Professional Documents
Culture Documents
IN GENERAL
It is that part of law which comes into play when the issue before the court
affects some fact, event or transaction that is so clearly connected with a foreign
system of law as to necessitate recourse to that system (Cheshire, Private
International Law, 1947 ed., p. 6).
Conflict of Laws is that part of the municipal law of a state which directs
its courts and administrative agencies, when confronted with a legal problem
involving a foreign element, whether or not they should apply a foreign law or
foreign laws. (Paras, Phil. Conflict of Laws, 1996 ed., p. 2).
Any case which involves facts occurring in more than one state or nation,
so that in deciding the case, it is necessary to make a choice between the laws
of different states or countries, is a Conflict of Laws case.
It includes not only foreign sovereign countries or states but also political
subdivisions of states or countries which have their own legal systems, such as
the different states
constituting the United States of America, the federal states of Australia,
Canada, Mexico, Brazil and Germany, etc.
4. Why is this subject more important in recent times than in the past?
6. What is the reason for the diversity of conflicts rules among the
different states of the world?
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This is because each group of people have a language, culture, mores and
customs, religion, ideals and beliefs, peculiar to such group, which are reflected
or expressed in their laws and legal systems. For example, while the great
majority of the countries of the world allow absolute divorce, our country still has
not legalized absolute divorce. And while some countries are very liberal in
granting divorces, others are not so liberal.
Indirect sources: the same as other branches of law: among others, the
natural moral law, and the writings and treatises of thinkers and famous writers
and jurists on the subject.
Chapter II
(a) First, determine whether the court has jurisdiction over the case. If it
has no jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed on that ground. If it has
jurisdiction, the court will determine whether it should assume jurisdiction over
the case or dismiss it on the ground of forum non conveniens. Of course, it is the
law of the forum that determines whether the court has jurisdiction or not over
the case.
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(b) Once the court has determined whether it has jurisdiction over the
case, it will next determine whether to apply the internal law of the forum or the
proper foreign law, considering the attendant circumstances.
2. How does the court determine whether it has jurisdiction over the
case?
There are three kinds of jurisdiction: (a) jurisdiction over the subject-
matter, (b) jurisdiction over the person, and (c) jurisdiction over the res.
(a) Since jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law, it cannot
be conferred by consent of the parties or by their voluntary submission.
(c) Since jurisdiction over the subject-matter exists only in the abstract, it
must be invoked by filing the proper complaint or petition with the court. And it
is the allegations of the complaint or petition read in the light of the proper
jurisdictional law, that confer jurisdiction on the court. If the allegations of the
complaint show prima facie a lack of jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the case
outright. No preliminary hearing on the evidence is needed. If, on the other
hand, the complaint or petition, on its face, shows the presence of jurisdiction,
trial must be held. Should the evidence show that the court really has no
jurisdiction, the case must be dismissed.
(b) Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired the moment he invokes the
power of the court by instituting the action by the proper pleading. Jurisdiction
over the defendant is acquired when he enters his appearance or by the
coercive power of legal process exerted by the court over him.
A plaintiff, under the rule of submission, may sometimes by filing suit with
the court be deemed to consent to its exercise of jurisdiction over his original
cause of action including counter-claims filed by the defendant, and he would
then be subject to the judgment of the court. As for the defendant, his personal
appearance or appearance by counsel is tantamount to his giving consent to the
court's exercise of jurisdiction over his person, except if his appearance or that
of counsel is for the sole purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the court.
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(c) Jurisdiction over the defendant may be acquired through his voluntary
appearance, as already stated, or by personal or substituted service of summons
on him under the Rules of Court. This is referred to as the coercive process in the
manner provided by law.
Strict compliance with the above rules is required before the court can
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (Pantaleon v. Asuncion,
105 Phil. 761; Sequito v. Letrondo, 105 Phil. 1139). Thus, service on a 12-year
old daughter of the defendant is not valid substituted service because of the
child's lack of suitable age and discretion (Sequito v. Letrondo, id.). However, the
question of erroneous service of summons must be raised before judgment is
rendered, or this would be a clear case of waiver (Jaranilla v. Gonzales, 96 Phil.
3) Moreover, defective service may be cured by actual receipt of the summons
by the defendant, or if in any other manner, knowledge of the existence of the
case should come to his attention (Sequito v. Letrondo, id.).
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sufficient, whether the defendant is in the Philippines or not (Pantaleon v.
Asuncion, 105 Phil 761).
(a) When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
(b) When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action relates to or the subject of which is, property
within the Philippines (real or personal), in which the defendant has a
claim a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
(c) When the defendant is a non-resident but the subject of the action is
property located in the Philippines, in which the relief demanded
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
therein; and
(d) When property of a non-resident defendant has been attached in the
Philippines.
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sufficient for the court to acquire jurisdiction over Mar (Sec. 15, Rule 14, 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure).
But the demand for support of the child against Mar will not prosper,
because it would be a judgment in personam, and summons by publication
would not give the court jurisdiction over Mar.
For the declaration of nullity of marriage, yes, because that asks for a
declaration of the personal status of Susan, equivalent to an action quasi in rem.
(a) Once the plaintiff files an action before a Philippine court, whether he
be a Filipino citizen or a foreigner, a resident or non-resident of the Philippines,
he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court and puts the judicial machinery
into action. Hence, he is now subject to any counterclaims, cross-claims, etc.
that the defendant may put up under Philippine law. In choosing a particular
forum, the plaintiff has accepted the entire judicial machinery of the forum
completely, so that he must accept not only its benefits but its burdens as well.
6. Explain why the court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction over a case
on the basis of the principle of forum non conveniens.
As has been said before, even if the court has jurisdiction over a conflicts
case, it may, by invoking the principle of forum non conveniens, refuse to
exercise or assume that jurisdiction, in view of any of the following practical
reasons:
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(a) The evidence and the witnesses may not be readily available in the
forum;
(b) The court dockets of the forum may already be clogged so that to
permit additional cases would hamper the speedy administration of
justice;
(c) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided in another
jurisdiction, either because the main aspects of the case transpired
there or the material witnesses have their residence there;
(d) To curb the evils of "forum shopping"; i.e., the non-resident plaintiff
might have filed the case in the forum merely to secure procedural
advantages or to annoy or harass the defendant;
(e) The forum has no particular interest in the case, the parties not being
citizens of the forum or are residents elsewhere; or the subject-matter
of the case evolved somewhere else;
(f) Other courts are open and the case may be better tried in said courts;
(g) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the
right sought to be enforced by the plaintiff; or
(h) The difficulty of ascertaining the foreign law applicable.
(See Stimson, Conflict of Laws, pp 348-352; Canada Malting Co. v.
Patterson Steamship, 285 U.S. 413. 423; Heine v. New York Ins. Co., 45
Fed. (2d) 426)
Issue: May the Oregon court, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse to
take cognizance of the case?
7. After the court has acquired jurisdiction over a conflicts case and has
decided to assume that jurisdiction, when is it bound to apply the
internal or domestic law (lex fori)?
There are at least three (3) instances when the forum has to apply the
internal or domestic law (lex fori) in deciding a case in conflicts of law, viz:
(a) When the law of the forum expressly so provides in its conflicts rules;
(b) When the proper foreign law has not been properly pleaded and
proved;
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(c) When the case involves any of the exceptions to the application of the
proper foreign law; (i.e., exceptions to comity).
9. Explain why the foreign law cannot be applied if it has not been
pleaded and proved.
This is the second case wherein the internal or domestic law of the forum
(lex fori) will be applied; that is, when the proper foreign law has not been
properly pleaded and proved. The reason is that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. So that if the proper foreign law is not pleaded (in
the complaint or petition, or in the answer or any other responsive pleading) and
is not proven as a fact, the court has the right to presume that the applicable
foreign law is the same as the internal or domestic law of the forum and should,
therefore, apply the latter law (Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43; Sy Joc
Liong v. Syquia, 16 Phil. 137; Lim v. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; Fluemer v. Hix, 54
Phil. 610; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500).
(2) A copy of the law attested by the officer having legal custody of
the record or by his deputy, accompanied by a certificate of any
Philippine embassy, consular, or foreign service officer in the
foreign country where the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office. (Rule 132, sec. 25, Rev. Rules of Court)
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(b) What is meant by the “processual” presumption of law?
This rule means that when the proper foreign law has not been
properly proved, the court of the forum may presume that said foreign
law is the same as its local or domestic law, which it can now apply.
10. How is a foreign law that has been duly pleaded and proved to be
interpreted by our courts?
As a general rule, a foreign law that has been duly pleaded and proved
should be given by our courts the same interpretation as that given by the
foreign tribunals of the country where the law comes from.
(a) When the application of the foreign law would run counter to a
sound and established public policy of the forum.
Examples:
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(d) When the foreign law is penal in character:
(f) When the foreign law might work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum:
(g) When the application of the foreign law would endanger the
vital interests of the State:
Remember that we apply the lex situs or lex rei sitae to all
properties, whether real or personal, found or located in the Philippines
(first par., Art. 16, New Civil Code).
Chapter III
1. What are the theories that justify the court, in a conflicts case, to
apply the foreign law instead of its own domestic or internal law?
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(a) The theory of comity
(b) The vested-right theory
(c) The theory of local law
(d) The theory of harmony of laws
(e) The theory of justice.
Thus, two principles have been given upon which the theory of
comity rests: the comity based on reciprocity, and the comity based
on the persuasiveness of a foreign judgment.
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48 of Rule 39 on the “effect of foreign judgments or final orders”, a
foreign final judgment or order “is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title” and “may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact”.
Under this theory, our courts enforce not the foreign law or foreign
judgment but the right or rights that have been vested under such law or
judgment. Rights once acquired under a foreign law or judgment should
be enforced regardless of where the suit for its enforcement was filed.
Thus, the ideal of uniformity and predictability of results would be
achieved. If a foreign law gives a person a right, the mere fact that the
law of the forum does not give him a similar or the same right is no reason
to refuse to help him get what belongs to him. The exception is, if the
foreign law is against the public policy of the forum. It is a principle of
every civilized law that vested rights should be protected. This principle
also discourages forum-shopping.
The American court ruled in the above case that foreign torts
should be governed by the lex loci delicti commissi. A right having been
created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence follows
everywhere. (See also MacDonald v. Railway, 71 N.H. 448; King v. Sarria,
69 N.Y. 24; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 225 N.Y. 448)
The adherents of this theory believe that we apply a foreign law not
because it is foreign, but because our own law by applying a similar rule
requires us to do so; hence, it is as if the foreign law has become part of
our own internal or domestic law.
A good example of this theory is Art. 16, par. 2, New Civil Code,
which requires us to apply the national law of the deceased in the matter
of his testate or intestate succession. If the deceased was a Chinese
although the children are already Filipinos, we are required to apply
Chinese law, not because it is the appropriate foreign law, but because
our own Civil Code tells us to do so.
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is single or married. The application of the same or similar solution also
prevents the bad practice of forum-shopping.
3. There being many theories as to the proper choice of law that should
be applied in each particular case, what, then, should be considered
the right theory?
Chapter IV
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On the other hand, a conflicts rule or provision of law is a provision found
in our own law which governs a factual situation possessed of a foreign element.
It is usually expressed in the form of an abstract proposition that a given legal
question is “governed” by the “law of a particular country” (which may be an
internal law or the proper foreign law), to be ascertained in the manner indicated
by the provision.
Example of an internal rule: Art. 796. All persons who are not expressly
prohibited by law may make a will. (New Civil Code)
They are:
(a) The one-sided rule (which indicates when Philippine law will
apply).
Examples:
Art. 15, New Civil Code: Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons,
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
Art. 818, id.: Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly,
or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or
for the benefit of a third person.
Examples:
Art 16, first par., New Civil Code: Real property as well as
personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
Art. 17, first par., id.; The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.
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Observation: While Art. 15 of the New Civil Code literally
applies only to Filipinos and is actually a one-sided rule, the
Supreme Court has given it a multilateral application in that it has
held that foreigners, in their status and legal capacity, are governed
by their national law (Gibbs v. Govt., 49 Phil. 293; Recto v. Harden,
L-6897. Nov. 29, 1956). In other words, the nationality theory
embodied in Art. 15 of the New Civil Code has been applied by the
Supreme Court even to persons who are citizens of countries
following the domiciliary theory, like Americans.
(b) the point of contact or connecting factor, which is the law of the
country with which the factual situation is most intimately connected
In other words, the first part states certain operative facts, the legal
consequences of which are determined in the second part; that is, the first part
raises, while the second part answers or solves, a legal question.
Example: Art. 1763, New Civil Code, providing that “the law of the
country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the
common carrier for their loss, destruction, or deterioration”.
In this provision, we have the picture of a cargo ship traveling on the high
seas but for some reason or another, the cargo or part of it is lost, destroyed, or
deteriorates during the voyage.
What law is to be applied to determine the liability of the ship? The law of
the country to which the lost cargoes are to be transported, or the law of their
destination, not the law of the country where the lost cargoes were loaded, or
the place of embarkation.
Another example: Art. 1039, New Civil Code, providing that “capacity to
succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent”. Here again, we
get the picture of a. person who dies, but whose heirs may be citizens of another
country. What law should apply to determine who will succeed the deceased?
The law says it is the law of the country of which the deceased was a citizen, and
not the law of the citizenship of his heirs.
Chapter V
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By characterizing the legal problem, the court or the parties involved reach the
proper solution whether to apply the local law or the proper foreign law.
The Supreme Court applied the above solution in the following case:
There is no question that all procedural matters are governed by the lex
fori. Thus, matters of service of summons, joinder or splitting of cause of action,
how to appeal, periods of appeal, etc. are governed by the law of the forum.
But what about prescription of action and the Statute of Frauds? Are they
substantive (our law considers them such, so that they are found in the New Civil
Code as well as the Rules of Court) or merely procedural and, therefore,
governed by the lex fori?
Chapter VI
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PERSONAL LAW
THEORIES IN DETERMINING ONE'S PERSONAL LAW
It may be his national law, the law of his domicile, or the law of the situs of
the event or transaction wherein he was involved, depending on the theory
applied and enforced in the forum.
“Capacity”, on the other hand, is only part of one’s status, and may be
defined as the sum total of his rights and obligations (Graveson, Conflict of Laws,
p.96).
Under our Civil Code, there are two (2) kinds of capacity:
(a) juridical capacity (passive capacity) - which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations; and
(b) capacity to act (active capacity) – which is the power to do acts with
legal effects.
(Art. 37, New Civil Code)
(a) The nationality theory (also called the personal theory) - by virtue of
which the status and capacity of a person is determined by the law of his
nationality or his national law.
(b) The domiciliary theory - by virtue of which the status and capacity
of a person is determined by the law of his domicile (also called the
territorial theory).
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(c) The situs or eclectic theory - which views the particular place or
situs of an event or transaction as generally the controlling law.
4. What theory does the Philippines follow? What about the United
States?
In countries that follow the nationality theory like the Philippines, yes. In
countries that follow the domiciliary or eclectic or situs theory, no.
7. What are the reasons why some countries adopt the nationality
theory, while others adopt the domiciliary theory?
Civil law countries, like the Philippines, follow the nationality theory. In
such countries, the nationality theory has been considered justified on practical
considerations of convenience and expediency. The people of these countries
are considered bound by a spirit of national unity, by a common history and
mores, so that the identity and legal position of their citizens are guaranteed by
the consistent application of their national laws on status and family relations
wherever they may go and even when they migrate to other countries. Note that
many Filipinos who have become naturalized in other countries still want to
come back to the Philippines and die here because they still consider themselves
as Filipinos.
The domiciliary theory, on the other hand, assumes that the attributes
which make up one's status and personal relations are intimately connected with
the country where they have made their hone. It is adopted by the United States
and other common law countries, whose populations consist of peoples of
different nationalities with varying traditions, culture, and ideals, and whose
unity may be considered achieved by adopting the law of their domicile as the
law that governs their status and family relations. Countries with mixed
population brought about by the migration of foreigners to their shores need the
domiciliary principle to attain a certain fusion of their population and to avoid the
necessity of applying a different law to practically every case.
Chapter VII
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1. What are the weaknesses of the nationality theory?
(a) Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship (Art.
IV, sec. 2, 1987 Constitution).
(b) Citizens by naturalization are those who were formerly aliens but
by judicial, legislative, or administrative process, have become Filipino citizens.
Jus soli - A person is a citizen of the country where he was born, or of the
country of his birth. Thus, the baby of Filipino parents but born in the U,S. is not
only a Filipino but also an American citizen under "the principle of jus soli, which
the U.S. follows.
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Jus sanguinis - This is the rule that we follow in the Philippines. It is
citizenship by blood; i.e., those whose fathers or mothers, or whose both parents
are Filipino citizens, is a Filipino citizen.
Each country or state has the sole power and authority to determine
under its internal or municipal law who are its citizens or nationals. As provided
in Art. 2 of the Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws (April 12, 1930):
5. Considering that only the Philippines can determine who are Filipino
citizens, may the problem of the dual or multiple citizenship of a
Filipino arise in the Philippines?
No. Dual citizenship cannot be avoided due to the diverse laws of the
different countries of the world as to who are their citizens and who are not. So,
a Filipino may have dual citizenship, as shown in Question 5 hereof. But the
concern of the aforesaid provision of the Constitution is not with dual citizenship
per se but with naturalized citizens of the Philippines who still maintain their
allegiance to the countries of their origin. Thus, for candidates for public office
with dual citizenship, suffice it that upon the filing of their certificate of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship, considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. (Mercado v. Manzano, 307
SCRA 630 [1999]).
Such question would arise only from the point of view of a third state.
For example, if a girl whose parents are Filipinos but who was born and has lived
all her life in California, U.S.A., is applying for scholarship in a French university,
the French authorities will regard her not as a Filipino but as an American, as her
California citizenship is the more effective connecting factor in determining what
is her citizenship, Filipino or Californian. This is applying the theory of effective
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nationality embodied in Art. 5 of the Hague Convention on Conflict of
Nationality Laws which provides:
8. In what case or cases may a Filipino have dual citizenship from the
point of view of a third state?
(a) In a case where a Filipino (because his parents are Filipinos) was born
in American soil, he is a Filipino under the rule of jus sanguinis while he is an
American under the rule of jus soli.
(b) If a Filipino woman marries a foreigner whose national law allows her
to become a citizen of her husband's country like China by such marriage, she
still retains her Philippine citizenship under Art. IV, sec. 4 of the 1987
Constitution, unless by her act or omission, she is deemed to have renounced
her Philippine citizenship. Therefore, she would be both a Filipino and a Chinese
citizen, if she does nothing to renounce her Philippine citizenship.
11. Suppose in the above problem, the deceased woman was residing
at the time of her death, not in Japan or China, but in another or a third
country, like Singapore? Will the solution to the problem be the same?
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The solution would now be different because we can no longer say that
she was more closely connected to Japan or China, the countries of which she
was a citizen at the time of her death. In this case, then, the domiciliary theory
comes to the rescue and will consider the country of her domicile at the time of
her death (Singapore). So, we should first apply the nationality theory by taking
her two national laws (Japanese and Chinese) and applying them together
insofar as they are consistent and harmonious with each other. But if they are
inconsistent and in conflict with each other, then we should already apply the
law of Singapore, which was her domicile and home at the time of her death.
In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court formerly held that since a
petition under Rule 108 contemplates a summary proceeding, substantial errors
like citizenship cannot be corrected therein. However, this ruling has already
been superseded by subsequent cases (Tolentino v. Paras, 122 SCRA 526; Rep.
v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462; Rep. v. Belmonte, 158 SCRA 173, among others) to
the effect that if all procedural requirements of Rule 108 are followed and all
persons with interest in the wrong entry had been notified and a full blown trial
is held, the proceedings are no longer summary but adversarial, and substantial
errors like citizenship can already be corrected under Rule 108.
15. Who are citizens of the Philippines under the 1987 Constitution?
Art. IV, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the citizens of the
Philippines as follows:
“(l) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
16. Who were citizens of the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution?
Art. Ill, Section l (l) of the 1973 Constitution provides that the following are
citizens of the Philippines:
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“(l) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of 1935; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
17. Since the 1973 Constitution considers as Filipino citizens those who
were such at the time of the adoption of said Constitution on January
17,1973, who are those referred to in said provision?
20. Where do you find the law providing for election of Philippine
citizenship under the 1935 Constitution?
21. Who were Filipino citizens at the time of the adoption of the 1935
Constitution on May 14, 1935?
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(1) Those born in the Philippines who resided therein on April 11, 1899
(the date of the ratification of the Treaty of Paris between the U.S. and Spain)
and were Spanish subjects on that date, unless they had lost their Philippine
citizenship on May 14, 1935;
(2) Natives of the Spanish Peninsula who resided in the Philippines on April
11, 1899, and who did not declare their intention of preserving their Spanish
nationality between that date and October 11, 1900 (the time provided for
doing so), unless they had lost their citizenship by May 14, 1935;
(3) Naturalized citizens of Spain who resided in the Philippines on April 11,
1899 and who did not declare their intention of preserving their Spanish
nationality between that date and October 11, 1900, unless they had lost
their citizenship by May 14, 1935;
(4) Children born of (l), (2), and (3) subsequent to April 11, 1899, unless
they had lost their Philippine citizenship by May 14, 1935;
(6) Children of persons embraced in (5), unless they had lost their
Philippine citizenship on or before May 14, 1935;
(8) Children of (7) who were still under 21 years of age at the time their
mothers regained Philippine citizenship (Roa v. Collector, 23 Phil. 321;
Talaroc y. Uy, GR L-5397, Sept. 26, 1952);
(9) Foreign women who, before May 14, 1935, got married to citizens of
the Philippines, who might themselves be lawfully naturalized in the
Philippines, unless they had lost their Philippine citizenship on or before May
14, 1935;
(10) All other persons born in the Philippines who, on the strength of the
erroneous application of the jus soli doctrine in the Roa case, were
mistakenly declared by the courts as Filipino citizens, unless they had lost
their citizenship by May 14, 1935. These are citizens by res judicata. (See
Tan Chong v. Sec. of Labor, GR L-47616, Sept. 16, 1947: Talaroc v. Uy,
supra).
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23. Suppose the Filipino mother of a child born under the 1935
Constitution was not legally married to her alien husband, what is the
citizenship of the child?
(3) Under the 1987 Constitution: Citizens of the Philippines who marry
aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission,
they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced their Philippine
citizenship (Art. IV, Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution).
Note: Unlike the similar provision in the 1973 Constitution, the above
provision of the 1987 Constitution now applies to both males and females who
marry aliens.
(1) In the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, Jan.20, 1967, it was held that
the proper proceeding wherein an alien woman married to a Filipino can be
herself declared a Filipino citizen is a naturalization proceeding in a court of
justice, and that any such declaration by any other office or agency is null and
void.
(2) In Moya Ya Lim Yao v. Comm. of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292 (1971), the
Supreme Court reversed the Burca ruling and held that “under Sec. 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 [the Revised Naturalization Law], an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipino
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Sec. 4 of
the same law.” This decision in effect ruled that it is not necessary for the alien
wife of a Filipino husband to prove in a court proceeding that she possesses all
the qualifications set forth in Sec. 2 and none of the disqualifications under Sec.
4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law. It is enough that she proves that she
is not disqualified to be a Filipino citizen not necessarily in court but even before
an agency like the Immigration Commission.
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Note also that an alien woman married to an alien husband who (the
husband) is subsequently naturalized also follows the Philippine citizenship of
her husband, provided she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under Sec. 4 of the same Revised Naturalization Law. This is a case of
derivative naturalization (similar to the minor children of a naturalized
Filipino citizen).
(3) However, in the recent case of Djumanton v. Domingo, 240 SCRA 746,
the Supreme Court held that there is no law guarantying aliens married to
Filipinos the right to be admitted into, much less given permanent residence in,
the Philippines. Entry of aliens into the Philippines and their admission as
immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipinos.
Marriage of an alien woman to a husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino
citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the Philippine
upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien.
Note: Unlike the Moya Lim case where the alien woman married to a
Filipino husband did not appear to have any disqualification for naturalization,
the alien woman in the above Djumanton case refused to leave this country
even after the expiration of her extended stay here and instead got married to a
Filipino, apparently to avoid her deportation.
(3) By administrative process, under Rep. Act No. 9139, otherwise known
as "The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000", approved in 2001.
Under this law, a Special Committee on Naturalization is created, with the
power to approve, deny or reject applications for naturalization filed with
said Committee. Members of the Committee are the Solicitor General as
chairman, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his representative and
the National Security Adviser as members.
26
27. What are the qualifications for judicial naturalization under Sec 2,
C.A. No. 473, as amended?
(1) The petitioner must not be less than 21 years of age on the date of the
hearing of the petition;
(4) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than P5,000,
Philippine currency, or must have some lucrative trade, profession, or
occupation;
(5) He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of
the principal Philippine languages; and
(6) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age in any of the
public or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools
where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire period of
the residence required of him, prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as citizen.
28. What are the disqualifications for naturalization under C.A. No. 473,
as amended?
(1) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein
since birth;
27
(2) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the filing of his/her petition;
(3) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the
underlying principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted
himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his/her
entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly
constituted government as well as with the community in which he/she is
living;
(4) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary
education in any public school or private educational institution duly
recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where
Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as
part of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any
race or nationality; Provided, that should he/she have minor children of
school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;
(5) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful
occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her
support and if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of
his/her family; Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants
who are college degree holders but are unable to practice their profession
because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;
(6) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of
the dialects of the Philippines; and
(7) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of
the Filipino people.
30. What are the disqualifications for naturalization under Rep. Act.
9139?
Sec. 4 of said Act provides that the following are not qualified to be
naturalized under the same:
28
Under Commonwealth Act. 63 as amended by Rep. Act. No. 106, a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways:
Note, however, that under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the woman in
No. (7) above retains her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she
is deemed under the law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship.
Under Sec 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Rep. Act No.
106, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired as follows:
(1) That the applicant be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have
resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for
naturalization;
29
his relations with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living; and
Chapter VIII.
2. Define domicile.
It is the place where a person "has his true, fixed, permanent home and
principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the
intention of returning" (Story, Conflict of Laws, sec. 41).
It is “the place where a person has a settled connection for certain legal
purposes, either because his home is there or because that is the place assigned
to him by law" (First Restatement, sec. 9).
"For the exercise of civil rights and fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence." (Art. 50,
New Civil Code).
30
Domicile in general speaks of one's permanent place of abode, while
citizenship or nationality indicates ties of allegiance and loyalty. A person may
be a citizen or national of one state and a domiciliary of another. Filipinos who
are immigrants abroad, like the holders of green cards in the U.S., are still
Filipino citizens, but their domicile is the country to where they have
permanently migrated.
(1) In some cases, our own law makes the law of the domicile of a person
the controlling factor in the solution of conflicts cases.
(2) Sometimes, our law makes either the law of one's nationality or that of
his domicile as the controlling factor.
(4) During the early years of American colonization of the Philippines, our
Supreme Court in some cases applied the domiciliary theory, like the case of the
validity of a divorce decree obtained abroad.
(5) Citizens of countries like the U.S. or Great Britain, which follow the
domiciliary theory, may become involved in litigation in our country, which
follows the nationality theory.
(6) Again, some great countries like the U.S. and Great Britain follow the
domiciliary theory, so that it would do well for us to make a comparative study of
the nationality and domiciliary theories.
6. What law determines one’s domicile, his national law or the lex fori?
The prevailing rule is that the forum applies its own concept of domicile in
determining the domicile of a litigant before its courts.
(c) Domicile of choice: The domicile of a person sui juris because he has
his home there and to which, whenever absent, he intends to return.
31
Note: Domicile of origin is acquired at birth; therefore, it never changes.
While constructive domicile is given after birth to those who lack capacity to
choose their own domicile, like minors, insanes, etc.
Also, domicile of origin never changes, for a person is born only once,
while constructive domicile may change from time to time, like when the parents
of a minor change domicile several times.
(1) No person can ever be without a domicile; or, every natural person
must have a domicile.
(2) A person cannot have two simultaneous domiciles.
(3) A natural person, free (not a prisoner) and sui juris (one of age and
under no disability) can change his domicile at pleasure.
(4) A domicile once acquired, is retained until a new one is gained.
(5) The presumption being in favor of the continuance of an existing
domicile, the burden of proof is on the one who alleges that a change
of domicile has taken place.
(6) To acquire a new domicile of choice, the following must concur:
(a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(b) an intention to remain there(animus manendi); and
(c) an intention not to return to the former abode (animus non
revertendi)
(Gallego v Vera, 73 Phil. 453)
(1) If the child is legitimate, his domicile of origin is that of his parents at
the time of his birth; if the parents are separated, the domicile of the custodial
parent.
If the child is legitimated, the domicile of his father at the time of his
birth controls, since the effects of legitimation retroacts to the time of the child’s
birth (Art. 180, Family Code).
(2) The domicile of origin of an adopted child is the domicile of his real
parents at the time of his birth, not the domicile of the adopters
(1) Minors
32
(c)In case of absence or death of either parent, the domicile of the
present parent. Even in case of the remarriage of the surviving parent,
still his/her domicile determines the constructive domicile of the minor
child.
(d) If the child is adopted, the domicile of choice of the adopter is
the child's constructive domicile.
(b) If the marriage is voidable: Apply the same rules as when the
marriage is valid. However, after annulment, the wife can freely select her
own domicile of choice.
(b) Soldiers - Since they are compelled to follow the dictates of the
military, their domicile is their domicile before their enlistment.
Chapter IX.
33
the law of his domicile, but by the law of the place (situs) where an important
element of the problem occurs or is situated.
(a) If his participation is active, i.e., when he does the act voluntarily, the
governing law is -the law of the actual situs of the transaction or event. –
(b) If the participation is passive, as when the effects of the act are set
forth or determined by law, the governing law is the law of the legal situs; i.e.,
the domicile of the individual concerned.
(a) Since the act of getting married is voluntary, the validity of the
marriage is governed by its actual situs, or the lex loci celebrationis (Art.
26, first par., Family Code)
(b) With respect to the rights and obligations, and property relations, of
the Filipino couple, however, they are governed by the national law of the
spouses, which regulates or fixes such matters between them; in other
words, the legal situs is the national law of the spouses. (Art. 80, Family
Code)
Art. 16, first par., of the New Civil Code provides that “real property as
well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated”. Thus, if the act or transaction involves property, whether real or
personal, the law that determines the validity of the transaction is the lex situs
or lex rei sitae. Even the capacity of the parties to the transaction is governed by
the lex situs or lex rei situs, not by the lex nationalii or the lex domicilii.
Chapter X.
Every internal or municipal law of a. state has two parts; (1) Its purely
internal or domestic law which applies to domestic cases; and (2J Its rules in
Conflict of Laws which it applies to cases with some foreign element.
Now, the problem of "renvoi" arises when there is doubt as to whether the
reference by the lex fori (the law of the country where the problem arises) to
the foreign law involves (l) a reference to the internal law of the foreign law or
(2) a reference to the entirety of the foreign law, including its conflicts rules.
34
In such case, if the first state follows the nationality theory, and the
second state follows the domiciliary theory, the problem of “renvoi” will most
probably arise.
Take the case of a California citizen who had resided in this country for 50
years and who dies here, leaving a sizable estate. Art. 16, sec. par., of the New
Civil Code provides that in testate or intestate succession, we should apply the
national law of the deceased which, in this case, is California law. But California’s
internal law has one rule for its own citizens who reside there, and another rule
for its citizens who have their domiciles abroad. In the latter case, California law
provides that the law of the domicile of its deceased citizen should apply. Thus,
while our Civil Code refers the matter to California law (the national law of the
deceased), California law refers the matter back to us, telling us to apply the law
of the deceased's domicile, which is Philippine law. Should the Philippine court
tasked to settle the estate of the deceased accept the “renvoi” and apply
Philippine law, or insist that California internal law binding on its own citizens-
residents should be applied, the same being the deceased's national law? This is
the “renvoi” problem.
3. Discuss why our Supreme Court accepted the “renvoi” in the case of
The Matter of the Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, Adolfo Aznar
and Lucy Christensen v. Helen Christensen Garcia. 7 SCRA 95 (l963).
The case referred to above is the first case decided by our Supreme Court
which raised the “renvoi” problem.
The facts of the case are: The deceased Edward Christensen was a
California citizen who had resided in the Philippines for a long time prior to his
death; hence, a domiciliary of the Philippines. In his will, he left almost his entire
estate to Lucy, an acknowledged natural child in California, and gave a small
legacy to Helen, an acknowledged natural child in the Philippines. Under
California internal law, its deceased citizen may dispose of his estate by will in
any manner he pleases. However, California law also provides that where its
deceased citizen resides in another country, the law of his domicile should
determine his succession. Thus, while Lucy contended that the will of the
deceased should be given effect, following California internal law, Helen insisted
that Philippine the law, of the domicile of the deceased, should be applied, under
which she is a forced heir and is entitled to a legitime.
The ruling: Recognizing that there were two sets of rules under California
internal law, one for its citizens who reside there and another for its citizens who
reside in other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court held that if it should refer the
matter to California law, said law will toss the problem back to us, which would
result in international football. Hence, we should apply Philippine law (the law of
the deceased's domicile) as directed by the conflicts rules of California,
especially as Philippine law makes acknowledged natural children forced heirs of
the parents recognizing them, while California law provides no legitime for such
children. As a result, Helen, the Filipino child, was given a legitime.
Note: The Supreme Court's ruling was obviously intended to favor the
Filipino child. What if no Filipino citizen was involved, like, for instance, if those
fighting over the estate of the deceased were all California citizens? Would our
Supreme Court have still accepted the “renvoi” and apply Philippine law?
4. There are actually four (4) solutions that court can adopt whenever it
is confronted with a “renvoi” problem like the Christensen case. What
are they?
35
This means that the court does not want the problem to be sent back to
us. That is, as in the case of the testate or intestate succession of a foreigner but
domiciled in our country, we would simply apply his national law, or the internal
law of his country.
Here, we refrain from applying the national law of the deceased foreigner,
although our law tells us to do so, if said law follows the domiciliary theory and
directs that we apply the law of the domicile of the deceased. So, in the end, we
still apply Philippine law.
Under this theory, we would simply do what the foreign court would do if
confronted with the same case. So that if the California court (as in the
Christensen case) would apply California internal law, we would do the same. If,
however, said court would apply Philippine law, we would follow suit. The
advantage of this theory is that regardless of forum, the applicable law will be
the same. But it can also result in international pingpong if we do what the
California court would do, but the California court would do what we do, etc.
This occurs when the local court, in adopting the foreign court theory,
discovers that the foreign court accepts the “renvoi.” But since the foreign law
remits the case to Philippine law, being the law of the deceased's domicile, the
foreign court may discover that Philippine law does not accept the remission (as
it applies the national law of the deceased), so the foreign court, sitting as a
Philippine court, would still apply its own internal law. This is then what our court
will apply.
They are not the same because while “renvoi” involves two laws,
transmission actually involves three laws.
36
Although the “renvoi” doctrine was invoked in this case, our Supreme
Court held that there was no “renvoi” problem here because the deceased Amos
G. Bellis was both a. citizen and a domiciliary of Texas, USA.
The facts: Bellis, a citizen and resident of Texas at that time of his death,
left some properties in the Philippines. Before his death, he executed two wills,
one following Texas law disposing of his properties in Texas, and another,
following Philippine law, disposing of his properties in the Philippines. Bellis had
several illegitimate children in the Philippines but in his two wills, he did not give
anything to his illegitimate children. During the settlement of his estate, the
illegitimate children opposed both wills because they had been deprived of their
legitimes, and insisting that Philippine law should be applied. There are no
compulsory heirs under Texas law, and Texas law, furthermore, does not have
conflicts rules governing the succession of its citizens.
Held: The illegitimate children are not entitled to any legitime because
under Texas law, which is the national law of the deceased and which we must
apply under Art. 16, par. two of the Civil Code, there are no compulsory heirs
and no legitimes.
As for the oppositors’ arguments that since the deceased executed two
wills, one to govern his estate in the Philippines and the other to govern his
Texas estate, it must have been the intention of the deceased to have Philippine
law govern his properties in the Philippines, the Supreme Court held that
following Miciano v. Brimo. 50 Phil. 867, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties in the Philippines shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not in accordance with his national law is illegal and void.
8. All in all, in the absence of definitive laws on the matter, how should
we resolve the “renvoi” problem in the Philippines?
Chapter XI.
37
“Birth determines personality, but the conceived child shall
be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it,
provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.”
In fact, Art. 5 of PD 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code) is more
precise when it provides that -
"The civil personality of the child shall commence from the time of
his conception, for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the re-
quirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code."
Depending on the conditions of its birth, there are, therefore, two kinds of
children:
38
a passenger in a bus suffers an abortion as a result of an accident
due to the negligence of the bus driver?
Death in this article means "physical death", not civil interdiction which is
sometimes regarded as "civil death", and which merely restricts, not
extinguishes, capacity to act (Art. 38 New Civil Code). A declaration of death in
accordance with one’s personal law (whether his national law or the law of his
domicile) by a court of competent jurisdiction is considered valid for all purposes.
(a) Within two (2) years after a person’s disappearance without leaving an
agent to administer his property, or having left an agent, the power of the latter
had expired, any interested person, relative, or friend may ask the competent
court to appoint a person to represent the absentee in all that may be necessary
(Art. 381, New Civil Code). The present spouse is, however, preferred in the
appointment when there is no legal separation (Art. 383).
(b) After the lapse of two (2) years without any news about the absentee
or since the receipt of the last news, and five (5) years if the absentee has left
an administrator of his property, his absence may be declared (Art. 384, id).
39
(c) The intestate heirs, if the absentee left no will;
(d) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right
subordinated to the condition of his death. (Art. 385, id.)
The procedure for the declaration of one's absence is found in Rule 107 of
the Revised Rules of Court. However, “the judicial declaration of absence shall
not take effect until 6 months after the publication in a newspaper of general
circulation” (Art. 386, id.).
8. When may the absentee be presumed dead, and for what purposes?
(b) For all other purposes except succession, an absence of seven (7)
years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is necessary (Art.
390, New Civil Code).
According to Art. 39, New Civil Code the following shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(b) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four (4) years;
(c) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances
(like earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, fire, dangerous expeditions, etc.).
Since age is part of one's personal status, it is the personal law (whether
the national law or the law of the domicile) of a person that determines whether
he has reached the age of majority or not.
40
11. What is the age of majority under Philippine law?
Republic Act. No. 6809, approved December 13, 1989, amended Art. 234
of the Family Code by reducing the age of majority to 18 years save the
exceptions established by existing law in special cases. But the age of
contracting marriage without parental consent has, under the same law,
remained at the age of twenty-one
Note that also under the same Rep. Act No. 6809, the responsibility of
parents (if the children live in their company) and guardians, for the torts
committed by their children and wards below 21 years of age, has been
retained. The result is that such parents and guardians are still responsible for
the damages caused by their children (as to parents) and wards (as to
guardians) even if the child is above 18 years of age (the age of majority) but
below 21 years of age. The defect of the provision is with respect to guardians of
minor children, because if the children are already above 18, they do not need
guardians anymore, unless they are under some other disability.
In countries that follow the nationality theory like the Philippines, the
capacity to contract of a person is governed by his national law and follows him
wherever he goes, while in countries like the U.S. and Great Britain that follow
the domiciliary theory, one's capacity to contract is governed by the law of his
domicile. In other words, a person’s capacity to contract is governed by his
personal law, whether it is the lex nationalii of the lex domicilii.
The exception in the Philippines are contracts involving real or personal
property, in which cases the lex situs or lex rei sitae applies including the
capacity of the contracting parties (Art. 15, New Civil Code).
41
the national law of the defendant, an Illinois citizen, in determining his capacity
to enter into a contract with the Philippine Government to work here as a
stenographer.
13. What about the use of names and surnames, which is also part of
one's status? What is the law on the matter?
Even aliens can ask for change of name in the Philippines, provided they
are domiciled here. In other words, the status of an alien is governed by the lex
domicillii or the law of his domicile (Ong Huan Tin v. Rep., L-20997, April 27,
1967). But an alien whose citizenship is either controverted or doubtful cannot
ask for a change of name under Rule 103 (Basas v. Rep., L-23595, Feb. 20,
1966).
As for Philippine substantive law on the use of names and surnames, Arts.
364 to 375 lay down the rules on the use of surnames by legitimate, legitimated,
adopted, and illegitimate children; married women as well as women whose
marriages had been annulled or who are legally separated from their husbands;
widows; and in case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants.
All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are considered
by the Family Code as illegitimate (Art. 165), whether the child is an acknow -
ledged natural child or a natural child by legal fiction as defined by the New Civil
Code or spurious, and they are all required to use the surname of the mother
under the Family Code (Art. 176). However, the new Republic Act No. 9255,
amending Art. 176 of the Family Code, now allows illegitimate children to use
the surname of the father “if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private written instrument is made by the
father” during the latter's lifetime.
The right to use a title of nobility depends upon the national law of the
person concerned (Rabel, Conflict of Laws, Vol. I, p. 169). Such persons may
continue using their titles of nobility in our country, but if they apply for
naturalization, they must renounce any hereditary title or order of nobility that
they possess (Sec. 17, Revised Naturalization Law). In fact, our Constitution (the
1935, 1973. and 1987) does not allow titles of royalty or nobility.
Legislative jurisdiction over one's status is the power of his personal law to
govern his status wherever he goes, while judicial jurisdiction is the power of the
courts to decide questions or controversies concerning one's status.
42
Thus, our courts can decide cases involving the status and capacity of
foreigners brought before them, but in doing so, our courts will apply the
personal law of the foreigner, whether it be his national law or the law of his
domicile, depending on what theory the country of his citizenship follows.
For example, even if the personal law of the foreigner allows divorce, he
cannot apply for divorce from his spouse before a Philippine court because we do
not recognize divorce and our courts have no jurisdiction to grant divorces.
However, a foreigner who applies for legal separation in our country on a ground
available under his national law but not under our law, may obtain a favorable
judgment from our courts, because it is his national law on legal separation that
our courts will apply, but subject to our procedural law.
Chapter XII.
A. MARRIAGE AS A CONTRACT
The Family Code prescribes essential as well as formal requisites for the
validity of a marriage. The essential requisites are (l) legal capacity, of the
contracting parties who must be male and female; and (2) consent freely given
in the presence of the solemnizing officers (Art. 2). While the formal requisites
are:
Like the absence of any of the essential requisites, the absence of any
formal requisite shall also render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35 (2), but an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage; the party or parties responsible for the irregularity will,
however, be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable (Art. 4. id.).
43
The above formal requisites apply also to foreigners who get married in
the Philippines. If one or both of the parties are foreigners, the foreigner must
submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage issued by the
diplomatic or consular officials of his/her country in the Philippines before he/she
can be issued a marriage license; while stateless persons or refugees need only
to submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to
contract marriage (Art. 21, id.).
Under Art. 26 of the Family Code, “all marriages outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(l), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38”.
In other words, we follow the rule of lex loci celebrationis; if valid in the
country of celebration, the marriage is also valid in the Philippines, except those
enumerated in said Art. 26.
(l) Either or both parties did not have the legal capacity to get married
(Art. 35 {l});
2) The marriage is immoral for being bigamous or polygamous (Art.
35{4})
(3) Consent of one party is lacking because of mistake as to the identity of
the other (Art. 35{5}).
(4) One of the parties was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the
marriage to comply with the essential marital obligations (Art. 36);
(5) The marriage is incestuous (Art. 37); or
(6) The marriage is void by reason of public policy (Art. 38).
(l) We still apply the rule of lex loci celebrations, but not the exceptions in
the first par. of Art. 26 of the Family Code, which apply only to Filipinos. But
universally considered incestuous marriages are excepted; i.e., marriages
44
between ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters; and marriages
that are highly immoral (bigamous or polygamous marriages in Christian
countries that prohibit such marriages).
(2) Re proxy marriages., while they are not allowed under Philippine
internal law, the rule in the U.S. is that where permitted by the law of the place
where the proxy participates in the marriage ceremony, they are entitled to
recognition at least insofar as the formal validity of the marriage is concerned.
This rule is intended to protect the wife and children (Salonga, supra, p. 266).
(3) As to marriages on board a vessel on the high seas, since the country
whose flag the ship is flying has jurisdiction over the ship, the rule is that
compliance with the law of the said country is required for the marriage to be
valid. In the U.S. where each state has its own law on marriage, the law of the
domicile of the ship owner governs (Salonga, supra, p. 267).
(4) If the parties or at least the husband is a Muslim (whose religion allows
plural marriages), it is believed that we would recognize up to four marriages of
the same husband (as recognized by the Philippine Muslim Code on Personal
Laws) to protect the rights of the wives and children.
If the marriage is valid under the law of one of the spouses while void
under the law of the other, we should uphold the validity of the marriage, unless
the marriage is universally incestuous or highly immoral (the same rule as to
foreigners who get married abroad).
It is believed that the national law of the Filipino -that is. Philippine law-
should be followed; otherwise, our public policy would be violated. This is true
both as to the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the marriage. Thus, a Filipino
cannot marry his or her American first cousin in the Philippines, such marriage
being prohibited by the Family Code. They cannot also marry without a marriage
license, unless the marriage is one exempt from such license.
B. MARRIAGE AS A STATUS
45
2. What law governs the personal relations of the spouses in Conflict of
Laws?
What law, then, should govern the personal relations of a Filipino wife,
who retains her Philippine citizenship, and her alien husband?
46
(1) If the spouses have the same nationality but they acquire a new
nationality by their common act, their new national law will govern their personal
relations.
(2) If the husband alone changes his nationality after the marriage, that
law of the last common nationality of the spouses would govern, to avoid
prejudice to the wife who would suffer a change in her rights without any free
exercise of choice on her part (as provided in the Hague Convention of 1905)
(3) If the spouses retain their different nationalities after the marriage, it
has been suggested that the national law of both spouses should govern (Rabel,
id., p. 327). Another writer, however, offers a better solution; i.e., apply the law
of the husband at the time of the marriage (Wolf, Private International Law, 360,
361). The result, it is claimed, will not necessarily be unfair to the wife, because
the then national law of the husband may even be more favorable to her than
her own national law. Besides, she should already know what the husband’s
national law was when they got married.
Some exceptions to the above rule would be, if the national law of the
husband violates the public policy of the forum, or the national law of the wife
happens to be the law of the forum, intended as it is to protect the wife's rights.
5. Finally, what are the personal rights and duties of husband and wife
under Philippine law?
(1) The spouses are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support (Art. 68, Family
Code).
(2) The spouses have the right to fix together the family domicile.
However, in case of disagreement between them, the court shall
decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the
other if the latter should live abroad, or for other valid and
compelling reasons which should not be incompatible with
the solidarity of the family (Art 69, id.).
(3) The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family (Art.
70, id.)
(4) The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both
spouses (Art. 71, id.).
(5) When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal
union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor, or injury
to the other or the family, the aggrieved spouse may apply to the court
for relief (Art. 72, id.).
6. Going now to the property relations of husband and wife, what are
the conflicts rules on the matter?
For the same reason that the personal relations of the spouses are
governed by the personal law of the husband if they are of different nationalities,
the same rule also applies to their property relations, or to the property regime
that governs their marriage.
47
In the Philippines, since we follow the nationality theory, the property
relations of the spouses are, in the absence of a marriage settlement between
them, governed by Philippine law, regardless of the place of the celebration of
the marriage and their residence (Art. 80, Family Code)
(l) If both spouses are aliens, in which cases the general rule in Conflict of
Laws will apply; and
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contract affecting real property,
whether situated in the Philippines or in a foreign country, in which cases the lex
situs will govern the formalities to be observed for the contract’s validity (Art.
15, New Civil Code)
A good example is the change that the Family Code introduced in the
property relations of the spouses. While the New Civil Code established the
system of conjugal partnership of gains between the spouses, the Family Code
changed the system or the regime to the absolute community regime. Thus,
couples who get married under the Family Code who did not enter into a
marriage settlement have a regime of absolute community of property between
them. However, marriages solemnized under the New Civil Code without
marriage settlements are still governed by said Civil Code; i.e., the spouses still
have a conjugal partnership of gains between them, subject, however, to the
changes introduced by the Family Code in the administration and disposition of
conjugal properties, which have retroactive effect, without prejudice to vested
rights acquired before the Family Code took effect (Art. 105, Family Code).
48
C. ANNULMENT and DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
Note: In Canon Law, there are only two categories of marriage: void and
valid. Void marriages are considered annullable, such that the remedy to declare
a marriage null and void under Canon Law is called annulment. Annulment in
Canon Law should, not be confused with annulment in the civil law which applies
only to voidable marriages.
2. If the marriage is null and void or an absolute nullity, can the parties
remarry without going to court, since after all, the marriage does not
exist at all?
No. Under Art. 40 of the Family Code which is a new provision, “the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.”
What the frarners of the Family Code wanted was for a person not to
assume that his or her marriage is null and void, even if such be the fact, but he
or she must first seek a judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage
49
before marrying again; otherwise, his or her second marriage will also be void
and even bigamous (See Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499; Vda. de
Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This new provision in the Family Code
abandons the old decisions of the Supreme Court to the effect that where a
marriage is illegal or void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary
to establish its invalidity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100
Phil. 1033).
The above article also protects the spouse who believes that his or her
marriage is null and void from being charged with bigamy if he or she marries
again, because there would already be a judicial declaration of the nullity of his
or her marriage before the remarriage. And this provision is retroactive.
Thus, a marriage void for lack of a marriage license still needs a judicial
declaration of nullity before the parties can marry again (Republic v. C.A. and
Castro. 236 SCRA 257; Domingo v. C.A., 226 SCRA 572). It has also been held
that where a party contracts a second marriage on the mere belief that his or
her spouse is already dead without filing a summary proceeding under Art. 41 of
the Family Code, the second marriage is bigamous and void (Navarro v.
Domagtoy. 259 SCRA 129).
3. What are the conflicts rules on annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriage?
In Conflict of Laws, the grounds for annulment of marriage, and those for
the declaration of nullity of marriage, are the grounds provided for by the
law alleged to have been violated which, in general, is the lex loci
celebrationis or the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated, with
certain exceptions, The reason is this: Considering that it is the lex loci
celebrationis that is usually applied to determine whether a marriage is valid or
not, it is the same law that also determines whether a marriage is voidable or
not, and whether it is void or not.
Thus, if Filipinos get married abroad, the lex loci celebrationis will
determine the grounds for annulment (Art 26, Family Code). For example, two
Filipinos get married in England. Let us assume that sterility is a ground for
annulment of marriage in England. The marriage of the two Filipinos will be
annullable on the ground of sterility, even if sterility is not a ground for
annulment under the Family Code. This is because English law is the lex loci
celebrationis.
As to foreigners who get married abroad, the exceptions to the lex loci
celebrationis would be the same as those in marriages as a contract; namely,
marriages that are highly immoral (like bigamous and polygamous marriages
between Christians) and universally incestuous marriages.
Since we follow the nationality theory, our courts have jurisdiction to take
cognizance of annulment and nullity suits in marriage in cases where the
litigants are Filipinos.
50
Domiciliaries of the Philippines can also file such suits in the Philippines.
In other countries, it is usually the courts of the parties’ domicile who have
jurisdiction over such cases, since that is the place which has the greatest
interest in the domestic relations of the spouses. Another reason for this rule is a
practical one: in order not to compel the parties, who are domiciled in one
country, to travel to their country of nationality just to file such cases.
D. ABSOLUTE DIVORCE
(1) The Siete Partidas, the law in force in the Philippines during the
Spanish regime and prior to the enactment of the Civil Code of Spain, allowed
only legal separation, not absolute divorce.
(2) Later, the provisions on divorce of the Civil Code of Spain were
suspended in the Philippines by Gov. Weyler, so that they were never enforced
in the Philippines (Benedicto v. Dela Rama, 3 Phil. 34, Francisco v. Jason, 60
Phil.442)
(3) On March 11, 1917, a Divorce Law (Act 2710) was passed in the
Philippines, but it recognized only two grounds for absolute divorce, adultery
on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband; and in
either case, there must be a previous conviction. Many couples did not,
therefore, apply for divorce under this law because they did not want their
children to have convicts for their parents.
(4) During the Japanese occupation, a law allowing absolute divorce was
passed (Executive Order No. 141) allowing divorce on 10 grounds. Many
Filipino couples took advantage of this law and sought divorce under its
provisions.
(5) Executive Order No. 141 was effective in this country until October 23,
1944 when General Douglas MacArthur reestablished the Commonwealth
Government, which resulted in the repeal of Exec. Order No. 141 and in effect
revived Act No. 2710.
(6) Act No. 2710 was later repealed by the New Civil Code, which allows
and recognized only legal separation. The draft of the Code had provisions on
divorce, but during the discussions over the draft of the Code in Congress and
with the strong opposition of the Catholic population of the country, absolute
divorce was eliminated and substituted with legal separation.
51
(7) The Family Code also does not allow absolute divorce except that
which is validly obtained abroad by a foreigner from his or her Filipino spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, in which case the Filipino spouse can also
remarry (Sec. par. , Art. 26, Family Code)
2. May an alien who had divorced his Filipino spouse in his home
country come back to the Philippines and ask for legal separation and
separation of property against his Filipino wife on the ground of the
latter’s adultery?
The two cases are similar. In the Van Dorn case, Richard Upton, the
American husband of Alice Reyes, and the latter, obtained a divorce in Nevada,
U.S.A. Thereafter, Alice Reyes married again in Nevada. Later, Upton came back
to the Philippines and claimed that a business in the name of Alice Reyes was
their conjugal property and that the latter should render an accounting and let
him manage said business. The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by
Upton from Alice released she latter from their marriage, and Upton had no legal
standing to sue Alice as he was no longer her husband when he filed the
aforementioned case after their divorce.
52
(a) The petitioner or respondent had his or her habitual residence in
the state where the divorce was obtained;
(b) If both spouses were nationals of said state; or
(c) Although the petitioner was a national of another country, he or
she had his or her residence in the place where the divorce was obtained.
(2) In the United States, a state has the duty to recognize a divorce
obtained in a sister state if the spouses were domiciled in the latter state.
(b) In legal separation, the grounds arise after the marriage; in annulment,
the grounds must exist at the time of or before the celebration of the marriage.
(c) In legal separation, the parties are still married to each other and
cannot remarry; in annulment, the marriage is set aside and the parties can
marry again.
(d) In legal separation, the grounds are those given by the national law or
the domiciliary law of the parties concerned, inasmuch as the question is one
of status; annulment, on the other hand, questions the very existence of that
status; so that as a general rule, the grounds for annulment are those given by
the lex loci celebrationis, subject to certain exceptions.
(a) If the parties are of the same nationality, the grounds for legal
separation are those given by their personal law (whether national law of the
domiciliary law, as the case may be).
(b) If the parties are of different nationalities, the grounds available under
the personal law of the husband as well as those available under the law of the
wife are all available grounds for granting the legal separation. (Hague
Convention on Legal Separation, Art. 8).
53
4. What courts may grant legal separation? Or, in what country should
the case be filed?
(a) Jurisdiction in the case of aliens is not assumed by the forum unless
the national law of the parties is willing to recognize its jurisdiction.
(b) In the Philippines, foreigners may ask for legal separation here, even if
they did not get married in this country. What is important is that the court has
jurisdiction over both parties.
(c) Most countries assume jurisdiction over cases for legal separation on
the basis of the domicile of one of the parties or the matrimonial domicile. The
rationale for this rule is that the law of the domicile of the parties is that with
which they are most intimately connected (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed. ,
395-396).
5. Is it necessary that the cause for legal separation take place in this
country for our courts to have jurisdiction over the case?
6. What are the grounds for legal separation under the internal law of
the Philippines?
54
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation;
(6) Prescription. (Art. 56, Family Code)
8. What is the prescriptive period for the filing of the action in the
Philippines?
Within five (5) years from the time of the occurrence of the cause (Art. 57,
Family Code)
9. Can the wife drop the name of the husband after the decree of legal
separation?
No, because they are still married. And this is true whether she is the
guilty party or not.
As held in Laperal v. Republic, 6 SCRA 357, the wife who has been granted
legal separation cannot petition to be allowed to revert to her maiden name.
10. If one of the parties in a legal separation case dies during the
pendency of the case, should the case be dismissed or does it survive?
11. Does the offended spouse inherit from the guilty spouse? What
about the guilty spouse, does he or she inherit from the innocent
spouse?
Of course the offended spouse inherits from the guilty spouse because the
parties are still married to each other.
As for the guilty spouse, he or she is disqualified from inheriting from the
innocent spouse by intestate succession, and provisions in the will of the latter
favorable to him or her are revoked by operation of law (Art. 63 (4), Family
Code).
However, to disqualify the guilty spouse from inheriting from the innocent
spouse by intestate succession, the latter must file a case of legal separation
against the former. This is provided in Art. 1002, New Civil Code, stating that “in
case of legal separation, if the surviving spouse gave cause for the separation,
he or she shall not have any of the rights granted in the preceding articles”
(meaning the right to inherit by intestate succession). But there must be a
decree of legal separation as stated in Question 10 hereof.
Chapter XIII.
STATUS OF CHILDREN
(a) If the parents are of the same nationality, their common personal law,
whether their national law or the law of their domicile, will be applied. (I Rabel,
supra).
55
If the parents are of different nationalities, the personal law of the father
governs (Rabel, id.).
(b) In the Philippines, since we follow the nationality theory (Art 15, New
Civil Code), the common national law of the parents applies, and if they have
different nationalities, the national law of the father governs.
Art. 164 of. the Family Code defines legitimate children as “children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents”; while illegitimate children
are defined by the succeeding Art. 165 as "children conceived and born outside
a valid, marriage, xx x unless otherwise provided in this Code”.
As for the exceptions to Art. 165 of the Code defining who are illegitimate
children, the exceptions referred to are the children born of void marriages
under Art. 36 (void because of the psychological incapacity of one of the
spouses) and under Art. 53 (those born of the first marriage of parties before
said first marriage had been annulled or declared void, and who marry a second
time without delivering the presumptive legitime of the children of their first
marriage).
The rights of legitimate and legitimated children under Art. 174 of the
Family Code are:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity
with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames;
Note: The legitime of each legitimate child is half of the parent's estate
divided by the number of legitimate children (Art. 888, New Civil Code); while in
intestate succession, legitimate children inherit equally (per capita) without
distinction as to age or sex, and even if they spring from different marriages
(Art. 979. id.)
Art. 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children have the
rights:
56
(1) To use the surname of the mother;
(2) To be under the parental authority of the mother;
(3) To support in conformity with this Code;
(4) To the legitime, which is one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child.
Remember that under the new Rep. Act No. 9255, illegitimate children
may now use the surname of the father "if their affiliation has been expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private written instrument
is made by the father" during the latter's lifetime.
5. What law governs the rights and duties between parent and child?
(a) If the child is legitimate as determined by the above rules, either the
common personal law of the parents, or the personal law of the father if the
parents are of different nationalities, governs. (Rabel, id.).
(c) In the Philippines, again since we follow the nationality theory, the law
of the mother governs if the child is illegitimate, unless the child is again
recognized by the father, in which case the personal law of the father (whether it
is the same as the mother) applies.
B. LEGITIMATION
57
Under Art. 177, the following requisites must concur in order that a child
may be legitimated:
(a) The child was conceived and born outside lawful wedlock.
(b) The parents, at the time of the child's conception, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other.
Note: The additional requirement under Art. 270 of the New Civil Code
that the parents must have acknowledged the child first before or after their
marriage, is no longer necessary under the Family Code, because this Code has
deleted recognition of natural children and already confers on legitimate and
illegitimate children their status at the moment of birth. Children that fall under
Art. 177 of the Family Code are, therefore, ipso facto legitimated upon the
subsequent marriage of the parents no matter how long a period of time has
elapsed from the birth of said children to the time of the marriage of their
parents.
(See also comments by this same author on Arts. 177 to 182 of the
Family Code in her “Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines”).
The immutablity of the status of a legitimated child is very clear under Art
180 of the Family Code which provides that “the effects of legitimation shall
retroact to the time of the child's birth”. Also, Art. 178 provides that “the
annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation”.
They have the same rights as legitimate children (Art. 179), namely:
Note: In De los Santo s v. Luciano, 60 Phil. 328, it was held that the
legitimated daughter of a man can inherit from the man's brother as a legitimate
niece.
C. ADOPTION
(a) Before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, our law on
adoption was PD 603 (the Child and Youth Welfare Code), which expressly
repealed all the provisions of the New Civil Code on adoption.
58
(c) Subsequently, all the provisions of PD 603 and Executive Order No. 91
on substantive matters were repealed by Title VII of the Family Code. Certain
procedural provisions of PD 603 on adoption (Arts. 32 to 38) were not, however,
repealed by the Family Code.
Under the Family Code, aliens were not allowed to adopt in the Philippines
anymore except those referred to in Art. 184 (3) thereof, and non-resident aliens
were allowed to adopt Filipino children only under the law on Inter-Country
Adoption (Republic Act No. 8043) which was signed by former Pres. Fidel V.
Ramos on June 7 1995 Under this law, the adoption proceedings are to be held in
the home country of the adopters.
(d) Still later, on February 25, 1988, former Pres. Ramos signed Republic
Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998”,
amending many provisions of the Family Code on domestic adoption.
(a) The old definition of adoption in the Partidas is that it is "the act
whereby one person is received as the offspring of another although he is not
such by nature".
This definition was based on the theory that adoption is mainly for the
benefit of the adopter, so that those who have no children or have lost them,
may have the solace and joys of parenthood, and that the void which exists in
childless homes may be filled (Ynigo v. Republic, 95 Phil. 244).
“Adoption is thus given a social and moral purpose; that is, to extend to
the orphan or to the child of the indigent, the incapacitated or the sick, the
protection of society in the person of the adopter” (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Phil., 694).
The legal effects of the adoption are determined by the same law that
created the relationship of adoption.
59
(a) As stated in the discussion of Question No. 1 hereof, while the Civil
Code of the Philippines did not allow non-resident aliens to adopt, PD 603
liberalized the Civil Code provisions on adoption and allowed even non-resident
aliens to come to the Philippines and adopt our children here.
(b) The Family Code, however, became strict in adoption of aliens in the
Philippines because of reports received by the Committee that drafted the Code
(of which this author was a member) that some Filipino children adopted by
aliens and brought by the latter to their home countries suffered cultural and
psychological shock and could not adjust to their new lives in the foreign
countries of their foreign adopters. Also, information was received that old alien
pedophiles, after having been allowed to adopt Filipino children in the
Philippines, would, after bringing said children to their home countries, simply
abandon these children after they had satisfied their sexual desires on them.
There were even alleged cases of Filipino children who, after having been
adopted by foreigners, were killed for organ transplants in the foreign homes of
their adopters. Hence, the Committee believed that by limiting adoption of
Filipino children by aliens to former Filipino citizens (and/or their spouses)
related by blood to the adopted children, the latter would be given some
measure of protection by the adopters who are their relatives by consanguinity.
(c) Republic Act No. 8552 or the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998" again
allows aliens (who are not former Filipino citizens) to adopt in our country,
provided:
Note, however, that the special kinds of aliens enumerated above by Rep.
Act 8552 are required to be related to the child to be adopted within the 4th
degree of consanguinity or affinity. Art. 184 of the Family Code which the
above provision of Rep. Act 8552 amends did not limit the degree of
consanguinity between the adopter and adopted child. On the other hand, Sec.
7(b) of Rep. Act 8552 includes children related within the 4th degree of affinity
60
to the adopting parent, which relationship of affinity was not included in Art. 184
of the Family Code.
This author cannot understand, though, why Rep. Act 8552 in the above
provision limits the degree of relationship by consanguinity of the adopter and
the adopted child only to the 4th degree. This means that a former Filipino would
not be able to adopt the child of his or her first cousin (5th degree) or his or her
second cousin (6th degree). Since the important consideration here is the love
and protection that a relative by blood, who is now an alien, can give to the child
once the latter is brought to the adopter's foreign home, it is immaterial how
close they are related by blood.
6. The cases of Republic v. C.A. and Hughes, 227 SCRA 401, and
Republic v. Judge Toledano, GR. 94147, June 6, 1994, decided by the
Supreme Court, denied the joint petitions for adoption filed under the
Family Code by former Filipino wives, now American citizens, and their
American husbands, because what the Family Code only allowed was
joint adoption by Filipino citizens and their aliens spouses. Are these
decisions still good under Rep. Act 8552?
No more if the aliens husbands of former Filipino wives can comply with
the requirements for alien adopters under Sec. 7 (b) of Rep. Act 8552.
But, Rep. Act 8552 still requires that husband and wife must jointly
adopt, which joint adoption was also required by the Family Code, except when
one spouse seeks to adopt his or her own illegitimate child, or when one spouse
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other spouse (Art. 185, Family Code).
Republic Act 8552 adds that in cases where the spouses are legally separated
(Act. 7, sec. par., sub. par. {iii}), the husband or the wife can adopt alone, and
the consent of the other spouse to an adoption filed by one spouse is no longer
necessary.
(1) All legal ties between the biological parent /parents and the
adopted child are severed and the same shall be vested in the adopter/adopters,
except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter. In other
words, parental authority over the adopted child is transferred to the adopter.
(2) The adopted child shall be considered for all intents and purposes to
be the legitimate child of the adopter/adopters, and as such is entitled to all the
rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate children.
(3) In legal and intestate succession, the adopter/adopters and the
adopted child shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. Testamentary succession will, however, apply if the adopted
child and the adopter or adopters had left a will.
(Secs. 16, 17, 18, Rep. Act 8552)
(1) Adoption proceedings in our country are always judicial and in rem ;
i.e.. publication is required as constructive notice of the petition for adoption to
the whole world, since adoption creates status.
(2) Since there can be no valid adoption without a court decree granting
the same, a mere agreement of adoption between the adopters and the parents
of the child is not a valid adoption (Santos-Ynigo v. Republic, 95 Rep. 244), nor
61
the fact that the child had been adopted de facto (ampon) by the alleged
adopting parents (Lazatin v. Judge Campos, 92 SCRA 250).
(3) Neither is the mere registration of the child in the civil registry as the
child of the adopter a valid adoption. This even amounts to the crime of
simulation of birth punishable by prison mayor in the medium period, and a fine
not exceeding P50,000.00 (Sec. 2l (b), Rep. Act 8552).
(4) The capacity and right of the adopter to file a petition for adoption, are
governed by the law in force at the time the petition is filed, and cannot be
impaired by a new law disqualifying him or her for adoption (Republic v. C.A. and
Bobiles, GR 92326, 24 Jan. 1992; Republic v. Miller, GR 125937, April 21, 1999).
This is particularly true if both the adopter and the adopted child are
nationals or domiciliaries of the forum that decreed the adoption (Rabel, id., p.
647).
10. Does adoption confer on the adopted child the citizenship of the
adopter?
No, adoption does not confer on the adopted child the citizenship of the
adopter. Adoption is a matter political, and not civil, in nature, and the ways in
which it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil Code (Uggi
Lindamand Therkelsen v. Republic, 12 SCRA 400; also Ching Leng v. Galang, L-
11931, 27 Oct. 1958).
Chapter XIV.
There are two theories or systems in determining the proper law for the
transmission of successional rights; the unitary or single system, and the split
or scission system.
62
However, under the split or scission system, which England and the
United States adopt, succession to real property is governed by the lex situs,
while succession to movable or personal property is governed by the law of the
domicile of the deceased at the time of his death.
Extrinsic validity deals with the forms and solemnities in the making of
wills, which include the age and testamentary capacity of the testator and the
form of the will (whether oral or written, public or private instrument, notarial or
holographic, the number of witnesses, etc.).
Intrinsic validity concerns itself with the order of succession, the amount
of successional rights each heir gets, and such other matters that fall under the
term "substance" as distinguished from "forms and solemnities" of wills.
(a) If a Filipino makes a will abroad, he may comply with the formalities of
Philippine law (lex nationalii) or the lex loci celebrationis (the law of the place
where he was at the time of the execution of the will (Art. 815, New Civil Code).
Thus, a Filipino doctor working in New York may execute a will in
accordance with Philippine law or New York law.
(b) If an alien makes a will abroad, he may comply with the formalities of
his lex nationalii (the law of the country of which he is a citizen), the lex domicilii
(the law of his domicile) (Art. 816, New Civil Code), or the lex loci celebrationis
(the law of the country where he was at the time of the execution of the will).
(Art. 17, i.d.).
(c) If an alien makes a will in the Philippines, he may comply with the
formalities of his own country (lex nationalii) or of Philippine law (lex loci
celebrationis)
(d) As for a holographic will, which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself, it is subject to no other form and may
be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed (Art. 810, New
Civil Code).
(a) Filipinos cannot make joint wills whether here or abroad. Thus, a joint
will made by two Filipinos in a foreign country is void even if valid under the lex
loci celebrationis (Art. 819, New Civil Code).
(b) Joint wills made by aliens abroad shall be considered as valid in the
Philippines if valid according to their lex nationalii or lex domicilii or if valid under
the lex loci celebrationis (Arts. 816 and 17, id.)
(c) Joint wills made by aliens in the Philippines are void even if valid under
their lex nationalii or lex domicilii, in order that our public policy on joint wills
may not be militated against.
63
(d) A joint will executed by an alien and a Filipino citizen abroad will be
valid as to the alien (if his national law, law of the domicile, or the lex loci
celebrationis allows it), but void as to the Filipino, the same being against our
public policy on joint wills.
The New Civil Code applies the lex nationalii of the decedent in par. 2 of
its Art. 16. This was also followed by the Supreme Court in Miciano v. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867; Bellis v. Bellis, 20 SCRA 558; and Cayetano v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA
522).
In civil law countries like the Philippines, the national law of the deceased
applies. In common law countries like the U.S. and Great Britain which follow the
split or scission system, the lex domicilii of the deceased at the time of death
applies with respect to personalty, while the lex situs applies with respect to real
property.
(a)Under Art. 829 of the New Civil Code, a revocation done outside the
Philippines by a person who does not have his domicile here, is valid if done
according to:
(l) The law of the place where the will was made (lex loci celebrationis);
or
(2) The law of his domicile at the time of revocation (lex domicilii).
A problem here would arise if the testator revokes his will while
domiciled in one country and later, changes his domicile, then dies in
the latter state. If the laws of his former domicile and his domicile at
the time of his death are different, which law applies? Common sense
and logic should apply the law of the domicile at the time of the
testator's death, but this is not what our law says.
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(c) If the revocation is done outside the Philippines by a person who is
domiciled here, it is valid if made in accordance with our law (the lex domicilii) or
the lex loci actus of the revocation (the place where the revocation was made)
(see Art.. 17, par. 1, New Civil Code).
(c) If the will admits of different interpretations, that which will make the
dispositions operative shall be preferred. The interpretation that will give the will
the most favorable construction to accomplish its purpose shall be made (Arts.
788-792, New Civil Code).
(d) Every effort should be made to prevent intestacy in keeping with the
policy of respecting the will of the testator, provided that this can be
ascertained.
10. What is probate, and what are the conflicts rules on probate of
wills?
(a) Probate is the process of proving before a competent court the due
execution of a will, that the testator was possessed of testamentary capacity,
and the approval by said court of the will.
(c) Under Art. 838 of the first paragraph of the New Civil Code, "no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court".
(d) There is no period of prescription for the probate of a will. For the
probate of a will is not exclusively established in the interest of the surviving
heirs but primarily for the protection of the testator’s expressed wishes in the
disposition of his properties. Since the probate of validly executed wills is
required by public policy, the State could not have intended the Statute of
Limitations to defeat said policy. (Guevata v. Guevara, GR L-5405, Jan. 31,
1956).
(e) Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of
each country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper court in the
Philippines (Rule 77, sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court).
(f) Although a foreign will had already been probated in a foreign country,
it still has to be reprobated in the Philippines in accordance with our procedural
law, because a foreign judgment, no matter how intrinsically meritorious, cannot
have, as a general rule, automatic extraterritorial effect. But instead of proving
all over again the due execution of the will, it is ordinarily sufficient to ask for the
enforcement here of the foreign judgment of the probate abroad.
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(g) The evidence necessary for the probate or allowance of wills which
have been probated outside the Philippines are:
1) The due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign law
because we cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
2) The testator had his domicile in the foreign country where the will
was probated;
3) The will had been admitted to probate in said country;
4) The foreign tribunal is a probate court;
5 ) The laws of the foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills
were followed.
(Vda. De Perez v. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722).
(e) The rights, powers, and duties of the executor or administrator are co-
extensive with the territorial jurisdiction of the court that qualified or appointed
him. Thus, an executor or administrator qualified or appointed by a Philippine
court has jurisdiction only over the properties of the deceased located in the
Philippines.
If the deceased had properties but left no heirs and no will, how can the
country where the properties are located claim said properties?
66
There are two theories adopted by different states so that they may claim
the properties left by a deceased who left no heirs and no will.
First, some countries including England and most American states adopt
the theory that such properties have become ownerless (bona vacantia); hence,
they should revert to the state where they are situated by escheat.
In the Philippines and some civil law countries, the theory adopted is that
the State is the last heir of a deceased person. Hence, the State succeeds to the
properties left by said deceased as an heir.
The Philippines can, however, claim said properties and business interest,
by adopting the theory of “caduciary rights” of the State. This is in consonance
with the proposition that in a situation such as this, "rules of conflict of laws are
largely abandoned and each country appears to work on the principle of seizing
all property of the deceased lying within its borders”; i.e., the Philippines should
regard said properties as ownerless or bona vacantia. In short, the properties
pass to the Philippines as an incident of sovereignty, not as an heir (Black's Law
Dictionary, Abridged, 5th ed., p. 92).
Chapter XV.
PROPERTY
1. Are the conflicts rules on real and personal property the same?
Almost all legal systems adopt the lex situs or lex rei sitae, i.e., the law of
the place where the property is located or situated, with respect to real property.
Thus, the law of the place where it is situated governs everything concerning
real property. The reason for the rule is clear and logical. "As the place where a
thing is situated is the natural center of rights over it, everybody concerned with
the thing may be expected to reckon with the law of such place." (Wolff, Private
International Law, p. 564). Indeed, a reference to the lex situs of real property
satisfies the need for certainty, predictability, anil uniformity, as well as the
reasonable expectations of the parties, in dealing with real property.
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properties did not have a fixed situs, an artificial situs was given to them;
namely, the personal law of the owner.
Recently, in many countries, the lex situs or lex rei sitae has also been
adopted with respect to personal properties, the chief reason for the change
being that the situs is easily ascertainable, making it convenient for the parties
and third persons who may be affected by rights in rem created over personal
properties to have those rights enforced and made effective (Wolff, id.). As the
place where the properties are located has the legal and coercive power to
enforce said rights, the lex situs or lex rei sitae applies to said properties
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 470).
2. How about in the Philippines, have we also adopted the rule of the
lex situs or lex rei sitae with respect to personal properties?
Yes, for Art. 15 of the New Civil Code provides that "real property as well
as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated".
3. What was the reason given for the change of rule in the New Civil
Code?
Indeed, it has been held that personal property may be separated from its
owner, who may be taxed on its account at the place where the property is
located, although he is not a domiciliary, citizen or resident of the state which
imposed the tax (Manila Gas Cor. v. Collector, 62 Phil. 895). In fact, the concept
of movable property has so grown in the Philippines that even intangible
properties like shares of stock in a corporation, franchises, credits and the like
are now considered movable property although they have no physical or
material situs.
4. What matters connected with real property are governed by the lex
situs?
The exceptions to the application of the lex situs or lex rei sitae with
respect to real properties are the following:
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(1) Succession: In civil law countries like the Philippines, testate and
intestate succession, whether the properties are real or personal and
wherever they may be located, is governed by the national law of the
deceased, not the lex situs, including the order of succession, the amount
of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of testamentary
dispositions (Art. 16, par. 2, New Civil Code).
Capacity to succeed is also governed by the national law of the
deceased (Art. 1039, id.).
(2) Contracts involving real property but do not deal with title or real
rights over the property, the issue being the contractual rights and
liabilities of the parties, are governed by the proper law of the contract;
i.e., either the lex loci voluntatis or the lex loci intentionis .
6. What are the difficulties in applying the rule of the lex situs or lex rei
sitae to movables or personal properties, and how are they to be
resolved?
(2) The aforesaid personal properties which are usually in motion or do not
have tangible existence are thus given artificial or constructive situs, which will
be discussed in the succeeding questions.
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(a) As to liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of goods in
transit, the law of destination is applied (Example is Art. 1753 of the
New Civil Code).
(b) The validity and effect of seizure of goods in transit are governed
by law of the place where the goods were seized which is their
temporary situs.
(c) Disposition or alienation of goods in transit is generally governed
by the proper law of the contract between the parties (the lex loci
voluntatis or lex loci intentionis). The reason is obvious: such
disposition or alienation is effected through a contractual obligation.
In some states, however, the transfer of title to chattels is governed
by the law of the place where the chattels are located at the time of
the transfer, and this title will ordinarily be recognized in any other
state where the chattels are brought or transferred.
(3) Situs of a debt for taxation purposes is the domicile of the creditor,
where the collectible credit may be taxed. (Minor, id ., pp. 281-282).
(4) For the purpose of administering debts, the situs is the place where
the assets of the debtor are actually situated (Minor, id., pp. 283-285).
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(bb) The American Restatement, however, claims that the situs
is the place where the instrument was executed (Am. Restatement,
p. 348).
(2) The law that determines the validity of the transfer, delivery, or
negotiation of negotiable instrument is generally the law of the situs of
the instrument at the time of transfer, delivery, or negotiation (Cheshire,
Priv. Int. Law, p. 622).
(l) Sales of corporate stocks are governed by the law of the place of
incorporation, since it is there that the transfer is recorded in the books of
the corporation (Beale, Foreign Corporations, Sec. 376; also, Sec. 650,
Corporation Code of the Philippines).
Attaching or execution creditors are not bound by the transfer
unless entered in the books of the corporation (Unson v. Diosomito, 61
Phil. 535), unless said creditors actually knew of the unregistered transfer
(Fua Cun v. Summers, 44 Phil. 705).
(d) Franchises:
Art. 521 of the New Civil Code provides that goodwill of a business is
property and may be transferred together with the rigrit to use the name
under which the business is conducted.
The goodwill of a business, as well as taxation thereon, is governed by
the law of the place where the business is carried on. "Goodwill" is the
patronage of any established trade or business; the benefit acquired by an
establishment beyond the value of its capital stocks, funds, or property, in
consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement that it
receives from its customers (See Menendez v. Holt, 128 US 514).
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(2) In the Philippines, Art. 520 of the New Civil Code provides that "a
trade-mark or trade-name duly registered in the proper government
bureau or office is owned by and pertains to the person, corporation, or
firm registering the same, subject to the provisions of special laws."
(3) Under Sec. 21-A of Rep. Act No. 166, as amended by Sec. 7 of Rep.
Act. No. 638), any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or
trade name has been registered or assigned under this Act may bring an
action for infringement, for unfair competition, or false designation of
origin or false description, whether or not it has been licensed to do
business in the Philippines under the Corporation Code, at the time it
brings the complaint; Provided that the country of which the said foreign
corporation or juristic person is a citizen or in which it is domiciled, by
treaty, convention, or law, grants a similar privilege to corporations or
juristic persons of the Philippines.
(6) In Philips Erport B.V. v. CA, 206 SCRA 457 (1992), the Supreme
Court reiterated its earlier decision in Western Equipment and Supply Co.
v. Reyes, 51 Phil 115 (1927), that a corporation’s right to use its corporate
and trade name is a property right, a right in rem, which is entitled to
protection like any other tangible property, and cannot be impaired or
defeated by subsequent appropriation by another corporation in the same
field.
(8) In 1998, Congress passed Rep. Act No. 8293 known as “The
Intellectual Property Code” and establishing the Intellectual Property
Office. Under Sec. 123 of the Act, certain marks cannot be registered,
among which are those –
“x x x identical with, or confusingly similar to, or constituting
a translation of a mark which is considered by a competent
authority of the Philippines to be well-known internationally
and in the Philippines, whether or not it is registered here, as
being the mark of a person other than the applicant for
registration, and used for identical or similar goods or
services”.
Sec. 3 of the same Act provides that any foreign corporation, being
a national or domiciliary of a country which is a party to a convention,
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treaty, or agreement relating to intellectual property rights to which the
Philippines is also a party or which extends reciprocal rights to our
nationals by law, “shall be entitled to benefits to the extent necessary to
give effect to any provision of such convention x x x”. Such foreign
corporation even if it is not engaged in business in the Philippines may
nevertheless bring a civil or administrative action for opposition,
cancellation, infringement, or unfair competition, as provided for in Sec.
160 of the Act. However, under Sec. 156, same Act, only owners of
registered marks may recover damages from any person who infringes his
rights.
Chapter XVI.
CONTRACTS
"Contract" is defined by Art. 1305 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as "a
meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect
to the other, to give something or to render some service".
Every state, in the exercise of its sovereignty, has the right to determine
its own law on contracts. As long as there is no foreign element in a contract,
questions pertaining thereto are governed by the law of the forum state. It is
when there is a foreign element in a contract that problems arise, for then, the
forum will have to decide what law should be applied in determining the
existence or non-existence of a contract, as well as its validity, both extrinsic
and intrinsic, and the capacity of the contracting parties.
Art. 17 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "the forms and
solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by
the laws of the country in which they are executed". And Sec. 9 of the American
Restatement Second, considers as binding the "formalities which meet the
requirements of the place where the parties executed the contract".
73
(l) Art. 1319, par. 2 of our Civil Code states that "acceptance
made by letter or telegram does not bind the offeror except from the
time it came to his knowledge. The contract, in such a case, is
presumed to have been entered entered in the place where the offer
was made.
In the Philippines, the lex loci celebrationis is, therefore, the
country of execution.
(c) By way of other exceptions are, when the lex loci contractus or lex
loci celebrationis contravenes an established and important policy of the
forum; or to apply it would work gross injustice to the people of the forum;
or if the transaction is contra bonos mores. Remember that the
enforcement of a foreign law is only a matter of comity, and the foregoing
cases are clear exceptions to comity.
B. CAPACITY OF PARTIES
(b) In the Philippines, Art. 15 of the New Civil Code provides that capacity
of a Filipino is governed by Philippine law, and this is so because we follow the
nationality theory.
A 20-yr. old Filipino enters into a contract in Italy where the age of
majority is 21. Can the Filipino later plead his incapacity under Italian law (which
is the lex loci celebrationis) to avoid liability under the contract?
No, because under Phil, law, he has the capacity to contract (Rep. 6809
has reduced the age of majority to 18 years). Art. 15, Civil Code of the
Philippines provides that capacity to contract of Filipinos is governed by their
national law.
3. What law will govern the incapacity of the alien in the following
specific problem?
74
An 18-yr. old alien, who has no capacity to contract under his national law
wherein the age of majority is 21, enters into a contract in the Philippines. Can
he later plead his incapacity under his national law to evade the contract?
No, because to apply the national law (or law of the domicile) of the alien
in determining his capacity to contract would require Filipinos to first ascertain
what the personal law of that alien is, sometimes with great difficulty, such that
business transactions with aliens would be greatly impeded.
4. The weakness of applying the national law of the contracting party
as to his capacity in the foregoing cases is thus seen. How can such
difficulties be avoided under our law?
75
2. But there should be limitations to the court’s choice-of-law in
determining the intrinsic validity of contracts. Can you state what they
are?
(a) Generally, the parties cannot select a law that has no connection at all
with the transaction.
(b) If the law selected should change, it is the new law that should be
applied, for it may be presumed that the parties knew that law can always be
changed as times and conditions change. The exception is, when the change is
so revolutionary that it could never have been contemplated by the parties
(Wolff, supra, 430-431).
(c) Several laws may be selected, each of which will govern the different
elements of the transaction (Cheshire, Private International Law, p. 236)
(d) If under the selected law, the contract is legal, but in the place of
performance, it is illegal, the selected law should prevail and the contract should
be considered legal (II Rabel, supra, p.537). Otherwise, the place of
performance, which could be merely accidental, will control. Besides, the place
of performance may be different under different laws (Wolff, supra, p. 135)
(e) Assuming that the law of the place of performance can be ascertained, (as
when it is expressly agreed upon by the parties), still, questions of substantial
and essential validity (such as whether the contract is valid, voidable, or void)
should be governed by the proper law of the contract. Only minor details (such
as the time of payment during business hours) should be governed by the law of
performance (Chesire, supra).
(f) While the parties may stipulate on the proper law of the contract, they
cannot stipulate on the jurisdiction of courts or to oust our courts of their
jurisdiction (Molina v. De la Riva, 6 Phil. 12).
(g) The parties cannot also contract away applicable provisions of our law
that are heavily impressed with public interest or which involve public policy
(like our labor laws) (Pakistan International Airlines v. Ople, 190 SCRA 99).
(h) American law recognizes "cognovit" clauses if the parties were of equal
bargaining power and the debtor voluntarily agreed to said clause.
“Cognovit" clauses specify which courts would have jurisdiction in case
of breach or default in payment, or it may be one that waives the debtor's
right to notice (otherwise known as confession of judgment).
2. Lease of property:
(a) If it creates real rights, such as those for a period of more than one
year or is registered, apply lex situs.
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(b) If the lease is from month-to month, week-to-week, or day-to-day, and
does not create real rights, apply the law on contracts:
(1) Extrinsic validity – lex loci celebrationis
(2) Capacity of the parties –personal law of the parties
(3) Intrinsic validity – lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis
4. Contract of loan:
If it is mutuum, apply the rules on contracts in general; i.e.,
(a) Extrinsic validity - lex loci celebrationis
(c) Capacity of the parties - personal law of the parties
(d) Intrinsic validity - lex loci voluntatis or lex loci
intentionis
If it is commodatum, apply the lex situs because it is a real contract.
5. Lease of service (or employment) agency, guaranty or suretyship.
These are personal contracts; hence the law on contracts will apply.
(a) Extrinsic validity - lex loci celebrationis
(b) Capacity of the parties - personal law of the parties
(c) Intrinsic validity - lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis
But an agency to alienate or encumber real is governed by the lex
situs.
6. Contract of transportation or carriage:
This is a contract to render service; therefore, the law on contracts
applies.
(a) Extrinsic validity - lex loci celebrationis
(b) Capacity of parties - personal law of the parties
(c) Intrinsic validity - lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis
(d) Liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of goods in transit
- law of destination of the goods (Art. 1753, New Civil Code).
(e) If the Carriage of Goods by Sea act governs, the limitation of the
liability of the carrier under said Act applies, unless the shipper
declares the goods and inserts such declaration in the bill of lading
(American President Lines v. Klepper, 110 Phil. 243 (1960).
If, however, the contract is for international air transportation:
(a) The liability of the airline in case of death, injury to passengers,
or loss or damage to cargo, is governed by the Warsaw Convention,
as amended, to which we became a party in 1951 (Santos III v.
Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256 (1992).
(b) But if there was malice, gross negligence, bad faith, or improper
discrimination on the part of the carrier or its agents, the carrier is
liable for damages beyond those limited by the Warsaw Convention
(Lopez v. Pan Am, 16 SCRA 431 (1965); KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v.
C.A., 65 SCRA 237 (1975); Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. C.A., 255
SCRA 38 {1996}).
Chapter XVII.
TORTS
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1. What is the meaning of "tort"?
(b) In Spanish law, the concept of "quasi-delict" or culpa aquiliana includes all
acts or omissions committed through fault or negligence causing damage to
another, independent of contract.
(c) In American law, however, "tort" has a broader meaning, for it covers
legal wrongs not only committed through negligence but also those committed
with malice or willful intent, but of course, independent of contract. Otherwise, it
will be breach of contract and covered by another field of law, contract law.
Our concept of "tort" under the New Civil Code is a blending of the Spanish
culpa aquiliana and the American tort, which nay be committed not only through
fault or negligence, but also with malice and willful intent.
Thus, Art. 20 of the New Civil Code provides: "Every person who, contrary
to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same". This is a new provision under Chapter 2 of the Code on
Human Relations, which is an entirely new Chapter in the Code.
Art. 2176 of the same Code, on the other hand, retains the Spanish concept
of culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict. It provides:
3. In Conflict of Laws, what law governs liability for torts, and what are
the reasons for the rule?
(a) Liability for torts in general is governed by the lex loci delicti
commissii; i.e., the law of the place where the delict or wrong was committed.
4. In applying the rule of lex loci delicti commissii , how is the locus
delicti determined, especially if the wrong conduct is committed in one
state and the injuries are sustained in another, or the conduct is a
continuing act that spans several states (like in the U.S.)?
There are at least three (3) theories in determining where the locus delicti
is:
(a) Civil law theory - the locus delicti is where the act began. This is so
since the rules on tort are intended to regulate human conduct, such
that a person who willfully and negligently acts contrary to the social
78
norms must be held liable for the injury caused (II Rabel, supra, p.
303).
(b) Common law theory: The locus delicti is the place where the
wrongful act became affective. The reason is that without an injury,
there is nothing to protect and there is no necessity for judicial relief.
(c) Theory of Dr. Rabel - The locus delicti is the place which has the
most substantial connection with the wrongful act.
Examples:
(2) Saudi Arabian Airlines v. C.A., 297 SCRA 469 (1998); .Here,
our Supreme Court held that Philippine law should apply, because it was
in the Philippines that private respondent deceived plaintiff-stewardess;
plaintiff was working for respondent here; plaintiff's nationality and
domicile were here; we were intimately concerned with the ultimate
outcome of the case not only for the benefit of the litigants but also for
the vindication of our country's system of law and justice in a
transnational setting. Hence, the locus delicti was the Philippines
79
This approach considers the relevant concerns that two or more
states may have in the case and their respective interests in applying
their laws to it. If this approach is applied to the Babcock case cited
above, it would appear that only New York law had a legitimate interest in
advancing its purposes and policies, while Ontario, Canada law had no
interest to advance. In other words, it was a case of false conflict.
If, however, the case poses a real conflict between the interests of
two or more States, if the interested forum finds that the other State has a
greater claim in the application of its law to a given case, the forum
should yield and apply the law of the other state. Or, if the forum is
disinterested in the case, it can dismiss the same on the ground of forum
non conveniens. In short, the State which has the more relevant and
weighty interests in the case should be considered the locus delicti.
(a) If the tort is committed aboard a public vessel, whether on the high
seas or in foreign territorial waters, the law of the flag is the lex loci delicti
commissii.
(b) If the tort is committed aboard a private or merchant vessel on the
high seas, the law of registry is the lex loci delicti commissii.
(c) If two vessels collide and are from the same state, the law of registry is
the lex loci delicti commissii.
(d) If the vessels come from different states with identical laws, apply said
identical laws.
(e) If the vessels come from different states with different laws, the lex
loci delicti commissii is the general maritime law as understood and applied by
the forum where the case is filed (Paras, supra, p. 394, citing American cases).
80
(b) Remember, however, that while all procedural matters are governed
by the lex fori (i.e., Philippine law), since the case is filed here, all substantive
matters are governed by the lex loci delicti sommissii. Thus:
(1) The period of prescription of the action is governed by the lex loci
delicti sommissii because in Philippine law, prescription is substantive, not
merely procedural.
(2) The proper parties, the measure of damages, and the question
whether the act complained of is considered the proximate cause of the
injury, are all governed by the lex loci delicti commissii.
(3) The burden of proof and the defenses that may be interposed by
the defendant are also governed by lex loci delicti commissii.
8. What is the Alien Tort Act, and do you know if it has been applied in
cases filed by Filipinos in the United States?
(a) The Alien Tort Act of. the United States, which was enacted in 1789,
grants U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over any civil action filed by an
alien for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.
(b) It was under the above law that the United States Court of Appeals
upheld the jurisdiction of the district court of Hawaii over a class action for
damages filed by almost ten thousand Filipino victims of human rights abuses
and torture committed by the late President Ferdinand Marcos and his officials in
the Philippines during the Marcos regime, resulting in a nearly US$2 billion
judgment in favor of the victims and/or their heirs (Trajano v. Marcos-Manotoc,
125 L.Ed. 2d 661, 113 S. Ct. 2959).
Chapter XVIII.
CRIMES
(a) While both tort and crime are wrongs, a tort violates private rights while a
crime is committed against the State.
(b) Tort actions are instituted by the injured person against the wrongdoer in
a civil case the purpose of which is indemnification for damages suffered; while
crimes are prosecuted in the name of the State against the offender in criminal
actions the purpose of which are the protection and vindication of the interests
of the public as a whole, the punishment of the offender, the reformation of the
offender, or to deter others from committing the same act.
(c) Torts are transitory in character, so that the tortfeasor can be made liable
for his wrongful act in any jurisdiction where he may be found. Crimes, on the
other hand, are local and can be prosecuted only in the places or states where
the crimes are committed.
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2. How does the court determine whether a wrongful act is a tort or a
crime?
In the Philippines, certain acts may be both torts and crimes. Under Art.
33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "in cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the; criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."
Take the offenses classifed as "'criminal negligence" under Art. 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. They may be prosecuted as crimes by the State. On the
other hand, the victims may file separate actions for damages against the
offenders based on torts.
(a) Territorial theory - Under this theory, the state where the crime was
committed has jurisdiction to try the case, and its penal code and the penalties
prescribe therein will apply. The reason is that the aggrieved state is duty bound
to prosecute and punish the offender as his crime affects directly and
particularly the dignity, authority, and sovereignty of the state where said crime
is committed.
(d) Real or eclectic theory - Any state whose penal code has been
transgressed upon has jurisdiction to bring to justice the perpetrators of the
crime, whether the crime was committed inside or outside its own territory.
Crimes under this theory would include piracy, slavery, drug trafficking,
immoral traffic in women and children, etc.
(The above enumeration was taken from Paras, id., pp. 403-406)
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In the Philippines, we follow as a general rule the territorial theory, and by
way of exception, the protective theory.
We also follow the rule of generality in criminal law; i.e., all persons,
whether Filipinos or aliens, are subject to our penal laws and can be prosecuted
for their violations (Art. 14, Civil Code of the Philippines).
They are the cases mentioned in Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
“Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this code shall be enforced not only
within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior
waters and maritime zone but also outside its jurisdiction, against
those who –
(1) Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or
airship;
(2) Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the
Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Island;
(3) Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into
these Islands of the obligations mentioned in the preceding
numbers;
(4) While being officers or employees, should commit an offense
in the exercise of their official functions; or
(5) Should commit any of the crimes against national security
and the law of nations”.
There are two theories that have generally been used, and which our
Supreme Court has applied in the old opium cases, in determining this question
of jurisdiction; the English Rule (which emphasizes the territorial principle) and
the French Rule (which stresses the nationality theory).
(a) English Rule: The territory where the crime was committed (in our
problem , the Philippines) will have jurisdiction except:
(b) French Rule: The state whose flag is flown by the vessel has
jurisdiction, except if the crime affects the peace, order, security, and
safety of the territory. (Paras, id., citing Brierly, Law of Nations, p.
180)
The above two rules were also cited and compared by the
Supreme Court in the case of People v. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 279,
although the Court also held that as we were at that time a territory
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of the United States, we follow the English rule which was the one
prevailing in the United States. This case, however, involved the
crime of smoking opium in a foreign vessel anchored in Manila Bay,
which the High Court held was a breach of our public order because
of the pernicious effects that it produced in our territory. In short,
the Supreme Court actually applied the French rule to the case, not
the English Rule. Nonetheless, as observed by the late Justice Paras
in his book in Conflict of Laws, “the difference between the two rules
is largely academic and theoretical, the two rules being essentially
the same. Thus, if aboard a German ship anchored in Manila Bay,
the crime of murder is committed, under the English rule, the
Philippines would have jurisdiction in view of the general rule. Under
the French theory, the Philippines would also have jurisdiction under
the exception, for the crime indeed affects the peace and security of
the territory. Whether we follow, therefore, the English or French
rule on the matter is not significant: The effect is the same”. (Paras,
supra, pp. 410-411)
7. Did the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea change the
above rules?
Chapter XIX.
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
A. CORPORATIONS
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2. What are the different theories in determining the personal or
governing law of a corporation?
(1)The theory that the personal law is the law of the place of
incorporation:
One difficulty of this theory is that the board may meet in different
states, although this defect may be cured by expressly providing in the
articles of incorporation or by-laws where the principal meeting place of
the board is.
The defect of this theory is that the corporation may have its
enterprise scattered all over the world. Besides, the physical acts of the
corporation are not as important as the decisions reached by its board of
directors.
According to Article 51 of the New Civil Code, “When the law creating or
recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical
persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal
representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions.”
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corporations to secure a license to do business in the Philippines is to enable the
courts to exercise jurisdiction over them or the regulation of their activities in
our country.
5. What are the exceptions to the theory that the personal law or the
nationality of a corporation follows the place of its incorporation?
(b) For wartime purposes, we adopt the control test; i.e., we pierce the
veil of corporate identity and go into the nationality of the controlling
stockholders to determine whether a corporation is an enemy corporation.
Thus, a German-controlled corporation, even if incorporated in the
Philippines, was considered an enemy corporation during the last World
War for the purpose of freezing its assets (David Wineshop v. Phil. Trust,
L-3869, Jan. 31, 1952).
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil or disregarding the
corporate fiction also permits the courts to impose personal liability on the
stockholders if the corporation form has been used to defeat the public
convenience, justify wrongs, or protect fraud or crime (Tan Boon Bee and
Co. v. J. Jarencio, 163 SCRA 205).
The personal law of the corporation (which, in the Philippines, is the place
of incorporation) governs the requisites for the formation of the corporation, the
required number of incorporators and the members of the Board of Directors,
the kinds of shares of stock allowed, the transfer of stocks in a way that it would
be binding on the corporation, the issuance, amount and legality of the
dividends, and the powers and duties of the officers, stockholders, and
members.
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character as to distinctly indicate a purpose to do other business in the state and
to make the state a base of operations for the conduct of a part of the foreign
corporation’s ordinary business ( Far East International Import and Export
Corporation v. Nankai Kogyo Co., Ltd., L-13525, Nov. 30, 1962).
The contract is unenforeceable; i.e., the corporation cannot sue in our courts
until the necessary license is obtained. After the issuance of the license, suits
may be instituted even on the pre-license contracts which are considered valid (
Marshell-Wells & Co. v. Elser Co., supra).
But the person who contracted with the corporation may be considered in
estoppel if he had received benefits from the contract (Fletcher, Vol. I,
Cyclopedia of Law of Private Corporations, sec. 8520).
Yes, because the corporation cannot put up by way of defense its own
failure to comply with the law (Gen. Cor. Of the Phil. V. Union Ins. Society of
Canton, 48 OG #1, Jan. 1952, p. 73). But the court must be able to acquire
jurisdiction over the corporation.
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14. What about multinational or transnational corporations, what law
applies to them?
Yes, on contracts previously entered into by it. After all, fairness demands
that the citizens and residents of the Philippines be afforded the opportunity to
sue these foreign corporations locally, instead of requiring them to sue in the
foreign countries where they are domiciled. By the same token, the foreign
corporation that has withdrawn should also be allowed to sue on validly existing
transactions, entered into previous to the cessation of its business here. And an
identical rule should also apply to contracts entered into prior to the revocation
of the foreign corporation’s license. (Paras, supra, and authorities cited, p. 438).
B. PARTNERSHIPS
However, in the United States and some countries in Europe and Latin
America, partnerships are not regarded as independent persons with juridical
personalities of their own except for the purpose of insolvency proceedings (See
Campos Rueda & Co. v. Pac. Com. Co, 44 Phil. 916). However, in the United
States today, a new theory has been developed, getting away from the old
common law conception that a partnership is simply an aggregate of individuals,
and instead treating it as a separate entity distinct from the partners.
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dissolution and winding up, are all governed by the partnership’s personal law or
the law of the state where it was created.
For example, in a New York case where a limited partner under Cuban
law was sued in New York for breach of contract entered into by the Cuban
partnership in New York , it was held that the limited partner was not liable, and
that New York Law could not enlarge the liability of a limited partner under
Cuban law simply because the contract was entered into in New York (King v.
Sarria, 69 NY 24 [1877]).
No, because the authority of the receiver is only within the territorial
boundaries of the Philippines, or co-extensive with the jurisdiction of the court
that appointed him.
Chapter XX.
1. What are the reasons for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments by the forum?
The reasons are basically the same as recognition by the forum of the
proper foreign law; and the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign
law or comity are also applicable to foreign judgments.
(a) Enforcement means that the plaintiff or petitioner wants the court to
positively carry out and make effective the foreign judgment, while recognition
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means that the defendant or respondent is presenting the foreign judgment
merely as a defense, on the basis of res judicata.
(a) The requisite proof of the foreign judgment may not have been
presented.
The manner of proving a foreign judgment is the same as
proving a foreign law (Rule 132, sec. 25, Revised Rules of Court).
(d) The foreign judgment must not contravene a sound and established
public policy of the forum.
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(e) The judgment must be res judicata; i.e., the judgment must be final;
the foreign court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
the judgment must be on the merits; and there was identity of parties, subject
matter, and cause of action.
(a) Under the former Sec. 50 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
foreign judgment in rem (i.e., a judgment of a foreign court upon a specific
thing) was already considered conclusive upon the title to the thing; meaning, it
is binding against the whole world, provided the foreign court had jurisdiction to
pronounce said judgment.
Under sec. 48, Rule 39, of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, however, all
judgments or orders of foreign courts, whether in rem or in personam, are
considered merely prima facie or presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title, and both kinds of
judgments are subject to the defenses of want of jurisdiction on the part of the
foreign court, want of notice to the defendant or respondent, collusion, fraud or
clear mistake of law or fact.
(b) The former Sec. 50 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court covered
only final judgments. Sec. 48, Rule 39, of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
includes final orders. Both, however, must comply with the rules on finality of
judgments or orders; i.e., the rules of res judicata.
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