Mendoza Vs Teh in the ordinary action for reconveyance.
In her opposition to the
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122646. March 14, 1997]
ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late NORBERTO B.
MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. Hon. Angelito C. Teh, Presiding Judge, Branch 87, RTC, Rosario,
Batangas, Sps. Herminio & Clarita Tayag @ Sps. George T. Tiglao & Clarizza T. Tiglao and/or @
Teofilo M. Esguera, Leonor M. Esguera. Leticia M. Esguera, Joel M. Esguera, Ricardo M.
Esguera, Voltaire E. Tayag, Benito I. Tayag, Merlie Malig, Alberto T. Tayag, Rosemarie T. Tayag.
Leticia E. Lulu and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Batangas, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 28, 1994, petitioner for herself and as
administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased husband
Norberto Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Batangas a complaint for reconveyance of title (involving parcels
of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition for preliminary
injunction docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009.[1] Paragraphs 2
and 3 of said complaint states:
2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff,
the Intestate Estate of the late Norberto B. Mendoza in her
capacity as the surviving wife of the deceased Norberto B.
Mendoza who died on December 29, 1993;
3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this
Honorable Court as the judicial administratrix of her co-
plaintiff for purposes of this case; [2]
Private respondents filed on January 21, 1995 their answer [3]
with motion to dismiss[4] alleging among others that the complaint
states no cause of action and that petitioners demand had already
been paid.[5] On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed
another pleading entitled motion to dismiss invoking, this time,
lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, laches and
prescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction,
private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for
appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated
motions, petitioner asserts among others, that the allegation
seeking appointment as administratrix is only an incidental matter
which is not even prayed for in the complaint. Replying to the
opposition, private respondents argued that since petitioners
husband resided in Quezon City at the time of his death, the
appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC
of that place in accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court. Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas
has no jurisdiction over the case.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, the RTC of Batangas
thru respondent Judge Teh dismissed without prejudice the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the rules
governing an ordinary civil action and a special proceeding are
different. Accordingly, the lower court found it unnecessary to
discuss the other grounds raised in the motion to dismiss. [6]Upon
denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, he filed this
petition under Rule 45 on pure questions of law. The Court
thereafter gave due course to the petition.
The issue is whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an
allegation seeking appointment as administratrix of an estate,
would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case?
We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as
amended by RA 7691 provides:
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation
is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00)...
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and
intestate ....
Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that:
Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, testate and intestate... (italics ours).
The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which
involves title title to property worth millions of pesos, such as the
lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling
within its jurisdiction are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation,
such as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate. Even
the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73[7])
impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for
granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate
proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of
either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate.
By arguing that the allegation seeking such appointment as
administratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and
private respondents confuses jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of
Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95[8] provides that actions
involving title to property shall be tried in the province where the
property is located, in this case, - Batangas. The mere fact that
petitioners deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the time
of his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the
Court.[9]
Second, the cases cited[10] by private respondents are not at
point as they involve settlement of estate where the probate court
was asked to resolve questions of ownership of certain
properties. In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved,
but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate
administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of
estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited
jurisdiction of a probate court. The above allegation is not even a
jurisdictional fact which must be stated in an action for
reconveyance. The Court therefore, should have at least,
proceeded with the reconveyance suit rather than dismiss the
entire case.
Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot
generally decide questions of ownership or title to property[11] is not
applicable in this case, because: there is no settlement of estate
involved and the RTC of Batangas was not acting as a probate
court. It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should
be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or
its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a
mere question of procedure.[12] Moreover, the instant action for
reconveyance does not even invoke the limited jurisdiction of a
probate court.[13] Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction,
whether it be on the reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of
an administratrix, it was improper for respondent judge to dismiss
the whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Finally, judges should not dismiss with precipitate haste,
complaints or petitions filed before them, just so they can comply
with their administrative duty to dispose cases within 90 days at
the expense of their judicial responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 14, 1995 and
November 14, 1995 of the RTC of Batangas are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to immediately proceed with
the disposition of the case in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
SUMMARY:
Adelia filed a complaint with the Batangas RTC for reconveyance ofproperty on
behalf of the intestate estate of her deceased husband, simultaneouslyasking for appointment as
administratrix thereof. Respondents opposed, claimingthat since the deceased had lived in
QC, the QC RTC was the proper court. RTCBatangas dismissed the case. SC held that the
respondents had mistaken venuewith jurisdiction. BP 129 clearly grants the RTC jurisdiction
over a complaint forreconveyance of property (over P20k) and for complaints incapable of
pecuniaryestimation, such as seeking appointment as administratrix. Furthermore, this casedid
not involve the settlement of an estate, hence no need for the limited jurisdiction of a
probate court, so Judge Teh shouldn’t have dismissed the complaintfor lack of jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE:
Venue is not the same as jurisdiction. The location of property affectsvenue, but its
value or the nature of the remedy sought affects jurisdiction, which isconferred by law.
 G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL
JR., Petitioners, vs.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent
Facts:
Jose Portugal (Portugal, Sr.) contracted two marriages.
The first marriage is with Paz Lazo in 1942 whom he had a daughter
named Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal (April 1950), the herein
respondent, and the second marriage is with Isabel de la Puerta in
1948, who gave birth to a boy named Jose Douglas Portugal, Jr. (Sept.
1949), the petitioners herein.
By virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights
executed by Portugal Sr. and his 4 siblings, over the estate of their
father, a parcel of land n Caloocan was issued a TCT in the name of
“Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo”.
Paz died in 1984, while Portugal Sr. died intestate in 1985.
In 1988, Leonila executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir
of Estate of Deceased Person”, adjudicating to herself the Caloocan
parcel of land, and was subsequently registered (1988) in her name
“Leonila Portugal Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.”
In 1996, Isabel and Portugal, Jr. (petitioners) filed a complaint against
Leonila for cancellation of Affidavit of Adjudication and TCT issued in
her name, alleging that Leonila is not related whatsoever to the
deceased Portugal, Sr., hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan
parcel of land, and accordingly prayed that said TCT be cancelled and a
new one be issued in their (petitioner’s) name.
A Pre-Trial Order was issued, citing the following issues to be resolved,
to wit:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.
Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can
still be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the
complaint. (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action
and lack of jurisdiction without resolving the issues as stated in the pre-
trial order, on the ground that petitioner’s status and right as putative
heirs had not been established before a probate court.
Citing the case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the Supreme
Court in this case ruled that the establishment of a status, a right, or a
particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding, not an
ordinary civil action. Thus, the court, not being a probate court, is
without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiff’s cause to establish their
status and right herein.
On appeal to CA, the petitioners cite the case of Carino vs. Carino. In
this case, the SC ratiocinates that the court may pass upon the validity
of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case.
However, the CA found Carino to be inapplicable. The appellate court
held that in Carino case, the main issue was the validity of the two
marriages, whereas in the instant case, the main issue is the
annulment of title to property. Thus, the CA affirmed the TC’s
dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for
annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT
issued in her name.
Ruling: NO.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was
the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule
74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception
to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should
be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in
case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an
executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A
probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are
the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of
the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to
still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it
is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact
that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case,
could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial
court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs
could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial
court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the
parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.
Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can
still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET
ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-
enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
Reyes vs Enriquez
Facts:
Petitioners claim to be the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes
who co-owned the subject parcel of land located in Talisay, Cebu,
with Anacleto Cabrera. On the other hand respondents, claim to
be the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as husband and daughter of
Anacleto's daughter.
On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann Enriquez,
sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses
Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their
co-respondents in this case. When Spouses Fernandez, tried to
register their share in the subject land, they discovered that
certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by
Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in
Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.;
(2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that
Anacleto only owned ¼ of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m.
belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by
Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano
Dico.
Alleging that the documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the
respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the
aforementioned documents and for damages. They likewise
prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of the subject
property.
The RTC dismissed the case, but upon appeal it was reversed,
hence the petition.
Issue:
 Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special
proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits
of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes.
Ruling:
Yes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings
in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property.
This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance. The
respondents have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs
of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property.
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is
allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court. A real party in
interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof. Such
interest, to be considered a real interest, must be one which is
present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy,
or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
Comment: This ruling of the court is only proper because if
people are allowed to file claims without verifying first their
respective interest, then the whole system will be in shambles.
Because then, courts would try to decide on claims but only to find
out later that the claimants do not really have interest to the claim,
wasting the courts time,money, and resources.
HILADO VS CA
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate
on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita
Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca
Benedicto-Paulino.[1] At the time of his death, there were two pending civil
cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-
9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City,
Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The
second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City,
Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers
Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.[2]
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A.
Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to
be P5 Million, net of liabilities.[3] On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an
order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her
deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.[4] In
January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of
Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband.[5] In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private
respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending
claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.[6] Private respondent
stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases
as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil
Case No. 11178.[7] Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to
submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the
estate.[8]
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,[9] praying that they be furnished
with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality
of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even
before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an
omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission
by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents
estate.[10] Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC,
alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the
estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as
unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties
within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.[11] After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals.
The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the
civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision[12] dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according
to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The
Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the
decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending
litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts
erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in
support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various
other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.[13]
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the
courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished copies of all
processes and orders issued by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed
by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.[14] Second, they prayed that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission
thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.[15] Third,
petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by
the administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof,
set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice
to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate.[16]
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely
informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of
Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that an intervenor has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or
is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court x x x While the language of Section 1, Rule
19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate
proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an
intervenor must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent and expectant.[17]
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of
Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The
settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special
proceedings under the Rules of Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable to special proceedings.
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a
decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
intervention under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had
sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their
recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners
have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily
mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the
right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let
us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any interested
persons or any persons interested in the estate to participate in varying
capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these
provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right
of any person interested to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to
file a petition for administration; (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the
giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the
known heirs, creditors, and to any other persons believed to have interest in the
estate; (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a person interested in the estate to
petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an
individual interested in the estate of the deceased to complain to the court of the
concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of
evidence of the decedents title or interest therein; (5) Section 10 of Rule 85,
which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of
the Administrators account to persons interested; (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89,
which requires the court to give notice to the persons interested before it may
hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the
properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows any person
interested in the estate to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue
of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided
for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether
express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent,
under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately
after granting letters of administration and published by the administrator
immediately after the issuance of such notice.[19] However, it appears that the
claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in
connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for
tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the
notice to creditors required under Rule 86.[20] These actions, being as they are
civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the
administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that
the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was
successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil
case[21] was already pending review before this Court at the time of Benedictos
death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in
the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In
the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the
right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what
extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,[22] and
it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the
facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and
damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the
same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom
Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his
complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband.
He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of
the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the
administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until
the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of
the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator
moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had
already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court
refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil
case, and the Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the
intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to
protect their interests it appearing that the property in
litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the
only property of the estate left subject of administration
and distribution; and the court is justified in taking
cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact
that whatever is determined in said civil case will
necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in
the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking
cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume
general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record
its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases
and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its
jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding
in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending
determination of the separate civil action for the reason that
there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of
administration proceedings until after the separate action
pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated,
cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of
Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or
personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon,
and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against the
executor or administrator." What practical value would this
provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be
prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to
close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to
settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the
ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of
property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another
person should be determined in a separate action and should be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that
an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim
and caprice of the heirs x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied) [Citations
omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed
to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can
partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the
Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of this court have always been to
the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests
are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their
action.[24]
Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but
they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special
Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also any person interested or persons
interested in the estate various specified capacities to protect their respective
interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending
action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by
the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would
have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment
could no longer be enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a
creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every
aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific
instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we
deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the
intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other
modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under
this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings
filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility
of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the
developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of
the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate
remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under
Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the
estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and
contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate
proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission that if the Court were
to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate
court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise,
would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of
merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the
service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the
estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the
intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of
speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized
by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core
concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate
proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,[25] the Court heard a petition for
mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying
that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which
the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to
fore, the provision stating that the records of every court of justice shall be
public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person
x x x. The Court ruled that petitioners were interested persons entitled to access
the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the
records tomonitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing
the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the
estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and
the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accountingappears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the
complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al.,
they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his
estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135,
Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x[26]
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the
intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the
service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest
of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of
in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to
access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order
or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less
cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the
decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors
in the estate are preserved.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do
require notice to any or all interested parties the petitioners as interested parties
will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to
interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time
and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the
executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing
for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all,
even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the
existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be
set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and
complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance
tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the
appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a
deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under
oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in
the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said
reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within
three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the
administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year
from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt
that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either
duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the
party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the
performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate,
there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the
interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the
administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may
seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a
creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief.
After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of
sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good
faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is
correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived
of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in
this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that
petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto,
are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in
the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on
Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hiladovs CA
Facts: -Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He
was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto, and his only daughter, Francisca.
-At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases
against him involving the petitioners. The first, was then pending
with the RTC of Bacolod City, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one
of the plaintiffs therein. The second, was then pending with the
RTC of Bacolod City, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation
and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs
therein.
-On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor.
-On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing
private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased
husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.
-In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of
the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of
the Estate of her deceased husband.In the List of Liabilities
attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among
the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being
litigated before the Bacolod City courts.
-On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex AbundantiCautela,praying that they be
furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the
intestate proceedings.
-Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing
the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband.
-On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not
interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to
intervene in the intestate proceedings.
-After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the
right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto
Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they
lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
-Tha CA denied their petition. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether the lower courts erred in denying them the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto
Benedicto
Ruling: No. The merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are
to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in
the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of
petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the
judgment against the estate.
The Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or
any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every
aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead
provides for specific instances when such persons may
accordingly act in those proceedings, the Court deemed that while
there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners,
they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the
intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the
prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the
estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which
such interests can be protected.
Sheker vs Estate od Sheker
DECISION
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal
of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC)
dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective
claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on
October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him
amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of
certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount
of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be
incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said
realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for
the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that
(1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a
certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to
attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and
served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing
without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by
respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per
Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising
the following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate
proceeding contain a certification against non-forum
shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a
probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the
docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding
be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written
explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?[2]
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a
probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment
of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72
of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are
applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
The Court gave due course to the petition for review
on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section
2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.[3]
The petition is imbued with merit.
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in
ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings
is not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In
the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of
Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing
ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far
as practicable.
The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or
perform; capable of being put into practice, done or
accomplished.[4] This means that in the absence of special provisions,
rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much
as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said
proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say
that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to
special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory
pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and
the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not
in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to
special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person as in the present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC
err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent
estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification
against non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling
that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an
initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding
was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the
decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,
after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons
having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify
the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims;
otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.[5]
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a
motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the
estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new
litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter
arising in the progress of the case in which the
motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right
 or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious

progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or

collateral to the main object of the action and is resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and

connected with and dependent upon the principal conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be

remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied) incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering

the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the
settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent service will do away with the practice of some lawyers
since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere
contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less
not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification
against non-forum shopping. than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the
Appeals,[8] that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim
(attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance,
the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even
without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon
constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing receiving notice from the post office that the registered
fees within a reasonable time.[9]After all, the trial court had already
assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the
therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the
estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating
the estate.
before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all,
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De
Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is squarely in point. Therein, the Court thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such
held thus:
pleading or other papers.

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court,

passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this

held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal

or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with. service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13
then gives the court the discretion to consider a that in the present case, personal
service would not be
pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of practicable. Considering the distance
between the Court of Appeals
service or filing were not resorted to and no written and Donsol, Sorsogon where the
petition was posted, clearly, service by
explanation was made as to why personal service registered mail [sic] would have
entailed considerable time, effort and
was not done in the first place. The exercise of expense. A written explanation why
service was not done personally might
discretion must, necessarily consider the have been superfluous. In any case, as
the rule is so worded with the use
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself of may, signifying permissiveness, a
violation thereof gives the court
begins with the clause whenever practicable. discretion whether or not to consider
the paper as not filed. While it is true
that procedural rules are necessary to
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section secure an orderly and speedy
11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, administration of justice, rigid
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort application of Section 11, Rule 13 may
to other modes of service and filing, the be relaxed in this case in the interest of
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics
filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of supplied)
time, place and person, personal service or filing
is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is
practicable may resort to other modes be had, which Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83
why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes
with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a
court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject written explanation why service was not done personally
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and might have been superfluous.
the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal
italics supplied) construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed
where, among other cases, the injustice to the adverse
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality party is not commensurate with the degree of his
of personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
applied Section 11 of Rule 13: prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied)

As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of In the present case, petitioner holds office
Court] requires, service and filing of in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the
pleadings must be done personally RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City.The
whenever practicable. The court notes lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance
between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve
and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of
Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why
service has not been done personally, may be considered as
superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under
Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the
interest of substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of
estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid.[13] The ultimate purpose for
the rule on money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the
Phil. v. Santibaez,[14] thus:
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate
in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the
vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against it,
thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees,
or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt
presentation and disposition of the claims against
the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of
the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
distribute the residue.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural
rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal
service, again in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9,
2003, respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City
, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take
appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule
82 of the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Facts: The will of Alice Sheker was admitted by the court and
thereafter all creditors were ordered to file their respective claims
against the estate. On Oct. 7, 2002, a contingent claim for agent's
commission in the total amount of P481,250.00 was filed by
petitioner.
However, the executrix of the estate moved for the dismissal of
the money claim on the ground that no docket fee was paid, no
certification for non-forum shopping was attached, and no written
explanation was made as to why there was no personal service of
the claim. The court thereon dismissed the claim.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the money
claim for failure to pay the docket fee, attach a cert. of non-forum
shoping, and make a personal service.
Ruling: The court erred in strictly applying Sec. 2, Rule 72 of the
Rules of Court because such calls also for practicabiliy for it to
apply other than the absence of special provisions.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling
that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is
an initiatory pleading.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of
Appeals, that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money
claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by
a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to
the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because
the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may
order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.
on the issue of personal service, as in Musa v. Amor, a written
explanation why service was not done personally “might have
been superfluous" because the distance from the petitioner's
residence and the respondent court is very far.
Petition granted.
Comment: Yes, in this case the court was too blinded with its
sense of duty to follow to the rules to the letters. The court should
have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the
requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, in
the interest of substantial justice. Because in the end, it would be
the estate that would benefit upon being given notice of a money
claim against it so it can be inspected and verified.
Vda de Manalo Vs CA
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S.
Vda. De Manalo, et. al., seeking to annul the Resolution[1] of the Court of
Appeals[2] affirming the Orders[3] of the Regional Trial Court and the
Resolution[4]which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts[5] are as follows:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc,
Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife,
Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme,
Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita
Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia
Manalo, Orlando Manalo, and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left
several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac
including a business under the name and style Manalos Machine Shop
with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at No.
45 Gen. Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the
surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros,
Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a
petition[6] with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila[7] for the
judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and
for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator
thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the
said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the
publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by
registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at
their respective addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the
trial court issued an order declaring the whole world in default, except
the government, and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners
therein on March 16, 1993. However, this order of general default was
set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners (oppositors
therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and
Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which to file their
opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners,
through counsel, culminating in the filing of an Omnibus Motion[8] on
July 23, 1993 seeking: (1) to set aside and reconsider the Order of the
trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional
extension of time to file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing
their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to
declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of
the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding
judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order[9] which resolved,
thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the
oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering
the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of
their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this
proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and
immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons
of the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this
Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular
administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No.
39851, after their motion for reconsideration of the Order dated July 30,
1993 was denied by the trial court in its Order[10] dated September 15,
1993. In their petition for certiorari with the appellate court, they
contend that: (1) the venue was improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons;
(3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate
proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise
among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-
forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for certiorari in its Resolution[11] promulgated on September
30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution was likewise dismissed.[12]
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for
review is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which
denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver
that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same
family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but that the same
have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC No. 92-63626
is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same
family. They point out that it contains certain averments which,
according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:
xxx
Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the
death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any
settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the
deceased father, TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the
properties aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own
benefit and advantage xxx.
xxx
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling
the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own
advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein
petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.
xxx
 Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners
were compelled to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and
incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less
than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel
committing to pay P200,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus
honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court xxx.[13]
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be
dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the
ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the
petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made involving members of the same family
prior to the filing of the petition pursuant to Article 222[14] of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an
action or proceeding, the averments[15] and the character of the relief
sought[16] in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be
controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626 belies herein petitioners claim that the same is in the nature of
an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on
February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the
time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his
residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.[17] The
petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the
names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by
the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In
addition, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for
doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private
respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their
deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for
of this Honorable Court:
(a) That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to
petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the administration of the estate
of the deceased TORADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond
in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.
(b) That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO
have been inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have
been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that
the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed
among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.
c) That the litigation expenses o these proceedings in the amount of
P250,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus
honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing
and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against
ANTONIO MANALO.[18]
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains
certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil
action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the
said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto
which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing
admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory
counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's
fees and costs[19] in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary
civil action an ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of
the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the
purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of
the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and
immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court,
sitting, as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction[20] and
cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be
properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the
rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well
as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in
the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were
otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out
of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem.[21] So it
should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626 were to be considered as a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the
Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by
virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the
rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding. Petitioners contend that the term
proceeding is so broad that it must necessarily include special
proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take
refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to
justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the
deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear
enough, to wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members
of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035 (underscoring
supplied).[22]
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary
civil actions. This is clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by
one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in
which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the
redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in
equity.[23] A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice,
whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.[24] Besides, an excerpt from the Report
of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code
Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions
which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same
family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than
a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary
that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a
litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is
known that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than strangers.[25]
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not
being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact
no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters
of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy
whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.[26] The petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently
to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that
they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and
special jurisdiction of the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED
for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
1. Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila, died intestate in
1992. He was survived by his wife and his eleven children, who are all
of legal age. He left several real properties located in Manila and in
Tarlac including a business- Manalos Machine Shop with offices at
Quezon City and at Valenzuela.
2. In November, the respondents, who are eight of the surviving children
filed a petition with the RTC for the judicial settlement of the estate of
their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo, as
administrator thereof.
3. The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing and
directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and directing
service by registered mail of the order.
 4. The trial court issued an order declaring the whole world in default,
except the government, and set the reception of evidence of the
petitioners. However, this order of general default was set aside by the
trial court upon motion of the petitioners who were granted ten (10)
days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
5. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by petitioners, culminating in
the filing of an Omnibus Motion seeking: (1) to reconsider the denial of
the motion for additional extension of time to file opposition; (2) to set
for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for
dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
6. The trial called resolved such issues in the following manner: 1.)
admitted the opposition for the purpose of considering the merits 2.)
denied the hearing for such affirmative defenses are irrelevant and
immaterial 3.) declared that the court had jurisdiction 4.) denied the
motion for inhibition 4.) set the application of Romeo Manalo for
appointment as regular administrator in the for hearing
7. The MR of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed a petition for
certiorari, contending that: (1) the venue was improperly laid; (2) the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of
the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4)
there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among
members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum
shopping was attached to the petition
8. CA dismissed; MR was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
9. Petitioners claim that the petition for letters for administration,
settlement and distribution of estate is actually an ordinary civil action
involving members of the same family and thus should be dismissed
under Rule 16 of the ROC on the ground that a condition precedent for
filing the claim has not been complied with- that is, that there was
failure to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made involving members of the same family prior to the filing of the
petition pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
ISSUES: W/N CA erred in upholding the questioned orders of the RTC which
denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate
RULING + RATIO: NO. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate is a special proceeding and, as such, it is
a remedy whereby the respondents seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. They merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father
and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said
deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the
limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint shall be
controlling. A careful scrutiny of the petition belies the claim that the same is in
the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person such as the fact of death and his residence which are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest. It also contains an enumeration of the names
of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased
which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the
reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the
intention to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
Petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising
matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. They may also
not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of
Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased
Troadio Manalo.
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article
2035
Art. 222 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term
suit that it refers to an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
An excerpt from the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the
intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only
to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the
same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation
between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should
be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and
passion in the family. It is known that lawsuit between close relatives generates
deeper bitterness than strangers.
DISPOSITION: Petition is denied for lack of merit
 NATCHER VS CA
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction
in an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages,
adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person particularly in questions as to advancement of property made by
the decedent to any of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 is the decision[1] of public respondent Court of Appeals, the
decretal portion of which declares:
Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one entered
annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in
favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the
Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT
No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del
Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
So ordered.
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were
registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters
located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his
six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and
Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas estate on 09
February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real
property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano
received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of
the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the
six children.
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an
Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver
of Rights where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to
his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters
registered under Gracianos name, as covered by TCT No.
35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further
subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of
80.90 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the
second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under
TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot[2]to a third
person but retained ownership over the second lot.[3]
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia
Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT
No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No.
186059[4] was issued in the latters name. On 07 October 1985, Graciano
died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first
marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint[5] filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that
upon Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of
fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by
making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June
1987[6] in favor of herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT
No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT No. 186059 in the name of Patricia
Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint
that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been
impaired.
In her answer[7] dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher
averred that she was legally married to Graciano on 20 March 1980 and
thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of
the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Gracianos lifetime,
Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children,
hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against
Gracianos estate or against herein petitioners property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered
a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:[8]
 1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor
of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete
nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been
decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the
spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
2) The deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as
it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New
Civil Code;
3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a
donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance
inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the
deceased.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower
courts decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a
just and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying
an ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of title, went
beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in
a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased
person. XXX
X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject
property as an advance inheritance. What the court should have
done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave
the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding
instituted for that purpose. X X X
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective
mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and
assails the appellate courts decision for being contrary to law and the
facts of the case.
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant
petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil
action and special proceedings, in this wise:
X X X a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to
specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
XXX
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked
distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a
formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal
remedies according to definite established rules. The term special
proceeding may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute
expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted
generally upon an application or motion.[9]
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law
expounds further:
It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in
equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings
which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and
prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of
proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted
without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary
actions. X X X A special proceeding must therefore be in the
nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular
relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending
action, by petition or motion upon notice.[10]
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of
a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the
estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate
court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of
the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word may, it is
nevertheless clear that the same provision[11] contemplates a probate court
when it speaks of the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings.
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its
general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and
resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein
petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance
and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper
vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present
circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly
constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife,
herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate courts disquisition is elucidating:
Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate
of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special
proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the
court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-
appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the estate
of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the
proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From
the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an
ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a
special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed
rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject
property as an advance inheritance.[12]
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our
pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo[13] and Mendoza vs. Teh[14] that
whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial
Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue
but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is a procedural question
involving a mode of practice which may be waived.[15]
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein
private respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even
assailed the authority of the trial court, acting in its general jurisdiction,
to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to
petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently
enunciated the long standing principle that although generally, a probate
court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested
parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.[16]
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely
an allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which
does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would
have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a
probate court.[17] (emphasis supplied)
 Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal
share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that
certain steps be taken first.[18] The net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death;
then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the
partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or
heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether
or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.[19]
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and
proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court failed to
observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the
estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to
sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby
holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate
and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters
involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosarios estate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
NATCHER VS CA
Facts: Graciano is married to graciana, they have 6 children. They are the
owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 SQ in manila. Upon the death
of Graciana, Graciano together with his 6 children entered into a extrajudicial
settlement of the said estate, they divided the said property where a new title
was given.
Graciano donated to his children a portion of his interest in the land amounting
to 4,949.30 SQ leaving only 447 SQ registered under his name as covered by a
title. Subsequently, his remaining lot has also been divided and the other
portion was sold to a third person.
Graciano married Natcher, during their marriage, Graciano sold his remaining
land to Natcher. Graciano died leaving Natcher and his 6 children as heirs.
The Children of Graciano filed a complaint against Natcher stating that she
employed fraud
misrepresentation and forgery, aquired the land by making it appear that
Graciano executed a deed of sale over the said land, in consequence their
legitime has been impaired.
RTC: Deed of sale is prohibited by law
DOS is not a valid donation
DOS may however be an extension of advanc inheritance.
CA: RTC do not have jurisdiction, as the PROBATE COURT has exclusive
jurisdiction to make a just and
legal distribution of the estate.
RTC was trying an ordinary action, hence the acts performed should have
been in a probate court.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC, acting as a court of gen. jurisdiction, adjudicate matters
relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person PARTICULARLY
ON QUESTIONS AS TO ADVANCEMENT OF PROPERTY MADE BY THE
DECEDENT TO ANY OF THE HEIRS?
HELD: THE SC, differentiated Action VS. Special Proceedings. an action for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
The matter in this case fall w/in the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court in
the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Under Sec 2, Rule 90 of ROC, QUESTIONS AS TO ADVANCEMENT MADE
OR ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE DECEASED TO ANY HEIR
MAY BE HEARD AND DETERMINED BY THE COURT HAVING
JURISDICTION OF THE ESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word MAY it is nevertheless clear
that it contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings.
RTC acting in its general jurisdiction is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the said issue.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL
JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-
BELTRAN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal
Jr., assail the September 24, 2002[1] Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch
124[2] which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of
title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following
material allegations claims of the parties which they sought to prove
by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz
Lazo.[3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.[4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom
she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, [6] later baptized as
Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.[7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights[8] over the estate of
their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2,
1964.[9] In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and
participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his
favor.[10]
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan
parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C.
Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person[12] adjudicating
to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172[13] in
Portugals name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No.
159813[14] was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on
March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran,
married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of
the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in
her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23,
1996 a complaint[15] against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of
Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in
her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related
whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the
Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made
false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of
Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in
respondents name and to issue in its stead a new one in their
(petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a
Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal
Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.
Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the
complaint.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,[17] after
giving an account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses
and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined
during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the
ground that petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been
established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over
the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court
held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of
Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as
heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to
the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the
establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a
special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary
civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the
former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a right. Their status
and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet,
the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on
plaintiffs cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have
the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule
2, supra).[19] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning
the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically
opposed to this Courts following ruling in Cario v. Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993])
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of
the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence
of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001)
subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999),
the appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case
in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was
the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago
Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the two
women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both
of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario
contracted two marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the only
question was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award
of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely an incident to the
question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the
case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is
the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is that
the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two
contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, both
now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights
of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x
x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be
properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil
action, whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil
suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is
axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or
allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the
establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an
ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that
purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original,
underscoring supplied).
 The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,[22] thus
affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the
appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed
to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite
the existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cario, and (ii) when the
Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the
evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . .
.[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that
the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance
with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above
disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the
pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a
quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and
the determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory
to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed
for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court
misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect
encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a
reading of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts to pass on the
determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so
long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and that
contrary to the appellate courts ruling, they had established their status
as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners
have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs
before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit
of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned therein. They
later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two
lots had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay
Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof
to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus
filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved
to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia,
state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of itexcept the
allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat
they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the
determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made
in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for
reconveyance . . .[27] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the
petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et
al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29] this Court held that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a
status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a
special proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he
is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and
is survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are
children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China
in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another
marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will
nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent.
The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on
Marcosas request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his
purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the
estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R.
Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam
and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made
in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of
properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and
Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some
unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard
by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil
case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al.
are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is
Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues
raised for determination was whether they are the legitimate children of
Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam
and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the
father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct the trial
courts findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the
birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the
deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it
does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in
any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof; and that
[t]he other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely
immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between
the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as
children of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court
should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa
is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the
[civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the]
[s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the
special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir
Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half sister of his mother.
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister of
his father, moved to reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia
Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an
heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of
appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against
Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the
RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by
Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who
posed, among other issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had
jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the deceased] while the
[estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same
court, this Court held that [i]n the interest of orderly procedure and
to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents
estate, a court should not interfere with [estate]
proceedings pending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge
of Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate
proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private
respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself
declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the
merits of her claim in the interest of justice, and declared her an heir
of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an
adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita),
and her adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the
settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother,
following which the probate court directed that the records of the case
be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father
to annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and
fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the
two lots allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed
a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father
to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the
parties agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanitas motion in
the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots
alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided,
set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order
setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the
meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the
project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery
of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside
the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was
no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate
proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two
lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this
Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive
that the records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this
Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been legally
terminated as Juanitas share under the project of partition had not been
delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with,
the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs.
Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does
not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The
better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which
may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate
court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol
vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082;
Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-
461).[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial
court setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to
continue because it involves no longer the two lots adjudicated to
Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which
the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or
parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but
there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then
the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and
settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had
been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or
if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special
proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then
an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to
bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication
of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she
was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February 15,
1988[35] the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second
sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.[36] Said
rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving
a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec.
6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed
to name an executor therein.[37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A
probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are
the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of
the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,[38] to still
subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding
which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status
of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the
estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case
subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented
evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case
upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,[39] the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the
trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-
trial, which bear repeating, to wit:

1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.

Portugal, is valid;

2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.

Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);

3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still
be contested by plaintiffs;

4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the

complaint.[40]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed

September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET
ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch
124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-
enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto
Cabrera as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3551
FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION G.R. No. 162956
REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and (T-8070). On April 17, 1996, petitioners executed an Extrajudicial
EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial
Petitioners,
Settlement) involving a portion of the subject parcel of land. On March
Present: 21, 1997, the petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, executed a Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale (the
- versus - CARPIO, Segregation and Confirmation) over the same property. By virtue of the
CORONA,
*AZCUNA, and aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 (T-8070) was cancelled and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. new TCTs were issued: (1) TCT No. T-98576 in the name of Anacleto
PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for himself
Cabrera covering Lot 1851-A; (2) TCT No. T-98577 covering Lot 1851-B
and Attorney-in-Fact of his daughter Promulgated:
DEBORAH ANN C. ENRIQUEZ, and in the name of petitioner Eutiquio Dico, Jr.; (3) TCT No. T-98578
SPS. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner Faustino Reyes; (4) TCT
No. T-98579 covering Lot 1851-D in the name of petitioner Esperidion
CATALINA FERNANDEZ,
Reyes; (5) TCT No. T-98580 covering Lot 1851-E in the name of
Respondents. April 10, 2008 petitioner Julieta G. Rivera; (6) TCT No. T-98581 covering Lot 1851-F in
x------------------------------------------------x the name of Felipe Dico; and (7) TCT No. T-98582 covering Lot 1851-G
in the name of Archimedes C. Villaluz.[3]
DECISION
Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf
of his minor daughter Deborah Ann C. Enriquez (Deborah Ann), also
PUNO, C.J.:
known as Dina Abdullah Enriquez Alsagoff, on the other hand, alleges
that their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
Seguera Cabrera (collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned pro-indiviso
the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals
share in the subject parcel of land or 1051 sq. m. They further allege
(CA) dated September 29, 2003 in CA G.R. CV No. 68147, entitled
that Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters Graciana, who
Peter B. Enriquez, et al. v. Faustino Reyes, et al., reversing the decision
died single and without issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch XI dated June
mother of respondent Deborah Ann who succeeded their parents rights
29, 2000, which dismissed the complaint filed by the respondents
and took possession of the 1051 sq. m. of the subject parcel of
herein.[1]
land. During her lifetime, Graciana sold her share over the land to
Etta. Thus, making the latter the sole owner of the one-half share of the
The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land known
subject parcel of land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed
as Lot No. 1851 Flr-133 with an aggregate area of 2,017 square meters
located in Talisay, Cebu.[2] on to petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate. On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah
According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes, Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses
Julieta C. Rivera, and Eutiquio Dico, Jr., they are the lawful heirs of Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-
respondents in the case at bar. After the sale, Spouses Fernandez took
possession of the said area in the subject parcel of land.[4]
When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the
subject land, they discovered that certain documents prevent them from
doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating
that his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately
369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating
that Anacleto only owned of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs
to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa
Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-
Judicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated April
17, 1996; (4) certificates of title in the name of the herein petitioners;
and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale
dated March 21, 1997 executed by the alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes
and Anacleto Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing documents are
fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a complaint for annulment
or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for
damages. [5]They likewise prayed for the repartition and resubdivision of
the subject property.[6]
The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the
case on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were actually seeking
first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since they
can not demand the partition of the real property without first being
declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary civil
action, as in this case, but through a special proceeding specifically
instituted for the purpose.[7]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and
directed the trial court to proceed with the hearing of the case.[8] The
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners was similarly
denied.[9]
Hence this petition.
The primary issue in this case is whether or not the respondents
have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs
of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify
the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial
Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of
Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the
heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to
cancel the new transfer certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-
questioned documents.
We answer in the affirmative.
An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.[10] A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.[11]
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is
allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court.[12] A real party in
interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof.[13] Such interest, to be
considered a real interest, must be one which is present and substantial,
as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.[14] A plaintiff is a real party in
interest when he is the one who has a legal right to enforce or protect,
while a defendant is a real party in interest when he is the one who has
a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by
reason of the defendants act or omission which had violated the legal
right of the former.[15] The purpose of the rule is to protect persons
against undue and unnecessary litigation.[16] It likewise ensures that the
court will have the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in
the consideration of a case.[17] Thus, a plaintiffs right to institute an
ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to the relief
sought.
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a
property was registered sue to recover the said property through the
institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for
reconveyance and partition,[18] or nullification of transfer certificate of
titles and other deeds or documents related thereto,[19] this Court has
consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an
ordinary civil action since the matter is within the exclusive competence
of the court in a special proceeding. [20] In the recent case of Portugal v.
Portugal-Beltran,[21] the Court had the occasion to clarify its ruling on
the issue at hand, to wit:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas
in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the
estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings
for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are
pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed
but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a
need to file one, then the determination of, among
other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in
said special proceedings. Where special proceedings
had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right
to have himself declared in the special proceedings as
co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then
an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as
heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition
or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased.[22]
In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an
action for the Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and
Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc., a review of the allegations
therein reveals that the right being asserted by the respondents are their
right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-half of
the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in the
documents the respondents sought to annul. As correctly pointed out by
the trial court, the ruling in the case of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v.
Hon. Roy del Rosario[23] is applicable in the case at bar. In the said
case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the legal heirs of the late
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for annulment of the transfer
certificates of title issued in the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation
on the ground that the subject properties rightfully belong to the
petitioners predecessor and by virtue of succession have passed on to
them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled:
...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs
of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown
any proof or even a semblance of it except the
allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchays that they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the
determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
couple must be made in the proper special proceedings
in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of
property. This must take precedence over the action for
reconveyance.[24]
In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their
allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither
is there anything in the records of this case which would show that a
special proceeding to have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed
the case for there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted
by parties who are not real parties in interest.While a declaration of
heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the
allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to protect or
enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of the
property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that
they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as
such heirs in the proper forum.
 Furthermore, in Portugal,[25] the Court held that it would be
superfluous to still subject the estate to administration proceedings since
a determination of the parties' status as heirs could be achieved in the
ordinary civil case filed because it appeared from the records of the
case that the only property left by the decedent was the subject matter
of the case and that the parties have already presented evidence to
establish their right as heirs of the decedent. In the present case,
however, nothing in the records of this case shows that the only property
left by the deceased Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had
respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any evidence to
establish their rights as heirs, considering especially that it appears that
there are other heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in this
case that had signed one of the questioned documents.Hence, under
the circumstances in this case, this Court finds that a determination of
the rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera in a special proceeding is necessary.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of

the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated June 29, 2000 DISMISSING the complaint
is REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956
In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio.
EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE
EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.
Francisco M. Ramos and Valeriano Silva for appellee.
Filemon Cajator for appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on
November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of
Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente
and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that
they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the
case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly
filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this
objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on
appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her
aforementioned sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on
November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court,
provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether
a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except
in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio
was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga,
where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as
his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who
treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on
October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A
España Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring his
belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a
stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to
his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent
remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila,
sometimes before November 26, 1952. On this date, he contracted
marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion
Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute
left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the
age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never
stayed or even slept in said house at España Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the
decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over
seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile,
and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the
contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained
until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70;
Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of
Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case
at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have
been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential,
namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical
presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein
permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of
Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of
the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the
decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been in
Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows
down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent
appears to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His
son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify
thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention,
opposition of the appellants herein, that "the deceased (had) decided to
reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said
appellee did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and
son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice,
presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A España Extention was
purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his
(decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding, the
lower court held that the decedent's intent to stay permanently in
Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said property and the
transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is
untenable.lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent
because he had been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the very
words of herein appellee. It is not improbable — in fact, its is very likely
— that said advice was given and followed in order that the patient could
be near his doctor and have a more effective treatment. It is well settled
that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely
for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will
never again be able, on account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict
of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott,
Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to live
with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality.
Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at
No. 889-A España Extention, Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on
October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his death, the decedent
gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and
"B" residence certificates used by the decedent in aknowledging said
Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the
deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion
Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days
prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando,
Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the
legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to said
wedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by his first
marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion
and would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it
were false. Consequently, apart from appellee's failure to prove
satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish his home in
Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his
death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the
retention of the old domicile 1— which is particularly strong when the
domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently
was, as regards said decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of
record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being
offered in evidence, and refused to entertain the same in the order
appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from its resolution in
rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The
court then held:
Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached
to the records for whatever action oppositors may want to take
later on because until now the personality of the oppositors has
not been established whether or not they have a right to
intervene in this case, and the Court cannot pass upon this
question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of
this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be
dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be
admitted in evidence before appellants had established their
"personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their
filiation. When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to
establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged illegitimate
children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection
thereto stating:
Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court,
and it seems that you are now trying to prove the status of your
client; you are leading so that. The main point here is your
contention that the deceased was never a resident of Quezon
City and that is why I allowed you to cross-examine. If you are
trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the
objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Court. This is not yet the time to declare who are persons who
should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the
domicile of the decedent, because of their alleged lack of "personality",
but, when tried to establish such "personality", they were barred from
doing so on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find
ourselves unable to sanction either the foregoing procedure adopted by
the lower court or the inference it drew from the circumstances
surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent
positions. While, on the one hand, he declared that appellants could not
be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for
they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the
order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the appellee, said
appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning
of the hearing, in the lower court, appellants' counsel announced that he
would take part therein "only to question the jurisdiction, for the purpose
of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-
examination of petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the relation
between the decedent and the appellants. As, the appellee objected
thereto, the court said, addressing appellants' counsel: "Your stand until
now is to question the jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to
establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless
you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.).
Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on
my stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected
Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that appellants "refuse to submit to the
jurisdiction of this court and they maintain that these proceedings should
be dismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record that they
were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for
the purpose only of assailing the same, and the court felt that appellants
were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.
At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove,
not only their right to object to appellee's petition, but, also, that venue
had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged relationship
with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the
Civil Code of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is
Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have admitted
Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in
connection with the issue under consideration.
Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that on
November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga received a petition of appellants herein, dated November 4,
1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres
Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing thereof
free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The
latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953, which
was received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on
which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On
December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all
surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage,
including petitioner herein), moved for the dismissal of said proceedings,
owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This motion was granted in
an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75,
section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case
at bar. Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile or
residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking
cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said
provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before
two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly
have intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested
therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed
before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would
then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially, said
provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties
in several provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their
respective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of
either one of said provinces, not only because said courts then have
concurrent jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of
the case shall exclude the other courts — but, also, because the
statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the
Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence,
which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the
court of first instance of any province in which they have
properties.lawphil.net
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident
are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised
before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of
Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be
decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been
improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the
corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper
court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance
of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the
estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that
it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and
dismissed appellee's petition.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's
petition is dismissed, with costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 "There is a presumption in favor of the continuance of an
existing domicile. Therefore, then burden of proving a change
lies in all cases upon those who alleged that he change has
occurred. This presumption may have a decisive effect, for it the
evidence is so conflicting that it is impossible to elicit with
certainly what the resident's intention is, the Court, being unable
to reach a satisfactory conclusion one way or the other, will
decide in favor of the existing domicile." (Private International
Law by Cheshire, pp. 218-219.)
"In the absence of any circumstances from which the courts may
infer the animus, they are accustomed to fall back on two legal
presumptions, without which it would in some cases be
impossible to arrive at any conclusions as to a party's domicile.
"The first of these is the presumption that the party has retained
the last domicile known to have been possessed by him. This
follows from the principle that a domicile acquired is retained
until another is gained, and from the other principle growing out
of it that the burden of proof is on him who alleges a change of
domicile." (Conflict of Laws by Minor, p. 123.)
2 "It is often said, particularly in the English cases, that there is a
stronger presumption against change from a domicile of origin.
3 Which was not been categorically denied, appellee's counsel
having limited themselves to alleging, in an unsworn pleading,
that they have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief on said
claim the appellants than there is against other changes of
domicile. "'Domicile of origin. . . . differs from domicile of choice
mainly in this — that is character is more enduring, its hold
stronger, and less easily shaken off.' The English view was
forcibly expressed in a Pennsylvania case in which Lewis, J.,
said: "The attachment which every one feels for his native land is
the foundation of the rule that the domicile of origin is presumed
to continue until it is actually changed by acquiring a domicile
elsewhere. No temporary sojourn in foreign country will work this
change.' In a federal case in Pennsylvania the same point was
emphasized." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, p. 129.)
Eusebio vs. Eusebio
In the matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. Eugenio
Eusebio, petitioner and appellee, vs. Amanda Eusebio, Virginia Eusebio,
Juan Eusebio, et al., oppositors and appellants.
December 28, 1956 | Concepcion
Facts:
Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his
appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He
alleged that his father, who died on November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon
City. Eugenio’s siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos),
stating that they are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition and
alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed
that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly
laid.
The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenio’s petition and overruled his siblings’
objection.
gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract
signed by Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion
Villanueva two days prior to his death stated that his residence is San
Fernando, Pampanga.
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose and
freedom of choice, (2) physical presence at the place chosen, (3) intention to
stay therein permanently. Although Andres complied with the first two
requisites, there is no change of domicile because the third requisite is absent.
Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of
the CFI of Rizal because they introduced evidence on the residence of the
decedent, it must be noted that appellants specifically made of record that they
were NOT submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the
purpose only of assailing the same.
In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in
San Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to
appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been
laid improperly.

Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal? Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained. It
is not changed by presence in a place for one’s own health.

Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always
been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot
at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio,
who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before
he was able to transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and
was forced to live in his son’s residence. It is well settled that “domicile is not
commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one own’s health” even if
coupled with “knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of
illness, to return home. Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the
presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.

Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no

direct evidence of such intent – Andres did not manifest his desire to live in
Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio
was not presented to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate,
his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that
municipality. In the deed of sale of his house at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch
Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA
and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word
"resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring
to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means.
Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is
sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a
petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C,
alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time,
she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate.
On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8,
1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the
petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons
interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in
the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the
appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor
of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed
that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of
Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the
Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the
jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8,
1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading
and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse
interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as
administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in
the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition
for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule.
This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects:
(1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of
Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the
deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as
legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio,
who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving
spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her
preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G.
Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular
administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed
by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to
confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the
court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition
was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original
and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the
issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973,
praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent
allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash
advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling
attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the
special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and
real properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order,
received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the
motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973,
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition,
because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest
has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and
(3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to
inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion
to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the
said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-
blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde,
with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973,
one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of
properties in the hands of third persons which have not been determined
as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special
administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of
the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B.
Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction,
and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus
motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2,
Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1subject only to the previous qualification
made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the
marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the special
administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August
20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of
title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of
the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.,
was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her
name without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does
not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that
the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2,
1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the
appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition,
the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of
administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of
his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia
had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her
objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular
administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27,
1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view
of previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix
to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the
resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of
action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of
her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was
likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the
first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the
special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed
the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an
inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of
the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973,
insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a)
legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c)
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special
administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks
and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7,
1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned
orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as
special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final
liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding
amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver
to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the
estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all
certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia,
whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C)
before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of
Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death
was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the
residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months
before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also
testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the
time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia
commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar
in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the
alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one
dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the
order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental
petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three
others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain
properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling
the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia
G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The
case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the
Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1,
1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-
19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February
10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as
special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the
motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon
a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the
office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed
Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge
Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of
the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975.
She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-
19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the
proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of
the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This
notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to
Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the
previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that
the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the
parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still
pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded
Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments
were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt
on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January
12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a
petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani
Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was
issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari
in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter
stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to
letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should
allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last
residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets,
intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who
seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be
appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within
the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings
in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not
an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in
the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of
venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such
legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject
matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause
began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure,
which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be
fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not
exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely,
the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over
the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for
lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this
provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that
it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to
the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous
Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however,
purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be
brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement
of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does
not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is
merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised
Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides"
mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent
at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term
"resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature —
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B.
Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of
his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely
stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real
estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia
assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no
domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as
"property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba,
Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B.
Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by
Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers,
the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended
petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's
"last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision,
Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was
presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa
B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the
deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before
his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated
November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of
sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973,
transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels
of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G.
Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the
conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of
First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is
that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4
of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not
objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case
before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia
did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue
assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed
of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as
surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing
the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the
decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as
special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia
claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of
Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a
special administrator was only proper when the allowance or
disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however,
broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now
allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special
administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no
authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes
and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise
of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal
principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal
principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be
taken into account in the appointment of a special
administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a
special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others
in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of
the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent,
besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she
would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire
estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked
ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as
the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B.
Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with
Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter,
incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that
Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special
administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine
who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is
entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be
determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on
the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. 21The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient
reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G.
Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated
therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for
the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein
the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these
documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the
surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs.
Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all
inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was
properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the
interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City
court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special
administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and
the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing
with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof
to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the
proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17,
1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738,
subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar
Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70
for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia
Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby
denied, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
. VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch
Vl, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, *
PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
x---------------------------------------------------x
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ERNANI C.
PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976 MARTIN, J.:
FACTS:
1. On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned property in
Calamba, Laguna.
2. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule field with CFI Laguna a petition for
letters of administration and ex parte appointment as special
administratix over the estate. Motion was granted.
a. there was an allegation that the wife was Carolina Carpio
3. Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and in behalf of their child:
Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by CFI.
a. Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and
as a mere illegitimate sister of the deceased is not entitled
to succeed from him
4. CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule.
a. Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of
P30k.
ISSUES:
a.) Venue v. jurisdiction
b.) What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73
Section 1 Mean?
c.) Who is entitled?
HELD/RATIO:
a.) RULE 73
SECTION 1. “if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled at the CFI in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in
which he had estate.
The court 1st taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court,
in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.”
Fule’s own submitted Death Certificate shows that the deceased resided in
QC at the time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna was improper.
Venue is subject to waiver (RULE 4 SECTION 4), but Preciosa did not
waive it, merely requested for alternative remedy to assert her rights as
surviving spouse.
However, venue is distinct from “jurisdiction” which is conferred by
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to be with CFIs independently from the
place of residence of the deceased.
RULE 79
SECTION 2, demands that the petition should show the existence of
jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts such as death, name, last residence, existence, situs of
assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as next of kin,
creditor or otherwise to be appointed.
b.) Resides – ex vi termini “actual residence”
- Elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed.
- Same meaning as “inhabitant”.
- Popular sense – the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode
- Must be more than temporary
Distinguished from
“legal residence or domicile” – requires bodily presence and an
intention to make it one’s domicile.
c.) Preciosa is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special
administratrix.
The New Rules RULE 80 SECTION 1 broadened the basis for appointment
of special administrator (temporarily) to take possession and charge of
the estates of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and (regular) executors or administrators appointed.
Old rules basis ay: appeal of allowance of disallowance of a will;
New: added - “xxx delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause (includes parties cannot agree among
themselves) including an appeal of allowance of disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a xxx”
The discretion to appoint a special administrator or not is with the probate
court, the paramount consideration is the beneficial interest of the
appointee in the estate of the decedent.
In re: Fule, it is not required that the administratrix be entitled to share in the
estate of the decedent – only that one is entitled to the administration;
but the preference of Preciosa is with sufficient reason – the widow would
have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership.
For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin.
DISPOSITION: Fule’s petition DENIED.
GARCIA FULE V. COURT OF APPEALS
Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo
FACTS:
On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned property in
Calamba, Laguna. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with CFI Laguna a
petition for letters of administration and exparte appointment as special
administratrix over the estate. Subsequently, the motion was granted..There
was an allegation that the wife was Carolina Carpio
Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and nn behalf of their child:
Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by CFI. Preciosa alleged that
Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere illegitimate sister of thedeceased
is not entitled to succeed from him.
The Court of Appeals reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule.
Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30, 000.00.
ISSUES:
a.)What is the distinction between venue and jurisdiction
b.)What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73,
Section 1 mean?
RULING:
Rule 73, Section 1.“if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled at the CFI in theprovince
in which he resides at the time of his death, And if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the CFI of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of thelocation of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, inthe original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. ”Fule’s own submitted Death
Certificate shows that the deceased resided in QC at the time of his death,
therefore the venueof Laguna was improper.
Venue is subject to waiver (Rule 4, Section 4), but Preciosa did not
waive it, merely requested for alternativeremedy to assert her rights as
surviving spouse. However, venue is distinct from “jurisdiction” which is
conferred by Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to bewith CFIs independently
from the place of residence of the deceased.
 Rule 79 Section 2, demands that the petition should show the existence G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
of jurisdiction to make the appointmentsought, and should allege all the
necessary facts such as death, name, last residence, existence, situs of assets, ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as next of kin, creditor or vs.
otherwise to be appointed. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL
CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA,
CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO
Resides – ex vi termini “actual residence”-Elastic and should be GONZALEZ, respondents.
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it
isemployed.-Same meaning as “inhabitant”. Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner.

Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution
promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors'
Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two
(2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all
residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children
of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes
Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco
Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.

On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)1 respondent
Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first
instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late
senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of
Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu
and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the
petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the
heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA
PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.

The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and
modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to
be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date,
a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition
for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet
ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following:
 It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet
regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite
publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied
with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all
of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters
of administration.2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the
Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the
court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last
will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the
surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said
proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss,
dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of
Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued
an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until
after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition
for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to
the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor
sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did
they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate
courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to
Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the
jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate
and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged
exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-
R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss,
giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an
intestate proceeding."4 The said court further found in said order that
the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal,
Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the
opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the
decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of
Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper
Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule
73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation,
the Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not mean
to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he
died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over
the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above
the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the
probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City Court of First
Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the oppositors as
understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as
proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the
will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his
death was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A
(Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition
for probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he
executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y
Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of
Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the latter as his
second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the
one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself
selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the
center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition
before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the
decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate
proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others.5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City
court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April
1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was
likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for
probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals,
but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the
Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court
noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and
motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons
for his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that
the testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument
he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature
thereto.6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of
the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly
notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental
witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A.
Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr.,
who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the
decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of
donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St.,
Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its
said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and
testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with
all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate
without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to
probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with
respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the
Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate
and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI
having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first
invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can properly
and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the
decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not
the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the
Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said
court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in
which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said
respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the
proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of
another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13,
1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc.
2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special
administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the Court
today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not
having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... .
" It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was
certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to
jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is
filed, but only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage
of the proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and
determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements
of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding
and directing the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B.
Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding and taking any
action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said
respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions
heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge,
therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of
injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent
Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review
on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court
erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering
it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling
and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of
the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament.
This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether
the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for
probate of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents
never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus
enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction,
once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate
proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the
hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as
to its due execution and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in
issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with
the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the
deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations: —
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First
Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the
other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as
the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the
different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the
Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
The cited Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his
estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.
This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho9 as
follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in
probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is regarded
as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we
decline to follow this view because of its mischievous
consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted
in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province where the
deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all
the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court and the case is therein completely finished except for a claim
of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on
appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first time in this
Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of
residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider such
question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial
court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which
have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same
case will have to be commenced anew before another court of
the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous
effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to
require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No.
48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No.
190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have
been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over
the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained in a
law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as
we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General
vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction
— Act No. 136, 11Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the
place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are
many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of
Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place
where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of
the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the
new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled is properly called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom
the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of
equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition
is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order
to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their
minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that
the decedent died intestatemay be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of
the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the
second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged
last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a
motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance
its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting
its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's
order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court,
then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition
which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of
jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by
its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the
question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his
death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu
City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline
to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon
City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition
and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of
the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under
Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the
decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu
court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule
of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it
and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the
Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of
said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City
court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the
appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the
decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance
with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against
respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings
over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect
the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in
accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that
the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the
latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state
an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however,
is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as
an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case,
the Quezon City court) although opining that certain considerations therein "would
seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will
for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate
special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already
pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the
Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the
Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter
court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not
the proper venuetherefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely
a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is
precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this
connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed
by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio
Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with
notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the
Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the
Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona
filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All
these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed
with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an
Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal
and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date;
thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator
with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more
than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962.
 To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the
probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a
premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that
this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a
lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if
the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in
some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the
present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too
late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will
duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the
first choiceof residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile
therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be
contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph
of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the
Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record
otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it
and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late
senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one"
held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of
whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction
- in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this
Court. Parenthetically, we note that the question of the residence
of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal
resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the
ordinary course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in
view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the
Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives
Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that
this matter requires airing in the proper court, as so indicated in
the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan,
et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of
the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed
with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine
the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament
upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or
Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both
courts — at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court —
that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and
therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It
would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the
Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to
determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City
court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu
court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding
based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine
Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only
then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the
corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is
taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for
allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts"
in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the
death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where
the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having
left his estate in such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-
requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and
when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even
against the State. The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is
conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted
regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was
not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to
it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by
a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's
appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra,
where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's
action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in
accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered
that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court
even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to
have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As
stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the
administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the
jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all
over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another
province "is too obvious to require comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the
decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's
estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1
provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between them to
the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be
set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it
would be converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of
his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in
disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and
testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such
dire consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in
consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the
applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where
respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier
by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where
petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on
February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters
testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her
husband's estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go
all the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a
new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be convertedinto
a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for
the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the
Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had
their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be
executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith,
and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to
require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon
City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take
up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73,
section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her
husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to be administered
and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the
appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the
proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City
court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the
deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of
jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her
residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate
even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not
act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take
cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to the testateproceedings
filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of
the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and
motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that
the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never
challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April
1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus
leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise
jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted
without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's
will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its
testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of
Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order
of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix
thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said
order of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a special
civic action of prohibition.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has
done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and transferredto
the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of
needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate
estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and
its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-
widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will
and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved
and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to
repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert
once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in
fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of
incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal
residence of the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.
CUENCO VS. CA
Balanay, Rendel Bryan
FACTS:
In 1964, Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila Doctors’ Hospital
survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco and their
two (2) minor sons all residing at 69 Piy Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon
City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely,
Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen
Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age
and residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters
of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the
senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu
and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second
wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the last
will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance
resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate
proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground
of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu
already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and
motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and
issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
The CA ruled in the following manner:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings.
The Special Proceeding of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court
whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court
which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether
the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the
decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI),
it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco. The said respondent should assert her rights within the
framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the
jurisdiction of another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that the judge of the Cebu CFI,
stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet
ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this
Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding ..." It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was
certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction
itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the
exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events,
jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the
pronouncements of a trial judge.
ISSUE
Whether or not in Special Proceedings, the court with whom the estate
or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ
of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate
proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the
deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, not the
court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed. Since the Quezon
City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court,
the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said
Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise,
it would affect the prompt administration of justice. It would be an unfair
imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the
decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a
disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to
require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from
Quezon City to the Cebu court every time she has an important matter of the
estate to take up with the probate court.
In the case at bar, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate
petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the
Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the
residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament
upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or
Quezon City.
Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for
probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first choice
of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein
— with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be
contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last
paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of
the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the
record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the
petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
Finally, venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City
court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that
the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the
decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its
admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of
petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the
decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate
proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such
proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings
before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should
the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the
Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of
record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-24742
October 26, 1973
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow
and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage,
residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu,
alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with
properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second
wife (widow), filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the
last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but the said court held in
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon City shall have acted
on the probate proceedings. CFI Cebu, in effect deferred to the probate
proceedings in the Quezon City court.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on
ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu
already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and
motion to dismiss were denied. Lourdes filed special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent CA. CA favored Lourdes
holding that CFI Cebu had first acquired jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against
Quezon City court ordering it to refrain from proceeding with the testate
proceedings.
2. Whether or not CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction
over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings.
HELD:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ
of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate
proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the
deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to
pursuant to the deceased testator's wish. start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate same rank in another province is too obvious to require comment. It
of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and
residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in
jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. Conversely, such court, accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on
may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more
been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu
domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up
the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died
with the probate court.
intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition
and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second
court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last
will.
Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to
probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take
cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be
false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City
court, to the exclusion of all other courts.
2. No. Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take
cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition
since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over
the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other
courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed,
said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court undisputably
had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

NOTE (additional info):

 Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings should
be by appeal: Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's
assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the
will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that
Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had
his conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity
duly given by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by
appeal from said court in the original case except when want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
 When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if
court had improper venue: the mischievous effect in the administration
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set
aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March
17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed
a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent
but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real
properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by
his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has
no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo
since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo
in seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime
in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to
Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions
for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted
that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a
motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge
Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On
even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it
was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition.
On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence
set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent
and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was
without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27
of Judge
Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders
of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent
by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under
paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage
with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article
26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce
in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The
foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this
reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated
as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse
can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x
x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to
our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can
only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile,
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to
Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in
which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
– Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence
is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in
Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of
election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the
Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased
the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating
the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent
also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent
by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling
cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which
has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by
his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his
Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the
alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held
that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after
the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated
by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as
to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that
the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely
freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still marriedto private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife.
The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when
the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of
divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise
cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative
intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent. 1awphi 1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void
under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s
rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact,
for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because
only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as
it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we
are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always
an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker,
to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by
Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo
under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific
guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated
text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was
done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof
also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to
the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence,
the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage,
the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid
v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described
the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion
to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of
co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by
the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must
be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating
and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS
Balanay, Rendel Bryan
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted three marriages.
His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five
years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom
he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American
citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo
married Felicidad San Luis (marriage solemnized at California, U.S.A.), then
surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived with her
for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992. Upon death of Felicisimo, Felicidad (respondent in this case) sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
The RTC ruled that Felicidad, as a widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that the venue was properly laid. Mila, one of
the children by first marriage, filed a motion for inhibition against Judge
Tensuan. The motion was granted and the case was reraffled to Branch 134
presided by Judge Arcangel. Same issues were raised at the second trial.
However, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It
held that, at the the time of Felicisimo’s death, he was duly elected governor
and a resident of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with the decedent was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
On appeal to the CA, it reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court
ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence
or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as
governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the
petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of
the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at
the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray and Romualdez v. RTC,
Br. 7, Tacloban City, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They
claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether venue was properly laid.
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his
death." The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the
terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light
of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. The
word "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary. There is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of
actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing
venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have
his residence in one place and domicile in another. In the instant case, while
petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa
from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that
Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate. The subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the
branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City
as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition
was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Petition is DENIED.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During
his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had
a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom
he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued
an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial
court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage
with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case
before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration
Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered
as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their PHILLIPS, respondent.
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary that the property be [G.R. No. 133359. January 31, 2000]
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed
FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge
equal, unless the contrary is proven.
of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix
of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, respondents. Scmis
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
DECISION
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
MENDOZA, J.:
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to
dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth
reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that
further proceedings. petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo
de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering that they involve the same
parties and some of the issues raised are the same.

The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:

On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City,
filed a petition for probate of his will[1] in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos
alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole
legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by
his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00;
and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private
respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will[2] was annexed to the
petition for probate.

On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch

61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. The order reads:

On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the

hearing of the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30 oclock in
the morning, copies of which were served to Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips (Officers
Return, dated 04 September 1995 attached to the records).
When the case was called for hearing on the date set, no
oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed
and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his
evidence in support of the petition.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was
placed on the witness stand and was directly examined by the
Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give
this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the
petitioner when he executed the subject will. After the
examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of sound
and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and
undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last
Will and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that
he was neither forced nor influenced by any other person in
signing it. Mis sc
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence
adduced that petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last Will
and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his
residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes
Park, Makati City; said Last Will and Testament was signed in
the presence of his three (3) witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr.
Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"),
Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10",
& "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-
13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of
the testator and in the presence of each and all of the
witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and duly
notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh.
"A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and Testament,
pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").
Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia
Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole
legatee and devisee of petitioners properties, real and
personal, approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms.
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and to
serve as such without a bond.
From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has
substantially established the material allegations contained in
his petition. The Last Will and Testament having been
executed and attested as required by law; that testator at the
time of the execution of the will was of sane mind and/or not
mentally incapable to make a Will; nor was it executed under
duress or under the influence of fear or threats; that it was in
writing and executed in the language known and understood by
the testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and
subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of another; that the testator and all the
attesting witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament freely
and voluntarily and that the testator has intended that the
instrument should be his Will at the time of affixing his
signature thereto.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself)
the petition for the allowance of the Last Will and Testament of
Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED and ALLOWED.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention
claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators sister) and Octavio
L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr.
De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner
thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the
issuance of letters of administration in his name. Mis spped
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the
designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to
withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a
memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch 61)
still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.[3]
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other
hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of
letters testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with
the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343
and assigned to Branch 65.
Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65
issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator
of Dr. De Santoss estate.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to
set aside the appointment of private respondent as special administrator. He
reiterated that he was the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of
the testator; that he came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343
only by accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before
Branch 61 of the same court was still pending; that private respondent
misdeclared the true worth of the testators estate; that private respondent was
not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be
given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No.
M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case before
Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ."
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied
on August 26, 1996 petitioners motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this
matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision[4] promulgated on February
13, 1998, upheld the denial of petitioners motion for intervention.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996,
returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground that
there was a pending case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos
pending before said court. The order reads: Spped
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this
Court, transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the ground
that this case is related with a case before this Court, let this
case be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there is
no related case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT
ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before this Branch.
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as
petitioner under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the Allowance
of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-
4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996 and has
become final.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became
final, herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a
MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after
this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the motion
could not be admitted as the subject matter involves a separate
case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant
withdrew her motion and filed this case (No. 4343).
Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR
INTERVENTION before Case No. M-4223 and this motion was
already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August 1996
likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate
case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot
be included in this case filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court.
It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation
of cases must be approved by the Presiding Judges of the
affected Branches.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,[5] Judge Abad Santos
appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) to
hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the
probate proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the
transfer of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later recalled his
decision and took cognizance of the case "to expedite the proceedings." Thus,
in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.
of Branch 61 to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the
fact that said branch began the probate proceedings of the
estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise
its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire
estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed as
per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional
Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if
only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept that
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but one court. Jo
spped
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice
and the Office of the Court Administrator, of the Supreme
Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los
Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles,
Intervenor.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners motion for
intervention. Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion
was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision [6] setting aside
the trial courts order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any right or
interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court - Makati,
Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate
proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of
Dr. Arturo de Santos
 2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court - Makati,
Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance
of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr.
Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the
respondent.
4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum
shopping in filing her petition for issuance of letters
testamentary with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65
knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving the
same testate estate of the decedent is still pending with the
Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61. Spped jo
First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-
Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr.
De Santos. Citing the cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban[7] and Tagle v.
Manalo,[8] he argues that the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully
distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant
to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that
Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private respondents petition for issuance
of letters testamentary.
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is
limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law.[9]
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the
testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court
proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The
cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts
cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the
principle of ambulatory nature of wills.[10]
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate
of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court
having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case,
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance
of wills after the testators death shall govern. Miso
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of
Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on
petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either
during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.
Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any
executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death
of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the
will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or
is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the
court for the allowance of his will.
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has
been explained by the Code Commission thus:
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the
testamentary capacity of the testator or the formalities adopted
in the execution of wills. There are relatively few cases
concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It
is far easier for the courts to determine the mental condition of
a testator during his lifetime than after his death. Fraud,
intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if
a will does not comply with the requirements prescribed by law,
the same may be corrected at once. The probate during the
testators life, therefore, will lessen the number of contest upon
wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator,
the only questions that may remain for the courts to decide
after the testators death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that even
when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he
may be acting under duress or undue influence, but these are
rare cases.
 After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator,
it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the
same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would
also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he
has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate
proceeding after the testators death would be in order.[11]
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996,
there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of
allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court. There is,
therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-
Makati that -Nex old
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun
the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it
continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate
proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance
of a will but continues up to such time that the entire estate of
the testator had been partitioned and distributed.
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the
testator meant merely that the partition and distribution of the
estate was to be suspended until the latters death. In other
words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a
manifestation for the same purpose in the probate court.[12]
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites
Rule 73, 1 which states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, it was held:[13]
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section
1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of the state," is in
reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and
Processes." It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal
provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the
subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court
over the subject matter "existed was fixed before procedure in
a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or
changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in
which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised.
There are cases though that if the power is not exercised
conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely,
the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it
legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may
thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment
may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something
essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the
procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has
nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of
convenience to the parties. Mani kx
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with
approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00
(in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended. The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region
do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each
other.[14]
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the
petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar
other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of the testator after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso
v. Ramolote:[15]
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-
equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court of First
 Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the
judges. And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction
over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to
the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or
proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It
is for this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly
grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or
power to apportion the cases among the different branches,
both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination
of the work by the different branches of the same court. The
apportionment and distribution of cases does not involve a
grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and
continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the
province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of
the court.
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction
over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for
issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as
the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is
material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the
proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under
the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a
compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral
relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in
case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has
already been probated and disposes of all his properties the
private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled.
His interest in the decedents estate is, therefore, not direct or
immediate. Maniks
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one,
having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the
opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records
show, not supported by evidence.
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest
in the estate or the will, and the private respondent has none.
Moreover, the ground cited in the private respondents
opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the
truth worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the
question of her competency to act as executor. Section 2, Rule
76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the
probable value and character of the property of the estate. The
true value can be determined later on in the course of the
settlement of the estate.[16]
Rule 79, 1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous
petition for administration. - Any person interested in a will may
state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not
issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of
them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon
the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same
time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct,
not merely incidental or contingent.[17]
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his
entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to
succeed. Manikan
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code
with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction;
 (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the
Civil Code.[18]
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have
been preterited in the testators will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on
his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted
or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the
desires of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:[19]
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a
necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the
manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to
appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his
wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may
be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give
bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. [20] None of
these circumstances is present in this case.
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping
when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No.
M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still
pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and
reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the same facts, and a
judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed
by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will.
Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated. Oldmis o
On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by
private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose
of securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect
the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the
filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies
and devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity
between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during the pendency of the
former. There was, consequently, no forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CASE: MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS
324 SCRA 172
G.R. No. 129505
January 31, 2000
NATURE:
Review on certiorari of 2 CA decisions which ruled that petitioner has no right to
intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
FACTS:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos filed a petition for probate of his will
in RTC-Makati, Branch 61.He alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had
named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc;
and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, Pacita de
los Reyes Phillips.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Gorospe issued an order granting the
petition and allowing the will. Dr. De Santos died 10 days later.
On April 3, 1996, Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention
claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L.
Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De
Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus
prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of
letters of administration in his name.
On the other hand, Phillips, the will’s designated executrix, filed a motion
for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, she moved
to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a
memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court still had
jurisdiction to allow his intervention.
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996.
Meanwhile, Phillips, who withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary, refiled a petition for the same with the Makati RTC, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343, assigned to Branch 65.
Upon Phillip's motion, Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order,
dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santos's
estate.
Petitioner sought to intervene in M-4343 and to set aside the appointment
of Phillips as special administrator. He reiterated that he was the nearest of kin of
the testator; that he came to know of the existence of M-4343 only by accident; that
the probate proceedings in M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was still
pending; that Phillips misdeclared the true worth of the testator's estate; that Phillips
was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be
given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.
 On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of M-4343 to
Branch 61, on the ground that it is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of
RTC Branch 61.
It appears, however, that in M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on August
26, 1996 petitioner's motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the CA
which upheld the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated Sep 4, 1996, returning
the records of M-4343 to Branch 65. The order states that there is no related case
involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before
Branch 61; there is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner
under Rule 76 for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as M-4223
which was already decided on 16 Feb 1996 and has become final; after it became
final, Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after Branch 61
ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the subject matter involves a
separate case under Rule 78, and movant withdrew her motion and filed M-4343;
Octavio de Santos Maloles II filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before M-4223
and this was already DENIED likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a
separate case to be filed under Rule 78.
Initially, Judge Abad Santos appeared firm in his position that it would be
improper for Branch 65 to hear and resolve M-4343, considering that the probate
proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer of the
records back to the latter branch. However, he later recalled his decision and took
cognizance of the case to expedite the proceedings:
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Gorospe of Branch 61 to continue
hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the probate
proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise
its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the testator had
been partitioned and distributed as per Order dated 23 Sep 1996, Branch 65 shall
take cognizance of the petition if only to expedite the proceedings, and under the
concept that the Makati RTC is but one court.
On Nov 4, 1996: Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner's motion for
intervention. Phillips’ MFR denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA which set aside the trial court's order on the ground that
petitioner had not shown any right/interest to intervene in M-4343.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a right to intervene.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for
issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the
nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material
and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings
before Branch 65, the CA held that Maloles’ claim to being a creditor of the estate is
a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition
to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by
evidence; the opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or
the will, and Maloles has none. Moreover, the ground cited that the executrix has
deliberately misdeclared the true worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the
question of her competency to act as executor. Rule 76, sec 2 requires only an
allegation of the probable value and character of the property of the estate. The true
value can be determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate.
Rule 79, sec 1 provides:Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary.
Simultaneous petition for administration. Any person interested in a will may state in
writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named
therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall
pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be
filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.
Under this provision, "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or
contingent.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his
entire estate by will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings
based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator
instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect
the desires of the testator. As stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a
necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he
wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence,
one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The
curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to
give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate.
DispositionWHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963
DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased
EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and
ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES,
namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners.
Romerico F. Flores for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate court in
Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of
donation in question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties
mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died
on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was
instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to
probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his widow;
his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and
Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes
herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor
of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her
collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and
Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena,
all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate
proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of
Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena
Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On
June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of
partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2
of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the
theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership
of the spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960,
respectively, set the two projects of partition for hearing, at which evidence was
presented by the parties, followed by the submission of memoranda discussing
certain legal issues. In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted
heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the
deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal
partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half share of
such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no
lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the donation; and (3) that
even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same
must be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts.1äwphï1.ñët
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the
deed of donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal character to
the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the
Civil Code, and that since the donation was null and void the deceased
Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore
could not validly dispose of it in his will.
On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding,
issued an order declaring the donation void without making any specific finding
as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for
the reason that, considered under the first category, it falls under Article 133 of
the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during the
marriage; and considered under the second category, it does not comply with
the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the
same Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same order the court
disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file another,"
dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased
Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B,
between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs
of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties
were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960,
the executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the
contention previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena
Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili
and taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of the donation
"without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The motion for
new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners
filed this present petition for review by certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the
probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had generally no power to
adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to
title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings," 1 except
where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of
the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. 2 However, we have also
held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them
to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted,
said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil.
561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties,
matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by
the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are
not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the
Court of Appeals erred in upholding the power of the probate court in this case to
adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein
involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or
to the deceased husband exclusively?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in
the sense advanced by appellants that the trial court had completely no authority to pass
upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and void
and does not bind even those who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision
because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action can not
vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there can be no
exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v.
Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason:
"Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The
responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the
delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure,
which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the
filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived". Strictly speaking, it is
more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the subject matter, for the
jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the
ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be
vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration
proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs
and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and
payment of all the debts and expenses.3 Thereafter, distribution is made of the
decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding
is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the
mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a
necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the
ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of
the decedent's estate are before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all
matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as
no interests of third parties are affected.4
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of
certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or
to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate
court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine
the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties
to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her
death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and
who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected.
It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but
the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that
is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being
asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with
the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the
widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the question of
ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the
contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition
claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as
representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition
and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be
deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly,
the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of
partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character
of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents".
In other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed
lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners
themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties — which is well
within the competence of the probate court — and just because of an opposition thereto,
they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction
of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection
are the ones who set the court in motion.5 They can not be permitted to complain if the
court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them. 6
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of
ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not
only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of
her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried
properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel,
the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he
performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no
estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the
deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was
illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the
required formalities similar to a will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the
same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. So ordered.
BERNARDO v CAGR L-18148 | 7 SCRA 367 | February 28, 1963 | BARRERA,
J.:
FACTS: The properties in the will of testator Eusebio was disposed to his wife
Hermogena and his cousins. The wife died and was substituted by hercollateral
relatives, upon executor Bernardo's petition. Petitioner
-executor filed his project of partition, but was opposed by collateral
relativesclaiming that ½ of the properties disposed of in the will are part of the
spouses conjugal partnership. Probate court heard evidence.
Petitionercontended that it was donated by the wife to the husband so it was
not part of CPG and that the oppositors cannot question the validity of
thedonation in the probate proceedings.
Oppositors rebutted that since it was donated during marriage, it was void;
hence, the husband did not own itand cannot dispose it by will. Probate court
ordered the donation voided and that executor submit another project of
partition.
Petitioner filed Motionfor New trial (MNT) on the ground that probate court had
no jurisdiction, but was denied. Petitioner filed for appeal to CA, but was also
denied.
Hence, this petition for review by certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not a probate court can determine a question of ownership
over property during distribution.
HELD: YES. Probate court has to liquidate the conjugal partnership to
determine the testator's estate to be distributed to
the heirs who are partiesto the proceedings.
As a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon
on testate or intestate proceedings,
• e x c e p t : a. where a party prays merely for inclusion or exclusion from
inventory of the property; andb. when interested parties are all heirs and submit
a question as to title to property, provided third persons are not prejudiced
41. BERNARDO vs CA
G.R. No. L–18148 February 28, 1963
RULE 73 - VENUE AND PROCESS
Facts:
Capili died in 1958, testate in which he disposed his properties in favor of his
wife, cousins all surnamed Capili and Arturo, Deogracias (petitioner) and
Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Reyes (wife) died the following year. Upon
petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of Capili, she was
substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos,
Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia,
Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro. The executor filed a project of
partition in the estate proceedings in accordance with the terms of the will,
adjudicating the estate of Capili among the testamentary heirs with the
exception of Reyes, whose share was allotted to her collateral relatives. These
relatives filed an opposition to the executor’s project of partition and submitted a
counter-projection of their own claiming ½ of the properties mentioned in the
will of the deceased Capili on the theory that they belong not to the latter alone
but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void for the reason
that it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code which prohibits donation between
spouses during the marriage. In the same order, the court disapproved both
project of partitions and directed the executor to file another, dividing the
property mentioned in the last will and testament of Capili and the properties
mentioned in the deed of donation, between the instituted heirs of Capili and
Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of the
deceased spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not a probate court in a special proceeding had jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the deed of donation in question and pass upon the
question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned in the will.
Held:
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. The Court held that the
determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance. The probate court has the jurisdiction since there is a necessity to
liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the
decedent which is to be distributed among heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings, including the widow, now represented because of her death, by
her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and
who appeared voluntarily.
The petitioners, by presenting their project of partition including therein the
disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her
husband) put in question the issue of ownership of the properties is within the
competence of the probate court.
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., VS.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
Borlagdatan, April
FACTS:
It appears from the records that Jose Portugal (Portugal, Sr.) contracted
two marriages.
1st marriage with Paz Lazo in 1942 whom he had a daughter named Leonila
Perpetua Aleli Portugal (respondent) 2nd marriage with Isabel de la Puerta in
1948, who gave birth to a boy named Jose Douglas Portugal, Jr. (petitioners).
By virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights executed by
Portugal Sr. and his 4 siblings, over the estate of their father, a parcel of land n
Caloocan was issued a TCT in the name of “Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C.
Lazo”.
Paz died in 1984, while Portugal Sr. died intestate in 1985.
In 1988, Leonila executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate
of Deceased Person”, adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land, and
was subsequently registered (1988) in her name “Leonila Portugal Beltran,
married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.”
In 1996, Isabel and Portugal, Jr. (petitioners) filed a complaint against Leonila
for cancellation of Affidavit of Adjudication and TCT issued in her name,
alleging that Leonila is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, Sr.,
hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land, and accordingly
prayed that said TCT be cancelled and a new one be issued in their
(petitioner’s) name.
However, the CA found Carino to be inapplicable. The appellate court held that
in Carino case, the main issue was the validity of the two marriages, whereas in
the instant case, the main issue is the annulment of title to property. Thus, the
CA affirmed the TC’s dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine
their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
RULING: NO.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she
was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general
rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or
intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a
deceased.

A Pre-Trial Order was issued & after trial, the trial court dismissed the case for
lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction without resolving the issues as
stated in the pre-trial order, on the ground that petitioner’s status and right as
putative heirs had not been established before a probate court.

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to CA, citing the case of Carino vs. Carino. In
this case, the SC ratiocinates that the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case.
FERDINAND R. MARCOS II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and
HERMINIA D. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Government action is once again
assailed as precipitate and unfair, suffering the basic and oftly implored
requisites of due process of law.Specifically, the petition assails the Decision of
[1]
the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31363,
where the said court held:
"In view of all the foregoing, we rule that the deficiency income tax
assessments and estate tax assessment, are already final and (u)nappealable -
and- the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax remedy resorted to by the
government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct and separate from the
other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and is
not affected or precluded by the pendency of any other tax remedies instituted
by the government.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition for certiorari with prayer for Restraining Order and
Injunction.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
More than seven years since the demise of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos,
the former President of the Republic of the Philippines, the matter of the
settlement of his estate, and its dues to the government in estate taxes, are still
unresolved, the latter issue being now before this Court for
resolution. Specifically, petitioner Ferdinand R. Marcos II, the eldest son of the
decedent, questions the actuations of the respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in assessing, and collecting through the summary remedy of Levy on
Real Properties, estate and income tax delinquencies upon the estate and
properties of his father, despite the pendency of the proceedings on probate of
the will of the late president, which is docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 10279 in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 156.
Petitioner had filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with an application for writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order on June 28, 1993, seeking to -
I. Annul and set aside the Notices of Levy on real property dated February 22,
1993 and May 20, 1993, issued by respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue;
II. Annul and set aside the Notices of Sale dated May 26, 1993;
III. Enjoin the Head Revenue Executive Assistant Director II (Collection
Service), from proceeding with the Auction of the real properties covered
by Notices of Sale.
After the parties had pleaded their case, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision on November 29, 1994, ruling that the deficiency assessments for
[2]
estate and income tax made upon the petitioner and the estate of the deceased
President Marcos have already become final and unappealable, and may thus
be enforced by the summary remedy of levying upon the properties of the late
President, as was done by the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition for Certiorari with prayer for Restraining Order and
Injunction.
No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED."
Unperturbed, petitioner is now before us assailing the validity of the
appellate court's decision, assigning the following as errors:
A. RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SUMMARY TAX
REMEDIES RESORTED TO BY THE GOVERNMENT ARE NOT AFFECTED AND PRECLUDED
BY THE PENDENCY OF THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE LATE
PRESIDENT'S ALLEGED WILL. TO THE CONTRARY, THIS PROBATE PROCEEDING
PRECISELY PLACED ALL PROPERTIES WHICH FORM PART OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S
ESTATE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS OF THE PROBATE COURT TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL
OTHER COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
B. RESPONDENT COURT ARBITRARILY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY DECIDING THAT
SINCE THE TAX ASSESSMENTS OF PETITIONER AND HIS PARENTS HAD ALREADY
BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE, THERE WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO THE MERITS OF
THE GROUNDS CITED IN THE PETITION. INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER THE TAX
ASSESSMENTS HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL, HOWEVER, PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT
TO QUESTION THE UNLAWFUL MANNER AND METHOD IN WHICH TAX COLLECTION IS
SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED BY RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER AND DE GUZMAN. THUS,
RESPONDENT COURT SHOULD HAVE FAVORABLY CONSIDERED THE MERITS OF THE
FOLLOWING GROUNDS IN THE PETITION:
(1) The Notices of Levy on Real Property were issued beyond the period
provided in the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 38-68.
 (2) [a] The numerous pending court cases questioning the late President's
ownership or interests in several properties (both personal and real) make
the total value of his estate, and the consequent estate tax due, incapable
of exact pecuniary determination at this time. Thus, respondents
assessment of the estate tax and their issuance of the Notices of Levy and
Sale are premature, confiscatory and oppressive.
[b] Petitioner, as one of the late President's compulsory heirs, was never
notified, much less served with copies of the Notices of Levy, contrary to
the mandate of Section 213 of the NIRC. As such, petitioner was never
given an opportunity to contest the Notices in violation of his right to due
process of law.
C. ON ACCOUNT OF THE CLEAR MERIT OF THE PETITION, RESPONDENT COURT
MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO POWER TO GRANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
TO PETITIONER. SECTION 219 OF THE NIRC NOTWITHSTANDING, COURTS POSSESS THE
POWER TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN RESPONDENTS
COMMISSIONER'S AND DE GUZMAN'S ARBITRARY METHOD OF COLLECTING THE
ALLEGED DEFICIENCY ESTATE AND INCOME TAXES BY MEANS OF LEVY.
The facts as found by the appellate court are undisputed, and are hereby
adopted:
"On September 29, 1989, former President Ferdinand Marcos died in Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA.
On June 27, 1990, a Special Tax Audit Team was created to conduct
investigations and examinations of the tax liabilities and obligations of the late
president, as well as that of his family, associates and "cronies". Said audit
team concluded its investigation with a Memorandum dated July 26, 1991. The
investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a written notice of the
death of the decedent, an estate tax returns [sic], as well as several income tax
returns covering the years 1982 to 1986, -all in violation of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).
Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos
before the Regional Trial of Quezon City for violations of Sections 82, 83 and
84 (has penalized under Sections 253 and 254 in relation to Section 252- a & b)
of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thereby caused the preparation and
filing of the Estate Tax Return for the estate of the late president, the Income
Tax Returns of the Spouses Marcos for the years 1985 to 1986, and the
Income Tax Returns of petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II for the years
1982 to 1985.
On July 26, 1991, the BIR issued the following: (1) Deficiency estate tax
assessment no. FAC-2-89-91-002464 (against the estate of the late president
Ferdinand Marcos in the amount of P23,293,607,638.00 Pesos); (2) Deficiency
income tax assessment no. FAC-1-85-91-002452 and Deficiency income tax
assessment no. FAC-1-86-91-002451 (against the Spouses Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos in the amounts of P149,551.70 and P184,009,737.40
representing deficiency income tax for the years 1985 and 1986); (3) Deficiency
income tax assessment nos. FAC-1-82-91-002460 to FAC-1-85-91-002463
(against petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II in the amounts of P258.70
pesos; P9,386.40 Pesos; P4,388.30 Pesos; and P6,376.60 Pesos representing
his deficiency income taxes for the years 1982 to 1985).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue avers that copies of the deficiency
estate and income tax assessments were all personally and constructively
served on August 26, 1991 and September 12, 1991 upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos
(through her caretaker Mr. Martinez) at her last known address at No.
204 Ortega St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes 'D' and 'E' of the Petition). Likewise,
copies of the deficiency tax assessments issued against petitioner Ferdinand
'Bongbong' Marcos II were also personally and constructively served upon him
(through his caretaker) on September 12, 1991, at his last known address at
Don Mariano Marcos St. corner P. Guevarra St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes 'J'
and 'J-1' of the Petition). Thereafter, Formal Assessment notices were served
on October 20, 1992, upon Mrs. Marcos c/o petitioner, at his office, House of
Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, Quezon City. Moreover, a notice to
Taxpayer inviting Mrs. Marcos (or her duly authorized representative or
counsel), to a conference, was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos, Dean
Antonio Coronel - but to no avail.
The deficiency tax assessments were not protested administratively, by Mrs.
Marcos and the other heirs of the late president, within 30 days from service of
said assessments.
On February 22, 1993, the BIR Commissioner issued twenty-two notices of levy
on real property against certain parcels of land owned by the Marcoses - to
satisfy the alleged estate tax and deficiency income taxes of Spouses Marcos.
On May 20, 1993, four more Notices of Levy on real property were issued for
the purpose of satisfying the deficiency income taxes.
On May 26, 1993, additional four (4) notices of Levy on real property were
again issued. The foregoing tax remedies were resorted to pursuant to Sections
205 and 213 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
In response to a letter dated March 12, 1993 sent by Atty. Loreto Ata (counsel
of herein petitioner) calling the attention of the BIR and requesting that they be
duly notified of any action taken by the BIR affecting the interest of their client
Ferdinand 'Bongbong Marcos II, as well as the interest of the late president -
copies of the aforesaid notices were served on April 7, 1993 and on June 10,
1993, upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner, and their counsel of record, 'De
Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and Serapio Law Office'.
Notices of sale at public auction were posted on May 26, 1993, at the lobby of
the City Hall of Tacloban City. The public auction for the sale of the eleven (11)
parcels of land took place on July 5, 1993.There being no bidder, the lots were
declared forfeited in favor of the government.
On June 25, 1993, petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction."
It has been repeatedly observed, and not without merit, that the
enforcement of tax laws and the collection of taxes, is of paramount importance
for the sustenance of government.Taxes are the lifeblood of the government
and should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. However, such
collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will
negate the very reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary to
reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and the taxpayers
so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the common
good, may be achieved." [3]
Whether or not the proper avenues of assessment and collection of the
said tax obligations were taken by the respondent Bureau is now the subject of
the Court's inquiry.
Petitioner posits that notices of levy, notices of sale, and subsequent sale
of properties of the late President Marcos effected by the BIR are null and void
for disregarding the established procedure for the enforcement of taxes due
upon the estate of the deceased. The case of Domingo vs. Garlitos is [4]
specifically cited to bolster the argument that "the ordinary procedure by which
to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased, person, as in
an inheritance (estate) tax, is for the claimant to present a claim before the
probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount
therefor." This remedy is allegedly, exclusive, and cannot be effected through
any other means.
Petitioner goes further, submitting that the probate court is not precluded
from denying a request by the government for the immediate payment of taxes,
and should order the payment of the same only within the period fixed by the
probate court for the payment of all the debts of the decedent. In this regard,
petitioner cites the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. The Administratrix
of the Estate of Echarri (67 Phil 502), where it was held that:
"The case of Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Collector of
Internal Revenue (52 Phil 803), relied upon by the petitioner-appellant is good
authority on the proposition that the court having control over the administration
proceedings has jurisdiction to entertain the claim presented by the government
for taxes due and to order the administrator to pay the tax should it find that the
assessment was proper, and that the tax was legal, due and collectible. And the
rule laid down in that case must be understood in relation to the case of
Collector of Customs vs. Haygood, supra., as to the procedure to be followed in
a given case by the government to effectuate the collection of the
tax. Categorically stated, where during the pendency of judicial administration
over the estate of a deceased person a claim for taxes is presented by the
government, the court has the authority to order payment by the administrator;
but, in the same way that it has authority to order payment or satisfaction, it
also has the negative authority to deny the same. While there are cases where
courts are required to perform certain duties mandatory and ministerial in
character, the function of the court in a case of the present character is not one
of them; and here, the court cannot be an organism endowed with latitude of
judgment in one direction, and converted into a mere mechanical contrivance in
another direction."
On the other hand, it is argued by the BIR, that the state's authority to
collect internal revenue taxes is paramount. Thus, the pendency of probate
proceedings over the estate of the deceased does not preclude the assessment
and collection, through summary remedies, of estate taxes over the
same. According to the respondent, claims for payment of estate and income
taxes due and assessed after the death of the decedent need not be presented
in the form of a claim against the estate. These can and should be paid
immediately. The probate court is not the government agency to decide
whether an estate is liable for payment of estate of income taxes. Well-settled is
the rule that the probate court is a court with special and limited jurisdiction.
Concededly, the authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with
limited jurisdiction, as a probate court over estate of deceased individual, is not
a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective,
cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity by the
very parties invoking its authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication; to determine who are the heirs of
[5]
the decedent; the recognition of a natural child; the status of a woman
[6] [7]
claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an
[8]
heir by the testator; and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary
[9]
rights.
[10]
The pivotal question the court is tasked to resolve refers to the authority of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue to collect by the summary remedy of levying
upon, and sale of real properties of the decedent, estate tax deficiencies,
without the cognition and authority of the court sitting in probate over the
supposed will of the deceased.
The nature of the process of estate tax collection has been described as
follows:
"Strictly speaking, the assessment of an inheritance tax does not directly
involve the administration of a decedent's estate, although it may be viewed as
an incident to the complete settlement of an estate, and, under some statutes, it
is made the duty of the probate court to make the amount of the inheritance tax
a part of the final decree of distribution of the estate. It is not against the
property of decedent, nor is it a claim against the estate as such, but it is
against the interest or property right which the heir, legatee, devisee, etc., has
in the property formerly held by decedent. Further, under some statutes, it has
been held that it is not a suit or controversy between the parties, nor is it an
adversary proceeding between the state and the person who owes the tax on
the inheritance. However, under other statutes it has been held that the hearing
and determination of the cash value of the assets and the determination of the
tax are adversary proceedings. The proceeding has been held to be necessarily
a proceeding in rem. [11]
In the Philippine experience, the enforcement and collection of estate tax,
is executive in character, as the legislature has seen it fit to ascribe this task to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Section 3 of the National Internal Revenue
Code attests to this:
"Sec. 3. Powers and duties of the Bureau.-The powers and duties of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue shall comprehend the assessment and collection of all
national internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges, and the enforcement of all
forfeitures, penalties, and fines connected therewith, including the execution of
judgments in all cases decided in its favor by the Court of Tax Appeals and the
ordinary courts. Said Bureau shall also give effect to and administer the
supervisory and police power conferred to it by this Code or other laws."
Thus, it was in Vera vs. Fernandez that the court recognized the liberal
[12]
treatment of claims for taxes charged against the estate of the decedent. Such
taxes, we said, were exempted from the application of the statute of non-claims,
and this is justified by the necessity of government funding, immortalized in the
maxim that taxes are the lifeblood of the
government.Vectigalia nervi sunt rei publicae - taxes are the sinews of the
state.
"Taxes assessed against the estate of a deceased person, after administration
is opened, need not be submitted to the committee on claims in the ordinary
course of administration. In the exercise of its control over the administrator, the
court may direct the payment of such taxes upon motion showing that the taxes
have been assessed against the estate."
Such liberal treatment of internal revenue taxes in the probate proceedings
extends so far, even to allowing the enforcement of tax obligations against the
heirs of the decedent, even after distribution of the estate's properties.
"Claims for taxes, whether assessed before or after the death of the deceased,
can be collected from the heirs even after the distribution of the properties of
the decedent. They are exempted from the application of the statute of non-
claims. The heirs shall be liable therefor, in proportion to their share in the
inheritance."[13]
"Thus, the Government has two ways of collecting the taxes in question. One,
by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the amount of
the tax proportionate to the inheritance received.Another remedy, pursuant to
the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all property and rights to
property belong to the taxpayer for unpaid income tax, is by subjecting said
property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or transferee to the
payment of the tax due the estate. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Pineda, 21 SCRA 105, September 15, 1967.)
From the foregoing, it is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in
probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory
requirement in the collection of estate taxes. It cannot therefore be argued that
the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of the properties
allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it was required to
seek first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the Tax Code, and in
the pertinent remedial laws that implies the necessity of the probate or estate
settlement court's approval of the state's claim for estate taxes, before the
same can be enforced and collected.
On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or
settlement court which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial
administrator of the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any
party interested in the estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid. This
provision disproves the petitioner's contention that it is the probate court which
approves the assessment and collection of the estate tax.
If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR's decision to assess the
estate taxes, this should have been pursued through the proper administrative
and judicial avenues provided for by law.
Section 229 of the NIRC tells us how:
"Sec. 229. Protesting of assessment.-When the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue or his duly authorized representative finds that proper taxes should be
assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings. Within a period to be
prescribed by implementing regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to
respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner shall
issue an assessment based on his findings.
Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for
reconsideration or reinvestigation in such form and manner as may be
prescribed by implementing regulations within (30) days from receipt of the
assessment; otherwise, the assessment shall become final and unappealable.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual, association or
corporation adversely affected by the decision on the protest may appeal to the
Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of said decision;
otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. (As
inserted by P.D. 1773)"
Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within the time
required for the filing of the same, petitioner, and the other heirs never
questioned the assessments served upon them, allowing the same to lapse into
finality, and prompting the BIR to collect the said taxes by levying upon the
properties left by President Marcos.
Petitioner submits, however, that "while the assessment of taxes may have
been validly undertaken by the Government, collection thereof may have been
done in violation of the law.Thus, the manner and method in which the latter is
enforced may be questioned separately, and irrespective of the finality of the
former, because the Government does not have the unbridled discretion to
enforce collection without regard to the clear provision of law."
[14]
Petitioner specifically points out that applying Memorandum Circular No.
38-68, implementing Sections 318 and 324 of the old tax code (Republic Act
5203), the BIR's Notices of Levy on the Marcos properties, were issued beyond
the allowed period, and are therefore null and void:
"...the Notices of Levy on Real Property (Annexes 0 to NN of Annex C of this
Petition) in satisfaction of said assessments were still issued by respondents
well beyond the period mandated in Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 38-
68. These Notices of Levy were issued only on 22 February 1993 and 20 May
1993 when at least seventeen (17) months had already lapsed from the last
service of tax assessment on 12 September 1991. As no notices of distraint of
personal property were first issued by respondents, the latter should have
complied with Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 38-68 and issued these
Notices of Levy not earlier than three (3) months nor later than six (6) months
from 12 September 1991. In accordance with the Circular, respondents only
had until 12 March 1992 (the last day of the sixth month) within which to issue
these Notices of Levy. The Notices of Levy, having been issued beyond the
period allowed by law, are thus void and of no effect."
[15]
We hold otherwise. The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued
within the prescriptive period and in accordance with the provisions of the
present Tax Code. The deficiency tax assessment, having already become
final, executory, and demandable, the same can now be collected through the
summary remedy of distraint or levy pursuant to Section 205 of the NIRC.
The applicable provision in regard to the prescriptive period for the
assessment and collection of tax deficiency in this instance is Article 223 of the
NIRC, which pertinently provides:
"Sec. 223. Exceptions as to a period of limitation of assessment and collection
of taxes.- (a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax
or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court
for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time
within ten (10) years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud, or
omission: Provided, That, in a fraud assessment which has become final and
executory, the fact of fraud shall be judicially taken cognizance of in the civil or
criminal action for the collection thereof.
xxx
(c) Any internal revenue tax which has been assessed within the period of
limitation above prescribed, may be collected by distraint or levy or by a
proceeding in court within three years following the assessment of the tax.
xxx
The omission to file an estate tax return, and the subsequent failure to
contest or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner's
cause, as under the above-cited provision, in case of failure to file a return, the
tax may be assessed at any time within ten years after the omission, and any
tax so assessed may be collected by levy upon real property within three years
following the assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax assessment had
become final and unappealable by the petitioner's default as regards protesting
the validity of the said assessment, there is now no reason why the BIR cannot
continue with the collection of the said tax. Any objection against the
assessment should have been pursued following the avenue paved in Section
229 of the NIRC on protests on assessments of internal revenue taxes.
Petitioner further argues that "the numerous pending court cases
questioning the late president's ownership or interests in several properties
(both real and personal) make the total value of his estate, and the consequent
estate tax due, incapable of exact pecuniary determination at this time. Thus,
respondents' assessment of the estate tax and their issuance of the Notices of
Levy and sale are premature and oppressive." He points out the pendency of
Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0001-0034 and 0141, which were filed by the
government to question the ownership and interests of the late President in real
and personal properties located within and outside the Philippines. Petitioner,
however, omits to allege whether the properties levied upon by the BIR in the
collection of estate taxes upon the decedent's estate were among those
involved in the said cases pending in the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the court is
at a loss as to how these cases are relevant to the matter at issue. The mere
fact that the decedent has pending cases involving ill-gotten wealth does not
affect the enforcement of tax assessments over the properties indubitably
included in his estate.
Petitioner also expresses his reservation as to the propriety of the BIR's
total assessment of P23,292,607,638.00, stating that this amount deviates from
the findings of the Department of Justice's Panel of Prosecutors as per its
resolution of 20 September 1991. Allegedly, this is clear evidence of the
uncertainty on the part of the Government as to the total value of the estate of
the late President.
This is, to our mind, the petitioner's last ditch effort to assail the
assessment of estate tax which had already become final and unappealable.
It is not the Department of Justice which is the government agency tasked
to determine the amount of taxes due upon the subject estate, but the Bureau
of Internal Revenue whose determinations and assessments are presumed
[16]
correct and made in good faith. The taxpayer has the duty of proving
[17]
otherwise. In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of
official duties, an assessment will not be disturbed. Even an assessment based
on estimates is prima facie valid and lawful where it does not appear to have
been arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously. The burden of proof is upon the
complaining party to show clearly that the assessment is erroneous. Failure to
present proof of error in the assessment will justify the judicial affirmance of
said assessment. In this instance, petitioner has not pointed out one single
[18]
provision in the Memorandum of the Special Audit Team which gave rise to the
questioned assessment, which bears a trace of falsity. Indeed, the petitioner's
attack on the assessment bears mainly on the alleged improbable and
unconscionable amount of the taxes charged. But mere rhetoric cannot supply
the basis for the charge of impropriety of the assessments made.
Moreover, these objections to the assessments should have been raised,
considering the ample remedies afforded the taxpayer by the Tax Code, with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals, as described
earlier, and cannot be raised now via Petition for Certiorari, under the pretext of
grave abuse of discretion. The course of action taken by the petitioner reflects
his disregard or even repugnance of the established institutions for governance
in the scheme of a well-ordered society. The subject tax assessments having
become final, executory and enforceable, the same can no longer be contested
by means of a disguised protest. In the main, Certiorari may not be used as a
substitute for a lost appeal or remedy. This judicial policy becomes more
[19]
pronounced in view of the absence of sufficient attack against the actuations of
government.
On the matter of sufficiency of service of Notices of Assessment to the
petitioner, we find the respondent appellate court's pronouncements sound and
resilient to petitioner's attacks.
"Anent grounds 3(b) and (B) - both alleging/claiming lack of notice - We find,
after considering the facts and circumstances, as well as evidences, that there
was sufficient, constructive and/or actual notice of assessments, levy and sale,
sent to herein petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos as well as to his mother
Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
Even if we are to rule out the notices of assessments personally given to the
caretaker of Mrs. Marcos at the latter's last known address, on August 26, 1991
and September 12, 1991, as well as the notices of assessment personally given
to the caretaker of petitioner also at his last known address on September 12,
1991 - the subsequent notices given thereafter could no longer be ignored as
they were sent at a time when petitioner was already here in the Philippines,
and at a place where said notices would surely be called to petitioner's
attention, and received by responsible persons of sufficient age and discretion.
Thus, on October 20, 1992, formal assessment notices were served upon Mrs.
Marcos c/o the petitioner, at his office, House of Representatives, Batasan
Pambansa, Q.C. (Annexes "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-3"; pp. 207-210,
Comment/Memorandum of OSG). Moreover, a notice to taxpayer dated
October 8, 1992 inviting Mrs. Marcos to a conference relative to her tax
liabilities, was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos - Dean Antonio Coronel
(Annex "B", p. 211, ibid). Thereafter, copies of Notices were also served upon
Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner and their counsel "De Borja, Medialdea, Ata,
Bello, Guevarra and Serapio Law Office", on April 7, 1993 and June 10,
1993. Despite all of these Notices, petitioner never lifted a finger to protest the
assessments, (upon which the Levy and sale of properties were based), nor
appealed the same to the Court of Tax Appeals.
There being sufficient service of Notices to herein petitioner (and his mother)
and it appearing that petitioner continuously ignored said Notices despite
several opportunities given him to file a protest and to thereafter appeal to the
Court of Tax Appeals, - the tax assessments subject of this case, upon which
the levy and sale of properties were based, could no longer be contested
(directly or indirectly) via this instant petition for certiorari."
[20]
Petitioner argues that all the questioned Notices of Levy, however, must
be nullified for having been issued without validly serving copies thereof to the
petitioner. As a mandatory heir of the decedent, petitioner avers that he has an
interest in the subject estate, and notices of levy upon its properties should
have been served upon him.
We do not agree. In the case of notices of levy issued to satisfy the
delinquent estate tax, the delinquent taxpayer is the Estate of the decedent,
and not necessarily, and exclusively, the petitioner as heir of the deceased. In
the same vein, in the matter of income tax delinquency of the late president and
his spouse, petitioner is not the taxpayer liable. Thus, it follows that service of
notices of levy in satisfaction of these tax delinquencies upon the petitioner is
not required by law, as under Section 213 of the NIRC, which pertinently states:
"xxx
...Levy shall be effected by writing upon said certificate a description of the
property upon which levy is made. At the same time, written notice of the levy
shall be mailed to or served upon the Register of Deeds of the province or city
where the property is located and upon the delinquent taxpayer, or if he be
absent from the Philippines, to his agent or the manager of the business in
respect to which the liability arose, or if there be none, to the occupant of the
property in question.
xxx"
The foregoing notwithstanding, the record shows that notices of warrants
of distraint and levy of sale were furnished the counsel of petitioner on April 7,
1993, and June 10, 1993, and the petitioner himself on April 12, 1993 at his
office at the Batasang Pambansa. We cannot therefore, countenance
[21]
petitioner's insistence that he was denied due process. Where there was an
opportunity to raise objections to government action, and such opportunity was
disregarded, for no justifiable reason, the party claiming oppression then
becomes the oppressor of the orderly functions of government. He who comes
to court must come with clean hands. Otherwise, he not only taints his name,
but ridicules the very structure of established authority.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVED to DENY the present
petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120880 June 5, 1997
FERDINAND R. MARCOS II, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and HERMINIA D. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
FACTS: More than seven years since the demise of the late Ferdinand E.
Marcos, the matter of the settlement of his estate, and its dues to the
government in estate taxes, are still unresolved. Specifically, petitioner
Ferdinand R. Marcos II, the eldest son of the decedent, questions the
actuations of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue in assessing,
and collecting through the summary remedy of Levy on Real Properties, estate
and income tax delinquencies upon the estate and properties of his father,
despite the pendency of the proceedings on probate of the will of the late
president.
A Special Tax Audit Team was created to conduct investigations and
examinations of the tax liabilities and obligations of the late president, as well
as that of his family, associates and "cronies". Said audit team concluded its
investigation with a Memorandum dated July 26, 1991. The investigation
disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a written notice of the death of the
decedent, an estate tax returns [sic], as well as several income tax returns
covering the years 1982 to 1986, — all in violation of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).
The BIR Commissioner issued several notices of levy on real property against
certain parcels of land owned by the Marcoses — to satisfy the alleged estate
tax and deficiency income taxes of Spouses Marcos.
Marcos II filed a certiorari case before the Court of Appeals to question the levy
and the auction sale. CA rendered its Decision on November 29, 1994, ruling
that the deficiency assessments for estate and income tax made upon the
petitioner and the estate of the deceased President Marcos have already
become final and unappealable, and may thus be enforced by the summary
remedy of levying upon the properties of the late President, as was done by the
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Internal Revenue has the authority to
collect by the summary remedy of levying upon, and sale of real properties of
the decedent, estate tax deficiencies, without the cognition and authority of the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. (As
court sitting in probate over the supposed will of the deceased. inserted by P.D. 1773)

No. The approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over
the deceased is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate taxes. It
cannot therefore be argued that the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the
levying and sale of the properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the
ground that it was required to seek first the probate court's sanction. There is
nothing in the Tax Code, and in the pertinent remedial laws that implies the
necessity of the probate or estate settlement court's approval of the state's
claim for estate taxes, before the same can be enforced and collected.
On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement
court which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial administrator of
the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any party interested in
the estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid. This provision disproves the
petitioner's contention that it is the probate court which approves the
assessment and collection of the estate tax.
If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR's decision to assess the estate
taxes, this should have been pursued through the proper administrative and
judicial avenues provided for by law.
Section 229 of the NIRC tells us how:
Sec. 229. Protesting of assessment. — When the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized
representative finds that proper taxes should be assessed, he
shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings. Within a period to
be prescribed by implementing regulations, the taxpayer shall
be required to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to
respond, the Commissioner shall issue an assessment based
on his findings.
Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within the time required
for the filing of the same, petitioner, and the other heirs never questioned the
assessments served upon them, allowing the same to lapse into finality, and
prompting the BIR to collect the said taxes by levying upon the properties left by
President Marcos.
The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued within the prescriptive
period and in accordance with the provisions of the present Tax Code. The
deficiency tax assessment, having already become final, executory, and
demandable, the same can now be collected through the summary remedy of
distraint or levy pursuant to Section 205 of the NIRC.
The omission to file an estate tax return, and the subsequent failure to contest
or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner's cause, as
under the above-cited provision, in case of failure to file a return, the tax may be
assessed at any time within ten years after the omission, and any tax so
assessed may be collected by levy upon real property within three years
following the assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax assessment had
become final and unappealable by the petitioner's default as regards protesting
the validity of the said assessment, there is now no reason why the BIR cannot
continue with the collection of the said tax. Any objection against the
assessment should have been pursued following the avenue paved in Section
229 of the NIRC on protests on assessments of internal revenue taxes.

Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a

request for reconsideration or reinvestigation in such form and
manner as may be prescribed by implementing regulations
within (30) days from receipt of the assessment; otherwise, the
assessment shall become final and unappealable.

If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual,

association or corporation adversely affected by the decision
on the protest may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within
thirty (30) days from receipt of said decision; otherwise, the
MARCOS II vs. CA PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G.
273 SCRA 47 JARING, represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G.
GR No. 120880, June 5, 1997 JARING, respondents.

"The approval of the court sitting in probate is not a mandatory requirement in the DECISION
collection of estate taxes."
"In case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed at anytime within 10 years MENDOZA, J.:
after the omission."

FACTS: Bongbong Marcos sought for the reversal of the ruling of the Court of Appeals
to grant CIR's petition to levy the properties of the late Pres. Marcos to cover the
payment of his tax delinquencies during the period of his exile in the US. The Marcos
family was assessed by the BIR after it failed to file estate tax returns. However the
assessment were not protested administratively by Mrs. Marcos and the heirs of the late
president so that they became final and unappealable after the period for filing of
opposition has prescribed. Marcos contends that the properties could not be levied to
cover the tax dues because they are still pending probate with the court, and settlement
of tax deficiencies could not be had, unless there is an order by the probate court or until
the probate proceedings are terminated.
Petitioner also pointed out that applying Memorandum Circular No. 38-68, the BIR's
Notices of Levy on the Marcos properties were issued beyond the allowed period, and
are therefore null and void.
ISSUE: Are the contentions of Bongbong Marcos correct?
HELD: No. The deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax assessment are
already final and unappealable -and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax
remedy resorted to by the government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct and separate from
the other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and is not
affected or precluded by the pendency of any other tax remedies instituted by the
government.
The approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the
deceased's estate is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate taxes. On
the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement court which is
bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial administrator of the decedent's estate to
deliver any distributive share to any party interested in the estate, unless it is shown a
Certification by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the estate taxes have been
paid. This provision disproves the petitioner's contention that it is the probate court which
approves the assessment and collection of the estate tax.
On the issue of prescription, the omission to file an estate tax return, and the
subsequent failure to contest or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the
petitioner's cause, as under Sec.223 of the NIRC, in case of failure to file a return, the
tax may be assessed at anytime within 10 years after the omission, and any tax so
assessed may be collected by levy upon real property within 3 years (now 5 years)
following the assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax assessment had become final
and unappealable by the petitioner's default as regards protesting the validity of the said
assessment, there is no reason why the BIR cannot continue with the collection of the
said tax.
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the
surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent Romeo Jaring[1] was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in
Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years
ending on September 12, 1990.On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond,
for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio
and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of
rent was P485,600.00, payable in two installments of P300,000.00
and P185,600.00, with the second installment falling due on June 30,
1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the contract.
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance
of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their
obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and
Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the alternative, he prayed for the
rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants fail to pay the
balance.
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her
husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988. [2] She based
her action on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then provided that
"when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules."
This provision has been amended so that now Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:
When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or
implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in
which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting
claims against the estate of a deceased person.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since
petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be
independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that
the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case. [3] The
Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason, they were declared
in default.
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial,
ordering petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the
unpaid balance of P50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00
and the costs of the suit.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial
court erred in denying her motion to dismiss. In its decision[4] rendered on July
10, 1997, the appellate court dismissed her appeal. It held:
The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be
dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the regional trial
court, does not apply where there are other defendants against whom the
action should be maintained. This is the teaching of Climaco v. Siy Uy, wherein
the Supreme Court held:
Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a cause of
action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was, however, a
cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money, and the
corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the
death of the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court.
xxxxxxxxx
However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co was
also named defendant in the complaint. Obviously, therefore, the order
appealed from is erroneous insofar as it dismissed the case against
Co. (Underlining added)
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were
signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot avoid
the action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to the contract has
totally extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David:
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled jurisprudence,
when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his action in toto
against any of the debtors obligated in solidum.Thus, if husband and wife
bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death, her liability is
independent of and separate from her husband's; she may be sued for the
whole debt and it would be error to hold that the claim against her as well as the
claim against her husband should be made in the decedent's estate. (Agcaoili
vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97).[5]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4,
1998.[6] Hence this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY, 19
SCRA 858, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONER
WAS NOT SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST
REMAINING DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO
THE CLAIM FOR PAYMENT AGAINST HER AND HER
HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD BE PROSECUTED AS A MONEY
CLAIM.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. v. DAVID,
133 SCRA 317, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE
SPOUSES IN THIS CASE DID NOT BIND THEMSELVES
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT
JARING.[7]
The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving
spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of
money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy
is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten
months before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on
October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, 21 which
deals with dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the defendant
during the pendency of the case and the subsequent procedure to be
undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, 20 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to continue
until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff
therein will then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. The issue to be
resolved is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file this case
against petitioner.
Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed
the sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated
rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is one
which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of the
Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.[8]
When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved[9] and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the
settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, 2 which states:
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have
died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.
As held in Calma v. Taedo,[10] after the death of either of the spouses, no
complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim
must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the
conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the
powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the
administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of
estate proceedings.[11] Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de
facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property
belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal
partnership property is void.[12]
The ruling in Calma v. Taedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of Ventura
v. Militante.[13] In that case, the surviving wife was sued in an amended
complaint for a sum of money based on an obligation allegedly contracted by
her and her late husband. The defendant, who had earlier moved to dismiss the
case, opposed the admission of the amended complaint on the ground that the
death of her husband terminated their conjugal partnership and that the
plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable against the partnership, should be made
in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. The trial court nevertheless
admitted the complaint and ruled, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, that
since the defendant was also a party to the obligation, the death of her husband
did not preclude the plaintiff from filing an ordinary collection suit against
her. On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the
death of either spouse. . . . Where a complaint is brought against the surviving
spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal
[partnership], any judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action should
be in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses,
there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not mean,
however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And private respondent
cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules
of Court, he may apply in court for letters of administration in his capacity as a
principal creditor of the deceased . . . if after thirty (30) days from his death,
petitioner failed to apply for administration or request that administration be
granted to some other person.[14]
The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling,
namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy[15] and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David,[16] are based
on different sets of facts. In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos Siy Uy and Manuel
Co, were sued for damages for malicious prosecution. Thus, apart from the fact
the claim was not against any conjugal partnership, it was one which does not
survive the death of defendant Uy, which merely resulted in the dismissal of the
case as to him but not as to the remaining defendant Manuel Co.
With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and
severally executed an indemnity agreement which became the basis of a
collection suit filed against the wife after her husband had died. For this reason,
the Court ruled that since the spouses' liability was solidary, the surviving
spouse could be independently sued in an ordinary action for the enforcement
of the entire obligation.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is
chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which is
primarily bound for its repayment.[17] Thus, when the spouses are sued for the
enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in
their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as
independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary liability, as
between them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary to be true, the
nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be discussed later, is not
solidary but rather merely joint, making Imperial still inapplicable to this case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the
present suit against petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the
Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of petitioner's husband
or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either for the issuance of
letters of administration[18] or for the allowance of will,[19]depending on whether
petitioner's husband died intestate or testate. Private respondent cannot short-
circuit this procedure by lumping his claim against the Alipios with those against
the Manuels considering that, aside from petitioner's lack of authority to
represent their conjugal estate, the inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is
necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say,
such power exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the
settlement of the decedent's estate and not to any other court.
 Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay
private respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount
of P50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them
jointly or solidarily. In connection with this, Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides:
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and
the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to
demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance
with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation
expressly so estates, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires
solidarity.
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation
of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective
conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be divided into
two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and
Remedios Manuel are ordered to pay the amount of P25,300.00, the attorney's
fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The complaint
against petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a claim by
private respondent in the proceedings for the settlement of estate of Placido
Alipio for the collection of the share of the Alipio spouses in the unpaid balance
of the rent in the amount of P25,300.00.

Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary SO ORDERED.
does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is
divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt being
considered distinct from one another.[20]
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that
when there are two or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the latter's
obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be sure, should the lessees or
sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the lease
period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can be held jointly and
severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of their solidary
liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they have
become joint tortfeasors.[21]In the case at bar, there is no allegation that the
sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term of the
sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance sought to be collected by private
respondent in his collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long before the
sublease expired on September 12, 1990.
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when
there are more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. On the
other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract involved in this case reads:[22]

2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period of
three (3) years and two (2) months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P485,600.00) PESOS, including all the
improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon as well all
fishing equipment, paraphernalia and accessories. The said amount shall be
paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the following manner, to wit:

A. Three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract;

and

B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (P185,6000.00) Pesos to be

paid on June 30, 1989.
Alipio v CA
GR No. 134100
September 29, 2000
EXTINGUISHMENT OF OBLIGATIONS - DEATH
FACTS:
(1) Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in
Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years
ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the
fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and
Purita Alipio and the Manuel Spouses.
(2) The sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance
of P50,600.00.
(3) Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband,
Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.
RTC: Surviving spouse should pay. The trial court denied petitioner's motion
on the ground that since petitioner was herself a party to the sublease
contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit together with the
Manuel spouses and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his
exclusion from the case.
CA: Surviving spouse should pay. It is noted that all the defendants,
including the deceased, were signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The
remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming that the death of
one of the parties to the contract has totally extinguished their obligation.
ISSUE: (1) Whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection
of a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or
(2) whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the decedent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------
APPLICABLE LAW/S:
• Rule 3. Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. When the action is
for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action
was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall
instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable
judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of
a deceased person.
• Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more
debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the
former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to
render, entire compliance with the prestation. There is a solidary liability only
when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the
obligation requires solidarity. (1137a)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------
HELD: (1) Surviving spouse is not liable. The conjugal partnership of gains is
liable. It is clear that Climaco had a cause of action against the persons
named as defendants therein. It was, however, a cause of action for the
recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money, and the corresponding action
is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the death of the defendant,
in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
As held in Calma v. Tañedo, after the death of either of the spouses, no
complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim
must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the
conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse,
the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to
the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the
settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a
de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property
belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal
partnership property is void. the inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property
is necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to
say, such power exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the
settlement of the decedent's estate and not to any other court.
(2) The obligation is joint. Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the
wording of the obligation the contrary does not appear, an obligation is
presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into as many equal shares
as there are debtors, each debt being considered distinct from one another.
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of
the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective conjugal
partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be divided into two so
that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.