Military Organization in Aquitaine Under The Early Carolingians PDF

Military Organization in Aquitaine under the Early Carolingians
Author(s): Bernard S. Bachrach

Source: Speculum, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Jan., 1974), pp. 1-33
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Medieval Academy of
America
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A JOURNAL OF MEDIEVAL STUDIES
Vol. XLIX JANUARY 1974 No. 1
MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN AQUITAINE

UNDER THE EARLY CAROLINGIANS
BY BERNARD S. BACHRACH
IT is difficult to overemphasize the role played by military force in the expansion

of Carolingian domination over the lands of the erstwhile Merovingian realms
and in the creation of Charlemagne's empire. Therefore, it is hardly surprising
that a large number of scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to Caro-
lingian military institutions.' Primary importance has been given to Charles
Martel, who is said to have changed the Frankish army from a host of axe-
throwing infantry into a force of heavily armed cavalry. Whereas the infantry
of Merovingian times is generally considered to have served because of some
primal Teutonic duty demanding that all free men perform military service,
Charles is credited with granting benefices to his newly created cavalry and thus
1 A. Prenzel, Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Kriegsverfassung unter den Karolingern (Leipzig, 1889);
Gustav Roloff, "Die Umwandlung des friinkischen Heers von Chlodowig bis Karl den Grossen," Neue
Jahrbiicher fur das klassische Altertum, ix (1902), 389-399; Karl Rubell, "Frankisches und spaitro-
misches Kriegswesen," Bonner Jahrbuicher, cxiv (1906), 136-142; II. Delbruck, Geschichte der IKriegs-
kunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, iII (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1907); W. Erben, "Zur Geschichte des
karolingischen Kriegswesens," Historische Zeitschrift, ci (1908), 321-326; IHelen Cam, Local Govern-
ment in Francia and England (London, 1912); H. Fehr, "Das Waffenrecht der Bauern im Mittelalter,"
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte, Germ. Abt., xxxv (1914), 111-211; H. von
Mangoldt-Gaudlitz, Die Reiterei in den germanischen und frankischen HIeeren bis zum Ausgang der
deutschen Karolinger (Berlin, 1922); Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages,
I (2nd ed.; London, 1924); E. von Frauenholz, Das Heerwesen der germanischen Friiltzeit, des Franken-
reiches und des ritterlichen Zeitalters, i (Munich, 1935); H. Conrad, Geschichte der deutschen Wehrver-
fassung, i (Munich, 1939); F. Lot, L'Art militaire et les armges au moyen age en Europe et dans le
Proche-Orient, i (Paris, 1946); F. L. Ganshof, "A propos de la cavalerie dans les armees de Charle-
magne," Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres: Comptes rendus des seances (1952), ii, 531-B57;
J. F. Verbruggen, "L'Armee et la Strategie de Charlemagne," Karl der Grosse, i, ed. WV. Braunfels
(Dusseldorf, 1965), pp. 420-434; F. L. Ganshof, "Charlemagne's Army," Frankish Institutions under
Charlemagne (Providence, R. I., 1968), pp. 59-68, 151-161, also his "L'Armee sous les Carolingiens,"
Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull'alto medioevo, xv.1 (1968), 109-130 (hereinafter
cited as SSCL); J. Beeler, Warfare in Feudal Europe, 730-1200 (Ithaca, N. Y., 1971), pp. 1-30; and
A. V. B. Norman, The Medieval Soldier (New York, 1971), pp. 28-43.
2 Military Organization in Aquitaine
initiating the large-scale development of what some historians call feudalism.2

Whether Charles Martel did in fact revolutionize the tactics, armament, and
basis of service in the Frankish army is a fiercely debated issue.3 But even if he
accomplished such great changes, he could not have carried out his program in
the many areas of Gaul, Germany, Italy, and Spain which came under Caroling-
ian rule after his death. Because of the diversity of peoples and customs which
flourished in Charlemagne's empire, it is misleading for anyone studying the
Carolingian era to give the impression that there was uniformity in military
organization.4 For example, it is essential to call attention to the fact that, al-
though Charlemagne developed frontier defenses called marches, the burg sys-
tem of defense established on the Saxon frontier differed from the aprisio system
developed on the Catalan frontier.5
G. Tabacco's recent studies of military organization in Carolingian Italy have
revealed that the rank and file of the host were not drawn from free Lombards
who lived in colonies established on lands of the royal fisc, rather the obligation
rested upon all free men with landed wealth.6 This suggests that the indigenous
population in conquered areas played a far more fundamental role than was
generally believed. Yet Donald Bullough has observed correctly that "Tabacco's
arguments and conclusions cannot be applied without qualification to Charles's
transalpine domains." At least, this should not be done without thorough re-
search in particular regions. In short, though much has been written about
Carolingian military institutions, we are a long way from having an accurate
picture of the whole. The place to start, as Tabacco's research has shown, is at
the local or regional level; such studies, unfortunately, have been neglected in
2 This interpretation was first put forward by Heinrich Brunner, "Die Reiterdienst und die Anfinge
des Lehnwesen," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte, Germ. Abt., vii (1887), 1-88,
and it has dominated the literature ever since. See also Carl Stephenson, "The Origin and Significance
of Feudalism," American Historical Review, XLVI (1941), 788-812, and Lynn T. White, Jr., Medieva
Technology and Social Change (Oxford, 1962), pp. 1-38, 135-153.
3 For recent criticism of Brunner's thesis and its defenders, see Donald Bullough, "Europae Pater
Charlemagne and His Achievement in Light of Recent Scholarship," English Historical Review, Lxxv
(1970), 84-90, and Bernard S. Bachrach, "Charles Martel, Mounted Shock Combat, the Stirrup,
and Feudalism," Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, viI (1970), 49-75.
4 Unfortunately, both Verbruggen, "L'Arm6e," pp. 420-434, and Ganshof, "Charlemagne's Army,"
pp. 59-68, leave the impression of great uniformity. Ganshof, however, has frequently warned hi
readers to beware of generalizing too boldly about uniformity in the Carolingian empire, and the im-
pression left in the study cited above is very probably due to its brevity. Beeler, Warfare, pp. 1-30,
subscribes to the traditional generalized picture as does Norman, Medieval Soldier, pp. 28-43.
P p. Grimm, Die Vor- und Friihgeschichtlichen Burgwaille der Bezirke Halle und Magdeburg (Berlin
1958), pp. 32-88, esp. 84 f, and Herbert Jankuhn in Geschichte Schleswig-Holsteins, ed. Olaf Kiose,
iiI: Die Friihgeschichte (Neumtinster, 1958), pp. 78-74, 186-146. On the Spanish March, see A. Lewis
The Development of Southern French and Catalan Society, 718-1050 (Austin, Texas, 1965), pp. 70-71
also see n. 116, below. Cf. Ganshof, "Charlemagne's Army," p. 64.
6 G. Tabacco, I Liberi del Re nell'Italia carolingia e post carolingia (Spoleto, 1966), and Bullough,
"Europae Pater," p. 83. Cf. K. F. Drew, 'The Carolingian Military Frontier in Italy," Traditio, xx
(1964), 437-447. For a critique of Tabacco's study, see P. Toubert, "La libert6 personnelle au haut
Moyen Age et le problEme des arimanni," Le Moyen Age, LxxIIi (1967), 127-144.
Military Organization in Aquitaine 3
the pursuit of feudal beginnings and general syntheses for which the proper
foundations have yet to be laid.7
Among the many diverse regions of the Carolingian empire, Aquitaine, the
area south of the Loire, west of the Rhone, north of the Garonne and of Sep-
timania, is of outstanding importance. It emerged from Merovingian control as
an autonomous region during the later seventh century and its inhabitants
fought bitterly against the Carolingians until they were conquered by King
Peppin I. Aquitaine was the heartland of southern Gaul, and, unlike Septimania
to the south, it was not subject to extensive Gothic or Muslim influence.8 Of all
the regions of Gaul, Aquitaine remained most influenced by Roman institu-
tions.9 In military matters Aquitaine differed from other regions under Frankish
rule. During the Merovingian era the local levies were better organized in
Aquitaine than in any other region of Gaul.'0 The many fortified cities and
castra scattered throughout Aquitaine made necessary siege warfare with its con-
comitant technology and organization on a scale greater than that experienced
in any other area of the Carolingian empire north of the Alps."
Although no one has yet done a thorough study of Aquitanian military or-
ganization under the early Carolingians, scholars have tended to agree that it
was feudalized through the introduction of large numbers of Frankish vassals.
Some historians maintain that Peppin introduced these changes into Aquitaine
during the decade of warfare in which he conquered the region. Other scholars
suggest that Charlemagne reorganized the military in Aquitaine after the dis-
asters of 778.12 Here an effort is made to ascertain in detail the nature of the
military organization in Aquitaine under the early Carolingians and to evaluate
the impact that Peppin and Charlemagne had upon the military organization
which had developed in that region during the Merovingian era and during the
period of autonomy.
THE MEROVINGIAN BACKGROUND
It was common practice among magnates in Merovingian Aquitaine as in
I To the works cited above in nn. 1 and 2, add Peter Munz, Life in the Age of Charlemagne
York, 1969), pp. 58-71, 69-79.
8 The fundamental study is still that of LUonce Auzias, L'Aquitaine Carolingienne (778-987)
(Toulouse and Paris, 1937). Ph. Wolff, "L'Aquitaine et ses Marges," Karl der Grosse, I (DUisseldorf,
1965), 269-306, should be read in conjunction with Auzias's work, although they do not always agree.
Lewis, Development of Southern French and Catalan Society, pts. i and ii, provides much useful informa-
tion but must be used with care.
9 Walthar Kienast, Studien uiber die franzdsischen Volksstamme des Friihmittelalters (Stuttgart,
1968), pp. 42ff., and Wolff, "L'Aquitaine," pp. 305-306. Cf. Auzias, Aquitaine, p. 53.
?0 Bernard S. Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, 481-751 (Minneapolis, 1972), pp.
66-71.
'1 Ibid., pp. 17, 20-21, 37-38, 53, 101, 106. Cf. the explanation suggested by Btillough, "Europae
Pater," pp. 89-90.
n Lewis, Development of Souter French and Catalan Society, pp. 31-32, argues for this policy hav-
ing been initiated by Peppin. Wolff, "L'Aquitaine," pp. 292-293, seems to support the thrust of most
earlier scholars who attribute fundamental changes to Charlemagne. Yet, after reviewing the litera-
ture, he registers a doubt: p. 293, n. 192.
other parts of Gaul to employ personal followings of armed retainers. These men
were used in all kinds of military and paramilitary situations - from harassing
peasants and raiding monasteries to pursuing criminals, and participating in
regular military campaigns. Anyone who desired to rule effectively over a
large area as either a king or a duke found it necessary to purchase the loyalty of
these magnates and their armed followers with valuable "gifts" and even with
landed estates.'3
A second component of the Merovingian military organization in Aquitaine
was the specialized units and garrisons stationed in the many walled cities and
castra. Sometimes the garrisons were made up of the descendants of Roman
soldiers, and in the seventh century they were still called milites. They had a
legal position similar to the Romani and the laeti. These milites served under the
command of a tribunus who also retained his imperial title. Other garrisons were
of a more mixed nature drawn from the Romani and the laeti as well as from
among the Franci. Some of these men were organized as antrustiones who served
in military colonies (centena) which were situated on crown lands in many parts
of Gaul. These antrustiones were sworn followers of the king, but as the royal
fisc passed into the hands of various mayors and other magnates the men who
served on these lands became the supporters of the new lords.14
During the second half of the sixth century, local levies were organized in many
of the civitates of Aquitaine and along its borders. There is firm evidence for the
establishment of levies at Agen, Angers, Angouleme, the Auvergne (Clermont
Ferand), Blois, Bordeaux, Bourges, Nantes, Orleans, PieIrigueux, Poitiers,
Saintes, Toulouse, Tours, and the Velay (le Puy). More local levies were or-
ganized within this southwestern quadrant of Gaul than in the other three-
fourths combined. Local levies established in the less Romanized parts of Gaul
appeared later and did not last as long; it was not until the seventh century, for
example, that local levies were founded in Austrasia where the Frankish popula-
tion was larger than in any other part of Gaul.'5
The count (comes) of the civitas generally led the levy of his district. Occa-
sionally, however, several cities were brought together under the administrative
and military control of a duke (dux). For example, Duke Ennodius was given
control of Tours, Poitiers, Aire, and Lescar in 587. Such duces, who were the
administrative and military leaders of a group of cities, should be differentiated
from the dukes who held the ad hoc command of one or more levies for a single
campaign as did Duke Boso, the leader of the levies of Perigueux, Bordeaux,
Agen, and Toulouse in an invasion of Septimania in 589.16
The levies were used in both offensive and defensive actions. In the latter,
they protected their area from attack and performed police duties. These levies
13Bachrach, "Charles Martel," pp. 66-72, and Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization,
under amici, leudes, pueri, ,sodales, and socii.
14Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, under antrustiones, centena, Franci, garrisons,
laeti, milites, Romani, and tribunus.
16 Ibid., under levies, and esp. pp. 66-68, 109,
16 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
Military Organiation in Aquitaine
campaigned as far as three hundred miles from their home city and remained in
the field for as long as three months. The men who served in these units were
required to supply their own equipment and food for each campaign. The lengthy
periods of service, the frequent calls to arms, and the cost of participation made
it necessary for the men who formed these units to have attained a relatively
high economic status in society. Only men whose lands were worked by slaves or
serfs could afford to spend so much time at war.'7
The followings of the magnates, the special forces, and the local levies were
occasionally joined together in a general host. Sometimes even inferiores and
pauperes were called upon for the general levy or for local defense, but they were
not very effective because they lacked the wherewithal to arm and supply them-
selves adequately.18
INDEPENDENT AQUITAINE
During the later seventh century, the dukes of Aquitaine managed to usurp
royal power and rule independently of the Merovingian rois faineants.19 The
dukes tried, however, to maintain Merovingian military organization wherever
possible. Throughout Aquitaine the civitas continued to be important for military
purposes. The major cities, most of which had been walled and fortified since the
later Roman empire,20 were garrisoned. At Bourges in 760, for example, there
were at least two separate garrison units serving simultaneously. One of these
units was stationed there temporarily, and its members are referred to as ho-
mines.21 We may conclude that these men did not live permanently at Bourges
because their families were not settled in the city or in the general area. The other
garrison force was comprised of Gascons, and, in contrast to the former, they
were established permanently at Bourges; they had their families with them.
One additional piece of information survives which is significant for the light it
sheds on these units. Fredegar's continuator calls the Gascons liberi and notes
that Peppin, after capturing them, required them to swear an oath of faithfulness
to him.22 The homines, which formed the other unit, are not referred to as liberi
17 Ibid., pp. 68-71.

18 Ibid., p. 71.
19 It is unfortunate that Auzias was not able to complete the projected introduction "L'Aquitaine
independante, 670-768" to his L'Aquitaine carolingienne. See pp. 1, 6-8, and the bibliography cited
there. In addition, some useful information on this period is to be found in C. DeVic and J. Vaissette,
Histoire g6nzra1e du Languedoc, ii (Toulouse, 1879), and Lewis, Development of Southern French and
Catalan Society, pp. 3-28.
20 In general, see R. M. Butler, "Late Roman Town Walls in Gaul," The Archaeological Journal,
cxvi (1959), 25-50.
21 Fredegarii Chronicorum Liber Quartue cum Continuationibus, ed. and trans. J. M. Wallace-
Hadrill (London, 1960); hereafter references to Book IV are Fred., and to the continuations, Fred.
cont. Fred. cont., ch. 43: "homines illos quos Waiofarius ad defendendam ipsam civitatem dimiserat
clementiam sue pietatis absolvit dimissisque reversi sunt ad propria. Uniberto comite vel reliquos
Vascones quos ibidem invenit sacramentis datis secum adduxit, uxores eorum hac liberos in Frantia
ambulare praecepit...."
12 The question of oaths and their relation to vassi,fideles, liberi, the unfree, and military
been vigorously debated but remains unresolved. Some of the more important works have
6( Military Organization in Aquitaine
and Peppin did not require an oath from them. During the Merovingian era
several important units that served as garrison troops were drawn from men who
did not enjoy the status of liberi; among these less than free fighting men were
laeti and milites.23
The major cities like Clermont, Bourges, and Toulouse were not the only
fortified places in which garrisons were supported by the independent Aquitanian
dukes. Strongholds of lesser prominence were also garrisoned. A troop of Gascons
was stationed at Thouars in northern Aquitaine. The fort at Bourbon was gar-
risoned by a unit called homines Waiofarii, which may have been organized on
the same basis as that of the unit referred to simply as homines which served as
part of the garrison at Bourges. At Loches, twenty-five miles southeast of Tours,
the garrison was designated simply custodes. It should be noted that during the
Merovingian era this tenn custodes was used frequently to denote garrison troops;
such was the case at the nearby city of Tours.24
In addition to the garrisons stationed in the many cities and strongholds of
Aquitaine the dukes utilized various kinds of levies. The Romani of Orleans who
opposed Peppin's advance into Aquitaine in 761 can probably be identified with
the locally raised levies of that city which flourished during the Merovingian era.
The very use of the term Romani by an eighth-century Frankish chronicler may
suggest his perception of this continuity.25 The force led by Count Chilping of the
Auvergne in 764 is described in terms similar to those used to denote levies in the
Merovingian sources. It is also worth mentioning here that Count Chilping rein-
forced his levy with the Gascon unit which garrisoned the city of Clermont.26
These local levies were sometimes grouped together into larger forces under
the command of the duke of Aquitaine or his representative. In 761 Duke Waiofar
called upon Count Chunibert of Bourges and Count Blandinus of the Auvergne
to join him in an attack on ChUlons. Both the Auvergne and Bourges had estab-
lished local levies as early as the second half of the sixth century. Waiofar rein-
forced these levies with other troops and led his army against Chalons. It should
be made clear, however, that this force very probably did not include Gascons
since Fredegar's continuator is most scrupulous in mentioning them when they
did take part in some kind of military action.27 From the continuator's descrip-
below for the convenience of the reader: P. Petot, "L'hommage servile: Essai sur la nature juridique de
l'hommage," Revue historique de droitfrangais et 6tranger, series 4, vi (19927), 68-107, but see esp. 96-
106; F. Lot, "Le serment de fid6lit6 A l'6poque franque," RBPH, xiv (1935), 405-426; C. E. Odegaard,
"Carolingian Oaths of Fidelity," SPECuLuM, xiv (1941), 984-296; and F. L. Ganshof, "Charlemagne
et le serment," M6langes d'histoire du Moyen Age d&di68s a la mAmoire de Louis Haalphen (Paris, 1951),
pp. 9259-270.
23 On laeti and milites, see Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization pp. 70-73, 78-80 for the
former; pp. 71-73, 78-80, 88-89 for the latter.
24 Fred. cont., chs. 25, 43, 45; Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 50-51 for custodes
at Tours.
2; Fred. Cont., ch. 25.
26 Ibid., ch. 45; Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 66-67.
27 Fred. Cont., ch. 492; and for the sixth-century development of the levies of Bourges and the
Auvergne, see Bachrach, Merovingian Miilitary Organization, pp. 37, 38, 43, 54-55, 57, 60-61, 66-67,
70-71, 76; see the same work, pp. 50, 51, 62, 71, 78, 80, 88, 89, 96, 106, for custodes in general.
tion of Waiofar's force which engaged the Carolingians in 765, it can be seen that
a Gascon levy did not form a regular part of the army of Aquitaine but rather a
special and identifiably separate force. In 765 the duke is said to have led "a
large army," probably a group of reinforced local levies, and also "a large levy
of Gascons." The continuator further notes that these Gascons are the same
people who were once called Basques.28 Such a clearly identifible levy served
under the duke of Aquitaine a half-century earlier when in 719 Duke Eudo led a
hostis Vasconorum against Charles Martel.29
An important place in the military organization of independent Aquitaine was
held by the bands of personal armed retainers which were employed by the
magnates. Perhaps the outstanding example of such a magnate was Remistanius,
Duke Waiofar's uncle. Remistanius held no official position in the government
but he was so rich and powerful and his personal armed following was apparently
so formidable that he used them to attack Carolingian garrisons which had been
established in fortified positions.30 The military usefulness of these armed bands
is also illustrated by an episode involving Count Ammanugus of Poitiers and
Abbot Wulfard of St. Martin's at Tours. The count led his armed followers into
the Touraine and began plundering the region. The abbot, however, also em-
ployed a following of his own. The two forces met and the abbot's homines, kill-
ing Ammanugus and many of his followers, successfully defended the area in a
way similar to that of a local levy or a garrison.3'
The support of these magnates with their armed followers was essential to any
duke or king who wanted to rule over a large area. Throughout the Merovingian
era important men employed bands of armed retainers. Rulers and would-be
rulers purchased the support of these magnates and their followers with all kinds
of wealth, movable and landed, their own and that taken from others. For ex-
ample, Eudo, while Duke of Aquitaine, tried to use church property in the
Bourges area for the purpose of ensuring the loyalty of his followers.32
Waiofar's efforts to weaken Peppin's control in the Narbonnaise in 762 illus-
trates both the usefulness of these bands of armed retainers and the complexity
of Aquitanian military organization. Along with other magnates and their fol-
lowings, Waiofar's cousin Count Mantio reinforced by a levy of Gascons set out
to ambush a Carolingian force stationed at Narbonne as it was either approach-
ing or leaving the city. Mantio had his forces dismount and lay in wait for the
approaching enemy column. Though Mantio was able to spring his trap, the
Carolingian force recovered. The count and his followers as well as the other
magnates and many Gascons were killed. Those Gascons who survived the battle
fled on foot-and the Franks took their horses as booty.3
28Fred. Cont., ch. 47.

29 Ibid., ch. 10.
80 Ibid., chs. 45, 46, 50, 51. See also Bachrach, "Charles Martel," pp. 66-72.
31 Fred. Cont., ch. 45.
82 Cartulaire de S. Victor de Mareile, I, ed. M. Gu6rard (Paris, 1857), no. 81. See Bachrach,
"Charles Martel," p. 67.
33 Fred. Cont., ch. 44.
The important role played by the Gascons in Aquitanian military organization

should be emphasized. The Gascons had been under Merovingian suzerainty in-
termittently since the sixth century. In the seventh century Dagobert I placed
the Basque territory under a Saxon duke. By the early eighth century a Gascon
regional levy was a significant part of the military organization of the duke of
Aquitaine. This regional levy served far beyond the limits of Gascony and north
of the Loire beyond the borders of Aquitaine itself.34 In terms of its regional or-
ganization and its capacity to engage in long campaigns, it may be compared
with the regional levy of Champagne which the Merovingian kings organized
during the sixth century and which served as far from home as Italy."5 As has
already been noted, Gascon garrison forces were established with their families
in the north of Aquitaine far from their homes. There also seem to have been
small units of Gascons serving as field forces such as the one led by Mantio.
These may have been stationed in centenae.
In addition to using Basques, the dukes of Aquitaine also had Frankish fol-
lowers. Thus in his victory over the Muslims at Toulouse in 715, Duke Eudo is
said to have led a force of Aquitanians and Franks."6 A generation earlier a note-
worthy group of Frankish magnates had settled in Aquitaine, and Eudo may
have drawn his Frankish supporters from among these men and their descen-
dants.37 It is also possible, though less likely, that the Franks who served Eudo
were descendants of garrison troops settled in Aquitaine by Merovingian mon-
archs; this tradition was begun by Clovis, who is known to have established
units at Toulouse, Rodez, Saintes, and Bordeaux, and probably did so in many
other fortified cities and castra as well.38
The continuity in military organization in Aquitaine from the Merovingian
era to the period of independence is worth emphasizing. The three basic organiza-
tional categories - the levies, the personal armed followings of the magnates,
and the special units deployed largely for garrison duties - persist and flourish.
The ability of the duke or his officers to use fighting men from two or three of the
organizational units at the same time suggests flexibility. The use of free men, as
well as dependent followers, and perhaps even those who were less than free illus-
trates the diversity of classes from which these fighting men might be drawn. The
heterogeneous nature of the Aquitanian military from the ethnic standpoint is
illustrated by the incorporation of Romani, Wascones (Vaceti), Aquitani, and
Franci into various units.
34For general works on the history of Merovingian Aquitaine, see the works cited in n. 19, above.
For the Gascon levy, see Annales Anianenses, cols. 3-4, and Chronicon Ucenense, col. 25 (both of
these are found in HGL, vol. II); see also Chronicon Moissacense, I, ed. G. Pertz (Monumenta Germania
Historia Sriptores [Hannover, 1826]), 290. Cf. Annales Mettenses priores (hereinafter cited as Ann.
Mett.), ed. B. V. Simson (Monumenta Germania Historica Scriptores in us. schol. [Hannover and
Leipzig, 1905]), for the years 718, 761, and esp. 765.
35 Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 47, 60, 66, 68, 76, 83, 125.
36 Ann. Anian., cols. 3-4: "Eudo princeps Aquitanie cum exercitu Aquitaniorum vel Fran-
chorum.. . ." Ann. Ucen., col. 25: "Eudo, princeps Aquitanie cum exercitu Acquitanorum ac
Franchorum ...."
r Bachracli, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 96.
38 Ibid., p. 12.
THE CAROLINGIAN CONQUEST
For almost a decade (760-768) Peppin fought against Duke Waiofar in an

attempt to bring Aquitaine under Carolingian control. Fortunately, these cam-
paigns are unusually well-documented, and thus it is possible to ascertain the
manner in which Peppin organized the military in his newly conquered territory.
In 761 Peppin's armies captured the important fortified places of Bourbon,
Chantelle, and Clermont. In the Auvergne he also obtained many other strong-
holds by treaty. Peppin continued his campaigning the following year and after
an elaborate siege took the city of Bourges; his forces also captured the fortress
at Thouars in 762. By 766-767 most, if not indeed all, of the fortified places in
Aquitaine were in Peppin's hands.9
As in the days of the later Roman empire and the Merovingian era, warfare
in Aquitaine focused upon the fortified cities and other strongholds in the region.
Peppin's military objectives therefore were similar in many ways not only to
those pursued by the Visigothic kings who seized Aquitaine from Rome and
garrisoned its strong places but to those of the Merovingians who drove out the
Goths and later fought over the region in their civil wars.40 To sustain this type
of warfare it was necessary to maintain effective siege operations. Thus, for ex-
ample, Peppin's army that attacked Bourges erected around the city a breast-
work which included ramparts for the placement of siege engines and for other
weapons of various kinds which the Carolingians used to help them to capture
their objective.4'
By 766 it had become clear to Waiofar that Peppin's command of siege tech-
nology was so well developed that the duke had to withdraw his garrisons from
the fortified cities and strongholds he still commanded. In addition, Waiofar
understood that Peppin was intent upon establishing a military organization
in Aquitaine similar to that which had flourished there since late Roman times,
i.e., military organization based in large part upon the garrisoning of fortified
cities and other strongholds. Therefore, to thwart Peppin's objectives, Waiofar
ordered that the walls be breached or razed in the fortified places from which he
withdrew his garrisonsA41
Peppin, however, ordered the rebuilding of these fortifications, and though the
39 Fred. Cont., chs. 25, 42, 43, 46, and Annale8 Regni Francorum (hereinafter cited as ARF), ed.
F. Kurze (Monumenta Germania Eiistorica: Scriptore8 rerum germanicarum in u8. schol. [Hiannover,
1895]), for the years 749, 761, 762, 766, 767. Bachrach, "Charles Martel," pp. 55-57, and Bullough,
"Europae Pater," pp. 89-90.
40 Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 17, 20, 21, 37-38, 101, 105.
41 Fred. Cont., ch. 43: " . . . castra metatusque est undique et omnia quae in giro fuit vastavit.
Circumsepsit urbem munitionem fortissimam, ita ut nullus egredi ausus fuisset aut ingredi potuisset,
cum machinis et omni genere armorum, circumdedit ea vallo." See also Bullough, "Europae Pater,"
pp. 89-90, and also p. 89, nt 2.
" Fred. Cont., ch. 46: "Videns praedictus Waiofarius princeps Aquitanicuim quod castro Claremonte
rex bellando ceperat et Bitoricas caput Aquitaniae munitissimam urbem cum machinis capuisset,
et inpetum eius ferre non potuisset, omnes civitates quas in Aquitania provintia dictioni sue erant,
id est Pectavis, Lemovicas, Sanctonis, Petrecors, Equolisma vel reliquis quam plures civitates et,
castella, omnes muros eorum in terra prostravit.. ." Bachrach, "Charles Martel," p. 57.
task was both costly and time-consuming the sources note that he spared no
expense and gave the task a very high priority. At Bourges, for example, as
soon as the city (urbs) had fallen to his forces, Peppin commanded that the walls
be repaired; he also placed the entire district (civitas) under his counts (comites).
Peppin had the walls of the fort (castrum) at Argenton repaired and placed this
stronghold under his comites as well. Before his death in 768 Peppin had prob-
ably managed to restore most of the fortified places abandoned by Waiofar.43
Like those who were given command at Bourges, the counts who were detailed
to secure at least some of the newly-repaired fortifications have been called
"comtes-gouverneurs"; it has been claimed that their office was a new one created
by Charles Martel.4 We do know that these comites were used to command
garrisons at forts and fortified cities. For example, the comites Australdus and
Galemanius served with their men as a garrison for Narbonne. We also know
that these garrisons were not permanently settled in a new home with their
families. The troops served for a time as a garrison and then were moved on to
another task. Thus, Count Australdus, after garrisoning Narbonne with his men,
was assigned to help defend the ChAlons area where he was detailed to cooperate
with Count Adalard of ChAlons. Other comites also served under Adalard in this
area.45
It is clear that Adalard of ChAlons was the regular count of the civitas, but
the other comites, like Australdus, were not the usual type of count who served
as the administrative and military head of a civitas. The title comes as applied to
men like Galemanius and Australdus seems to be one of honor given to a worthy
fighting man, probably one with a personal armed following of his own, who could
be used in a great variety of military and paramilitary operations. Far from being
an innovation introduced by Charles Martel, however, such comites would seem
to have had their institutional origins in later Roman and Merovingian practices.
Throughout the later Roman empire the term comites is used to denote elite
military personnel who were accorded high status in the imperial army and who
generally had some honored relation with the emperor. In Gaul during the later
fifth century, for example, we learn about a Gallo-Roman magnate named Titus
who was the leader of a band of armed followers. The Emperor Leo was so im-
pressed by his armed exploits that he invited him to come to the eastern part of
the empire and gave him the title comes.46 In the Merovingian era we find im-
portant men who performed military functions being given the title comes; such
men, however, did not hold the office of count of the civit as. Some were associated
with the court and were sent on military missions by the king.47 Even the inde-
pendent dukes of Aquitaine used men with the title comes in this manner. Waio-
43 Fred. Cont., chs. 43, 46, 50; ARF, 766; and Ann. Mett., 766.
44 E. Ewig, "L'Aquitaine et les Pays Rh6nans au haut moyen Age," Cahiers de civilisation m6dibvale,
I (1958), 50.
4' Fred. Cont., chs. 44, 45.
46 R. I. Frank, Scholae Palatinae (Rome, 1969), pp. 118, 169, 198, 226; Jones, Later Roman Empir
x, 666; and Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 16, 23, 44.
47Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 79, 82.
far's garrison commander at Touars, which was only a castrum and not a civita8,
was called comes. Waiofar's cousin Mantio also held the title of comes as did
several of the magnates who served with him.48 Peppin also used comites of this
type for tasks other than that of garrison duty. He employed them to guard the
queen, to undertake special missions to hunt down his enemies, and to support
the forces led by a count of the civitas.49 Thus we may conclude that the use of
comites for military and paramilitary operations in Aquitaine was not an in-
novation of Charles Martel which his son Peppin then imposed upon a con-
quered region; instead, comites were a relatively old institution which had been
used in the later Roman empire, adopted by the Merovingians, and continued
by the independent dukes of Aquitaine as well as by the Carolingians under
Peppin.
When used for garrison duty these comites with their followers served only
temporary assignments. For example, Count Australdus was transferred from
garrison duty at Narbonne to more active duty in the Chalons area. The comite
established at Bourges in 762 were soon replaced by Chunibert who was count of
that city.50 For garrison purposes, Peppin gave command of the castrum within
the city of Bourges to Remistanius, an Aquitanian magnate; he was to defend
the castrum against Waiofar.5' In the civitas of Berry, Peppin encamped a unit
of Franks (scara Francorum) which may have been similar to the centenae used in
Merovingian times, i.e., "a Frankish settlement, part military and part colonizing
in function, living under a royal official (of imperial origin) called the centenarius
upon the land of the royal fisc."52 As will be seen below, the office of centenarius
persisted in Aquitaine under the Carolilngians.
Peppin established garrisons and special units throughout Aquitaine. Various
terms are used in the sources to denote these units. Some are called homines sUi8,
i.e., homines Pippini, and others are simply called custodes. We know that at
Angouleme and at Argenton the garrisons were comprised at least in part of
Franks and in the Bourges area another Frankish unit was established. Fredegar's
continuator clearly distinguishes between the Franci who were used as garrison
troops and the custodes.53 This may suggest that the latter were indigenous
troops, perhaps even the men who had once served under Waiofar. As noted
earlier, Peppin was not averse to using Remistanius and his Aquitanian followers
at Bourges. Perhaps Peppin obtained an oath of faithfulness from the Gascons
he captured at Bourges in 7692 because he intended to use these men himself for
military purposes. We cannot ascertain, however, whether these or other Basques
48 Fred. Cont., chs. 48, 45.

49 Ibid., chs. 45, 49, 51.
60 Ibid., ch. 51. Cf. the remark that before the capture of Remistanius Chunibert was count but
after the capture a certain Gislarius is styled count.
b1 Ibid., ch. 46.
52 Ibid.; and ARF, 766, fov the scara. There is as yet no adequate study of the scara in Carolingian
times. For the definition of centena quoted above, see J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, The Long-Haired King3
(London, 1962), p. 198, n. 1, ana also Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 81, 87-88,
109, for the scara in Merovingian times, and pp. 25, 82, 84, 46, 71-72, 97, 108, 109, 124 for the centena.
63 Fred. Cont., chs. 46, 50, and ARF, 766, 769.
were included among the custodes he deployed in strongholds throughout Aqui-

taine. The term custodes was used to denote garrison troops both in the Mero-
vingian period and under the independent dukes of Aquitaine.54
As noted earlier it was necessary for anyone who hoped to rule a large area to
secure the loyalty of the magnates of the region and to obtain the military sup-
port of their personal armed followers. Thus in 765 Peppin purchased the sup-
port of Remistanius, Waiofar's uncle. Peppin gave Remistanius gold, silver,
costly cloths, horses, and arms. He also made him the administrator of half of
the Bourges district as far west as the River Cher and gave him the fort (castrum)
within the city itself which he was supposed to hold against Waiofar.55 Other
Aquitanian magnates also joined Peppin; for example, Count Chunibert of
Bourges, after losing his city to the Carolingians in 762, swore an oath of faith-
fulness to Peppin and was reinstalled as count. By 766 many of the Aquitanian
magnates realized that Waiofar's cause was lost and offered their support to
Peppin."
Shortly before his death in 768, Peppin issued a capitulary for the purpose of
regularizing Carolingian control in Aquitaine. In chapter ten he directed that the
principle of the personality of the law would obtain in the region just as it had
under the independent dukes, the Merovingians, the Visigoths, and the Romans.
Thus Peppin gave support to the customs and traditional institutions of the
various peoples dwelling in Aquitaine.57 Further, he reaffirmed an old Merovin-
gian and very probably imperial military regulation - when a military force is
mobilized in Aquitaine, its fighting men must not loot and pillage but are limited
to the taking of wood, water, and grass."8 This order, moreover, would seem to
suggest that Peppin either had already or was about to reconstitute local and
general levies in Aquitaine.
In reviewing Peppin's military organization in Aquitaine we discover that two
of the three basic structures which he found there, i.e., the magnates with their
personal armed followings and the garrisons in fortified places, he permitted to
continue, and the third, i.e., the levies, were probably being mobilized as well.
Though the forms of military organization indicate continuity, it is equally clear
that Peppin removed Gascon garrisons from some places and established Frank-
ish personnel in some locations. He did, however, continue to use non-Frankish
garrisons of custodes. His capitulary on the personality of the law gives particular
emphasis to the rights of the Romans and of the Salian Franks. Thus it is more
"4 See n. 27, above, for custodes, and Fred. Cont., chs. 25, 42, 48, for the terms used to describe the
garrisons of the independent dukes of Aquitaine.
16 Fred. Cont., chs. 45-46.
66 Ibid., chs. 43, 48, 51, 52.
5t Capitularia regum Francorum, I, ed. A. Boretius (Monumenta Germania Historica [Hannover,
18831) - hereinafter cited as MGH, Cap. - no. 18, ch. 10: "Ut omnes homines eorum legis habeant,
tam Romani quam et Salici, et si de alia provincia advenerit, secundum legem ipsius patriae vivat."
58 Ibid., ch. 6. See, for the early Merovingians, Clovis's order, " . . . nullus de regione illa aliud,
quam herbarum alimenta aquamque praesumeret," as preserved by Gregory of Tours, Liberi His-
toriarum X, ed. B. Krusch and W. Levison (Monumenta Germania !Iistorica: Ser. rer. Merov. [Han-
nover, 1937-1951]), x.1, Bk. II, ch. 87.
than likely that the Franks whom he placed in Aquitaine were drawn from among
the Romanized Salians settled in Neustria and not from among the German-
speaking Ripuarians settled further to the east. Peppin's recognition of the legal
identity of the Romani may also suggest that local levies composed largely of
Romani, like the unit he had encountered at Orleans, would continue to be used.
CHARLES THE GREAT
In 768 when Waiofar was killed and his supporters submitted to Peppin, the
war in Aquitaine appeared to be at an end. Peppin died in the same year, how-
ever, and Hunoald, a relative of Waiofar, tried to rekindle resistance to the
Carolingians in southern Aquitaine. Charlemagne, in whose regnum this part of
Aquitaine had been included, made an effort to enlist the support of his brother
Carloman for a campaign against Hunoald. When Carloman refused to cooperate,
Charles decided that a rapid and decisive response to Hunoald's efforts was the
only means by which to avert a full-scale war in Aquitaine. Therefore, time was
of the essence, and Charles took the risk of going to war with the relatively small
band of personal armed retainers that formed his retinue.59 When he arrived
at Angoul6me, the city closest to the projected theater of operations, he ob-
tained support from the Frankish garrison which had been stationed in the
city by his father about two years earlier. He took the additional step of calling
up the remnants of the local levy of the civitas for additional support.60 This last
move involved some risk because Charles could not be sure that the levy, com-
posed largely of middle rank inhabitants of the civitas, would prove loyal to him.
During the war these people had suffered greatly at the hands of the Caroling-
ians.6' As events turned out, Charles's gamble was successful and Hunoald's ef-
forts were nullified. To secure the Carolingian's military position in the south-
western corner of Aquitaine, Charles saw to the building of a fort at Fronsac on
the Garonne which he had garrisoned.62 From Charles's activities in this cam-
paign, it is clear that he made no fundamental changes during the first year of his
reign in the traditional forms of military organization which flourished in Aqui-
taine.
69 ARF, 769: "Domnus Carolus gloriosus rex iter peragens partibus Aquitaniae, eo quod Hunaldus
voluit rebellare totam Wasconiam etiam et Aquitaniam, et cum paucis Francis auxiliante Domino
dissipata iniqua consilio supradicti Hunaldi. Et in ipso itinere iungens se supradictus magnus rex
cum germano suo Carlomanno in loco, qui dicitur Duas dives. Inde Carlomannus se revertendo
Franciam iter arripiens ...." Annale* qui dicuntur Einhardi (hereinafter cited as Ann. Eink.), ed.
F. Kurze (Monumenta Germania Hi8torica: Scriptore* rerum Germanicarum in u*. *chol. [Hannover,
1895]), for the same year, 769, are much more explicit in condemning Carloman for not aiding Charles.
60 ARF, 769: " . . . Carolus benignissimus rex ivit ad Aequolesinam civitatem, et inde sumpsit
plures Francos cum omni utensilia et praeparamenta eorum ....." On the garrison placed there by
Peppin, see Fred. Cont., ch. 46.
61 Ann. Einh., 769: " . . . ille Egolisenam Aquitaniae civitatem proficiscitur et inde contractis
undique copiis fugientem Hunoldum persequitur." The sequence of events suggests strongly that
the force was levied in the civitas of Angoul8me. The word undique leaves no doubt that the garrison
stationed in the urbs could not have been the force under consideration. For the local levy of An-
goul8me under the Merovingians, see Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 58, 61, 66,
67, 76. On the devastation in southern Gaul, see Fred. Cont., ch. 46.
82 ARF, 769: " . . . ibat super flumen Dornoniam et aedificavit ibi castrum, qui dicitur Fronciacus."
For a decade after Hunoald's revolt, whatever problems may have existed in
Aquitaine did not intrude into Charles's affairs in any-significant way. It would
seem that his show of force in 769 and Peppin's administrative arrangements
instituted a year earlier had satisfied the Aquitanian magnates who had accepted
Carolingian rule and who in return were permitted to retain their own laws and
customs. In addition, Charles was very busy further to the east with the Saxons,
Lombards, and Avars. By 778, however, he was of the opinion that his affairs
were in good order and thus he undertook an invasion of northern Spain. This
campaign ended ignominiously with the disastrous defeat at Ronceveaux. On
his return from Spain, Charles stopped at the royal villa of Chasseneuil south of
the Loire and there issued several directives for securing loyal support in Aqui-
taine and for defending the southwestern frontier.63 The so-called Astronomer in
his Vita Hludowici provides the following account of Charles's actions:
Ordinavit autem per totam Aquitaniam comites, abbates, necnon alios plurimos quos
vassos vulgo vocant, ex gente Francorum, quorum prudentiae et fortitudine nulli
calliditate nulli vi obviare fuerit tutum, iesque commisit curam regni prout utile iudica-
vit, finium tutamen, villarumque regiarum ruralem provisionem. Et Biturigae civitati
primo Humbertum, paulo post Sturbium praefecit comitem, porro Pictavis Abbonnem,
Petragoricis autem Widobodum, sed et Arvernis Iterium, necnon Vallagiae Bullum, sed
Tholosae Chorsonem, Burdegalis Sigwinum, Albigenisibus vero Haimo, porro Lemov
Hrodgarium.64
This information has been judged to be of the greatest significance for under-
standing the nature of military organization in Aquitaine under Charlemagne.
The count of the civitas traditionally commanded the local levy of his district
and as a magnate he also had a personal armed following. Abbots were also im-
portant magnates, in Aquitaine as elsewhere, and with the great wealth they had
at their disposal they too employed bands of armed retainers.65 Vassi are re-
garded by many scholars as military dependents whose primary function was to
serve as heavily armed cavalry in the new "feudal" warfare introduced by
Charles Martel and made possible by the stirrup.66
From the Astronomer's remarks it is clear that Charles deemed it necessary to
place new counts at the head of the six most important civitates in Aquitaine:
Bourges, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Poitiers, Limoges, and Clermont, as well as in
three less important ones: the Velay, Albi, and Perigueux. It is not unreasonable
to ask what the former counts had done or, for that matter, had not done which
63 F. L. Ganshof, "Une crise dans le rigne de Charlemagne, les ann6es 778 et 779," M61anges
d'histoire et le litt6rature offerts a Monsieur Charles Gilliard (Lausanne, 1944), pp. 132-144. Auzias,
L'Aquitaine carolingienne, pp. 3ff., and Wolff, "L'Aquitaine," pp. 271-273.
" Vita Hludowici Imperatori8 (hereinafter cited as V. Hlud.), ed. G. Pertz (Monumeta Germania
Ilistorica: Scriptores [Hannover, 1827]), x, ch. 3.
65 F. L. Ganshof, "Benefice and Vassalage in the Age of Charlemagne," Cambridge Historical Jour-
nal, vI (1939), 152-155; Lewis, Developmentt of Southern French and Catalan Society, pp. 7ff. provides a
great deal of material but the texts should be rechecked.
66 WThite, Medieval Technology and Social Change, pp. 28 ff.; Verbruggen, "L'Arm6e et la Strat6gie
de Charlemagne," pp. 420ff.; Beeler, Feudal Warfare, pp. lOff.; and Norman, Medieval Soldier,
pp. 40ff.
so displeased Charles that he found it necessary to upset an apparently smooth

working relationship with nine important men that in some cases may have
flourished for a decade. In attempting to provide a plausible answer to this
question, we should observe that when Charles's forces marched into Spain they
included men drawn from Burgundy, Austrasia, Bavaria, Provence, Septimania,
and Italy. Charles's household forces also took part and perhaps a contingent
from the Breton march under Count Roland served as well. There is no specific
mention, however, of a levy from Neustria or of one from Aquitaine.67 We know
nothing about matters in Neustria, but it is not impossible that the nine counts
who were removed in Aquitaine after the invasion had refused to call up their
levies for the Spanish campaign or had provided inadequate forces.68 During the
Merovingian era, it was not uncommon for a count to refuse to muster his local
levy when the king ordered it. When this happened and the king could retaliate,
he would replace the offender.69
When a Merovingian count refused to obey his monarch or when magnates
schemed against their king, it was a sign that the ruler was regarded as being
insecurely established and vulnerable to attack and intrigue.70 In 778, before
Charles's forces were defeated in Spain, there was widespread unrest in his
kingdom; apparently he was unaware of this. While in Spain, however, he learned
that the Saxons were in revolt, Italy needed attention, the Avars were far from
subdued, and the Gascons were hostile.7' The directives he issued at Chasseneuil
suggest that Charles had developed doubts about the loyalty of many of the
Aquitanian magnates. Not only did he replace nine counts, but he prohibited all
magnates who were not va88i dominici from employing personal bands of armed
retainers. Further, Charles banned sworn associations of any kind. These actions
indicate that Charles considered drastic measures necessary to sustain Carolingian
control in Aquitaine.72 Perhaps these efforts thwarted an incipient revolt. In any
event, within this milieu it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the
counts whom Charles remoVed had not given him full support in his invasion of
67 ARF, 778, and 1ginhard: Vie de Charlemagne (cited hereinafter as V. Karoli), ed. and trans.
Louis Halphen (Paris, 1947), ch. 9. See R. Fawtier, La Chanson de Roland (Paris, 1933), pp. 152-153,
and Ganshof, "Une crise," p. 137, n. 1. Jules Horrent, "La bataille des Pyr6n6es de 778," Le Moyen
Age, LXXVIIu (1972) 197-2927 adds nothing new here.
88 Wolff, "L'Aquitaine," p. 287, is not so bold but concludes: "Charles a remplace les comtes dont
il n'etait par sflr, laisse en place ceux auxquels il gardait sa conflance; mieux valait d'ailleurs ne par
renouveler l'administration toute d'un seul coup." Fawtier, Chanson de Roland, p. 176, outlines the
opposition in Aquitaine to Charles. Cf. Ganshof, "lUne crise," p. 137, n. 1.
69 Bachrach, Merovingia Military Organization, p. 42, for example.
70 Ibid., pp. 48-51, 56-60, 64-OS, 72, 92-94, are useful examples.
21 Ganshof, "lUne crise," pp. 133-145.
n MGH!, Cap. 20, ch. 14: "De truste faciendo nemo praesumat." This prohibition was renewed for
Aquitaine in 789 (MG!I, Cap. 924, ch. 15). The general regulations concerning sworn associations are
found in ch. 16 in 779 and ch. 16 in 789. We know that the 779 regulations of Cap. 20 (or perhaps a
similar set of regulations set out in 778 for Aquitaine alone, but now lost) had force in Aquitaine be-
cause of its confirmation in a special capitulary for Aquitaine in 789. On the subject of the oaths, see
Ganshof, "Charlemagne et le serment," pp. 259-260; also see the works cited in n. 922, above.
The "nemo" in this context may perhaps be understood in the absolute sense of "no man" or "no
one." It is more probable, however, that it has a much more limited sense in this context, ile. "no
Spain. This observation may illuminate the Astronomer's remark that Charles's
new officials would not be easily obstructed in their duty either by cunning or by
force.73 Although Charles appointed nine loyal comites to replace suspect ones, he
did not change the structure of the levies they commanded.
In turning from the comites to the vassi of the Astronomer's text, we are faced
with a term considered by many scholars as descriptive of men who formed the
core of Charlemagne's army, the heavy cavalry.74 The Astronomer's use of the
term, however, is hardly so clear. In fact, it is ambiguous. Did the Astronomer
intend to say that only the "alios plurimos" were sent to defend the frontier or
did he mean to say that the counts, the abbots, and the many men sent to
Aquitaine were to look after the kingdom, care for the royal fisc, and defend the
frontier.75 This ambiguity is compounded by yet another problem. Scholars agree
that the Astronomer intended the phrase "quos vasos vulgo vocant" to modify
only the "alios plurimos" and not the entire phrase "comites, abbates, necnon
alios plurimos."76 F. L. Ganshof has shown, however, that counts were indeed
vassi dominici as were abbots.77 Ganshof has suggested that the Astronomer even
hesitated to come right out and describe the "alios plurimos" with the term
vassi because "in southern Gaul it still recalled a condition not far removed from
slavery."78 If this explanation is in fact correct, then there can be no doubt that
the Astronomer was less than eager to call abbots and counts vassi although it
was in fact a legally correct term.
Men described as vassi dominici in Aquitaine during this period performed
many services including caring for royal villas, defending the frontier, ad-
ministering justice, and helping the missi.79 Vassi dominici were important men
man" who is not exempt from the prohibition. In the language of the capitularies one frequently
encoiuters such locutions of an apparently absolute nature which are not at all intended to be under-
stood as absolute. The most obvious is found in the use of omnis which is the opposite or the virtual
opposite of nemo. On this see Cam, Local Government, p. 31: "The expression omnes, which is very
frequently found in the military capitularies, is not to be insisted on, as it may merely mean all who
have certain obligations." On historical grounds it would be less that prudent to insist upon the abso-
lute meaning of "no man" since this would have the effect of depriving Charles's vassi dominici of
their right to have their own vassi.
It would probably be too fanciful to suggest that the language of the capitulary contains a kind
of pun which juxtaposes "nemo" and "homo" with the latter having the meaning of royal vassal.
73 V. Hlud.. ch. S.
74 See the works cited in n. 66, above.
75 Wolff, "L'Aquitaine," p. 292, n. 185: "En fait, il est difficile de d6terminer la t&che particuliere
des vas&i, les comtes etant mentionnus dans la m8me phrase." Cf. Charles Odegaard, Vassi and Fideles
in the Carolingian Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1945), p. 37.
7 Odegaard, Vassi and Fideles, p. 37.
77 Ganshof, "Benefice and Vassalage," p. 167; F. L. Ganshof, "Charlemagne et les institutions de la
monarchie franque," Karl der Grosse, i, 888-890; and F. L. Ganshof, Feudalism, trans. P. Grierson
(2nd English ed.; New York, 1961), p. 20. The effort by Odegaard, Vassi and Fiddes, to impose a
rigid distinction between the two terms with the former referring to military followers and the latter
to high officials simply cannot be sustained.
78 Ganshof, Feudalism, p. 20.
79 Wolff, L'Aquitaine, pp. 292-295,
in the region, and many of them had personal armed followers of their own. They
were entitled, as Professor Ganshof put it, "to the respect and consideration of
other men that is described as honor in the texts."80 It does not seem to be an
exaggeration to suggest that Charles desired to make all the important men in
his realm vassi dominici, thus tying them more closely to him than were the or-
dinaryftdeles, i.e., subjects.8' Charles's directives for Aquitaine established in this
region a number of men who were tied to him by a special oath and from whom he
expected full support. These vassi dominici are seen in the sources carrying out
all kinds of tasks, but curiously we have no texts describing these men charging
in massed squadrons with lances couched, their mail coats gleaming in the sun,
sweeping their inferiorly armed enemies from the field.
Charles's efforts in Aquitaine in 778 reveal two lines of reform insofar as
military organization in concerned. An attempt was made to limit the military
effectiveness of the Aquitanian magnates who were not vassi dominici. Some of
these may have been exiled while the others were forbidden to employ bands of
personal armed retainers or form private sworn associations.82 Meanwhile new
magnates, lay and clerical, were moved into Aquitaine, many of whom were ex
gente Francorum; these men were vassi dominici, whom Charles could trust.83
New counts were placed in command of the local levies. It is likely that some of
the vassi dominici who were charged with defending the frontier served as garrison
commanders in the many castra and other fortified places of the region. These
reforms brought about some changes in personnel and a closer bond than had
existed before between Charles and the magnates who controlled armed force.
In 781 Charles made Aquitaine a kingdom and established his three-year-old
son Louis as king. The child was sent to Aquitaine with a substantial escort under
the tutelage of a magnate named Arnold.84 In 785 when Charles learned that a
conspiracy had been planned to overthrow him, he sent a large military force
into Aquitaine; its job was to bring the boy safely to the king who was at Pader-
born. The Astronomer, who provides most of our information on this episode,
makes two useful points concerning the military in Aquitaine. He notes that at
the time Louis was brought to his father at Paderborn, the primary problem of a
military nature in Aquitaine was the defense of the frontier which was left under
the control of the marchiones who remained at home. Also of importance to our
understanding of military matters in the south is the Astronomer's observation
80 Ganshof, "Benefice and Vassalage," p. 148.

81 The much debated case of Tassilo of Bavaria suggests this. See Ganshof, "Benefice and Vas-
salage," p. 151, for this definition of fideles. Also see Ganshof, Feudalinm, pp. 51-52. Odegaard, Vassi
and Fideles, pp. 39ff., presents a great deal of evidence to sustain this conclusion but rejects the thrust
of his own data.
82 On exiles see Auzias, L'Aquitaine carolingienne, p. 10.
83 There has been a great deal of debate concerning the ethnic origins of the counts sent into Aqui-
taine in 778. Lewis, Development of Southern French and Catalan Society, p. 46, argues that Sigwin and
Humbert were not Franks. Cf. Wolff, "L'Aquitaine," p. 191. For Hrodgar or Rotgar, see Geoffroi
Tenant de la Tour, L'Homme et la terre de Charlemagne a Saint Louis (Paris, 1948), p. 109.
84 Y. Elud.. ch. 4. On this see Ganshof. "Un crise." DD. 144-145.
that the Gascons were traditionally mounted spearmen who apparently did not
use armor to any great extent.85
Our information about military matters in Aquitaine is fragmentary, and it is
not until 789 that we once again have some useful data. In that year a Gascon
magnate named Adalaricus set an ambush and captured Count Chorso of
Toulouse. Adalaricus forced Chorso to take oaths which compromised his posi-
tion as a vassus of Charles.86 In response to the violence perpetrated by Adalaricus
and his followers, Charles issued a special capitulary for Aquitaine. In this he
renewed the ban against private sworn associations and the order that magnates
who were not vassi dominici could not employ bands of personal armed retainers.
lie added, moreover, that all of his free subjects were to take an oath of faithful-
ness to him.87
In 790 Adalaricus was exiled by Charles and those who supported him were sub-
dued by the new count of Toulouse, William.88 The entire episode illustrates the
role the magnates with their illegally gathered followers played in the politics
of the region and the ineffectiveness of Charles's original prohibition against
bands of personal armed retainers. In this case, a royal official who was also a
royal vassal was captured and forced to swear oaths limiting his loyalty to his
lord and king. The defense of the frontier was in the meantime weakened and the
entire system of Carolingian control was shown for a brief period at least to be
inadequate.
Two years later Louis was ordered by his father to raise as large an army as he
could, lead it into Italy, join with his brother Peppin, and gain control of the
province of Beneventum. The combined forces of the two brothers ravaged the
area and captured a fortress. News of a plot to overthrow Charles caused him to
recall his sons from Italy and he ordered them to come to him at Salz in Bavaria.89
Before Louis had left for Italy, he was instructed to provide for the defense of
Aquitaine. While Louis was still in Italy, however, the Muslim leader Abd al-
Malik ibn Mughith attacked the frontier of Aquitaine. First he seized the for-
tress at Gerona and then he moved into the Narbonnaise which he devastated.
The garrison of Narbonne, however, managed to hold out and Abd al-Malik
turned his troops toward Carcassone. Count William of Toulouse hastily organ-
ized the forces available to him and met the Muslims on the banks of the Orbieu
near the fort at Villedaigne. Abd al-Malik's forces won a decisive victory and,
after collecting a huge amount of booty and many captives, they returned to
Spain.90
", V, Elud., ch. 4, and Ann. Einh., 785.

86 V. Hlud., ch. 5.
87 MGM, Cap. 24, ch. 15, and Cap. 28, ch. 18, along with the introduction to Cap. 24. On these
directives, see Ganshof, "Charlemagne et le serment," pp. 261-267.
8s V. flud., ch. 5.
89 Ibid., ch. 6.
90 Ann. Einh., 798; Chron. Moissac., 798 (p. 800); Ann. Anian., col. 10; and Chron. Ucen., cols.
27-28. See F. Griffe, "La razzia sarrasine de 798 en Septimanie: Bataille de l'Orbieu ou bataille de
l'Orbiel," Annas du Midi, mix (1941), 225-286, and B. LSvi-Provengal, Tiioire de lVespagne musul-
mane, I (Paris, 1950), 145-146.
Although the main thrust of the Muslim attack was aimed at Narbonne and
Carcassone, raiding parties penetrated other parts of the Aquitanian frontier. A
story survives about a certain Datus, an important man in the Rouergue. His
mother was killed by the Muslims and his lands were despoiled. In an effort to
stop the invaders, he led his socii against the fortified position where they en-
camped with their booty. Datus's followers were armed and mounted but they
were no match for the enemy. This story probably survives because of Datus's
connection with the foundation of the monastery of Conques. Although this
story has been embellished for religious purposes, it probably contains a modicum
of truth; basically, that men like Datus with their armed followers (8ocii)
skirmished with various groups of raiders in various places along the Aquitanian
frontier in 793.91
The terms used by the writers who have left records of the major opposition
to the Muslims on the banks of the Orbieu are useful for attempting to ascertain
the nature of military organization in Aquitaine. William's army is said to have
been composed of comites and cu8todes.92 It is not referred to in terms which usu-
ally were used to indicate levies. Custodes is a word used in the Merovingian and
early Carolingian periods, especially in Aquitaine, to denote garrison troops.93
(Comites, by contrast, is an ambiguous term. William, the Carolingian commander,
was a comes, the count of the civitas of Troulouse. However, in the texts that re-
count the events of 793, there is no reference to the levy of Toulouse, to any other
local levy, or to a general levy which would be formed in large part of local levies.
It is important to reiterate that Louis had been ordered to lead as large an army
as lie could muster into Italy in 7992; this suggests that he may have led the local
levies of Aquitaine south of the Alps.94 It is unlikely that the comites who seem
to have formed an essential pait of William's army were simply the half-dozen or
so counts of the civitates of southern Aquitaine. It is more than likely that these
latter counts were in Italy with Louis and the local levies of their districts.
Concerning William's comites two explanations seem reasonable, and both are
probably to some extent accurate. Since comnitme are given equal consideration
along with custodes as the basis of William's army, it may be concluded that they
played a numerically substantial role. They may, in fact, have been William's
personal followers; thus, the sources are using the term in a manner similar to
the usage in late Roman, Merovinigian, and independent Aquitanian times, as
91 Erinold le Noir, Poetmne sur Louir le Pieux (cited hereinafter as Ilermoldus, Pohne), ed. E. Faral
(2nd ed.; Paris, 1964),11. 935-301. Also see Faral's notes, pp. 93, 25, 27.
92 Chron. Jfoissac., 793: Hisham " . . . misit Abd-el-Melec, unum ex principibus suis, cum exercitu
magno Sarracenorum ad vastandum Gallias. Qui venientes Narbonam, suburbia eius igne suc-
cenderunt, multosque chlristianos ac praeda magna capta, ad urbem Carcassonam pergere volentes,
obviam eis exiit Willelmus [quondam comes] alliique comites Francorum cum eo. Commiseruntque
proelium super fluvium Oliveio, ingravatumque est proelium nimis, ceciditque maxima para in illa
die ex populo christiano. Willelmus autem pugnavit fortiter in die illa. Videns vero quod sufferre eos
non posset, quia socii eius dimiserunt eum fugientes, devertit ab eis." Ann. Einh., 793: " . . . Sarra-
ceni Septimaniam ingressi proelioque cum illius limitis custodibus atque comitibus conserto multis
Francorum interfectis victores ad sua regressi sunt."
93 See n. 54, above.
94 V. Hllud., ch. 6.
20 Military Organtzation in Aquitaine
well as among the Carolingians in the days of Peppin. Such an interpretation is

given some support by the usage of the Moissac chronicler who refers to William's
comites as his socii, which is a common one for denoting personal armed fol-
lowers.9"
Some of the comites who served under William at Orbieu may also have been
the commanders of the custode8 stationed along the frontiers in the various
strongholds maintained by the Carolingians. Comes was the term used to denote
at least some garrison commanders under the independent dukes of Aquitaine
and under Peppin.96 These latter comites could not have constituted a very large
group, however. It seems reasonable to conclude that, in the absence of local
levies which were probably in Italy with Louis, William relied upon his own per-
sonal armed followers, i.e., comites / socii, and upon the custodes drawn from the
strongholds along the frontier. These custodes served directly under their garrison
commanders who were also sometimes called comites.
The difficulties of 792-793 led Charles once again to seek additional means to
secure greater control of his realm and to increase the efficiency of his military
organization. He commanded that the oath of faithfulness owed by all free men
be renewed;97 but, whereas in 789 he also renewed the prohibition against mag-
nates having bands of armed supporters, in 792 he took a different course. It
seems that many magnates, men like Datus of Rouergue perhaps, illegally kept
bands of personal armed followers which included servi. It also appears that vassi
dominici included servi among their vassi. Thus, when the king ordered all fight-
ing men to join the host, these magnates did not go to the expense of bringing
their unfree retainers since only free men of means were required to serve.
Therefore in 792 Charles ordered the servi who were the armed retainers of the
lords who had provided them with weapons and horses to swear an oath of faith-
fulness to him similar to the one sworn by free men.98 Through this oath Charles
established the legal means by which to obtain military service from these servi
cum armis who previously had not been required to serve him. This action also
reversed Charles's policy by which magnates who were not vassi dominici were
prohibited from having bands of personal armed followers. Through these oaths
Charles attempted to forge a direct link with both his rear vassals, free and un-
free, and with the retainers, free and unfree, of magnates who were not vassi
dominici.99
The failure of William's forces to defend the frontier in 793 was followed by an
investigation of fiscal and military matters in Aquitaine. From this investigation
Charles learned that many of the vassi dominici whom he had sent into the region
96 See above, pp. 4, 7.

97 MGH, Cap. 925, ch. 4.
98 Ibid.: "coloni .. . servi, qui honorati beneficia et ministeria tenent vel in bassallatico honorati
sunt cum domini sui et caballos, arma et scuto et lancea spata et senespasio habere possunt: omnes
iurent."
99 Ganshof, "Benefice and Vassalage," pp. 174-175, discusses some of the problems involved in
enforcing service upon the vassals of vassi dominici and other magnates.
in 778 to care for the royal fisc had usurped possession of a great many of these
installations and had kept the profits for themselves. Other magnates who were
not vassi dominici also seem to have benefitted at the expense of the royal fisc.
Therefore, Charles ordered that all royal villas be returned to their intended use;
to carry out this directive, he sent two missi into Aquitaine to set matters right.
Further, four regular wintering places to be used in sequence were established for
Louis and his retinue; these were at Doue, Chasseneuil, Angeac, and Ebreuil,
all in the northern part of Aquitaine. In addition, the duty owed by the inhabi-
tants of Aquitaine to provide annonas militares was eliminated; Louis decided
that it was more desirable to supply his own men from his own lands than to
rely upon public taxes.'00 Presumably the va8si dominici would have to supply
their own armed retainers privately as well. Concerning this change, Philippe
Wolff observed, "Ceci suggere une degradation progressive du systeme des
impts... ."101 Military men, viri militares, in Aquitaine opposed this innova-
tion;'10 we have no means, however, of ascertaining the extent to which it was
enforced.
These fisco-military reforms have long suggested to some scholars a connec-
tion with the important "capitulare de villis" which may have been issued in
794, or not long afterward, and which just possibly may have been intended for
Aquitaine rather than for the entire regnum Francorum.'03 According to this capitu-
lary, some inhabitants from each villa were organized for guard duty (waitas).'04
100 V. Hlud., chs. 6, 7.
101 Wolff, "L'Aquitaine," p. 292. Cf. Carlrichard Brtihl, "Das friinkische Fodrum," Zeitschrift der
Savigny-Stiftungfiir Rechtsgeschichte, germ. Abt., LXXVI (1959), 53-81, and Fodrum, Gistum, Servitium
Regis, i (Cologne, 1968), 574, n. 642.
102 V. Hlud., ch. 7.
103 A. Dopsch, Die Wirtschaftsentwicklung der Karolingerzeit, i (3rd ed.; Weimar, 1962), 28-74,
argued forcefully for dating the CV in 794 and localizing it in Aquitaine (the first edition of the above
work appeared in 1921). Marc Bloch, "L'origine et la date du 'Capitulare de Villis'," Revue His-
torique, cxii (1923), 40-56, and "La organisacion de los dominios carolingios y las teorias de
Dopsch," Annuario de historia del derecho espafnol, iII (1926), 89-119, showed the weakness of Dopsch's
arguments - philological, terminological, administrative, and legal - with little difficulty and in a
convincing fashion. He found it necessary ("L'origine," pp. 50-51) to admit the plausibility of "des
arguments de caract&re proprement historique." The best Bloch could do in casting doubt upon them
is to note that the coincidence of the extant evidence should not lead us to put too much faith in the
proposed relation of the CV and the reforms in Aquitaine. Walther von Wartburg, "The Localization
of the Capitulare Villis," SPECLum, XV (1940), 87-91, developed some new philological evidence for
localizing the CV in Louis's kingdom. F. L. Ganshof, "Observations sur la localisation du Capitulare
de villis," Le Moyen Age, LV (1949), 201-223, disposed of the majority of von Wartburg's arguments
but not all. Today there is a general consensus that the CV was meant for Charles's kingdom, exclud-
ing Italy, and can not be dated more exactly than between 770 and 800. On this consensus, see Wolf-
gang Metz, Das Karolingische Reichsgut (Berlin, 1960), pp. 77-86, and Bruhl, Fodrum, Gistum, pp.
81-83. Bloch's observation ("L'origine," p. 55) that the CV might be assigned to Louis for the period
794-September 813 has fallen by the wayside. Yet, throughout the literature on CV, only a small
portion of which has been discussed here, no better specific date than 794-795 has been suggested.
Although the early Carolingians may have issued directives concerning villa organization, none which
might fit the CV are described in a contemporary narrative source except that carried out in Aquitaine
in 794.
104M MG, Cap. 32, ch. 16. Gaishiof, "Charlemagne's Army," pp. 64, 157.
This service was supplemented by arrangements that provided a role for each
villa in the logistical organization of its local area for.the purpose of supplying
the host. Charles ordered that supplies were to be kept in readiness for campaigns
and that well-constructed wagons for the purpose of hauling these supplies were
also to be available. These wagons were to be provided with arms: a spear, shield,
bow, and quiver, and with leather covers so that food stuffs being carried would be
protected from the elements. These leather covers were to be so constructed that
they could be used as pontoons for bridges or for floating the wagons across
rivers.105
From article forty-two of this capitulary we learn that each royal villa was re-
quired to have an armory for outfitting certain of its men for the hostis.106 It is
important that the term used is hostis and not lantweri: the latter was a levy for
the local defense to which all men who could swing a club or hurl a stone might be
called;107 the hostis, by contrast, was organized from one or more city levies each
under the command of the count of the civitas and was often reinforced by the
armed followers of the various magnates of the region. These forces undertook
campaigns that might keep them away from home for several months and thus
were recruited from among men who were middle rank landholders and from pro-
fessional fighting men; economic dependents burdened with regular agricultural
services could not afford to perform such service.'08
In trying to ascertain who might have served in the hostis from the royal villas,
we should note that centenae were associated with these units of fiscal organiza-
tion and that the centenarius played an important role in Carolingian service as
he had under the Merovingians. Various classes and groups - Romani, laeti,
pueri, milites, as well as Franci - were established on the Merovingian centenae.
At least some of these inhabitants were antrustiones whom many scholars see in
terms of function as foreruinners of the vassi dominici, at least as the forerunners
of those vassi dominici who were of lesser position and prestige than counts,
abbots, and missi. In Merovingian times many groups and classes of inhabitants
on the centenae were lower in status than the liberi. In the Capitulare de villis a
distinction is also made between the liberi and the inhabitants of the centenae.109
Several scholars have suggested that Charles established military colonies in
Aquitaine,"0 and it is not impossible that the centenae were used as bases for some
of these colonies: traditionally, the centena served both a military and a coloniz-
ing function. On the royal villa at Cavilicus near Limoges, for example, substantial
numbers of unfree Franks were settled. In fact, the inhibitants of Cavilicus who
105 MGH, Cap. 32, chs. 30, 64, 68.

10 Ibid., ch. 62; also ch. 45 on shield-makers.
107 Cam, Local Government, p. 131; Ganshof, "Charlemagne's Army," p. 60.
108 For the Merovingian background, see above, pp. 3-5, and below, pp. 28-31, for further study
of the levy under Charles.
109 Ganshof, "Benefice and Vassalage," p. 158; and see above, n. 62. MGH, Cap. 32, ch. 62: "liberi
hominibus et centenis qui partibus fisci nostri." Cf. Bloch, "L'origine," p. 54, n. S.
110JLew, Development of Southern French and Catalan Society, pp. 80-33, 58fT.
bore Germanic names outnumbered those with Roman names.-"' It is not un-
reasonable to conclude that Charles, like Peppin and the Merovingians before
him, settled dependents on centenae, provided them with arms, and used them for
the host. The lower-class semiprofessional fighting men could then reinforce the
middle rank landholding and landowning class which formed the bulk of the
local levies.
Historically, the outstanding features of the military physiognomy of Aquitaine
were the various fortifications that rose above the countryside. As discussed
above, Peppin expended great sums to repair the walls of the cities and castra
which had been destroyed or damaged in his war with Waiofar. In addition,
Peppin saw to the garrisoning of these strongholds. There is every indication
that Charles, like his father, understood the basic strategic importance of garri-
soned fortifications for the military organization of Aquitaine. There is no men-
tion in the sources that Charles or his officers destroyed any fortified places in
Aquitaine. In addition, there is no evidence to suggest that Charles withdrew
garrisons from already existing fortifications. This argument from silence is
particularly significant since the documentation for Charles's reign is so much
better than for that of his predecessors; thus, a fundamental change in his policy
on a traditionally important form of military organization is unlikely to have
gone unnoticed. It is clear, moreover, that Charles did appreciate the significance
of fortifications and utilized them as a basic element in the military organization
in several parts of his kingdom, including Saxony and the Spanish March."2 In
the south of Aquitaine, as noted above, Charles maintained Peppin's policy at his
earliest opportunity by building and garrisoning a castrum at Fronsac.113 Charles's
continued interest in fortifying the Aquitanian frontier is evidenced by the mea-
sures he took in 778 and in the numerous garrison troops, custodes, stationed
there who served against the Muslims in 793.
From time to time as needs arose, Charles provided for the construction and
repair of fortifications in other parts of Aquitaine as well. In the Poitiers region,
for example, he saw to the building of a castrum for the defense of the monastery
of Saint-Savin, recognized the significance of the fort at Loudun which had been
constructed on the site of an old Roman stronghold, permitted the maintenance
of fortified villas at Chateau-Larcher and Colombiers, and sustained the military
importance of Tiffauges.114
1"I On the traditional nature of the centena, see Wallace-Hadrill, Long-Haired Kings, p. 198. For
(Caviliacus, see F. Delage and G. Brisset, "Un domaine carolingien en Limousin, Caviliacus," Bulletin
de la SociNtd archeologique et historique de Limou8in, LXXXIV (1952), 51-52, and Lewis, Development
of Southern French and Catalan Society, p. 60. It must be noted that the documents attesting the
names for Caviliacus are later Carolingian but probably reflect policies carried out in the reign of
Charlemagne.
11 For Saxony, see above, n. 5, and for the Spanish March, see below, p. 24, and also n. 116, below.
113ARF, 769.
114 M. Garaud, "La consttuction des chateaux et les destin6es de la 'vicaria' et du 'vicarius' Caro-
lingiens en Poitou," Revue Historique de Droit Frangais et Etranger, xxxI (1958), 54-78. On Loudun
we are fortunate to have the very fine study by Louis Charboineau-Lassay, "Les chateaux de Loudun
9,4 Military Organization in Aquitaine
The case of Tiffauges, like that of Loudun, provides an example of continuity in

military affairs from the later Roman empire through the early Middle Ages. A
group of Taifals, barbarians associated with the Central Asiatic Sarmatians, were
settled in the Poitiers area as military colonists (laeti) late in the fourth century.
Taifals were recruited from this colony to serve in military units in several parts
of the Roman empire during the fifth century. By the mid-sixth century, if in-
deed not earlier, the Taifal laeti in the Poitiers area had been integrated into the
Merovingian military organization under the command of a dux. By the end of
the century, this region of Aquitaine was known to Gregory of Tours and his
contemporaries as Thifalia. The Taifal laeti and their descendants left a compara-
tively large place-name legacy - Tiffauges being but one example - which per-
sisted well into the Middle Ages; these place names illustrate the Taifal's long-
lasting influence in the region. Of special note in the present context is the
persistence of Taifal military installations from the later Roman empire into the
ninth century and beyond. With the aid of archaeological investigations, his-
torians have been able to show that, like the Merovingians, the early Carolingians
used the fortifications at Tiffauges and Lusignan."15
The building, repairing, and garrisoning of castra were basic elements of
Aquitanian military organization and also fundamental to Charles's policy for
the expansion of the southwestern frontier. The recognized need to remedy the
damage done to the Aquitanian frontier defenses by Abd al-Malik in 793 was
translated into action at Toulouse in 797. Presumably with Charles's support,
Louis ordered that the frontier defenses be strengthened and put in good order.
Further, Count Burrellus was given the charge of occupying the city of Vich,
the castrum at Cardona, and the one at Casseres. He was to repair the walls of
these places, colonize them, and establish garrisons for their defense."6
d'apres les fouilles archeologiques de M. J. Moreau de la Ronde," Memnoires de la soci6te des antiquaires
de l'ouest, viii, Srd series (1915), 1-474. Chapters XII, XIII, XIV, and XV deal with the Merovingian
and Carolingian periods. Cf. the observations of Lewis, Development of Southern French and Catalan
Society, pp. 50ff.
11" A. Longnon, G6ographie de la Gaule au VIe Siecle (Paris, 1878), p. 176; Albert Grenier, Manuel
d'archeologie Gallo-Romaine (Paris, 1931), v, 399, n. 4; Garaud, "La construction des chateaux," pp.
55, 58, 59; and Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 12, 17, 29, 33, 36, 44, 124.
116 The policies articulated at Toulouse and carried out by Louis's officials (V. HIlud., ch. 8) may
be viewed in two equally valid ways: they contributed to the reinforcement of the Aquitanian frontier;
and they constituted the beginnings of what was to become the Spanish March. The military organiza-
tion of the Spanish March and of Septimania present many complex problems which are beyond the
scope of the present study. It is important to note, however, that the aprisio system which constituted
an element of fundamental importance in the military organization of the Spanish March and Septi-
mania was not employed in Aquitaine proper. This is only one of the many substantial differences
in military organization which contrast Aquitaine with the regions to the south. It may be suggested
that the latter regions owed much to Gothic and perhaps even Muslim influence.
On the aprisio, see the articles by A. G. Dupont, "Considerations sur la colonisation et la vie rurale
dans Roussillon et la Marche d Espagne au IXe siecle," Annales du Midi, LXVII (1955), 223-245, and
"L'aprision et la regime aprisionnaire dans la Midi de la France," Le Moyen Age, LXxi (1965), 180-
213, 375-399. On the Visigothic military, see Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz, El "Stipendium" HIispano-
Godo y los Origene8 del Beneftcio Prefeudal (Buenos Aires, 1947); E. A. Thompson, The Goths in Spain
(Oxford, 1969), pp. 262ff.; and Hans-Joachim Diesner, "K6nig Wamba und der westgotisch Fruih-
The newly strengthened frontier also served to help support an invasion of

Spain. In 800 Louis led his armies into Spain. Barcelona was bypassed but Lerida
was taken and destroyed as were other towns of the region in the direction of
Huesca. The area around Huesca was ravaged and burned by a detachment from
Louis's force, but no attempt to capture the city seems to have been under-
taken.117 Unfortunately, we do not know anything about the organizations of
Louis's forces during this campaign, but it is not improbable that some con-
tingents from Aquitaine were employed.
Louis's advance into Spain brought a response from Zaddo, the Muslim gover-
nor of Barcelona, who moved against Narbonne. He was captured with little
trouble. At virtually the same time some Basques attacked Liutard, the new
count of Fezensac. Some of the count's homine8 were killed in battle while others
were burned (perhaps while defending their wooden stockades). Liutard sup-
pressed this revolt, however, and the rebels were punished."8
In the spring of 802, when Zaddo and the Basques went on the offensive, Louis
had already gathered with his own magnates and with some important men sent
by Charles for the purpose of deciding about further incursions into Spain. The
Basque trouble delayed the implementation of their decisions until late summer or
early fall when a force called up from Aquitaine, Gascony, Burgundy, Provence,
and Septimania (Gothia) advanced into Spain; this time the capture of Bar-
celona was the goal. Louis devided his army into three parts. He assigned to
Count Rostagnus of Gerona the command of the force which was to besiege
Barcelona itself. Count William of Toulouse and Adhemar, a close associate of
Louis, were given command of the second unit which was posted beyond the
city to cut off any relief column that might be sent from Cordoba. Louis, himself,
remained with the reserve at Roussillon where he was in position to reinforce
either William or Rostagnus should there be a need to do so. The siege itself,
which included the construction of barracks "with lines of circumvallation and
contravallation" around the city, probably lasted from September of 802 until
April of 803.1"1
feudalismus," Jahrbuch der osterreichischen Byzantinistik, xviii (1969), 7-35. For the later period in
Spain, see Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz, "El Ej6rcito y la Guerra en el Reino Austurleon6s, 718-1037,"
SSCI, xv.1 (1968), 293-428.
Despite these and other works, a new comprehensive study of Visigothic military organization is
badly needed as is a comprehensive study of the military organization of the Spanish March under the
Carolingians. The remarks above, however, should not be understood as an attack on comparative
studies in southern French and northern Spanish institutions. The recent articles published in Les
structure8 sociale8 de l'Aquitaine, du Languedoc, et de l'Espagne au premier &ge ffodal (Paris, 1969)
clearly demonstrate the worth of such an approach.
"I V. HMud., ch. 10.
118 Ibid., ch. 12.
119 Hermoldus, Poe'me, 11. 102ff.; Chron. Moissac., 803 (p. 307); and V. Hlud., ch. 13. In general I
have followed the chronology established by L. Auzias, "Les sieges de Barcelone, de Tortose, et
d'Huesca (801-811)," Annales du Midi, xLviii (1936), 5-28. The entire question of the chronology
for this period is badly in need of review despite P. Wolff, "Les 6venements de Catalogne de 798-812
et la chronologie de l'Astronome," Anuario de Estudios Medievales, ii (1965), 451-458 who highlights
rather than solves the existing problems.
26 Military Organization in AquitMyine
Although we know the names of many of the important leaders of this cam-
paign, it is impossible to ascertain the specific organization of the forces they
commanded. For example, Count Liutard of Fezensac participated, and it is
reasonable to assume that at least part of the Gascon contingent, probably the
local levy of his district, was serving under his command. Lupus Sanchez, a
Basque magnate who seems to have been a vassus of Charles, also participated,
and he may have commanded his own personal armed followers. Count Sigwin
of Bordeaux, who along with Liutard, was the highest Carolingian official in the
Basque country, is not mentioned as taking part in the campaign. It would only
seem natural that Count William of Toulouse would have led the local levy of his
civitas in this campaign. We have seen, however, that he was also responsible for
the defense of the entire southeastern part of the frontier, and in 793 he did not
command the local levy of Toulouse but his own personal followers (comites) and
units of custodes drawn from the garrison forces in his area. Yet the example of a
third figure, Count Bera, provides additional reason to hesitate before concluding
that these forces followed some "regular" pattern of Carolingian military organ-
ization. From reading the Moissac Chronicle, one would conclude that Bera was
leading a general levy drawn from Gothia, i.e., Septimania. Hermold's poem about
Louis, however, suggests that Bera led a contingent of Goths. This latter im-
pression is given some support by the fact that after the fall of Barcelona Bera
was given command of the city and is said to have established a garrison of
Goths there.120
These data tell us very little about military organization in Aquitaine itself,
although they do indicate that the march areas which formed a part of Louis's
kingdom supplied considerable support for the invasion of Spain. It should be
reiterated that the independent dukes of Aquitaine who ruled before the Caro-
lingian conquest were accustomed to employing several kinds of Basque units as a
part of their military organization. The Carolingians, once they managed to
stabilize matters to a certain extent, also used Basques. In fact, the Carolingians
used whomever they could for support as did the Merovingians before them and
the Romans even earlier.
During the decade following the fall of Barcelona, several important campaigns
were undertaken for the purpose of extending Carolingian domination in Spain.
These efforts were of two kinds: attempts to capture by siege the cities of Tortosa
and Huesca, and raiding operations to harass the countryside held by the
Muslims. Tortosa was besieged in 805 and then again over a two-year period
from 808 through 809. Huesca was invested in 810. Raiding operations were
probably carried out through most of the decade. In addition, Louis's forces oc-
cupied Pamplona, apparently without opposition, in 811 and crushed a Basque
revolt in 8192.121
120 Hermoldus, Poeme, 11. 312-313: "Caetera per campos stabulat difussa juventus, / Francus,
Wasco, Getha, sive Aquitania cohors." Chron. Moissac., 803 (p. 307): "Qui congregato exercitu ex
Aquitania, Wasconia, necnon de burgundia, Provincia et Gothia, misit eos ante se ad obsidionem
civitatis." V. Hlud., ch. 13: "Post haec Bera comite ibidem ob custodiam relicto cum Gothorum
auxiliis ...." See also the notes compiled by Faral, pp. 16-19, 28-48.
121 V. Hlud., chs. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18. For the chronology, see Auzias, "Les sieges," pp. 5-28, with
some modifications.
We have some information about two of the more impressive raids carried out
against the Muslims. In 805 Isembard, Adhemar, Bera, and Burrellus were de-
tailed from Louis's main force which went on to besiege Tortosa. The raiders
crossed the Ebro, sacked a Muslim base at Villa Rubea, ravaged the surrounding
territory, and defeated a Muslim army which was gathered to stop them. After
twenty days in the field, the raiders terminated the operation and rejoined
Louis's main force which then broke off the action at Tortosa and returned home.
In 808, Adhemar and Bera along with some other magnates undertook a similar
operation. They sacked a Muslim camp on the banks of the Ebro and defeated an
army led by the governor of Tortosa. In these two raids, troops from Aquitaine
proper seem to have played no noteworthy role. Bera was the count of Barcelona
and Burrellus was count of Vich. These men can be expected to have been leading
the men from their districts which were part of the Spanish March. Isembard was
a vassus of Charles and Adhemar a close associate of Louis. Both these men may
have led only their own armed followers.122
The composition of the forces which Louis led against Tortosa in 805 is not in-
dicated in the sources. He seems to have made no concerted effort to emplace
siege engines or to do much else than devastate the area around the city. The
operations against the city begun in 808 were commanded by a certain Ingobert
who was sent by Charles for that purpose. While Bera and Adehemar raided,
Ingobert invested the city. When the raiders went home, Ingobert maintained the
siege through the winter. In 809 Louis arrived with reinforcements and new equip-
ment. Heribert brought a large contingent of troops from Francia, and Liutard
may have commanded his Gascon levy there.'23
In 810 Charles gave to this same mis8us Heribert the command of an expedition
sent to besiege Huesca. Although the city was invested and the surrounding area
was devastated, Heribert failed to obtain its surrender. We do not have very
much information concerning the forces which undertook this operation. The
Astronomer describes one element: "impudentes ac leves aliqui iuvenum." This
may suggest that Heribert's forces were short of well-trained, battle-hardened
veterans.124
That Charles took an active interest in Carolingian advancement into Spain
is suggested by the several conferences he had with Louis concerning the above-
mentioned campaigns, by the appointment of miM8i and other officials to partake
in these efforts, and by the assignment of troops from outside of the Aquitanian
kingdom for service in these operations. Thus, before the campaign against
Barcelona was undertaken, Charles and Louis had a lengthy meeting at Tours.
In the winter and early spring of 805, before the first attack on Tortosa, Louis
conferred with Charles at Aachen, and after the campaign, the two met at
Thionville. The second campaign against Tortosa was led by Charles's mi8sus,
Ingobert, and the siege of Huesca in 810 was commanded by another of his
missi, Heribert. In the effort against Tortosa in 809, Heribert represented
12 V. Hiud., ch. 14, 16.
4 Ibid., ch. 17.
Charles. In 803, Charles sent his son Charles the younger with an army to rein-
force the besiegers at Barcelona, and earlier he had detailed troops from Francia
and Burgundy to help in the initial stages of that campaign. In 809, Charles
sent a contingent of Franci to support Louis's siege of Tortosa.126
Charles's concern for the success of Carolingian policy in the southwest seems
also to be evidenced in several of the capitularies he issued during the decade be-
fore his death in 814. At the time of the campaign against Barcelona, for which
long and elaborate siege operations were undertaken, Charles issued a capitulary
detailing the baggage the army should carry. Of particular importance in the
present context are the orders given for carryig building and intrenching tools
which were necessary for the erecting of barracks and the lines of circumvallation
and contravallation.'26 The orders that siege artillery and ammunition for these
weapons be carried in the baggage train suggest that Charles or his advisers
were well aware of the problems which might be encountered in the siege of a
city like Barcelona. Of further interest from the point of view of logistics are the
orders concerning the necessity of having carts to haul this materiel as well as
large amounts of extra food and fodder. This might suggest that Charles expected
the siege of Barcelona to last through the winter as it in fact did. In addition,
orders were given in this capitulary to the counts to see to it that there were
enough boats to transport their men and that the bridges along the line of march
were in good order. The rank and file of the army, i.e., the levies of the various
civitates, were to be armed with bows and arrows, suggesting that fire power was
of concern not only in the form of artillery but with regard to hand weapons as
well. We are also informed in this capitulary that the host is supposed .to be or-
gainzed in a bipartite manner: the levies of the cities led by the counts, and the
bands of personal armed retainers of the important men.'27
The general success of the campaign against Barcelona in 8092-803 suggests
that the orders set out in the capitulary discussed above were not grossly ignored.
By contrast, Louis's failure to take Tortosa in 805 may indicate a somewhat
different state of affairs. After returning from Spain, Louis was summoned to
Thionville by Charles, presumably to report in detail on the campaign and per-
haps to make further plans. What Charles learned at Thionville apparently did
not please him, and he issued a capitulary which among other things enumerated
the abuses that limited the size and effectiveness of the Carolingian armies. It
2 For the meeting between Charles and Louis, see ARF, 805, and V. Hlud., chs. 12, 14; for the
missi, see V. Hlud., chs. 15, 16, 17; and for the troops, see Chron. Moissac., 803 (p. 307); Hermoldus,
Poeme, 11. 312-313; V. Hlud., chs. 13, 17. On the chronology, I modify Auzias, "Les sieges," pp. 5-28.
Cf. J. F. Bohmer (E. Mithlbacher, J. Lechner), Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs unter den Karolingern,
751-918 (Innsbruch, 1908), pp. 236-239.
a MGH, Cap. 77, chs. 9, 10. For the dates, see F. L. Ganshof, Richerches sur les capitulaires (Paris
1958), p. 10, n. 26. Ganshof, "Charlemagne's Army," pp. 65, 66, 159-160, believes that this capitulary
should be considered general in nature. He may be correct, but the emphasis on preparation for sieg
warfare may have been stimulated by the projected operations against Barcelona. Campaigns east
of the Rhine and against the Avars in the southeast did not involve the kind of complicated sieg
warfare which was a key element in the Spanish theater of operations.
n7 MGH, Cap. 77, chs. 9, 10.
seems that some free men were trying to avoid military servi
selves over ad servitium Dei and others were claiming that poverty kept them
from performing the military service which was required of them. Charles com-
manded his officials to collect the appropriate fines from those who had failed to
serve as they had been ordered. Charles also noted that those men who had hold-
ings of at least twelve manses were required to appear for battle in mail coats.
Those who held their twelve manses as beneficia were to be deprived of their hold-
ings and their brunia if they failed to do their duty.'28
The difficulties which apparently had beset Carolingian military efforts in the
campaigning season before the meeting at Thionville can be seen in a larger poli-
tical context. At Thionville, Charles ordered all free men and all unfree men in
positions of importance who claimed not to have taken the required oath of
faithfulness to do so. In this context Charles railed against conspiracies and
forbade the carrying of arms within the country except for legimimate military
and paramilitary purposes.'29 Charles's particular dissatisfaction with the mili-
tary in Aquitaine may be illustrated by his directive indicating the circum-
stances under which contingents of Saxons and Frisians would be called upon to
serve in Sapin.'30 If he contemplated the necessity of bringing troops from these
distant northeastern parts of his empire to serve in the southwest, he probably
had less than complete faith in the forces that could be raised in Aquitaine.
In 808 Charles issued yet another capitulary concerned with military matters.
This one probably had force in Louis's kingdom because the court at that time
was showing interest in the problems of developing the Aquitanian frontier into
the Spanish March.'3' The smooth functioning of the local levies seems to have
been Charles's primary concern in this capitulary. By 808 it became clear to
Charles and his advisers that free men having less than four manses could not
afford to serve in a regular manner in the local levies.'32 Thus Charles ordered
that men having one or more manses but less than four were to band together in
groups with total holdings of four manses to provide the means to send one of
their number to the host.'33 There is much in this capitulary that suggests that
mobilization was not going well. Counts, vicarii, and centenarii were permitting
men who were required to serve in the levies to remain at home. Magnates, lay
and ecclesiastical alike, were not bringing their personal armed followers to the
host.'34 In fact, the mobilization for the campaigning season of 807 had failed to
8 MGH, Cap. 44, chs. 6, 15, 16, 19. It should be noted that Charles was concerned about problems
other than those which Louis brought to him. Charles the younger also attended this meeting (ARF,
805) and certain Saxon matters were considered (MGH, Cap. 44, ch. 7).
no MGIH, Cap. 44, chs. 5, 9, 10. See Ganshof, "Le serment," pp. 968-969.
18O MGIH, Cap. 49, chs. 2, 8. For the date, see Ganshof, R4cherches, p. 10, n. 26.
13 For court interest, see ARF, 809, and V. Hlud., chs. 14, 15, 16.
12 See the failure of the mobilization called for in MGH, Cap. 48, chs. 1, 2, 8, as illustrated by MGH,
Cap. 50, ch. 7; Chron. Moiasac., 807 (p. 258); and Annales S. Amandi, ed. G. Pertz (Monumenta Ger-
mania Hiftrica: Scriptores [Hannover, 18261), x, 14 for the year 807. For a discussion of this, see
Ganshof, "Charlemagne's Army," pp. 61, 68, 154, 161.
m MGH, Cap. 60, chs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9.
14 Ibid., chs. 2, 8, 5, 6, 7, 8.
produce sufficient troops, and Charles found it necessary to cancel his military
plans for that year.'35
A steady stream of directives severely censuring magnates and lesser men who
avoided military service was issued by Charles during and immediately after the
period in which the Carolingians failed to take Tortosa and Huesca. The question
of desertion was taken up twice in 810 and then again in 811. The order to collect
the herribannum from all those who avoided military service was also repeated
several times. By 811 Charles commanded that the fine must be collected not
only from the offenders who failed to serve but from those important men in posi
tions of responsibility who connived to permit these abuses. Thus, for example,
a magnate who kept four of his personal armed retainers at home without permis-
sion to do so from the proper authority had to pay the fine of sixty solidi for each
of these vassi. The vassi, themselves, also had to pay sixty solidi each. The count
who allowed those owing service in the local levy to remain at home illegally also
had to pay as did the man who failed to do his military duty. In 811, Charles
added the penalty that those who did not or could not pay this fine would become
serfs of the king at least until such time as they met their obligations.'36
Charles also noted specific abuses committed by vassi of King Louis. These
vassi calimed that since their lord did not take part in a particular military
campaign they also did not have to do so, and thus they ignored the summons to
the host. Louis's absence from the campaign of 808 at Tortosa and from Huesca
in 810 may well have brought this abuse to Charles's notice. It is also specifically
stated in these capitularies that fighting men avoided service by becoming vassi
of magnates whom they knew were not going to be called up for military service.
Charles tried to ensure the service of these men by ordering that a vassus must
serve with the host under the command of the count of the civitas if his lord was
for some reason exempted from campaigning.'37
In the autumn of 811 after enough time had passed to evaluate the failure to
take Huesca, Charles ordered, at least for the immediate future, that the Aqui-
tanians would be called upon to serve beyond their borders only in Spain. This
sharply contrasts with the much heavier burdens placed upon forces raised in
other parts of the empire, and perhaps indicates that the Carolingians were not
having an easy time raising troops in Aquitaine.'38 Charles had become aware
that Aquitanian military organization was not sufficiently responsive to his will
and that it was only incompletely under Carolingian control. As has already been
mentioned, as early as 778 he replaced nine counts and introduced vassi to
strengthen his control of the military in Aquitaine. He prohibited the Aquitanian
magnates who were not vassi dominici from employing the personal armed
followings which were customary. Later, however, Charles reversed this policy

136 MGH, Cap. 64, chs. 12, 13; Cap. 65, ch. 13; Cap. 73, chsa 5, 6; Cap. 74, chs. 1, 2, 4. For som
general remarks on the entire problem, see Ganshof, "Charlemagne's Army," pp. 67-68, 160-161.
137 MGH, Cap. 73, chs. 7, 8, and Cap. 74, chs. 7, 9. See the discussion by Ganshof, "Benefice an
Vassalage," pp. 174-175. These abuses were not confined to Aquitaine as the texts above attest.
a8 MGL, Cap. 74, ch. 8.
Military Organtzation in Aquitaine 31
and permitted what he recognized to be a practice that he could not eliminate.

He hoped to gain some use from these important fighting forces which could
cause so much trouble if not loyal to him. In addition, Charles frequently found
it necessary to send Franks, Goths,and Gascons to undertake or support opera-
tions for which Aquitanian troops should have proved sufficient. After the
failure to take Tortosa in 805, Charles established regulations for using Saxon
and Frisian troops in Spain. In 811 his orders contained directives for the mobili-
zation of trops from many parts of the empire for use in Aquitaine and in Spain.
CONCLUSIONS
The basic structure of the military organization in Aquitaine was left largely
unchanged by the early Carolingians. The offensive force, the host, was organized
along bipartite lines, composed of the local levies of the civitates under the counts
and the personal armed followings of the magnates. These two sources of armed
force were fundamental to the earlier military organization in Aquitaine and
functioned together effectively when the ruling power was able to mobilize them.
This was largely a problem of securing and maintaining the loyalty of the im-
portant men both within and outside of government. In part, the organizational
role of the armed retainers of the magnates is paralleled in the later Roman mili-
tary by the personal followers (bucellarii) of the generals and other potentiores
who often served along side of the units of the regular army. Although the local
levies in the civitates of Aquitaine are essentially Merovingian creations, at least
one element of the levies, the men drawn from the centena, is of imperial origin.
Free men of means, however, formed the rank and file of the levies. Charles's
order that men having four manses were to serve in the levies and that others
with from one to three manses were to join in a group totaling four manses to
support one of their number in the host recognized the growing impoverishment
of the liberi (a process dating back at least to the later Roman empire) and re-
affirmed the Merovingian custom that only those free men who had dependents
to work their land could possibly afford to serve in military campaigns on a
regular basis. That a considerable degree of wealth was necessary for service in
the levies is further evidenced by the ancient custom, reaffirmed by Charles, that
participants in the host were required to supply themselves with food for three
months of campaigning and clothing and arms for six months in the field.'39
Defensively, the fundamental forms of military organization which flourished
in Aquitaine under the Merovingians also continued under the Carolingians.
The many fortified castra, castella, and civitates scattered throughout Aquitaine
were retained and new ones were built. These were defended by garrisons. For
local defense the lantweri, composed of all men who could help against invasion,
continued under the Carolingians.
Though the Carolingians recognized and maintained the basic forms of mili-
tary organization in Aquitaine, they did try to bring about changes. There were
19 Ibid.: "Constitutum est, ut secundum antiquam consuetudinem praeparatio ad hostem faci-

endam indicaretur et servaretur, id est victualia de marca ad tres menses et arma antque vestimenta
ad dimidium annum."
changes in personnel, but we cannot even guess at the number of new men who
were settled in Aquitaine from about 760 to 814. It is clear, however, that Ger-
man-speaking newcomers were not sufficiently numerous to effect substantial
linguistic changes in any locality. Further, it can be noted that only a very few
references to the use of the Salic law survive from later in the ninth century and
no reference to the use of the Ripuarian code are to be found.'40
In 778, and probably afterward as well, Charles introduced into Aquitaine
vassi dominici with personal armed retainers of their own. Some scholars main-
tain that these men formed the backbone of the Carolingian army and consti-
tuted a force of heavily armed cavalry which swept their enemies from the field
with the tactics of mounted shock combat."4' First, it must be admitted that we
simply have no idea how many such heavily armed fighting men there were in
Aquitaine; those who proclaim the importance of such forces admit that they
were not the numerically preponderant element in the Carolingian armies. How-
ever, it is claimed that these horsemen were the tactically decisive element in the
armies of Charles.1, So far as the sources provide us with evidence for the military
tactics of Aquitanian troops for the period under discussion, it is clear that the
besieging of fortified places was of the greatest tactical and indeed strategic sig-
nificance. There were heavily armed horsemen in Aquitaine under the early
Carolingians as there had been under the independent dukes, the Merovingian
kings, and the Roman empire. The tactical predominance of these men, however,
remains undocumented for Aquitaine under the early Carolingians.
It is clear that the men termed vassi dominici and. others called simply vassi
appear with increasing frequency in the early Carolingian sources. Some of the
vassi were the personal dependents of vassi dominici, and others were the personal
dependents of important men, magnates, who were not vassi dominici. Vassi,
whether dependents of the king or of magnates, received some kind of beneficiurn
(something of value) from their lords in return for the services they rendered.
Charles undertook extensive efforts to secure the support of important men;
making them vassi dominici was one method he employed in his efforts to ensure
their loyalty and to obtain service from them and from their vassi. Charles also
issued directives to enforce the swearing of oaths which legally bound magnates
140 Lewis, Development of Southern French and Catalan Society, pp. 58-59, 126-127, discusses th
question of new personnel and also collects the few references on the use of the Salic law in the later
ninth century.
141 White, Medieval Technology and Social Change, pp. 28ff., has been the most forceful recent
proponent of this view. More recently Beeler, Feudal Warfare, pp. 10ff., has supported this idea but
has rejected the fundamental place given to the stirrup by White. See also Norman, Medieval Soldier,
pp. 40ff.
142 White, Medieval Technology and Social Change, pp. 3, 5, 6, 11, 18, 187, 138. On numbers note
Ganshof's remark in "Charlemagne's Army," p. 67: "All that can be affirmed is that the armies of
Charlemagne were small." Wolff, "L'Aquitaine," p. 293: "Il serait 6videmment int6ressant de savoir
si ces vassi, dominici, et autres, 6taient nombreux, mais nous en sommes r&duits aux conjectures."
On the same page, n. 191, he remarks, "Malgr6 le plurimos de l'Atronome... ,on en est r6duit aux
impressions."
who were not va8si dominici to provide military service themselves and to lead
their vamsi, both free and unfree, to the host.
Yet, we should not permit ourselves to conclude that Charles brought about
radical changes simply because the term va8u8 gained in popularity and took on a
new meaning under the early Carolingians. During the Merovingian era, it was
common practice for the kings and later the mayors of the palace to secure the
military aid of important men who led bands of armed retainers by gTanting them
landed and movable wealth. The term vassus, which meant slave in the pre-
Carolingian sources, understandably was not used to describe these men; even
though there is not much terminological identity, there is much that is func-
tionally similar.'"
The early Carolingians strove constantly to increase their control over the
important men, those who served in an official capacity and those who did not.
Charles issued frequent capitularies, imposed oaths of various kinds, refined the
institution of the missi dominici, improved the courts, replaced delinquent offi-
cials, and repossessed the beneficia of vassi who did not do what was required of
them. These improvements probably gave Charles grater control of the military
resources in Aquitaine than had been enjoyed by the independent dukes and their
Merovingian predecessors. Yet, as we have seen, even Charles's control was often
severely limited. The achievement of the early Carolingians in Aquitaine lies in
developing relatively unspectacular administrative refinements and innovations
which were aimed at increasing the efficiency of existing institutions rather than
in braking radically with the past.'44
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
148 Bachrach, "Charles Martel," pp. 66-75, for the pre-Carolingian period.
144 Cf. F. L. Ganshof, "Les traits g6n6raux du syst6me d'institutions de la monarchie franque
SSCI, ix (1961), 124-126, whose emphasis upon the creation of legal forms leads him to conclude that
there was a great development of vassalage. The real impact of these refinements on the military
organization of Aquitaine were, however, slight.

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Military Organization in Aquitaine under the Early Carolingians

Author(s): Bernard S. Bachrach

Vol. XLIX JANUARY 1974 No. 1

MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN AQUITAINE

IT is difficult to overemphasize the role played by military force in the expansion

initiating the large-scale development of what some historians call feudalism.2

THE MEROVINGIAN BACKGROUND

It was common practice among magnates in Merovingian Aquitaine as in

17 Ibid., pp. 68-71.

28Fred. Cont., ch. 47.

The important role played by the Gascons in Aquitanian military organization

THE CAROLINGIAN CONQUEST

For almost a decade (760-768) Peppin fought against Duke Waiofar in an

48 Fred. Cont., chs. 48, 45.

were included among the custodes he deployed in strongholds throughout Aqui-

CHARLES THE GREAT

so displeased Charles that he found it necessary to upset an apparently smooth

80 Ganshof, "Benefice and Vassalage," p. 148.

", V, Elud., ch. 4, and Ann. Einh., 785.

well as among the Carolingians in the days of Peppin. Such an interpretation is

96 See above, pp. 4, 7.

105 MGH, Cap. 32, chs. 30, 64, 68.

The case of Tiffauges, like that of Loudun, provides an example of continuity in

The newly strengthened frontier also served to help support an invasion of

12 V. Hiud., ch. 14, 16.

4 Ibid., ch. 17.

15 See n. 132, above.

and permitted what he recognized to be a practice that he could not eliminate.

19 Ibid.: "Constitutum est, ut secundum antiquam consuetudinem praeparatio ad hostem faci-

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