G.R. No.
122646 March 14, 1997 In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, the RTC of Batangas thru respondent
ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratix of the Intestate
Estate of the late NORBERTO B. MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGELITO C. TEH respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 28, 1994, petitioner "for herself and as administratrix of the
intestate estate" of her deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a complaint for "reconveyance
of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition for
preliminary injunction" docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009.1 Paragraphs 2
and 3 of said complaint states:
2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate
Estate of the late Norberto B. Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife
of the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on December 29, 1993;
3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as
the judicial administratrix of her co-plaintiff for purposes of this case;2
Private respondents filed on January 21, 19953 their "answer with motion to
dismiss"4 alleging among others that the complaint states no cause of action
and that petitioner's demand had already been paid.5 On February 17, 1995,
private respondents filed another pleading entitled "motion to dismiss"
invoking, this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel,
laches and prescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction,
private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for
appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the
ordinary action for reconveyance. In her opposition to the motions, petitioner
asserts among others, that the allegation seeking appointment as
administratrix is only an incidental matter which is not even prayed for in the
complaint. Replying to the opposition, private respondents argued that since
petitioner's husband resided in Quezon City at the time of his death, the
appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC of that
place in accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction
over the case.
Judge Teh "dismissed without prejudice" the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
"on the ground that the rules governing an ordinary civil action and a special
proceeding are different." Accordingly, the lower court found it unnecessary
to discuss the other grounds raised in the motion to dismiss.6 Upon denial of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, he filed this petition under Rule 45 on
pure questions of law. The Court thereafter gave due course to the petition.
The issue is whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation
seeking appointment as administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of
its jurisdiction over the whole case?
We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA
7691 provides:
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). . .
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestat . . . .
Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that:
Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings,
testate and intestate . . . (emphasis ours).
The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title to
property worth millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is
cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions
"incapable of pecuniary estimation," such as the appointment of an duty to dispose cases within 90 days at the expense of their judicial
administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings responsibility.
(Section 1 of Rule 737) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over
petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 14, 1995 and November 14,
proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the 1995 of the RTC of Batangas are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial
RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that the court is ordered to immediately proceed with the disposition of the case in
allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its accordance with this Decision.
jurisdiction, both public and private respondents confuse jurisdiction with
venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-958 provides that SO ORDERED.
actions involving title to property shall be tried in the province where the
property is located, in this case, — Batangas. The mere fact that petitioner's
deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects
only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court.9

Second, the cases cited 10 by private respondents are not at point as they
involve settlement of estate where the probate court was asked to resolve
questions of ownership of certain properties.In the present suit, no
settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking
appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve
settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited
jurisdiction of a probate court. The above allegation is not even a
jurisdictional fact which must be stated in an action for reconveyance. The
Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with the reconveyance suit
rather than dismiss the entire case.

Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide

questions of ownership or title to property 11 is not applicable in this case,
because: there is no settlement of estate involved and the RTC of Batangas
was not acting as a probate court. It should be clarified that whether a
particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional
issue but a mere question of procedure.12 Moreover, the instant action for
reconveyance does not even invoke the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court. 13 Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction, whether it be on the
reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of an administratrix, it was
improper for respondent judge to dismiss the whole complaint for alleged
lack of jurisdiction.

Finally, judges should not dismiss with precipitate haste, complaints or

petitions filed before them, just so they can comply with their administrative
G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL
JR., Petitioners,
vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail
the September 24, 20021 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 1242 which
dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to
state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following
material allegations
by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.3
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.4
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she
named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.5
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,6 later baptized as Leonila
Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.7
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights8 over the estate of their father,
Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964.9 In the deed,
Portugal’s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155
sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.10
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel
of land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo."11
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by
Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person"12 adjudicating to herself the
Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-17213 in Portugal’s name was
subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 15981314 was issued by the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of
respondent, "Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988
transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name,
petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a
complaint15 against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication
executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related
whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the
Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false
representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication
and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds
for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondent’s name and to
issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners’) name, and that actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
be awarded to them.
Following respondent’s filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.
Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the
complaint.16 (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,17 after giving an
account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their
documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial,
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that
petitioners’ status and right as putative heirs had not been established
before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case,
citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.18
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at
bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of
Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as
heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right
to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein.
However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is
remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of
Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong
(ibid, a). The operative term in the former is "to establish", while in the latter,
it is "to enforce", a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the
decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a
cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on
plaintiffs’ cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not
have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and
2, Rule 2, supra).19 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial
court’s ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to
this Court’s following ruling in Cariño v. Cariño,20 viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572,
579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it
is essential to the determination of the case. (Niñal, et al. v. Bayadog,
GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cariño was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent
to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court
found Cariño to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cariño case was
the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4
Santiago Cariño, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between
the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cariño and Susan
Yee Cariño) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that
SPO4 S. Cariño contracted two marriages with said two women during his
lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages was
validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cariño
was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages
was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different
milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property. The only
undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his
lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, — herein
plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, — both now insisting to be the
legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties
herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x.
Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be
properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary
civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution
of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus
impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids
directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration
of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to
be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special
proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x
x21 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,22 thus affirmed the
trial court’s dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate
court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it
failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite
the existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cariño, and (ii) when the
Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the
evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . .
.24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court
that the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in
accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the
above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the
pronouncements in Cariño apply, a decision be entered remanding to the
court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is
valid, and the determination of "heirship" and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and
Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in
the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise
prayed for.25 (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits
which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cariño shows;
that Cariño allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the
determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate court’s ruling,
they had established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to
institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they
can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication
and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,26 the therein
petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants" of
the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994
that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the
therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which
in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The
therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The
therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein
petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as
heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it—
except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned
Yaptinchays—that they have been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court,
and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .27 (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the
petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v.
Rivera28 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,29 this Court held that "the declaration
of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right."
In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special
proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of
Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him
and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent
by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent
contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera;
and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving
spouse of the decedent." The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of
administration to, on Marcosa’s request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported
siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael
Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly
appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his
purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his
petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties
allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved
incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court,
following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it,
declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of
the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for
determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia
Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of
appellants Dy Tam et al., found "substantially correct" the trial court’s
findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth
certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not establish the identity of the deceased
Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not
appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner
intervened in the preparation and filing thereof"; and that "[t]he other
documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and
highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased
Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said
decedent."
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the lower court should
not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only
heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it
being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial
[p]roceeding."
In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was
a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who
was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding,
Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the
decedent’s maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva, the decedent‘s paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to
reconsider the court’s order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the
decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the
motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her
motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC,
for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case
was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of
Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said
judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed,
among other issues, "whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction
to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia
Villanueva’s share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate]
proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court," this
Court held that "[i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid
confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court
should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal
court," citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.32
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that the estate
proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-
Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-
heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her
claim in the interest of justice," and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted
daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her
adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the
testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate
court directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul
the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud,
and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots
allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in
the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her,
among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties’
agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanita’s motion in the testate
estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until
after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for
trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime,
filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of
partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she
was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966
order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial
question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to
her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April
27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate court’s approval of the project of partition and directive that the
records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held
that the testate estate proceedings had not been "legally terminated" as
Juanita’s share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her.
Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated
(Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain
his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs.
Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not
received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in
the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of
the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed,
and not through an independent action, which would be tried
by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order
of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and executed and re-
shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar,
89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107,
April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710,
March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).34 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court
setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to
continue because it "involves no longer" the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending,
or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the
circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of,
among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been 1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right Portugal, is valid;
to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can
no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for 2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran
his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the
estate of the deceased. 3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs;
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the
sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 198835 the 4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.40
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.36 Said rule is an exception to the
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be
24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of
therein.37 the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated
issues defined during the pre-trial.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate
or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a
deceased. No costs. SO ORDERED.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,38 to still subject it,
under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be
long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs
and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light
of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case,
could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-
trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no

compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,39 the trial court should proceed
to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render
a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear
repeating, to wit:
G.R. No. 162956 April 10, 2008
FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and
EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., petitioners,
vs. PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
September 29, 2003 in CA G.R. CV No. 68147, entitled "Peter B. Enriquez,
et al. v. Faustino Reyes, et al., reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch XI dated June 29, 2000, which dismissed
the complaint filed by the respondents herein.1
The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land known as Lot No.
1851 Flr-133 with an aggregate area of 2,017 square meters located in
Talisay, Cebu.2
According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes, Julieta C.
Rivera, and Eutiquio Dico, Jr., they are the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes
who co-owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3551 (T-8070). On
April 17, 1996, petitioners executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of
the Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial Settlement) involving a
portion of the subject parcel of land. On March 21, 1997, the petitioners and
the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a Segregation of Real Estate
and Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation and Confirmation) over the same
property. By virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 (T-
8070) was cancelled and new TCTs were issued: (1) TCT No. T-98576 in
the name of Anacleto Cabrera covering Lot 1851-A; (2) TCT No. T-98577
covering Lot 1851-B in the name of petitioner Eutiquio Dico, Jr.; (3) TCT No.
T-98578 covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner Faustino Reyes; (4)
TCT No. T-98579 covering Lot 1851-D in the name of petitioner Esperidion
Reyes; (5) TCT No. T-98580 covering Lot 1851-E in the name of petitioner
Julieta G. Rivera; (6) TCT No. T-98581 covering Lot 1851-F in the name of
Felipe Dico; and (7) TCT No. T-98582 covering Lot 1851-G in the name of
Archimedes C. Villaluz.3
Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf of his
minor daughter Deborah Ann C. Enriquez (Deborah Ann), also known as
Dina Abdullah Enriquez Alsagoff, on the other hand, alleges that their
predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia Seguera
Cabrera (collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned ½ pro-indiviso share in
the subject parcel of land or 1051 sq. m. They further allege that Spouses
Cabrera were survived by two daughters – Graciana, who died single and
without issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and mother of
respondent Deborah Ann – who succeeded their parents’ rights and took
possession of the 1051 sq. m. of the subject parcel of land. During her
lifetime, Graciana sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus, making the
latter the sole owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel of land.
Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to petitioners Peter and
Deborah Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. On June
19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051
sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez
(Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in the case at bar. After the
sale, Spouses Fernandez took possession of the said area in the subject
parcel of land.4
When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land,
they discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1)
Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in
Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit
by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned ¼
of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the
property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes
and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of
Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title in the name of
the herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and
Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by the alleged heirs of
Dionisia Reyes and Anacleto Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing
documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a complaint for
annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for
damages. 5 They likewise prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of
the subject property.6
The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the case on the
ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were actually seeking first and
foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since they can not
demand the partition of the real property without first being declared as legal
heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary civil action, as in this case,
but through a special proceeding specifically instituted for the purpose.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and directed the
trial court to proceed with the hearing of the case.8 The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners was similarly denied.9
Hence this petition.
The primary issue in this case is whether or not the respondents have to
institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of
Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial Settlement with the
Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of Real
Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes
and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer
certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-questioned documents.
We answer in the affirmative.
An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.10 A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.11
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to
prosecute and defend an action in court.12 A real party in interest is the one
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the one
entitled to the avails thereof.13 Such interest, to be considered a real interest,
must be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest.14 A plaintiff is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a
legal right to enforce or protect, while a defendant is a real party in interest
when he is the one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong
done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had
violated the legal right of the former.15 The purpose of the rule is to protect
persons against undue and unnecessary litigation.16 It likewise ensures that
the court will have the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in
the consideration of a case.17 Thus, a plaintiff’s right to institute an ordinary
civil action should be based on his own right to the relief sought.
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was
registered sue to recover the said property through the institution of an
ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition,18 or
nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents
related thereto,19 this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of
heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is "within the
exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding." 20 In the recent
case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,21 the Court had the occasion to
clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending,
or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the
circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination
of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said
special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but
had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has
lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir
and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can
be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of
the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased.22
In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for
the "Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of
Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations therein reveals that the
right being asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not
merely one-fourth as stated in the documents the respondents sought to
annul. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the case
of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del Rosario23 is applicable in
the case at bar. In the said case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the
legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for annulment of the
transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Golden Bay Realty
Corporation on the ground that the subject properties rightfully belong to the
petitioners’ predecessor and by virtue of succession have passed on to in a special proceeding is necessary. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition
them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled: is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated June
...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and 29, 2000 DISMISSING the complaint is REINSTATED.
Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it —
except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned No costs.
Yaptinchays — that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased
couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased SO ORDERED.
couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in
an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence
over the action for reconveyance.24

In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations,
have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in
the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to have
themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As
such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause
of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in
interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint,
it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought
to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of
the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that
they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such
heirs in the proper forum.

Furthermore, in Portugal,25 the Court held that it would be superfluous to

still subject the estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
the parties' status as heirs could be achieved in the ordinary civil case filed
because it appeared from the records of the case that the only property left
by the decedent was the subject matter of the case and that the parties have
already presented evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent.
In the present case, however, nothing in the records of this case shows that
the only property left by the deceased Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot,
and neither had respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any
evidence to establish their rights as heirs, considering especially that it
appears that there are other heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in
this case that had signed one of the questioned documents. Hence, under
the circumstances in this case, this Court finds that a determination of the
rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS
HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR
A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21
and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15
May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca
Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending civil
cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No.
95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein.
The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of
Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First
Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A.
Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent
to be ₱5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC
issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate
of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her
favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the
Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of
her deceased husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory,
private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned
two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City
courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding
to the two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and
₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC
required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,9 praying that they be furnished
with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion,
disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the
manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the
Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the
required inventory of the decedent’s estate.10 Petitioners also filed other
pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of
private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and
inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested
parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the
intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being
the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision12 dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the
intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of
petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as
these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other
courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower
courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of
procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special
Proceedings.13
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by
the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished
"copies of all processes and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as
the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14 Second,
they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market
value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a
deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination
under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties
interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.16
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely
informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of
Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language
of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening
in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal
interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules
of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings.
The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special
proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable to special proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a
decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
"intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they
had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square
with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that
petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would
not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before
the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be,
let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any
interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to participate in
varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite
these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which
recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of
letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3,
Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for
letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other
persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76,
which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance
of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment,
embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence
of the decedent’s title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which
requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of
the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule
89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before
it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of
the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any
person interested in the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of
the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either
satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract,
whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if
contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the
court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by
the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.19 However,
it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they
arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders
Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of
claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule
86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the
decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of
Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded
in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already pending
review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be
settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate
proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted,
they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet
until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the
intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang
Chia,22 and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief
narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for
reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of
the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate
proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years
earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia,
administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified
claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that
a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased,
and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been
terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took
cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the
intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into
an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the
intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the
Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it
was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that
the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only
property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the
court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the
unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will
necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the
determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil
case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case
but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation
of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess
of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the
closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate
civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the
extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action
pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be
entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides
that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce
a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or
administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action
against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply
because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first
taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to
the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property
alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be
determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory
if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at
the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x23 (Emphasis supplied) [Citations
omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed
to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can
partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later,
the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always
been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to
protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a
decision on their action."24
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests,
but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of
Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any person
interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified capacities
to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent
claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be
reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor,
the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or
diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced
against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a
creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in
every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for
specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on
the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or
reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if
the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate,
and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can
be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers
sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and
orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the
pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as
to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of
the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the
assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the
appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the
right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property
of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and
contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate
proceedings. We are mindful of respondent’s submission that if the Court
were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the
intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent
or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter
how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that
would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody
posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly
complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately
offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been
recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that
addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in
the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a
petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC
judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate
proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2
of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every
court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the
inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners
were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the
intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor
prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper
disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of
the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for
sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over
the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested
persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the
intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating
the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the
interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and
disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied.
Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to
the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their
individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the
administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means
by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved. 1awphi1
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do
require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested
parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be
given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference
to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor
or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize
the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the
hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue.
After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted
inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline
be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified
and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the
inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her
verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and
other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general
competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such
purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is
correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be
deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as
enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that
petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto
Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such
interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased
Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true

inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85
requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within
one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We
do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to
perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still
contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did
delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the
assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under
Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the
estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator,

the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek
with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a
creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such
relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the
G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner,
vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-
Administratrix, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of
the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated
January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims
against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7,
2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately ₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement
for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of
negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the
dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the
requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against
non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation
why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without
prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated
April 9, 2003.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a
certification against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim
should be dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate
proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time
of its filing thereat?
(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be
dismissed because of its failure to contain a written explanation on
the service and filing by registered mail?2
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate
proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a
written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees
upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special
proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although
directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.3
The petition is imbued with merit.
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in
ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is
not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court
govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall
be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform;
capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.4 This means that
in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be
applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so
would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of
Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable
or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of
Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and
initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and
filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate
would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are
applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person as in the present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in
dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for
failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum
shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints
and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent
money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the
present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the
filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections
1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary
or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent
are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their
respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.5
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a
motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in
the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of
Appeals,6 the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring
a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in
which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or
remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause.
It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the
action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy.7 (Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the
settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since
the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent
claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an
initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum
shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of
Appeals,8 that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim
(attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the
administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without
payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a
lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a
reasonable time.9 After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction
over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment
of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds
for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De
Guzman Vda. de Macatangay10 is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held
thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon
Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the
discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not
complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such
should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper;
and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if
service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal
service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some
lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than
ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing
counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for
instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice
from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or
other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating
before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing
undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of
adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11
of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper
as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no
written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in
the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause
"whenever practicable".
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule,
and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception.
Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of
the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing
is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may
resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin
with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise
consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues
involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service,
exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:
"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of
pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable. The court notes
that in the present case, personal service would not be
practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and
Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by
registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort and
expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might
have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the
use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the
court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed.
While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule
13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
(Emphasis and italics supplied) 1âwphi1
In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon,
while petitioner Sonia’s counsel’s is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83
kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service
impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was
not done personally "might have been superfluous."
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of
procedure has been allowed where, among other cases, "the injustice to the
adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed."11 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City,
while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed
orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial
notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed
not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus,
following Medina v. Court of Appeals,12 the failure of petitioner to submit a
written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be
considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion
under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in
the interest of substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of
deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue
by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid.13 The ultimate purpose for the rule on money
claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,14 thus:
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate
court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the
deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious
design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and
the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The
law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the
estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the
residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on
the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in
the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003,
respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take
appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of
the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S.
MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON., respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De
Manalo, et. Al., seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court and the
Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila
died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S.
Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio
Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M.
Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo
and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age. 1âwphi1.nêt
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several
real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a
business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at
No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General Tinio
Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the
surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros,
Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with
the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of
the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of
their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said
petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the
order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said
order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses
mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court
issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the
government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on
March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of
general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S.
Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10)
days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through
counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993
seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated
July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time file
opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as
grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the
immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the
oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the
merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of
their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this
proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and
immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this
Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as
regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after
the trial court in its Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for
improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse
was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest
efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no
certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for certiorari in its Resolution11 promulgated on September 30, 1996.
On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was
likewise dismissed.12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for
the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite
the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a
compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to
the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is
actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They
point out that it contains certain averments, which, according to them, are
indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:
X X X
Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of
his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or
extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the
properties aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit
and advantage xxx.
X X X of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the
estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to
the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.
X X X
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were
compelled to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses
and will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and
engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as
and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court
xxx.13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be
dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground
that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with,
that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made
involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition
pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the
complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful
srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement
and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein
petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action.
The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition
for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of
the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in
the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the
decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts upon
which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration
by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings.
In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt
as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio
Manalo, to wit;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this
Honorable Court:
a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to
petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the administration of the estate of
the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such
reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.
b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO
have been inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have
been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that
the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed
among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.
c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of
P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus
honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and
trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO
MANALO.18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain
averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein
petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the
petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by
the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials,
special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual,
moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an
apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately
seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-
vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the
purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the
late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to
the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and
dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out
only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the
effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the
defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too
difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly
delayed by simple strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for
settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626
were to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of
a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-
vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply
as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.'
Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must
necessarily include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge
under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the
invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal
of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo
inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in
Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil
actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil
action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission
unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that
legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially
adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a
litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that
every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is
allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know that
lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
stranger.25
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being
sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no
defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to
establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly
recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly
exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of
the probate court.1âw phi 1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of
merit, Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL
ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO –
MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES,
ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an
action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters
relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on
questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of
the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
is the decision1 of public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion
of which declares:
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one entered
annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in
favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the
Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No.
107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court.
No costs.
"So ordered."
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered
owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in
Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the
death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely:
Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954
adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of
TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while
each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property.
Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children. 1âw phi 1.nêt
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an
"Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of
Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his
children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters
registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988.
Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided
into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square
meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land
area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443.
Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained
ownership over the second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher.
During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443
to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the
latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon
Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor
herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly,
herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence
of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that
she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the
law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner
further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed,
in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents
may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein
petitioner's property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a
decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in
favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete
nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been
decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses
are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid
donation as it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the
New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a
donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance
inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the
deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's
decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just
and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an
ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond
its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property
as advance inheritance. What the court should have done was
merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for
that purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle
through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the
appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the
case."
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action
and special proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific
rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction
between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand
of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by
the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings,
the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law
expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in
 equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings
which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings
commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular
pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A
special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be
instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion
upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the
Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the
decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless
clear that the same provision11 contemplates a probate court when it speaks
of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general
jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the
issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner
Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the
RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court
so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the
decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of
a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo
determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and
assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased
to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings
provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited
discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action
cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding
because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a
quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance
inheritance."12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our
pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that
whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court
(then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of
procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice
"which may be waived".15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private
respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the
authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this
specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated
the long standing principle that although generally, a probate court may not
decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all
heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
decide the question of ownership.16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely
an allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which
 does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have
invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court.17 (emphasis supplied)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due
to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be
taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property
owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject
to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined,
the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced
the legitimes.19
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the
present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules
of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario.
This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these
well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing
circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is
indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as
well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del
Rosario's estate.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956
In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio.
EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs. AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE
EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO, oppositors-appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on
November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of
Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and
Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are
illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed
upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated
March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said
petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by
Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on
November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate, in the Court of First Instance
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was,
and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he
had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was
in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at
No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio
bought a house and lot at 889-A España Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2).
While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the
decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr.
Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where
the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City
of Manila, sometimes before November 26, 1952. On this date, he
contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion
Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute left
ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of
seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or even
slept in said house at España Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the
decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy
(70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence,
residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-
settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is
gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of
Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the
circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established
another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following
conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of
choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay
therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich,
Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624;
Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220).
Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and
had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue
narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent
appears to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son,
petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify thereon,
despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the
appellants herein, that "the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest
of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce the
testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus
Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A
España Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast
some light on his (decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This
notwithstanding, the lower court held that the decedent's intent to stay
permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said
property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is
untenable.lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because
he had been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein
appellee. It is not improbable — in fact, its is very likely — that said advice
was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and
have a more effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not
commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health",
even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on
account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I,
pp. 172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906;
U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with
him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then,
again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A
España Extention, Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952,
or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando,
Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates
used by the decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public,
was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract
Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis,
to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or
two (2) days prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando,
Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate
full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus
indicating that the children of the deceased by his first marriage, including
said appellee, were represented on that occasion and would have objected
to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart
from appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to
establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and
immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the
presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1— which is
particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando,
Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not been offset
by the evidence of record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered
in evidence, and refused to entertain the same in the order appealed from.
The reason therefor are deducible from its resolution in rejecting said
documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:
Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to
the records for whatever action oppositors may want to take later on
because until now the personality of the oppositors has not been
established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this
case, and the Court cannot pass upon this question as the
oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court and they
maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be
admitted in evidence before appellants had established their "personality" to
intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their filiation. When appellants,
however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the
deceased, as his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge
sustained appellee's objection thereto stating:
Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and
it seems that you are now trying to prove the status of your client;
you are leading so that. The main point here is your contention that
the deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I
allowed you to cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the
status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want
to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not yet the time to
declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the
domicile of the decedent, because of their alleged lack of "personality", but,
when tried to establish such "personality", they were barred from doing so
on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves unable
to sanction either the foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the
inference it drew from the circumstances surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions.
While, on the one hand, he declared that appellants could not be permitted
to introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for
they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the
order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the appellee, said appellants
had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of
the hearing, in the lower court, appellants' counsel announced that he would
take part therein "only to question the jurisdiction, for the purpose of
dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of
petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the relation between the
decedent and the appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court
said, addressing appellants' counsel: "Your stand until now is to question the
jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the status of the
oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the
jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused
to do so, stating: "I will insist on my stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of
the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that
appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they maintain
that these proceedings should be dismissed." Thus, appellants specially
made of record that they were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction
of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same, and the court
felt that appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.
At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not
only their right to object to appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been
laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged relationship with the
decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code
of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other
words, the lower court should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence
and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue under
consideration.
Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or
improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953,
the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of . . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
"Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal
was petition for the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order appears on the record.
dated November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of said court
on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as Special if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are
Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before
and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive
marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for the dismissal of said jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda.
proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the
First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This motion was granted proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the
in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding
section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of
bar. Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should,
the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's
case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of petition.
Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts
with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's
competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a petition is dismissed, with costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.
similar case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is
denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla,
parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident
decedents who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for
the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court of
first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts
then have concurrent jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking
cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts — but, also, because
the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the
Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence,
which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the
court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.lawphil.net

In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch
Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word
"resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring
to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons,
means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special
administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a
petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C,
alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same
time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate.
On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8,
1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the
petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons
interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in
the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the
appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a
debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore,
prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in
lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the
Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the
jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8,
1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous,
misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule
has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown
herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance
of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in
the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition
for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule.
This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four
aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the
First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and
Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation
that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original
petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has
expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the
estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be
appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this
supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the
reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not
possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original
and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the
issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973,
praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent
allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash
advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling
attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the
special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal
and real properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order,
received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the
motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973,
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition,
because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest
has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and
(3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to
inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental
motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the
court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an
illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G.
Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973,
one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of
properties in the hands of third persons which have not been
determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the
special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the
interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor
Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action,
jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus
motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa
B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that
the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in
Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous
qualification made by the court that the administration of the
properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with
the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been
authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and
possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of
the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to
deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without
any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear.
Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of
jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973,
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of
Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of
Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of
administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of
his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia
had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her
objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular
administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27,
1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in
view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special
administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack
of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia.
Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the
first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove
the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power
allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit
an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of
the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973,
insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her:
(a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c)
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special
administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks
and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7,
1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three
questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish
Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of
accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her
the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa
B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably
belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to
deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name
of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or
"married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-
C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time
of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing
that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City.
Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in
Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia
commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge
Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court,
viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the
criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the
delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G.
Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc.
27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of
jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia
G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The
case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the
Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1,
1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-
19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February
10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as
special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted
the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix
upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed
the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed
Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge
Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of
the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975.
She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-
19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the
proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court
of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals.
This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975,
an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to
Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the
previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention
that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the
parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is
still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded
Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments
were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt
on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January
12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a
petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani
Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was
issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for
certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations
hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in
a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With
particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should
affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the
appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as
death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and
situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the
right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor,
or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his
last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and
that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his
death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on
the court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as
the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define
the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The
power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was
fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is
not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in
which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it
loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a
loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court
may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may
thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a
strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of
convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of
First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes
the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the
place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will,
and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it
is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the
province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as
"venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean?
Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time
of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides"
connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of
venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed
as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B.
Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his
death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of
First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat
on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna,
died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her,
the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he
also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the
contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate
presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other
papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition,
Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove
the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia
G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of
residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three
months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney
dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels
of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring
part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina
B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of
residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative
that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is
subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
"When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is
deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to
hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction
or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but
availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights
as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the
proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as
special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia
claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule
80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions
causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only
proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The
new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree
among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special
administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority
for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes
prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion
must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no
reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice
of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the
appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to
consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the
consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial
interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the
widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For
such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering
the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked
ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the
widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia
maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G.
Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any
successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima
facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be
emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but
temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the
appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate
of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of
heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the
findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as
to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with
sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased
Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he
indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate
of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for
the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the
name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents
and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa
B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late
Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs.
Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior
courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly
assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of
justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's
exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the
latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of
Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be
required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975,
granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-
42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special
administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate
obligations is hereby upheld. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions
of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No.
L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL
CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA,
CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its
subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila
Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein
petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus
Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta.
Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage,
respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion
Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita
Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late
Senator)1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-
R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila
on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his
death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon
City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition
for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the
heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof
at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province
of Cebu.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a
new and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that
the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu
court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that
respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special
administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of
the said court, giving as reasons the following:
It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the
notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the
petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic
petition for the issuance of letters of administration.2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of
the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition
with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said
last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner
Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to
Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964,
the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on
petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document
purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano
Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to
the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to
nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu
court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition
proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and
Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and
assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain
petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her
petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed
that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to
dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding
over an intestate proceeding."4 The said court further found in said order that
the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y
Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order
follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition
and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don
Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his
death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March
1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the
aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors
do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he
died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate
proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will
should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed in
the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of
the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be
entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of
the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death
was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and
Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will
shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly
stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon
City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice
and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two
residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he
himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the
center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before
this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this
court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of
all others.5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon
City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction
over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court
was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration
dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing
for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour
intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors
appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the
hearing in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City
court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their
opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the
testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto.6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the
notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had
been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the
three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty.
Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the
notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and
the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates,
income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that
the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also
affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15
May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as
having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all
formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his
estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as
probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the
will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof,
respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case
CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No.
Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding
that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate
proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it
is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It
is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues
of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether
or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu
CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate
was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-
7898). The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of
the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of
another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964,
Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated
that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready
for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court
to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge
was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to
jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but
only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings.
At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not
depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing
the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and
the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from
proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending
before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions
heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein
and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition
for review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate
court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City
court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with
the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and
testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is
tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the
Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April
1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over
intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the
petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and
testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the
Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition
or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed
without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes
Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of the petition
and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due
execution and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in
law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from
proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all
its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's
last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the
following considerations: —
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts
of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate
estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays
down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in
order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule
provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule
73)8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of
his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely
of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa
vs. Co Ho9 as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases
the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view
because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has
been submitted in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province
where the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all
the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who
also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse
decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of
the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we
consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the
trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have
arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to
be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another
province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of
justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio &
Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act
No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in
the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as
defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing
merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again,
procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
(Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of
jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of
First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place
of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First
Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600,
fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the
place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the
new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person
shall be settled is properly called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with
whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive
jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between
courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with
whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow
and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition
before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false,
may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it
in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the
petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it
a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in
abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City
court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit
in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by
the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of
Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and
improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to
the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu
court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the
parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in
Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as
claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline
to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the
Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to
the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and
venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance
of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition
since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take
cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to
exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore,
as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon
City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the
estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition
before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and
deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by
the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon
City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be
declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in
admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against
respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate
proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with
the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,
testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it
has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left
a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings
for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this
case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain considerations
therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should
have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the
Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate
motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No.
6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate
to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the
purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in
this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition,
albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely
a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining
in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has
waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by
laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the
existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19,
1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in
Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice
of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of
the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28,
1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of
Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April
15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396
an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling
the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed
but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more
specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of
all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a
premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this
Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court
even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be
to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against
said proceedings is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of
the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that
Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his
conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly
given by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from
said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly
provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in
comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the
record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken
cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the
late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a
legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court
is considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of
First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that
the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring
both factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be
submitted in the ordinary course of procedure in the first instance,
particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the
Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu,
besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires
airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case
of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of
the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings
filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to
determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will
and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate
proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus
determined in effect for both courts — at the behest and with the deference
and consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon City was the actual
residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue,
the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the
practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to
be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to
determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon
City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at
the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this
factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court
should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its
contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after
years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in
Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it
is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition
for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such
"jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court
in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence
at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such
province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as
a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court
is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a
court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and
validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even
if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue
notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting
the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a
writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate
court's appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line
with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition
challenging the Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate
and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in
the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is
not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have
the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction."
As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect
in the administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as
affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole
proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before
another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require
comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of
the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the
decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule
73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different
courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating
conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and
that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who
unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to
who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of
whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the
decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament
and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire
consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in
consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under
all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court
(where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the
Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the
Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12,
1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the
decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly
entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's estate, 20 would
be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu
and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new
proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into
a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for
the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed
by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-
widow had their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and
entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in
accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue
and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money
and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she
has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule
73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the
death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to
be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased
spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides
in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in
Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and
exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of
the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and
petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and
go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and
conjugal estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court
did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by
petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last
will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to
dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that the
decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never
challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of
10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City
court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of
deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have
acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the
decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in
accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled
doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule
of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City
court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing
petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to
issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final and
can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as
it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by
and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice
and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference
and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will
and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without
bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and
actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and
authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to
repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to
revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that
indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the
strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City
was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by
respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered
dismissed. No costs.
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4,
1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which
reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31,
1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in
SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San
Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993,
she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to
Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of
his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs
are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the
conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration
be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to
his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her
brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28,
1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March
5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence
showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in
Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry
Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the
Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately
filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E.
Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions
for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent,
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted
by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16,
1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the
Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state
the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the
motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by
Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of
respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he
is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their
position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the
petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.
It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for
letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines
and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of
Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and
October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of
the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and
the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there
is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement
— of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form
whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the
law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to
remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for
review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to
adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue
of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid
because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one
domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void
and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the
latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity
to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the
case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the
terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
"domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the
instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is
a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in
one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained
a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated
January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December
1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of
the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country
Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling
cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993.
At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition
for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a
Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry
under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the
provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved
through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce
was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest
in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The
Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien
spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after
the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony
by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall
not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she
should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the
Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case,
it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery
suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a
Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the
said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has
long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed
marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating
that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the
Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background
and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on
August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26,
36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article
26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-
Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where
a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment
of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers
codified the law already established through judicial precedent. 1aw phi 1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where
one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a
valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover
in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To
be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary
when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the
will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present
petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that
there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the
laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific
guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It
held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and
the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the
co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent.
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation,
the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove
that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of
the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their
joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and
the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family
Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and
wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we
held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court
described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual
contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to
be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved
the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential.
xxx
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance
must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil
Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129505 January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 133359 January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his
Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and
PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late
Dr. Arturo de Santos, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth
and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that
petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr.
Arturo de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering that they
involve the same parties and some of the issues raised are the same.
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati
City, filed a petition for probate of his will1 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos
alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as
sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he
disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than
P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named
executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the
will2 was annexed to the petition for probate.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati,
Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. The
order reads:
On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of
the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning,
copies of which were served to Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.
and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips (Officer's Return, dated 04
September 1995 attached to the records). When the case was called
for hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written
opposition was ever filed and on motion of petitioner, he was
allowed to adduce his evidence in support of the petition.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on
the witness stand and was directly examined by the Court through
"free wheeling" questions and answers to give this Court a basis to
determine the state of mind of the petitioner when he executed the
subject will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that
petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress,
menace and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his
Last Will and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that
he was neither forced nor influenced by any other person in signing
it.
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced
that petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last Will and Testament
(Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his residence situated at 9
Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City; said Last
Will and Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3)
witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7",
"A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-
3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes
(Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the
presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of the
witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and duly
notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh. "A-
 15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and Testament,
pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").
Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia
Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole legatee
and devisee of petitioner's properties, real and personal,
approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los
Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and to serve as such
without a bond. 1âwphi 1.nêt
From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has
substantially established the material allegations contained in his
petition. The Last Will and Testament having been executed and
attested as required by law; that testator at the time of the execution
of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to make a
Will; nor was it executed under duress or under the influence of fear
or threats; that it was in writing and executed in the language known
and understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof and attested
and subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of another; that the testator and all the attesting
witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament freely and voluntarily
and that the testator has intended that the instrument should be his
Will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the
petition for the allowance of the Last Will and Testament of Arturo de
Santos is hereby APPROVED and ALLOWED.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26,
1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for
intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's
sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and
nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of
the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order
allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the
designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to
withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a
memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch
61) still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.3
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the
other hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the
issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same
purpose with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.
Upon private respondent's motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch
65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special
administrator of Dr. De Santos's estate.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343
and to set aside the appointment of private respondent as special
administrator. He reiterated that he was the sole and full blooded nephew
and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to know of the existence of
Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp.
Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was still pending; that
private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testator's estate; that
private respondent was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate;
and that petitioner should be given letters of administration for the estate of
Dr. De Santos.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case
before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ."
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had
denied on August 26, 1996 petitioner's motion for intervention. Petitioner
brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision4 promulgated
on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of petitioner's motion for
intervention.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996,
returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground
that there was a pending case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de
Santos pending before said court. The order reads:
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court,
transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is
related with a case before this Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65
with the information that there is no related case involving the ESTATE OF
DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before this Branch.
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner
under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during his
lifetime docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on
16 February 1996 and has become final.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein
Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently
withdrawn after this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the motion
could not be admitted as the subject matter involves a separate case under
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her motion and filed this
case (No. 4343).
Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before
Case No. M-4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch
61) of 26 August 1996 likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a
separate case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be
included in this case filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must
be approved by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,5 Judge Abad Santos
appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65)
to hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that
the probate proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered
the transfer of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later
recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to expedite the
proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61
to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch
began the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must
therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others,
until the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed as
per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial Court
Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if only to expedite the
proceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City is but one court.
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office
of the Court Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V.
Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de
Santos Maloles, Intervenor.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner's motion for
intervention. Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion
was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision6 setting
aside the trial court's order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any
right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61
has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its
issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 65)
acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary
filed by (private) respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of
letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing
her petition for issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial Court
— Makati, Branch 65 knowing fully well that the probate proceedings
involving the same restate estate of the decedent is still pending with the
Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61.
First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-
Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of
Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban7 and Tagle
v. Manalo,8 he argues that the proceedings must continue until the estate is
fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator,
pursuant to Rule 73, §1 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner
contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private respondent's
petition for issuance of letters testamentary.
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the
court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law.9
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the
testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court
proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator.
The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most
jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a
living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.10
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for
probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having
jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's
death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may
be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the
lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
Rule 76, §1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee,
or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may,
at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession
or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the
allowance of his will.
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator
has been explained by the Code Commission thus:
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary
capacity of the testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of wills.
There are relatively few cases concerning the intrinsic validity of
testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the
mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his death. Fraud,
intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does
not comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the same may be
corrected at once. The probate during the testator's life, therefore, will
lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during the
lifetime of the testator, the only questions that may remain for the courts to
decide after the testator's death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that even when the
testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under
duress or undue influence, but these are rare cases.
After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not
necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death.
Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if
he should die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the
ordinary probate proceeding after the testator's death would be in order.11
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996,
there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of
allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, §12 of the Rules of Court. There
is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of
RTC-Makati that —
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate
proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to
exercise said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted
that probate proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance
of a will but continues up to such time that the entire estate of the testator
had been partitioned and distributed.
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant
merely that the partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended
until the latter's death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a
manifestation for the same purpose in the probate court.12
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene,
cites Rule 73, §1 which states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, it was held:13
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as
the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended to define
the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The
power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed was fixed
before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not
altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which
the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases
though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of
the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may
thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby
be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The
appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of
convenience to the parties.
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates
with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or
P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches comprising each court in one
judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible
with each other.14
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the venue of
the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not
bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. As held in the leading
case of Bacalso v. Ramolote:15
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the
Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the
totality of which is only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested
in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one branch,
jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to
the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings
continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this reason that
Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice,
the administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different
branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of
the work by the different branches of the same court. The apportionment
and distribution of cases does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction,
the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First
Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge
of the court.
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction
over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for
issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that,
as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the
matter is material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene
in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of
Appeals held:
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the
decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As
the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from
the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which
has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private
respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the
decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been
raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to
intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in
the estate or the will, and the private respondent has none.
Moreover, the ground cited in the private respondent's opposition,
that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and
value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency
to act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires
only an allegation of the probable value and character of the
property of the estate. The true value can be determined later on in
the course of the settlement of the estate.16
Rule 79, §1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for
administration. — Any person interested in a will may state in writing the
grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named
therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon
notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at
the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and
direct, not merely incidental or contingent.17
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of
his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or
any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does
not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of
said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's —
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.18
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have
been preterited in the testator's will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based
on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator
instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to
respect the desires of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:19
delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in the will.
Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed
during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum
shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a

necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner
he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his
confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of
his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of
the right to dispose.

Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to

give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the
estate.20 None of these circumstances is present in this case.

Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping

when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were
still pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights
asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the
same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.

This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was
filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating
his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated. 1âwphi1.nêt

On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed
by private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the
purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put
into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings
commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963
DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the
deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely:
ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE
HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE
ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners.
Romerico F. Flores for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan holding that
the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the
question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died
on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate
was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was
admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor
of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed
Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo.
Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of
Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio
Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs,
namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and
Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate
proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate
of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of
Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives
aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the
executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of
their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the
deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter
alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10,
1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition for hearing, at which
evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of
memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the memorandum for the
executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties
disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him
exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes
had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral
heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question
the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could
question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the
testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts
be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts.1äw phï1.ñët
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that
the deed of donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal
character to the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in
Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the donation was null and void
the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife
and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will.
On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia
presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void without making any
specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or
mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first category, it falls
under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between
spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second category, it
does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in
relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause.
In the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and
directed the executor to file another," dividing the property mentioned in the
last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties
mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of
the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased
Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal
properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor
filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention
previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena
Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili
and taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of the donation
"without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The motion
for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed,
petitioners filed this present petition for review by certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not
declaring that the probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had
generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to
the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule,
question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate
proceedings,"1 except where one of the parties prays merely for the
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the
probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to
its final determination in a separate action.2 However, we have also held that
when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to
them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and
when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon
(Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661);
and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under
judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course
of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not
prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well
as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the power of the probate court in
this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to
whether the properties herein involved belong to the conjugal partnership of
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband
exclusively?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of
jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants that the trial court had
completely no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and
that its decision on the subject is null and void and does not bind even those
who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because, it is
contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action can not
vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there can
be no exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the
case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through
Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to property is within the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The responding Soriano's objection
(that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the
possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure,
which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of
practice (the filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived".
Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not
over the subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs
of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to
belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts.
This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the
liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and
legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and
payment of all the debts and expenses.3 Thereafter, distribution is made of
the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him.
The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party
is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in his
possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties
may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute.
All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are
before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and
incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as no
interests of third parties are affected.4
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of
ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the
conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the
within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself,
the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties
which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an
proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very
her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor
executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time
parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without
widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to knowledge works no estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased widow
her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought acted as she did because of the deed of donation she executed in favor of
to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and
is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the required
the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners formalities similar to a will.
and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the
testator. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance
with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. So
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves ordered.
to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination
of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by
the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones
who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as
part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or
substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and
submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them
must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same
proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do,
on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it
for granted that their theory as to the character of the properties is correct,
entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". In other words,
by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands
(upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband),
petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the
properties — which is well within the competence of the probate court —
and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw
either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court.
Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection
are the ones who set the court in motion.5 They can not be permitted to
complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them.6
G.R. No. 120880 June 5, 1997
FERDINAND R. MARCOS II, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and HERMINIA D. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Government action is once again
assailed as precipitate and unfair, suffering the basic and oftly implored
requisites of due process of law. Specifically, the petition assails the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 31363, where the said court held:
In view of all the foregoing, we rule that the deficiency income tax
assessments and estate tax assessment, are already final and
(u)nappealable-and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax remedy
resorted to by the government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct and
separate from the other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and
Criminal actions), and is not affected or precluded by the pendency of any
other tax remedies instituted by the government.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition for certiorari with prayer for Restraining Order and
Injunction.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
More than seven years since the demise of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos,
the former President of the Republic of the Philippines, the matter of the
settlement of his estate, and its dues to the government in estate taxes, are
still unresolved, the latter issue being now before this Court for resolution.
Specifically, petitioner Ferdinand R. Marcos II, the eldest son of the
decedent, questions the actuations of the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue in assessing, and collecting through the summary remedy
of Levy on Real Properties, estate and income tax delinquencies upon the
estate and properties of his father, despite the pendency of the proceedings
on probate of the will of the late president, which is docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 10279 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 156.
Petitioner had filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with an application for writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order on June 28, 1993, seeking to
—
I. Annul and set aside the Notices of Levy on real property dated February
22, 1993 and May 20, 1993, issued by respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue;
II. Annul and set aside the Notices of Sale dated May 26, 1993;
III. Enjoin the Head Revenue Executive Assistant Director II (Collection
Service), from proceeding with the Auction of the real properties covered by
Notices of Sale.
After the parties had pleaded their case, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision 2 on November 29, 1994, ruling that the deficiency assessments for
estate and income tax made upon the petitioner and the estate of the
deceased President Marcos have already become final and unappealable,
and may thus be enforced by the summary remedy of levying upon the
properties of the late President, as was done by the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition for Certiorari with prayer for Restraining Order and
Injunction.
No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Unperturbed, petitioner is now before us assailing the validity of the
appellate court's decision, assigning the following as errors:
A. RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
SUMMARY TAX REMEDIES RESORTED TO BY THE GOVERNMENT
ARE NOT AFFECTED AND PRECLUDED BY THE PENDENCY OF THE
SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE LATE
PRESIDENT'S ALLEGED WILL. TO THE CONTRARY, THIS PROBATE
PROCEEDING PRECISELY PLACED ALL PROPERTIES WHICH FORM
PART OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S ESTATE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS OF
THE PROBATE COURT TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER COURTS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
B. RESPONDENT COURT ARBITRARILY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY
DECIDING THAT SINCE THE TAX ASSESSMENTS OF PETITIONER AND
HIS PARENTS HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE,
THERE WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO THE MERITS OF THE GROUNDS
CITED IN THE PETITION. INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER THE TAX
ASSESSMENTS HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL, HOWEVER,
PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO QUESTION THE UNLAWFUL MANNER
AND METHOD IN WHICH TAX COLLECTION IS SOUGHT TO BE
ENFORCED BY RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER AND DE GUZMAN.
THUS, RESPONDENT COURT SHOULD HAVE FAVORABLY
CONSIDERED THE MERITS OF THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS IN THE
PETITION:
(1) The Notices of Levy on Real Property were issued beyond the period
provided in the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 38-68.
(2) [a] The numerous pending court cases questioning the late President's
ownership or interests in several properties (both personal and real) make
the total value of his estate, and the consequent estate tax due, incapable of
exact pecuniary determination at this time. Thus, respondents' assessment
of the estate tax and their issuance of the Notices of Levy and Sale are
premature, confiscatory and oppressive.
[b] Petitioner, as one of the late President's compulsory heirs, was never
notified, much less served with copies of the Notices of Levy, contrary to the
mandate of Section 213 of the NIRC. As such, petitioner was never given an
opportunity to contest the Notices in violation of his right to due process of
law.
C. ON ACCOUNT OF THE CLEAR MERIT OF THE PETITION,
RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD
NO POWER TO GRANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PETITIONER.
SECTION 219 OF THE NIRC NOTWITHSTANDING, COURTS POSSESS
THE POWER TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO
RESTRAIN RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER'S AND DE GUZMAN'S
ARBITRARY METHOD OF COLLECTING THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCY
ESTATE AND INCOME TAXES BY MEANS OF LEVY.
The facts as found by the appellate court are undisputed, and are hereby
adopted:
On September 29, 1989, former President Ferdinand Marcos died in
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.
On June 27, 1990, a Special Tax Audit Team was created to conduct
investigations and examinations of the tax liabilities and obligations of the
late president, as well as that of his family, associates and "cronies". Said
audit team concluded its investigation with a Memorandum dated July 26,
1991. The investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a written
notice of the death of the decedent, an estate tax returns [sic], as well as
several income tax returns covering the years 1982 to 1986, — all in
violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos
before the Regional Trial of Quezon City for violations of Sections 82, 83
and 84 (has penalized under Sections 253 and 254 in relation to Section
252 — a & b) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thereby caused the preparation and
filing of the Estate Tax Return for the estate of the late president, the Income
Tax Returns of the Spouses Marcos for the years 1985 to 1986, and the
Income Tax Returns of petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II for the
years 1982 to 1985.
On July 26, 1991, the BIR issued the following: (1) Deficiency estate tax
assessment no. FAC-2-89-91-002464 (against the estate of the late
president Ferdinand Marcos in the amount of P23,293,607,638.00 Pesos);
(2) Deficiency income tax assessment no. FAC-1-85-91-002452 and
Deficiency income tax assessment no. FAC-1-86-91-002451 (against the
Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in the amounts of P149,551.70 and
P184,009,737.40 representing deficiency income tax for the years 1985 and
1986); (3) Deficiency income tax assessment nos. FAC-1-82-91-002460 to
FAC-1-85-91-002463 (against petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II in
the amounts of P258.70 pesos; P9,386.40 Pesos; P4,388.30 Pesos; and
P6,376.60 Pesos representing his deficiency income taxes for the years
1982 to 1985).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue avers that copies of the deficiency
estate and income tax assessments were all personally and constructively
served on August 26, 1991 and September 12, 1991 upon Mrs. Imelda
Marcos (through her caretaker Mr. Martinez) at her last known address at
No. 204 Ortega St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes "D" and "E" of the Petition).
Likewise, copies of the deficiency tax assessments issued against petitioner
Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II were also personally and constructively
served upon him (through his caretaker) on September 12, 1991, at his last
known address at Don Mariano Marcos St. corner P. Guevarra St., San
Juan, M.M. (Annexes "J" and "J-1" of the Petition). Thereafter, Formal
Assessment notices were served on October 20, 1992, upon Mrs. Marcos
c/o petitioner, at his office, House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa,
Quezon City. Moreover, a notice to Taxpayer inviting Mrs. Marcos (or her
duly authorized representative or counsel), to a conference, was furnished
the counsel of Mrs. Marcos, Dean Antonio Coronel — but to no avail.
The deficiency tax assessments were not protested administratively, by Mrs.
Marcos and the other heirs of the late president, within 30 days from service
of said assessments.
On February 22, 1993, the BIR Commissioner issued twenty-two notices of
levy on real property against certain parcels of land owned by the Marcoses
— to satisfy the alleged estate tax and deficiency income taxes of Spouses
Marcos.
On May 20, 1993, four more Notices of Levy on real property were issued
for the purpose of satisfying the deficiency income taxes.
On May 26, 1993, additional four (4) notices of Levy on real property were
again issued. The foregoing tax remedies were resorted to pursuant to
Sections 205 and 213 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
In response to a letter dated March 12, 1993 sent by Atty. Loreto Ata
(counsel of herein petitioner) calling the attention of the BIR and requesting
that they be duly notified of any action taken by the BIR affecting the interest
of their client Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II, as well as the interest of the
late president — copies of the aforesaid notices were, served on April 7,
1993 and on June 10, 1993, upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner, and
their counsel of record, "De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and
Serapio Law Office".
Notices of sale at public auction were posted on May 26, 1993, at the lobby
of the City Hall of Tacloban City. The public auction for the sale of the
eleven (11) parcels of land took place on July 5, 1993. There being no
bidder, the lots were declared forfeited in favor of the government.
On June 25, 1993, petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II filed the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.
It has been repeatedly observed, and not without merit, that the enforcement
of tax laws and the collection of taxes, is of paramount importance for the
sustenance of government. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and
should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. However, such
collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will
negate the very reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary to
reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and the
taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the
common good, may be achieved. 3
Whether or not the proper avenues of assessment and collection of the said
tax obligations were taken by the respondent Bureau is now the subject of
the Court's inquiry.
Petitioner posits that notices of levy, notices of sale, and subsequent sale of
properties of the late President Marcos effected by the BIR are null and void
for disregarding the established procedure for the enforcement of taxes due
upon the estate of the deceased. The case of Domingo vs. Garlitos 4 is
specifically cited to bolster the argument that "the ordinary procedure by
which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased,
person, as in an inheritance (estate) tax, is for the claimant to present a
claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator
to pay the amount therefor." This remedy is allegedly, exclusive, and cannot
be effected through any other means.
Petitioner goes further, submitting that the probate court is not precluded
from denying a request by the government for the immediate payment of
taxes, and should order the payment of the same only within the period fixed
by the probate court for the payment of all the debts of the decedent. In this
regard, petitioner cites the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. The
Administratrix of the Estate of Echarri (67 Phil 502), where it was held that:
The case of Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Collector of
Internal Revenue (52 Phil 803), relied upon by the petitioner-appellant is
good authority on the proposition that the court having control over the
administration proceedings has jurisdiction to entertain the claim presented
by the government for taxes due and to order the administrator to pay the
tax should it find that the assessment was proper, and that the tax was legal,
due and collectible. And the rule laid down in that case must be understood
in relation to the case of Collector of Customs vs. Haygood, supra., as to the
procedure to be followed in a given case by the government to effectuate
the collection of the tax. Categorically stated, where during the pendency of
judicial administration over the estate of a deceased person a claim for
taxes is presented by the government, the court has the authority to order
payment by the administrator; but, in the same way that it has authority to
order payment or satisfaction, it also has the negative authority to deny the
same. While there are cases where courts are required to perform certain
duties mandatory and ministerial in character, the function of the court in a
case of the present character is not one of them; and here, the court cannot
be an organism endowed with latitude of judgment in one direction, and
converted into a mere mechanical contrivance in another direction.
On the other hand, it is argued by the BIR, that the state's authority to collect
internal revenue taxes is paramount. Thus, the pendency of probate
proceedings over the estate of the deceased does not preclude the
assessment and collection, through summary remedies, of estate taxes over
the same. According to the respondent, claims for payment of estate and
income taxes due and assessed after the death of the decedent need not be
presented in the form of a claim against the estate. These can and should
be paid immediately. The probate court is not the government agency to
decide whether an estate is liable for payment of estate of income taxes.
Well-settled is the rule that the probate court is a court with special and
limited jurisdiction.
Concededly, the authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with
limited jurisdiction, as a probate court over estate of deceased individual, is
not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective,
cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity by
the very parties invoking its authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication; 5 to determine who are the heirs
of the decedent; 6 the recognition of a natural child; 7 the status of a woman
claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; 8 the legality of disinheritance
of an heir by the testator; 9 and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of
hereditary rights. 10
The pivotal question the court is tasked to resolve refers to the authority of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue to collect by the summary remedy of levying
upon, and sale of real properties of the decedent, estate tax deficiencies,
without the cognition and authority of the court sitting in probate over the
supposed will of the deceased.
The nature of the process of estate tax collection has been described as
follows:
Strictly speaking, the assessment of an inheritance tax does not directly
involve the administration of a decedent's estate, although it may be viewed
as an incident to the complete settlement of an estate, and, under some
statutes, it is made the duty of the probate court to make the amount of the
inheritance tax a part of the final decree of distribution of the estate. It is not
against the property of decedent, nor is it a claim against the estate as such,
but it is against the interest or property right which the heir, legatee, devisee,
etc., has in the property formerly held by decedent. Further, under some
statutes, it has been held that it is not a suit or controversy between the
parties, nor is it an adversary proceeding between the state and the person
who owes the tax on the inheritance. However, under other statutes it has
been held that the hearing and determination of the cash value of the assets
and the determination of the tax are adversary proceedings. The proceeding
has been held to be necessarily a proceeding in rem. 11
In the Philippine experience, the enforcement and collection of estate tax, is
executive in character, as the legislature has seen it fit to ascribe this task to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Section 3 of the National Internal Revenue
Code attests to this:
Sec. 3. Powers and duties of the Bureau. — The powers and duties of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue shall comprehend the assessment and
collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges, and the
enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties, and fines connected therewith,
including the execution of judgments in all cases decided in its favor by the
Court of Tax Appeals and the ordinary courts. Said Bureau shall also give
effect to and administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it by
this Code or other laws.
Thus, it was in Vera vs. Fernandez 12 that the court recognized the liberal
treatment of claims for taxes charged against the estate of the decedent.
Such taxes, we said, were exempted from the application of the statute of
non-claims, and this is justified by the necessity of government funding,
immortalized in the maxim that taxes are the lifeblood of the
government. Vectigalia nervi sunt rei publicae — taxes are the sinews of the
state.
Taxes assessed against the estate of a deceased person, after
administration is opened, need not be submitted to the committee on claims
in the ordinary course of administration. In the exercise of its control over the
administrator, the court may direct the payment of such taxes upon motion
showing that the taxes have been assessed against the estate.
Such liberal treatment of internal revenue taxes in the probate proceedings
extends so far, even to allowing the enforcement of tax obligations against
the heirs of the decedent, even after distribution of the estate's properties.
Claims for taxes, whether assessed before or after the death of the
deceased, can be collected from the heirs even after the distribution of the
properties of the decedent. They are exempted from the application of the
statute of non-claims. The heirs shall be liable therefor, in proportion to their
share in the inheritance. 13
Thus, the Government has two ways of collecting the taxes in question.
One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the
amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. Another remedy,
pursuant to the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all
property and rights to property belong to the taxpayer for unpaid income tax,
is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or
transferee to the payment of the tax due the estate. (Commissioner of
Internal Revenue vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105, September 15, 1967.)
From the foregoing, it is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in
probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory
requirement in the collection of estate taxes. It cannot therefore be argued
that the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of the
properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it was
required to seek first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the
Tax Code, and in the pertinent remedial laws that implies the necessity of
the probate or estate settlement court's approval of the state's claim for
estate taxes, before the same can be enforced and collected.
On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or
settlement court which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial
administrator of the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any
party interested in the estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid.
This provision disproves the petitioner's contention that it is the probate
court which approves the assessment and collection of the estate tax.
If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR's decision to assess the
estate taxes, this should have been pursued through the proper
administrative and judicial avenues provided for by law.
Section 229 of the NIRC tells us how:
Sec. 229. Protesting of assessment. — When the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue or his duly authorized representative finds that proper taxes should
be assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings. Within a period
to be prescribed by implementing regulations, the taxpayer shall be required
to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner
shall issue an assessment based on his findings.
Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for
reconsideration or reinvestigation in such form and manner as may be
prescribed by implementing regulations within (30) days from receipt of the
assessment; otherwise, the assessment shall become final and
unappealable.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual, association or
corporation adversely affected by the decision on the protest may appeal to
the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of said decision;
otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. (As
inserted by P.D. 1773)
Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within the time
required for the filing of the same, petitioner, and the other heirs never
questioned the assessments served upon them, allowing the same to lapse
into finality, and prompting the BIR to collect the said taxes by levying upon
the properties left by President Marcos.
Petitioner submits, however, that "while the assessment of taxes may have
been validly undertaken by the Government, collection thereof may have
been done in violation of the law. Thus, the manner and method in which the
latter is enforced may be questioned separately, and irrespective of the
finality of the former, because the Government does not have the unbridled
discretion to enforce collection without regard to the clear provision of law." 14
Petitioner specifically points out that applying Memorandum Circular No. 38-
68, implementing Sections 318 and 324 of the old tax code (Republic Act
5203), the BIR's Notices of Levy on the Marcos properties, were issued
beyond the allowed period, and are therefore null and void:
. . . the Notices of Levy on Real Property (Annexes O to NN of Annex C of
this Petition) in satisfaction of said assessments were still issued by
respondents well beyond the period mandated in Revenue Memorandum
Circular No. 38-68. These Notices of Levy were issued only on 22 February
1993 and 20 May 1993 when at least seventeen (17) months had already
lapsed from the last service of tax assessment on 12 September 1991. As
no notices of distraint of personal property were first issued by respondents,
the latter should have complied with Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
38-68 and issued these Notices of Levy not earlier than three (3) months nor
later than six (6) months from 12 September 1991. In accordance with the
Circular, respondents only had until 12 March 1992 (the last day of the sixth
month) within which to issue these Notices of Levy. The Notices of Levy,
having been issued beyond the period allowed by law, are thus void and of
no effect. 15
We hold otherwise. The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued
within the prescriptive period and in accordance with the provisions of the
present Tax Code. The deficiency tax assessment, having already become
final, executory, and demandable, the same can now be collected through
the summary remedy of distraint or levy pursuant to Section 205 of the
NIRC.
The applicable provision in regard to the prescriptive period for the
assessment and collection of tax deficiency in this instance is Article 223 of
the NIRC, which pertinently provides:
Sec. 223. Exceptions as to a period of limitation of assessment and
collection of taxes. — (a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with
intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or
a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without
assessment, at any time within ten (10) years after the discovery of the
falsity, fraud, or omission: Provided, That, in a fraud assessment which has
become final and executory, the fact of fraud shall be judicially taken
cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for the collection thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Any internal revenue tax which has been assessed within the period of
limitation above prescribed, may be collected by distraint or levy or by a
proceeding in court within three years following the assessment of the tax.
xxx xxx xxx
The omission to file an estate tax return, and the subsequent failure to
contest or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner's
cause, as under the above-cited provision, in case of failure to file a return,
the tax may be assessed at any time within ten years after the omission, and
any tax so assessed may be collected by levy upon real property within
three years following the assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax
assessment had become final and unappealable by the petitioner's default
as regards protesting the validity of the said assessment, there is now no
reason why the BIR cannot continue with the collection of the said tax. Any
objection against the assessment should have been pursued following the
avenue paved in Section 229 of the NIRC on protests on assessments of
internal revenue taxes.
Petitioner further argues that "the numerous pending court cases
questioning the late president's ownership or interests in several properties
(both real and personal) make the total value of his estate, and the
consequent estate tax due, incapable of exact pecuniary determination at
this time. Thus, respondents' assessment of the estate tax and their
issuance of the Notices of Levy and sale are premature and oppressive." He
points out the pendency of Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0001-0034 and
0141, which were filed by the government to question the ownership and
interests of the late President in real and personal properties located within
and outside the Philippines. Petitioner, however, omits to allege whether the
properties levied upon by the BIR in the collection of estate taxes upon the
decedent's estate were among those involved in the said cases pending in
the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the court is at a loss as to how these cases are
relevant to the matter at issue. The mere fact that the decedent has pending
cases involving ill-gotten wealth does not affect the enforcement of tax
assessments over the properties indubitably included in his estate.
Petitioner also expresses his reservation as to the propriety of the BIR's total
assessment of P23,292,607,638.00, stating that this amount deviates from
the findings of the Department of Justice's Panel of Prosecutors as per its
resolution of 20 September 1991. Allegedly, this is clear evidence of the
uncertainty on the part of the Government as to the total value of the estate
of the late President.
This is, to our mind, the petitioner's last ditch effort to assail the assessment
of estate tax which had already become final and unappealable.
It is not the Department of Justice which is the government agency tasked to
determine the amount of taxes due upon the subject estate, but the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, 16 whose determinations and assessments are
presumed correct and made in good faith. 17 The taxpayer has the duty of
proving otherwise. In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the
performance of official duties, an assessment will not be disturbed. Even an
assessment based on estimates is prima facie valid and lawful where it does
not appear to have been arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously. The burden of
proof is upon the complaining party to show clearly that the assessment is
erroneous. Failure to present proof of error in the assessment will justify the
judicial affirmance of said assessment. 18 In this instance, petitioner has not
pointed out one single provision in the Memorandum of the Special Audit
Team which gave rise to the questioned assessment, which bears a trace of
falsity. Indeed, the petitioner's attack on the assessment bears mainly on the
alleged improbable and unconscionable amount of the taxes charged. But
mere rhetoric cannot supply the basis for the charge of impropriety of the
assessments made.
Moreover, these objections to the assessments should have been raised,
considering the ample remedies afforded the taxpayer by the Tax Code, with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals, as described
earlier, and cannot be raised now via Petition for Certiorari, under the
pretext of grave abuse of discretion. The course of action taken by the
petitioner reflects his disregard or even repugnance of the established
institutions for governance in the scheme of a well-ordered society. The
subject tax assessments having become final, executory and enforceable,
the same can no longer be contested by means of a disguised protest. In
the main, Certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a lost appeal or
remedy. 19 This judicial policy becomes more pronounced in view of the
absence of sufficient attack against the actuations of government.
On the matter of sufficiency of service of Notices of Assessment to the
petitioner, we find the respondent appellate court's pronouncements sound
and resilient to petitioner's attacks.
Anent grounds 3(b) and (B) — both alleging/claiming lack of notice — We
find, after considering the facts and circumstances, as well as evidences,
that there was sufficient, constructive and/or actual notice of assessments,
levy and sale, sent to herein petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos as
well as to his mother Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
Even if we are to rule out the notices of assessments personally given to the
caretaker of Mrs. Marcos at the latter's last known address, on August 26,
1991 and September 12, 1991, as well as the notices of assessment
personally given to the caretaker of petitioner also at his last known address
on September 12, 1991 — the subsequent notices given thereafter could no
longer be ignored as they were sent at a time when petitioner was already
here in the Philippines, and at a place where said notices would surely be
called to petitioner's attention, and received by responsible persons of
sufficient age and discretion.
Thus, on October 20, 1992, formal assessment notices were served upon
Mrs. Marcos c/o the petitioner, at his office, House of Representatives,
Batasan Pambansa, Q.C. (Annexes "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-3"; pp. 207-210,
Comment/Memorandum of OSG). Moreover, a notice to taxpayer dated
October 8, 1992 inviting Mrs. Marcos to a conference relative to her tax
liabilities, was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos — Dean Antonio
Coronel (Annex "B", p. 211, ibid). Thereafter, copies of Notices were also
served upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner and their counsel "De Borja,
Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and Serapio Law Office", on April 7, 1993
and June 10, 1993. Despite all of these Notices, petitioner never lifted a
finger to protest the assessments, (upon which the Levy and sale of
properties were based), nor appealed the same to the Court of Tax Appeals.
There being sufficient service of Notices to herein petitioner (and his mother)
and it appearing that petitioner continuously ignored said Notices despite
several opportunities given him to file a protest and to thereafter appeal to
the Court of Tax Appeals, — the tax assessments subject of this case, upon
which the levy and sale of properties were based, could no longer be
contested (directly or indirectly) via this instant petition for certiorari. 20
Petitioner argues that all the questioned Notices of Levy, however, must be
nullified for having been issued without validly serving copies thereof to the
petitioner. As a mandatory heir of the decedent, petitioner avers that he has
an interest in the subject estate, and notices of levy upon its properties
should have been served upon him.
. . . Levy shall be effected by writing upon said certificate a description of the
property upon which levy is made. At the same time, written notice of the
levy shall be mailed to or served upon the Register of Deeds of the province
or city where the property is located and upon the delinquent taxpayer, or if
he be absent from the Philippines, to his agent or the manager of the
business in respect to which the liability arose, or if there be none, to the
occupant of the property in question.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing notwithstanding, the record shows that notices of warrants of
distraint and levy of sale were furnished the counsel of petitioner on April 7,
1993, and June 10, 1993, and the petitioner himself on April 12, 1993 at his
office at the Batasang Pambansa. 21 We cannot therefore, countenance
petitioner's insistence that he was denied due process. Where there was an
opportunity to raise objections to government action, and such opportunity
was disregarded, for no justifiable reason, the party claiming oppression
then becomes the oppressor of the orderly functions of government. He who
comes to court must come with clean hands. Otherwise, he not only taints
his name, but ridicules the very structure of established authority.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVED to DENY the present petition.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.

We do not agree. In the case of notices of levy issued to satisfy the

delinquent estate tax, the delinquent taxpayer is the Estate of the decedent,
and not necessarily, and exclusively, the petitioner as heir of the deceased.
In the same vein, in the matter of income tax delinquency of the late
president and his spouse, petitioner is not the taxpayer liable. Thus, it
follows that service of notices of levy in satisfaction of these tax
delinquencies upon the petitioner is not required by law, as under Section
213 of the NIRC, which pertinently states:

xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. 134100 September 29, 2000
PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his
Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the
surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent Romeo Jaring1 was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in
Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years
ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the
fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and
Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The
stipulated amount of rent was ₱485,600.00, payable in two installments of
₱300,000.00 and ₱185,600.00, with the second installment falling due on
June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the contract.
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of
₱50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their
obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio
and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the alternative, he
prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants fail
to pay the balance.
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her
husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.2 She
based her action on Rule 3, §21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then
provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in these rules." This provision has been amended so that now Rule
3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express
or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court
in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting
claims against the estate of a deceased person.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner
was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be independently
impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of
her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.3 The Manuel
spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason, they were declared in
default.
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial,
ordering petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the
unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of
₱10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
erred in denying her motion to dismiss. In its decision4 rendered on July 10,
1997, the appellate court dismissed her appeal. It held:
The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must
be dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the regional
trial court, does not apply where there are other defendants against whom
the action should be maintained. This is the teaching of Climaco v. Siy Uy,
wherein the Supreme Court held:
Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a cause
of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was, however,
a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money, and
the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon
the death of the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co was
also named defendant in the complaint. Obviously, therefore, the order
appealed from is erroneous insofar as it dismissed the case against Co.
(Underlining added)
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were
signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot
avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to the
contract has totally extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial
Insurance, Inc. v. David:
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled
jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring
his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if
husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his
death, her liability is independent of and separate from her husband's; she
may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the claim
against her as well as the claim against her husband should be made in the
decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97).5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4,
1998.6 Hence this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY, 19 SCRA 858, IN
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT
SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST REMAINING
DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIM FOR
PAYMENT AGAINST HER AND HER HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD
BE PROSECUTED AS A MONEY CLAIM.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. v. DAVID, 133
SCRA 317, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE
SPOUSES IN THIS CASE DID NOT BIND THEMSELVES JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT JARING.7
The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving
spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum
of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper
remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten
months before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on
October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21
which deals with dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the
defendant during the pendency of the case and the subsequent procedure
to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the proceeding for
the settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, §20 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to
continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the
Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. The
issue to be resolved is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file
this case against petitioner.
Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed
the sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated
rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is
one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art.
161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for ¾
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.8
When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved9 and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the
settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, §2 which
states:
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. ¾ When the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall
be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either.
As held in Calma v. Tañedo,10 after the death of either of the spouses, no
complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim
must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the
conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse,
the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed
to the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the
settlement of estate proceedings.11 Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even
a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property
belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal
partnership property is void.12
The ruling in Calma v. Tañedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of Ventura
v. Militante.13 In that case, the surviving wife was sued in an amended
complaint for a sum of money based on an obligation allegedly contracted
by her and her late husband. The defendant, who had earlier moved to
dismiss the case, opposed the admission of the amended complaint on the
ground that the death of her husband terminated their conjugal partnership
and that the plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable against the partnership,
should be made in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. The trial
court nevertheless admitted the complaint and ruled, as the Court of
Appeals did in this case, that since the defendant was also a party to the
obligation, the death of her husband did not preclude the plaintiff from filing
an ordinary collection suit against her. On appeal, the Court reversed,
holding that ¾
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon
the death of either spouse. . . . Where a complaint is brought against the
surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against
said conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained thereby is void. The
proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the
spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not
mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And private
respondent cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the
Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of administration in
his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased . . . if after thirty (30)
days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for administration or request
that administration be granted to some other person.14
The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling,
namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy15 and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David,16 are based
on different sets of facts. In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos Siy Uy and
Manuel Co, were sued for damages for malicious prosecution. Thus, apart
from the fact the claim was not against any conjugal partnership, it was one
which does not survive the death of defendant Uy, which merely resulted in
the dismissal of the case as to him but not as to the remaining defendant
Manuel Co.
With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and severally
executed an indemnity agreement which became the basis of a collection
suit filed against the wife after her husband had died. For this reason, the
Court ruled that since the spouses' liability was solidary, the surviving
spouse could be independently sued in an ordinary action for the
enforcement of the entire obligation.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is
chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which
is primarily bound for its repayment.17 Thus, when the spouses are sued for
the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being
impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership
and not as independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary
liability, as between them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary
to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be
discussed later, is not solidary but rather merely joint, making Imperial still
inapplicable to this case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the
present suit against petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against
1âw phi 1
the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of petitioner's
husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either for
the issuance of letters of administration18 or for the allowance of
will,19 depending on whether petitioner's husband died intestate or testate.
Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim
against the Alipios with those against the Manuels considering that, aside
from petitioner's lack of authority to represent their conjugal estate, the
inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before any claim
chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively
pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's
estate and not to any other court.
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay
private respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount of
₱50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them
jointly or solidarily. In connection with this, Art. 1207 of the Civil Code
provides:
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one
and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a
right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire
compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so estates, or when the law or the nature of the
obligation requires solidarity.
Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the
contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the
debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt
being considered distinct from one another.20
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that
when there are two or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the latter's
obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be sure, should the lessees or
sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the
lease period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can be held
jointly and severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of
their solidary liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that
they have become joint tortfeasors.21 In the case at bar, there is no allegation
that the sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the
term of the sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance sought to be collected by
private respondent in his collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long
before the sublease expired on September 12, 1990.
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when there
are more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. On the
other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract involved in this case reads:22
2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period
of three (3) years and two (2) months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (₱485,600.00) PESOS, including all the
improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon as
well all fishing equipment, paraphernalia and accessories. The said amount
shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the following manner,
to wit:
A. Three hundred thousand (₱300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract;
and
B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (₱185,6000.00) Pesos
to be paid on June 30, 1989.
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of
the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective
conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00 should be divided
into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and
Remedios Manuel are ordered to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00, the
attorney's fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The
complaint against petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a
claim by private respondent in the proceedings for the settlement of estate
of Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the Alipio spouses in the
unpaid balance of the rent in the amount of ₱25,300.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 144915 February 23, 2004
CAROLINA CAMAYA, FERDINAND CAMAYA, EDGARDO CAMAYA and
ANSELMO MANGULABNAN, petitioners
vs. BERNARDO PATULANDONG, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals
Decision dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757, "In re: Petition for
the Probate of the Codicil (Will) of Rufina Reyes; Bernardo Patulandong v.
Anselmo Mangulabnan v. Carolina G. Camaya, Ferdinand Camaya and
Edgardo Camaya."
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will
wherein she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson
Anselmo Mangulabnan (Mangulabnan). The pertinent portion of her will
reads:
IKALIMA. - Aking inihahayag at ginagawa na tagapagmana, sa aking
kusang loob, ang pinalaki kong APO na si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN,
may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Flora Umagap, at naninirahan sa San
Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, at anak ng aking anak na si SIMPLICIA, at sa
aking APO na si ANSELMO ay aking ipinagkakaloob at ipinamamana,
sa aking pagkamatay, ang mga sumusunod kong pagaari:
LOT NO. TITLE NO. KINALALAGYAN NABANGGIT SA
288-A NT-47089 Sta. Cruz (1) p. 2
3348-A 100629 Poblacion (2) p. 2
3349-B 100630 Poblacion (3) p. 2
xxx1 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)
The testatrix’s son Bernardo Patulandong (Patulandong), respondent herein,
was in the will appointed as the executor.
During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of her
will before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija where it was
docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 128.
By Order2 of January 11, 1973, the CFI admitted the will to probate.
On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying above-quoted
paragraph five of her will in this wise:
UNA. - Ang Lote No. 288-A na nakalagay sa barrio ng Sta. Cruz, Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, magsukat 36,384 metro cuadrados, at nagtataglay ng TCT No.
NT-47089, na aking ipinamana sa aking apong si ANSELMO
P. MANGULABNAN, sangayon sa Pangkat IKA-LIMA, pp. 5-6, ng aking
HULING HABILIN (Testamento), ay ipinasiya kong ipagkaloob at ipamana
sa aking mga anak na sina BERNARDO, SIMPLICIA, GUILLERMA at JUAN
nagaapellidong PATULANDONG, at sa aking apong si ANSELMO P.
MANGULABNAN, sa magkakaparehong bahagi na tig-ikalimang bahagi
bawat isa sa kanila.
IKALAWA. - Na maliban sa pagbabagong ito, ang lahat ng mga tadhana ng
aking HULING HABILIN ay aking pinagtitibay na muli.
x x x3 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied) On May 14, 1988,
the testatrix died.
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of
the title to Lot 288-A. Patulandong refused to heed the request, however, in
view of the codicil which modified the testator’s will.
Mangulabnan thus filed an "action for partition" against Patulandong with the
Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 552
(the partition case).
On June 8, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in the partition
case,4 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court orders the partitioning of the properties and the
defendant to deliver the copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-
47089.
However, in view of the case cited by the plaintiff himself, the court holds
that the partition is without prejudice [to]... the probate of the codicil in
accordance with the Rules of Court, [P]alacios vs. Catimbang Palacios cited
by the plaintiff:
"After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not
necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death.
Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable of his petition and if
he should die before he had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary
probate proceedings after the testator’s death would be in order."
The Court also orders that the right of the tenants of the agricultural land in
question should be protected meaning to say that the tenants should not be
ejected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On July 17, 1989 Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva
Ecija a petition5 for probate of the codicil of the testatrix, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 218.
On December 28, 1989, the probate court issued an Order6 setting the
petition for hearing and ordering the publication of said order.
On February 7, 1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition case,
Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot No.
288-A and TCT No. NT-2157507 was issued in his name.
Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot No. 288-A by a
Deed of Sale dated February 19, 1991.8 TCT No. NT-215750 was thus
cancelled and TCT No. NT-2164469 was issued in the name of the
Camayas.
On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision10 in Sp. Proc. No. 218
admitting the codicil to probate and disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
the following manner:
1. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan
dated February 7, 1991 and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in
favor of the intervenors Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo, all surnamed
Camaya on February 19, 1991 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-
216446 under date March 18, 1991 issued in the names of the above-
named intervenors as NULL and VOID and of no force and effect; and,
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of
Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and reissue the
corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Filipino,
married to Gorgonia Mariano residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
Juan R. Patulandong, Filipino, widower and residing at San Lorenzo,
Gapan, Nueva Ecija; Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan of legal age,
Filipino, widow and residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Simplicia
R. Patulandong Mangulabnan, of legal age, widow, and residing at San
Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija and her grandson, Anselmo Mangulabnan
with full personal circumstances stated herein to the extent of one fifth (1/5)
each pursuant to the approved codicil (will) of Rufina Reyes dated June 27,
1973.11
The Camayas who had been allowed to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. 218, and
Mangulabnan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-said decision
but it was denied by Order12 of February 28,1996.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Camayas and Mangulabnan
(hereinafter referred to as petitioners) raised the following errors:
1. THERE WERE SERIOUS SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURES FROM THE
FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY THE RULES, THE LAW, AND THE
AUTHORITY OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SETTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
2. THE OPPOSITOR DID NOT ONLY ACQUIRE LOT NO. 288-A BY WILL
BUT HE ALSO ACQUIRED THE SAME BY PARTITION IN A CIVIL CASE
WHERE THE DECISION HAS ALREADY REACHED ITS FINALITY AND
THEREFORE CAN NO LONGER BE NEGATED BY A QUESTIONABLE
CODICIL.
3. THAT THE SUBJECT LOT 288-A IS NO LONGER WITHIN THE
REACHED (sic) OF THE PETITIONER CONSIDERING THAT THE
OPPOSITOR VENDOR HAD A CLEAN TITLE AND THAT THE
INTERVENORS-VENDEED HAD ACQUIRED THE SAME BY WAY OF
SALE AS INNOCENT PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.13
By Decision14 of June 19, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial
court.
Hence, the present petition for Review on Certiorari proffering the following
issues:
1. Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null
and void and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and the
deed of sale; and
2. Whether the final judgment in Civil Case No. 552 bars the allowance of
the codicil.
As to the first issue, petitioners contend that the under the law, the probate
court has no power, authority, and jurisdiction to declare null and void the
sale and titles of petitioners;15 and that the probate court can only resolve
the following issues:
1. Whether or not the instrument which is offered for probate is the last will
and testament of the decedent; in other words, the question is one of
identity[;]
2. Whether or not the will has been executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law; in other words, the question is one of due
execution[; and]
3. Whether the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of the will; in other words, the question is one of
capacity.16
In Cuizon v. Ramolete, 17 this Court elucidated on the limited jurisdiction of a
probate court, to wit:
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or
list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.
xxx
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent
court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the
estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession
and ownership of the property. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further
declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having
had the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
Moreover, following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree which reads:
SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law,
petitioners’ titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null and
void.
As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to
probate, it in effect amended the final judgment in the partition case which is
not allowed by law;18 and that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers
for value and enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful.19
Petitioners’ first argument does not persuade.
Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory
as it was not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that
the decision was "without prejudice [to] ... the
probate of the codicil." The rights of the prevailing parties in said case
were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil.
The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of
petitioners’ titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the merits of
petitioners Camayas’ claim that they are innocent purchasers for value and
enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 53757 affirming the January 16, 1996 Decision of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 35, of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
The decision allowing the codicil is AFFIRMED, but the 1) declaration as null
and void of Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued on February
7, 1991 by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo
Mangulabnan, the February 19, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
him in favor of the intervenors - herein petitioners Carolina, Ferdinand and
Edgardo Camaya, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-216446 issued on
March 18, 1991 in favor of the petitioners Camayas, and 2) the order for the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title
Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and reissue the corresponding Certificate
of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Juan R. Patulandong, Guillerma R.
Patulandong Linsangan, Simplicia R. Patulandong Mangulabnan, and
Anselmo Mangulabnan to the extent of one-fifth (1/5) each pursuant to the
approved codicil are SET ASIDE, without prejudice to respondent and his
co-heirs’ ventilation of their right in an appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005
EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR
AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-
PACIOLES, Petitioners,
vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the
people he leaves behind. For in death, a person’s estate remains, providing
a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is
another case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of
the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their
loved one.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr.,
herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent,
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and
Resolution2 dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The
Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioner’s motion for
partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles;
and his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an
estimated value of ₱10.5 million, stock investments worth ₱518,783.00,
bank deposits amounting to ₱6.54 million, and interests in certain
businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their
two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of
administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the
estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an
opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of
administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to
exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate
is composed of "paraphernal properties." Respondent prayed that the
letters of administration be issued to her instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed
a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.6
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the
latter has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a
compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the
preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law.7
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition
that both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they
decided to, in the capacity of business partners."8
In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her
son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner
and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate.10 Both were
issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the
requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila
Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were
filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of
Miguelita’s estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor
children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus
motion13 praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing
the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate
among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.
Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and
distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that
there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the
inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint
venture."14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s
estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be
scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the
estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition
and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The
intestate court ratiocinated as follows:
"On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the
declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be
premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her
opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the
properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are
entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a
co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their
partnership venture.’"
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the
Resolution dated May 7, 1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate court’s Order dated
January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied
petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being
premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s
claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in
issuing the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:
"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondent’s unsupported claim of
ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate
court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in
probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved
for these are matters which can be passed upon in the course of the
proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a
hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondent’s claim, is being
extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is
not tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion."
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments
of error:
"I. RESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE
INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING
CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE
LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED
EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II. RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING
THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID
FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE
INTESTATE COURT.
III. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT RESPONDENT CHING’S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE
CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an
intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving
properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate
or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of
the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to
the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises
special and limited jurisdiction.16
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a
probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its
purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and
provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title."
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s
claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key
consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing
and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether
or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this
case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and
Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the
inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:
"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his
Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on
November 4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12
of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low
valuation placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right to
submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each."
Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the
exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered
to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory,
taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate
properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the
settlement of Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his own inventory. His
mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his
appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or
knowledge."19 He could have submitted an inventory, excluding
therefrom those properties which respondent considered to be hers.
The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he
acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.
Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate
court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the
inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate
court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties
comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The intestate court went along
with respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution20 dated May 7,
1996, thus:
"On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late
Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a
claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs
could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for appropriate
proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositor’s claim. It must be
mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties,
which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for
convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest in the
estate and hence, should be given her day in Court."
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing
set by the intestate court was actually to "determine the propriety of
oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is
true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelita’s)
properties," then it means that she has a "material and direct interest in
the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The
intended "day in court" or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety
of respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of
Miguelita’s estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure
a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against
Miguelita’s estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to
determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of
the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its
jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off
stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and
reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to
ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of
any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course
of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has
no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a
regional trial court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or
list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so."22
Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of
general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the
resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly
belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a
provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still
respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of
Miguelita’s estate, as stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real estates
covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of
Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the
owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court’s pronouncement
in Bolisay vs. Alcid23 relevant, thus:
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to
support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a
Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the
law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a
mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. x x x
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a
property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence
of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should
be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title
is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly,
when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title. x x x"
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration
Decree," proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:
"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law."
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to
present convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We
quote her testimony, thus:
"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this
sworn statement of yours which I quote:" In accordance with the Chinese
tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we
decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to
our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take
full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame
witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that
right?
A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita
and the other half was given to Emmanuel.
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ½, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember
any more the amount.
xxxxxx
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one
half share of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among
you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of your late
husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen…
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po."24 Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over them and upon her
death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner
She further testified as follows: herein and their two minor children.28

"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land,
stocks, investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and
abroad, interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical
Supplies, Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam
Witness, how should these properties be partitioned or what should be
done with these properties? According to you earlier, you are
agreeable for the partition of the said properties with Emil on a 50-50
basis, is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land
located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San
Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po
ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish
or deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or
considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of
properties alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.29
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby
REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.

A: Kung ano ang sa akin…

xxxxxx

Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong

iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?

A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir."25

Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties

listed in petitioner’s inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any
document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis
of her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the
bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of paraphernal properties.26 Sensing
that such assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted
to change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were
"business partners" and that she gave to the latter most of her properties to
be used in a joint business venture.27 Respondent must have realized early
on that if the properties listed in petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then
G.R. No. 167405 February 16, 2006
ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner,
vs. HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the Resolution
dated May 14, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration. In the assailed
judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the September 18,
2002 and November 12, 2002 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204 but refrained from
dismissing the petition for letters of administration and settlement of estate
on the ground that petitioner must first prove that she was legally adopted by
the decedent, Elena Lising.
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the
late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed
as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she
was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named
as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda
Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and
respondents Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the
municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of
jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana
Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she
be appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of a bond, pending
settlement and distribution of Lising’s properties to the legal heirs.1
On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition2 to the petition,
claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband,
Serafin Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She asserted that
the petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an
administrator was unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising who
passed away without leaving any debts. She further asserted that Chichioco
is unfit to serve as administrator of Lising’s estate because of her
"antagonistic interests" against the decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-
heirs have questioned the decedent’s title to a piece of real property which
forms a large part of the estate.
On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the
Opposition3 attaching thereto the Certification4 issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the
Register of Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin
Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by
Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3,
promulgated on December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the Office of
the Civil Registrar on January 29, 1969.
Petitioner also submitted a Certification5 issued by the Clerk of Court of the
RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No.
1410 on December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioner’s adoption by Elena Lising
and Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No.
436 indicating that the adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of
the RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption decree
was recorded as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case for
adoption and therefore grants the same. Consequently, the Court declares
that henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all legal
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural
parents Orlando Zalzos and May C. Castro, and is to all legal intents and
purposes the child of the petitioners Serafin delos Santos and Elena Lising.7
Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution8 issued by the
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the death of
Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits were paid to his widow, Elena Lising,
and his "daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.
On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary
evidence to prove the jurisdictional facts of the case and to comment on
petitioner’s opposition.9 Only Rosario L. Zalsos appears to have filed a
Comment/Reply to Oppositor’s Opposition,10 after which the RTC ordered
the parties to submit memoranda thereon.11 On July 22, 1999, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.12
Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the adoption decree
docketed as SP No. 53457.13 They claimed that no proceedings for the
adoption of petitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of
Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the
adoption case. Petitioner’s natural mother supposedly connived with the
court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adopted by the Delos
Santos spouses and that the CFI’s order for initial hearing was published in
a weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders in
special proceedings.
Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the
suspension of hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP
No. 53457.14 Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed15 SP
No. 53457 for failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule
47 of the Rules of Court.16 The said dismissal became final and executory
on March 8, 2000.17
Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC
praying that the opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally resolved and
that the petition be dismissed.18 This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte
Motion19 filed by petitioner on October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate
resolution of her opposition.
On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment20 to the opposition
stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioner’s claim that she
was legally adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud." Respondents
also informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal complaint against
petitioner before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for
alleged falsification of the adoption decree and Judicial Form No. 43,
docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016.
Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution21 dated December 12, 2000
deferring resolution of petitioner’s opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204,
pending the outcome of the criminal case filed against the latter. In the
meantime, the parties were enjoined from dissipating or disposing any or all
of the properties included in the estate of Elena Lising without order from
this Court.
On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special
Administrator22 before the RTC on the ground that there was yet no true
determination and appraisal of the decedent’s universal estate. It was
prayed therein that the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be
appointed special administrator as he was "an experienced and able person
in the management of properties" and is "honest, impartial, competent and
acceptable to the majority of the interested parties."
In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge
petitioner with falsification of public documents per resolution dated January
5, 2001.23 Petitioner thus appealed the said finding to the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor.
On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents’ motion for the
appointment of a special administrator and appointed its branch clerk of
court, Atty. Saguyod.24 Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds
that the branch clerk of court was disqualified from taking on the task of
special administrator, and that Atty. Saguyod was appointed without being
required to file a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the petition should be
dismissed because she is the sole heir of the decedent.25 However, the RTC
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on November 5, 2001.26
On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed
the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal
complaint against petitioner.27 Undaunted, Chichioco filed a petition for
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion
before the RTC to enjoin petitioner from conducting business in a property
belonging to the estate. Respondent Chichioco alleged that petitioner
converted the basement of Lising’s residence into a billiard hall without
authority of the special administrator.28
Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002,
the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from
conducting business activity in any of the properties left by the decedent.
The Special Administrator is also empowered to take control and possession
of the listed personal and real properties of the decedent and those that may
be found to be owned or registered in the name of the same.
SO ORDERED.29
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which
was denied by the RTC on November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also
issued a resolution dismissing respondent Chichioco’s petition for review in
the criminal case.30
Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047,31 assailing the
September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 resolutions of the RTC.
Petitioner alleged that said resolutions were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction since as sole heir,
she had the right to possess and use the decedent’s property, title over
which automatically passed on to her upon the latter’s death. Moreover, the
special administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a bond and submit an
inventory of the decedent’s estate.
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be
dismissed since the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457
constituted res judicata as to the former. There was likewise no valid
challenge to her adoption and she consequently remains to be the sole heir
of the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there was no need for the
appointment of an administrator or for the settlement proceedings.
In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment32 nullifying the
resolutions of the trial court. It held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M.
Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court
as special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez,33 the appellate court
reasoned that such act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and
his clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedent’s estate. Moreover, Atty.
Saguyod failed to comply with the requirements of a bond and inventory and
could not therefore take control and possession of any of the decedent’s
properties.
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since
the dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did not
operate as res judicata to the former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner
to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos
Santos spouses since, according to the appellate court, "imputations of
irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a
cloud of doubt."
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15,
2005,34 hence this petition on the following assigned errors:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO
IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE
39.35
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE
MERITS.36
The petition is meritorious.
On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove
her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already
presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification
from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered
therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by
the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the
RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications were issued under the seal of the
issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are thus
presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the official duties that
said public officers perform.37
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public
document38 required by law to be entered into the public records, the official
repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting
the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the court
which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.39 As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the
clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s adoption which are entered in
the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of
petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or
overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not
cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its
contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be
presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of
nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate, as categorically held in
Santos v. Aranzanso.40 Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these
proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s
claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical
pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is
void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated
therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioner’s status
as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no serious
challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as
long as petitioner’s adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot claim
any interest in the decedent’s estate. For this reason, we agree with
petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.
As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like
them x x x, claim an interest in the estate x x x as alleged first cousins,
cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact
that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first
cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as
long as the adoption must be - as in the instant case - considered valid.
(Emphasis added)
Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily
exclude respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere
collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue
would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant
case. After all, the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical
consequence of our pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of
petitioner’s adoption.
Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the
resolution of the petitioner’s opposition, which is actually a motion to dismiss
the petition for letters of administration and settlement of the estate, is a
matter of record in the instant case. The same has in fact been submitted for
resolution before the RTC more than six years ago and is so far the only
pending incident before the RTC. The parties have likewise amply ventilated
their positions on the matter through their respective pleadings filed before
the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be served if we let the RTC
resolve the matter, only for its ruling to be elevated again to the Court of
Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The remand of the case to the
lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the
Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the evidence before
it.42 This is in keeping with the avowed purpose of the rules of procedure
which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding.43 Hence, since the grounds for
the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant in the records and there is
no cogent reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204
should be dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioner’s
second assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No.
204 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44602 November 28, 1938
MARIA CALMA, as administratrix of the testamentary proceedings of
Fausta Macasaquit, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. ESPERANZA TAÑEDO, assisted by her husband Felipe Mamaual,
and BARTOLOME QUIZON, Deputy Sheriff of Tarlac, defendants-
appellees.
AVANCENA, C.J.:
The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the
property described in the complaint, being their conjugal property. They
were also indebted to Esperanza Tañedo, chargeable against the conjugal
property, in the sums of P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10 per
cent per annum. On October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a
will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of
her properties. Upon the commencement of the corresponding probate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, the said daughter, Maria
Calma, was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the
deceased.
While these probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were
pending, Esperanza Tanedo, on January 27, 1934, filed a complaint against
Eulalio Calma for the recovery of the sums of P948.34 and P247. The Court
of First Instance of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of this sum. In
the execution of this judgment, despite the third party claim filed by Fausta
Macasaquit, the property described in the complaint was sold by the sheriff.
Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, now
brings this action and asks that the sale made by the sheriff of the property
described in the complaint be annulled and that the estate of Fausta
Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute owner thereof.
lawphi1.net
The court absolved the defendants from this complaint.
The probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were
instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176 reading:
SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the
provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and
partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally
capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of
proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property.
In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in
order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale
shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by this
Code for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer,
alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities
shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the
vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made.
Prior to this Act, the liquidation of conjugal property was made under section
685 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Interpreting the scope of Act No. 3176,
this court, in the case of Caragay vs. Urquiza (53 Phil., 72), said that the
amendment introduced by this Act consists in authorizing the institution of
testate or intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased spouse or of an ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of
the property of a conjugal partnership. It should be understood that these
remedies are alternative, and not cumulative, in he sense that they cannot
be availed of at he same time, inasmuch as an anomalous and chaotic
situation would result if conjugal property were administered, liquidated and
distributed at the same time in a testamentary proceeding and in an ordinary
action for liquidation and partition of property. Consequently, the
testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit having been instituted, the
liquidation and partition of the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to
Eulalio Calma should be made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any
other proceeding for the same purpose.
Interpreting this same Act No. 3176 in another decision, this court, in the
case of Cruz vs. De Jesus (52 Phil., 870) said that when the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the wife, the legal power of management of the
husband ceases, passing to the administrator appointed by the court in the
testate or intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there be any debts to
be paid. This doctrine has been confirmed in the other case of Ona vs. De testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the
Gala (58 Phil., 881). purposes of that case.

From the foregoing it follows that when Esperanza Tanedo brought suit The appealed judgment is reversed, without special pronouncement as to
against Eulalio Calma for the payment of the sums of P948.34 and P247, the costs. So ordered. Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and
which wee debts chargeable against the conjugal property, the power of Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Eulalio Calma. legal administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta
Macasaquit was living, had ceased and passed to the administratrix Maria
Calma appointed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit.
Hence, this being an indebtedness chargeable against conjugal property, no G.R. No. L-2263 May 30, 1951
complaint for its payment can be brought against Eulalio Calma, who had
already ceased as administrator of the conjugal property; the claim for this
PAZ Y. OCAMPO, JOSEFA Y. OCAMPO, ISIDRO Y. OCAMPO, GIL Y.
amount had to be filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta
OCAMPO, MAURO Y. OCAMPO, and VICENTE Y. OCAMPO, plaintiffs-
Macasaquit.
appellees,
vs.
Having to be filed according to Act No. 3176 under the provisions of the CONRADO POTENCIANO, VICTOR POTENCIANO and LOURDES
Code of Civil Procedure relative to the administration and liquidation of POTENCIANO, defendants.
properties of deceased persons, it should be filed before the committee on VICTOR POTENCIANO and LOURDES POTENCIANO, defendants-
claims in said testamentary proceedings and, at all events, thereafter, by appellants.
appeal to the corresponding Court of First Instance, in an ordinary action
against the judicial administratrix.
REYES, J.:
On the other hand, he property described in the complaint is included
This is an appeal by certiorari form a decision of the Court of Appeals.
among the inventoried properties subject to the testamentary proceedings of
Fausta Macasaquit because, belonging as it does to the conjugal property, it
should, under Act No. 3176, be included among the properties of the From the findings of fact of said court, which are conclusive for the purposes
testamentary proceedings. of this appeal, it appears that on February 3, 1930, Edilberto Ocampo,
married to Paz Yatco, executed a deed purporting to convey to his relative,
Conrado Potenciano, and the latter's wife, Rufina Reyes, by way of sale
We conclude that, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the
with pacto de retro for the sum of P2,5000, a town a lot with a house as
conjugal property had with his wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be
strong materials standing thereon. On that same day, Ocampo signed
brought against him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against
another document, making it appear that, for an annual rental of P300,
said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in the
which, as may be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price,
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the
the vendees were leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the
manner provided by law, by filing it first with the committee on claims.
redemption period.
Wherefore, we hold that the sale of the property described in the complaint,
The property involved in the above transaction is located at the center of the
made by the sheriff in execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio
poblacion of Biñan, Laguna, and in the opinion of the Court of Appeals,
Calma for the collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
worth between 20 and 25 pesos. Though registered in the name of Ocampo
property, is void and said property should be deemed subject to the
alone, it in reality belonged to him and his wife as conjugal property.
The period originally fixed for the repurchase was one year, "extendible to
another year," but several extensions were granted, with the vendor paying
part of the principal in addition to interests. The last extension granted was
for year from February 3, 1937, and the period having elapsed without the
repurchase having been made, Potenciano, on January 24, 1939, filed with
the register of deeds of Laguna an affidavit for the consolidation of title, on
the strength which the register of deeds issued transfer certificate of title no.
18056 in the name of Potenciano and his wife. This, however, did not close
the avenue for settlement, for on February 28, 1939, with Edilberto Ocampo
and Rufina Reyes already dead, Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to
repurchase the property for P2,500 within 5 years, and a lease thereon for
the same period of time at annual rental of P300 which, as may again be
noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price. On or about
February 7, 1944, Paz Yatco sought to exercise the option by tendering to
Potenciano at his clinic in Manila the sum of P4,000 an amount sufficient to
cover both principal and interest, and upon the tender being rejected,
deposited the money in court and brought an action in her own name and as
judicial administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband to compel
Potenciano to accept it and to have the title to the property reinstated in her
name and that of her husband.
Intervening in the case, Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, filed a
cross-complaint, alleging that the option to purchase granted by their father
to plaintiff on February 28, 1939, was null and void as to the share of their
deceased mother Rufina Reyes in the property in litigation, which share
passed to them by right of inheritance, and that as to their father's share in
the same property they, the intervenors, were exercising the right of
redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property held in common, for
which purpose they had already tendered him the sum of P1,250 on the fifth
day after they learned of said option through plaintiff's complaint. To meet
these allegations, plaintiff amended her complaint by including the
intervenors as defendants and alleging, in effect, that the pacto de retro sale
in question was in reality a mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt, with the
rental contract thrown in to cover the stipulated interest of 12 per cent; that
the option agreement for the repurchase of the property within five years
from February 28, 1939, and for the payment of rental for that period in an
amount equal to an annual interest of 12 per cent on the loan, was also
meant to be in reality an extension of the life of the mortgage; and that the
tender of payment was valid, the same having been made within the
extended period. The Court of First Instance, after trial, upheld these
allegations and gave judgment in favor of the children of Edilberto Ocampo
and Paz Yatco, who had substituted the latter after her death.
When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, that court took a
somewhat different view and rendered judgment declaring:
(a) That contract Exhibit A entered into between Edilberto Ocampo and
Conrado Potenciano was one of mortgage, with interest at the rate of 12 per
cent per annum;
(b) That the "option to purchase" and the "contract of lease" (Exhibit E and
E-1) were validly executed by defendant Conrado Potenciano and binding
upon the property in litigation;
(c) That appellants were not co-owners of said property, by inheritance of
one-half of the same from their deceased mother Rufina Reyes;
(d) That appellants were not entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption
(retracto legal) of the other half of the property belonging to their father
Conrado Potenciano;
(e) That the late Paz Yatco exercised her option to purchase the property in
litigation within the time she had to do so;
(f) That the consignation of the P4,000 in Japanese military notes, made
with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in payment of the
property in question, was in accordance with the law and relieved the heirs
of the spouses Ocampo-Yatco from paying anew said purchase price;
(g) Ordering defendant Conrado Potenciano to execute the corresponding
deed of conveyance, sufficient in law to transfer the title of the property in
litigation to the heirs of the deceased spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz
Yatco; and
(h) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of
title No. 18056 (Exhibit 1) and issue in lieu thereof a new transfer certificate
of title for said property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto
Ocampo and Paz Yatco, upon payment by appellees of the corresponding
fees and the registration in his office of the deed of conveyance mentioned
in the next preceding paragraph.
This judgment that is now before us for review.
First thing to be noted is that the Court of Appeals found and it is not
disputed that the pacto de retro sale made by Edilberto Ocampo in favor of
Conrado Potenciano and his wife was in reality a loan with security or an
equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for interest. Such being the case,
the lenders had no right, through the unilateral declaration of one or both
them, to consolidate title in themselves over the property given as security.
The consolidation of title effected by Potenciano in this case was, therefore,
null and void.
loan with security was still in effect, and as the tender was made in legal
currency (Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corporation,* 45 O.G. [Supp. 9] 229),
the tender and consignation must be held to produce their legal effect, which
is that of relieving the debtor from liability. (Art. 1176, Civil Code;
Limkako vs. Teodoro, 74 Phil., 313.)
Under this view of the case, it is not necessary to consider the claim of the
appellants Victor Potenciano and Lourdes Potenciano and that the Court of
Appeals erred in not declaring them owners of the property in question, they
having inherited one-half of it from their mother and acquired the other half
from their father in the exercise of their right of legal redemption as co-
owners. As ownership in the property never passed to their parents, these
appellants acquired nothing.

The Court of Appeals, however, held that the mortgage contract was Wherefore, with the modifications of the judgment below, let judgment be
superseded, through novation, by the option agreement for the repurchase entered, declaring the obligation evidenced by Exhibit "A", which is hereby
of the property mortgaged, and the appellants now contend that this war held to be mere contract of loan with security or equitable mortgage, already
error because Potenciano had no authority to enter into that agreement after discharged, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer
the death of his wife. To this contention we have to agree. The Court of certificate of title No. 18056 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of
Appeals erred in supposing that the surviving spouse had such authority title for said property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo
as de facto administrator of the conjugal estate. As pointed out by and Paz Yatco upon payment of the corresponding fees. With costs against
appellants, the decisions relied on by that court in support of its view are the appellants.
now obsolete. Those decisions laid down the rule that, upon the dissolution
of the marriage by the death of the wife, the husband must liquidate the
partnership affairs. But the procedure has been changed by Act No. 3176
(approved on November 24, 1924), now section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of
Court, which provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of
either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 324).

Furthermore, there is ground to believe that, as alleged by the appellees, the

option agreement in question was nothing more than mere extension of time
for the payment of the mortgagee debt, since in the mind of the parties the
real transaction had between them was that of loan with security, or
equitable mortgage, though as is usual in these cases, it was given the form
of sale with right to repurchase.

It follows from the foregoing that at the time Paz Yatco made the tender of
payment and consigned the necessary amount in court, the said contract of