Aquino III v. COMELEC, GR No.

189793, April 17, 201 Ruling

FACTS
Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed R.A. 9716, which
reapportioned the First an
Second legislative districts in the Province o( Camarines
Sur to create an additional district. The rst district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form
a new second legislative district
Sen. Aquiino III and Naga Mayor Robredo led a petition
for certiorari and prohibition
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced
by RA 9716, run
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a
legislative district. the petitioners claim that the
recon guration by RA 9716 of the rst and second
districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because
the proposed rst district will end up with a population of
less than 250,00 or 176, 383
No. While Section 5(3) Article VI of the 1987 constitution
requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,00 to
be entitled to a representative, it does not have to
increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled
to an additional district
FACTS
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative
district for the province of Camarines Sur by recon guring
the existing rst and second legislative districts of the
province. The said law originated from House Bill No.
4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009
To that effect, the rst and second districts of Camarines
Sur were recon gured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the rst district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form
a new second legislative district

Section 5(3) Article VI of the 1987 constitution
• Each legislative district shall compromise, as far as
applicable, contiguous, compact, adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least 250,000, or each
province have atleast one representative
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional
standards that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district. Thus, the proposed rst district will end
up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383

Issue ISSUE
WON RA 9716 was unconstitutiona

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 Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province
HELD
NO. The second sentence of  Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the constitution states that: “ Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
There is a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a
province is entitled to at least a representative, there is
nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a
city must rst meet a population minimum of 250,000 in
order to be similarly entitled
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the
constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only
for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province
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Aldaba vs Comele
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare
unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591),
creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos,
Bulacan, for violating the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a
city
Antecedent
Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through four legislative districts.
The First Legislative District comprised of the city of
Malolos[1] and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit,
Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA
9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,[2]
by creating a separate legislative district for the city. At
the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were led in
Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later
converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No.
1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The
population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested
fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied
on an undated certi cation issued by a Regional Director
of the National Statistics Of ce (NSO) that the projected
population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030
by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78
between 1995 to 2000.[3
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of
Malolos City, led this petition contending that RA 9591 is
unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
representation in Congress as provided under Section
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 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
In its Comment to the petition, the Of ce of the Solicitor
General (OSG) contended that Congress use of projected
population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination
on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature
to determine compliance with [a constitutional
requirement]
The certi cation can be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying of cer, in which
case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is
unauthorized
The population projection must be as of the middle of the
year, which in this case, the Certi cation issued by
Director Miranda was undated

Issue:  Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a It was also computed that the correct gures using the
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population
is  unconstitutional  as petitioned. And whether the City of of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333
Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected. as of August 1, 2010.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this
9591 is unconstitutional  for being violative of Section 5 Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to
(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of equalize the population and voting power among districts
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the
grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city
must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with
this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certi cation
which is based on the demographic projections, was
declared without legal effect because the Regional
Director has no basis and no authority to issue the
Certi cation based on the following statements supported
by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V.
Ramos, which provides

The certi cation on demographic projection can be issued

only if such are declared  of cial  by the Nat’l Statistics
Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated
whether the document have been declared of cial by the
NSCB

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 Angel Nava
vs COMELEC and Nelson Juli
Facts
Naval had served as member of the Sanggunian, 2nd
District of CamSur. On October 12, 2009, RA 9716 was
approved, reapportioning the legislative district of
Province of CamSur
Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old
Second District to form the present Third District. The
present Second District is composed of the two remaining
towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with ve towns from
the old First District
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among
the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served
until 2013
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected
as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from
the Third District in the 2013 elections. On October 29,
2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC) and led before the COMELEC a Veri ed
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certi cate
of Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully
served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three
consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian,
irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The
three-term limit rule’s application is more with reference to
the same local elective post, and not necessarily in
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connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing
Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time
is violative of the in exible three-term limit rule enshrined
in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly
construed
COMELEC cancelled Naval's COC
The conditions for the application of the three-term limit
rule are present in the instant case as the records clearly
establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time for the
same government post. To put things in a proper
perspective, it is imperative to review and discuss the
salient points in the case of Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The
case involves the question of whether or not a municipal
mayor, having been elected and had already served for
three (3) consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in light
of the conversion of the municipality to a city. In applying
the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the
conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert
the of ce of the municipal mayor into a local government
post different from the of ce of the city mayor. The Court
took into account the following circumstances: (1) That
the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as that
of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the
same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor
for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the
inhabitants were the same group of voters [over] whom
he held power and authority as their chief executive for
nine years
Ruling:Court denies the petition
A republic is a representative government, a government
run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy
4
 where the people govern themselves directly. The
essence of republicanism is representation and
renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of
public functionaries who derive their mandate from the
people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period
only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the
option of their principal
R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis
to be created, but the Third Districtis to be renamed.
Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a
legal provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers mean what they say
The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional
requirement to achieve equality of representation among
the districts. It is with this mindset that the Court should
consider Naval’s argument anent having a new set of
constituents electing him into of ce in 2010 and 2013
Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the
three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right to
equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines
Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District,
which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still
be represented, albeit by another eligible person
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Bagabuyo vs COMELEC (Plebiscite
FACTS:
Cagayan de Oro only had one legislative district before.
In 2006, CdO congressman Jaraula sponsored a bill to
have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was
passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were
created. Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law
and he went immediately to the Supreme Court. He was
contending that the 2nd district was created without a
plebiscite which was required by the Constitution
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the
case at bar
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar.
RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan
de Oro City in the House of Representatives and
Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply
when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a
local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did
not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory,
population and income classi cation; hence, no plebiscite
is required
Fact
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then
Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula led and
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 sponsored House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the
Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City
of Cagayan De Oro  or RA No. 9371. It increased
Cagayan de Oro’s legislative district from one to two. For
the election of May 2007, CDO’s voters would be
classi ed as belonging to either the rst or the second
district, depending on their place of residence. On March
13, 2007, COMELEC promulgated a resolution
implementing the said act. Bagabuyo led a petition at the
Supreme Court asking for the nulli cation of RA 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds. Petitioner
argued that COMELEC cannot implement a law without
the commencement of a plebiscite which is indispensable
for the division and conversion of a local govt. unit
Issue
  Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the
legislative apportionment of a city, involve the division and
conversion of a local government unit, necessitating a
plebiscit
Ruling
Petition is DISMISSED
The Court upheld respondent’s arguments saying that
such law only increased the representation of CDO in the
House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod. Creation, division, merger, abolition, and
alteration of boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires the
commencement of a plebiscite, while legislative
apportionment or reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5
need not
There was also no change in CDO’s territory, population,
income and class cation
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Legislative apportionment is de ned by Black’s Law
Dictionary as the determination of the number of
representative which a State, county or other subdivision
may send to a legislative body
  It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in
proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district
lines so as to equalize population and voting power
among th
districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the
realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
RA 9371 does not have the effect of dividing the City of
Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and
territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or
as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter
representation by giving each city voter more and greater
say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang
Panglunsod
The City, for its part, now has twice the number of
congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of
Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the
country has not increased to the point of doubling its
numbers, the presence of two congressman (instead of
one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and
proportional improvement in the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in Congress
6

 returns and quali cations of  the Members of the House

Reyes vs Comele of Representatives
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Issue
Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on WON the Comelec has jurisdiction over the petitioner who
Election ordering the cancellation of the Certi cate of is proclaimed as winner and who has already taken her
Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the oath of of ce for the position of member of the House of
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque Representative of Marinduqu

On October 31,2012 Joseph Socorro Tan led with the Hel

Comelec an Amended Petition t Yes. Comelec retains jurisdiction because the HRET does
Deny DUe Course or to Cancel the Certi cate of not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes quali cations, as well as over the assailed COMELEC
the petitioner, on the ground that it contained material Resolutions, unless a petition is duly led with said
representations. On March 27, 2013, the Comelec tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has led such
cancelled the certi cate of candidacy of the petitioner. action. Also, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after
She led a the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
MR on April 8, &'2013. On May 14, 2013, Comelec en Representatives, as stated in sec 17, art VI of the
banc denied her MR constitution. For one to be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, there must be concurrence of
However,, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner these requisites: 1, valid proclamation; 2. proper oath;
of the May 13, 2013 Elections and 3. assumption of of ce
On June 5,2013, Comelec declared the May 14, 2013
Resolution nal and Executory thus the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the
On the same day, petitioner took her oath of of ce before HR yet as she has not assumed of ce yet. Also, the 2nd
Feliciano Belmonte, th requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath
Speaker of the House of Representatives. She has yet to must be made 1 before the Speaker of the House of
assume of ce at that time, as her term of cially starts at Representatives, and @ in open session. Here, although
noon of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no
Comele indication that it was made during the plenary or in open
was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the
proclaimed because pursuant to Sec 17, Art VI of the required oath of of ce was indeed complied
Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if GAD
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, is alleged and proved to exist. For an act to be struck

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 down as having been done with GAD, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross. Here, this Court
nds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially
show that GAD exists
Party-list system
Banat vs COMELEC
Facts:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) led before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full
number of party list representatives provided by the
Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head
of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of
canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic
was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared
further in a resolution that the winning party list will be
resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then led a
petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the
COMELEC.
Issues:
(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives
provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory
or is it merely a ceiling?
(2) Is the 2% threshold and “quali er” votes prescribed by
the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can
major political parties participate in the party-list
elections?

Held: 
(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the
lling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the
House of Representatives to Congress. The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling;

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 party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of
additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court nds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats
when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the
two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec
11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5
(2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment
of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral
or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
 
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits
major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in
party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However,
by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in
Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly, or
indirectly.
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Atong paglaum vs comele
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 led by 52 party-
list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of
their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations
Issue
WON whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation
as party-list organization
Held
No, the Comelec did not commit GAD in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in May13, 2013 party-list
elections. However, since the Court adopts in this
Decision new parameters in the quali cation of national,
regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system,
thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied
by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand
to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the
COMELEC to determine who are quali ed to register
under the party-list system, and to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision
9
 The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution to include in the party-list system both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Section 5(1),
Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there
shall be "a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The
commas after the words "national," and "regional,"
separate national and regional parties from sectoral
parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended national and regional parties to be at the same
time sectoral, they would have stated "national and
regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because
it was never their intention to make the party-list system
exclusively sectoral
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that, during the rst three consecutive terms of
Congress after the rati cation of the 1987 Constitution,
"one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be lled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that
the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties
for two obvious reasons. First, the other one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list
representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-
list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing
the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the
reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral
parties applies only for the rst "three consecutive terms
after the rati cation of this Constitution," clearly making
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the party-list system fully open after the end of the rst
three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or
type of party that quali es under the three groups
constituting the party-list system
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list
structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list
system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-
sectoral parties
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 de nes a "party" as "either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a
sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further
provides that a "political party refers to an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of
government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A.
No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an
organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides
different de nitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-
oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral
party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral
party and need not represent any particular sector. There
is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or
regional political party must represent a "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector. It is suf cient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the same
ideology or platform, or the same governance principles
10

 and policies, regardless of their economic status as
citizens. The phrase "marginalized and
underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941,
in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks
"to promote proportional representation in the election of
that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class.
More speci cally, the economically "marginalized and
underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income
group as classi ed by the National Statistical
Coordination Board.

representatives to the House of Representatives through

the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos
belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
de ned political constituencies," to become members
of the House of Representatives. While the policy
declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties," the speci c implementing
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not de ne or require that
the sectors, organizations or parties must be
"marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to
even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5
are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to
absurdities.
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented"
should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are,
by their nature, economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant,
sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the
members of the sectoral party must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees
of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector,
or must have a track record of advocacy for the
sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector does not mean one must
"wallow in poverty, destitution or in rmity." It is su cient

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 COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS
IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-
LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First
Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Facts:
The present petitions were led by the two rival factions
within the same party-list organization, the Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR
CITIZENS) that are now praying for essentially the same
reliefs from this Court. One group is headed by
Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the organization’s
incumbent representative in the House of
Representatives. This group shall be hereinafter referred
to as the Arquiza Group. The other group is led by
Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the organization’s erstwhile third
nominee. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as
the Datol Group.
were allied with Rep. Arquiza.
the name of their nominees and the term sharing
agreement of the nominees. After the conduct of the May
10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second
among all the party-list candidates and was allocated
two seats in the House of Representatives. The rst seat
was occupied by its rst nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while
the second was given to its second nominee, David L.
Kho (Rep. Kho). The split among the ranks of SENIOR
CITIZENS came about not long after. According to the
Datol Group’s petition, the members of SENIOR
CITIZENS held a national convention on November 27,
2010 in order to address "the unful lled commitment of
Rep. Arquiza to his constituents."10 Further, a new set of
o cers and members of the Board of Trustees of the
organization were allegedly elected during the said
convention. SENIOR CITIZENS’ third nominee, Francisco
G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as the
organization’s Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30,
2010, in an opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled
from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that

On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited

SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list organization. SENIOR
Rep. Arquiza informed the o ce of COMELEC Chairman
CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections.
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. in a letter12 dated December 8,
However, the organization failed to get the required two
2011 that the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS,
percent (2%) of the total votes cast. n accordance with
Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation, which was to
the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of
take e ect on December 31, 2011. The fourth nominee,
additional seats under the party-list system, SENIOR
Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume the vacant position
CITIZENS was allocated one seat in Congress. Rep.
in view of the previous expulsion from the organization of
Arquiza, then the organization’s rst nominee, served as
the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr. Also, from the
a m e m b e r o f t h e H o u s e o f R e p re s e n t a t i v e s .
transcript of the hearing, it appears that the Arquiza
Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to
Group previously manifested that it was withdrawing its
participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. On May 5,
petition, but the same was opposed by the Datol Group
2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an
and was not acted upon by the COMELEC. the Comelec
agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenan which contains

12
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en bang issued a resolution that the list submitted to
them is deemed to be permanent as the law deprives the
party the right to change their nominees. thus, even if the
expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-list were true,
the list and order of nominees of the Senior Citizens
party-list remains the same in so far as the Comelec and
the law are concerned as it does not fall under one of the
three grounds mentioned in law for th changing of
nominees. and, that the resignation of Kho, pursuant to
the party nominees term-sharing agreement, cannot be
recognized and be given e ect so as to create a vacancy
in the list and change the order of the nominees. It must
be noted that the list and order of nominees, after
submission to this Commission, is meant to be
permanent. The legislature in crafting Republic Act No.
7941 clearly deprived the party-list organization of the
right to change its nominees or to alter the order of
nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC,
except for three (3) enumerated instances such as when:
(a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing
his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes
incapacitated. Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the
petitioner party-list were true, the list and order of
nominees of the Senior Citizen’s party-list remains the
same in so far as we are concerned as it does not fall
under one of the three grounds mentioned above.
Neither does it have an automatic e ect on the
organization’s representative in the House of
Representatives, for once a party-list nominee is
"elected" into o ce and becomes a member of the
House, he is treated similarly and equally with the regular
district representatives. As such, they can only be
expelled or suspended upon the concurrence of the two-
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thirds of all its Members and never by mere expulsion of
a party-list organization.
Due to the term sharing agreement which is contrary to
the Art 7 of the 1987 constitution, the registration and
accreditation of Senior Citizens under there Partylist
system of representation was cancelled.
Issue:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it issued the assailed Omnibus Resolution,
disqualifying and cancelling the registration and
accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of
its purported violation of the prohibition against term-
sharing.
Held
Yes, the Court nds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed
erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of
SENIOR CITIZENS. It is a well-entrenched principle that
statutes, including administrative rules and regulations,
operate prospectively unless the legislative intent to the
contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary
implication because the retroactive application of a law
usually divests rights that have already become vested.
This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non
respicit (the law looks forward, not backward). (Citations
omitted.)
True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide
that it shall have retroactive effect. Nonetheless, the
Court cannot subscribe to the argument of the Arquiza
Group that SENIOR CITIZENS already earned a vested
right to its registration as a party-list organization
13

 Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections52 teaches that
"a public of ce is not a property right. As the Constitution
expressly states, a ‘Public of ce is a public trust.’ No one
has a vested right to any public of ce, much less a vested
right to an expectancy of holding a public of ce." Under
Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
COMELEC is entrusted with the function to "register, after
suf cient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must
present their platform or program of government." In
ful lling this function, the COMELEC is duty-bound to
review the grant of registration to parties, organizations,
or coalitions already registered in order to ensure the
latter’s continuous adherence to the requirements
prescribed by law and the relevant rulings of this Court
relative to their quali cations and eligibility to participate
in party-list elections
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the
retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366
on the ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS’
vested right
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the
COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement
among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not
implemented. This fact was manifested by the Arquiza
Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted
by the COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein
the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its
petition for con rmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s
replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27,
2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself
refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the
tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even
declared that no vacancy was created despite the
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execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there
was also no indication that the nominees of SENIOR
CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded
in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this
Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on
this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus,
for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold
his seat and served his term as a member of the House
of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling
in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on
this point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not
actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears
that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had
been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC
En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the
part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact,
desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there
was no violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to
speak of. Clearly then, the disquali cation of SENIOR
CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and
accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this
case and the lack of a legal ground to disqualify the
SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a nding of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with
no choice but to strike down the assailed Omnibus
Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM)
and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).
14

Lico vs Comelec
Facts:
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization
which was registered on 16 November 2009 under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941. On 30 November 2009,
Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation
for the 10 May 2010 Elections.4 On 6 March 2010, it
filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with
petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascarina
as second nominee.
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating
Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.5 Based
on the procedure provided in BANAT Party-List v.
COMELEC,6 Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of
Representatives. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his
oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives,7
and thereafter assumed office. Several months prior to
its proclamation as one of the winning party-list
organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued
Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which
incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its
nominees.8 Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was
to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year
of the three-year term.9
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National
Convention, during which it introduced amendments to
its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient
changes was the composition of the Central
Committee,10 which would still be composed of 15
representatives but with five each coming from Luzon,
Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5 equal representation).
The amendments likewise mandated the holding of an
election of Central Committee members within six
months after the Second National Convention. In
effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term
of the incumbent members (referred to hereafter as
the Interim Central Committee) of the Central
Committee.13 The Interim Central Committee was
dominated by members of the Rimas Group.
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after
petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central
Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for
disloyalty.14 Apart from allegations of malversation and
graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner
Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as
factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his
expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution
and By-laws.15
On 8 December 2011, Congressman Lico filed a Motion
for Reconsideration with the Interim Central
Committee,16 which subsequently denied the same in a
Resolution dated 29 December 2011.17
While petitioner Lico's Motion for Reconsideration was
pending, the Lico Group held a special meeting in Cebu
City (the Cebu meeting) on 19 December 2011. At the
said meeting, new members of the Central Committee,
as well as a new set of officers, were elected.18 The
election was purportedly held for the purpose of
implementing the 5-5-5 equal representation
amendment made during the Second National
Convention.19
On 21 January 2012, the Rimas Group held a Special
National Convention in Parañaque City 20 (the
Parañaque convention), at which a new Central
Committee and a new set of officers were constituted.
15

 Members of the Rimas Group won the election and
occupied all the corresponding seats.
Issue:
WON the Comelec has jurisdiction over the expulsion
of a member of the House of Representative from his
party-list organization
Held
No. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution34
endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions
on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the
case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires
jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of
the nominee, and assumption of office as member of
the House of Representatives.35 In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-
list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he
assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus,
it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction
of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not
intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-
party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the
jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the
HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear
and decide the cases on any matter touching on the
validity of the title of the proclaimed winner.37
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's
expulsion from the House of Representatives is
anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which
necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A
party-list nominee must have been, among others, a
bona fide member of the party or organization for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in the
party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have
ruled that qualifications for public office, whether
elective or not, are continuing requirements. They
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election, or of assumption of office, but during the
officer's entire tenure.39
This is not the first time that this Court has passed
upon the issue of HRET jurisdiction over the
requirements for bona fide membership in a party-list
organization. In Abayon v. HRET,40 it was argued that
the petitioners did not belong to the marginalized and
under-represented sectors that they should represent;
as such, they could not be properly considered bona
fide members of their respective party-list
organizations. The Court held that it was for the HRET
to interpret the meaning of the requirement of bona
fide membership in a party-list organization. It
reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all
contests when it comes to qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives.
Issue
between the two contending groups, which is the
legitimate leadership of Ating Koop.
Held
A party-list organization owes its existence to the State
and the latter's approval must be obtained through its
agent, the COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v.
COMELEC,48 We declared that it is the State, acting
through the COMELEC, that breathes life to a party-list
16

organization. The implication, therefore, is that the
State, through the COMELEC, is a party to the principal
contracts entered into by the party-list organization
and its members - the Constitution and By-laws - such
that any amendment to these contracts would
constitute a novation requiring the consent of all the
parties involved. An amendment to the b laws of a
party-list organization should become effective only
upon approval by the COMELEC.
questioned on the ground that his term had expired at
the time it was filed. The Court applied by analogy the
default rule in corporation law to the effect that officers
and directors of a corporation hold over after the
expiration of their terms until such time as their
successors are elected or appointed.57Señeres ruled
that the hold-over principle applies in the absence of a
provision in the constitution or by-laws of the party-list
organization prohibiting its application.

Such a prerequisite is analogous to the requirement of In the present case, We have gone through the
filing of the amended by-laws and subsequent Constitution and B laws of Ating Koop and We do not
conformity thereto of the Securities and Exchange see any provision forbidding, either expressly or
Commission (SEC) under corporation law. Under the impliedly, the application of the hold-over rule. Thus, in
Corporation Code, an amendment to a by-law provision accordance with corporation law, the existing Interim
must be filed with the SEC. The amendment shall be Central Committee is still a legitimate entity with full
effective only upon the issuance by the SEC of a authority to bind the corporation and to carry out
certification that it is not inconsistent with the powers despite the lapse of the term of its members
Corporation Code.49 on 14 November 2011, since no successors had been
validly elected at the time, or since.
There being no showing that the amendments on the
by-laws of Ating Koop were filed with and subsequently
approved by the COMELEC, any election conducted
pursuant thereto may not be considered valid. Without
such requisite proof, neither the Lico Group nor the
Rimas Group can claim to be the legitimate set of
officers of Ating Koop.

The final, and most important question to be

addressed is: if neither of the two groups is the
legitimate leadership of Ating Koop, then who is?

We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim

Central Committee, whose members remain as such in
a hold-over capacity. In Seneres v. COMELEC,56 the
validity of the Certificate of Nomination filed by Buhay
Party-List through its President, Roger Robles, was

17
y­

y­

 Abang Lingkod vs Comelec

Facts:

18