MARTINEZ VS REPUBLIC (2006)
DECISION AFTER IT HAD BEEN DELARED IN DEFAULT
Applicant: Martinez
FACTS: Martinez filed a PETITION FOR REGISTRATION in his name of three
parcels of land located in Cortes, Surigao del Sur with an area of 3700sqm. He
alleged that:
a) He had acquired the property in 1952 through purchase from his uncle
whose predecessors-in-interest were traceable upto 1870s;
b) He had remained in continuous possession of the lots;
c) The lots remained unencumbered;
d) They became private property through prescription;
e) He had to initiate the proceedings since the Director of Land
Management Services failed to do so despite the completion of the
cadastral survey.
RTC Surigao del Sur set the case for initial hearing and ordered the publication
of the notice.
Republic opposed the application on the grounds that:
a) Martinez’s possession was not in accordance with Sec48(b) of CA141;
b) His muniments of title were insufficient to prove bona-fide acquisition
and possession of the property;
c) The lots formed part of the public domain.
RTC issued an ORDER OF GENERAL DEFAULT because no party appeared to
oppose the application during the hearing, and subsequently, decreed the
registration of the lots in the name of Martinez. RTC concluded that Martinez
and his predecessors have been in the open, continuous, public possession of
the lots for over 100 years.
LRA informed RTC that only 2 lots were referred to in the Notice published since
the other lot (LOT 370) was omitted due to the lack of an approved survey plan.
CA reversed RTC and ordered the dismissal of the application on the ground
that the evidence presented by Martinez is insufficient to support his application.
Hence, this petition by Martinez arguing that Republic has no right to oppose
the petition or appeal following the issuance of the order of general default.
ISSUE: WON REPUBLIC, THRU OSG, CAN STILL APPEAL THE RTC’S
HELD: YES! A defendant party declared in default retains the right to
appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff
failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the
decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a
motion to set aside the order of default.
SEC 26 of PD1529 provides that the order of default may be issued if no
person appears and answers within the time allowed. RTC issued the order of
general default simply because no oppositor appeared on the date of the
hearing, despite the fact that the Republic had already duly filed its
opposition.RTC erred in declaring oppositor in default simply because he failed
to appear on the day of the initial hearing. RTC should have accorded the
oppositor ample opportunity to establish its claim. (Dir of Lands vs Santiago).
HOWEVER, the SC cannot decide on the validity of the default order since
Republic did not challenge such.
THROWBACK:
1920: In Velez vs Ramas, the rule is that the defaulting defendant "loses his
standing in court, he not being entitled to the service of notices in the case, nor
to appear in the suit in any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be
heard at the final hearing."
1948: In Lim Toco v. Go Fay, the Court ruled that the defendant in default had
no right to appeal the judgment rendered by the trial court, except where a
motion to set aside the order of default had been filed.
1964: Sec 2 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court: the right to appeal was available
even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default had been filed. (The
intent of 1964 Rules was to allow the defaulted defendant to file an appeal from
the trial court’s decision.)
1997: Rules of Civil Procedure were amended. The old provision expressly
guaranteeing the right of a defendant declared in default to appeal the adverse
decision was not replicated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. BUT even under
the new rules, a defaulted defendant retains the right to appeal based on SC
decisions after the promulgation of the 1997 Rules (See LINA DOCTRINE).
ISSUE: WON MARTINEZ FAILED TO ADDUCE THE EVIDENCE NEEDED TO
SECURE THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOTS IN HIS NAME
HELD: YES! Take note that the case against Martinez was established not by
the OSG’s evidence, but by petitioner’s own insufficient evidence.

The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who
must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land
applied for. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors by
any of the means provided for the proper acquisition of public lands, the rule is
settled that the property must be held to be a part of the public domain. The
applicant must, therefore, present competent and persuasive proof to
substantiate his claim. He may not rely on general statements, or mere
conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title.

Martinez argued that he & his predecessors have been in possession of the land
since time immemorial.

Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion

over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property. It is not enough for an applicant to declare himself or his
predecessors-in-interest the possessors and owners of the land for which
registration is sought. He must present specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation.

Evidence presented by Martinez:

a) Deed of Sale - not translated from the vernacular in which it was

executed. SC: inadmissible in evidence.
b) White print copy of the survey plan, tracing cloth plan- NOT approved
by the Director of Lands. SC: Though the submission of the original
tracing cloth plan is a mandatory statutory requirement which cannot be
waived, the rule is settled that a survey plan must be approved by the
Director of Lands to be admissible in evidence.

PETITION DISMISSED. Lots cannot be registered in the name of Martinez.

CACHERO v. MARZAN
FACTS:
The Spouses Cachero filed a case in the CFI of La Union against the respondents
for recovery of possession and ownership of 2 parcels of land in Barrio Basca,
Aringay, La Union. The lower court rendered judgment declaring the petitioners
owners of the subject land. The judgment became final and executory.
About 7 years later the Spouses Cachero filed for the registration under the
Torrens Act of the subject land (109,480 sq. m.) identified as Lot No. 6860 of
the Cadastral Survey and another parcel of land (50,412 square meters)
identified as Lot No. 6859 of the same Cadastral Survey, both lots being
situated in Sitio Iriw, Basca Aringay, La Union. Subsequently, Atty. Yaranon filed
oppositions in said case in behalf of the respondents
Tomas Cachero died before judgment and was substituted by his children. The
judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses finding that the spouses and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous and notorious possession
of subject lots for more than 60 years in concept of owners except for a one-
hectare portion of Lot No. 6860 which the Cacheros had sold to Bernardino
Marzan; that Tomas Cachero had inherited said lots from his late father, Simeon
Cachero; and that the applicant spouses had been religiously paying the realty
taxes on the parcels of land as owners thereof.
The respondents thru their counsel, Atty. Yaranon, filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case
and that the subject lands, which have been the subject of cadastral
proceedings, showed that neither the Cacheros nor their predecessors-in-
interest had ever entered a claim for either lot. The Cacheros opposed the
motion and argued that by the time the motion for reconsideration was filed,
the judgment sought to be reconsidered had already become final. The motion
was denied.
About 7 months after the filing of the motion for reconsideration, persons not
parties to the registration proceedings filed a " petition for review of judgment
and/or decree." They alleged that they were the owners of the land designated
as Lot No. 6859 which they purchased sometime in 1929 and that they have
been in continuous possession thereof since then. They also alleged that the
petitioners fraudulently omitted to give them notice of their application for
registration and that in the earlier cadastral survey, Lots Numbered 6859 and
6860 had been declared public land for lack of any original claimant and at the
cadastral hearing only the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry, and they
had filed "cadastral answers". The petition prayed for the re-opening, review
and setting aside of the judgment and for the accord to them of an opportunity
to prove their asserted contentions.
The petition for review was denied. The Registration Court ruled that the
according to the report of the chief surveyor of the Land Registration
Commission, there was no decree of registration issued as regards the subject
lots. It also ruled that the movants had failed to show fraud on the Cacheros'
part.
Paulina Nodo and Felix Genova subsequently died and were substituted by their
heirs.
These Genova heirs filed an amended petition which was also denied by the
Registration Court. Then, they appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which
forwarded it to the Supreme Court, holding that the former had no appellate
jurisdiction over the matter. The CA also declared that the Genovas are third
persons who came into the case.
ISSUE: WON the cadastral proceedings should be deemed as a bar to the
Registration Proceedings.
HELD:
NO The cadastral case mentioned commenced before the outbreak of the Pacific
war. It had been abandoned and had not been continued or resumed after the
war, thus, it had ceased to exist. Hence, said compulsory cadastral proceedings
under the Cadastral Act cannot be invoked and set up as a bar to the
registration proceedings under the Torrens Act initiated more than twenty years
later by the Cacheros.
A cadastral proceeding which had long discontinued and abandoned, and which
had resulted in no judgment or final order affecting the lands involved in a
subsequent registration act under Act496, cannot be invoked and set up as a
bar to the latter proceedings. There being no final adjudication in the cadastral
proceeding, there is no reason to apply the doctrine of res judicata.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Zenaida Guinto-Aldana government or from any private individual. Itself makes their right
G.R. No. 175578, August 11, 2010 thereto unquestionably settled and hence, deserving of protection under
the law.
FACTS:

Respondents filed an application for registration of title over 2 pieces of

land, professing themselves to be co-owners of these lots having
acquired them by succession from their predecessors. That until the
time of the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous
possession of these lots in the concept of an owner and that they had
consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real
estate taxation. In support of their application, respondents submitted
to the court the pertinent tax declarations, together with the receipts of
payment thereof. Petitioner opposed the application for the reason that
the tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition in good faith or of prior
possession in the concept of an owner.

ISSUE:

WON respondents have occupied and possessed the property openly,

continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona fide claim of
ownership.

HELD:

Respondents’ possession through their predecessors-in-interest dates

back to as early as 1937 when the property had already been declared
for taxation by respondent’s father. Respondents could have produced
more proof of this kind had it not been for the fact that, the relevant
portions of the tax records on file with the Provincial Assessor had been
burned when its office was razed by fire in 1997. With the tax
assessments therecame next tax payments. Respondents’ receipts for
tax expenditures were likewise in therecords and in these
documents the predecessors of respondents were the named owners of
the property. Tax declarations and realty tax payment are
not conclusive evidence ofownership, nevertheless, they are a
good indication of possession in the concept of an owner. No one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. Indeed, respondents herein
have been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open,
continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition from the
LASAM V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS- Possession HELD:
First, the Court ruled that Exhibit L cannot be a valid application
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have because the identity o the land was not clearly established.
his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is
in possession, however, possession is not gained by mere nominal
CLAIM. Second, although there is proof that Lasam might have possessed a
portion of the parcel land, the proof is lacking in certainty as to the
portion occupied and the extent thereof. Although the counsel invokes
the doctrine of constructive possession, the said application is subject to
FACTS: certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among
these qualifications is one particularly relating to the size of the tract in
Lasam files a case in Court for the registration of a parcel of land, controversy with reference to the portion of land actually in possession
containing an area of around 24,000,000 hectares. He presents Exhibit of the claimant. While, therefore, possession in the eyes of the law does
L as proof of his possession over the land. Exhibit L is a certified copy of not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
an application. This application states that Lasam’s predecessor in ground before it can be said that he is in possession, possession is not
interest, Domingo Narag, has owned the land since time immemorial. gained by mere nominal CLAIM. The mere planting of a sign or a symbol
However, the property described in Exhibit L is 15,000,000 hectares of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an
only and the property sought to be registered is 24,000,000 hectares. immense tract of territory
Furthermore, the document, mentions a fifth parcel of land which is the
same parcel described in another Exhibit K. Apparently, the surveyor of
the land delineated the property based on what the possessor at that
time pointed out to him; he based his study mostly on hearsay.
According to the applicant, before his occupation of the land, only about
2 hectares were cultivated. But then, they justified this by invoking the
doctrine of constructive possession (That a person in possession of the
land does not have to have his feet on every square meter of ground
before it can be said that he is in possession).

Thus, the Director of Lands opposed the registration on the ground that
a) it is not supported by any title fit for registration and
b) that the land sought to be registered is public land.

ISSUE:
Is the applicant entitled to registration because of the required
possession during the time prescribed by law? Is he entitled to the
24,000,000 hectares of land considering that the area possessed is only
2 hectares?