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A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19,
1981
NENITA DE VERA SUROZA,
complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasig Branch 25 and EVANGELINE
S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court,
respondents.
FACTS:
Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th
Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine
Scouts), Fort McKinley, married
Marcelina Salvador in 1923. They
were childless. They reared a boy
named Agapito who used the surname
Suroza and who considered them as
his parents as shown in his 1945
marriage contract with Nenita de Vera
On a date not indicated in the record,
the spouses Antonio Sy and
Hermogena Talan begot a child named
Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old,
was entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz
(apparently a girl friend of Agapito) and
who was later delivered to Marcelina
Salvador Suroza who brought her up
as a supposed daughter of Agapito
and as her granddaughter. Marilyn
used the surname Suroza. She stayed
with Marcelina but was not legally
adopted by Agapito.
In 1973, Marcelina Suroza supposedly
executed a notarial will bequeathing
her house and lot to a certain Marilyn
Suroza. In 1974, Marcelina died.
Marina Paje was named as the
executrix in the said will and she
petitioned before CFI Rizal that the will
be admitted to probate. The presiding
judge, Honrado admitted the will to
probate and assigned Paje as the
administratrix. Honrado also issued an
ejectment order against the occupants
of the house and lot subject of the will.
Nenita Suroza, daughter in law of
Marcelina (her husband, son of
Marcelina was confined in the
Veteran’s Hospital), learned of the
probate proceeding when she received
the ejectment order (as she was
residing in said house and lot).
Nenita opposed the probate
proceeding. She alleged that the said
notarial will is void because (a) the
instituted heir therein Marilyn Suroza is
actually Marilyn Sy and she is a
stranger to Marcelina, (b) the only son
of Marcelina, Agapito Suroza, is still
alive and is the compulsory heir, (c)
the notarial will is written in English a
language not known to Marcelina
because the latter was illiterate so
much so that she merely thumbmarked
the will, (d) the notary public who
notarized will admitted that Marcelina
never appeared before him and that he
notarized the said will merely to
accommodate the request of a lawyer
friend but with the understanding that
Marcelina should later appear before
him but that never happened.
Honrado still continued with the
probate despite the opposition until
testamentary proceeding closed and
the property transferred to Marilyn Sy.
Nenita then filed this administrative
case against Honrado on the ground of
misconduct.
ISSUE:
Should disciplinary action be taken
against respondent judge for having
admitted to probate a will, which on its
face is void because it is written in
English, a language not known to the
illiterate testatrix, and which is
probably a forged will because she
and the attesting witnesses did not
appear before the notary as admitted
by the notary himself?
HELD:
Yes. Despite the valid claim raised by
Nenita, he still continued with the
testamentary proceeding, this showed
his wrongful intent. He may even be
criminally liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment or
interlocutory order or rendering a
manifestly unjust judgment or
interlocutory order by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
The will is written in English and was
thumb marked by an obviously illiterate
Marcelina. This could have readily
been perceived by Honrado that that
the will is void. In the opening
paragraph of the will, it was stated that
English was a language “understood
and known” to the testatrix. But in its
concluding paragraph, it was stated
that the will was read to the testatrix
“and translated into Filipino language.”
That could only mean that the will was
written in a language not known to the
illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is
void because of the mandatory
provision of Article 804 of the Civil
Code that every will must be executed
in a language or dialect known to the
testator. Had Honrado been careful
and observant, he could have noted
not only the anomaly as to the
language of the will but also that there
was something wrong in instituting to
Marilyn Sy as sole heiress and giving
nothing at all to Agapito who was still
alive.
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in
handling the testate case of Marcelina
S. Suroza, a fine equivalent to his
salary for one month is imposed on
respondent judge
ACOP V. PIRASO
52 PHIL 660
FACTS:
Probate proceeding was filed in the
CFI of Benguet for the last will and
testament of Piraso. CFI denied
probate of such instrument chiefly
because the will is written in English
and it has been established that Piraso
does not know any language other
than Igorrote dialect. Acop appealed
the case alleging that CFI committed
error in holding that the will should
have been written in Ilocano dialect.
This assigned error is based on CFI’s
decision stating that the will should
have been written in Ilocano because
Piraso knows Ilocano dialect albeit
imperfectily)
ISSUE:
WON the will should be allowed
probate.
HELD:
NO!
Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, strictly provides that:
"No will, except as provided in the
preceding section" (as to wills
executed by a Spaniard or a resident
of the Philippine Islands, before the
present Code of Civil Procedure went
into effect), "shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or
affect the same, unless it be written in
the language or dialect known by the
testator,"
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The petitioner’s argument should fail execution of the disqualification from being a witness to
because even if Piraso knows Ilocano purported wilt the a win. These Articles state:
(a ‘lil bit) the will is written in English decedent lacked
testamentary Art. 820. Any person
language which he does not
capacity due to old of sound mind and
understand. age and sickness; of the age of
and in the second eighteen years or
The presumption that testator knows alternative more, and not blind,
the dialect of the locality where he
deaf or dumb, and
resides, unless there is proof to the 4. That the able to read and
contrary is inapplicable here because purported WW was write, may be a
in the instant case, not only is it not procured through witness to the
proven that English is the language of undue and improper execution of a will
the City of Baguio where the deceased pressure and mentioned in article
Piraso lived and where the will was influence on the part 806 of this Code.
of the principal "Art. 821. The
drawn, but that the record contains
beneficiary, and/or following are
positive proof that said Piraso knew no of some other disqualified from
other language than the Igorrote person for her being witnesses to a
dialect. benefit. will:

The Court ruled in favor of petitioner. (1) Any person not

Private respondent appealed the domiciled in the
decision. The Court of Appeals, upon Philippines,
consideration of the evidence adduced
GONZALES V. COURT OF APPEALS by both parties, rendered the decision (2) Those who have
now under review, holding that the will been convicted of
falsification of a
in question was signed and executed
document, perjury or
by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on false testimony.
FACTS: April 15, 1961 in the presence of the
three attesting witnesses, Matilde Under the law, there is no mandatory
Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria requirement that the witness testify
On June 24, 1961, herein private Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the initially or at any time during the trial as
respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a to his good standing in the community,
document in the presence of the
petition with the Court of First Instance his reputation for trustworthythiness
of Rizal docketed as Special deceased and of each other as
required by law, hence allowed and reliableness, his honesty and
Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate uprightness in order that his testimony
of a will alleged to have been executed probate.
may be believed and accepted by the
by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and trial court. It is enough that the
designating therein petitioner as the qualifications enumerated in Article
principal beneficiary and executrix. 820 of the Civil Code are complied
Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow ISSUE: with, such that the soundness of his
and herein private respondent mind can be shown by or deduced
Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner from his answers to the questions
Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces propounded to him, that his age (18
of the deceased. The petition was Whether or not the respondent Court years or more) is shown from his
opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, appearance, testimony , or
herein petitioner, assailing the of Appeals erred in holding that the
document, Exhibit "F", was executed competently proved otherwise, as well
document purporting to be the will of as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or
the deceased on the following and attested as required by law when
dumb and that he is able to read and
grounds: there was absolutely no proof that the write to the satisfaction of the Court,
three instrumental witnesses were and that he has none of the
1. that the same is credible witnesses. disqualifications under Article 821 of
not genuine; and in the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's
the alternative contention that it must first be
established in the record the good
2. that the same was RULING: standing of the witness in the
not executed and community, his reputation for
attested as required trustworthiness and reliableness, his
We find no merit to petitioner's first honesty and uprightness, because
by law; assignment of error. Article 820 of the such attributes are presumed of the
Civil Code provides the qualifications witness unless the contrary is proved
3. that, at the time of of a witness to the execution of wills otherwise by the opposing party.
the alleged while Article 821 sets forth the

We also reject as without merit
petitioner's contention that the term
"credible" as used in the Civil Code
should be given the same meaning it
has under the Naturalization Law
where the law is mandatory that the
petition for naturalization must be
supported by two character witnesses
who must prove their good standing in
the community, reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, their
honesty and uprightness. The two
witnesses in a petition for
naturalization are character witnesses
in that being citizens of the Philippines,
they personally know the petitioner to
be a resident of the Philippines for the
period of time required by the Act and
a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable and that said petitioner
has in their opinion all the
qualifications necessary to become a
citizen of the Philippines and is not in
any way disqualified under the
provisions of the Naturalization Law
(Section 7, Commonwealth Act No.
473 as amended).
In probate proceedings, the
instrumental witnesses are not
character witnesses for they merely
attest the execution of a will or
testament and affirm the formalities
attendant to said execution. And We
agree with the respondent that the
rulings laid down in the cases cited by
petitioner concerning character
witnesses in naturalization
proceedings are not applicable to
instrumental witnesses to wills
executed under the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each
and everyone of the three instrumental
witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia,
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya,
are competent and credible is
satisfactorily supported by the
evidence as found by the respondent
Court of Appeals, which findings of fact
this Tribunal is bound to accept and
rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not
pointed to any disqualification of any of
the said witnesses, much less has it
been shown that anyone of them is
below 18 years of age, of unsound
mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or
write.
MERZA VS PORRAS
FACTS:
This case is an appeal from the Court
of Appeals which affirmed an order of
the Court of First Instance of Zambales
denying the probate of the last will and
testament and the so called “codicil”
identified as Exhibits A and B, of Pilar
Montealegre, deceased.
Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will
and so called codicil disinheriting her
husband Pedro Porras and some of
her relatives. These two documents
were submitted for probate but were
denied by the trial court, upon the
grounds such as the defect of the
attestation clause on Exhibit A and that
Exhibit B cannot be considered a
codicil for it was executed by the
testator a day before Exhibit A, thus it
cannot be included in the probate
proceedings.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the testatrix had
signed the instrument in the presence
of the said witness?
2. Whether or not Exhibit B partakes
the nature of a will?
RULING:
1. YES
It must be admitted that the attestation
clause was very poor drawn, its
language exceedingly ungrammatical
to the point of being difficult to
understand; but from a close
examination of the whole context in
relation to its purpose the implication
seems clear that the testatrix signed in
the presence of the witnesses.
Considering that the witnesses' only
business at hand was to sign and
attest to the testatrix's signing of the
document, and that the only actors of
the proceeding were the maker and
the witnesses acting and speaking
collectively and in the first person, the
phrase "in our presence," used as it
was in connection with the process of
signing, can not imply anything but the
testatrix signed before them. No other
inference is possible. The prepositional
phrase "in our presence" denotes an
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active verb and the verb a subject. The
verb could not be other than signed
and the subject no other than the
testatrix.
The use of the word "also" is no less
enlightening. It denotes that, as each
of the witnesses sign in the presence
of the testatrix and of one another, so
the testatrix sign in similar or like
manner — in their presence.
2. NO
With reference of Exhibit B the Court
of Appeal agreed with the trial court
that the document having been
executed one day before Exhibit A
could not be considered as a codicil
"because a codicil, as the word
implies, is only an addition to, or
modification of, the will." The Court of
Appeals added that "the content of
Exhibit B are couched in the language
of ordinarily used in a simple affidavit
and as such, may not have the legal
effect and force to a testamentary
disposition." Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals observed, disinheritance "may
not be made in any instrument other
than the will of Exhibit A, as expressly
provided for in article 849 of the Civil
Code," and, "there being no disposition
as to the disinheritance of the
oppositor, Pedro Lopez Porras (the
surviving spouse), in the said Exhibit
A, it is quite clear that he can not be
disinherited in any other instrument
including Exhibit B, which is, as above
stated, a simple affidavit."
Exhibit B does partake of the nature of
a will. A will is defined in article 667 of
the Civil code of Spain as "the act by
which a persons dispose of all his
property or a portion of it," and in
article 783 of the new Civil Code as
"an act whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law,
to control to a certain degree the
disposition of his estate, to take effect
after his death. Exhibit B comes within
this definition.

Juan Palacios vs. Maria Catimbang
Palacios, G.R. No. L-12207.
December 24, 1959
Facts:
Petitioner executed his last will and
testament and he, subsequently,
filed before the Court of First
Instance a petition for its approval,
this is in accordance with Article
838, paragraph 2. In said will he
instituted as his sole heirs his
natural children Antonio Palacios
and Andrea Palacios.
Respondent filed an opposition to
the probate of the will alleging that
she is the acknowledge daughter of
petitioner but she was incompletely
ignored in said will thus impairing
her legitime. Respondent does not
object to the probate of the will insofar
as its due execution is concerned or
on the ground that it has not complied
with the formalities prescribed by law;
rather she objects to its intrinsic
validity or to the legality of the
provisions of the will.
As to the essential requisites and
formalities provided by law for a
validity of a will, the court issues an
order admitting the will to probate.
The court, however, set a date for
the hearing of the opposition
relative to the intrinsic validity of
the will, the court declared the
oppositor (respondent herein) to be
the natural child of petitioner and
annulling the will insofar as it
impairs her legitime.
Issue:
whether the trial court may validly
entertain oppositions on the
intrinsic validity in a proceeding for
the allowance of a will.
Ruling:
No. The authentication of the will
decides no other questions than such
as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will. It
does not determine nor even by
implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions; that may
be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The
questions relating to these points
remain entirely un-affected, and may
be raised even after the will has been
authenticated.
In the present case, the court erred in
entertaining the opposition and in
annulling the portion of the will which
allegedly impairs the legitime of the
oppositor on the ground that
respondent is an acknowledged
natural daughter of the testator.
Additional rules:
 The only purpose of the
allowance of wills is merely to
determine if the will has been
executed in accordance with
the requirements of the law;
 On issues regarding the
rights of an acknowledged
natural child with his legitime
should be raised in a
separate action;
 After a will has been probated
during the lifetime of a
testator it does not
necessarily mean that he
cannot alter or revoke the
same before his death.
Should he make a new will, it
would also be allowable on
his petition, and if he should
die before he has had a
chance to present such
petition, the ordinary probate
proceedings after the
testator’s death would be in
order" (Report of the Code
Commission, pp. 53-54). The
reason for this comment is
that the rights to the
succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death
of the decedent (Article 777,
new Civil Code).
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Macam v. Gatmaitan, 60 Phil. 358
Facts:
This case comprises two appeals, one
taken by the petitioner Nicolasa
Macam and the other by the oppositor
Juana Gatmaitan, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
On March 27, 1933, Nicolasa Macam
filed in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan a petition for the probate of
the will dated July 12, 1932, and of the
codicil thereof dated February 17,
1933, executed by Leonarda Macam
who died on March 18, 1933, in the
municipality of Calumpit, of said
Province of Bulacan, and for her
appointment as executrix without
bond.
When the petition was called for
hearing on April 24, 1933, in the
absence of the judge, the clerk of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
upon instructions of said judge to
proceed to take the evidence in the
absence of any opposition, took the
evidence relative to the probate of the
will, no opposition to the same having
been filed. Inasmuch as Juana
Gatmaitan filed opposition to the
probate of the codicil, said clerk
deemed himself unauthorized to take
the evidence relative thereto and
refrained from so doing.
The will and the evidence for its
probate having been submitted to the
court the vacation Judge Hon. M.
Rosauro, on April 28, 1933, entered an
order allowing said will and appointing
the petitioner Nicolasa Macam as
executrix.
On July 6, 1933, after notice to the
parties, the codicil was called for
hearing, opposition having been filed
by Juana Gatmaitan, one of the
legatees instituted in the will which had
already been allowed by final and
executory judgment. After hearing
counsel for the respective parties, the
Judge presiding over the Court of First
Instance of bulacan dismisses the
opposition because the will has
become final and executory. The court
cannot entertain the so-called codicil.
Issues:

1. Is the probate of a will by final
judgment prior to that of a codicil
thereof bar to the probate of said
codicil?
2. Does the failure to the file opposition
to the probate of a will constitute a bar
to the presentation of the codicil for
probate?
RULING:
SEC. 625. Allowance necessary, and
conclusive as to execution.—No will
shall pass either the real or personal
estate, unless it is proved and allowed
in the Court of First Instance, or by
appeal to the Supreme Court; and the
allowance by the court of a will of real
and personal estate shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.
Interpreting the above legal provisions
as regards the scope of the allowance
of a will, this court, in numerous
decisions, has laid down the doctrine
that the probate of a will is conclusive
as to its due execution and as to the
testamentary capacity of the testator,
but not as to the validity of its
provisions, and in probate proceedings
the courts are without jurisdiction to
determine questions concerning the
validity of the provisions of the will.
The fact that a will has been allowed
without opposition and the order
allowing the same has become final
and executory is not a bar to the
presentation and probate of a codicil,
provided it complies with all the
necessary formalities for executing a
will required by section 614 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended
by section 1 of Act No. 1934.
It is not necessary that the will and the
codicil be probated together, as the
codicil may be concealed by an
interested party and it may not be
discovered until after the will has
already been allowed; and they may
be presented and probated one after
the other (40 Cyc., 1228), since the
purpose of the probate proceedings is
merely to determine whether or not the
will and the codicil meet all the
statutory requirements for their
extrinsic validity, leaving the validity of
their provisions for further
consideration.
The appeal taken by the petitioner
Nicolasa Macam is, therefore, well
founded and the court a quo erred in
flatly, denying her petition for the
probate of the codicil on the erroneous
ground that said codicil should have
been presented at the same time as
the will.
With respect to the opposition of the
oppositor-appellant Juana Gatmaitan,
the fact that she failed to file opposition
to the probate of the will does not
prevent her from filing opposition to the
probate of the codicil thereof,
inasmuch as the will may satisfy all the
external requisites necessary for its
validity, but the codicil may, at the time
of its execution, not be in conformity
therewith. If the testator had
testamentary capacity at the time of
the execution of the will, and the will
was executed in accordance with all
the statutory requirements, opposition
to its probate would not lie. On the
contrary, if at the time of the execution
of the codicil the testator lacked some
of the subjective requisites legally
capacitating him to execute the same,
or all the statutory requirements were
not complied with in the execution
thereof, opposition to its probate would
lie.
G.R. No. L-47305 July 31, 1942
In the matter of the estate of Rufina
Arevalo. ARISTON BUSTAMANTE,
administrator-appellant,
vs.
PETRONA AREVALO, ET AL.,
oppositors-appellees.
Facts:
Ariston Bustamante was declared by
the deceased Rufina Arevalo in his
second last will and testament as her
sole heir. Rufina died without
compulsory heir. The Second will was
opposed by the appellees in the
contention that it was forgery. The
Probate Court ruled that the second
will was forgery and thus, the first will
was allowed.
Issue:
1. Was the second will was a forgery?
2. Granting that the second will is
valid, do the second will revoked the
first will?
Ruling:
Anent to the first issue, the Honorable
Supreme Court ruled that the second
will was genuine and was not forged.
It is a first principle in writing that exact
coincidence between two signatures is
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absolute proof that one or the other is
a forgery. There must be some
different before authenticity reposes
upon a general characteristics
resemblance, coupled with specific
differences, such as naturally result
from the infinite variety of conditions
controlling the muscles of the writer at
each separate effort in forming his
signature.
In the present case, a careful scrutiny
of all the questioned and the standard
signatures has convinced us that they
have been written by the same person
because they show the same general
type, quality and characteristics, with
natural variations. We are, therefore,
inclined to give credence to the expert
testimony to that effect presented by
the appellant.
Moreover, a forger who has to make
two or more signatures usually sees to
it that all the signatures are uniform for
fear that any difference might arouse
suspicion. In this case, however, in
some questioned signatures the letters
"R" and "u" are separated, but in
others, they are united. Osborne in
"Questioned Documents"
Another indication of genuineness in a
holographic document or a
considerable amount of writing, or in
two or more disputed signatures, are
certain natural variations in the details
of the writing. It is difficult for the
inexperienced or unthinking examiner
to understand that a certain extent of
variation in a group of several
signatures and variation in repeated
words and letters in a continuous
holographic document can be
evidence of genuineness. The forger
does not understand this necessity for
natural variation and, as nearly as he
can, makes words and letters just
alike.
Anent to the second issue, the
Honorable Supreme Court ruled that
the second will revoked the first will.
We believe, therefore, that the first will
has been entirely revoked. Though it
might appear right that Amando
Clemente should receive something
from the estate because he, together
with Ariston Bustamante, has been
raised by the testatrix, and both are
her relatives, nevertheless it would be
venturesome for us to advance our
own idea of a just distribution of the
property in the face of a different mode
of disposition so clearly expressed by
the testatrix in the later will. As she

had no forcible heirs, she was
absolutely free to give her estate to
whomsoever she choose, subject of
course to the payment of her debts. It
would be a dangerous precedent to
strain the interpretation of a will in
order to effect what the court believes
to be an equitable division of the
estate of a deceased person. The only
function of the courts in these cases is
to carry out the intention of the
deceased as manifested in the will.
Once that intention has been
determined through a careful reading
of the will or wills, and provided the law
on legitimes has not been violated, it is
beyond the pale of judicial cognizance
to inquire into the fairness or
unfairness of any devise or bequest. It
might be said that it is hard to
understand how, in a temporary anger
at Amando Clemente, the testatrix
would entirely cut him off from the
inheritance. We should not, however,
sit in judgment upon her motives and
sentiments, first because, as already
stated, nothing in the law restrained
her from disposing of her property in
any manner she desired, and
secondly, because there are no
adequate means of ascertaining the
inward processes of her conscience.
She was the sole judge of her own
attitude toward those who expected
her bounty.
Samson v Naval
If the will does not produce legal
effects because it has not been
executed in accordance with the
provisions of the law, neither would the
revocatory clause therein produce
legal effects.
FACTS:
Attorney Perfecto Gabriel presented in
the Court for allowance as the will of
Simeona F. Naval, a document
executed by her on February 13, 1915,
and in which he was appointed
executor. After hearing the petition for
allowance filed by said executor, it was
denied on the ground that said
document was not duly executed by
the deceased as her last will and
testament, inasmuch as she did not
sign it in the presence of three witness
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and the two witnesses did not sign it in had not been duly executed by the
the presence of each other. deceased, as her last will and
testament, because she did not sign in
Thereafter the nieces and legatees of the presence of three witnesses, and
the same deceased filed in the same two of these witnesses did not sign in
court for allowance of her will, since the presence of each other, or what is
there was another document executed the same thing, that said document
by her on October 31, 1914. has not be attested and subscribed in
the manner established by law for the
The petition for allowance was execution of will.
opposed by Monica Naval, Rosa
Naval, and Cristina Naval on the
ground that the will has been revoked
by another will executed subsequently
by her during her lifetime.
The court issued an order admitting
said second document and ordering its
allowance as the last will and
testament of said deceased.
Rosa and Cristina Naval, assigned, as
errors committed by the court, among
others, the following:
1. The finding of the court that the will
of October 31, 1914, has not been
revoked by that of February 13, 1915.
ISSUE:
WON a will, containing a revocatory
clause, which is invalid, produces a
legal effect.
RULING:
Section 623 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, provides that no will shall
be revoked, except by implication of
law, otherwise than by some will,
codicil, or other writing executed as
provided in case of wills.
There is such relation between the
revocatory clause and the will which
contains it, that if the will does not
produce legal effects because it has
not been executed in accordance with
the provisions of the law, neither would
the revocatory clause therein produce
legal effects.
In the case at bar, the document,
executed by the deceased, Simeona
F. Naval, as her last will and
testament, dated February 13, 1915,
has been presented for allowance and
that court denied its allowance on the
ground that the document in question