THIRD DIVISION Despite the opposition filed by the OSG, the RTC issued an order of general default, even
the RTC issued an order of general default, even against
G.R. No. 160895 October 30, 2006
JOSE R. MARTINEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The central issue presented in this Petition for Review is whether an order of general default
issued by a trial court in a land registration case bars the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, from interposing an appeal from the trial court’s subsequent
decision in favor of the applicant.
The antecedent facts follow.
On 24 February 1999, petitioner Jose R. Martinez (Martinez) filed a petition for the registration in
his name of three (3) parcels of land included in the Cortes, Surigao del Sur Cadastre. The lots,
individually identified as Lot No. 464-A, Lot No. 464-B, and Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597, collectively
comprised around 3,700 square meters. Martinez alleged that he had purchased lots in 1952 from
his uncle, whose predecessors-in-interest were traceable up to the 1870s. It was claimed that
Martinez had remained in continuous possession of the lots; that the lots had remained
unencumbered; and that they became private property through prescription pursuant to Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Martinez further claimed that he had been constrained to
initiate the proceedings because the Director of the Land Management Services had failed to do
so despite the completion of the cadastral survey of Cortes, Surigao del Sur.1
The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-30 and raffled to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Surigao del Sur, Branch 27. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
furnished a copy of the petition. The trial court set the case for hearing and directed the publication
of the corresponding Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette. On 30 September 1999, the OSG,
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, opposed the petition on the grounds that appellee’s
possession was not in accordance with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141; that his
muniments of title were insufficient to prove bona-fide acquisition and possession of the subject
parcels; and that the properties formed part of the public domain and thus not susceptible to
private appropriation.2
the Republic of the Philippines, on 29 March 2000. This ensued when during the hearing of even
date, no party appeared before the Court to oppose Martinez’s petition.3
Afterwards, the trial court proceeded to receive Martinez’s oral and documentary evidence in
support of his petition. On 1 August 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision4 concluding that Martinez
and his predecessors-in-interest had been for over 100 years in possession characterized as
continuous, open, public, and in the concept of an owner. The RTC thus decreed the registration
of the three (3) lots in the name of Martinez.
From this Decision, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal dated 28 August 2000, 5 which was approved
by the RTC. However, after the records had been transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the RTC
received a letter dated 21 February 20016 from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) stating that
only Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B were referred to in the Notice of Hearing published in the Official
Gazette; and that Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597 had been deliberately omitted due to the lack of an
approved survey plan for that property. Accordingly, the LRA manifested that this lot should not
have been adjudicated to Martinez for lack of jurisdiction. This letter was referred by the RTC to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.7
On 10 October 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, 8 reversing the RTC
and instead ordering the dismissal of the petition for registration. In light of the opposition filed by
the OSG, the appellate court found the evidence presented by Martinez as insufficient to support
the registration of the subject lots. The Court of Appeals concluded that the oral evidence
presented by Martinez merely consisted of general declarations of ownership, without alluding to
specific acts of ownership performed by him or his predecessors-in-interest. It likewise debunked
the documentary evidence presented by Martinez, adjudging the same as either inadmissible or
ineffective to establish proof of ownership.
No motion for reconsideration appears to have been filed with the Court of Appeals by Martinez,
who instead directly assailed its Decision before this Court through the present petition.
We cannot help but observe that the petition, eight (8) pages in all, was apparently prepared with
all deliberate effort to attain nothing more but the perfunctory. The arguments raised center almost
exclusively on the claim that the OSG no longer had personality to oppose the petition, or appeal
its allowance by the RTC, following the order of general default. Starkly put, "the [OSG] has no
personality to raise any issue at all under the circumstances pointed out hereinabove."9 Otherwise,
it is content in alleging that "[Martinez] presented sufficient and persuasive proof to substantiate
the fact that his title to Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B is worth the confirmation he seeks to be done in
this registration case";10 and that the RTC had since issued a new Order dated 1 September 2003,
confirming Martinez’s title over Lot No. 370.
In its Comment dated 24 May 2004,11 the OSG raises several substantial points, including the fact
that it had duly opposed Martinez’s application for registration before the RTC; that jurisprudence
and the Rules of Court acknowledge that a party in default is not precluded from appealing the
unfavorable judgment; that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Lot No. 370 since its technical
description was not published in the Official Gazette; and that as found by the Court of Appeals
the evidence presented by Martinez is insufficient for registering the lots in his name. 12 Despite an
order from the Court requiring him to file a Reply to the Comment, counsel for Martinez declined to
do so, explaining, among others, that "he felt he would only be taxing the collective patience of this
[Court] if he merely repeats x x x what petitioner had succinctly stated x x x on pages four (4) to
seven (7) of his said petition." Counsel for petitioner was accordingly fined by the Court.13
The Court’s patience is taxed less by redundant pleadings than by insubstantial arguments. The
inability of Martinez to offer an effective rebuttal to the arguments of the OSG further debilitates
what is an already weak petition.
The central question, as posed by Martinez, is whether the OSG could have still appealed the
RTC decision after it had been declared in default. The OSG argues that a party in default is not
precluded from filing an appeal, citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals,14 and
asserts that "[t]he Rules of Court expressly provides that a party who has been declared in default
may appeal from the judgment rendered against him."15
There is error in that latter, unequivocal averment, though one which does not deter from the
ultimate correctness of the general postulate that a party declared in default is allowed to pose an
appeal. Elaboration is in order.
We note at the onset that the OSG does not impute before this Court that the RTC acted
improperly in declaring public respondent in default, even though an opposition had been filed to
Martinez’s petition. Under Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended, the order of
default may be issued "[i]f no person appears and answers within the time allowed." The RTC
appears to have issued the order of general default simply on the premise that no oppositor
appeared before it on the hearing of 29 March 2000. But it cannot be denied that the OSG had
already duly filed its Opposition to Martinez’s petition long before the said hearing. As we held
in Director of Lands v. Santiago:16
[The] opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally
filed, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration
case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set
for the initial healing. The pertinent provision of law which states: "If no person appears
and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant,
no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded . . . ," cannot
be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has
long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical,
unwarranted, and unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the oppositor to appear on
the date of the initial hearing would be a ground for default despite his having filed an
answer, it would have been so stated in unmistakable terms, considering the serious
consequences of an order of default. Especially in this case where the greater public
interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the
respondent Judge should have received the applicant's evidence and set another date for
the reception of the oppositor's evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner
herein should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the government's
claim.17
Strangely, the OSG did not challenge the propriety of the default order, whether in its appeal
before the Court of Appeals or in its petition before this Court. It would thus be improper for the
Court to make a pronouncement on the validity of the default order since the same has not been
put into issue. Nonetheless, we can, with comfort, proceed from same apparent premise of the
OSG that the default order was proper or regular.
The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be disputed. By forgoing the need for
adversarial proceedings, it affords the opportunity for the speedy resolution of cases even as it
penalizes parties who fail to give regard or obedience to the judicial processes.
The extent to which a party in default loses standing in court has been the subject of considerable
jurisprudential debate. Way back in 1920, in Velez v. Ramas,18 we declared that the defaulting
defendant "loses his standing in court, he not being entitled to the service of notices in the case,
nor to appear in the suit in any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final
hearing."19 These restrictions were controversially expanded in Lim Toco v. Go Fay,20 decided in
1948, where a divided Court pronounced that a defendant in default had no right to appeal the
judgment rendered by the trial court, except where a motion to set aside the order of default had
been filed. This, despite the point raised by Justice Perfecto in dissent that there was no provision
in the then Rules of Court or any law "depriving a defaulted defendant of the right to be heard on
appeal."21
The enactment of the 1964 Rules of Court incontestably countermanded the Lim Toco ruling.
Section 2, Rule 41 therein expressly stated that "[a] party who has been declared in default may
likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in
accordance with Rule 38."22 By clearly specifying that the right to appeal was available even if no
petition for relief to set aside the order of default had been filed, the then fresh Rules clearly
rendered the Lim Toco ruling as moot.
Another provision in the 1964 Rules concerning the effect of an order of default acknowledged that
"a party declared in default shall not be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, nor to take
part in the trial."23 Though it might be argued that appellate proceedings fall part of "the trial" since
there is no final termination of the case as of then, the clear intent of the 1964 Rules was to
nonetheless allow the defaulted defendant to file an appeal from the trial court decision. Indeed,
jurisprudence applying the 1964 Rules was unhesitant to affirm a defaulted defendant’s right to
appeal, as guaranteed under Section 2 of Rule 41, even as Lim Toco was not explicitly
abandoned.
In the 1965 case of Antonio, et al. v. Jacinto,24 the Court acknowledged that the prior necessity of
a ruling setting aside the order of default "however, was changed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Under Rule 41, section 2, paragraph 3, a party who has been declared in default may likewise
appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if
no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with
Rule 38."25 It was further qualified in Matute v. Court of Appeals26 that the new availability of a
defaulted defendant’s right to appeal did not preclude "a defendant who has been illegally
declared in default from pursuing a more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for
certiorari to have the judgment by default set aside as a nullity."27
In Tanhu v. Ramolete,28 the Court cited with approval the commentaries of Chief Justice Moran,
expressing the reformulated doctrine that following Lim Toco, a defaulted defendant "cannot
adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing, although [under Section 2, Rule 41,] he
may appeal the judgment rendered against him on the merits."29
Thus, for around thirty-odd years, there was no cause to doubt that a defaulted defendant had the
right to appeal the adverse decision of the trial court even without seeking to set aside the order of
default. Then, in 1997, the Rules of Civil Procedure were amended, providing for a new Section 2,
Rule 41. The new provision reads:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating
consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against or one or more of several parties or in separate
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is
pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Evidently, the prior warrant that a defaulted defendant had the right to appeal was removed from
Section 2, Rule 41. On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules incorporated the
particular effects on the parties of an order of default:
Sec. 3. Default; declaration of.—If the defending party fails to answer within the time
allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the
defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.
Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief
as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to
submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
(a) Effect of order of default.—A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings but shall not take part in the trial.
(b) Relief from order of default.—A party declared in default may any time after notice
thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default
upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of
default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the
interest of justice.
(c) Effect of partial default.—When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause
of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to
do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render
judgment upon the evidence presented.
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded.—A judgment rendered against a party in default shall
not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages.
xxx
It cannot be escaped that the old provision expressly guaranteeing the right of a defendant
declared in default to appeal the adverse decision was not replicated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Should this be taken as a sign that under the 1997 Rules a defaulted defendant no
longer has the right to appeal the trial court decision, or that the Lim Toco doctrine has been
reinstated?
If post-1997 jurisprudence and the published commentaries to the 1997 Rules were taken as an
indication, the answer should be in the negative. The right of a defaulted defendant to appeal
remains extant.
By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of a party declared in default had evolved into
a fairly comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of Appeals:30
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment,
file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has
meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)
 b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default,
but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial
under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and
executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)31
The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet even
after that provision’s deletion under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely
again on the Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal
from the judgment rendered against him. This can be seen in the cases of Indiana Aerospace
University v. Commission on Higher Education,32 Tan v. Dumarpa,33and Crisologo v. Globe
Telecom, Inc.34
Annotated textbooks on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure similarly acknowledge that even under
the new rules, a defaulted defendant retains the right to appeal as previously confirmed under the
old Section 2, Rule 41. In his textbook on Civil Procedure, Justice Francisco answers the question
"What are the remedies available to a defending party in default?" with a reiteration of
the Lina doctrine, including the remedy that a defaulted defendant "may also appeal from the
judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set
aside the order of default has been presented by him."35 Justice Regalado also restates
the Lina rule in his textbook on Civil Procedure, opining that the remedies enumerated therein,
even if under the former Rules of Procedure, "would hold true under the present amended
Rules."36 Former Court of Appeals Justice Herrerra likewise reiterates the Lina doctrine, though
with the caveat that an appeal from an order denying a petition for relief from judgment was no
longer appealable under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules.37 Herrera further adds:
Section 2, paragraph [2] of the former Rule 41, which allows an appeal from a denial of a
petition for relief, was deleted from the present Rule, and confined appeals to cases from
a final judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein, when declared by these rules to be appealable. A judgment by default
may be considered as one that completely disposes of the case.38
We are hard-pressed to find a published view that the enactment of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure accordingly withdrew the right, previously granted under the 1964 Rules, of a defaulted
defendant to appeal the judgment by default against him. Neither is there any provision under the
1997 Rules which expressly denies the defaulted defendant such a right. If it is perplexing why the
1997 Rules deleted the previous authorization under the old Section 2, Rule 41 (on subject of
appeal), it is perhaps worth noting that its counterpart provision in the 1997 Rules, now Section 1,
Rule 41, is different in orientation even as it also covers "subject of appeal." Unlike in the old
provision, the bulk of the new provision is devoted to enumerating the various rulings from which
no appeal may be taken, and nowhere therein is a judgment by default included. A declaration
therein that a defaulted defendant may still appeal the judgment by default would have seemed
out of place.
Yet even if it were to assume the doubtful proposition that this contested right of appeal finds no
anchor in the 1997 Rules, the doctrine still exists, applying the principle of stare decisis.
Jurisprudence applying the 1997 Rules has continued to acknowledge the Lina doctrine which
embodies this right to appeal as among the remedies of a defendant, and no argument in this
petition persuades the Court to rule otherwise.
In Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the Philippines,39 the Court, through Justice Callejo,
Sr., again provided a comprehensive restatement of the remedies of the defending party declared
in default, which we adopt for purposes of this decision:
It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his standing in court and
his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to
appeal from the judgment by default and assail said judgment on the ground, inter alia,
that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or
that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the
decision is contrary to law. Such party declared in default is proscribed from seeking a
modification or reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by
him in the Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would thereby be allowed to regain
his right to adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the trial court when he was declared
in default, and which he failed to have vacated. In this case, the petitioner sought the
modification of the decision of the trial court based on the evidence submitted by it only in
the Court of Appeals.40
If it cannot be made any clearer, we hold that a defendant party declared in default retains the
right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the
material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of
the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default. We reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine,
denying such right to appeal unless the order of default has been set aside, was no longer
controlling in this jurisdiction upon the effectivity of the 1964 Rules of Court, and up to this day.
Turning to the other issues, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Martinez failed to
adduce the evidence needed to secure the registration of the subject lots in his name.
It should be noted that the OSG, in appealing the case to the Court of Appeals, did not introduce
any new evidence, but simply pointed to the insufficiency of the evidence presented by Martinez
before the trial court. The Court of Appeals was careful to point out that the case against Martinez
was established not by the OSG’s evidence, but by petitioner’s own insufficient evidence. We
adopt with approval the following findings arrived at by the Court of Appeals, thus:
The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who must
show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. Unless
the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property
involved was acquired by him or his ancestors by any of the means provided for the
proper acquisition of public lands, the rule is settled that the property must be held to be a
part of the public domain. The applicant must, therefore, present competent and A According to my grandfather he bought that land from a certain Juan Casano in the
persuasive proof to substantiate his claim. He may not rely on general statements, or year 1870’s[,] I think.
mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title.
xxxx
Considered in the light of the opposition filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, we find
the evidence adduced by appellee, on the whole, insufficient to support the registration of Q By the way[,] when did your grandfather Hilarion Martinez die?
the subject parcels in his name. To prove the provenance of the land, for one, all that
appellee proffered by way of oral evidence is the following cursory testimony during his
A Either in 1920 or 1921.
direct examination, viz:

xxxx Q Since you said your immediate predecessors-in-interest Julian Martinez and Juan
Martinez inherited the same from your grandfather. Can you say it the same that your
predecessors-in-interest were the owners and possessors of the same since 1921 up to
Q You mentioned that you are the owner of these three (3) parcels of land. How did you the time they sold the land to you in 1952?
begin the ownership of the same?
A Yes, sir.
A I bought it from my uncles Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez.
xxxx
xxxx
In the dreary tradition of most land registration cases, appellee has apparently
Q x x x x Who took possession of these parcels of land from then on? taken the absence of representation for appellant at the hearing of his petition as
license to be perfunctory in the presentation of his evidence. Actual possession of
A I took possession, sir land, however, consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. It is not enough
Q As owner? for an applicant to declare himself or his predecessors-in-interest the possessors
and owners of the land for which registration is sought. He must present specific
acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general
A Yes, as owner. statements which are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and
substantiation.
Q Up to the present who is in possession as owner of these parcels of land?
The record shows that appellee did not fare any better with the documentary evidence he
A I took possession. adduced before the trial court. The October 20, 1952 Deed of Sale by which appellee
claims to have purchased the subject parcels from his uncle, Julian Martinez, was
Q Before Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez sold these parcels of land before you took not translated from the vernacular in which it was executed and, by said token, was
possession who were the owners and in possession of these? inadmissible in evidence. Having submitted a white print copy of the survey plan
for Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B, appellee also submitted the tracing cloth plan for Lot
A Hilarion Martinez, the father of my predecessors-in-interest and also my grandfather. No. 370 which does not, however, appear to be approved by the Director of
Lands. In much the same manner that the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is
a mandatory statutory requirement which cannot be waived, the rule is settled that a
xxxx survey plan not approved by the Director of Lands is not admissible in evidence.41

Court: These findings of the Court of Appeals, arrived at after a sufficiently extensive evaluation of the
evidence, stand in contrast to that contained in the RTC decision, encapsulated in a one-
Q Of your own knowledge[,] where [sic] did your grandfather Hilarion Martinez acquire paragraph précis of the factual allegations of Martinez concerning how he acquired possession of
these lands? the subject properties. The Court of Appeals, of course, is an appropriate trier of facts, and a
comparison between the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and that of the RTC clearly
demonstrates that it was the appellate court which reached a more thorough and considered
evaluation of the evidence.

As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the burden of proof expected of the petitioner in a land
registration case has not been matched in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 76371 January 20, 2000
MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL MAGALA substituted
by his Heirs, OTILIO DAMASEN and SEGUNDINA DAMASEN, ANTONIO ESCALANTE,
METODIO TULLAS, FLORA LABUGUEN and JUANA LABUGUEN, LOURDES SINDON
BAYUBAY, MANUEL MEDRANO and JOSE MEDRANO, petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO VALERA and the HONORABLE COURT of APPEALS, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
More than half a century ago,1 private respondent applied for the registration of two parcels of land
located in Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra described in Plan PSU-119561 with a total land area of
232,908 square meters. The first lot (hereinafter referred to as Lot 1) has an area of 210,767
square meters whereas the other lot (Lot 2) has an area of 22,141 square meters. In support of
her application, private respondent presented documents showing that when she was still single,
she bought Lot 1 during the years 1929-1932 from Cristeta Trangued and the heirs of Juan Valera
Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof since the Spanish regime in the concept of
owners and who declared it in their name for taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued
possession of said land in the concept of owner and continued to pay the tax thereon in her name.
Notices of the application for registration were published in the Official Gazette, with copies thereof
sent to persons mentioned therein and posted in the proper places.
The Director of Lands together with petitioners and other persons2 opposed the application of
private respondent. These oppositors were excluded from the order of general default issued by
the lower court on June 16, 1950.3 In the course of the hearing, the oppositors (except the Director
of Lands) aver that their lands were included in Lot 1 which private respondent sought to register
in her name. In support thereof, they contend that the land embraced by Lot 1 at the time it was
bought by private respondent is not the same land covered in her application for registration. To
avoid confusion, oppositors moved for an ocular inspection in order to determine the correct
boundary limits of the lands they respectively claim, however, the same was not allowed by the
court a quo. For his part, the Director of Lands' opposition was denied for failure to substantiate
his claim that the subject lands were part of the public domain. The opposition of the oppositors
other than the herein petitioners were likewise denied for various reasons including failure to
present their evidence.
After trial, in a decision dated April 23, 1956, the lower court disposed of the application for
registration as follows:
In view of all the foregoing, the applicant Rosario Valera married to Juan Valera, a
resident of Bangued, Abra, has proven that she has a registerable title to Lot 1, Psu-
119561, with an area of 210,767 square meters as her exclusive property, subject to the
encumbrance in favor of the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P1,000.00; and to Lot
2 in the same plan, with an area of 22,141 square meters, without liens or encumbrances,
as conjugal partnership property with her husband, Juan Valera.
After this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree be entered and the
corresponding title issue in accordance with law.4
Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is concerned, arguing,
among others, that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for new trial and their demand
for ocular inspection. On March 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals set aside the appealed decision
and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, and ordered the conduct of an
ocular inspection. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. This case shall be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings which shall include an ocular
inspection of the land applied with a view to determine its identity, location and boundary
limits whether the latter have been included in Lot 1 of the applicant's plan to warrant their
exclusion from the plan, or their registration in the names of the oppositors who have
presented evidence in support of their claim. Thereafter judgment shall be accordingly
rendered.5
In accordance with the CA directive, three commissioners were appointed by the trial court to
conduct the ocular inspection. The commissioners found:
That the property sought to be registered under survey plan Psu-119561 was relocated
and the extent and bounds of the portions claimed by the oppositors were pointed to by
them personally or by their supposed representative, the results of which are clearly
shown in the accompanying sketch plan marked as Annex "A" of their report by the
corresponding names, area and dimensions.
That the survey of the claims was continued the following day, January 29, 1967.
OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS
1. The claims of Manuel Magala, Abraham Lalugan, and Layao, Juan Medrano and
Eugenio Medrano as shown now in the sketch plan Annex "A" are not shown in the
original survey plan Psu-119561;
2. That claims of Otilio Damasen, Nicolas Bigornia, Ricardo Bersamira, Bonifacio
Brangan, Cristeta Medrano, Matias Turdil, Mariano Turqueza, Flora Labuguen, Cornelio
Bayubay, Ponce Talape, and Metodio Tullar, appeared in the original survey plan Psu-
119561 and likewise in sketch plan Annex "A" although three of these claims bear
different identifying names in the sketch Annex "A";
3. That out of the original area of 210,767 square meters in original survey plan Psu-
119561, the remaining portion not subject of opposition as appearing in sketch plan
Annex "A" is 69,683 square meters;
4. That the "Calle para Collago" which according to the decision of the Court of Appeals
and is stoutly maintained until the present by the oppositors to be the extent or boundary
 of the property of the applicant on the South side is existing and still is the boundary on
the South and on the Southeast side, as shown in the Sketch Plan, Exh. "A";
That the property of Francisco Santua abound also the applicant's property sought to be
registered on the South sides, at present as was the case during the original survey.6
The oppositors filed an opposition to the commissioner's report, whereupon a second ocular
inspection was ordered by the trial court. After the second inspection, the trial court, on August 28,
1967 again rendered judgment reiterating its original decision ordering the registration of the
aforesaid Lot 1 of PSU 119561 with an area of 210,7677 square meters in the name of private
respondent. The judge made the following observations based on the ocular inspection:
The Commissioners and the Presiding Judge, upon their ocular inspection, found out a
visible boundary on the South-east side of Lot 1 known as "Calle para Collago" which is
represented in the relocation plan Exh. HH running from the intersection to Lagayan
between points 22 and 21 down to point 18. This, in the opinion of the Court, is the
extension of the "Calle para Collago" referred to by the applicant Rosario Valera as
boundary exactly on the South but which was converted into ricefields by Francisco
Santua. This circumstance now could explain the presence of Francisco Santua as
boundary owner on the South which the parties stoutly maintained in the former
proceedings that the "Calle para Collago" was on the South but which oppositors now
repudiate claiming that the "Calle para Collago" is on the East. Taking a good view over
Lot 1, it could safely be concluded that the existing "Calle para Collago" is more to the
South than to the East.
With respect to the claim of the Damasens over Lot A mentioned in Exh. D which the
Court inadvertently failed to pass upon, the Court has found that it is within the property of
the applicant.8
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court reiterates its former decision ordering the registration of Lot 1 of
Plan Psu-119561, Exh. D, with an area of 210,767 square meters in the name of
applicant ROSARIO VALERA of Bangued, Abra, and a conjugal property with her
husband Juan Valera of the same municipality. The encumbrance with the Philippine
National Bank in the amount of P1,000.00 having already been settled (Exh. JJ-1) same
shall no longer be annotated on the title henceforth to be issued.
Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree issue.
The applicant Rosario Valera is hereby directed to pay within seventy two hours from
notice hereof the sum of P182.00 as fees for the commissioner Santiago Alejandre who
made the relocation survey.9
The case was again appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 40796-R) by the oppositors, some
of whom are now the petitioners in this case. 10 They argue that the lower court erred in not
excluding the areas they claimed as their own which were wrongfully included in Lot 1 but was
ordered registered in private respondent's name. Disposing of the appeal, the CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with the modification that the registration of Lot 1
of appellees (private respondent herein) should be confined to the extent only as
indicated in the sketch annexed to the Commissioner's report, Exhibit HH, and excluding
therefrom the landholding of the oppositors, as indicated in the same sketch, the
judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED. 11
The decision became final and executory for which a corresponding entry of judgment was issued
by the Court of Appeals. 12 Later, private respondent filed with the trial court a motion for the
issuance of writ of possession over two lots respectively tenanted by Trium Donato and Rudy
Donato which were likewise respectively claimed by Santiago Partolan (not an oppositor in the
land registration case) and Crispin Baltar (one of the oppositors). 13 In an Order issued on
September 14, 1981, the court a quo denied the motion. 14 When her subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied in another Order dated November 25, 1981, 15 private respondent
appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) which reversed the said two orders and
forthwith issued a decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the ORDERS appealed from are hereby
REVERSED and judgment is hereby entered ordering:
1. The issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of applicant-appellant covering the
landholding claimed by oppositor Crispin Baltar and tenanted by Rudy Donato;
2. Confirming the word "Landholding" in the dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R.
No. 40796-R as singular and referring only to the landholding opposed by oppositors
Segundina and Otilio Damasen as the only landholding excluded from lot 1; and
3. Ordering the issuance of the WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of the applicant-
appellant covering the landholdings opposed by the other oppositors who did not appeal
the decision of the lower court dated August 28, 1967.
Without any special pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED. 16
Oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of
Appeals. 17 Hence this petition for review initiated by some of the oppositors in the trial court. The
petition was initially denied by the Court. On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the
case was reinstated and respondent was required to submit her comment to the petition. 18
After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and after deciphering the ambiguous
discussions in the petition, 19 the assailed ruling of the respondent court cannot be sustained. The
burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant 20 who must show that he parcel of land, such as private respondent, must rely on the strength of his title and not on the
is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. 21 On him also rests the burden weakness of the defendant's claim. 34
to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain 22 considering that the inclusion in a of the public domain nullifies the title. 23Undoubtedly, a Private respondent's contention that the dispositive portion of the CA decision on April 30, 1979 in
land registration proceeding is one which is in rem in character, so that the default order issued by CA GR 40796-R which mentioned only "landholding" and not "landholdings", thus referring only to
the court binds the whole world and all persons whether known or unknown, 24 except those who that area claimed by the Damasen spouses, is too trivial. A reading of the said decision and the
have appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration case. 25 In the case at bar, those foregoing discussion clearly indicates that the land to be registered in private respondent's name
exempted from the order of general default are the petitioners and the other oppositors mentioned is limited to a certain area stated in the sketch annexed to the Commissioner's report. It
in footnote number 2. categorically excluded those portions pertaining to the oppositors. Since private respondent failed
to show that she has a proprietary right over the excluded areas, such as the portions occupied by
There is no dispute that the lands occupied and claimed by oppositors-petitioners Segundina and those against whom the writ of possession was sought for, then the trial court was correct in
Otilio Damasen were already finally adjudged excluded from Lot 1 and cannot be registered in refusing to grant the writ as the same has no basis.
private respondent's name. In other words, the Damasens were declared to have a rightful and
registrable right over their claims of specific portions of Lot 1. What private respondent wants is WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
that she be installed in possession of the area claimed by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar. Of SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court dated September 14, 1981 and November 25,
these two, only Baltar entered his opposition to private respondent's application for land 1981 are REINSTATED.
registration. Being a proceeding in rem, Partolan is charged with knowledge of the application of
private respondent since the notice was published in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled to a writ of possession
of that portion of Lot 1 occupied by Partolan and Baltar. No evidence was shown that private
respondent had a rightful claim whether possessory or proprietary with respect to those areas.
Even if Partolan was excluded by the order of general default and Baltar did not appeal from the
trial court's decision of April 23, 1956, the applicant must still prove and establish that she has
registrable rights over the land which must be grounded on inconvertible evidence and based on
positive and absolute proof. The declaration by the applicant that the land applied for has been in
the possession of her predecessor-in-interest for a certain period, does not constitute the "well-
nigh inconvertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in land registration. 26 Allegations of her
predecessors' ownership of the lot during the Spanish period is self-serving 27 and the declaration
of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to prove
ownership. 28 It should be noted that tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive
evidence of ownership in land registration cases. 29 Private respondent should have substantiated
her claim with clear and convincing evidence specifically showing the nature of her claim. Her
description of the circumstances of her own possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-
interest are mere conclusions of law which require further factual support and substantiation. If an
applicant does not have any rightful claim over real property, the Torrens system of registration
can confirm or record nothing. 30

Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one who relies on some
documents enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of said title but
also the identity of the land therein referred to, 31 inasmuch as this is required by law. The dispute
in this case pertains to the correctness of the survey of specific areas of lands. It must be borne in
mind what defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but the
boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. 32 Considering that the
writ of possession was sought by private respondent against persons who were in "actual
possession under claim of ownership," the latter's possession raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. 33 This unrebutted resumption militates against the claim of private respondent,
especially considering the evidentiary rule under Article 434 of the Civil Code that a claimant of a
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 175578 August 11, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ZENAIDA GUINTO-ALDANA, in her own behalf as Attorney-in-fact of MA. AURORA GUINTO-
COMISO, MA. LUISA GUINTO-DIONISIO, ALFREDO GUINTO, JR., PACITA R. GUINTO,
ERNESTO R. GUINTO, NATIVIDAD R. GUINTO and ALBERTO R. GUINTO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, assails the March 30, 2006 Decision1 and the
November 20, 2006 Resolution,2 both of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500. The
assailed decision reversed and set aside the July 10, 2003 judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court
of Las Piñas City, Branch 199 in LRC Case No. 02-0036, one for original registration of title,
whereas the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The facts follow.
On April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana4 (Zenaida), Ma. Aurora Guinto-Comiso, Ma.
Luisa Guinto-Dionisio, Alfredo Guinto, Jr., Pacita R. Guinto, Ernesto R. Guinto, Natividad R.
Guinto and Alberto R. Guinto, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch
199 an Application for Registration of Title5 over two pieces of land in Talango, Pamplona Uno,
Las Piñas City. These lands, identified as Lot No. 4 and Lot No. 5 in Conversion Consolidation
Subdivision Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,6 measure 1,509 square meters and 4,640 square
meters, respectively.7 Respondents professed themselves to be co-owners of these lots, having
acquired them by succession from their predecessors Sergio Guinto (Sergio) and Lucia Rivera-
Guinto (Lucia)—Zenaida’s parents—who, in turn, had acquired the property under a 1969
document denominated as "Kasulatan sa Paghahati ng Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman na may
Pagpaparaya at Bilihan." Under this document, Sergio and Lucia Guinto acquired for a
consideration the respective shares on the property of Pastor Guinto, Dionisio Guinto, Potenciana
Guinto and Marcelina Bernardo who, together with Luisa, had derived the same from Romulado
Guinto.8Respondents also alleged that until the time of the application, they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous
possession of these lots in the concept of owner and that they had consistently declared the
property in their name for purposes of real estate taxation.9
In support of their application, respondents submitted to the court the blueprint of Plan Ccs-
007601-000040-D,10 as well as copies of the technical descriptions of each lot,11 a certification
from the geodetic engineer12 and the pertinent tax declarations,13 together with the receipts of
payment therefor.14 Expressly, they averred that the property’s original tracing cloth plan had
previously been submitted to the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 255 (Las Piñas RTC) in
connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128—a previous registration case involving
the subject property which, however, had been dismissed without prejudice.15
The trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and substance; hence, it gave due
course thereto and ordered compliance with the publication and notification requirements of the
law.16
Opposing the application, petitioner, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City,
advanced that the lots sought to be registered were inalienable lands of the public domain; that
neither respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in prior possession thereof; and
that the muniment of title and the tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition or of prior possession in the concept of
owner.17
At the hearing, Zenaida identified her herein co-respondents to be her siblings, nephews and
nieces. She likewise identified the adjoining lot owners named in the application and the
supporting documents attached to the application as well. She testified that the subject lots had
been surveyed at the instance of her family sometime between 1994 and 1995, and that said
survey was documented in Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and in the geodetic engineer’s technical
description of the lots. She implied that they did obtain the original tracing cloth plan of the
property, but it was forwarded to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) by the Las Piñas RTC in
connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128. Notwithstanding this admission, and
without objection from the oppositor, the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and the technical
description of the property were provisionally marked in evidence.18
Furthermore, Zenaida—61 years old at the time of her testimony—declared that she has known
that the subject lots were owned by her family since she was 5 years old and from her earliest
recollection, she narrated that her grandparents had lived in the subject lots until the death of her
grandmother in 1961. She implied that aside from her predecessors there were other persons,
caretakers supposedly, who had tilled the land and who had lived until sometime between 1980
and 1990. She remembered her grandmother having constructed a house on the property, but the
same had already been destroyed. Also, sometime in 1970, her family built an adobe fence
around the perimeter of the lots and later, in the 1990s, they reinforced it with hollow blocks and
concrete after an inundation caused by the flood.19 She claimed that she and her father, Sergio,
had been religious in the payment of real estate taxes as shown by the tax declarations and tax
receipts which she submitted to the court and which, following identification, were forthwith marked
in evidence.20
Zenaida’s claim of prior, open, exclusive and continuous possession of the land was corroborated
by Josefina Luna (Josefina), one of the adjoining lot owners. Josefina, then 73 years old, strongly
declared that the subject lots were owned by Zenaida’s parents, Sergio Guinto and Lucia Rivera,
since she reached the age of understanding, and that she had not come to know of any instance
where a third party had placed a claim on the property. When asked whether there was anyone
residing in the property and whether there were improvements made thereon, she said there was
no one residing therein and that there was nothing standing thereon except for a nipa hut. 21
At the close of Josefina’s testimony, respondents formally offered their exhibits without the
oppositor placing any objection thereto.22 After weighing the evidence, the trial court, on July 10,
2003, rendered its Decision denying the application for registration. It found that respondents were
unable to establish with certainty the identity of the lots applied for registration, because of failure
to submit to the court the original tracing cloth plan as mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529. It likewise noted that the fact of adverse, continuous, open, public and peaceful possession
in the concept of owner has not been proved by the evidence as Zenaida’s and Josefina’s
respective testimonies did not establish the nature of the possession of respondents’
predecessors.23 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the applicants to comply with the requirements of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, the Application for Original Registration of Title is hereby DENIED.
ORDERED.24
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on March 30, 2006, issued the
assailed Decision reversing the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.26 Hence, it filed the instant petition which
attributes error to the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial court’s July 10, 2003 decision.
Petitioner principally posits that under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the submission in court of the
original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be registered is a mandatory requirement in
registration proceedings in order to establish the exact identity of the property. While respondents
admitted that the original tracing cloth plan of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 in this case was in the custody of
the LRA as a consequence of their first attempt to have the property registered, petitioner,
invoking Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines,27 believes that respondents, on that score
alone, are not relieved of their procedural obligation to adduce in evidence the original copy of the
plan, because they could have easily retrieved it from the LRA and presented it in court.28
Furthermore, petitioner suggests that the blueprint of the subdivision plan submitted by
respondents cannot approximate substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 17 of
P.D. No. 1529. Again, relying on the aforementioned Del Rosario case, petitioner observes that
the blueprint in this case, allegedly illegible and unreadable, does not even bear the certification of
the Lands Management Bureau.29 Lastly, petitioner attacks respondents’ claim of prior possession.
It notes that there is no clear and convincing evidence that respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, adverse, public and exclusive possession of Lot Nos. 4
and 5 for 30 years.30
Commenting on the petition, respondents observe that petitioner’s arguments are mere reiterative
theses on the issues that have already been addressed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
Decision and Resolution, and that there are no new matters raised which have not yet been
previously passed upon. Accordingly, they prayed that the petition be denied.31
We find the petition to be unmeritorious.
Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree of 1978,
materially provides:
Section 17. What and where to file.–The application for land registration shall be filed with the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file,
together with the application, all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of
the land approved by the Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has
furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes.
The provision denotes that it is imperative in an application for original registration that the
applicant submit to the court, aside from the original or duplicate copies of the muniments of title, a
copy of a duly approved survey plan of the land sought to be registered. The survey plan is
indispensable as it provides a reference on the exact identity of the property. This begs the
question in the instant case: Does the blueprint copy of the survey plan suffice for compliance with
the requirement? In not so many cases,32 it was held that the non-submission, for any reason, of
the original tracing cloth plan is fatal to the registration application, since the same is mandatory in
original registration of title. For instance, in the Del Rosario case relied on by petitioner, the Court
ruled that the submission of the original copy of the duly approved tracing cloth plan is a
mandatory condition for land registration as it supplies the means by which to determine the exact
metes and bounds of the property. The applicant in that case was unable to submit the original
tracing cloth plan of the land he was claiming because apparently, as in the present case, it was
previously transmitted by the clerk of court to the LRA. Yet the Court, deeming it the applicant’s
obligation to retrieve the plan himself and present it in evidence, denied the application, to wit:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of
Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The
reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a
parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall
the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining
land.1avvphi1 The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner’s application for
registration.
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the branch
clerk of court, but the latter submitted the same to the LRA. This claim has no merit. Petitioner is
duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial
court. x x x33
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is
merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of
the property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the
boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must
be denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied
by pieces of evidence—such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed
technical description of the property—which may likewise substantially and with as much certainty
prove the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered.
Thus, sound is the doctrinal precept laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,34 and in the later cases of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the Philippines35 and Republic
of the Philippines v. Hubilla,36 that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for
registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now the
Lands Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]),
blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification. Pertinently, the
Court in Hubilla, citing Recto, pronounced:
While the petitioner correctly asserts that the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth
plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory requirement, this Court has
recognized instances of substantial compliance with this rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled
that blueprint copies of the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other evidence
could also provide sufficient identification to identify a piece of land for registration purposes. x x
x37
In the case at bar, we find that the submission of the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,
together with the technical description of the property, operates as substantial compliance with the
legal requirement of ascertaining the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 applied for registration. The
blueprint, which is shown to have been duly executed by Geodetic Engineer Rolando Roxas
(Roxas), attached to the application and subsequently identified, marked, and offered in evidence,
shows that it proceeded officially from the Lands Management Services and, in fact, bears the
approval of Surveys Division Chief Ernesto Erive. It also shows on its face that the survey of the
property was endorsed by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the
DENR.38 This, compounded by the accompanying technical description of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 duly
executed and verified also by Roxas,39 should substantially supply as it did the means by which
the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 may be ascertained.
Verily, no error can be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that respondents were able
to approximate compliance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Also telling is the observation made
by the Court of Appeals that there was no objection raised by the oppositor or by the LRA to the
admission of the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D despite the fact that they were well-
informed of the present proceedings, to wit:
In the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants do not deny that only the blueprint copy of the plan of
the subject lands (Exh. "J") and not the original tracing cloth plan thereof was submitted to the
court a quo since they had previously submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the Land
Registration Authority. However, despite the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants to present the
original tracing cloth plan, neither the Land Registration Authority nor the oppositor-appellee
question[ed] this deficiency. Likewise, when the blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. "J") was offered in
evidence, the oppositor-apellee did not raise any objection thereto. Such silence on the part of the
Land Registration [Authority] and the oppositor-appellee can be deemed as an implied admission
that the original tracing cloth plan and the blueprint copy thereof (Exh. "J") are one and the same,
free from all defects and clearly identify the lands sought to be registered. In this regard x x x, the
blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. "J"), together with its technical descriptions (Exhs. "K" and "L"), is
deemed tantamount to substantial compliance with the requirements of law.40
We now proceed to the issue of possession. Petitioner theorizes that not only were respondents
unable to identify the lots applied for registration; it also claims that they have no credible evidence
tending to establish that for at least 30 years they and their predecessors-in-interest have
occupied and possessed the property openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.41 We do not agree.
In an original registration of title under Section 14(1)42 P.D. No. 1529, the applicant for registration
must be able to establish by evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts
of dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.43 He
must prove that for at least 30 years, he and his predecessor have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land. Republic v. Alconaba 44 well
explains possession and occupation of this character, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.45
Proceeding from this fundamental principle, we find that indeed respondents have been in
possession and occupation of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 under a bona fide claim of ownership for the
duration required by law. This conclusion is primarily factual.
From the records, it is clear that respondents’ possession through their predecessor-in-interest
dates back to as early as 1937. In that year, the subject property had already been declared for
taxation by Zenaida’s father, Sergio, jointly with a certain Toribia Miranda (Toribia). 46 Yet, it also
can be safely inferred that Sergio and Toribia had declared the land for taxation even earlier
because the 1937 tax declaration shows that it offsets a previous tax number. 47 The property was
again declared in 1979,48 198549 and 199450 by Sergio, Toribia and by Romualdo.
Certainly, respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it not been for the fact
that, as certified by the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor, the relevant portions of the tax
records on file with it had been burned when the assessor’s office was razed by fire in 1997. 51 Of
equal relevance is the fact that with these tax assessments, there came next tax payments.
Respondents’ receipts for tax expenditures on Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977 and 2001 are
likewise fleshed out in the records and in these documents, Sergio, Toribia and Romualdo are the
named owners of the property with Zenaida being identified as the one who delivered the payment
in the 1994 receipts.52
The foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments clearly show that Zenaida’s testimony in this
respect is no less believable. And the unbroken chain of positive acts exercised by respondents’
predecessors, as demonstrated by these pieces of evidence, yields no other conclusion than that
as early as 1937, they had already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the property. Not only
do they show that they had excluded all others in their claim but also, that such claim is in all good
faith.

Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax declarations and realty tax
payment are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are a good indication of
possession in the concept of owner. These documents constitute at least proof that the holder has
a claim of title over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to
the property. It also announces his adverse claim against the state and all other parties who may
be in conflict with his interest. More importantly, it signifies an unfeigned intention to contribute to
government revenues—an act that strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.53

Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the concept of owner—
open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition from the government or from
any private individual—itself makes their right thereto unquestionably settled and, hence,
deserving of protection under the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 30, 2006 Decision and the November 20, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179181 November 18, 2013
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, Petitioner,
vs.
CRESENCIASTA.TERESA RAMOS, assisted by her husband PONCIANO
FRANCISCO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this petition for review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the
challenge to the April 10 2007 decision2 and the August 9, 2007 resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84646. This CA decision affirmed, with modification, the January
17, 2005 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156 of Pasig City (RTC), in LRC Case No.
N-5811 that denied the application for confirmation and registration of title filed by the petitioner,
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM).
The Factual Antecedents
At the core of the controversy in the present petition are two parcels of land – Lot 1 with an area of
34 square meters and Lot 2 with an area of 760 square meters- covered by amended Plan PSU-
2239195 property), both located in what used to be Barrio Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. On
September 15, 1966, the RCAM filed before the R TC, (then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch 11, acting as a land registration court, an application for registration of title 6 (application) of
property, pursuant to Commonwealth Act C.A.) No. 141 (the Public Land Act). 7On October 4,
1974, the RCAM amended its application8 by reducing Lot 2 to 760 square meters (from 1,832
square meters).
In its amended application, the RCAM claimed that it owned the property; that it acquired the
property during the Spanish time; and that since then, it has been in open, public, continuous and
peaceful possession of it in the concept of an owner. It added that to the best of its knowledge and
belief, no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affects the property, and that no person has any
claim, legal or equitable, on the property.
The RCAM attached the following documents to support its application: amended plan Psu-
223919; technical description of Lots 1 and 2;9 surveyor s certificate;10 and Tax Declaration No.
9551 issued on September 6, 1966.11
On May 22, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Director of Lands, filed
an opposition12 to the application. The Republic claimed that the property is part of the public
domain and cannot be subject to private appropriation.
On August 18, 1992, respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos, through her husband Ponciano
Francisco, filed her opposition13 to the RCAM's application. She alleged that the property formed
part of the entire property that her family owns and has continuously possessed and occupied
from the time of her grandparents, during the Spanish time, up to the present. Cresencia
submitted the following documents,14 among others, to support her requested confirmation of
imperfect title:
1.) the death certificates of Cipriano Sta. Teresa and Eulogia Sta. Teresa Vda. de Ramos
(Cresencia's parents);
2.) her marriage certificate;
3.) their children's birth certificates;
4.) certificates of ownership covering two bancas;
5.) photographs of these two bane as with her youngest child while standing on the
property and showing the location of the RCAM' s church relative to the location of the
property;
6.) photographs of a pile of gravel and sand (allegedly for their gravel and sand business)
on the property;
7.) photographs of the RCAM's bahay ni Maria standing on the property;
8.) a photograph of the plaque awarded to Ponciano by ESSO Standard Philippines as
sole dealer of its gasoline products in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal;
9.) a photograph of their La Compania Refreshment Store standing on their titled lot
adjacent to the property;
10.) a photograph of the certificate of dealership given to Ponciano by a Tobacco
company for his dealership in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal; and
11.) the registration certificate for their family's sheet manufacturing business situated m
Bagumbayan, Taguig,15 Rizal.
The RCAM presented in evidence the following documents, in addition to those already on
record:16 tax declarations issued in its name in 1948, 1973, 1981, 1990, 1993, and 1999;17 the
certified true copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 0082 covering the lot in the name of Garcia,
which adjoins the property on the south; and the affidavit of Garcia confirming the RCAM's
ownership of the property.18 It likewise submitted several testimonial evidence to corroborate its The RCAM filed the present petition after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration.21
ownership and claim of possession of the property.
Assignment of Errors
The ruling of the RTC
The RCAM argues before us that the CA erred and gravely abused its discretion in:22
19
In its decision of January 17, 2005, the RTC denied the RCAM's application for registration of
title. The RTC held that the RCAM failed to prove actual possession and ownership of the property 1. confirming the incomplete and imperfect title of the oppositor when the magnitude of
applied for. The RTC pointed out that the RCAM's only overt act on the property that could be the parties evidence shows that the oppositors merely had pretended possession that
regarded as evidence of actual possession was its construction of the bahay ni Maria in 1991. could not ripen into ownership;
Even this act, according to the RTC, did not sufficiently satisfy the actual possession requirement
of the law as the RCAM did not show how and in what manner it possessed the property prior to
2. failing to consider that the RCAM had continuous, open and notorious possession of
1991. The RCAM's tax declarations were also inconclusive since they failed to prove actual
possession. the property in the concept of an owner for a period of thirty (30) years prior to the filing of
the application; and
In contrast, the numerous businesses allegedly conducted by Cresencia and her family on the
property, the various pieces of documentary evidence that she presented, and the testimony of the 3. confirming the oppositor’s incomplete and imperfect title despite her failure to comply
with the substantial and procedural requirements of the Public Land Act.
RCAM' s own witnesses convinced the RTC that she and her family actually possessed the
property in the manner and for the period required by law.
The Issue
This notwithstanding, the RTC refused to order the issuance of the title in Cresencia's name. The
RTC held that Cresencia failed to include in her opposition a prayer for issuance of title. In sum, the core issue for our resolution is who -between the RCAM and Cresencia -is entitled to
the benefits of C.A. No. 141 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for confirmation and
registration of imperfect title.
The RCAM assailed the R TC' s decision before the CA.

The Court s Ruling

The CA ruling

Preliminary considerations: nature of he issues; factual-issue-bar rule

In its April 10, 2007 decision,20 the CA affirmed with modification the RTC's January 17, 2005
ruling. The CA confirmed Cresencia's incomplete and imperfect title to the property, subject to her
compliance with the requisites for registration of title.
The CA agreed with the RTC that the totality of the evidence on record unquestionably showed
that Cresencia was the actual possessor and occupant, in the concept of an owner, of the
disputed property. The CA held that Cresencia s use of the property since the Spanish time
(through her predecessors-in-interest), as confirmed by the RCAM s witnesses, clearly
demonstrated her dominion over the property. Thus, while she failed to register the property in her
name or declare it for taxation purposes as pointed out by the RCAM, the CA did not consider this
non-declaration significant to defeat her claim. To the CA, Cresencia merely tolerated the RCAM s
temporary use of the property for lack of any urgent need for it and only acted to protect her right
when the RCAM applied for registration in its name. Thus, the CA declared that Cresencia
correctly waited until her possession was disturbed before she took action to vindicate her right.
The CA similarly disregarded the additional tax declarations that the RCAM presented in support
of its application. The CA pointed out that these documents hardly proved the RCAM s alleged
ownership of or right to possess the property as it failed to prove actual possession. Lastly, the CA
held that it was bound by the findings of facts and the conclusions arrived at by the RTC as they
were amply supported by the evidence.
In her comment,23 Cresencia primarily points out that the present petition essentially questions the
CA’s appreciation of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who attested to her actual,
public and notorious possession of the property. She argues that these are questions of fact that
are not proper for a Rule 45 petition. In addition, the findings of the RTC were well supported by
the evidence, had been affirmed by the CA, and are thus binding on this Court.
We are not entirely convinced of the merits of what Cresencia pointed out.
The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of this Court over petitions for review on certiorari is limited
to the review of questions of law and not of fact. "A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or
when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented,
the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence x x x as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of
the situation."24
An examination of the RCAM's issues shows that the claimed errors indeed primarily question the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lower courts' conclusion that Cresencia, and not the
RCAM, had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the period required by law.
When the presented question centers on the sufficiency of the evidence, it is a question of
fact25 and is barred in a Rule 45 petition.
Nevertheless, jurisprudence recognizes certain exceptions to the settled rule. When the lower
courts grossly misunderstood the facts and circumstances that, when correctly appreciated, would
warrant a different conclusion, a review of the lower courts' findings may be made.26 This, in our
view, is the exact situation in the case as our discussions below will show.
Moreover, the RCAM also questions the propriety of the CA s confirmation of Cresencia's title over
the property although she was not the applicant and was merely the oppositor in the present
confirmation and registration proceedings. Stated in question form -was the CA justified under the
law and jurisprudence in its confirmation of the oppositor's title over the property? This, in part, is a
question of law as it concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to recognized facts.
Hence, we find it imperative to resolve the petition on the merits.
Requirements for confirmation and registration of imperfect and incomplete title under C.A. No.
141 and P.D. No. 1529
C.A. No. 141 governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. Section 11 of
C.A. No. 141 provides, as one of the modes of disposing public lands that are suitable for
agriculture, the "confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles." Section 48, on the other hand,
enumerates those who are considered to have acquired an imperfect or incomplete title over
public lands and, therefore, entitled to confirmation and registration under the Land Registration
Act.
The RCAM did not specify the particular provision of C.A. No. 141 under which it anchored its
application for confirmation and registration of title. Nevertheless, the allegations in its application
and amended application readily show that it based its claim of imperfect title under Section 48(b)
of C.A. No. 141. As amended by P.D. No. 1073 on January 25, 1977, Section 48(b) of C.A. No.
141 currently provides:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. [emphases and italics ours]
Prior to the amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1073, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, then
operated under the Republic Act R.A.) No. 1942 (June 22, 1957) amendment which reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter. [emphases and italics ours]
Since the RCAM filed its application on September 15, 1966 and its amended application on
October 4, 1974, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942 (which then
required possession of thirty years), governs.
In relation to C.A. No. 141, Section 14 of Presidential Decree P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree specifies those who are qualified to register their incomplete title over an
alienable and disposable public land under the Torrens system. P.D. No. 1529, which was
approved on June 11, 1978, superseded and codified all laws relative to the registration of
property.
The pertinent portion of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 reads:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. [italics
ours]
Under these legal parameters, applicants in a judicial confirmation of imperfect title may register
their titles upon a showing that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, 27 since June 12, 1945,
or earlier (or for at least 30 years in the case of the RCAM) immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title. The burden of proof in these cases rests on the applicants who
must demonstrate clear, positive and convincing evidence that: (1) the property subject of their
application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) their alleged possession
and occupation of the property were of the length and of the character required by law. 28
On the issue of whether the RC M is entitled to the benefits of C A No. 141 and P.D. No. 1529
Reiterating its position before the RTC and the CA, the RCAM now argues that it actually,
continuously, openly and notoriously possessed the property since time immemorial. It points out
that its tax declarations covering the property, while not conclusive evidence of ownership, are
proof of its claim of title and constitute as sufficient basis for inferring possession.
For her part, Cresencia counters that the RCAM failed to discharge its burden of proving
possession in the concept of an owner. She argues that the testimonies of the RCAM s witnesses
were replete with inconsistencies and betray the weakness of its claimed possession. Cresencia
adds that at most, the RCAM s possession was by her mere tolerance which, no matter how long,
can never ripen into ownership. She also points out that the RCAM s tax declarations are
insufficient proof of possession as they are not, by themselves, conclusive evidence of ownership.
We do not see any merit in the RCAM s contentions.
The RTC and the CA as it affirmed the RTC, dismissed the RCAM s application for its failure to
comply with the second requirement – possession of the property in the manner and for the period
required by law.
We find no reason to disturb the RTC and the CA findings on this point. They had carefully
analyzed and weighed each piece of the RCAM s evidence to support its application and had
extensively explained in their respective decisions why they could not give weight to these pieces
of evidence. Hence, we affirm their denial of the RCAM' s application. For greater certainty, we
expound on the reasons below.
a. The RC M failed to prove possession of the property in the manner and for the period required
by law
The possession contemplated by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 is actual, not fictional or
constructive. In Carlos v Republic of the Philippines,29 the Court explained the character of the
required possession, as follows:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
Accordingly, to prove its compliance with Section 48(b)' s possession requirement, the RCAM had
to show that it performed specific overt acts in the character an owner would naturally exercise
over his own property. Proof of actual possession of the property at the time of the filing of the
application is required because the phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of
owner," the RCAM used to describe its alleged possession, is a conclusion of law, 30 not an
allegation of fact. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent [and] notorious x x x
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when [the
possession is characterized by acts manifesting] exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to [the applicant's] own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous
that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood."31
Very noticeably, the RCAM failed to show or point to any specific act characterizing its claimed
possession in the manner described above. The various documents that it submitted, as well as
the bare assertions it made and those of its witnesses, that it had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the property, hardly constitute the "well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence required in cases of this nature.32 We elaborate below on these points.
First, the tax declarations issued in the RCAM's name in 1948, 1966, 1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and
1999 did not in any way prove the character of its possession over the property. Note that the
settled rule is that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess land when not supported by any other evidence showing actual, public and adverse
possession.33 The declaration for taxation purposes of property in the names of applicants for
registration or of their predecessors-in-interest may constitute collaborating evidence only when
coupled with other acts of possession and ownership;34 standing alone, it is inconclusive.
This rule applies even more strongly in this case since the RCAM's payments of taxes due on the
property were inconsistent and random. Interestingly, while the RCAM asserts that it had been in
possession of the property since the Spanish time, the earliest tax declaration that it could present
was that issued in 1948. Also, when it filed its application in 1966 and its amended application in
197 4, the RCAM presented only two tax declarations (issued in 1948 and 1966) covering the
property. And since then, up to the issuance of the January 1 7, 2005 decision of the R TC, the
RCAM presented only five other tax declarations -those issued in 1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and
1999. The case of Tan v. Republic35 teaches us that this type of intermittent and sporadic
assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation.
Second, even if we were to consider the RCAM' s tax declarations as basis for inferring
possession, 36 the RCAM still failed to prove actual possession of the property for the required
duration. As already noted, the earliest tax declaration that it presented was for 1948. We are in
fact inclined to believe that the RCAM first declared the property in its name only in 1948 as this
tax declaration does not appear to have cancelled any previously-issued tax declaration. Thus,
when it filed its application in 1966, it was in possession of the property for only eighteen years,
counted from 1948. Even if we were to count the possession period from the filing of its amended
application in 1974, its alleged possession (which was only for twenty-six years counted from
1948) would still be short of the thirty-year period required by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as
amended by RA No. 1942. The situation would be worse if we were to consider the amendment
introduced by P.D. No. 1073 to Section 48(b) where, for the RCAM's claimed possession of the
property to give rise to an imperfect title, this possession should have commenced on June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Third, the amended plan Psu-223919, technical description for Lots 1 and 2, and surveyor s
certificate only prove the identity of the property that the RCAM sought to register in its
name.37 While these documents plot the location, the area and the boundaries of the property,
they hardly prove that the RCAM actually possessed the property in the concept of an owner for
the required duration. In fact, the RCAM seemed to be uncertain of the exact area it allegedly
possesses and over which it claims ownership. The total area that the RCAM applied for, as stated
in its amended application and the amended survey plan, was 794 square meters (34 square
meters for Lot 1 and 760 square meters for Lot 2). Yet, in its various tax declarations issued even
after it filed its amended application, the total area declared under its name was still 1,832 square
meters. Notably, the area stated in its 1948 tax declaration was only 132.30 square meters, while
the area stated in the subsequently issued tax declaration (1966) was 1,832 square meters.
Significantly, the RCAM did not account for or provide sufficient explanation for this increase in the
area; thus, it appeared uncertain on the specific area claimed.
Fourth, the RCAM did not build any permanent structure or any other improvement that clearly
announces its claim of ownership over the property. Neither did it account for any act of
occupation, development, maintenance or cultivation for the duration of time it was allegedly in
possession of it. The "bahay ni Maria" where the RCAM conducts its fiesta-related and Lenten
activities could hardly satisfy the possession requirement of C.A. No. 141. As found out by the CA,
this structure was constructed only in 1991 and not at the time of, or prior to, the filing of its
application in 1966.
Last, the RCAM s testimonial evidence hardly supplemented the inherent inadequacy of its
documentary evidence. While apparently confirming the RCAM s claim, the testimonies were
undoubtedly hearsay and were not based on personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the RCAM’s claimed actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession.
b. The RC M failed to prove that the property is alienable and disposable land of he public domain
Most importantly, we find the RCAM s evidence to be insufficient since it failed to comply with the
first and most basic requirement – proof of the alienable and disposable character of the property.
Surprisingly, no finding or pronouncement referring to this requirement was ever made in the
decisions of the R TC and the CA.
To prove that the property is alienable and disposable, the RCAM was bound to establish "the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute."38 It could have also secured a certification from the government that
the property applied for was alienable and disposable.39 Our review of the records shows that this
evidence is fatally absent and we are in fact disappointed to note that both the RTC and the CA
appeared to have simply assumed that the property was alienable and disposable.
We cannot tolerate this kind of approach for two basic reasons. One, in this jurisdiction, all lands
belong to the State regardless of their classification.40 This rule, more commonly known as the
Regalian doctrine, applies with equal force even to private unregistered lands, unless the contrary
is satisfactorily shown. Second, unless the date when the property became alienable and
disposable is specifically identified, any determination on the RCAM' s compliance with the second
requirement is rendered useless as any alleged period of possession prior to the date the property
became alienable and disposable can never be counted in its favor as any period of possession
and occupation of public lands in the concept of owner, no matter how long, can never ripen into
ownership.41
On this ground alone, the R TC could have outrightly denied the RCAM' s application.
On the CA’s authority to confirm the title of the oppositor in land registration proceedings
The RCAM next argues that the CA’s act of confirming Cresencia's title over the property is
contrary to law and jurisprudence. The RCAM points out that it filed the application for registration
of title under the provisions of C.A. No. 141 or alternatively under P.D. No. 1529; both statutes
dictate several substantive and procedural requirements that must first be complied with before
title to the property is confirmed and registered. In affirming Cresencia's title without any evidence
showing her compliance with these requirements, it claims that the CA, in effect, made Cresencia
the applicant entitled to the benefits of the land registration proceedings that it initiated before the
lower court.
We differ with this view.
Section 29 of P.D. No. 1529 gives the court the authority to confirm the title of either the applicant
or the oppositor in a land registration proceeding depending on the conclusion that the evidence
calls for. Specifically, Section 29 provides that the court "x x x after considering the evidence x x x
finds that the applicant or the oppositor has sufficient title proper for registration, judgment shall be
rendered confirming the title of the applicant, or the oppositor, to the land x x x x." (emphases and
italics ours)
Thus, contrary to the RCAM's contention, the CA has the authority to confirm the title of
Cresencia, as the oppositor, over the property. This, of course, is subject to Cresencia's
satisfaction of the evidentiary requirement of P D No. 1529, in relation with C.A. No. 141 in support
of her own claim of imperfect title over the property.
The issue of whether Cresencia is entitled to the benefits of C.A. No. 141 and P.D. No. 1529
The RCAM lastly argues that the evidence belies Cresencia's claim of continuous, open and
notorious possession since the Spanish time. The RCAM points out that, first, Cresencia failed to
declare for taxation purposes the property in her name, thus effectively indicating that she did not
believe herself to be its owner. Second, Cresencia did not have the property surveyed in her name
so that she could assert her claim over it and show its metes and bounds. Third, Cresencia did not
register the property in her name although she previously registered the adjoining lot in her name.
Fourth, Cresencia did not construct any permanent structure on the property and no traces of the
businesses allegedly conducted by her and by her family on it could be seen at the time it filed its
application. And fifth, Cresencia did not perform any act of dominion that, by the established
jurisprudential definition, could be sufficiently considered as actual possession.
We agree with the RCAM on most of these points.
While we uphold the CA' s authority to confirm the title of the oppositor in a confirmation and
registration proceedings, we cannot agree, however, with the conclusion the CA reached on the
nature of Cresencia's possession of the property.
Under the same legal parameters we used to affirm the RTC's denial of the RCAM' s application,
we also find insufficient the evidence that Cresencia presented to prove her claimed possession of
the property in the manner and for the period required by C.A. No. 141. Like the RCAM, Cresencia
was bound to adduce evidence that irrefutably proves her compliance with the requirements for
confirmation of title. To our mind, she also failed to discharge this burden of proof; thus, the CA
erred when it affirmed the contrary findings of the RTC and confirmed Cresencia’s title over the
property.
We arrive at this conclusion for the reasons outlined below.
First, the various pieces of documentary evidence that Cresencia presented to support her own
claim of imperfect title hardly proved her alleged actual possession of the property. Specifically,
the certificates of marriage, birth and death did not particularly state that each of these certified
events, i.e. marriage, birth and death, in fact transpired on the claimed property; at best, the
certificates proved the occurrence of these events in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal and on the
stated dates, respectively.
Similarly, the certificate of ownership of two bancas in the name of Ponciano, the registration
certificate for their family s sheet manufacturing business, the photograph of the certificate of
dealership in the name of Ponciano given by a tobacco company, and the photograph of the
plaque awarded to Ponciano by ESSO Standard Philippines as sole dealer of its gasoline products
did not prove that Cresencia and her family conducted these businesses on the disputed property
itself. Rather, they simply showed that at one point in time, Cresencia and her family conducted
these businesses in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. In fact, Cresencia s claim that they conducted
their gasoline dealership business on the property is belied by the testimony of a witness who
stated that the gas station was located north (or the other side) of Cresencia s titled lot and not on
the property.42
The presence on the property, as shown by photographs, of Cresencia s daughter, of the two
bancas owned by her family, and of the pile of gravel and sand they allegedly used in their gravel
and sand business also hardly count as acts of occupation, development or maintenance that
could have been sufficient as proof of actual possession. The presence of these objects and of
Cresencia s daughter on the property was obviously transient and impermanent; at most, they
proved that Cresencia and her family used the property for a certain period of time, albeit, briefly
and temporarily.
Finally, the records show that the La Compania Refreshment Store business (that they allegedly
conducted on the property) actually stood on their titled lot adjoining the property.
Second, while Cresencia registered in her name the adjoining lot (which they had been occupying
at the time the RCAM filed its application and where their La Compania Refreshment Store stood),
she never had the property registered in her name. Neither did Cresencia or her predecessors-in-
interest declare the property for taxation purposes nor had the property surveyed in their names to
properly identify it and to specifically determine its metes and bounds. The declaration for taxation
purposes of property in their names would have at least served as proof that she or her
predecessors-in-interest had a claim over the property43 that could be labeled as "possession" if
coupled with proof of actual possession.
Finally, the testimonies of Ponciano and Florencia Francisco Mariano (Cresencia's daughter) on
the nature and duration of their family's alleged possession of the property, other than being self-
serving, were mere general statements and could not have constituted the factual evidence of
possession that the law requires. They also failed to point out specific acts of dominion or
ownership that were performed on the property by the parents of Cresencia, their predecessors-in-
interest. They likewise failed to present any evidence that could have corroborated their alleged
possession of the property from the time of their grandfather, Cipriano, who acquired the property
from its previous owner, Petrona Sta. Teresa. Interestingly, other than Ponciano and Florencia,
none of the witnesses on record seemed to have known that Cresencia owns or at least claims
ownership of the property.
At any rate, even if we were to consider these pieces of evidence to be sufficient, which we do not,
confirmation and registration of title over the property in Cresencia' s name was still improper in
the absence of competent and persuasive evidence on record proving that the property is
alienable and disposable.
For all these reasons, we find that the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC's ruling on this matter
and confirmed Cresencia's imperfect title to the property.WHEREFORE, in light of these
considerations, we hereby DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the decision
dated April 10, 2007 and the resolution dated August 9, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 84646 to the extent described below:
1. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals as it affirmed the January 17 2005
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, in LRC Case No. N-5811
that DENIED the application for confirmation and registration of title filed by the petitioner,
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila; and
2. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the confirmation made by the Court of Appeals of the
title over the property in the name of respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos for lack of
sufficient evidentiary basis.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42859 March 17, 1938
GABRIEL LASAM, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and JOSE CHAN HONG HIN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
Acting Solicitor-General Melencio and B. Pobre for appellants.
Alfredo Catolico for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
On January 24, 1930, Gabriel Lasam filed with the Court of First Instance of Cagayan an
application for the registration of 152 parcels of land containing a total area of 24,723,436 square
meters, situated in the municipality of Solana, Province of Cagayan, described in the plan Exhibit
K attached to the application. These 152 parcels include the parcel No. 9 here involved.
According to the lower court, the portions of said parcel No. 9 which opposed during the time of
survey were delimited and marked on its plan Psu-67516 attached to the record as lots A to Z, AA
to HH, MM to ZZ, AAA to ZZZ, AAAA to ZZZZ, AAAAA, to FFFFF, NNNNN, 35 to 38, and 111 to
143, all inclusive. (Decision of the lower court, Bill of Exception of the Government, p. 35.)
The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that it is not supported by any title fit
for registration and that the land sought to be registered is public land. The brothers Felipe, Jose
and Salvador, all surnamed Narag, who are first cousin to the applicant Lasam, also filed
opposition on the ground that they are the owners of parcels No. 9. Opposition were also filed by
Tomas Furigay and 35 other persons as homesteaders; by the provincial fiscal, representing the
Directors of Forestry, on the ground that portions thereof are public forest; by Francisco Caronan
and some 71 others parties, claiming the parcels occupied by them as their exclusive properties;
by Jose Chan Hong Hin, on the ground that the applicant includes his property of about 22
hectares and 50 ares; and by Mauro Antonio, on the ground that the applicant includes the portion
occupied by him and belonging to him. Pablo Soriano succeeded in having the order of general
default set aside as to him and was allowed to registered his opposition at a latter date.
Amendede applications and oppositions by the parties were subsequently permitted to be filed.
After a protracted hearing, the lower court rejected and the oppositions filed, declaring the
applicant, Gabriel Lasam, the owner of parcel No. 9 as indicated in the plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit
K), and decreed the registration of said parcel in his favor.
On September 10, 1934, counsel for various oppositors, after excepting to the decision, filed a
motion for new trial which was denied, and the case was brought before this court by bill of
exceptions.
The Narag brothers and the Directors of Forestry appear to have abandoned their opposition.
They made no attempt to substantiate their claims at the trial.
Counsel for the Director of Lands, et al. and for Jose Chan Hong Hin, et al. make various
assignments of error in their respective briefs. It is not believe necessary however, to consider
each and every assignment made as the questions presented may, in our opinion, be reduced to
the following propositions: (a) Whether or not the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, is entitled to the
registered of parcel No. 9 on the basis of the document presented as Exhibit L, hereinafter to be
referred to, or in the alternative, whether or not he is entitled to registered on the basis of public,
continuous, and adverse possession under a claim of ownership during the time prescribed by law
(par. 9, application); and the negative, (b) whether or not the numerous oppositors — excluding
the homesteader — are entitled to the parcels which they allege are included in the controverted
parcel No. 9. The rights of the homesteader necessarily depend on the resolution of these two
propositions.
Exhibit L purports to be an application dated June 27, 1873 addressed by Domingo Narag 1.º to
the Alcalde Mayor, in which the former stated that he had been in possession of the land above
described and asked that informacion testifical be admitted. The informacion testifical was had
before the Alcalde Mayor and appears to have been approved by the Judge of the Court of First
Instance without objection on the part of the fiscal. It is the theory of the applicant that Domingo
Narag 1.º the original owner of parcel No. 5, described in Exhibit L, owned P1,000 from the
applicant's which amount Narag needed for his candidacy gobernadorcillo of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, in 1880; that the original of Exhibit L was turned over by the applicant to his lawyer,
Vicente Marasigan, who lost it, and for this reason, only a certificate copy of the document marked
Exhibit L presented; and that the fifth parcel mentioned in the document, Exhibit L, is the parcel
No. 9 described in the plan, Exhibit K. The Government contends that Exhibit L is not a valid titled
and does not confer ownership that even if it were valid, it does not cover so extensive an area as
that appearing on the plan, Exhibit K.
The land designated as the fifth parcel is described in Exhibit L as follows:
5.ª Un terreno o pasto de ganados vacunos llamado Marguirig o Cagguban que linda al
poniente con el estero Pagul, oriente con el pueblo de la Solana al norte con el sitio
llamado y Calabbacao y al sur con el sitio llamado Atayo el cual tiene un cabida de siete
mil brazaz y herede de mis Padres hace viente y dos años y en la actualidad es donde
mis granados de procreacion.
Parcel No. 9, the registration of which is applied for in these proceedings, is described thus (brief
of claimant-appellee p. 61):
Por el norte con barrios de Iraga, Bauan y Bangag;
Por el este con el Centro y los barrios de Basi, Natapian y Lanna;
 Por el sur con la carretera provincial; y
Por el oeste barrios de Maguirig, Cagguban y estero Pangul.
We are of the opinion that the court below committed no error in receiving Exhibit L as evidence
for the claimant, but its admission by the court does not necessarily entitled the applicant Gabriel
Lasam, to the registration of the parcel claimed by him in these proceedings. It is apparent that
parcel No. 9, as indicated in the plan, Exhibit K, is not the same parcel No. 5 described in
document Exhibit L. Whereas Exhibit L gives as boundaries on the north the sitios of Maasin and
Calabbacao, Exhibit K gives the barrios of Iraga, Bauan, and Bangag; on the east Exhibit L gives
the pueblo of Solana, whereas Exhibit K gives "el Centro y los barrios de Basi, Natappian y
Lanna"; on the west Exhibit L gives estero Pangul, whereas Exhibit K gives the barrios of
Maguirig, Cagguban and estero Pangul; on the south Exhibit L gives the sitio of Atayao, whereas
Exhibit K gives the carretera provincial. While there may be partial indentity as to boundaries on
the east and west, such indentity is lacking as to the boundaries on the north and south. This
discrepancy is accentuated by the admmission of the applicant that the parcel whose registered is
sought is much smaller than that described in paragraph 5 of Exhibit L. The explanation given by
the surveyors Jose Mallanao, presented as witness by the claimant, is a follows:
Because on the north side when we went around the lot and I asked for the barrios of
Maasin and Calabacao the applicant pointed to me a place very far from where he was at
the time and where he actually occupied the land, and on the south side he indicated to
me the provincial road. I asked why he should not take the actual land indicated by this
title and he told me that he was not occupying that portion . That is the reason why I took
up the boundary on the south as provincial road. On the east side he indicated to me the
center of the municipality of Solana, barrios of Basi, Nangalisan and Lanna, and on the
west is a public land party bounded by the barrios of Maguirig, and Cagguban and estero
Pangul.
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title thereto, must
prove not only the genuiness of his title but the indentity of the land therein referred to. The
document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for registration or not at all. If as in this case,
he only claims a portion of what is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property
sought to be registered is included in that title. The surveyor, Jose Mallannao, did not actually
check up the boundaries of parcel No. 5, as described in Exhibit L, and in testifying that parcel No.
9, in Exhibit K, is smaller than that described as parcel No. 5 in Exhibit L, he relied on hearsay. For
instance, when asked whether north of barrios Iraga, Bauan and Bangag of the land described in
plan Exhibit K, he would locate the sitios of Maasin and Calabacao, he replied: "They said that
Calabbacao is north of that barrio Iraga yet." (Emphasis ours.)
Aside from what has been said with reference to discrepanies in the boundaries, we cannot
overlook the fact that the area in Exhibit L is vaguely given as 7,000 brazas. The surveyor for the
applicant, Jose Mallannao, calculated the area of the property described in paragraph 5 of Exhibit
L on the basis of 7,000 square brazas or 49,000,00 square as 15,695,500 hectares more or less
(s.n. pp. 820-822). The area claimed here according to the amended application of February 26,
1930, and the plan Exhibit K is 24,723,437 square meters. According to the applicant before his
occupation of the land ceded by Domingo Narag 1.º, only about 2 hectares were cultivated. (s.n. p.
56, Gabriel Lasam.) And, with reference to the payment of the land tax, the Solicitor-General in his
brief (p. 12) makes the following observation:
The property appears to have been declared for taxation purposes as evidenced by
revisions of tax declarations, Exhibit G-20 and G-21 (pp. 136, 137, record). There had
been previous declarations with an area of about 294 hectares (id.) but, according to
Exhibit G-22 (p. 138, record), the area which was not previously declared contains 1,685
hectares.
With the exception of a statement in which it appears that tax was paid in 1902 (p.
140, id.) there appears in the record no tax receipts evidencing the payment of taxes
continuously from 1902 up to this time.
It is not necessary to pass upon the contention of the Solicitor-General that the informacion
testifical (Exhibit L) is no legal effect because of failure subsequently to solicit composition title
pursuant to the Royal Decree of June 25, 19880 (Fuster vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 40129,
Dec. 29, 1934), or to convert possession into a registration of ownership in accordance with article
393 of the Mortgage law (Fernandez Hermanos vs. Director of Lands, 57 Phil., 929), for even if we
were to accord all the legal force to this document (Exhibit L), it would not serve as a basis for the
registration of 24,723,437 square meters.
Having arrived at this conclusion as to Exhibit L, is the applicant entitled to registration because of
the required possession during the time prescribed by law? We have examined the evidence on
this point both testimonial and documentary, and while there is evidence showing that the claimant
might have possessed a portion of the parcel claimed by him and the registration of which is
sought, we find the evidence lacking in certainly as to the particular portion occupied and the
extend thereof. Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos vs.
Director of Lands (39 Phil., 175, 180). (See also Roales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil., 302, 304.)
But it should be observed that the applicant of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case
is subject to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among these
qualifications is "one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the
portion actually in possession of the claimant." While, therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be
said that he is in possession", possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as
amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim.
The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan like claim of
dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while
it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction. In the present case, upon the description of 7,000
brazas as the area of the land said have been originally possessed by Domingo Narag 1.º and
conveyed to the applicant, only two hectares of which were according to the applicant cultivated at
the time of such transfer, the applicant would on the basis of the computation hereinabove
referred to and given at the trial by surveyor Jose Mallannao, be entitled under Exhibit L to more
than 13,000 hectares, although only 2,432 odd hectares are now being sought for registration in
these proceedings. The fact, however, that he is claiming only a portion of the land claimed by him
to be included in his title, the further fact that according to his own testimony he has given up more
than 1,000 hectares to the Bureau of Forestry, the discrepancies in the boundaries, his tax
declarations, and the existence of numerous homesteaders and claimants are significant and tend
to show that his possession over the entire portion of the land sought to be registered is not "such
as to apprise the community and the world that the entire land was for his enjoyment." (Ramos vs.
Director of Lands, supra.)

Our attention is next directed to the decision of this court in Pamittan vs. Lasam and Mallonga (60
Phil., 908) which according to counsel for the claimant Lasam, is determinative of the ownership of
the property now sought to be registered. Said case refers to an action for partition between the
heirs of Sofia Pamittan, wife of Gabriel Lasam, originally brought in the Court of First Instance and
appealed to this court. The trial court in that case found that parcel No. 7 — which is said to
correspond to parcel No. 9 sought to be registered in these proceedings — "although during the
existence of the conjugal partnership, was proven to be the exclusive property of the husband
Gabriel Lasam". This court not have passed upon the question whether parcel No. 7 was the
same parcel No. 9 in these proceedings; nor could it have passed upon the conflicting claims with
reference to parcel No. 9, now sought to be registered. Whatever was said in that case could not
bind the oppositors in the present case, who were not parties thereto.

The grounds for opposition of the various oppositors are divergent and are based on (a)
possession from time immemorial: (b) acquisition by inheritance, purchase and donations propters
nuptias and inter vivos; (c) payment of land taxes from 1906, 1915 and 1918 up to the filing of
oppositions; and (d) acquisition "a titulo de composicion" with the State. These oppositors denied
tenants of the applicant Lasam. After persual of the evidence presented by them, we are
constrained to accept the conclusion of the lower court that none of the portions or lots claimed by
them or any one of them has been sufficiently identified, either by the oral or documentary
evidence which they presented. In view thereof, and because of the insufficiency of the evidence
presented, we are of the opinion that the lower court committed no error in dismissing their
oppositions.

In view of the foregoing, the judgement of the lower court is reserved, without prejudice to the filing
by the applicant. Gabriel Lasam, of a new application and plan covering the portion of the land
actually occupied by him since July 25, 1894. Upon the determination of that portion by the lower
court, let judgement be rendered accordingly. The remaining portion or portions of lot No. 9 as
indicated on plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit K) are hereby declared public lands, to be disposed of or
otherwise death with in accordance with law. Without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188494 November 26, 2014
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Remman Enterprises, Inc. (petitioner)
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to assail the Decision 2 dated May 23, 2008 and
Resolution3 dated June 22, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74418. The CA
reversed the Decision4 dated November 27, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 155, in LR Case No. N-11379, which granted the petitioner's application for land
registration of three (3) parcels of land situated in Taguig, Metro Manila (subject properties).
The petitioner, through its authorized representative Ronnie P. Inocencio (Inocencio), filed with the
RTC on June 4, 1998 an application for registration of the subject properties situated in Barangay
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of 27,477 square meters, 23,179 sq m and 45,636
sq m, more particularly described as follows:
SWO-00-001771, being a conversion of Lot 3079, Mcadm-590-D, containing an area of Twenty[-
]Seven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy[-] Seven (27,477) square meters, more or less; SWO-
00-001768, being a conversion of Lot 3071, Mcadm-590-D, containing an area of Twenty[-] Three
Thousand One Hundred Seventy[-]Nine (23,179) square meters, more or less; and SWO-00-
001773, being a conversion of Lot 3082, Mcadm-590-D, containing an area of Forty[-]Five
Thousand Six Hundred Thirty[-]Six (45,636) square meters, more or less, all brought under the
operation of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) or Commonwealth Act 141, as amended
x x x.5
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, interposed its opposition to the
application.1avvphi1 During the initial hearing of the case on May 4, 1999, the petitioner presented
and marked documentary evidence6 to prove its compliance with jurisdictional requirements.7
On October 25, 1999, the petitioner was allowed to present its evidence before the Branch Clerk
of Court of the RTC. Inocencio, the petitioner’s sales manager, testified that the subject properties
were purchased on August 28, 1989 by the petitioner from sellers Magdalena Samonte, Jaime
Aldana and Virgilio Navarro. The properties were declared for taxation purposes on August 9,
1989.After the sale, the petitioner occupied the properties and planted thereon crops like rice, corn
and vegetables.8
Witness Cenon Serquiña (Serquiña) supported the application for registration by claiming that he
had been the caretaker of the subject properties since 1957, long before the lots were purchased
by the petitioner. Serquiña alleged that no person other than the applicant and its predecessors-in-
interest had claimed ownership or rights over the subject properties.9
On November 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision10 granting the petitioner’s application. The
decretal portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the Applicant, Remman Enterprises, Inc.,
represented in this matter by its representative, Ronnie P. Inocencio, the absolute owner in fee
simple of three (3) parcels of land, all located at Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, more
particularly described as follows:
1.) SWO-00-001771, being a conversion of Lot 3079, Mcadm-590-D;
2.) SWO-00-001768, being a conversion of Lot 3071, Mcadm-590-D; and
3.) SWO-00-001773, being a conversion of Lot 3082, Mcadm-590-D
together with their corresponding technical descriptions.
Once the foregoing Decision has become final, let the corresponding decree of registration issue.
SO ORDERED.11
Dissatisfied, the State appealed to the CA by alleging substantive and procedural defects in the
petitioner’s application. It argued that the identity of the subject properties was not sufficiently
established. The State further claimed that the character and length of possession required by law
in land registration cases were not satisfied by the petitioner.
Finding merit in the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision dated May 23, 2008 reads:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED NOVEMBER 27, 2001is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE and
this case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.12
The CA explained that the survey plans and technical descriptions submitted by the petitioner
failed to establish the true identity of the subject properties. The application should have been
accompanied by the original tracing cloth plan duly approved by the Director of Lands.13 The
petitioner should have also submitted a certification from the proper government office stating that
the properties were already declared alienable and disposable.14 The CA further cited a failure to
establish that the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject parcels of land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.15
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner to assail the CA’s dismissal of its
application for land registration. The petitioner argues that the identity of the subject properties
was sufficiently established through the submission of the original tracing cloth plans, survey plans
and technical descriptions. The alienable and disposable character of the properties was also duly
established via a certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Further, it claims
that it and its predecessors-in-interest possessed the parcels of land in the nature and within the
length of time required by law.
The petition is dismissible.
On the matter of proof of the subject property’s identity, jurisprudence provides that the
presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be dispensed with, subject however to certain
conditions. Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the original clothing plans that cover the subject
properties do not form part of the case records. The Court has nonetheless held in Republic v.
Espinosa:16
As ruled in Republic v. Guinto-Aldana, the identity of the land, its boundaries and location can be
established by other competent evidence apart from the original tracing cloth such as a duly
executed blueprint of the survey plan and technical description:
"Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is
merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of
the property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the
boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must
be denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied
by piecesof evidence—such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed
technical description of the property—which may likewise substantially and with as much certainty
prove the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered."17 (Citations omitted)
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the CA’s dismissal of the petitioner’s application for original
registration was proper considering the latter’s failure to sufficiently establish that the subject
properties were already declared alienable and disposable by the government. Its reliance on a
Report,18 issued by the CENRO, DENR National Capital Region, West Sector, was misplaced.
The Court ruled in Republic v. Medida:19
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,this Court explained that a Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO certification, by itself, fails toprove the alienable
and disposable character of a parcel of land. We ruled:
[I]t is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondents failed to do so because the certifications
presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. x
x x.
xxxx
The present rule on the matter then requires that an application for original registration be
accompanied by: (1) CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. x x x.20 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration, who must provethat the properties subject of the
application are alienable and disposable.21 Even the notations on the survey plans submitted by
the petitioner cannot be admitted asevidence of the subject properties’ alienability and
disposability. Such notations do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that the subject properties remain part of the inalienable public domain.22
Given the foregoing, the dismissal of the petitioner's application for registration was proper. Under
pertinent laws and jurisprudence, the petitioner had to sufficiently establish that: first, the subject
properties form part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession anq occupation of the same; and third, the possession is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.23
Without sufficient proof that the subject properties had been declared alienable and disposable,
the Court finqs no reason to look further into the petitioner's claim that the CA erred in' finding that
it failed to satisfy the nature and length of possession that could qualify for land registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition if DENIED. The Decision dated May 23, 2008 and Resolution dated
Jun~ 22, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74418 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.