a wrongful
act or omission, but independent of it, and adequate to bring the injurious results. Any
cause intervening between the first wrongful cause and the final injury which might
reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated by the original wrongdoer is not such an
efficient intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as the
proximate cause of the final injury."
 Dela Cruz v. Octaviano
G.R. No. 219649, July 26, 2017
Second Division

Peralta, J.:

DOCTRINE: Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by any new cause, produces an event, and without which the event would not
have occurred."

FACTS:

Captain Renato Octaviano, a military dentist, was riding at the back of the tricycle driver
when a vehicle driven by petitioner Al Dela Cruz hit the back of their tricycle. He was
thrown from the tricycle and landed on the gutter 2 meters away. He had his leg
amputated from below the knee on that night, and thereafter had to go through more than
a year of rehabilitation and treatment. Renato spent a total of P623,268.00 for his medical
bills and prosthetics. Thus, Renato and his mother Wilma filed with the RTC a civil case
for damages against petitioner and the owner of the vehicle.

ISSUE:

Is Dela Cruz liable for damages?

RULING:

Yes. The police report prepared by the traffic investigator SPO2 Vicente Soriano detailed
what happened on the night of April 1, 1999, stating that the Honda Civic driven by Dela
Cruz swerved to avoid hitting another tricyle, and it was after doing such that it
sidesweeped the tricycle of Octaviano and company. Two witnesses also testified that
Dela Cruz appeared to be drunk on that fateful night.

The law prohibits drunk driving. Republic Act No. 4136, Chapter IV, Article V, Section
53 known as Land Transportation and Traffic Code provides that no person shall drive a
motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug. It is established by
Renato’s evidence that Dela Cruz drove the Honda Civic while under the influence of
alcohol thus proving his negligence.

The requisite that there be a direct relation of cause and effect between the damage or
injury and the fault or negligence is clearly present. Had defendant Dela Cruz exercised
caution, his vehicle would not have collided with the tricycle and Renato’s leg would not
be crushed necessitating its amputation. The cause of the injury or damage to the
Renato’s leg is the negligent act of defendant Dela Cruz.
 Visayan Electric Company, Inc. v. Alfeche
G.R. No. 209910, Nov. 29, 2017
Third Division

Leonen, J.:

DOCTRINE: An electric distribution company is a public utility presumed to have the

necessary expertise and resources to enable a safe and effective installation of its
facilities. Absent an indication of fault or negligence by other actors, it is exclusively
liable for fires and other damages caused by its haphazardly installed posts and wires.

FACTS:

A fire broke out in South Poblacion, San Fernando, Cebu, which burned down the house
and store of respondent Emilio Alfeche and his son, respondent Gilbert and the adjacent
watch repair shop owned by respondent Manugas. It was alleged that the cause of the fire
was the constant abrasion of VECO' s electric wire with M. Lhuillier's signboard. The
Alfeches and Manugas sent a letter to the management of VECO asking for financial
assistance, which VECO denied. VECO asserted that the fire was due, not to its fault, but
to that of M. Lhuillier.

ISSUE:

Is VECO liable?

RULING:

Yes. The immediate cause of the fire was the short circuiting of VECO's wires. This short
circuiting, in turn, happened because VECO's wires had been abraded or stripped of their
insulation by their constant rubbing with M. Lhuillier's signage. When M. Lhuillier's
signage was installed in 1995, it was free from any obstacle. No allegation was made, let
alone proof presented, that the signage had been relocated in the interim. In contrast, a
plethora of evidence attests to the relocation of VECO's posts and wires, which resulted
in the close proximity between the wires and M. Lhuillier's signage. With an utter dearth
of evidence indicating that it was the signage that moved, no reasonable conclusion is left
other than that the wires and posts were moved. This transfer could not have been
effected by anyone other than the electricity utility company responsible for their
installation and maintenance, VECO.

Thus, VECO's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered by respondents
Emilio, Gilbert, and Manugas. All the elements for liability for a quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code are present, to wit:

(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;

(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he
must respond; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the
damages incurred.
 Poole-Blunden v. Union Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 205838, Nov. 29, 2017
Third Division

Leonen, J.:

DOCTRINE: A bank that wrongly advertises the area of a property acquired through
foreclosure because it failed to dutifully ascertain the property's specifications is grossly
negligent as to practically be in bad faith in offering that property to prospective buyers.
Any sale made on this account is voidable for causal fraud.

FACTS:

Poole-Blunden came across an advertisement placed by Union Bank in the Manila

Bulletin for the public auction of certain properties, including a condominium unit. About
a week prior to the auction, Poole-Blunden visited the unit for inspection. Poole-Blunden
did not doubt the unit's area as advertised. However, he found that the ceiling was in bad
condition, that the parquet floor was damaged, and that the unit was in need of other
substantial repairs to be habitable. Poole-Blunden won the unit at the auction and
executed a Contract to Sell which contains an as-is-where-is clause with Union Bank.
Poole-Blunden eventually decided to construct 2 additional bedrooms in the Unit. He
took rough measurements of the Unit, which indicated that its floor area was just about
70 square meters, not 95 square meters, as advertised by UnionBank.

ISSUE:

Is Union Bank liable for fraud?

RULING:
There are two types of fraud contemplated in the performance of contracts: dolo
incidente or incidental fraud and dolo causante or fraud serious enough to render a
contract voidable. The fraud required to annul or avoid a contract must be so material that
had it not been present, the defrauded party would not have entered into the contract.
While petitioner was not a specific target, respondent was so callously remiss of its duties
as a bank. It was so grossly negligent that its recklessness amounts to a wrongful
willingness to engender a situation where any buyer in petitioner's shoes would have been
insidiously induced into buying a unit with an actual area so grossly short of its
advertised space.

Causal fraud is attendant in this case. Union Bank orchestrated a situation rife for
defrauding buyers of the advertised unit. Therefore, the Contract to Sell between
petitioner and respondent is annulled, and petitioner be refunded all the amounts he paid
to respondent in respect of the purchase of the Unit.
 Citystate Savings Bank v. Tobias
G.R. No. 227990, March 7, 2018
Second Division

Reyes, Jr., J.:

DOCTRINE: The existence of apparent or implied authority is measured by

previous acts that have been ratified or approved or where the accruing benefits have
been accepted by the principal. It may also be established by proof of the course of
business, usages and practices of the bank; or knowledge that the bank or its officials
have, or is presumed to have of its responsible officers' acts regarding bank branch
affairs.

FACTS:

Rolando Robles, a certified public accountant, was an acting manager of petitioner

Citystate Savings Bank. Sometime in 2002, Teresita Tobias, a meat vendor, opened
an account with petitioner after being persuaded by Robles. Thereafter, Robies
would frequent Tobias' stall at the public market to deliver the interest earned by her
deposit accounts in the amount of Php 2,000.00. In turn, Tobias would hand over her
passbook to Robies for updating. The passbook would be returned the following day
with typewritten entries but without the corresponding counter signatures.

Tobias was later offered by Robles to sign-up in petitioner's back-to-back scheme,

wherein she invested a total of 1,800,000. Under the scheme, the depositors
authorize the bank to use their bank deposits and invest the same in different
business ventures that yield high interest. In 2005, Robles failed to remit the interest
as scheduled. It was later found that Robles has withdrawn the money and
appropriated it for personal use.
ISSUE:

Is Citystate Savings Bank liable for damages?

RULING:

Petitioner is liable under Article 1911 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Art. 1911.
Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the
agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers.”

Robles as branch manager was 'clothed' or 'held out' as having the power to enter into the
subject agreements with the respondents. The testimonies of the witnesses presented by
petitioner establish that there was nothing irregular in the manner in which Robles
transacted with the respondents. In fact, petitioner's witnesses admitted that while the
bank's general policy requires that transactions be completed inside the bank premises,
exceptions are made in favor of valued clients, such as the respondents. In which case,
banking transactions are allowed to be done in the residence or place of business of the
depositor, since the same are verified subsequently by the bank cashier. Consequently,
petitioner is estopped from denying Robles' authority.49 As the employer of Robles,
petitioner is solidarity liable to the respondents for damages caused by the acts of the
former, pursuant to Article 1911 of the Civil Code.
 Solidum v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014
First Division

Bersamin, J.:

DOCTRINE: Res ipsa loquitur has the following essential requisites: (1) the accident
was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution of the person injured. The doctrine can be invoked when direct
evidence is absent and not readily available.

FACTS:

Gerald Albert Gercayo was born with an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth,
Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine
out through the abdominal wall. When he was three years old, he was admitted at the
Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the
surgical team, and was assisted by 3 other doctors. The anesthesiologists included Dr.
Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum. During the
operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two
weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or
move.

His mother Ma. Luz Gercayo lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries. Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office
filed an information solely against Dr. Solidum.

ISSUE:
Is res ipsa loquitur applicable to make Dr. Solidum liable?

RULING:

No. Although the second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic
agent and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that
the patient, being then unconscious, could not have been guilty of contributory
negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of
oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed
as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or
during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove
that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had
caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course
of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal
reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the patient.

The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued
for negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does not depend on any individual
physician’s own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may
determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the
patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is
required. Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical
qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care
was applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine
whether the first three elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Thus, Dr. Solidum was acquitted.
 Rosit v. Davao Doctors Hospital
G.R. No. 210445, December 07, 2015
Third Division

Velasco Jr., J.:

DOCTRINE: A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong committed

by a medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to or the death of a patient. There
are four elements involved in a medical negligence case, namely: duty, breach, injury,
and proximate causation.

FACTS:

Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident, resulting in a fractured jaw. He was operated on

by Dr. Gestuvo, who used a metal plate fastened to the jaw with metal screws to
immobilize the mandible. As the operation required the smallest screws available, Dr.
Gestuvo cut the screws on hand to make them smaller. Dr. Gestuvo knew that there were
smaller titanium screws available in Manila, but did not so inform Rosit supposing that
the latter would not be able to afford the same.

Following the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and close his mouth and was in
pain. Rosit went back to Dr. Gestuvo who referred him to a dentist, Dr. Pangan. Dr.
Pangan thereafter operated on Rosit, removing the plate and screws installed by Dr.
Gestuvo and replaced them with smaller titanium plate and screws. Three days after the
operation, Rosit was able to eat and speak well and could open and close his mouth
normally.

ISSUE:

Is Dr. Gestuvo liable for damages?

RULING:

To establish medical negligence, an expert testimony is generally required to define the

standard of behavior by which the court may determine whether the physician has
properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient. However, when the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is
dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence.

Resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as an exception to the requirement of an expert
testimony in medical negligence cases may be availed of if the following essential
requisites are satisfied: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.

The first element was sufficiently established when Rosit proved that one of the screws
installed by Dr. Gestuvo struck his molar. Had Dr. Gestuvo used the proper size and
length of screws and placed the same in the proper locations, these would not have struck
Rosit's teeth causing him pain and requiring him to undergo a corrective surgery. Anent
the second element for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine application, it is sufficient that the
operation which resulted in the screw hitting Rosit's molar was, indeed, performed by Dr.
Gestuvo. Lastly, the third element that the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured was satisfied in this case. It was not
shown that Rosit's lung disease could have contributed to the pain. What is clear is that he
suffered because one of the screws that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit Rosit's molar.

Furthermore, petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to make an "informed consent".

There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based
upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material
risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed
treatment."

These four essential elements are also present here. Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of withholding
material information which would have been vital in the decision of Rosit in going
through with the operation with the materials at hand. Thus, Dr. Gestuvo is also guilty of
negligence on this ground.
 Borromeo v. Family Care Hospital, Inc.
G.R. No. 191018, January 25, 2016
Second Division

Brion, J.:

DOCTRINE: Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable when the failure to observe due care is
not immediately apparent to the layman.

FACTS:

The petitioner Carlos Borromeo brought his wife Lilian to the Family Care Hospital
because she had been complaining of acute pain at the lower stomach area and fever for
two days. She was admitted and placed under the care of Dr. Inso, who later scheduled
Lilian for exploratory laparotomy, a surgical procedure involving a large incision on the
abdominal wall that would enable Dr. Inso to examine the abdominal cavity and identify
the cause of Lilian’s symptoms. Lilian gave her consent to the procedure.

Dr. Inso conducted the surgery, wherein he ultimately removed her appendix which was
already infected and congested with pus. The operation was successful, but roughly six
hours after Lilian was brought back to her room, Dr. Inso was informed that her blood
pressure was low. He ordered the infusion of more intravenous fluids which somehow
raised her blood pressure. Despite the late hour, Dr. Inso remained in the hospital to
monitor Lilian’s condition. Subsequently, they had to give Lilian a blood transfusion, but
her condition continued to deteriorate. Dr. Inso then transferred Lilian to Muntinlupa
Medical Center (MMC) because the Family Care Hospital did not have an intensive care
unit (ICU). At around 4:00 A.M., Lilian was taken to the MMC by ambulance. Dr. Inso
followed closely behind in his own vehicle. Upon reaching the MMC, a medical team
was on hand to resuscitate Lilian. However, at around 10:00 a.m., Lilian passed away
despite efforts to resuscitate her.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Reyes revealed that Lilian’s death was caused by internal
bleeding, which he opined could have been avoided if the site was repaired with double
suturing instead of the single continuous suture repair that he found.

ISSUE:

Is Dr. Inso and the Family Care Hospital liable for damages?

RULING:

A medical professional has the duty to observe the standard of care and exercise the
degree of skill, knowledge, and training ordinarily expected of other similarly trained
medical professionals acting under the same circumstances. A breach of the accepted
standard of care constitutes negligence or malpractice and renders the defendant liable for
the resulting injury to his patient.

However, this standard is based on the norm observed by other reasonably competent
members of the profession practicing the same field of medicine. Because medical
malpractice cases are often highly technical, expert testimony is usually essential to
establish: (1) the standard of care that the defendant was bound to observe under the
circumstances; (2) that the defendant’s conduct fell below the acceptable standard; and
(3) that the defendant’s failure to observe the industry standard caused injury to his
patient.

In this case, the petitioner failed to present an expert witness. Dr. Reyes is not an expert
witness who could prove Dr. Inso’s alleged negligence. His testimony could not have
established the standard of care that Dr. Inso was expected to observe nor assessed Dr.
Inso’s failure to observe this standard.
On the other hand, the respondents presented testimonies from Dr. Inso himself and from
two expert witnesses in pathology and surgery. They affirmed that Dr. Inso did not
deviate from the usual surgical procedure, and they agreed that Lilian could not have died
from bleeding of the appendical vessel. They also identified Lilian’s cause of death as
massive blood loss resulting from DIC.

Lastly, res ipsa loquitur is not applicable when the failure to observe due care is not
immediately apparent to the layman. It is also not applicable to cases where the actual
cause of the injury had been identified or established.

Thus, Dr. Inso cannot be held liable for damages because his negligence has not been
duly proven.
 Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital v. Capanzana
G.R. No. 189218, March 22, 2017
First Division

Sereno, CJ.:

DOCTRINE: In order to successfully pursue a claim in a medical negligence case, the

plaintiff must prove that a health professional either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent health professional would have or have not done; and that the action
or omission caused injury to the patient.

FACTS:

Regina Capanzana, a 40-year-old nurse pregnant with her third child, was scheduled for
her third caesarean section. However, a week earlier, she went into active labor and was
brought to petitioner hospital for an emergency C-section. She was received by Dr.
Ramos and Dr. Santos, the same attending physicians in her prior childbirths. On that
same day, she gave birth to a baby boy. 13 hours after her operation, Regina complained
of a headache, a chilly sensation, restlessness, and shortness of breath. She asked for
oxygen and later became cyanotic. After undergoing an x-ray, she was found to be
suffering from pulmonary edema.

When her condition still showed no improvement, Regina was transferred to the Cardinal
Santos Hospital. The doctors thereat found that she was suffering from rheumatic heart
disease mitral stenosis with mild pulmonary hypertension. This development resulted in
cardiopulmonary arrest and, subsequently, brain damage. Regina lost the use of her
speech, eyesight, hearing and limbs. She was later discharged, but in a vegetative state.

ISSUE:
Is the hospital liable?

RULING:

In fixing a standard by which a court may determine whether the physician properly
performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimonies from both
plaintiff and defense are resorted to.

In this case, the expert testimony of witness for the respondent Dr. Godfrey Robeniol, a
neurosurgeon, provided that the best time to treat hypoxic encephalopathy is at the time
of its occurrence; i.e., when the patient is experiencing difficulty in breathing and
showing signs of cardiac arrest. Regina complained of difficulty in breathing before
eventually showing signs of cyanosis. When she was gasping for breath and turning
cyanotic, it was the duty of the nurses to intervene immediately by informing the resident
doctor. Had they done so, proper oxygenation could have been restored and other
interventions performed without wasting valuable time. The nurses of petitioner hospital
committed a breach of their duty to respond immediately to the needs of Regina. This
negligent delay on the part of the nurses was the proximate cause of the brain damage
suffered by Regina.

For the negligence of its nurses, petitioner is thus liable under Article 2180 in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2180, an employer like petitioner hospital
may be held liable for the negligence of its employees based on its responsibility under a
relationship of patria potestas. The liability of the employer under this provision is
"direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon a prior recourse against the negligent
employee or a prior showing of the insolvency of that employee."

The employer may only be relieved of responsibility upon a showing that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
The rule is that once negligence of the employee is shown, the burden is on the employer
to overcome the presumption of negligence on the latter's part by proving observance of
the required diligence. In this case, the hospital failed to discharge its burden of proving
due diligence in the supervision of its nurses, and is therefore liable for their negligence.
FORTUITOUS EVENT

Metro Concast Steel Corp. v. Allied Bank Corporation

G.R. No. 177921, December 4, 2013
Second Division

Perlas-Bernabe, J.:

DOCTRINE: To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur: (a) the
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply
with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the
event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
obligations in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury or loss.

FACTS:

Metro Concast, a domestic corporation, through herein individual petitioners, obtained

several loans from Allied Bank. By way of security, the individual petitioners executed
several Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety Agreements in favor of Allied Bank.
However, petitioners failed to settle their obligations, prompting Allied Bank to file a
complaint for collection of sum of money.

Petitioners admitted their indebtedness to Allied Bank but denied liability for the interests
and penalties charged, claiming to have paid the total sum of ₱65,073,055.73 by way of
interest charges. They also alleged that the economic reverses suffered by the Philippine
economy in 1998 as well as the devaluation of the peso against the US dollar contributed
greatly to the downfall of the steel industry, directly affecting the business of Metro Concast
and eventually leading to its cessation. Metro Concast eventually sold its equipment as scrap
metal to Peakstar Oil Corporation. In a Memorandum Agreement, with the alleged
conformity of Allied Bank, Peakstar obligated itself to purchase the scrap metal for a total
consideration of ₱34,000,000.00. Unfortunately, Peakstar reneged on all its obligations under
the MoA.

Thus, petitioners asseverated that their failure to pay their outstanding loan obligations to
Allied Bank must be considered as force majeure, and that since Allied Bank was the party
that accepted the terms and conditions of payment proposed by Peakstar, petitioners must
therefore be deemed to have settled their obligations to Allied Bank.

ISSUE:

Are the loan obligations of petitioners extinguished?

RULING:

No. Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It
is therefore not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, but it
must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is
not impossibility to foresee the same.

While it may be argued that Peakstar’s breach of the MoA was unforseen by petitioners, the
same us clearly not "impossible"to foresee or even an event which is independent of human
will. Neither has it been shown that said occurrence rendered it impossible for petitioners to
pay their loan obligations to Allied Bank and thus, negates the former’s force majeure theory
altogether. In any case, the performance or breach of the MoA bears no relation to the
performance or breach of the subject loan transactions, they being separate and distinct
sources of obligations. The fact of the matter is that petitioners’ loan obligations to Allied
Bank remain subsisting for the basic reason that the former has not been able to prove that
the same had already been paid or, in any way, extinguished.