G.R. Nos. 100225-26.

May 11, 1993

People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee vs Raul Santos y Narciso, Maria Morales y Bacon, Peter
Doe, Richard Doe, Accused, Raul Santos y Narciso, Accused-Appellant

Facts:
Gilcerio Cupcupin was driving a jeepney with Alberto Bautista on board. They were at a stop at the
corner of Estrella and Yango Streets in Navotas and were about to make a right turn when two persons
with firearms approached the jeep and fired at them. The shooters were later identified as Raul Santos and
Mario Morales. Baustista survived after having escaped despite receiving grave injuries. On the other
hand, one PO1 Victorino Bohol witnessed the said shooting and was able to call for other policemen to
respond to the scene. Sworn Statements and testimonies of Baustista and PO1 Bohol were admitted as
evidence to identify Santos and Morales. Prosecution also submitted the sworn statement of Ronaldo
Guerrero, a witness in another criminal case wherein Santos was charged with the murder of Daniel
Nuguera, in order to show criminal propensity on the part of appellant Santos. On appeal, accused makes
the following assignment of errors: (1) his identification in the police line-up by the two witnesses is
inadmissible as he was not afforded his right to counsel; (2) he questions the trial court for admitting a
sworn statement by one Ronaldo Guerrero, a witness in another criminal case accused was also charged
with the murder which had taken place in the very same site where Bautista and Cupcupin were
ambushed as such accused contends that the affidavit of Ronaldo Guerrero was hearsay evidence,
considering that the prosecution did not present Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness during the trial.

Issue:
Whether the trial court may not admit a sworn statement of a witness taken from another criminal case
wherein the accused for both cases are one and the same.

Held:
The trial court admitted the same as falling within one or more of the exceptions set out in Section 34,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

"Sec. 34. Similar Acts as Evidence. — Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is
not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage
and the like.” Trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the
limited purpose for proving knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant knew that
the particular corner of two (2) particular streets in Malabon was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its
passengers. As in fact, both in the instant case, as well as the case where Guerrero’s testimony was
originally presented, the scene of the crime is one and the same.