Compilation

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY.
ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019
VII. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

1. APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
a. Aldaba vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010)
CARPIO J.:
FACTS:
This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which
creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the
province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage
of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos
City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo
(then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be
as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress.
ISSUE: Whe he R.A. 9591, A ac c ea i g a legi la i e di ic f he Ci f Mal l ,

B laca i c i i al a e i i ed.
RULING:
It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative
of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least
250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is
based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional
Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements
supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by
he Na l S a i ic C di a i B a d. I hi ca e, i a a ed he he he d c me ha e
been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying
officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the
Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the
Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.
DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019
b. Aquino III v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010)
Perez, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order
to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates
the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (
250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the

creation of a new legislative district in a province.
RULING:
NO. The ec d e e ce f Sec i 5 (3), A icle VI f he c i i a e ha : Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
e e e e a i e.
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at
least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must
first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
c. Mariano vs COMELEC
(G.R. No 118577, March 7, 1995)
Puno, J.
FACTS:
The e i i e a ail he c i i ali f RA 7854 hich i e i led A Ac C e i g he
M ici ali f Maka i i a Highl U ba i ed Ci be k a he Ci f Maka i. S i g a
taxpayers, the first petition assails Sec. 2, 51 and 52 of RA 7854 as unconstitutional on the three
grounds namely: 1) delineated the land area of the proposed City of Makati in violation of Art. X, Sec.
10 of the Constitution, in relation to Sec. 7 and 450 of LGC wherein area of local government unit
should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions (Sec. 2); 2) attempts to alter or
e a he 3 c ec i e e m limi f l cal elec i e fficial i ce he ci hall ac i e a e
corporate existence is in violation of Art. X, Sec. 8 and Art. VI, Sec. 7 of the Constitution (Sec. 51);
and 3a) reapportionment cannot be made by a special law; 3b) the addition of a legislative district
a e e ed i he i le f he bill; a d 3c) Maka i la i , a e 1990 ce , a d l
at 450,000 (Sec. 52).
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit in petitions. Sec. 2 did not add, subtract, divide or
m l i l he e abli hed la d a ea f Maka i. I a e e l a ed ha he ci la d a ea hall
c m i e he e e e i f he m ici ali . F he m e, he legi ima e ea h he la d
area was not defined by metes and bounds with technical descriptions was because of the territorial
dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio. Out of respect, they did
not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue.
Petitioners have far complied with the requirements in challenging the constitutionality of a
law. They merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (exception Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise
the issue. Also, they raised the issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no
jurisdiction.
In Tobias v. Abalos ruling, it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.
Makati has met the minimum population requirement. In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than
250,000 shall be entitled to at least 1 congressional representative.
d. Tobias vs Abalos
(G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994)
BIDIN, J.
FACTS:
Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a
petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same
legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of
the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong
into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that
provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years
following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made
pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained.
ISSUE:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first
contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural
and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives,
the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
" le he i e ided b la . The ef e, he i c ea e i c g e i al e e e a i
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census
to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000
inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the
requirements were not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of separate legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

e. Montejo vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the
annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the
ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The
3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan,
Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.
Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act
No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the
subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all
the territories comprised therein.
On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a
regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district
composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five
municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities
in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it
promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan
of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.
ISSUE: Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of
redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not.
RULING:
No. Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of Leyte.
While concededly the conversion of Biliran into a regular province brought about an imbalance
in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 districts of Leyte, the issue involves
reapportionment of legi la i e di ic , a d e i i e emed lie i h C g e . Thi C ca
itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as
the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make
la . Said di a ce a e ha The C mmi i Elec i i he eb em e ed make mi
adj me he ea i me he ei made.
However, Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples
include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which
is still in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to
make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any
authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted
by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)
f. Sema vs Commission on Elections

(G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM O ga ic Ac a d e i g i i h e

create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the
municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only
made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should
be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as
C aba a a a legi la i e district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan
with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate
legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her
rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the
Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative
representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being
deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S.
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
RULING:
No. Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
legislative districts, nothing in Sec. 20, Article X of the Constitution, authorizes autonomous regions,
expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts. Accordingly, Sec. 19, Art. VI of
R.A. 9054, granting the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void
for being contrary to Sec. 5, Art. VI, and Sec. 20, Art. X, as well as Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution.
The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by
Congress to the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. However,
pursuant to the Constitution, the power to create a province is with Congress and may not be validly
delegated. Section 19 is, therefore, unconstitutional. MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. The creation of Shariff Kabunsuan
is invalid.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through
a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress
to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes
the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through
a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact.
The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative
districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. It would be
anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a
national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,
cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
"The Regi al A embl ma e e ci e legi la i e e e ce he f ll i g ma e :

(k) Na i al elec i . Si ce he ARMM Regi al A embl ha legi la i e e
enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is
elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first
representative is always elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law.
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and
its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous
for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its
legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is
maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-
evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it
can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To
allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to
operate outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly's legislative powers
"[ ]i hi i e i ial j i dic i
2. QUALIFICATIONS
a. Marcos vs COMELEC
(G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She
he ed he c llege deg ee, ed ca i , i S . Pa l C llege Di i e W d U i e i al i
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila
during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected
as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,
when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila
during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District
f Le e a d al a ca dida e f he ame i i , filed a Pe i i f Ca cella i a d
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven
months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency
due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.
RULING:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor
of a conclusion supporting petiti e claim f legal e ide ce or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A mi f ll d micile f he a e . Tacl ba became Imelda d micile f igi b

operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
3. A ife d e a ma icall gai he h ba d d micile beca e he e m e ide ce

in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late
President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and
not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while livi g i he b he h e, a ac , hich he d micilia i e i clea l
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby
SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers
to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
b. AQUINO vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995)
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,
Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a
petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1
year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino
to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above
dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino
until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino
ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
ISSUE: Whe he e ide c i he ce ifica e f ca didac ac all c e d micile a a

the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
RULING:
N . The lace he e a a ac all c c i el ha hi e ma e h me, he e he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community
for electoral gain.
A i ce ifica e f ca didac i a e i (1992) elec i i dica e ha he a a e ide

and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election.
A i c ection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims
to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other
residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not
to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the
Second District of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.
c. Coquilla vs COMELEC
(G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy.
In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued
making several trips to the United States.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern
Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating
that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-elec i gh ca cel C illa
certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a
material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was
claimed he i e . O J l 19, 2001, COMELEC g a ed Al a e eii a d de ed he
ca cella i f e i i e ce ifica e f ca didac .
ISSUE: Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one year before
the elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.
RULING:
No. The petitioner had not been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar, for at least one year prior
to the May 14, 2001 elections. Although Oras was his domicile of origin, petitioner lost the same when
he became a US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy. From then on, until November 10, 2000, when
he reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation, petitioner was an alien without any right to
reside in the Philippines. In Caasi v. Comelec, infra., it was held that immigration to the US by virtue
f he ac i i i f a g ee ca d c i e aba d me f d micile i he Phili i e .
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

"dwelling" of "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is "the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain.
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's
parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of a new domicile.
3. PARTY-LIST SYSTEM (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941)
a. Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 203766 : April 2, 2013)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme
Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued
in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and
organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not
come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups
are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond,
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
RULING:
No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the
two aforestated cases.
Political Law- Party-list system
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that
"the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but
also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the
entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties
can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list
system prescribed in the Constitution.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party
or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A.
No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government. "On the other
hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. "R.A. No. 7941 provides different
definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each
other.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly

different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need
not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or
regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient
that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same
governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that
did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified
by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines
and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees
of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector.
Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify,
even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-
list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or

lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized
and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-
defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist
from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has
ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present
petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by
this Court.
b. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on Elections

(G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010)
BRION, J.
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its
e l i , de i g al he la e m i f ec ide a i , i acc da ce i h Sec i 6(8) f
Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others
the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner
elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it
became the law in question.
ISSUES: WON COMELEC erred in delisting PGBI.
RULINGS:
Yes. Petition is granted. The law is clear that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of
any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it a) fails to participate in the last
two (2) preceding elections; or b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing
from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides
for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
The disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should
now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section
6 (8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the
law is, and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.
The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot
ai PGBI deli i g f m he e f egi e ed a i al, egi al ec ral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second,
MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legisla i e i e f Sec i 6(8) f RA 7941, a PGBI ci ed
congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.
c. ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)
DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-ge de ed i di id al (LGBT ). I c a ed i 2003, A g Ladlad
first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic
Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for accreditation was denied
on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again
filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on moral grounds.
Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that
he a -list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose
interests a e al he a i . U il he ime c me he Ladlad i able j if ha ha i g mi ed
sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for
accreditation under the party-li em ill emai j ha . Tha he Phili i e ca ig e i
more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused
b aid eligi ha e i ed i cie a d he e a e blicl acce ed m al m .
COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda
to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for
the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA
7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941.
RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It
al di ec ed he COMELEC g a e i i e a lica i f a -list accreditation.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records
has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.
O C i i ide i A icle III, Sec i 5 ha la hall be made e ec i g a

establishment of religion, hibi i g he f ee e e ci e he e f. A b m, ha -
e abli hme cla e call f i g e me e ali i eligi ma e . Clea l , g e me al
elia ce eligi j ifica i i i c i e i h hi lic f e ali .
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to

elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
d. ANAD v. COMELEC
(GR No. 206987, September 10, 2013)
PEREZ, J.
FACTS:
On November 7, 2012, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution cancelling the
Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation of petitioner Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(ANAD) on the following grounds: a) ANAD does not belong to, or come within the ambit of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors enumerated in Sec. 5 of RA 7941; b) The Certificate of
Nomination submitted by the party only contained 3 nominees instead of 5, which is a failure to comply
with the procedural requirement set forth in Sec. 4, Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366; and c) ANAD failed
to submit its statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 National and Local Elections
as required by Sec. 14 of RA 7166
ANAD challenged the above-mentioned resolution. The Court remanded the case to the
COMELEC for re-evaluation. In the assailed Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the COMELEC affirmed
he ca cella i f e i i e Ce ifica e f Regi a i a d/ Acc edi a i a d di alified hem
from participating in the 2013 Elections for violation of election laws and regulations. Hence, this
petition
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution
without the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process clause.
RULING:
NO. ANAD was already given the opportunity to prove its qualifications during the summary
hearing of August 23, 2012, during which ANAD submitted documents and other pieces of evidence
to establish said qualifications. The COMELEC need not have called another summary hearing as
they could readily resort to the documents and other piece of evidence previously submitted by
petitioners in re-a ai i g ANAD alifica i .
The COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over
the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within
its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion
or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. As empowered by law, the COMELEC may cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply
with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections
Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is essential as the said provision is a safeguard
against arbitrariness. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to
substitute and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after submission of
the list to the COMELEC.
The COMELEC will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements
prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general
circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of
election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any
particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in
newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make
intelligent and informed choice.
e. Abang Lingkod Party-list vs COMELEC

(G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013)
REYES, J.
FACTS:
Abang Lingkod Party-list is a sectoral organization that represents the interest of peasant
farmers and fisherfolk. On May 31, 2012, the party manifested its intent to participate in the May 2013
elections. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513 which required previously registered party-list
groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary
hearing for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under RA
7941. The party complied with the needed documents and after due proceedings, the COMELEC en
banc cancelled their registration as a party-list group. They pointed out that Abang Lingkod (1) failed
to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; (2) it
merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections; and
(3) failed to show that nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have
been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the sectors it claims to represent. Abang
Lingkod then filed a petition alleging COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its
registration under the party-list system. This was consolidated with 51 other separate petitions whose
registration were cancelled or who were denied registration.
On April 2, 2013, the Court laid down new parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in
screening parties, organizations or associations seeking registration and/or accreditation under the
party-list system. The Court then remanded to COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-
list groups, including that of Abang Lingkod, to determine whether they are qualified pursuant to the
new parameters and, in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued a Resolution affirming the cancellation of Abang
Li gk d egi a i . The a gh f ec ide a i , h e e , i hd e i a d filed instead
this petition, claiming that the former gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the cancellation
of its registration when it should have allowed it to present evidence to prove its qualification as a
party-list group pursuant to the Atong Paglaum ruling. On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that
the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC g a el ab ed i di c e i i ca celi g he a egi ai de he

party-list system.
RULING:
YES. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on requiring ABANG
LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group's track record is no longer required
pursuant to the Court's pronouncement in Atong Paglaum. Abang Lingkod's registration must be
cancelled due to its misrepresentation is a conclusion derived from a simplistic reading of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 and the import of the Court's disposition in Atong Paglaum. Not every
misrepresentation committed by national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations would merit
the denial or cancellation of their registration under the party-list system. The misrepresentation must
relate to their qualification as a party-list group.
Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the party-list system are
not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to their verified
petitions their "constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and
other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC."
Sectoral parties or organizations are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their
track record, i.e., proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they
represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral
organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent. If at all, evidence
showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only
required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization.
Also, a declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration under Section 6 (6)
of R.A. No. 7941, in order to be a ground for the refusal and/or cancellation of registration under the
party-list system, must pertain to the qualification of the party, organization or coalition under the
party-list system. In order to justify the cancellation or refusal of registration of a group, there must be
a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render the group
disqualified from participating in the party-list elections.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to
assess the qualification of Abang Lingkod pursuant to Atong Paglaum. It was only remanded to the
them so that they may reassess, based on the evidence already submitted, whether the party qualifies
to participate in the party-list system. The records also disclose that Abang Lingkod was able to file
with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, negating its
claim that it was denied due process. As it has been held, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given a chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
f. COCOFED v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013)
BRION, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation Inc. is an organization and
dectoral party whose membership comes from the peasant sector, particularly the coconut farmers
and producers. On May 29, 2012, it manifested with the COMELEC its intent to participate in the
party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted only 2 nominees - Atty. Emerito Calderon and Atty.
Domingo Espina. Pursuant to Res. No. 9513, the COMELEC conducted a summary hearing to
determine whether COCOFED, among several party-list groups, had continuously complied with the
legal requirements. In its November 7, 2012 resolution, the COMELEC ca celled e i i e
registration and accreditation as a partylist organization. On Dec. 4, the party submitted the names
of Charles Avila in substitution of Atty. Espina and Efren Villaseñor as its third nominee.
Pursuant to the Atong Paglaum ruling, the Court remanded all the petitions to the COMELEC
to determine their compliance with the new parameters set by the Court in that case. On May 10,
2013, COMELEC i ed i a ailed e l i , mai ai i g i ea lie li g f he a failure to
comply with the requirement of Sec. 8 of RA 7941 to submit a list of not less than 5 nominees.
COCOFED moved for reconsideration only to withdraw its motion later and instead, filed a
Manifestation with Urgent Request to Admit Additional Nominees with the COMELEC, namely: Felino
Gutierrez and Rodolfo de Asis. On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the
cancellation final and executory.
COCOFED argues that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed
resolution on the following grounds: a) COMELEC violated its right to due process; b) Failure to
submit the required number of nominees was based on the good faith belief that its submission was
sufficient for purposes of the elections, that it could still be remedied, and the number of nominees
becomes significant only when a party-list organization is able to attain a sufficient number of votes
which would qualify it for a seat in the House of Representatives; and c)COMELEC violated its right
to equal protection of the laws since at least 2 other party-list groups (ACT-CIS and MTM Phils.)
which failed to submit 5 nominees were included in the official list of party-list groups.
ISSUE: WON Comelec gravely abused its discretion on issuing assailed Resolution
RULING:
N . COCOFED fail e bmi a li f 5 mi ee , de i e am le i d
before the elections, is a violation imputable to the party under Section 6 (5) of RA 7941. Under
Section 6 (5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration. However, not every kind of violation
automatically warrants the cancellation of a party-list group's registration. Since a reading of the entire
Section 6 shows that all the grounds for cancellation actually pertain to the party itself, then the laws,
rules and regulations violated to warrant cancellation under Section 6 (5) must be one that is primarily
imputable to the party itself and not one that is chiefly confined to an individual member or its nominee.
The la g age f Sec. 8 f RA 7941 d e l e he d hall i c ec i i h he

requirement of submitting a list of nominees; it uses this mandatory term in conjunction with the
mbe f ame be bmi ed ha i c ched ega i el , i.e., le ha fi e.
While COCOFED fail e bmi a c m le e li f e i eme ma ha e bee am g

the grounds cited by the COMELEC in earlier cancelling its registration, this is not sufficient to support
a finding of grave abuse of discretion.
The fact that a party-list group is entitled to no more than three seats in Congress, regardless
of the number of votes it may garner, 24 does not render Section 8 of RA No. 7941 permissive in
nature.
The Court cannot discern any valid reason why a party-list group cannot comply with the
statutory requirement. A party is not allowed to simply refuse to submit a list containing "not less than
five nominees" and consider the deficiency as a waiver on its part.
A party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees fail to qualify, even
if party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. The Court in no way authorized a party-list
group's inexcusable failure, if not outright refusal, to comply with the clear letter of the law on the
submission of at least five nominees.
g. AMORES v HRET
(G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010)
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of office of one Emmanuel Joel Villanueva
as representative of CIBAC in the HoR. Petitioner argues that Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing
of nomination, beyond the age limit of 30 which was the limit imposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector"
and his change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFW and families not affected six months prior to
elections.
ISSUE: Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to respondent Villanueva
RULING:
The law is clear that representative of youth sector should be between 25 to 30 and sectoral
representation should be changed 6 months prior to elections. Villanueva is ineligible to hold office
as a member of HoR representing CIBAC because he violated both requirements.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.
Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
h. Bantay Republic Act. v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007)
GARCIA, J.
FACTS:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set
aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which
have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were
accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941)
and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition seeking to
disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No.
177314, addre ed 2 le e he Di ec f he C melec La De a me e e i g a li f ha
g mi ee . E ide l bek he M . R ale , e al., a he i a ce f C melec
en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring he mi ee ame
c fide ial a d i e effec de i g e i i e R ale ba ic di cl e e e . Acc di g
COMELEC, there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of
nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman
Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list
elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the
requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan
Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names
of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have
the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent
groups from participating in the elections.
ISSUE: WON respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various
party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed
by the Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to release the names of said candidates based on the right to information. That the right to
information is being sought after in the context of the electoral climate and the controversial Party-
List system under Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act highlights the uniqueness of
these cases.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees
shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the
requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited
in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision
requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition
to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely
nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously
misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure
before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about
matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting,
as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of
Gardiner v. Romulo, 21 has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law
or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. 22 So
it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier. In all, we agree with the petitioners that
respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of
the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.
i. BANAT v COMELEC
(G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made
a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20%
shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least
2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of
Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes
cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list
candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the
2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify
for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not
supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the
20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory,
then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the
prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation
( hich hall be di c ed i he HELD i f hi dige ).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the
3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties
are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
RULING:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts,
there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution
provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule,
200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However,
the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in
fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the
May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1
ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available

to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-
list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house.
However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the
ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or
one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one
million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation
of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list
seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number
of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
im leme a i f Sec i 5(2), A icle VI f he C i i a d e e he a ai me f he
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Re e e a i e .
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is
guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also
get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
a ailable ea f all ca i a addi i al ea a e he ma im m ea e e ed de he Pa
List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision
in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round,
all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their
one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the
total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are
a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the
full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly,
in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for
the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats
allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33%
of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above:

(Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-
percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats.
Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat
limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there
are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those
higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of
UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections
a he d a a alified a d ha e e he f ame f he Constitution in their deliberations
deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in
his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the
will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the
Constitution and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall
participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the
party-list system.
4. ELECTION, SALARIES, PRIVILEGES
a. LOZADA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-59068. JANUARY 27, 1983)
DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an
election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention
Sec 5 (2), A 8 f he 1973 C i i hich ide : I ca e a aca c a i e i he Ba a a g
Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call
a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to
e e he e i ed e m. COMELEC e he e i i allegi g, b a iall , ha 1) e i i e
lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill
vacancies in the legislature.
RULING:
No. The SC j i dic i e he COMELEC i l e ie b ce i a i he la e
decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New
C i i hich ead : A deci i , de , li g f he C mmi i ma be b gh he
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy
he e f. The e i i hi ca e deci i , de li g f he COMELEC hich i gh be
reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision,
which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the
COMELEC.
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies
exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the
necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to
mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of
appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate
the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the
BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to
appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may
not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article
VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP,
not to the IBP.
b. PHILCONSA v. Mathay
(G.R. No. L-25554. OCTOBER 4, 1966)
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the
Auditor of the Congress ofthe Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or
passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of
the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner
contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution.
The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the
approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members
of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all
the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have
fully expired before the increase becomes effective.
RULING:
No. In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation
f legi la bec me f ll effec i e, he C i i al i i efe all membe f he Se a e
and the House of Represe a i e i he ame e e ce, a a i gle i, ih di i c i
separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks
f he e i a i f he f ll e m f he Se a a d Re e e a i e ha a oved the measure,
using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both
houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word
e m i he i g la , he c mbi ed i h he f ll i g h a e all he membe f he Se a e a d
he H e, de c e ha i he a lica i f A . VI, Sec. 14( Sec. 10), he f dame al
consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure
must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it will have expired.
c. LIGOT V. MATHAY
(G.R. No. L-34676. APRIL 30, 1974)
TEEHANKEE, J.
FACTS:
Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines
for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to
December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 fi i g he ala ie f
c i i al fficial a d ce ai he fficial f he a i al g e me a e ac ed i la a d
under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators
and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the
Ac e e l ided ha aid i c ea e hall ake effec in accordance with the provisions of the
C i i . Lig e m e i ed Decembe 30, 1969, he filed a claim f e i eme de
Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity
of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the
la h ee ea f hich a e c i he ba i he ei ided i ca e f em l ee ba ed
on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the a e f a a ided b la .
HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue
ce ifica i . The A di Ge e al he , Ma ha , al di all ed he ame. The h f Lig a eal
is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00
per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which
ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would
become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December
30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased
ala f membe f C ge a ided b la ( de Re ublic Act 4134) was already
P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
RULING:
No. To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum
would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving
i di ec l ha he c ld b ai di ec l . Lig claim ca be ai ed a fa a he a d he
members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are
concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within
he ie f he C i i al i i limi i g hei c m e a i a d he em l me hei
salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired
on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
(which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to
pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were
permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General
i hi deci i i he imila ca e f e i i e c lleag e, ex-C g e ma Si g , (S) ch a
scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling
admi i a i e a h i ie d i di ec l ha ca be d e di ec l .
d. PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS
(G.R. No. 132875. FEBRUARY 3, 2000)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:
Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts is pending appeal. Jalosjos, filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge his
duties of a Congressman including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having convicted in the first instance including of a non-bailable offense.
Jalosjos argument is the mandate of sovereign will which he states that he was re-elected as
Congressman of Firs District of Zamboanga del Norte by his constituents in order that their voices
will be heard and since the accused-appellant is treated as bona fide member of the House of
Representatives, the latter urges co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos, be allowed to discharge his mandate
as member of the House of Representatives.
RULING:
No. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators or members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution and shows that this privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense.
It is true, that election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, the
rights and privileges from being elected as public official may be restricted by law. Privilege has to be
granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position, the higher the rank the greater the
requirement of obedience rather that exemption.
The accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos has not given any reason why he should be exempted
from the operation of Section 11 Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the abuse is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman with a crime punishable imprisonment by more than six (6) months
is not merely authorized by law, has constitutional foundations. Allowing Jalosjos to attend in
Congressional sessions and meetings for five (5) days in a week which will make him a free man with
all the privileges and would make his status to that of a special class, it also would be a making of the
purpose of the correction system.
e. TRILLANES IV V. PIMENTEL
(G.R. No. 179817. JUNE 27, 2008)
CARPIO-MORALES, J.
FACTS:
Pe i i e T illa e IV i ial f c d e a i ela i he Oak d I cide . I he
2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30,
2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate,
alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution
whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.
Antonio Trillanes won a seat in the Senate while being under detention for staging an alleged
c d e a . Bef e he c mme ceme f hi e m, hi fell i i Se a filed a m ion to
allow him to attend Senate sessions and perform his duties as senator. It was argued that there is a
world of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the
stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of
Jalosjos.
Trillanes posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his
mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying
his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper
e e e a i , de i g he e le ill, e dia i g he e le ch ice, a d e li g he ma da e
of the people.
Moreover, he pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who
have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former
G e N Mi a i h e e all ed a e d cial f c i .
ISSUE: Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists
RULING:
No. The petition is bereft of merit. In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and
that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already
convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's
Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues
to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude,
i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for
coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense." Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the
presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and
institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained
in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies
the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates
the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal
action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
f. OSMENA V. PENDATUN
(G.R. No. L-17144. OCTOBER 28, 1960)
BENGZON, J.
FACTS:
I J e 1960, C g e ma Se gi O me a, J . deli e ed a eech e i led A Me age
Ga cia . I he aid eech, he di a aged he P e ide Ca l Ga cia a d hi admi i a i .
Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the
charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless
and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court.
Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme
Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whe he O me a imm i ha bee i la ed
RULING:
No. Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate
in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives shall not be questioned in
any other place.
The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished

in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom
of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or
any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives
is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which
the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether
O me a c d c c i ed di de l beha i , i ld ha e a med appellate jurisdiction,
which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government.
g. JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG
(G.R. No. 15905. AUGUST 3, 1966)
CONCEPCION, C.J.
FACTS:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open
letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational
plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political
strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of
Defe e, Je Va ga , a la i g a c d a lace him a he e ide . The la e
allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may
not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have
been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang
c llec a m f damage agai Caba gba g allegi g ha Caba gba g a eme i libel .
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower
house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that
the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members
of Congress.
RULING:
No. A icle VI, Sec i 15 f he C i i ide The Se a a d Membe f he
House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
he lace.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge
of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform
its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in
session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of
the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
5. DISQUALIFICATIONS AND OTHER INHIBITIONS
a. ADAZA V. PACANA
(G.R. No. 68159. MARCH 18, 1985)
ESCOLIN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Homobono Adaza was elected Governor of Misamis Oriental during the 1980
elections. His Vice-Governor, herein respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., was likewise qualified and
assumed officed during their oath on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office
would expire on March 3, 1986.
Pacana and Adaza filed their certificates of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan
Pambansa elections on March 27, 1984 and April 27, 1984 respectively. Petitioner won and took his
oath as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 9184 and respondent likewise took over the vacancy as
Governor and took his oath of office on July 25, 1984.
Pe i i e c e d Paca a la f l cc a c f he G e ffice, he ce hi e i i
for prohibition with a writ of parliamentary injunction and/or restraining order was filed before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Homobono Adaza can exercise and discharge his functions as
Mambatas Pambansa and Provincial Governor simultaneously.
RULING:
No. Under Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, a Member of the National Assembly
(now Batasan Pambansa) shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. Petitioner
Adaza, being a public officer is subject to the regulations and conditions as the law may impose and
cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one
office.
Upon taking his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa, petitioner subsequently
operated to vacate his former post and he can no longer continue to occupy the same, nor attempt
to discharge its functions which makes respondent to reassume the position of Vice-Governor and
later on take oath of office as Governor for the unexpired term in lawful accordance with the Local
Government Code.
b. LIBAN V. GORDON
(G.R. No. 175352, JULY 15, 2009)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed
with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while
respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During
respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of
the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege
that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be
a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-owned
or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of
the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate,
pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts
upon their appointment to another government office.
ISSUE: Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of respondent
who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate.
RULING:
No. PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions. The PNRC is a non-profit,
donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and
compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality,
race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be
owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC.
The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and
private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. The
PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private
Corporations by Special Law. The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers
to private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or
controlled corporations created by special charters.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by general
law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations
created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special
privileges denied to other citizens. In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private
corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations
may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a
general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private
corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the
Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office
in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC
as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with
the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporate.
c. LIBAN V. GORDON
(G.R. No. 175352. JANUARY 18, 2011)
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation on a Supreme Court decision which
ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from
being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private
corporation and the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered
the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation. Respondent takes exception to
the second part of the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC
as a private corporation. Respondent avers that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon
in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the
lis mota of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC
statute.
RULING:
No. In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised in the issue of
standing. As such, the Court should not have declared certain provisions of such as unconstitutional.
On the substantive issue, the PNRC is sui generis. It is unlike the private corporations that the
Constitution wants to prevent Congress from creating.
First, the PNRC is not organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to assist victims of
war and administer relief to those who have been devastated by calamities, among others. It is
entirely devoted to public service. It is not covered by the prohibition since the Constitution aims to
eliminate abuse by the Congress, which tend to favor personal gain. Secondly, the PNRC was created
in order to participate in the mitigation of the effects of war, as embodied in the Geneva Convention.
The creation of the PNRC is compliance with international treaty obligations. Lastly, the PNRC is a
National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is not like government instrumentalities and
GOCC. The PNRC is regulated directly by international humanitarian law, as opposed to local law
regulating the other mentioned entities. As such, it was improper for the Court to have declared certain
portions of the PNRC statute as unconstitutional. However, it is the stand of Justice Carpio that there
is no mandate for the Government to create a National Society to this effect. He also raises the fact
that the PNRC is not sui generis in being a private corporation organized for public needs. Justice
Abad is of the opinion that the PNRC is neither private or governmental, hence it was within the power
of Congress to create.
6. SESSIONS, OFFICERS, QUORUM, RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF

MEMBERS
a. AVELINO v. CUENCO
(G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949)
FACTS:
On February 21, 1949, Sen. Tanada filed with the Senate Secretary charges against Senate
President Avelino. Sen. Tanada requested to give a privilege speech during the session. Sen.
Ta ada m i eec i l de ied f he c mm c e a d li g Se . Sa idad a d
Ta ada f de ! . Se ator Avelino along with other Senators, walked-out of the session hall.
Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz issued Resolution No. 67 and 68 declaring the vacancy of the
position of Senate President and installing Hon. Cuenco as Acting Senate President. These
resolutions were voted and unanimously approved.
Thus, Avelino filed a petition before the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court with a
vote of 6 out of the 10 Justices present, decided to deny the petition stating that the Court has no
jurisdiction on the case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The SC with a majority vote of
seven, granted the motion and took cognizance over the case.
ISSUE: WON the 12 Senators who installed Cuenco as the Acting President of the Senate constituted
a quorum?
RULING:
YES. Supreme Court held that there is a quorum that the 12 senators being the majority of 23
Senators. Resolution Nos. 67 and 68 are valid. Sen. Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate
President. PETITION DISMISSED.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted?
In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business
of the Senate. Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say
so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators
including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country
of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum,
"the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the
House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a
majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate
for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if
one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have
been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.
b. Arroyo v. De Venecia
(G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners are challenging the validity of R.A. 8420 (amends certain provisions of the
Na i al I e al Re e e C de b im i g Si Ta e ) b fili g a e i i f f ce i a i a d/
prohibition. They claim that respondents violated the rules of the House which are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution when the Chair of the
Committee (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) allegedly ignored a privileged question raised by Rep.
Arroyo during the committee report for the approval of R.A. 8420.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep.
Arroyo's interpellation:
(1)the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall

(2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as
certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996
(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as
(4) the published version
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision
that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that for this reason they are
judicially enforceable. This contention was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to
support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by
courts. In this case, petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion
in enacting R.A. No. 8240 affects its validity?
RULING:
No. The petition was dismissed. According to the findings of the court, the alleged violations
are merely internal rules of procedures rather than what petitioners claim to be constitutional
requirements for enacting laws. In this case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only
those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this
Court. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded
its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the
judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.
There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be determined by viva voce or
nominal voting. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken
every time a House has to vote, except only on the following instances upon the last and the third
readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the Members present and in repassing a bill over the veto
of the President. Second, there is obviousness on the part of the petitioner to delay the business of
the House, thus eliminating the alleged skullduggery on part of the accused. Third, the enrolled bill
doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus legally binding provided it is in harmony
with the constitution. Lastly, the court upheld principle of separation of powers, which herein, is
applicable for the legislative branch for it has exercised its power without grave abuse of discretion
resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
c. Pacete v Commission on Appointments

(G.R. No. L-25895, July 23, 1971)
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the
Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato.
He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his
appointment, was made during the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on
Appointments at its next session in 1965.
On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he likewise included in his petition,
through the Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge, the
ground being that his appointment had been by-passed.
Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for the
reconsideration of the confirmation of the appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of Pigcawayan,
Cotabato, in view of derogatory information which he had received.
Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was led to notify the then
Secretary of Justice accordingly, following what he considered to be the prevailing practice of such
body that the mere presentation of such letter "automatically vacated the confirmation of the
appointment in question . . ." Respondent Secretary of Justice through the Judicial Superintendent
then advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as municipal judge, as he had not been
duly confirmed. The Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice was likewise named respondent
as he had, as a consequence, withheld petitioner's salaries.
ISSUE: W N e i i e a i me m be c fi med.
RULING:
For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did suffice to set
it aside, even in the absence of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of what
is provided in the Constitution. That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single
member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-
man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
contends, is infinitely worse. It is indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It can find no
shelter in the constitutional prescription.
In view of confirmation
In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was contended that his

confirmation became final and irrevocable upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the
Fifth Congress on May 21, 1965.
In view of construction
As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule
21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: "Resolution of the
Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more
than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a
reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew to the Commission. Any
motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final
disposition of such a motion."
In Altarejos v. Molo this Court gave full attention to the argument that the motion for
reconsideration of Congressman Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect of recalling the
confirmation of petitioner's appointment and that, accordingly, it should be considered non-existent.
His opinion continued: "Pursuant to this provision, the vote of a majority of the members present in
favor of the motion for reconsideration is necessary to 'reopen' the appointment and, hence, to
'recall' its confirmation and to require a resubmission of the appointment for confirmation."
The other provision is worded thus: "The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress."
That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective

body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the
effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation prayed for by
petitioner. The right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato
is in accordance with law, his confirmation having been duly confirmed. No pronouncement as to
costs.
d. Osmeña v. Pendatun
(G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960)
BENGZON, J.
FACTS:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the
House making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of
this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate the
truth of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges,
and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished
by the House.
Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the
ground that it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
the House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving
petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House
resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.
Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain
the petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.
ISSUE: Whe he he H e Re l i i la ed e i i e c i i all g a ed a liame a

immunity for speeches
RULING:
NO. Sec i 15, A icle VI f C i i ide ha f a eech deba e in
C g e , he Se a Membe f he H e f Re e e a i e hall be e i ed i a
he lace. Thi ec i a ake i ac f ec. 6, cla e 1 f A . 1 f he C i i f he
United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
C g e ma , e e hele , be e i ed i C g e i elf. Ob e e ha he hall be
questioned in any othe lace ha C g e .
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished

in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose
i e able a d e c age a e e entative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
a d cce f i i i di e abl ece a ha he h ld e j he f lle libe f eech, a d
that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise
f ha libe ma cca i ffe e. I g a a ee he legi la c m le e f eed m f e e i
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative
body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the
judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which
the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts.
e. Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

(G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001)
VITUG, J.
FACTS:
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the
stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter
against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also
a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens
legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were
filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional
liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was
filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without
violating the Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. it is true that the Constitution ide ha each h e ma de e mi e he le f
its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed i da .
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless
in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress
to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or
the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior
as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and
that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be
suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
cha ged. Th , i ha bee held ha he e f he d ffice ld i dica e ha i a lie o any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense
charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat
to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis
in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as,
that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him
do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13
of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out
in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.
7. RECORDS AND BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS; LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL AND CONGRESSIONAL

RECORD
a. Mabanag v. Vito
(G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947)
Tuason, J.
FACTS:
Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held
on 23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the
first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election.
The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except
to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally
suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives,
but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition
was filed. As a consequence, these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the
passage of the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was
their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is
required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to
prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the
Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the
Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine
Youth Party.
ISSUE: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
RULING:
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are
not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions
has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is
predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require
elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the
meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and
authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the
courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government. If a political question
conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an
amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question.
The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be
noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is
a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and
committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of
any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the
judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity
of a proposal then into that of ratification.
b. Arroyo v De Venecia
(G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress
as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21,
1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
ISSUE: Whether Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion when R.A. No. 8240 was passed
in violation of the rules of the House.
RULING:
No. The Court, after considering the arguments of the parties, found no ground for holding
that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. The Court was of
the opinion that what was violated were merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any
rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform
to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'" Accordingly, the case was dismissed.
c. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez

(G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963)
Concepcion, J.
FACTS:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea
and formaldehyde which were both being imported from abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular,
Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco however paid in
protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank
agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the
Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two
separate and distinct components were not tax exempt; that what was tax exempt is urea
formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the
provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides that the margin established by
the Monetary Board shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of
Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Ca c h e e a e ed ha he e m ea f maldeh de a ea i g i hi i i h ld
be c ed a ea a d f maldeh de . I f he c e d ha he bill a ed in Congress
c ai ed he c la i e c j c i a d be ee he e m ea a d, f maldeh de , a d ha
he membe f C g e i e ded e em ea a d f maldeh de e a a el a e e ial
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin gl e called ea f maldeh de , he la e a
finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during
the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used he e m ea f maldeh de
ISSUE: Whe he he e m ea f maldeh de h ld be c ed a ea a d

f maldeh de .
RULING:
No. Urea formaldehyde was not a chemical solution. It was the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions
ela i g em e a e, acidi , a d ime f eac i . U ea f maldeh de a clea l a fi i hed
d c , hich a a e l di i c a d diffe e f m ea a d f maldeh de , a eparate articles
ed i he ma fac e f he he ic e i k a ea f maldeh de .
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said
law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would
be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill hich e he e m ea f maldeh de i ead
f ea a d f maldeh de was conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which
the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining
one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy was by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
d. Astorga v. Villegas
(G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974)
Makalintal, C.J.
FACTS:
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise
issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been
assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for
Ma dam , I j c i a d/ P hibi i i h P elimi a Ma da a d P hibi I j ci
compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA
4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was
c ide ed ha e e e bee e ac ed. Whe he hi aid la a ed he 3 d eadi g in the lower
house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on
Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor
amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During
such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved
by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the
latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out
however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent
to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments
thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due
to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their
signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the
concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of
the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive f f a bill d e e ac me .
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
RULING:
No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks
of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked
to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed
by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do
this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in
the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to
incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to
be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction
and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
e. Morales v. Subido
(G.R. No. L-29658, November 29, 1968)
Castro, J.
FACTS:
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three
ea b d e e a bachel deg ee. M ale a he chief f de ec i e b ea f he
Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as
patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief,
Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional
appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil
Se ice, a ed he de ig a i f M ale a ac i g chief b ejec ed hi a i me f fail e
to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requireme f he aid ii .
Instead, Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the
Police Act of 1966, which Section provides for the minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of
Police Agency that no person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a
bachel deg ee f m a ec g i ed i i i f lea i g a d ha e ed ei he i he A med F ce
of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in
the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
N he e i he ab e i i a i ided ha a e h ha e ed he lice
de a me f a ci ca be alified f aid ffice. M ale h e e a g ed ha he he aid
act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually that no person may be appointed
chief f a ci lice age c le he h ld a bachel deg ee a d ha e ed ei he i he A med
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and
has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed
Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress
but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was
he i e i f he h a e ha e ed a chief f lice i h e em la ec d. M ale e
to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which
according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached
to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the
journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
RULING:
No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines
shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau
of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect
due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments.
Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine
what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity
of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield
to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires
must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can
decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now
decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the
journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
8. ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
a. TAÑADA V. CUENCO
(G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957)
CONCEPCION, J.
FACTS:
In the 1955 elections, the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was dominantly occupied by five
(5) senators, from the Nacionalista Party and only one (1) opposing senator from the Citizens Party,
one of the petitioners, Lorenzo Tañada.
The other petitioner, Diosdado Macapagal, ran for office at Senate and subsequently lost and
therefore contested to court contesting that SET was dominated with members of Nacionalista Party
which would make his election with no chance of winning.
It was provided that SET should be composed of: three (3) justices of the Supreme Court,
three (3) senators from the majority party, and three (3) senators from the minority party.
ISSUE: Whether or not the composition of five (5) Nacionalista Party on a SET is constitutional?
RULING:
No, it was clearly provided that there should be three (3) senators each for both the majority
and minority party in SET as provided in the previously Article VI, Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution.
The most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals in the equal representation of said parties therein,
and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of
said Tribunals.
The framers of the Constitution intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the
Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the
majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members
of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power.
b. BONDOC V. PINEDA
(G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991)
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP)
were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of
Pampanga.
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a
protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of nine (9)
members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of
the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
Petitioner, Bondoc then filed a protest in HRET and won over respondent, Pineda.
Thereafter, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera, received a letter from
the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal decided
to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of
Electoral Tribunal as Congressman Camasura allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of
Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political
party.
ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives can interfere with the protest in the HRET by
removing one of its members.
RULING:
No, the resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from
the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the
House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc as
provided in Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
Furthermore, the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution.
Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause,
such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political
party, or removal for other valid cause.
A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of
proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show
that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his
expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to
security of tenure.
This serves as HRET as a non-partisan group and clearly independent of the House of
Representatives.
c. ABBAS V. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 83767, October 27, 1988)
GANCAYCO, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 1987
congressional elections by the Commission on Elections.
The respondent Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court
and six (6) Senators. Thereafter, the Abbas and some of the petitioners filed with the respondent
Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing
and resolution of SET Case on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as
respondents therein.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair
play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of
necessity which they perceive to be the foundation of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a
solution both practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, such as the amendment of the
respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only three
Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) requiring the concurrence
of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more
than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less
than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions
ISSUE: Whether or not, the proposed amendment to the Tribunal Rules may be appreciated,
especially with regards to the disqualification of members?
RULING:
No, the proposed amendments obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the
only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor
repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal
lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Furthermore, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators. To our
mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a
duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest
as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law. Electoral Tribunal
cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of
its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
d. PIMENTEL V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. Petitioners were among the party-
list representatives who were proclaimed winners during the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioners
assailed the composition of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Commission on Appointments (CA).
In accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for
the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees
would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from
13 organizations. Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the
House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district
representatives belonging to various political parties.
As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA
were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties.
The Petitioners prayed for the reorganization of the members of the HRET and the CA to be
inclined with the Section 17 and 18 of Article VI of the Constitution and the Party-List System Act,
Republic Act No. 7941.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of HRET and CA violates the Constitution
RULING:
No, Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must
first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in
the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on
proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list
representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant
case to the court. Consequently, petitioners' direct recourse to this Court is premature.
e. SAMPAYAN V DAZA
(G.R. No. 103903, September 11, 1992)
ROMERO, J.
FACTS:
On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify
respondent RaulDaza, then incumbent congressman, from continuing to exercise the functions of his
office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the
United States since October 16, 1974.Petitioners allege that Mr.Daza has not renounced his status
as permanent resident.Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition before the
COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the
basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and that the instant petition is concerned with the
unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
RULING:
No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot and
academic for the reason that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his position forthe duration
of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Moreover the jurisdiction
of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer
be issued against respondent since his term has already expired. Furthermore as a de facto public
officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office becaus e
his acts are as valid as those of a dejure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered.
f. AQUINO V COMELEC
(G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995)
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. He provided in his
certificate that he has resided for 10 months in Makati.
Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS--
NUCD--UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for Congressman which,
under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which requires: should be for a period not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 8, 1995, the elections were
held and the petitioner, Agapito Aquino, garnered 38,547 votes against another candidate, Agusto
Syjuco, who obtained 35,910 votes. However, his victory was suspended by COMELEC due to the
case. On June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the
Second Division dated May 6, 1995 and declared Aquino ineligible and thus disqualified as a
candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
The petitioner claims that COMELEC lost its jurisdiction on May 8, 1995, election day, and
that the original jurisdiction is in the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET), therefore
COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whe he he COMELEC fi di g f c m lia ce i h he e ide c e i eme f e

year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
RULING:
No. COMELEC assumes jurisdiction in all contests relative to the election returns and
qualification of the candidates and the HRET only becomes applicable when the said candidate
becomes a member of Senate or HOR. Thus, a candidate that was still not proclaimed is still not a
member of HOR in compliance to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution. Also, under Sec 6 of RA
6646, COMELEC has the power to proclaim a candidate to be suspended and thus has the capacity
to not count the votes. The basis of this is RA 6646, Section 6: Effect of Disqualification Case:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Furthermore, it also shows how the trial will not be terminated just because the candidate won
he elec i gi i g he COMELEC j i dic i ide elec i . The d e ide ce f g il i g
in Sec. 6 of RA 6646 does not preclude the power of COMELEC to disqualification cases only but a
further reading of Omnibus Election Code Sec 7 of RA 6646 also involve cases of ineligibility.
g. VINZONS-CHATO V COMELEC
(G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone
congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections.
On May 14, 2004, at 11:30 a.m., the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) proclaimed
respondent Unico as representative-elect of the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. On
July 2, 2004, the COMELEC (First Division) ordered the suspension of the effects of the proclamation
of respondent Unico. On July 23, 2004, i lif ed he aid de he g d ha e de U ic
proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to
pass upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also automatically conferred jurisdiction to
another electoral tribunal.
Subsequently, the COMELEC (First Division) issued the Resolution dated April 13, 2005,
dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It stated preliminarily that the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC) is precluded from entertaining pre-proclamation controversies on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the election returns or certificates of
canvass involving the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House
of Representatives and Party-List.
The COMELEC (First Division) also held that the MBC or PBC had no discretion on matters
pertaining to the proclamation of the winning candidates because they were simply performing a
ministerial function. Absent a lawful order from the COMELEC to suspend or annul a proclamation,
the PBC of Camarines Norte, in particular, was mandated to comply with its duties and functions
including the proclamation of respondent Unico as the winning candidate for the lone congressional
district of Camarines Norte. His petition was dismissed for utter lack of merit.
Aggrieved, petitioner Chato filed a motion for reconsideration thereof which was elevated to
the COMELEC en banc for resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of jurisdiction.
RULING:
No. In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied
e i i e Cha m i f ec ide a i li g ha he C mmi i al ead l j i dic i e
the case since respondent Unico had already taken his oath as a Member of the Thirteenth (13th)
Congress. It reasoned, thus:
In Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105278, November 18, 1993), the
Supreme Court made a categorical pronouncement that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals
hich a e he le j dge f all c e ela i g he elec i , e , a d alifica i f hei
respective Members, thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973
Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa
(Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide the pre-
proclamation controversies against members of the House of Representatives as well as of the
Senate.
The Honorable Court reiterated the aforequoted ruling in the recent case of Aggabao vs.
COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No. 163756, January 26, 2005), where it held that:
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC j i dic i e elec i c e ela i g hi elec i , e , a d alifica i
e d , a d he HRET j i dic i begi .
Considering that private respondent Renato Unico had already taken his oath and assumed
office as member of the 13th Congress, the Commission had already lost jurisdiction over the case.
h. BELLO V COMELEC
(G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010)
BRION, J.
FACTS:
AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, It filed its Certificate of Nomination together
with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees wherein the first nominee is Mike Arroyo.
Several petitions for disqualification of Arroyo emerged but have been dismissed both by
Comelec Second division and comelec en banc. In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10, 2010
elections the required percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as
AGPP fi mi ee, i i he H e f Re e e a i e . He a claimed a AGPP d l -
elected party-list representative in the House of Representatives. On the same day, Arroyo took his
a h f ffice, a AGPP Re e e a i e. A d, hi ame a , he eafter, entered in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives.38
Thereafter two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto were filed with the House of
Re e e a i e Elec al T ib al (HRET) e i i g A eligibili a AGPP representative
in the House of Representatives. The HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons
directing Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions.
ISSUE: Whe he he HRET ha j i dic i e he e i f A alifications as

AGPP mi ee af e hi clama i a d a m i ffice a a membe f he H e f
Representatives.
RULING:
The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications
of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all intents and
purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives although the entity directly voted upon
a hei a . He ce, he COMELEC j i dic i e elec i c e ela i g to his qualifications
e d a d he HRET j i dic i begi .
Si ce A , AGPP fi mi ee, ha al ead bee claimed a d ake hi a h f ffice

as a Member of the House of Representatives, Thus, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, we
hold that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has the
e cl i e igi al j i dic i hea a d le A alifica i a a Membe f he H e
of Representatives.
i. VILANDO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 192147 & 192149. AUGUST 23, 2011)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner Renald F. Vilando, as taxpayer, filed petitions for Quo Warranto, challenging
the eligibility of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong, who won the position of Representative of the First District
of Negros Oriental. They contended that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and was ineligible for
office, and that she was born to a father whose naturalization had not attained finality, and a mother
whose citizenship has changed when she married. Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural born
citizen, the naturalization of her father had already attained status of res judicata (a matter that has
been adjudicated by a competent court and may not be pursued further by the same parties). HRET
dismissed the petition on May 17, 2010. The petitioner contended that The petition for Quo
Wa a i a c lla e al a ack he ci i e hi f he fa he f Limkaich g beca e he fa he
certificate of naturalization is of no force and effect; Limkaichong cannot derive her citizenship from
her mother because of her marriage to her father; and as HRET has the plenary, absolute and
exclusive jurisdiction over questions of eligibility of Members of the House of Representatives, the
HRET can look into the eligibility of Limkaichong, and as incident thereto, look into the validity of her
fa he ce ifica e f a ali a i .
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit.
RULING:
N , he e i a i f Limkaich g e m e ders the question of her eligibility moot and
academic. However, as citizenship is a continuing requirement for Members of the House of
Re e e a i e , he C deem i a ia e e l e he e i i . Vila d c e i hich
requires the Court to l k i he alleged lli f he g a f a ali a i f Limkaich g fa he
is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father, which can only
be done through a direct action. It is true that HRET has complete and exclusive jurisdiction over
such cases but it does carry the authority to delve into the legality of the grant of naturalization.
Pursuant to par.1, Sec. 1, Article IV of governing law of 1935 Constitution, records disclosed that
Limkaichong was born in Dumagete City to naturalizaed Filipino father, as a result, Limkaichong is a
Fili i ci i e . I he e i i e c e i ha he m he i l ge a Fili i he he ma ied
is without merit as her mother is natural born citizen and LImkaichong, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship, falling under par. 1, Sec. 1, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution.
Also, under par. 3, Sec. 1 of Article VI of the present Constitution, those born before January 17, 1973
of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Filipino
citizens. LImkaichong was deemed to elected Filipino citizenship informally when she participated in
barangay elections as a young voter, and when she ran and won as Mayor of Negros Oriental.
j. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-45081, JULY 15, 1936)
LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly
passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest
prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest
against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day,
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not
consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
di mi al f e de e . The Elec al C mmi i h e e de ied hi m i .
ISSUE: Whether or not the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
RULING:
No, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. The Court denied the petition.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of
the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner
toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
k. PEÑA V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 123037, March 21, 1997)
TORRES, JR., J.
FACTS:
Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution1 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the Petition Ad Cautelam of the Petitioner Teodoro Q. Peña in HRET
Case No. 95-014. Petitioner questioned the election of the private respondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.
as Member of the House of Representatives representing the Second District of the province of
Palawan.
Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional Office in
the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 1995, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner.
On May 22, Pe a led a e i i AD CAUTELAM i h he HRET, claimi g ha he elec i

in the 2nd district of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote buying, intimidation
and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during
he c i g f e a d he e a a i f elec i e a d ce i ca e f ca a hich a ec ed
the results of the election. Because of these irregularities, Pena stated that he lost the election by
almost 7k votes. He the a ailed Ab eg clama i . Ab eg led a a e a dam i
dismiss on June 23, averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same
being i cie i f m a d b a ce. I e e ce, he m i di mi a ch i challenge on
the fact that the petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement
of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many votes would be gained by the protestant as a result
of the same. Pena later submitted a li f eci c c e ed eci c J l 10, 17 da af e
Ab eg a e . I Oc be , he HRET led ha hile i had j i dic i e he e i i , a he le
judge of all contests relating to the election returns and ali ca i f he members of the House
of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action, and is therefore,
i cie i f m a d b a ce, me i i g i di mi al. Pe a led a e i i f ce i a i i h he
SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET c mmi ed g ea ab e f di c e i i di mi i g Pe a eii

ad cuatelam for lack of substance.
RULING:
N , A e al f he e i i e eal ha e i i e make eci c me i f he eci c
where widespread election, fraud and irregularities occurred. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into
he e b a ce f he e . The e c i i ha he e i i m be cie in form and
substance means that the petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained
therein are unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no
he c e ha di mi he e i i , he i e, he a m i f a elec ed blic cial ma ,
and will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate. The defect in the instant
case arises from the failure allege he c e ed eci c . O l a ba e allega i f ma i e f a d,
widespread intimidation a d e i m a d he e i i eg la i ie , ih eci ca i a d
substantiation of where and how these occurrences took place, appears in the petition.
We ca all a elec i e ba ed ch im a e me e , otherwise,

the whole election process will deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other,
racing to disembark from the water.
9. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
a. Daza v. Singson
(G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989)
CRUZ, J.
FACTS:
After the congressional elections, House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its
twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties. Petitioner Raul
A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the

House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party
and joined the LDP, reducing their former party to only 17 members.
The petitioner challenged his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the
assumption of his seat by the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on
Appointments.
RULING:
Yes. In Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission
on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of
its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the
temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission
on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of
the Constitution.
b. Coseteng v. Mitra
(G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990)
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
The congressional elections resulted in the election to the House of Representatives of the
candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party
(LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan
(KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate
elected under the banner of KAIBA.
A year later the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was organized as a
political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affliated with the
LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments, had to be reorganized.
The House of Representatives revised the House majority membership in the Commission on
Appointments to conform with the new political alignments.
Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs to declare
as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon,
Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on
Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from
recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election
to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based
on proportional representation of the political. parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments
was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160
members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be
rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would
equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining
two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the
Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the
House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein."
c. Guingona v. Gonzales
(G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992)
CAMPOS, JR., J.
FACTS:
After elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-
NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties
agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) / Total No. of
Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members
for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN.
Guingona, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the respondent
Senate President Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, from
recognizing the membership of Senators Alberto Romulo as the eighth senator elected by the LDP,
and Wigberto L. Tañada, as the lone member representing the LP-PDP-LABAN, in the Commission
on Appointments, on the ground that the proposed compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of
the rule of proportional representation, and that it is the right of the minority political parties in the
Senate, consistent with the Constitution, to combine their fractional representation in the Commission
on Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide who, among the senators in their ranks,
shall be additionally nominated and elected thereto.
ISSUE: Whe he di g ff i all ed i de e mi i g a a e e e ai i he C A.
RULING:
No. The political parties represented in the Senate is as follows: LDP- 7.5, LP-PDP-LABAN -
.5, NPC - 2.5, and LAKAS-NUCD - 1.5. Based on Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution question
is the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. Converting a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 is a violation of
Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission
be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. In so doing one other party's
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the
Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.
d. Drilon v. De Venecia and Madrigal v. Villar

(G.R. No. 180055, July 31, 2009)
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
Drilon et al. went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for
theLiberal Party in the CA. Speaker Jose de Venecia merely said that he would study their demand.
During the session of the House of Representatives, Tañada requested from the House leadership
one seat in the CA for the Liberal Party. Respondents filed for dismissal of the petition.
In the meantime, Senator Madrigal sent letters to Villar and Nograles claiming that the
composition of the Senate and House in the CoA violated the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation. She requested for the reorganization of the membership of CoA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the proper party concerned.
RULING:
No. The first petition has been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party as
member of the House contingent. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained a direct injury
as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not allege that she (or her political party) was
deprived of a seat in the CoA, or that she or her party possess personal and substantial interest to
confer with her locus standi.
VIII. POWERS OF CONGRESS
1. CONCEPT
a. Gonzales v. Hechanova
(G.R. No. L-21897, October 22 1963)
CONCEPCION, J.
FACTS:
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements
with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a
certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice.
Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons
of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo
Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that
Hecha ai ih j i dic i i e ce f j i dic i , beca e Re blic Act 3452 prohibits
he im ai f ice a d c b he Rice a d C Admi i a i a he g e me
agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by
Macapagal.
RULING:
Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a
statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such
justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be

invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it
in the affirmative, by pro idi g ha he SC ma be de i ed f i j i dic i e ie , e i e,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may
ide, fi al j dgme a d dec ee f i fe i c i All ca e i which the constitutionality or
alidi fa ea , la , di a ce, e ec i e de eg la i i i e i .I he d ,
our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
2. ONE SUBJECT RULE
a. TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Valentin Tio assails the constitutionality of PD 1987 e i led A Ac C ea i g he
Vide g am Reg la B ad i h b ad e eg la e a d e i e he ide g am i d .
He a ack he c i i ali f he dec ee he g d ha Sec. 10 he e f, hich im e a
tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a rider and the same is not
ge ma e he bjec ma e he e f.
ISSUE: WON he a i i f PD 1987 i a ide .
RULING:
NO. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry
through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent
with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation, it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree. The title of the decree, which is
the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all
those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the decree.
b. PHILCONSA V. GIMENEZ
(G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965)
REGALA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Constitution Association Inc. (PHILCONSA) filed this petition to restrain
the Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress from
"passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the
payment to any former Senator or former Member of the House of Representatives of retirement and
vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and likewise restraining the respondent
disbursing officers of the House and Senate, respectively, and their successors in office from paying
he aid e i eme a d aca i g a i ie ." O e f e i i e a g me i ha he i i f he
retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in
violation of Section 21 (1) of Art. VI of the Constitution. The title gives no inkling or notice whatsoever
to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave privileges
to the members of Congress.
Title of RA 3836: "AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF

COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX
ISSUE: WON the title of RA 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.
RULING:
NO. The succeeding paragraph of Republic Act No. 3836 refers to members of Congress and
to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To
provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter, not germane
to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In the light of the history and analysis of RA 3836, the Court concludes
that the title of said law is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the
aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
c. LIDASAN V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967)
SANCHEZ, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Bara Lidasan, resident and tax payer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato and a
alified e f he 1967 elec i a ha RA 4790, hich i e i led A Ac C ea i g he
M ici ali f Dia a i he P i ce f La a del S be decla ed c i i al a d ha
COMELEC resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. RA 4790
transferred twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato to the province of Lanao
del Sur.
ISSUE: WON RA 4790 is constitutional.
RULING:
NO. Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political divisions, which legislative
purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional. Suggestion was made
to salvage said law since the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province
of Lanao del Sur, however, the totality of 21 barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof, and the
Court may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine out of twenty-one
barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured, for this unduly stretches judicial
interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point, and to do so indeed, is to pass the line
which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. RA 4790 is inseparable and it is
accordingly null and void in its totality.
d. CHIONGBIAN V. ORBOS
(G.R. No. 96754, June 22, 1995)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
These suits challenge the validity of a Art. XIX, Sec. 13 of the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge"
by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous
Region, and the EO 429 issued by the President Corazon Aquino pursuant to such authority,
"Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao."
ISSUE: WON the power granted to the President is not expressed in the title of the RA 6734.
RULING:
YES. The reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to the general
subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a practical rather than a technical
construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions are
germane to that subject.
e. MARIANO V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-118577, March 7, 1995)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7854 - A Ac C e i g he M ici ali f
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized Ci be k a he Ci f Maka i. O e f he a g me f he
petitioners is that Sec. 52 of said RA increases the legislative district of Makati, which was not
expressed in the title of the bill.
ISSUE: W/N RA 7854 failed to comply with the one subject rule.
RULING:
NO. The policy of the Court favors the liberal construction of the one title-one subject rules so
as not to impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly
mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. It should be sufficient compliance if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject. There is
compliance to the one title-one subject rule if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to such general subject.
f. TATAD V. SECRETARY OF ENERGY

(G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 8180 - An Act Deregulating the Downstream
Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The law imposes tariff duty on imported crude oil at the rate of
3% and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of 7%. One of the arguments of the petitioners
is that the inclusion of the tariff provision violates Sec. 26 (1) of the Constitution requiring every law
to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. It argues that such provision is foreign
to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
ISSUE: W/N such provision failed to comply with the one subject rule.
RULING:
NO. This Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. The title
need not mirror, fully index, or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a
single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general method and
means of carrying the general subject. Providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA
8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
g. LACSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999)
MARTINEZ, J.
FACTS:
11 persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, and organized crime
syndicated involved in bank robberies in Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue by the Anti-
Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). An information came that what transpired is
actually is a summary execution and not a shoot our. Panfilo Lacson, petitioner, was among those
charged as principal in 11 informations for murder before the Sandiganbayan. After reinvestigation,
11 amended informations were filed, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory. The
accused now question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as it is limited only to cases where one
or more of the principal accused are government officials with SG 27 or higher, or PNP officials with
a rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. During the pendency of the resolution, a law (RA 8249) was
a ed defi i g e a di g he j i dic i f Sa diga ba a dele i g he d i ci al f m he
i ci al acc ed. He ce, he Sa diga ba a admi ed he Ame ded I f rmations. Petitioners
challenge the constitutionality of RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.One of the arguments is that the title of the law is misleading, which actually expands
rather than define the old Sandiganbayan law, thereby violating the one title-one subject requirement
for the passage of statutes.
ISSUE: W/N RA 8249 failed to comply with the one subject rule.
RULING:
NO. The challenged law does not violate the one title-one subject provision of the Constitution.
M ch em ha i i laced he di g i he i le f he la ha i defi e he Sa diga ba a
j i dic i he ha i allegedl d e i e a d i jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction
of Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title
of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments.The requirement that
every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve.
h. FARINAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Sec. 14 of RA 9006 - The Fair Election Act (An
Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful, and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices). According to petitioner, the inclusion of Sec. 14 repealing Sec. 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the 2 statutes. RA
9006 deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination
of unfair election practices, while the OEC imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an
office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto
resigned upon filing of COC. The repeal is thus not embraced in the title nor germane to the subject
matter of RA 9006.
ISSUE: W/N Sec. 14 of RA 9006 is a proscribed rider insofar as it was not included in the title of the
statute.
RULING:
NO. The proscription provided in the Constitution is aimed against the evils of the so-called
omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and unconsidered encroaches. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. To
determine whether there has been compliance, it is sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need
not be set forth.The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of the OEC within its contemplation. This Court has held that an act
having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions no matter
how diverse so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject.
i. CAWALING V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001)
SANDOVAL, J.
FACTS:
Pe i i e Be jami Ca ali g a ail R.A. N . 8806 e i led A Ac C ea i g he Ci f
Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
A ia i g F d The ef i ce i c a e e he " e bjec -one bill" rule of the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the
creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.
While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner
claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon.
ISSUE: WON RA 8806 is constitutional.
RULING:
YES. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that
is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from
the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon
was created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can
it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.
j. GIRON V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013)
SERENO, CJ.
FACTS:
Petitioner Henry Giron assails the constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates)
and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9006, otherwise known as the Fair
Election Act. Giron asserts that the insertion of both sections in the Fair Election Act violates the Art.
VI, Sec. 26 (1) f he 1987 C i i . Pe i i e a e ha he e i i ae ela ed he
main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the
treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed, while
Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns
the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of
candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity.
ISSUE: WON he i cl i f he ec i i la e he e bjec - e i le le.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason that
would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act.
They have not put forward any gripping justification to reverse our ruling in Fariñas, in which we have
already ruled that the title and the objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include
subjects other than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda. Moreover, the
Congress consciously looked for a more generic title in order to express the thrust of the law. Such
can be construed in the Bicameral Conference Committee deliberations (the case has an excerpt of
the discussion). The Congress did not limit the law to the lifting of the political ad ban. After combing
through various laws, they found other election practices that they considered inequitable. Some of
these practices included the appreciation of the votes cast in case of a late substitution of candidates
and the ipso facto resignation of certain elective officials upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy. Thus, to "level the playing field," Congress fashioned a law that would address what they
determined were unfair election practices; hence, the birth of the Fair Election Act. After a careful
analysis of the foregoing, the Court finds that the assailed sections are indeed germane to the subject
expressed in the title of RA 9006: R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. The title was worded broadly enough
to include the measures embodied in the assailed sections.
k. IMBONG V. OCHOA
(G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
The RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range
of modern family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive
health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its
mandates.Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective
the current laws on contraception, women's health and population control. The petitioners are one in
praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. One of the many arguments against it is
that it violates the one subject-one bill rule provision of the Constitution. According to them, being one
for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent to act as a population control measure.
ISSUE: W/N the law violates the one subject-one bill rule provision.
RULING:
NO, the law does not violate the one subject-one bill rule provision. A textual analysis of the
ai i i f he la h ha b h e d c i e heal h a d e ible a e h d a e
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. The one
subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another
or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act." Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human
development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
3. ORIGIN OF BILLS; THREE READINGS
a. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

(G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties
as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There
are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation
of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not
pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution
RULING:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law
but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill
ld be de he Se a e e l c c i h ame dme b al e
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff
or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation
of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate
days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same
day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice.
b. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

(G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
The e e ca e i l e m i eeki g ec ide a i f he C deci i dismissing
the petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the
several petitioners.
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press
from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At
a a e, i i a e ed, e e di c imi a a ai f c i i all g a a eed freedom is
c i i al , ci i g i f he ca e f M d ck . Pe l a ia.
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand,
asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as
covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform
a d e i able a d ha C g e hall e l e a ge i e em f a a i .
Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt
a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies
provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a
constitutional policy.
ISSUE: Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded
Value-Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the
press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution.
The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to
the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it
d e eall ma e ha he la d e di c imi a e agai he e beca e e e
nondiscriminatory taxatio c i i all g a a eed f eed m i c i i al. The C a
speaking in that case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is
mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint
on the exercise of its right. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the
exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or
exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties
purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its
right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to
violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such
taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the
security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of
another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it
impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items,
petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property
which is equally essential. The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc.,
which are essential goods and services was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of
the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716
granted exemption to these transactions while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the
VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides
ha The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive
em f a a i . Ne e hele , e ali a d if mi f a a i mea ha all a able a icle
kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to
make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is
enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in
similar situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes
hich, like he VAT, a e eg e i e. Wha i im l ide i ha C g e hall e l e a
ge i e em f a a i . The c i i al i i has been interpreted to mean simply
ha di ec a e a e . . . be efe ed [a d] a m ch a ible, i di ec a e h ld be
mi imi ed. The ma da e C g e i e c ibe, b e l e, a ge i e a em.
c. Alvarez v. Guingona
(G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996)
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.
FACTS:
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House of
Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was
introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate
conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government
rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243.
Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the
ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of Santiago
was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That
in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which
should not be.
ISSUE: Whether or not considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA
7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives
RULING:
Yes. Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import was passed in the Senate,
it cannot be said to have originated in the House of Representatives.
Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr 1993). The
SB was filed 19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec, and was transmitted to the
Senate 28 Jan 1994.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in
the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House
of Representatives, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application
should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon
until it receives the House bill.
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court said that what the Constitution simply means
is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large,
are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby
made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate
of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
d. Arroyo v. De Venecia
(G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions
of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the
House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then
ceeded. Af e Re . A i e ella i f he f he c mmi ee e , Maj i Leade
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called
f bjec i he m i . The he Chai decla ed: The e bei g e, a ed. A he ame
time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, Wha i ha M . S eake ? The Chai a d
Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Maj i Leade m i , he a al f he c fe e ce c mmi ee e had b he al ead bee
declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House
RULING:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects
person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which
the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effec i el e e ed f m e i i g he e e ce f a m. Re . A ea lie
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the
quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
e. Arroyo v. De Venecia
(G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners are challenging the validity of R.A. 8420 (amends certain provisions of the
Na i al I e al Re e e C de b im i g Si Ta e ) b fili g a e i i f f ce i a i a d/
prohibition. They claim that respondents violated the rules of the House which are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution when the Chair of the
Committee (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) allegedly ignored a privileged question raised by Rep.
Arroyo during the committee report for the approval of R.A. 8420.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion
of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation:
(1)the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall

(2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as
(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as
(4) the published version
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision
that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that for this reason they are
judicially enforceable. This contention was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to
support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by
courts. In this case, petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting
R.A. No. 8240 affects its validity?
RULING:
The petition was dismissed. According to the findings of the court, the alleged violations are
merely internal rules of procedures rather than what petitioners claim to be constitutional
requirements for enacting laws. In this case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only
those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this
Court. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded
its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the
judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.
4. APPROVAL OF BILLS; VETO
a. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS v. VALENCIA

(G.R. No. L-20740, June 30, 1964)
BARRERA, J.
FACTS:
This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary injunction
filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Monserrat
Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein,
against respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio
Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting
Service, sought and was allowed to intervene in this case, said interveners having been granted a
construction permit to install and operate a television station in Manila.
Petitioners applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied because it should be
filed two month before the expiration of the license. Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended
by Republic Act 584, on the powers and duties of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
(formerly Commerce And Communications), he may approve or disapprove any application for
renewal of station or operator license, provided, however, That no application for renewal shall bed
is approved without giving the licensee a hearing. Thus the notices of hearing were sent by
respondents to petitioners. Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to find out whether there is
ground to disapprove the applications for renewal. According to petitioner however, the violation has
ceased to exist when the act of late filing was condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance
of the circular dated July 24, 1962.The lone reason given for the investigation of petitioners'
applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased
to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation.
They were summoned by Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even
af e hei e mi ha e i ed. Vale cia claimed ha beca e f CBN c tinued operation sans
license and their continuing operation had caused damage to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
RULING:
In the case at bar, the issuance of the said circular, the lone reason given for the investigation
of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal
effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation.
There was no express agreement there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle
Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9 in favor of PBS. The only basis of the contention of the
respondents that there was such renunciation is the statement "Channel 10 assigned in lieu of
Channel 9", appearing in the construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV from Quezon
City to Baguio City, issued to petitioner. This statement alone, however, does not establish any
agreement between the radio control authority and the station operator, on the switch or change of
operations of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10.
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has
been violated by the refusal of Chronicle Broadcasting Network to cease operation. Further, the
Supreme Court noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine
Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the
Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence,
since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures
made b Vale cia de a me he a e i fac i i la i f he la a d he ca claim damage
therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then President vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, this
gives rise to the question of whether the President may legally veto a condition attached to an
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. The executive's veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases.
If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever, and the
restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by the
intervener PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a television station in Manila, where there
are already television stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition for the
release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void. It is not difficult to see that even if it
were able to prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervener would not have been entitled to
reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.
b. Gonzales v. Macaraig
(G.R. No 87636, November 19, 1990
Melencio Herrera, J.
FACTS:
G ale , ge he / 22 he e a , a ailed he c i i ali f C e f
Sec i 55 f he 1989 A ia i Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, a d subsequently of its counterpart Section
16 f he 1990 A ia i Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). G ale a e ed he f ll i g: (1) he P e ide
line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s;
therefore, she e ceeded he a h i he he e ed Sec i 55 (FY 89) a d Sec i 16 (FY 90)
which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot
exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry
with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of
the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the
prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution.
Or diffe e l , ha he P e ide he e e ` i i fa A ia i Bill.
RULING:
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted
b i m be ea ed a i em, hich ca be e ed b he P e ide i he e e ci e f hi i em-veto
e . The SC e e e f he a d le ha e e a mi g a g e d ha i i ae
beyond the e ec i e e e , a d Sec i 55 (FY 89) a d Sec i 16 (FY 90) e e
i i i he b dge a e e f he e m, he a e i a ia e i i ha h ld be
ea ed a i em f he e f he P e ide e e.
Article 6 Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution has 2 parts, a.) President generally can veto the
entire bill as exercise of her power and b.) president shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue of tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item
or items to which he does not object.
Court ruled the constitutionality of the presidential veto and the petition was DISMISSED.
c. BENGZON v. DRILON
(G.R. 103524, April 15, 1992)
Gutierrez, J.
FACTS:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
e ealed d i g he ime f f me P e ide Fe di a d Ma c . The e ld la ided ce ai
retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions.
Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among
government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on
the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by
P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the
case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect,
RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB)
for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did
the allotment in the following manner: Congress made a i em e i led: Ge e al F d Adj me ;
included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the government;
among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the
retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already
deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
RULING:
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them
in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set
aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to
enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds
should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate,
the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations
law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on
he g d ha he e h ld be ga f di i c i ilege efe e ial ea me e i ed
Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional
provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto
part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item,
the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is:
the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in
its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general
adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but
did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are
declared valid and subsisting.
d. PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ
(G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994)
QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president
involving the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel.
The Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund.
PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which
those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994,
neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and
Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive
Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four
special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the
P e ide i he im leme a i f ce ai a ia i f he CAFGU , he DPWH, a d he
National Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whe he he P e ide e i alid.
RULING:
In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the
CDF is constitutional. In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the
others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs
Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994
commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly
addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o
vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed
i i i c ide ed i a ia e ; i fac he Sc f d ha ch i i if e ed ld i
effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The a ia i f S a e U i e i ie a d C llege (SUC ), he P e ide e ed ecial

provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted
for the same in the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The
SC ruled that the veto i alid f i i i c m lia he O e F d P lic it avoided double funding
and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual
obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled
that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a
veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how
the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution
allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which
ca be e ed e a a el f m he i em hich he ela e l g a he a e a ia e i
the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-im ai me fc ac al bliga i , a d if all ed, hall effec i el
alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed
ece a m de i e he AFP . The SC affi med he e . A i i bl cki g a admi i a i e
action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated
i a e a a e a d b a i e bill. The ef e, bei g i a ia e i i .
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered
by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI
of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons
provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU s
C ge a ia ed c m e a i f he CAFGU i cl di g he a me f e aai
benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special
P i i he i em he CAFGU hall be bjec i P e ide ial a al a P.D.
No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
I hi e me age: The aid c di i i c i e i h he C i i al i j c i

prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B f he C i i al hich a e ha elec i e
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless
ecificall a h i ed b la . I am, he ef e, c fide ha he head f the said offices shall
maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation
standardization. Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR.
The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in
the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the
Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In
the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must
be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their
local districts know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government
or the president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position
to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.
5. APPROPRIATION
a. TESDA v. COA
(G.R. No. 196148, February 10, 2015)
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari 1 with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order or writ
of preliminary injunction to annul Decision No. 2012-210 2 of the Commission on Audit (COA). The
COA disallowed payments of EME by the TESDA to its officials.
The audit team disallowed the payment of EME amounting to P5,498,706.60 for being in
excess of the amount allowed in the 2004-2007 GAAs. It was further discovered that EME were
disbursed to TESDA officials whose positions were not of equivalent ranks as authorized by the
Department of Budget and Management.
TESDA, through Director-General Augusto Boboy Syjuco, Jr., appealed and argued that the
2004-2007 GAAs and the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual allowed the grant of EME
from both the General Fund and the TESDP Fund provided the legal ceiling was not exceeded for
each fund. TESDA argued further that the General Fund and the TESDP Fund are distinct from each
other, and TESDA officials designated as project officers concurrently with their regular functions
were entitled to separate EME from both funds. The COA denied the appeal for lack of merit
prompting TESDA, through its Director-General to file a petition for review with COA. The same was
denied. The COA ruled that failure of TESDA officials to conform to the 2004-2007 GAAs negated
their claim of good faith. Hence this petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to annul COA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA properly disallow the payment of excessive EME by TESDA.
RULING:
Yes. COA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed the disbursement of
EME to TESDA officials for being excessive and unauthorized by law. Provisions in the GAA are clear
in stating that the EME shall not exceed the amount fixed therein. Those entitled to claim EME not
exceeding the amount provided in the GAA are as follows: (1) the officials named in the GAA, (2) the
officers of equivalent rank as may be authorized by the DBM, (3) and the offices under them.
However, TESDA had a different interpretation of the law. It contends that there was no prohibition
under the 2004-2007 GAAs regarding the additional EME chargeable against TESDP Fund. This
argument deserves scant consideration. It is worth noting that TESDA, an instrumentality of the
government established under the TESDA Act of 1994, is accorded with budget for its implementation
which is included in its annual GAA. The TESDP Fund, which is being sourced from the Treasury,
belongs to the government. The Constitution provides that, o money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.No law was pointed out by TESDA authorizing
it to grant additional reimbursement for EME from the TESDP Fund, contrary to the explicit
requirement in the Constitution and the law.
The Director-General blatant violation of the clear provisions of the Constitution, the 2004-
2007 GAAs and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Hence,
he is required to refund the EME he received from the TESDP Fund for himself. TESDA officials, on
the other hand, who had no participation in the approval of the excessive EME acted in good faith
and they need not refund the excess EME they received.
b. COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla
(G.R. No. 151991, September 18, 2002)
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996,"
providing for the modernization and computerization of the voters' registration list and the
appropriation of funds therefor "in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list
of voters," the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and installations of
information technology equipment and ancillary services for its VRIS Project. Private respondent
Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to participate as one
of the bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA's bid in the amount of P6.588
Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and was declared the winning bidder.
However, under Republic Act No. 8760, the budget appropriated by Congress for the
COMELEC's modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds
under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC
was only P1.2 Billion Pesos. Then COMELEC Chairman Harriet O. Demetriou issued a memorandum
to the COMELEC en banc expressing her objections to the contract.
On February 2, 2001, the term of former Chairman Demetriou and those of Commissioners
Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores expired. Appointed as their successors were
petitioners Alfredo L. Benipayo as Chairman and Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason,
Jr. as Commissioners. Chairman Benipayo, through various press releases and public statements,
announced that the VRIS Project has been "scrapped, dropped, junked, or set aside," He further
announced his plan to "re-engineer" the entire modernization program of the COMELEC,
emphasizing his intention to replace the VRIS Project with his own version, the "Triple E Vision."
Unsatisfied with the adverse turn of events, PHOTOKINA filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
215, Quezon City a petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages against the COMELEC and all
its Commissioners.
On December 19, 2001, respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla issued the first assailed
Resolution granting PHOTOKINA's application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. On
February 8, 2002, respondent judge issued the second assailed Resolution denying the COMELEC's
Omnibus Motion and, this time, granting PHOTOKINA's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
in behalf of then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Resurreccion Z.
Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
ISSUE: WON the Commission On Elections is justified in refusing to formalize the contract; prudence
dictated the commission not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and
available funds.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence
dictated them not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available
funds. Definitely, to act otherwise would be a futile exercise for the contract would inevitably suffer
the vice of nullity. Verily, the contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab initio.
This is to say that the proposed contract is without force and effect from the very beginning or from
its incipiency, as if it had never been entered into, and hence, cannot be validated either by lapse of
time or ratification.|||
While this is not the proceeding to determine where the culpability lies, however, the
constitutional mandate cited above constrains us to remind all public officers that public office is a
public trust and all public officers must at all times be accountable to the people. The authority of
public officers to enter into government contracts is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility. In the exercise of their contracting prerogative, they should be the first judges of the
legality, propriety and wisdom of the contract they entered into. They must exercise a high degree of
caution so that the Government may not be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action. In fine, we
rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the
contract. Since PHOTOKINA's bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS
Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void; and that in
issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing
Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court set aside the assailed orders of the trial court. The Court ruled that
mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. In the case at bar, the
alleged contract relied upon by PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which it seeks to be protected, is
being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also because it was illegal and
against public policy. The Court also ruled that petitioners were justified in refusing to formalize the
contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them not to enter into a contract not backed up by
sufficient appropriation and available funds. Definitely, to act otherwise would be a futile exercise for
the contract would inevitably suffer the vice of nullity. There is no way that the COMELEC could enter
into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way beyond the amount appropriated by
law for the project. That being the case, the Bid Awards Committee should have rejected the bid for
being excessive or should have withdrawn the Notice of Award on the ground that in the eyes of the
law, the same is null and void.
c. Araullo v. Aquino
(G.R. No. 209187, July 1, 2014)
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
B dge Sec e a Fl e ci B ch Abad he came ih a g am called he
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) which was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of
government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
jec i ead f ai i g f e ea a ia i . S ha ha e de he DAP was that if
a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds
allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as
a i g b he E ec i e a d aid f d ill then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP
program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of
such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court). Other sources of the DAP
include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds
are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he,
and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators. This apparently opened a
can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns
out that some non-Executive projects were also funded. This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo,
Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file
various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions
a : DAP i c i i al beca e i i la e he c i i al le hich ide ha m e
shall be paid f he T ea e ce i a ce f a a ia i made b la . Sec e a
Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs.
38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to
use savings, respectively).
ISSUE: Whe he he DAP i la e he i ci le m e hall be aid f he T ea y

e ce i a ce f a a ia i made b la (Sec. 29(1), A . VI, C i i ).
RULING:
No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise,
an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated
for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP. There is no executive impoundment in the
DAP. Im dme f f d efe he P e ide e ef e e d a propriations or to
retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Ne e hele , he e im dme i he ca e a ba beca e ha i l ed i he DAP a
the transfer of funds.
But, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to
make ealig me f f d , h e e , ch a fe ealig me h ld l be made i hi hei
e ec i e ffice . Th , c -border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the
DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-E ec i e age cie . F he , a fe i hi hei
e ec i e ffice al c em la e ealig me ff d a e i i g jec i he GAA. U de he
DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar
as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some
of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25 (5),supra,must be made upon
a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective
offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.
On the issue of what are “savings”
The e DAP a fe a e a i g c a ha a bei g decla ed b he E ec i e.

U de he defi i i f a i g i he GAA, a i g l cc , am g he i a ce , he he e
is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
aba d ed. The GAA d e efe a i g a f d i hd a f ma l m i g jec .
Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis
at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and
he bei g decla ed a a i g b he E ec i e a ic la l b he DBM.
d. Belgica v. Ochoa
(G.R. No. 208566, November 11, 2013)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel. The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included
in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya
Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential
Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy. Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by
allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for
the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles.
Na le had bee hel i g la make i f eli g hei k ba el f d i ab 20 b g NGO
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used
in legit existing projects b a e i fac g i g gh jec . A a di a he c d c ed b he
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before
the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
RULING:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles: a. Separation of Powers, b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power, c. Principle
of Checks and Balances, d. Local Autonomy. The 2013 PDAF Article congers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, which violates the principle of non-delegability since
said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation. This is
lodged in the Congress (Sec. 29 par. 1 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution). The individual legislators
are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate how much from such fund
would go to a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. The constitution
does not allow this.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The Supreme Court ruled that PD 910,which created the
Malam a a F d, a ell a PD 1869 (a ame ded b PD 1993), hich ame ded PAGCOR
charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit: (i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all
fees,among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund
(the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for
other purposes which the President may direct; (ii)PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides
ha a a f PAGCOR ea i g hall be all ca ed a Ge e al F d ( he P e ide ial S cial F d)
which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.These are sufficient laws which met the
requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does
not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910
and PD 1869. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation
of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.
The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any office of the Government,
because it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. The Court,
however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legi la c l f hi PDAF e e ld all him e e a e him elf i ffice.
e. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications

(G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960)
CONCEPCION, J.
FACTS:
I 1953, Re blic Ac N . 920 a a ed. Thi la a ia ed P85,000.00 f he
c c i , ec c i , e ai , e e i a d im eme Pa ig feede ad e mi al .
Petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed
that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be
improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose
Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual
claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his
property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld.
Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be restrained from
releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated
the said property to the City of Pasig.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, however the lower court dismissed such.
ISSUE: WON said item of appropriation should be declared null and void.
RULING:
YES. Decision appealed from is reversed, and the records remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.
The appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent
donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the
constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private
e ca be ig ed. I acc da ce i h he le ha he a i g e m be e e ci ed f
public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for
he ad a age f i a e i di id al . I a m ch a he la d hich he jec ed feede ad e e
to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
Where the land on which projected feeder roads are to be constructed belongs to a private
person, an appropriation made by Congress for that purpose is null and void, and a donation to the
Government, made over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of the Act for the purpose
of giving a "semblance of legality" to the appropriation, does not cure the basic defect. Consequently,
a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said
appropriation.
f. Guingona v. Carague
(G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991)
GANCAYCO, J.
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of PHP 98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with PHP 86.8 Billion
for debt service) and PHP 155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act (PHP 233.5 Billion in total); while the appropriations for DepEd, Culture and Sports
amount to PHP 27.017 Billion.
Petitioners seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of PD 81, Sec. 31 of PD 1177 and
PD 1967 which authorizes the automatic appropriation for debt service and restrain its disbursement.
They argue that (1) upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of Pres. Marcos, the
legislative power was restored to the Congress when the Constitution was ratified by the people; (2)
that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but
Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; (3) and said PHP 86.8 Billion automatic
appropriation is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, cannot be enforced.
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that such decrees did not expire, it is
still inoperative under Art. XVIII, Sec. 3 which states that those inconsistent with the Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked. They also point out that it is inconsistent with
Art. VI, Sec. 24 whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by
Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, they state that said decrees violates Art.
VI, Sec. 29 (1), asserting that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation,
otherwise, it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance
the amount appropriated for the debt service.
ISSUE: WON the decrees are in violation of the Constitution.
RULING:
NO. An examination of the PDs show the clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the
payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans including those guaranteed by the national
government, should be made available when they shall become due precisely without the necessity
of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods and
necessities are incapable of determination in advance.
The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt
management policies. The argument of petitioners that said decrees are inconsistent with the
Constitution is untenable. The framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in
the statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to
mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative mill. The only reasonable interpretation of said
provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to
be passed by Congress.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid,
necessitated by the very nature of the problem being, addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made
certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees.
g. Garcia v. Mata
(GR No. L-33713, Jul 30, 1975)
CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Eusebio Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. He held the rank of Captain with a monthly emolument of PHP 478.00. Pursuant to RA
2334, which provided that reserve officers with at least 2 years of active duty shall be reverted to
inactive status within 3 years from the approval of the act, he was reverted to inactive status and
since then has neither received emoluments from AFP nor employed in the government in any
capacity. He filed the necessary petitions to the concerned offices, but received reply only from the
Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant General. Thus, he filed a petition in court to reinstate him,
readjust his rank and pay all emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion.
Garcia argues that his reversion was in violation of RA 1600 (Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year
1956-1957) Par. 11 of the Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines which prohibits
the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated
active commissioned service. When RA 1600 took effect, he had already had accumulated service
of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the AFP.
The trial court dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: WON Par. 11 of RA 1600 is invalid, unconstitutional and inoperative.
RULING:
YES. While RA 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal
year 1956-1957, said paragraph refers to the fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling
to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and
irrelevancy continue throughout the entire paragraph. It was a non-appropriation item inserted in an
appropria i mea e i i la i f he c i i al i hibi i agai ide he ge e al
a ia i ac .
Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation, it

is as though it has never been passed. Petitioner cannot compel the respondents to reinstate him,
promote or readjust his rank, much less pay him back the emoluments and allowances.
h. Araullo v. Aquino
(G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
In this case, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the decision
promulgated on July 1, 2014 and the petitioners, a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
The respondents maintain the the issues in these consolidated cases were mischaracterized
and ece a il c i i ali ed; ha he C ' i e eai f a i g ca be e ed b
legi la i c ide i g ha a i g i defi ed i he Ge e al A ia i Ac (GAA), he ce
making it a statutory issue; that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations
constitute savings and may be used for augmentation; and that the Court should apply legally
recognized norms and principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their
motion.
The petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional
and illegal all moneys under the DAP used for alleged augmentation of appropriation items that did
not have actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts
recommended by the President for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the
budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON DAP is in violation of the Constitution.
RULING:
YES, HOWEVER, he C fi d me i i he e de a g me ega di g he DAP-
funded projects that there is no constitutional requirement for Congress to create allotment classes
within an item.
Indeed, Section 25 (5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item that may be the
object of augmentation by the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief
Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. In Belgica v. Ochoa , we said that an item
that is the distinct and several part of the appropriation bill, in line with the item-veto power of the
President, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not be only general provisions.
Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25 (5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible
purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or
allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that
the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the
President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to
which that expense category belongs to.
i. Aglipay v. Ruiz
(G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937)
LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
The Director of Posts declared that he will order the issuance of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Petition, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the Director of Post from issuing and
selling the said postage stamps.
The said act of the Director of Posts is pursuant to the appropriation act appropriating P60,000
for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps, and authorizing the Director of Posts to dispose
of the amount as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.
ISSUE: W/N issuing and selling said postage stamps is violative of Sec. 13 Art. VI of the Constitution
(now Sec. 29 Par. 2).
RULING:
NO. The issuance of the postage stamps in question was not inspired by any sectarian feeling
to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to
that Church. The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourists to this country. The officials merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people. In the stamp, what is
emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itslf but Manila as the seat of that congress.
While the issuance and sale of the stamps may be said to be inseparably linked with an event
of a religious character, the resulting propaganda received by the Roman Catholic Church was not
the aim and purpose of the Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities
simply because of incidental results.
j. Garces v. Estenzo
(G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981)
AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
The Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, issued resolutions regarding the acquisition
of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day.
Included in the resolution is the provision that the custody of the image shall be with the chairman of
the fiesta and would remain in his residence for one year until the election of his successor. The
image was obtained from Cebu City using private funds from cash donations and solicitations of the
barangay residents and neighboring places. The image was displayed in the Roman Catholic Church
during the day of the mass. However, the parish priest refused to return the same, claiming that it
belongs to the Catholic church. After series of disagreements, a petition was filed questioning the
constitutionality of the resolutions. Petitioners contend that the resolutions contravene the
constitutional provision that no public money shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or used for the
benefit of any religion.
ISSUE: WON the resolutions violate such constitutional provision.
RULING:
NO. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge
religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or
clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. It is entirely a secular
matter. Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and wh has
some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provision banning the use of public money or
property.
k. Manosca v. CA
(G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996)
VITUG, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land, which is being claimed by the Government pursuant to
its eminent domain / expropriation function. The said piece of land was ascertained by the National
Historical Institute to have been the birthsite of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. NHI
passed a resolution declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Respondents filed an
urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property.
Petitioners move to dismiss the petition on the thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a
public purpose and the act would constitute and application of public funds for the use, benefit,
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity.
ISSUE: WON the expropriation is in violation of Sec. 29 Par. 2 Art. VI.
RULING:
NO. What should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that
might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to
recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather
than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the INC. The benefit that may be derived by
members of INC are merely incidental and secondary in nature.
6. TAXATION
a. Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

(G.R. No. L-19201 June 16, 1965)
PAREDES, J.
FACTS:
In 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc. in Bacolod City donated P10,000 in case to Rev. Fr. Crispin
Ruiz, the then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental and the predecessor of Rev. Fr. Casimiro
Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic Church. The total amount was actually spent for the
purpose intended.
O Ma ch 1958, M.B. E a e filed a d gif a e .S b e e l , A il 1960, he

CIR i ed a a e me f d ee gif a i he am f P1,370 i cl di g cha ge , i e e
of 1% monthly from May 1958 to June 1960 and the compromise for the late filing of the return against
the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental of which Lladoc was a priest.
Lladoc protested and moved to reconsider but it was denied. He then appealed to the CTA,
in his petition for review, he claimed that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest,
thus, he is not liable. Moreover, he asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even against the
Roman Catholic Church, would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the Constitution.
The CTA ruled in favor of the CIR. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whe he eii e h ld be liable f a e ed d ee gif a d a ed.
RULING:
Yes, imposition of gift tax is valid. Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines,
exempts from taxation, cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and
all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only
from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra
distinguished from excise taxes.
In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was
not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it was an excise upon the
use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. Manifestly,
gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not a property
tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of
which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of
Constitution. The exempt from taxation as employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted to
mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such
privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the exemption herein must be denied.
H e e , he C ed he me i f Llad c claim, a d held a liable he Head f Di ce e

for being the real party in interest instead of Lladoc who was held to be not personally liable; the
former manifested that it was submitting himself to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court and he
e e ed Llad c b ief, b efe e ce, a hi a d f all e .
b. Province of Abra v. Hernando

(G.R. No. L-49336, August 31, 1981)
FERNANDO, C.J.
FACTS:
The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of The Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued,
Inc. Desirous of being exempted from a real estate tax, the latter filed a petition for declaratory relief
on the ground that other than being exempted from payment of real estate taxes, its properties are
also "being actually, directly and exclusively used for religious or charitable purposes as sources of
f he bi h , he a i h ie a d hi hel e . Af e c d c i g a mma hea i g,
respondent Judge Hernando granted the exemption & without hearing the side of petitioner. The
petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss but the same was denied. Hence, this present petition for
certiorari and mandamus alleging denial of procedural due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the Church in this case is exempt from taxes.
RULING:
No, the properties of the Church are not exempted for tax. It is true that the Constitution
provides that "charitable institutions, mosques, and non- fi ceme e ie a e e i ed ha f he
exemption of "lands, buildi g , a d im eme , he h ld l be "e cl i el b al
"actually and "directly used for religious or charitable purposes. There must be proof therefore of the
actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes
to be exempt from taxation. It has been the constant and uniform holding that the exemption from
taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against
the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation; hence, an exempting
provision should be construed strictissimijuris. However, in this case, there is no showing that the
said properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses.
The respondent judge would not have erred so grievously had he merely compared the
provisions of the present Constitution and with that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the tax
e em i f la d , b ildi g , a d im eme . The e i a ma ked diffe e ce. U de he 1935
C i i : Ceme e ie , ch che , a d a age c e a e a he e , a d all la d ,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall
be e em f m a a i . The e e C i i added cha i able i i i ,m e ,a d -
fi ceme e ie a d e i ed ha f he e em i f la d , b ildi g , a d im eme , he
h ld l be e cl i el b al ac all a d di ec l ed f eligi cha i able
purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The change should not be ignored. It clearly
appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the
case immediately in favor of private respondent, respondent judge failed to abide by the constitutional
command of procedural due process. The petition was granted. Respondent judge, or whoever as
acting on his behalf, was ordered to hear the case on the merit.
c. Abra Valley College v. Aquino

(G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988)
PARAS, J.
FACTS:
Abra Valley College, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly
i c a ed i h he SEC filed a c m lai a l a d decla e id he N ice f Sei e a d he
N ice f Sale f i l and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes
and penalties. Paterno Millare filed through counsel a motion to dismiss the complaint. The provincial
fiscal filed a memorandum for the government wherein they opined that based on the evidence, the
laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school building and the school lot used for
educational purposes of the Abra Valley College is exempted from payment of taxes. Nonetheless,
the trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of the said school for
residential purpose. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes.
RULING:
NO. It must be stressed that while the court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
i e eai f he h a e e cl i el ed f ed ca i al e a ided f i he A icle
VI, Section 22, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always
been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the main purpose. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for
commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of
the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and
his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complementary to the
main or primary purpose educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of
education. Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the
school building as well as the lot where it is built should be taxed, not because the second floor of the
same is being used by the director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor
thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes
of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be return to the school involved.
7. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION AND QUESTION HOUR
a. In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio v. Gordon
(G.R. No. L-19201, June 16, 1965)
PAREDES, J.
FACTS:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
di ec i g a inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in
hei eai b hei e ec i e B a d f Di ec . P a hi , Ma 8, 2006, Se a
Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource
persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation
beca e f i c mmi me . A he ame ime, he i ked Sec i 4(b) f E.O. N . 1 N membe
or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative
admi i a i e ceedi g c ce i g ma e i hi i fficial c g i a ce. A a e l , he
e i e e PCGG ham e ed e f ma ce f i a k. G d Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative
inquiry.
RULING:
It can be said that the C g e e f i i ha gai ed m e lid e i e ce a d
e a i ec al. The C high ega d ch e i e de ed m e e ide i Se a e .
E mi a, he e i ca eg icall led ha he e fi i i b ad e gh c e fficials of the
e ec i e b a ch. Ve il , he C ei f ced he d c i e i A a l ha he eai f
g e me , bei g a legi ima e bjec f legi la i , i a e bjec f i e iga i a d ha
he e fi i i c -extensive with the e legi la e . S bjec ea able c di i
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and
in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable
them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can
participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation.
b. Philcomsat Holdings v. Senate

(G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin (Locsin) and Manuel D. Andal (Andal) are nominees of the
government to the board of directors of Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) and Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). Both Locsin and
Andal are also directors and corporate officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC). By virtue
of its interest in both PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the government has also substantial interest in PHC.
The government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), received cash
dividends from POTC. However, POTC suffered losses because of its huge operating expenses. In
view of the losses and t ec he g e me i e e i POTC, PHILCOMSAT a d PHC,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Proposed Senate Resolution No. 455 directing the
conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC
and the mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred
to Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises (Senate Committee), which
conducted hearings. Locsin and Andal were invited to attend these hearings as resource persons.
The Senate Committee found an overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG over POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the
g e me i e e i he aid c ai . C mmi ee Re ort No. 312 recommended the
privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC and
PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance
(DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
Locsin and Andal filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the hasty approval of the
Senate of the Committee Report No. 312.
ISSUE: Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312.
RULING:
The Se a e C mmi ee e fi i ela i e PSR N . 455 ha bee a ed a d
upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio
hich ci ed A icle VI, Sec i 21 f he C i i , a f ll : The Se a e he H e f
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
b ch i i ie hall be e ec ed. The C e lai ed ha ch c fe al f he legi la i e e
of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case, the respondents Senate Committees, must
carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. On this score, the Senate
Committee cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to
conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the Senate Committee be faulted for doing so on the very same
day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to
these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered
pointless.
c. Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon

(G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991)
PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the
transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue-ribbon Committee. Petitioners and
Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know"
regarding the alleged acqui i i f he L a G f he e ie f Be jami K k R m alde
which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG and citing probable violations of Republic Act. 3019
Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5.
Ricardo Lopa declined to and Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon,Jr. likewise refused to testify
involving his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by
e de C mmi ee i i c ld ad e el affec hi igh a ell a h e f he he
petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case. Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the
Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damages, prejudice and injury, and that there
is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
injunctive relief.
ISSUE: Whe he he Se a e Bl e Ribb C mmi ee i i ha alid legi la i e ea d

done in aid of legislation.
RULING:
No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5
f RA N . 3019, he i e k a The A i-Graft and Corrup P ac ice Ac . I he d , he
purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not
the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the
36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no
intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
i eall i aid f legi la i beca e i i ela ed a e within the jurisdiction of
Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President
M . Rica d L a had i la ed Sec i 5 f RA N . 3019, he A i-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Ac , a ma e ha a ears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this
case.
d. Arnault v. Nazareno
(G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950)
OZAETA, J.
FACTS:
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as
Buenavista and Tambobong estates. A question that the Senate sought to resolve was the obvious
i eg la i f he g e me a me e E e B , a n-resident American citizen, of the
total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to
determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
government. Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions,
was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation,
the petitioner repeatedly refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440, 000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a
petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Senate has the power to punish petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name
of the person to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. Whether the petitioner can rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?
RULING:
1. Yes, the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner. The Constitution (1935) did not contain an
express provision empowering either of the two Houses of Congress to punish non-members for
contempt. But the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a
witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The Court found that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was
held in contempt by the Senate was pertinent to the matter under inquiry. If the subject of investigation
before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony
of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the
committee by imprisonment.
2. No, the petitioner may not exercise his right against self-incrimination in this case. As against
witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to
give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The ground upon which the
witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford him safety. Due to his inconsistent
and evasive answers, the Courts believed that his answers were false, and that his insistent claim
that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the
name. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is
punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable. Since according
to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative
of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his
claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
e. Arnault v. Balagtas
(G.R. No. L-6749, July 30, 1955)
LABRADOR, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the
purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the #Philippines. The
price paid for both estates was Php 5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the Philippines
ad ed Re l i N . 8 he eb i c ea ed a S ecial C mmi ee de e mi e he he he aid
purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just,
he a ie e ible he ef , a he fac he C mmi ee ma deem e i he emi e .
In the investigation conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution, petitioner-appellee
was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, Php 440,000 was delivered. Petitioner-appellee
refused to answer this question, whereupon the Committee resolved on May 15, 1950 to order his
commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the
new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate or to the Special
Committee the name F$ the person who received Php 440,000 and to answer questions pertinent
thereto.
While still in confinement in Bilibid, petitioner-appellee executed an affidavit wherein he gives

in detail the history of his life, the events surrounding acquisition of the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates by Gen. Burt, the supposed circumstances under which he met one by the name of Jess D.
Santos. The Committee did not believe this. The Committee adopted Resolution No. 114 which reads
a f ll : RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL AND ORDERING THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY AND IN
CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL,
UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.
ISSUE: Whether or not the continued confinement and detention of the petitioner-appellee, as
ordered in Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952 valid.
RULING:
Yes, the principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is sounded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental
to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative
body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require
and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance
of its power and authority? The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the
legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from
the judicial process by which offenders are brought to courts of justice for the meting out of the
punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the
legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a necessary
concomitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and
application of the criminal law. Also, the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power
and is committed in the course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the
defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute
disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional
limitations the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference.
f. Senate v. Ermita
(G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the
China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP,
and the Fertilizer scam. The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date
arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement
f he hea i g Se . 29 i de aff d aid fficial am le ime a d i d a d
prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
i e iga i . Se a e ef ed he e e . O Se . 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective
immedia el , hich, am g he , ma da ed ha all head f de a me f he E ec i e B a ch
of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House
of Congress. P a hi O de , E ec i e Sec. E mi a c mm ica ed he Se a e ha he
executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet
given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the
AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order 464 is constitutional.
RULING:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions
of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the1987 Constitution.
The C g e e fi i i e e l ec g i ed i Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, which is not
infrequently true, recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand
provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and
it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the
members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance
but also,in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21
would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made
between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and
22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information
in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis
in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a
long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited
as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI
of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their
part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid
of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head
to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is
not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must
give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with
the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless,
when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is 'in aid of legislation' under Section
21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
g. Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks

(G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007)
NACHURA, J.
FACTS:
Before February 1, 2005, Senator Enrile introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166. On February 1,
2005, Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech denouncing SCB- Philippines for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and
urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent similar fraudulent
activity. The aforementioned Senate Committee, acting through Senator Angara, set the initial
hearing on February 28, 2005. Then, SCB- Philippines submitted to the Senate Committee a letter
dated February 24, 2005, stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the
same issues, challenging the jurisdiction of Committee to continue with the inquiry. Senator enrile
moved that subpoenas be issued to those who did not attend the hearing.
SCB Philippines also brought to the attention of the Senate Committee the lack of proper
authorization from affected clients for the bank to make the public disclosures of their accounts and
he lack f c ie f acc i g d c me me i ed i Se a E ile i ilege eech, a d
reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-
Philippines of unregistered foreign securities. The petitioners were later served with subpoena ad
testificandum and duces tecum to compel them to attend and testify at a hearing set on March 15,
2005. As such, this Petition for Prohibition was filed by the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the
judicial powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.
RULING:
The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in
the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices
committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of
the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority,
of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a
criminal or an administrative investigation.
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not
be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees
of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly
evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation,
respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities
may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation
for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with
the evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial
agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
h. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability

(G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into
a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(a ima el P16 Billi Pe ). The P jec a be fi a ced b he Pe le Re blic f Chi a.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then
invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with
P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
a e, i ki g e ec i e i ilege . I a ic la , he ef ed a e he e i : (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other
hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and
Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited
in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that
he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by
executive privilege.
RULING:
Yes, Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid out the three
elements needed to be complied with in order for the claim to executive privilege to be valid. These
are: 1.) the protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power; 2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the
P e ide him elf. The j dicial e i ha a ad i m be i e a i al imi i h he
President; and, 3.) it may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
gh likel c ai im a e ide ce, a d b he unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument
ha he c mm ica i elici ed b he h ee e i fall de c e ation and correspondence
be ee he P e ide a d blic fficial ece a i he e ec i e a d lic deci i -making
ce , a d ha he i f ma i gh be di cl ed migh im ai di l ma ic a ell a
economic relations with the People Re blic f Chi a. I i clea he ha he ba i f he claim i
a matter related to the quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign
relations.
As to the second element, the communications were received by a close advisor of the
P e ide . U de he e a i al imi e , e i i e Ne i ca be c ide ed a cl e ad i ,
bei g a membe f he P e ide Cabi e .
And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority. Presidential communications are presumptive privilege and that
the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access
to such conversations. In the present case, respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or
critical need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21, Art.
VI. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under
Sec. 22, A . VI. A led i Se a e . E mi a, he e igh f c i f C g e ma be facili a ed
by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in p i f legi la i .
Ne i ef al a e ba ed he claim f e ec i e i ilege d e i la e he e le
right to information on matters of public concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution
itself provides that this right i bjec ch limi a i a ma be ided b la .
8. BOARD OF CANVASSERS IN ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT/VICE-PRESIDENT
a. Lopez v. Senate
(G.R. No. 163556, June 08, 2004)
FACTS:
A petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed by Congressman Lopez seeking the
nullification of Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress creating a
Joint Committee in charge of the preliminary canvassing of votes of the candidates for President and
Vice-President in the May 2004 election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in the creation of a Joint
Committee for the purpose of the preliminary canvassing of the votes for the 2004 Presidential and
Vice-Presidential elections.
RULING:
The Court en banc upheld the constitutionality of the Joint Committee created by Congress;
m lga e i le f he ca a i g f he ce ifica e .
The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse of discretion for
Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee.
The C ei e a ed ha C g e ma alidl delega e he i i ial de e mi a i f he

authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee,
c m ed f membe f he H e f Re e e a i e a d f he Se a e.
The petition was therefore dismissed on the ground of the petitioner failed to establish that
Congress gravely abused its discretion in the creation of such Joint Committee.
b. Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress

(G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004)
FACTS:
A petition for prohibition was filed by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., seeking for the
declaration of the Court of the nullity and void continued existence of the Joint Committee of
Congress created to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and
preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 2004
elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004 on the ground of that said
adj me e mi a ed a d e i ed he aid da a d he aid T elf h C g e e i g he e m
2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence. "Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and
proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." Petitioner relied in Section 15, Article VI
of the Constitution to further support his claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term of the regular session of both Houses of the Twelfth Congress
terminated and expired upon its adjournment.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the term of the Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the
adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004. It further reiterated
ha Sec i 15, A icle VI f he C i i d e e ai he e m f C g e , b i
regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next
regular e i .
The final adjournment of the regular sessions of the Twelfth Congress does not terminate the
a k f C g e i a k f a he ica i g a d ca a i g he ce ifica e f ca a i ce i a
non-legislative function.
IX. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
1. THE PRESIDENT
a. Macalintal v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003)
Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS:
A petition was filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee
Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes" as unconstitutional. Alongside such questioned provisions sought to be declared as
unconstitutional by the petitioner is Section 18.5 which provides Respondent Commission on
Elections the power to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list
representatives including the President and the Vice-President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 18.5 or Republic Act No. 9189 is unconstitutional for being violative
of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution.
RULING:
The Court ruled that Section 18.5 of Republic Act No. 9189 is repugnant to Section 4, Article
VII f he C i i . Sec i 18.5 f R.A. N . 9189 ide ha he C mmi i Elec i i
em e ed de he clama i f i i g ca dida e . Sec i 4, A icle VII f he C i i
dictates that Congress has the power to canvass votes and proclaim the winners for the Presidential
and Vice-Presidential elections.
In allowing Respondent COMELEC to be empowered under Section 18.5 or said R.A.

encroaches the power of Congress vested by the Constitution, to canvass the votes for President and
Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.
It partially upheld Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 with respect only to the authority given to the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and party-list representatives but not as
to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-
President which is lodged with Congress.
b. Lopez v. Senate
(G.R. No. 163556, June 08, 2004)
FACTS:
A petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed by Congressman Lopez seeking the
nullification of Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress creating a
Joint Committee in charge of the preliminary canvassing of votes of the candidates for President and
Vice-President in the May 2004 election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in the creation of a Joint
Committee for the purpose of the preliminary canvassing of the votes for the 2004 Presidential and
Vice-Presidential elections.
RULING:
The Court en banc upheld the constitutionality of the Joint Committee created by Congress;
voting 14-0, led ha Sec i 4, A icle VII f he C i i e e l em e C ge
promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certifica e .
The Court ruled that it had no power to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless
there is a clear violation of the Constitution. The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute
grave abuse of discretion for Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee.
The petition was therefore dismissed on the ground of the petitioner failed to establish that
Congress gravely abused its discretion in the creation of such Joint Committee.
c. Brillantes v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004)
Callejo Sr., J.
FACTS:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court led by Atty. Sixto
S. Brillantes, seeking to nullify, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, Resolution No. 6712.
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 which authorizes the
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes
and canvassing or consolidating the results of the national and local elections.
This AES system has 3 phases mainly; the biometrics system of registration, the computerized
voting and counting of votes and lastly, the electronic transmission of result; Senate President
Franklin Drilon questioned the constitutionality of the proposed electronic transmission of results for
the positions of the President and the Vice-President.
COMELEC issued a resolution 6712, declaring that it adopts the policy that the precinct
election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in
advance to the COMELEC, Manila. For the purpose, respondent COMELEC established a National
Consolidation Center, Electronic Transmission Centers for every city and municipality. In relation to
this, the electronically transmitted results shall be made available via the Internet, text messaging and
electronic billboards. Interested parties may print the result published in the COMELEC website.
ISSUE: Whether or not Res. No. 6712 is violative of Section 4 Article VII of the Constitution.
RULING:
The C led ha Re . N . 6712 de he g i e f a fficial ab la i f elec ion
results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to
canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President.
If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the
President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an
fficial ca a f aid e .
The Court further pointed out that there is no constitutional and statutory basis for COMELEC
to undertake a separate and an unofficial tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically, for
in conducting such unofficial tabulation of the results of the election. In allowing so, Respondent
COMELEC descends to the level of a private organization and spends public funds for the purpose.
d. Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress

(G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004)
FACTS:
A petition for prohibition was filed by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., seeking for the
declaration of the Court of the nullity and void continued existence of the Joint Committee of
Congress created to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and
preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 2004
elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004 on the ground of that said
adj me e mi a ed a d e i ed he aid da a d he aid T elf h C g e e i g he e m
2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence. "Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and
proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." Petitioner relied in Section 15, Article VI
of the Constitution to further support his claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the continued canvassing of Joint Committee created by Congress even after
the final adjournment of the regular sessions of the Twelfth Congress is unconstitutional.
RULING:
The Court ruled that in favor of the constitutionality of act of the Joint Committee created by
C g e . Se a e hall c ene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to
canvass during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-
P e ide la e ha hi da af e he da f he elec i a e e l ided i Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution. Regardless of the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress,
the Constitution clearly directs the Congress to canvass the votes and proclaim the elected President
and Vice-President. Thus, upon the fulfillment of said constitutionally mandated tasks, only then can
the said Joint Committee sine die adjourn.
The C , he ef e, fi d ha he e i legal im edime he J i C mmi ee

completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public
session of both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to
a ecial e i .
e. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 221697, March 8,2016)
Perez, J.
FACTS:
A petition for certiorari was filed by Grace Poe-Llamanzares against Respondent Commision
on Elections for disqualifying her certificate of candidacy for Presidency for the May 2016 elections.
Petitioner was disqualified by Respondent on the ground of false material representation by indicating
on such COC that she at that time, has been residing in the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months
prior to the day of the 2016 elections but on the contrary, stated on her previous COC for the 2013
Senatorial elections that she has been a resident of the Philippines for 6 years and 6 months before
the said election; thus, making her unable to satisfy the requirement of 10-year residency in the
country. There were two other significant issues raised in the case at bar. The question of whether
she is a natural-born citizen and of whether such citizenship was reacquired upon repatriation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in disqualifying the certificate of candidacy of Petitioner.
RULING:
The Court ruled that Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction for disqualifying the Certificate of Candidacy of Poe-Llamanzares for Presidency.
Section 3 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the qualifications of a President and a Vice-
P e ide a d ead : N e ma be elec ed he ffice f he P e ide Vice-President
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and
ha bee a e ide f he Phili i e f a lea e ea immedia el ecedi g he elec i .
Respondent COMELEC does not have the power to determine the qualifications of a
candidate. It is the Presidential Electoral Tribunal that is granted power by the Constitution to
determine the qualifications of a candidate as stated in Section 4 Article VII of the Constitution. The
Certificate of Candidacy of the Petitioner therefore cannot be cancelled by COMELEC at it is not a
competent body which holds the power to decide whether such candidate lacks or is unable to satisfy
the requirements.
2. TERM OF OFFICE; PRIVILEGES
a. Osmeña v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991)
PARAS, J.
FACTS:
The petition at bar for a determination of the validity and constitutionality of Republic Act 7056,
"An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for Synchronized and
Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor,"
Such provisions in the said RA that were deemed by the petitioners unconstitutional were:
Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized
national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992.
Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all
incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and
shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section
2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution.
The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or
tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-
Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the
title "Commission on Elections" of the Constitution.
The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056
to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of
May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections
to the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself.
If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to
eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be
made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the RA 7056 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes. Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the
synchronization of national and local elections. However, RA 7056 provides for the de-
synchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. It also violated
Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except
barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of
November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two years and seven
months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years. The law was also held
violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the campaign period. RA 7056 provides
for a different campaign period.
b. Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco

(G.R. No. 6157, July 30, 1910)
JOHNSON, J.
FACTS:
An original action commenced in this court to secure a writ of prohibition against the Hon. A.S.
Crossfield, as one of the judges of the Court of first Instance of the city of Manila, to prohibit him from
taking or continuing jurisdiction in a certain case commenced and pending before him, in which
Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea) (respondent herein) is plaintiff, and W. Cameron forbes, J.E. Harding,
and C.R. Trowbridge (petitioners herein) are defendants.
The plaintiffs are W. Cameron Forbes is the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and
Chief of Police J. E. Harding and Chief of the Secret Service of the city of Manila C. R. Trowbridge.
Defendant A. S. Crossfield is one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila.
Defendant Chuoco Tiaco is a foreigner of Chinese nationality and a resident of the Philippine Islands
for the last 35 years having a family in the country and some properties. Chuoco Tiaco filed a case
for DAMAGES (monetary) alleging that defendants forcibly deported the plaintiff to China and forcibly
prevented his return for some months in violation of the right of the said plaintiff herein to be and to
remain in the Philippine Islands as established by law.
Crossfield issued an inhibition against Forbes et al from spelling or deporting or threatening

to expel or deport Chuoco Tiaco. Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for writs of prohibition
against the judge and the respective plaintiffs, alleging that the expulsion was carried out in the public
interest and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese government in the Philippines,
and was immediately reported to the Secretary of War. The complaints were demurred to, but the
Supreme Court overruled the demurrers, granted the prohibition, and ordered the actions dismissed.
The judge, having declined to join in the applications for writs of error, was made a respondent, and
the cases are here on the ground that the plaintiffs have been deprived of liberty without due process
of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor General, as Chief Executive, can be sued in a civil action.
RULING:
No. No one can be held legally responsible in damages, or otherwise, for doing in a legal
manner what he had authority under the law to do. The Governor-General had authority, under the
law, to deport or expel the defendants, and the circumstance justifying the deportation and the method
of carrying it out are left to him. He can not, therefore, be held liable in damages for the exercise of
such power.
c. In Re: Bermudez
(G.R. No. 76180, October 24, 1986)
FACTS:
Petitioner quoted the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
"Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon
of June 30, 1992."
"The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall
be held on the second Monday of May, 1992."
Be m de claim ha he aid i i i clea a h m i efe , he then asks the

C decla e a d a e he e i f he c c i a d defi i e e a h , am g he
present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to as the
i c mbe e ide .
ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.
RULING:
No. The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack of cause of action.
Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this action (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43
SCRA 677). It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent Presidents of
the Republic. President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents
are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness
of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common
public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon
C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the
extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purpose of synchronization of elections. Hence
the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May,
1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution.
d. Soliven v. Makasiar
(G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
The petitioners in this case was charged for libel by the president. Cory Aquino herself filed a
complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit
because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a
president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself
be laced de he c j i dic i a d c e el he ld be c e i g be ed back.
Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be
a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
RULING:
Yes. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely
the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
e. Estrada v. Desierto
(G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice- President. He was accused of receiving P220
million in jueteng money from Governor Singson. He was also charged that he took from Governor
Singson 70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. There was an outcry for his
resignation.
The impeachment trial began on 7 December 2000, with 21 senator-judges presided over by
Chief Justice Hilario Davide. At a point when 11 senator-judges ruled against opening a second
e el e f e ide ce h i g he e ide P3.3 billi ba k acc de he ame J e
Vela de , he blic ec e ig ed a d a ma dem a i a EDSA bega .
On 20 January 2001, the president negotiated with representatives of the vice-president. News broke
out that Chief Justice Hilario Davide would administer the oath of presidency to the vice president at
EDSA Shrine. Estrada issued two statements - one stating reservations on the constitutionality of
A e ide c , a d a he a i g ha he i i ca able f di e i g hi e ibili ie a
president, thus allowing Arroyo to be the acting president.
The Arroyo administration was met with acceptance by the different branches of government,
by majority of the public, and by the international community. The impeachment trial was closed,
despite sentiments such as those of Senator Defensor- Santiago that the impeachment court had
failed e l e he ca e, lea i g e e i ega di g E ada alifica i f he
elected posts.
The Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to file a series of cases regarding the corruption of
Estrada. Estrada filed a motion compelling the Ombudsman to refrain from further proceedings until
his term as president was over. He also filed a petition to be confirmed as the lawful and incumbent
president, temporarily unable to fulfill his duties, thus making Arroyo an acting president only.
The Supreme Court ruled a) to inform the parties that they did not declare the Office of the President
vacant on 20 January 2001, b) to prohibit either party from discussing in public the merits of the case
while in its pendency, c) to enjoin the Ombudsman from resolving pending criminal cases against
Estrada for 30 days.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent
of the immunity
RULING:
(1) Yes. The court ruled that that the resignation of the Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed
by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged
the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality;
(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to
any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of
our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president
which he has given up, and (5) he called on this supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
(2) No. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption . By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that
immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts
of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
f. Gloria v. CA
(G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000)
PURISIMA, J.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a petition for prohibition to restrain petitioners from reassigning him from
incumbent Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational Schools Superintendent of
the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST).
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, prohibited the petitioners from implementing the
respondent's reassignment as it is violative of his right to security of tenure. No period was fixed for
private respondent's reassignment, nor was there any indication that the reassignment was only
temporary.
ISSUE: Whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division Superintendent of
Quezon City to Vocational School Superintendent of MIST is violative of his security of tenure.
RULING:
Yes. the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner
to MIST "appears to be indefinite." The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary
Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best
fit his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can
thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has
been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing
in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would
only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces
an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or
duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure
of the private respondent.
g. Senate v. Ermita
(G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
The cases at bar are petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005, praying
for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
EO 464 prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of
chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP
are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
ec i g he e ide a al. EO 464 c i i ali a a ailed f i i alleged ha i
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
RULING:
EO 464 is constitutional in part. Only Section 1 and Section 2a are valid and the rest are
invalid. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21
f m Sec i 22 f A 6 f he 1987 C i i . The C g e e f i i i e e l
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and
exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to
others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the
Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not
only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers
only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation,
under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt
of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary
to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of hich i b ai i f ma i i i fC g e e igh f c i .
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21
and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power
of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is
by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment.
It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to
a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement
then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance
of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however,
be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not
bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the
Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President
to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a
matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress
e i e hei a ea a ce i i aid f legi la i de Sec i 21, he a ea a ce i ma da f
the same reasons stated in Arnault.
h. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability and Public Officers and Investigations

(G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
FACTS:
At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the show cause
Letter dated November 22, 2007 and contempt Order dated January 30, 2008 concurrently issued by
respondent Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Trade and
Commerce, and National Defense and Security against petitioner Romulo L. Neri, former Director
General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into
a contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People's Republic of China.
Petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that
then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether
or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege.
RULING:
Yes. Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions "fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy decision-making
process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People's Republic of China." Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power
to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the
President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being
a member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
3. PROHIBITIONS/INHIBITIONS
a. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

(G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003)
CORONA, J.
FACTS:
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery
of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO)
issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the
Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of
all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship."
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court
prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to
the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now
be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated
its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the
merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation,
fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets
be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying
procedural sidetracks.
ISSUE: Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a president
during his term of office.
RULING:
Yes. It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties;
(b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other
stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition
and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents,
respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or
inconsistent with such admissions.[83]
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since
they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their
net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as
President could not receive any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and
instrumentalities.[84] Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could
not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.[85] In
fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was
expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold
any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any
profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially
interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any
court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned
or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the
provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or
administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject
to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis
for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of
the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d)
and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be
construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or income
from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and
respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there were such other sources of lawful
income. And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically
stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to
specify the known lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie
evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other material
possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of proportion to the known
lawful income of such persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets
and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL
was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not presenting
their SAL would reward them for their violation of the law.
b. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 83815, February 22, 1991)
FERNAN, C.J.
FACTS:
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil
Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality
of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13,
Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The P e ide , Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in
any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
The hall ic l a id c flic f i e e i he c d c f hei ffice.
CLU avers that b i e f he h a e le he i e ided i hi C i i , he

only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in
the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure
multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution
itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of
Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the
general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
hich ca e ide he c i i ma ife i e a d he e le de a di g thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary
position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
c. Funa vs. Ermita

(G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena
H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), vice Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport
of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006.
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T.

Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA,
in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and
la e , filed he i a eii challe gi g he c i i ali f Ba i a
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed
Administrator of the MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she assumed her duties and
responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with
the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed,
violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their
deputies and assistants.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H.
Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent
capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and
therefore, NULL and VOID.
Fi all , he C imila l fi d e de he ha bei g j a de ig a i , a d

em a a ha , e de Ba i a a e e eall a i ed a OIC Admi istrator of MARINA,
untenable. In Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., we distinguished between the terms appointment and
designation, as follows:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before
us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are
designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in

nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which
does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
Clea l , e de elia ce he f eg i g defi i i i mi laced c ide i g ha he

above-cited case addressed the issue of whether petitioner therein acquired valid title to the disputed
position and so had the right to security of tenure. It must be stressed though that while the
de ig a i a i he a e f a ac i g a d em a ca aci , he d h ld he ffice e e
employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the
appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in
prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office,
and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section
13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IXB.
T h ld a ffice mea e cc he ame, be i e i a d

admi i a i , hich im lie hi g le ha he actual discharge of the functions and duties of
the office.
d. Funa vs Agra
(G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013)
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo appointed
Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera
in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo
designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the
petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to
challe ge he c i i ali f Ag a c c e a i me de ig a i , claimi g i be
prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit,
President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and
that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010.
Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was
then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting
Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary
of Justice; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of
Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for
Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then
relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment
of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General.
Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding
the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving
the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.
ISSUE: Whe he Ag a h ldi g f c c e ii i c i i al.
RULING:
Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose
text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office
or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not
otherwise so provided.
I a f m me ha Ag a de ignation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text

of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices
or employments in the Government or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations
was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in
possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of
the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the
Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the
avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and
hei de ie a d a i a . T c e diffe e l i e he e i able fl dga e f
circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department
and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of
Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government
agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.
It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General, was
not covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position being merely
vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered
by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent designations were still
subject to the conditions under the latter constitutional provision. In this regard, the Court aptly pointed
out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive
official to hold more than one office onl if all ed b la b he ima f c i f hi ii .
I he ca e f Q im . O ae a, hi C led ha , [ ]he e i legal bjec i a g e me
official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
i c m a ibili . The c cial e i de e mi i g he he i c m a ibili e i be ee ffice a
laid out in People v. Green whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one
office has the right to interfere with the other.
e. National Amnesty Commission vs. COA

(G. R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004)
CORONA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created in 1994 by
then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process
and review amnesty applications. It is composed of 7 members: a Chairperson, three regular
members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior
and Local Government as ex officio members.
After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over
said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria. However, in 1997, NAC resident
auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives pursuant to
COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
Meanwhile, in 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada.
Section 1, Rule II thereof provides that ex officio members may designate their representatives to the
Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other
benefits as may be authorized by law.
Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the
resident auditor and the National Government Audit Office disallowing payment of honoraria to the
ex officio members' representatives, to no avail.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing COA Memorandum No.
97-038 without the required notice and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code
2. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion disallowing the payment of honoraria
on the ground of lack of authority of representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of the ex
officio members
3. Whether or not the representatives de facto officers and as such are entitled to allowances
RULING:
1. No. COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not need, for validity and effectivity, the publication
required by Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
We clarified this publication requirement in Taada vs. Tuvera:
[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of
instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or
regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing
prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official
family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and
receiving double compensation.
2. No. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance
whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' official representatives.
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment
but by mere designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment

is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions
of a given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law,
upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so
designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a
designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an
employee's right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to
the position, and not a mere designation.
In Civil Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and
assistants, who hold positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional
compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached
to their principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members were
not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was called
per diem, honorarium, allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA and Bitonio vs. COA, we upheld COA's disallowance of
the payment of honoraria and per diems to the officers concerned who sat as ex officio members or
alternates. The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, the ex
officio member. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover the ex officio member apply
with equal force to his representative. In short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving
additional compensation for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative likewise
restricted.
3. No. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed
but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own
principals are prohibited from receiving.
f. Bitonio vs COA
(G.R. No. 147392, March 12, 2004)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Bitonio was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE.
DOLE Acting Secretary Brilliantes designated the Bitonio to be the DOLE representative to the Board
of Directors of PEZA. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, Bitonio was receiving
a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of
the PEZA's disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner
pursuant to the ruling in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary where Executive Order No. 284
allowing government officials to hold multiple positions in government was declared unconstitutional.
Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold
other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive
compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides. Bitonio filed an
MR but the COA denied the same. Thus, he appealed to the SC.
The petitioner maintains that he is entitled to the payment of per diems, as R.A. No. 7916
specifically and categorically provides for the payment of a per diem for the attendance of the
members of the Board of Directors at board meetings of PEZA. The petitioner contends that this law
is presumed to be valid; unless and until the law is declared unconstitutional, it remains in effect and
binding for all intents and purposes. Neither can this law be rendered nugatory on the basis of a mere
memorandum circular COA Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the COA. The petitioner stresses
that R.A. No. 7916 is a statute more superior than an administrative directive and the former cannot
just be repealed or amended by the latter.
He also posits that R.A. No. 7916 was enacted four (4) years after the case of Civil Liberties
Union was promulgated. It is, therefore, assumed that the legislature, before enacting a law, was
aware of the prior holdings of the courts. Since the constitutionality or the validity of R.A. No. 7916
was never challenged, the provision on the payment of per diems remains in force notwithstanding
the Civil Liberties Union case. Nonetheless, the petitioner's position as Director IV is not included in
the enumeration of officials prohibited to receive additional compensation as clarified in the Resolution
of the Court dated August 1, 1991; thus, he is still entitled to receive the per diems.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his
attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
RULING:
Yes. The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any
compensation for this additional office, because his services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office. It follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA Board
merely as representative of the Secretary of Labor, is likewise prohibited from receiving any
compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative would have a better right than his principal, and
he fac ha he e i i e ii a Di ec IV f he De a me f Lab a d Em l me
(DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. After all, the
petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit
as his representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in the
Board at all.
There is also no merit in the allegation that the legislature was certainly aware of the
parameters set by the Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) years after the finality of the Civil
Liberties Union case. The payment of per diems was clearly an express grant in favor of the members
of the Board of Directors which the petitioner is entitled to receive.
It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the highest law of
the land which is the Constitution. No law can render nugatory the Constitution because the
Constitution is more superior to a statute. If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental
law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. It is the task of the Court to see to it that
the law must conform to the Constitution.
The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why
the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748. Under the amended law, the members of the Board of
Directors was increased from 8 to 13, specifying therein that it is the undersecretaries of the different
Departments who should sit as board members of the PEZA. The option of designating his
representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the last
paragraph as to the payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted,
considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.
4. SUCCESSION
a. ESTRADA VS. ARROYO

(G.R. No. 146738, MARCH 2, 2001)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
This involves petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic. A short outline of events that
precipitated the case at bar thus follows:
1. Petitioner won in the May 1998 national elections as president, the respondent as vice
president.
2. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner and his
family of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Such expose ignited several reactions
of rage.
3. There became a built up of a call for petitioner to resign from office and his officials one by
one resigned withdrawing their support.
4. In November 20 Impeachment Trial of the petitioner was opened, in December 7
Impeachment Trial began.
5. January 19 people lined up in EDSA showing a greater call for the resignation of the
president.
6. January 20 was the day of petitioner's surrender. At 12:00 noon Chief Justice Hilario Davide
administered oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm petitioner
left Malacanang and issued a press statement and a letter transmitting the executive power
upon him, the president to the vice president becoming the acting president
7. The Monday after the oath, Arroyo discharged powers of the President.
8. Criminal cases have been filed against the petitioner after he stepped down into presidency.
ISSUE:
1. WON the cases at bar present a justiciable controversy / political question specifically in regard the
legitimacy of the Arroyo administration
2. WON Estrada merely resigned as President
3. WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as President
4. WON Estrada enjoys immunity from suit
5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
RULING:
FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.
The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the
1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope
of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been
laid d ha i i em ha icall he i ce a d d f he j dicial de a ment to say what the law
i ...
The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II.
EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly
to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.
EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot
be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial
review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.
SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.
The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is
an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.
The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes,
as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.
"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

"The P e ide a . Pag d a ag d a ak . A k a ma ad a g ma aki . Pag d a ak a
ed a e, b ea c ac , i iga. (I am e i ed. I d a a m e f hi i ai f l. I m i ed
of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
"I j a clea m ame, he I ill g .
The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to
e ig i clea he he aid A k a ma ad a g ma aki . A k a ae d f
resignation.
During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only
unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after
transition period.
His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing
his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace,
the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-
assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the
people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given
him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead i he ame e ice f c . Pe i i e efe e ce i af e challe ge
af e cc i g he ffice f he e ide hich he ha gi e ; a d (5) he called hi e
to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly,
the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
e ide c . The e elea e a e i i e aledic , hi fi al ac f fa e ell. Hi e ide c i
now in the past tense.
THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Sec i 11 f A icle VII ide ha C g e ha he l ima e a h i de he

Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his function . B h
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which
a e : RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS
PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS
AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE
ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. The Se a e al a ed
Se a e Re l i N . 82 hich a e : RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no
l ge em a . C g e ha clea l ejec ed e i i e claim f i abili . E e if e i i e ca
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress
and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.
The S eme C ejec ed e i i e a g me ha he ca be ec ed f he

reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his
loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
Rec g i i g ha he Im eachme C i F c Offici . Si ce he Im eachme C i
functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment
proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil
cases may already be filed against him.
The SC also ruled in In re: Sa i Be m de ha i c mbe P e ide a e imm e f m

i f m bei g b gh c d i g he e i d f hei i c mbe c a d e e b be d.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been
aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non
to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings.
Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in
the same footing as any other trespasser.
FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere
fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove
that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at
bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
X. POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
1. GENERAL
a. National Electrification Administration v. Commission on Audit

(G. R. No. 143481, February 15, 2002)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Joint Senate and House of Representatives Resolution No. 01, Series of 1994, raised the
salaries of government employees. The new salary schedule shall be implemented within four (4)
years beginning in 1994. On December 28, 1996, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive
Order No. 389 (EO 389) directing payment of the fourth and final salary increases authorized under
Joint Resolution No. 01 in two tranches: one on January 1, 1997 and the other on November 1, 1997.
On January 1, 1997 NEA, implemented and paid out fourth and final salary increases one-
time tranche, lumpsum, instead of paying it in two tranches. As a result, COA issued a notice of
disallowance which NEA appealed but was denied by the Commission on Audit en banc. NEA filed a
e i i f ce i a i bef e S eme C e e e a d e a ide COA de ial.
ISSUE: Whether or not Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess jurisdiction in disallowing the single or lump sum payout of the fourth and final salary
increases.
RULING:
No. NEAs accelerated implementation of the Salary Standardization Law II is not in
accordance with law. There is no merit in NEAs contention that the DBM, upon its approval of NEAs
proposed budget, had effectively stamped its imprimatur on the accelerated implementation of the
salary increases starting January 1, 1997 because NEAs proposed budget for 1997 included funds
for such accelerated implementation. This is not the approval contemplated by the Presidential
Memorandum dated November 7, 1995, which requires compliance with specific terms and
conditions. The DBMs approval of NEAs proposed budget cannot be deemed sufficient authority to
execute the same in disregard of the relevant orders and circulars providing for its manner of
execution. The budget process is a cycle of sequential and interrelated budget activities regularly
recurring within a specific time frame (a twelve-month period called fiscal year). The presidential
power of control over the executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is
self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much
less withdrawn, by the legislature.
b. Villena v. The Secretary of the Interior

(G.R. No. L-46570, April 21, 1939)
Laurel, J.
FACTS:
Jose D. Villena was mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior
recommended the suspension of Villena to the Office of the president that approved the same. The
Secretary suspended Villena. Villena claimed that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter
and that power or jurisdiction was vested in the local government [the governor] pursuant to Sec.
2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has the
power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be
exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of
charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in Sec. 2188 of the Administrative
Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over
local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in
suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the
genera law which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an elected Local Government Official
under investigation.
RULING:
Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a
municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears vested in the provincial
g e b ec 2188 f he Admi i a i e C de hich ide ha The provincial governor shall
receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment
of any crime involving mo al i de .
However, that power of the provincial governor of suspension, expressly granted by sec 2188
of the Administrative Code, was not necessarily exclusive which will preclude the Secretary of the
Interior from exercising the same power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the
President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office by virtue of his greater
power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law.
Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would
be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity
would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official
(sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal
official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be
issued to give way for an impartial investigation.
c. Planas v. Gil
(G.R. No. L-46440, January 18, 1939)
Laurel, J.
FACTS:
In November 1938, Carmen Planas, a municipal board member of Manila, published a
statement criticizing the acts of certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a
newspaper. The following morning, she received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the
President) by order of the president directing her to report before the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
She was directed to explain and prove her allegations.
She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter.
She said that as an elective official, she was accountable for her political acts to her constituency
alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive
officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which petitioner was affiliated. Further, she contended
that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen and in the exercise of her
right to discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be the subject of an administrative
investigation; that the issue was only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents of said
statement infringe any provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil,
however took cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor
General replied for the CSC arguing that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution,
the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive which were of purely
administrative in character.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President.
RULING:
The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction were his official
acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule was non-
interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC was precluded
from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these were properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental powers
viewed in the light of political philosophy was a relative theory of government. There was more truism
and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers.
In the present case, the President was not a party to the proceeding. He was neither
compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC was the party respondent and the theory
was advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken by him was directed by
authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings
instituted by Planas. The argument was farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the
government was acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but
was neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative
immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference was not in the nature of a sovereign
passport for all the subordinate official and employees of the executive Department to the extent that
at the mere invocation of the authority that it purported the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the
validity or legality of an executive order was necessarily abated or suspended.
Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied
the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but
right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the truth.
d. Lacson v. Roque
(G.R. No. L-6225, January 10, 1953)
Tuazon, J.
FACTS:
The mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some allegedly defamatory and libelous
utterances against a certain judge (Judge Montesa). Montesa then filed a libel case against Lacson.
A special prosecutor was assigned to the case. The special prosecutor recommended the suspension
of Lacson to the President. The President, through acting Executive Secretary Mariano Roque, issued
a suspension order against Lacson.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President can suspend a Mayor from his office.
RULING:
No. There was neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping
a h i em e m ici al fficial . I i e ha he P e ide hall . . . e e ci e ge e al
supervision over all local g e me , b e i i d e c em la e c l.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers
was not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers were always controlled by the
particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations
The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in section 64 (b) of
he Re i ed Admi i a i e C de m be d e c f mabl la ; and only for disloyalty to the
Re blic f he Phili i e he ma a a ime em e a e f ma ii f a h i
de he G e me f he Phili i e . Agai , hi e f em al m be e e ci ed
conformably to law, in this case, the allege libelous act of Lacson cannot be considered as disloyalty.
e. Mondano v. Silvosa
(G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955)
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape
and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the
governor to investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned
Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed
a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as
part of the executive and by virtue of the order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, was with
di ec c l, di ec i , a d e i i e all b ea a d ffice de hi j i dic i . . . a d
ha e d ma de he i e iga i f a ac c d c fa e i he e ice f a
bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or
designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control
over a mayor.
RULING:
No. The Constitution provides:
The P e ide hall ha e c l f all he e ec i e de a me , b ea , ffice ,

exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care
ha he la be fai hf ll e ec ed.
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he
has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department
head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not
have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the
service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his
jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President
exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as
conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all
local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par
1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to

see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal
official i he i cial g e h i a h i ed ecei e a d i e iga e c m lai made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of a c ime i l i g m al i de.
A d if he cha ge a e e i , he hall bmi i e cha ge chi g he ma e he i cial
board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and
he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the
b a d, if i hi i i he cha ge be e affec i g he fficial i eg i f he ffice i e i . Sec
86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by
the Department Head over the administration of municipalities.
I hi ca e, he g e ca l i e iga e M da f c ime ela i g M da

office. If the issue is not related to his office but involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape or
concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final conviction before a suspension may be issued.
The i i , he g e m e d a ma beca e he ac i g a a age f he E ec i e
but because of the power granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.
f. Almario V. Executive Secretary

(G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013)
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up and jointly
administer the National Artists Award. There were three deliberations for determining the nominees
and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde,
Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the

aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors.
Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural
groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents.
Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring Lazaro

Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo
gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection
process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the
Deliberation Panels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion with regards
to the violation of the right to equal protection.
RULING:
Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be nominated for
being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not
make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.
Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were
exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order
of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno
fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner
Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established
procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position.
In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an
interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.
2. APPOINTMENT
a. Valencia v. Peralta
(GR. No. L-20864, August 23, 1963)
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Elpidio Valencia was designated as Acting Chairman of the board of directors of
then President Carlos P. Garcia on October 4, 1961. Allegedly, after Valencia was extended the ad
i e im a i me , he k a a h f ffice he ii Chai ma , ad i e im, B a d f
Di ec , Na i al Wa e k a d Se e age A h i (NAWASA) Oc be 25, 1961. S ch
appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA) on April 27, 1962, declaring
him a Chai ma f he B a d f a e m e i i g J l 20, 1967.
On June 2, 1962, however, respondent Secretary of National Defense Macario Peralta Jr.
was appointed ad interim to the same position by President Diosdado Macapagal. This prompted
Vale cia i i e a eii challe gi g he legali f Pe al a a i me , claimi g ha he
position is not vacant since he has not resigned nor been removed for cause, and his tenure is bound
to expire only after a term of six years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of respondent Peralta is valid.
RULING:
YES. The argument of petitioner Valencia that his oath and confirmation imply a prior ad
interim appointment cannot be considered as it has been held in jurisprudence (People v. Murray)
that the better rule requires some kind of written memorial that could render his title to public office
indubitable. There is on record only one written designation of Valencia, but as mere Acting Chairman,
dated October 4, 1961. Such was not a permanent appointment, and therefore, was revocable at
anytime by the Chief Executive, and actually revoked by his subsequent designation of Peralta.
Therefore, the Court had no alternative but to declare that Valencia had failed to establish title to the
office he claims.
b. Binamira v. Garrucho
(G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990)
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon Binamira was designated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA) by the Minister of Tourism and Chairman of the PTA. Board, Jose Gonzales. His
resignation was demanded by respondent Peter Garrucho. Two days after, President Corazon
Aquino sent Garrucho a memorandum designating him as General Manager of the PTA for the reason
that the present General Manager Binamira was not designated by the President as required by
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 564, but only by the Secretary of Tourism, making such invalid.
Garrucho having taken over the position, Binamira filed this petition of quo warranto to question his
title and to seek reinstatement to the office from which he claims to have been removed without just
cause in violation of his security of tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or not Binamira has claim of security of tenure.
RULING:
NO. Binamira was merely designated by the Minister of Tourism, which the President had
overturned as required by PD No. 564. Where the person is merely designated and not appointed,
the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will
by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. Thus, Binamira cannot
sustain that he has been illegally removed.
c. Matibag v. Benipayo
(G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002)
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
The COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner Angelina Matibag as "Acting Director IV" of the
EID, which then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed in a "temporary" capacity.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC

Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. In his capacity as
Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum reassigning directors, including the reassignment of
Matibag to the Law Department. The latter requested to reconsider such, citing Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and
detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001."
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, exempting
the COMELEC from the coverage of the said memo circular.
Matibag appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. At
the same time, she filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against
Benipayo. During the pendency of her complaint, she filed a petition to the Court questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ad interim appointments of the COMELEC officers were valid.
RULING:
YES. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into
office. The fact is it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. Pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, an ad interim
appointment is permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress pursuant. Thus, the ad interim
appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are valid and do not
constitute temporary or acting appointments.
d. Sarmiento v. Mison
(G.R. No. L-79974, December 17, 1987)
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcialla seek to enjoin respondent Salvador
Mison from performing the functions of the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) and respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of Department of Budget, from effecting
di b eme i a me f Mi ala ie a d em l me . The a ail ha he a i me f
Mison is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments (CA). The respondents maintain its constitutionality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Mison as BOC Commissioner is unconstitutional.
RULING:
NO. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are four groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. The first group includes the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. Such
is clearly appointed with the Consent of the CA. The second group includes all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; and the third group are those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Appointment for any of the positions
included in both groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent or confirmation
of the CA. And finally, the fourth group are those officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may, by law, vest in the President alone. This implies that, in absence of such a law, lower-
ranked officers appointed by the President are also subject to confirmation by the CA.
In this case, the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is not one of those within
the first group of appointments where the consent of the CA is required. As a matter of fact, based
on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commissions, the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded
he ii f head f b ea from appointments that need consent or confirmation of the CA.
The ef e, Mi a i me i c i i al.
e. Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on

Appointments
(G.R. No. 83216, September 4, 1989)
Bidin, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles and three others were appointed as Sectoral
Representatives by President Corazon Aquino pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 16 (2) and Art. XVIII, Sec.
17 of the Constitution. Quinton-Deles was the sectoral representative for Women. They were
subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office, but the Commission on Appointments (COA) filed
an opposition against petitioner and those appointed alleging that their appointment must have the
concurrence of the COA. This compelled the House Speaker to suspend their oathtaking.
During a committee meeting of COA, to which respondent was invited, the Committee of the
Constitutional Commissions and Offices of COA ruled against the position of petitioner. Hence,
petitioner filed a petition questioning the objection of COA. She claims that her appointment does not
need the concurrence of COA, pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which does not
require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the
House of Representatives before they can assume office.
RULING:
YES. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in Section 5 (2), Article VII of the
Constitution may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Article
XVIII of the same. It is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are
am g he he ffice h e a i me a e e ed i he P e ide i hi C i i ,
referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.
f. Soriano v. Lista
(G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003)
Corona, J.
FACTS:
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice
Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain and they assumed office without confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner Elpidio Soriano, as member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and as a taxpayer, filed a petition against the officers and Emilia Boncodin in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management. In his petition, he questions
the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which he claims requires confirmation of the COA.
ISSUE: WON the promotions and appointment of said officers require confirmation of the COA.
RULING:
NO. The PCG is now under the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 475 issued by President Fidel Ramos. It is no longer part of
the Philippine Navy or Armed Forces of the Philippines. It is clear from Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces
e i e c fi ma i b he COA. The cla e ffice f he a med f ce f m he a k f c l el
a al ca ai i he i i efe mili a ffice alone. Therefore, the promotions and
appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and
higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.
g. Bautista v. Salonga
(G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989)
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
O A g 27, 1987, he P e ide de ig a ed e i i e Ma C ce ci Ba i a a Ac i g
Chai ma , C mmi i H ma Righ (CHR) , a d af e a fe m h , e e ded he e ma e
appointment. Immediately after taking her oath, she immediately discharged the functions and duties
of her office.
On January 8, 1989, Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments (CA) requesting her to submit information and documents required by its rules in
connection with the confirmation of her appointment. The CA wrote to her again, requesting her
presence at a meeting that would deliberate on her appointment. She wrote back to the Chairman of
the CA stating that the CA has no jurisdiction to review her appointment. The CA, on the other hand,
di a ed he ad i e im a i me i ie f he ef al bmi he j i dic i f he CA.
Ba i a m i f ec ide a i a like i e de ied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the position of Chairman of the CHR is among those positions that require
the confirmation of the CA.
RULING:
NO. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are four groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR falls
under the second e e ce f he i i beca e he a e ffice f he g e me h m he
(the President) may be authorized by law to appoint, pursuant to Section 2(c) of Executive Order (EO)
No. 163. This type of appointment does not require the review or participation of the Commission on
Appointments. Therefore, the CA does not have jurisdiction to review her appointment and likewise,
cannot disapprove such.
h. Calderon v. Carale
(G.R. No. 91636, April 23 1992)
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD
442) was approved. It provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments (COA). Pursuant to said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed the Chairman
and Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). After said appointments,
then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 161, designation the
places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
This petition instituted by Peter Calderon questions the constitutionality and legality of the
permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondent Chairman
and Members of NLRC, without submitting the same to the COA.
ISSUE: Whether or not said appointments are subject to the confirmation of the COA.
RULING:
NO. The second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution refers to all other
officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and
Commissioners fall within the second sentence, more specifically under the 3rd group of appointees
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and
Members of NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 whose
appointments require confirmation by COA.
To that extent, RA 6715 which requires the confirmation of COA is unconstitutional because
it amends by legislation the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution by adding
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and it amends by
legislation the second sentence of the same provision, by imposing the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the
President.
i. Manalo v. Sistoza
(G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999)
Purisima, J.
FACTS:
On December 1990, Republic Act (RA) 6975 creating the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) was signed into law by President Corazon Aquino. Under Sections 26 and 31 of
the same, it was provided that the PNP Chief as well as certain police officers including Directors and
Chief Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments (COA) before they can take their office.
On March 10, 1992, President Aquino promoted fifteen police officers by appointing them to
positions in the PNP with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. Without their names submitted
to the COA for confirmation, said police officers took their oath and assumed their respective
positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under Secretary Salvador
Enriquez, authorized for their salaries and other emoluments.
On October 21, 1992, petitioner Jesulito Manalo brought to the Supreme Court a petition for
prohibition to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements made thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the police officers is valid.
RULING:
YES. There was no need for the confirmation of respondent officers by the Commission on
Appointments because their positions are not included in the group of officers enumerated under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution that require the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. Consequently, Sections 26 and 31 of RA 6974 are unconstitutional for empowering
the Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments
are not required by the Constitution. In view thereof, Secretary Enriquez did not act with grave abuse
of discretion in authorizing and effecting disbursements for the salaries and other emoluments of the
respondent police officers whose appointments are valid.
j. Rufino v. Endriga
(G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The Endriga group were appointed members of the board of trustees of the Cultural Center
of the Philippines (CCP) by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1995, with the qualification that their
appointments would extend only until December 31, 1998. By December 22, 1998, then President
Joseph Estrada advised petitioners that they were being replaced by seven new trustees to the CCP
board, the Rufino group. This led the Endriga group to file quo warranto proceedings questioning the
authority of the president to appoint new members in the CCP board. They claim that under Section
6(b) f P e ide ial Dec ee (PD) N . 15, aca cie i he b a d hall be filled b elec i b a e
f a maj i f he ee held a he e eg la mee i g. Si ce he e a l e ea aca
due to the expirati f Ma a e m, P e ide E ada c ld a i a e b a d.
The Court of Appeals (CA) granted their petition and declared the Endriga group lawfully
entitled to hold office and ousted respondents from the CCP board. The Rufino group filed for a motion
for reconsideration, asserting that Section 6(b) of PD 15, which authorized the CCP trustees to elect
their fellow trustees, should be declared unconstitutional for it is allegedly repugnant to Section 16 of
Article VII of the Constitution, which all ed he a i me l f ffice l e i a k ha he
appointing power.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 6(b) of PD No. 15 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
YES. Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards." In this case, the President appointed the Endriga group as
trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga group to the same positions. In
effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set of officers in the Executive branch. Each
appointing power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two powers are irreconcilable. Thus,
the Court must put an end to this recurring anomaly.
k. Lacson v. Romero
(G.R. No. L-3081, October 14, 1949)
Montemayor, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Lacson was appointed by the President as provincial fiscal of Negros
Oriental. The appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (COA) and thereafter,
he took his oath of office and performed the duties of that office.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the President nominated Lacson to the
post of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the same date, the President nominated for the position of
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental respondent Honorio Romero. Both nominations were
simultaneously confirmed by COA.
Lacson neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of the fiscal of Tarlac.
Romero, on the other hand, took his oath of office, notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and
thereafter proceeded to his station. Upon arrival at Negros Oriental, Romero notified Lacson of his
intention to take over the office, but the latter objected. Lacson then instituted a petition for quo
warranto against Romero.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lacson is entitled to the post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental.
RULING:
YES. There is no power in this country which can compel a man to accept an office.
Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and
no one can compel him to do so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no
vacancy in said office was created unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as such fiscal of Negros
Oriental. A provincial fiscal as a civil service official may not be removed from office even by the
President who appointed him, and even with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, except
for cause.
l. Luego v Civil Service Commission

(G.R. No. L-69137, August 5, 1986)
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
On 18 February 1983, petitioner was appointed as Administrative Officer II at the Office of the
City Mayor in Cebu City by Mayor Florentino Solon. The appointment was described as "permanent"
but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary due to a protest filed by the private
respondent. On March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the legality of which does not have to be
decided here, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the
petitioner for the contested position and on June 28, 1984, said respondent was appointed by the
new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte.
ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on
the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee.
RULING:
NO. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the
right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it
temporary. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing
the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is
qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest
to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred.
m. Lapinid v Civil Service Commission

(G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991)
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position
of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This
appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito Junsay. He
contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in
view of his preferential right thereto. In a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the Commission
disposed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor
(SG 18). Upon learning of the said resolution, Lapinid, who claimed he had not been informed of the
appeal and had not been heard thereon, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 19, 1990.
ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on
the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee.
RULING:
NO. The Court declares once again that the Civil Service Commission has no power of
appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the
appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required
qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications
should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It
cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person is better qualified and much less
can it direct the appointment of its own choice. Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even
this Court cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of
mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personality is the prerogative of the appointing
authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority.
n. Pobre v Medieta
(G.R. No. 106677, July 23, 1993)
Grino-Aquino, J.
FACTS:
The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable Julio B.
Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior
Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of the
PRC. On January 6, 1992, Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon sought the opinion of Acting
Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III on whether the President's power to appoint the
Commissioner of the Professional Regulation Commission is restricted by Section 2 of P.D. No. 223,
as amended. The Executive Secretary wanted to know whether the President may appoint as
Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person other than the
Senior Associate Commissioner. In a Memorandum dated January 22, 1991, Acting Secretary of
Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III answered that the said provision by the Executive Secretary does not
limit or restrict the appointing power of the President. On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C.
Aquino appointed the petitioner, then an Associate Commissioner, as the PRC
Commissioner/Chairman. He took his oath of office on February 17, 1992.
Even before Commissioner Pobre's appointment, the private respondent, Mariano A.

Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a petition for declaratory relief against
Commissioner Pobre, Executive Secretary Drilon, and Acting Secretary of Justice Eduardo
Montenegro, praying that they be enjoined from appointing, or recommending, the appointment of
Associate Commissioner Pobre as Chairman of the PRC because under Section 2 of P.D. No. 223,
he (Mendieta), as the senior Associate Commissioner, was legally entitled to succeed Francia as
Chai ma f he PRC, bei g ha a aca c i he C mmi i hall be filled f he e i ed
term only with the most senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the
expiration of his e m, e ig a i em al .
On August 5, 1992, Judge Somera rendered a decision in favor of Mendieta and on August
19, 1992, she issued a writ of prohibitory injunction directing the Deputy Sheriff of Manila to stop
Pobre from discharging the functions and duties of the Chairman/Commissioner of the PRC, and from
enjoying the rights and privileges of that office.
ISSUE: WON the President may appoint as Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate
Commissioner or any person other than the Senior Associate Commissioner.
RULING:
YES. In interpreting this section of P.D. No. 223, consideration should be accorded the
provision of the Constitution vesting the power of appointment in the President of the Philippines.
Section 10, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution empowers the President to appoint "those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint." The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in
the Commission (except the position of "junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by
"succession" or by "operation of law" for that would deprive the President of his power to appoint a
new PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners "all to be appointed by the President"
under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only occasion for the President to exercise
his appointing power would be when the position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner
becomes vacant. We may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately
clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself to the selection
and appointment of only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in that
agency. Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC Chairman/Commissioner to succeed Julio B.
Francia, Jr. at the expiration of his term, did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 223 and in fact
conforms with the Chief Executive's interpretation and implementation of the law, the legality of said
appointment should be upheld.
o. Pimentel v Ermita
(G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The Senate and the House of Representatives ("Congress") commenced their regular session
on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives,
was constituted on 25 August 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments 2 to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments. Respondents took their oath of
office and assumed duties as acting secretaries.
On 8 September 2004, petitioners filed the present petition as Senators of the Republic of the
Philippines. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo
issued ad interim appointments 3 to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they
were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
ISSUE: WON President Arroyo's appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional.
RULING:
YES. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution
expressly allows it to interfere. 6 Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly
against the legislature. 7 The scope of the legislature's interference in the executive's power to
appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may
Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap

measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to
the office. 16 In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the
office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice
as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.An alter ego,whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since
a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President's confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while
Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical
reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter
5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that "[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already
in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch." Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in
the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
p. De Rama v Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001)
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de
Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall
of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Petitioner de Rama justified his recall
request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were "midnight" appointments
of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. On April 30, 1996, the CSC denied petitioner's request for the recall of the appointments
of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC also dismissed petitioner's allegation that these
were "midnight" appointments, pointing out that the Constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner
prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to
local elective officials. After reviewing the facts and issues raised by petitioner, the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution 6 dated May 16, 1997 which held that there was no abuse of the power of
appointment on the part of the outgoing mayor.
ISSUE: WON there was abuse of the power of appointment on the part of the outgoing mayor.
RULING:
NO. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. A thorough perusal of the records reveal that
the CSC's ruling is supported by the evidence and the law. The fourteen (14) employees were duly
appointed following two meetings of the Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26,
1995. There is no showing that any of the private respondents were not qualified for the positions
they were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments were duly attested to by the Head of the CSC
field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had already assumed their appointive positions even
before petitioner himself assumed his elected position as town mayor. Consequently, their
appointments took effect immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled by petitioner. It
has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee's assumption of the
position in the civil service, "he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation
of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing." 17
Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not
only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation
of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous
notice and hearing. The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on so-called
"midnight appointments," specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next
presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.
q. In Re: Mateo Valenzuela

(A.M. No. 98-5-01, November 9, 1998)
Narvasa, C.J.
FACTS:
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta are appointed as Judges of the RTC
of Bago City and Cabanatuan, respectively, by the President. These appointments appear prima
facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional
provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
ISSUE: WON the President is required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and
9 of Art. VIII, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution.
RULING:
NO. D i g he e i d a ed i Sec. 15, A . VII f he C i i m h immedia el
bef e he e e ide ial elec i a d he e d f hi e m he P e ide i ei he e i ed
to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply
mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided
therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect
once every 6 years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of
the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling
of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of
any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.
r. De Castro v Judicial and Bar Council

(G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
C.J. Puno is set to retire on 17 May 2010 or 7 days after the presidential election. January
2010, the JBC begun to take applications for the position of C.J. Meanwhile, strong objections to
P e . GMA a i i g C.J. P cce a e. The i a eii e e h filed e i i g
her authority to appoint a new C.J. in the light of the ban imposed on presidential appointments two
months immediately before the next presidential elections up to the e d f he P e ide e m de
Sec 15, Art VII of the Constitution. This view however seemingly conflicts with Sec 4(1), Art VIII which
provides that any vacancy in the SC shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy,
and Sec 9, Art VIII which provides that the President shall issue appointments to the Judiciary within
90 days from submission by the JBC of the list of nominees.
It is further argued that there is no imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice
considering that Sec 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the next
President appoint the successor. It provides that in case of a vacancy in the office of the C.J. or of
his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate
Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another C.J. is appointed and
duly qualified.
It is also argued that there is no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the
prohibition period the successor of C.J. Puno because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the
90 days mandated in Sec 4(1), Art VIII remaining (the period that remains of the 90 days counted
f m C.J. P e i eme af e he e d f GMA e m).. A ecedent frequently cited by the parties
is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.
Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section
15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions
during the period therein fixed.
ISSUE: WON the ban on making presidential appointments under Sec 15, Art VII extend to
appointments to fill vacancies in the SC and in the rest of the Judiciary.
RULING:
No. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Sec 15, Art VII to the
appointment of Members of the SC, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored
the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission further show that the
filling of a vacancy in the SC within the 90-day period was made a true mandate for the President.
This was borne out of the fact that 30 years hitherto, the Court seldom had a complete complement.
F he , he age i Sec 4(1), A VIII f he d hall an imperative should not be disregarded.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Sec 15, Art VII, undoubtedly, the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Dept. The
framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer
be midnight appointments to the Judiciary and appointments to the Judiciary for the purpose of buying
votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations.
The fact that Secs 14 and 16 of Art VI refer only to appointments within the Executive Dept.
renders conclusive that Sec 15 of the same also applies only to the Executive Dept. This is consistent
with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. If the
framers intended Sec 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments, they would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition.
To hold that Sec 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary undermines the intent of the
Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Dept. for it will tie the Judiciary and the SC
to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election.
s. VILLALUZ v ZALDIVAR
(G.R. NO. L-22754, December 31, 1965)
Bautista Angelo, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office. He
alleged that he was as chief of said office on 20 May 1958 and two days thereafter his nomination
was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged
that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the
removal of Villaluz. Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and
ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz
be removed. The president then issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from his post.
Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed considering
that he is an appointee of the president.
RULING:
Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the Philippines
has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to
the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No. 2260; being a
presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the
government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by
the President of the Philippines under the principle tha he e em e i i he e i he e
a i .
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to
the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can
be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not
with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that
inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says
ha he C g e ma b la e he a i me f he i fe i ffice , i he P e ide al e, i
the co , i head f de a me .
t. ALAJAR v ALBA
(G.R. Nos. L-10360 & L-10433, January 17, 1957)
Felix, J.
FACTS:
RA 603 created the City of Roxas. Sec 8 thereof provides that the vice mayor shall be
appointed by the president. Pursuant to the law, Alba was appointed as the mayor. Later
on, the president sent communication to Alba telling him that he will be replaced by a new appointee,
Alajar. Alajar was then declared as the acting mayor. Alba refused to leave his post and he appealed
his case before the Judge Evangelista who ruled in favor of him. Alajar then complained. Alba argued
that section 2545 of the RAC w/c provides:
A i me f Ci Official . The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with the

consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines, the mayor, the vice-
mayor . . . and he may REMOVE a lea e a f he aid ffice . . . , ha bee decla ed
i c m a ible i h he c i i al i hibi i ha ffice em l ee i he Ci il Se ice hall be
em ed e ded e ce f ca e a ided b la , beca e he i i are mutually
repugnant and absolutely irreconciliable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alba can be removed by the president upon displeasure.
RULING:
The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good behavior, had
any vested interest or contract right in his office, of which Congress could not deprive him. The
question is not novel. There seems to be but little difficulty in deciding that there was no such
interest or right.
Admi edl , he ac f C g e i c ea i g a public office, defining its powers, functions and

fi i g he e m he e i d d i g hich he ffice ma claim h ld he ffice a f igh a d he
e e he e m d i g hich he i c mbe ac all h ld he ffice, i a alid a d c titutional
exercise of legislative power. In the exercise of that power, Congress enacted RA 603 on April 11,
1951, creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for the position of Vice-Mayor and its
tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President,
so, the logical inference is that Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain
officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alba was appointed by the
pleasure of the resident and can also be removed when that pleasure ceases.
u. APARRI v COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. L-30057, January 31, 1984)
Makasiar, J.
FACTS:
On January 15, 1960, the Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) approved resolution no. 13 (series of 1960), which appointed
Appari as a general manager of the said company which will take effect on January 16, 1960.
However on March 15, 1962, the same Board of Directors approved resolution no. 24 (series of 1962)
which states that the Chairman of the Board has transmitted to the Board of Directors the desire of
the office of the Philippines to fix the term of Aparri, the general manager up to the closing time of the
office on March 31, 1962 in accordance with paragraph 2, section 8 of R.A. 1160:
Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors shall have the
following powers and duties:
2) T a i a d fi he e m f ffice f Ge e al Ma age , bjec he recommendation

f he Office f Ec mic C di a i a d he a al f he P e ide f he Phili i e , . The
Board, by a majority vote of all members, may, for cause, upon recommendation of the Office of
Economic Coordination and with the approval of the President of the Philippines, suspend and/or
remove the General Manager and/or the Assistant General Manager (p. 46, rec., emphasis supplied).
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution no. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of the petitioner
without cause.
RULING:
YES. It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is
necessary in each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate
the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office
is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors subject to the
recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of the president of the
Philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the
petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and
phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention of the legislative must
be determined from the language employed and where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no
room for construction.
The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right
to hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.
v. DOMINGO v ZAMORA
(G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
On 5 March 1999, former President Jospeh E. Estrada issued EO 81 entitled Transferring the
Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine
Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports.
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01592
reassingning all remaining BPESS staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS. Secretary
Gonzales then issued another memorandum reassigning the BPESS Staff named in the
Memorandum to various offices within DECS. The petitioners were dissatisfied with the reassignment.
They argue that EO 81 is void for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. They likewise
challenged the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: WON EO 81 and DECS Memoranda are valid.
RULING:
YES. EO 81 i a alid e e ci e f he P e ide delega ed e e ga i e he Office f
the President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy, and efficiency. To remain effective
and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of
he P e ide i c mma d f he P e ide . Thi i he a i ale behi d he P e ide
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.
Petitioners contention that the DECS is not part of the Office of the President is immaterial.
Under EO 292 which expressly grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the
President, the DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if it is not part of
the Office of the President, said EO clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency
of the DECS.
3. CONTROL
a. Banda v. Ermita
(G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010)
FACTS:
President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office)
over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to
Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their
printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the
services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was
offered by the NPO.
E ec i e O de N . 378 al limi ed NPO a ia i i he Ge e al A ia i Ac

to its income. Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees
of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the
executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former
President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378
i la e e i i e ec i f e e, beca e i a e he a f he g ad al ab li i f he NPO.
ISSUE: Whether EO 378 is constitutional.
RULING:
YES. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to re
ga i e he ffice a d age cie i he e ec i e de a me i li e i h he P e ide
constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation
of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Executive Order No.
292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and
redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the
said Code, is explicit: The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency
that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly
attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information
Agency), is part of the Office of the President. To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to
reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies of
the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created
or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power
to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws
and prevailing jurisprudence.
b. Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines v. Romulo

(G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007)
PUNO, C.J.
FACTS:
President Joseph E. Estrada issued E.O. No. 102 on May 24, 1999 pursuant to Section 20,
Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and
Sections 78 and 80 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8522, also known as the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) of 1998. E.O. No. 102 provided for structural changes and redirected the functions and
operations of the Department of Health. On October 19, 1999, the President issued E.O. No. 165
"Directing the Formulation of an Institutional Strengthening and Streamlining Program for the
Executive Branch" which created the Presidential Committee on Executive Governance (PCEG)
composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) as co-chair.
Secretary of Health Issued issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 94, Series of 2000, which
set the implementing guidelines for the restructuring process on personnel selection and placement,
retirement and/or voluntary resignation. A.O. No. 94 outlined the general guidelines for the selection
and placement of employees adopting the procedures and standards set forth in R.A. No. 66564 or
the "Rules on Governmental Reorganization," Civil Service Rules and Regulations, Sections 76 to 78
of the GAA for the Year 2000, and Section 42 of E.O. No. 292. On August 29, 2000, the Secretary of
Health issued Department Memorandum No. 157, Series of 2000.
Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a union of
affected employees in the Malaria Control Service of the Department of Health. MEWAP filed a case
assailing that E.O. 102 violates E.O. 292 and R.A 8522.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to reorganize structurally and functionally the
functions of the Department of Health.
RULING:
Yes. The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health
under the Constitution and statutory laws pursuant to Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987
Constitution. The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with
the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus,
except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies
or offices in the e ec i e de a me a e c ce ed, he P e ide e fc l ma j if him
to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to
carry out reorganization measures.
c. Domingo v. Zamora
(G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No. 81 entitled
"Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports."
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01592 on
January 10, 2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the service,
all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594 reassigning the
BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with
their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition. Petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and
unconstitutional for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the
P e ide i a ce f EO 81 i la ed he i ci le f e a a i f e . Pe i i e al
challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid.
RULING:
Yes. Although the issue is moot and academic upon the passing of Republic Act 9155 which
ab li hed he BPESS a d a fe ed DECS f c i ela i g c m eii he
Philippine Sports Commission, the Supreme Court stressed that E.O. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987), g a he P e ide c i i g a h i e ga i e he Office f he P e ide achie e
im lici , ec m , a d efficie c . The e ga i a i f he President of the Office of the President
is limited only to transferring functions from the Office of the President to Departments or agencies or
ice e a. T a fe d e e l i he em l ee ce a i i he ffice beca e hi ffice
continues to exist although in another department or agency.
However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2)
and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President
Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to
another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize
offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited
to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or
Agencies, and vice versa.
d. Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012)
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13
(E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD).On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed
before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as
well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana
Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase
by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares
of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their
respective written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and
charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed
as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a quasi-
judicial function through and E.O. and not through legislative enactment by Congress.
RULING:
No, because the President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department
under E.O. 292. In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora the Court affirmed that the
President's authority to carry out are organization in any branch or agency of the executive
department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of Section 31, Book III, E.O. 292(the
Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. "The law grants the President this power in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To
remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After
all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly,
the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative
authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.The President's power to reorganize the
Office of the President under Section31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power
to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO292, the President can
reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292,
the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within
the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of
the President to Departments or agencies, and vice versa. The distinction between the allowable
organizational actions under Section31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is
crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity
of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations
prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a
Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I,
respectively, and was placed directly "under the Office of the President.
e. DENR v DENR Region 12 Employees

(G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003)
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Regional Executive Director of DENR for Region 12, Israel Gaddi, issued a Memorandum,
(pursuant to DENR Admin Order 99-14) directing immediate transfer of the DENR [Region] 12 offices
from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato Respondents filed with RTC a petition for nullity of
orders with prayer for preliminary injunction. TC issued TRO enjoining petitioner from implementing
assailed Memorandum Petitioner filed MR with motion to dismiss raising the ff grounds:
1. power to transfer the Regional Office of the DENR is executive in nature

2. The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on EO 429, which reorganized
Region 12
3. The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the SC in the case of Chiongbian vs.
Orbos (1995)
4. Since the power to reorganize the Administrative Regions is executive in nature citing
Chiongbian, the SC has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
Subsequently, TC rendered judgment ordering that the assailed Memorandum be not

enforced for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, TC
de ed ha he ea f he DENR Regi al Office be e ed C aba Ci . Pe i i e MR
was denied. Appeal before the CA was dismissed outright on procedural grounds. Another MR was
denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
RULING:
YES. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which recognizes the establishment of
a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article
VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize
the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a
particular executive department. .In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the
DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal,
South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed
to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
f. CITY OF ILIGAN v DIRECTOR OF LANDS

(G.R. No. L-30852, February 26, 1988)
Gancayco, J.
FACTS:
President issued Proclamation 335, withdrawing certain parcels of public land in Iligan from
ale e leme a d e e i g ch f he e f NPC (Na l P e C a i ). B i e f aid
clama i , NPC c c ed a fe ili e la amed Ma ia C i i a La e , NPC ld he fe ili e
la Ma cel Ti e a d R bbe C i h all he machi e ie , igh f cc a c , a d e f la d
and then covenanted to collaborate with DANR in facilitating sale and right to lease for at least 25
years, the lands where plant is erected. Proclamation 20 and 198 were issued. Proc. 20 excluding
f m eai f P c. 335 ce ai a ea cc ied b Ma. C i i a a d Em l ee H i ga d
declaring such lands for open disposition. Proc. 198 changing the technical description of said areas
(6 l ). The Ma cel S eel a d Ma. C i i a filed a M c. Sale A lica i i h he B ea f
La d Ma cel Ti e a d Ma. C i i a a e i e c ai . P cha e a Ma cel Ti e b
a he i e c . Ma cel S eel e a ed aid la . I he ice f ale i ed i Ma ila, Di ec
f La d ad i ed ha B ea ill ell i a a c i aid la d f Ma cel S eel. P e ide he
issued Proc. 469 excluding from the reservation made in favor to NPC certain lands in Iligan (Lot
1, 1-a, 3, and 4) and DONATING said lands in favor of Iligan City. Mayor of Iligan wrote to Director of
Lands informing him that City is the owner of said lands and foreshores in auction. But no action was
taken on said request for exclusion and so City filed a complaint for injunction in CFI against Director.
Injunction temporarily issued. Pending case, President Marcos issued Proc. 94 excluding from the
donation in Proc. 469 certain lands (Lot 1-a, 2-a, and 3) and declaring same for open disposition. CFI
dismissed the complaint of City and dissolved injunction. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not President has the authority to grant a portion of public domain to any
government like the City of Iligan.
RULING:
YES
Section 60 of Public Land Act states that tracts of land can be disposed of by grant, donation
or transfer made to a province, municipality, branch, or subdivision of government for
purposes conducive to public interest.
Who has authority to donate? Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources through
Director of Lands (Sec 60)
Can President donate instead of Secretary and Director? YES
Director has direct executive control of lands (e.g. lease, sale, concession, disposition of land
of public domain)
Director SUBJECT to control of Secretary of Agriculture.
Sec e a c l i SUBJECT c l f PRESIDENT
Under Art VII Sec 17: President shall control ALL executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
Hence, President has the same authority to dispose of portions of public domain as his
subordinates.
Such authority to dispose is also granted to the President under Section 69 of the Public Land
Act.
Since, President has the authority to donate lands of public domain for residential,
commercial, & industrial purposes. Questioned Proclamation 469 is VALID and binding:
Ownership of lands now vested in City of Iligan.
Mayor of City upon proclamation immediately had the lots surveyed and entered into
negotiation with National Investment and Development Corp. and those interested in
developing the Coco-Chemical Plant in order to accelerate economic expansion in the City.
Proclamation 94 is NULL and VOID as said parcels had been segregated and had become
property of Iligan.
Decision of CFI REVERSED.

g. Araneta v Gatmaitan
(G.R. Nos. L-8895 L-9191, April 30, 1957)
Felix, J.
FACTS:
San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, a
part of the National waters of the Philippines with an extension of about 250 square miles and an
average depth of approximately 6 fathoms, is considered as the most important fishing area in the
Pacific side of the Bicol region. The operation of trawls in the area was said to have depleted the
marine resources in the area. On April 4, 1954, the President issued Executive Order 22, prohibiting
the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response
for the general clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay. A
group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order Nos. 22, 60 and 80 were valid.
RULING:
Yes. Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or
fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and; b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to
provide regulations and restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Fisheries Act is complete in
itself, leaving to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and
regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. It also appears from the exhibits on record in
these cases that fishing with trawls causes "a wanton destruction of the mother shrimps laying their
eggs and the millions of eggs laid and the inevitable extermination of the shrimps specie" , and that,
"the trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep into the ocean bed. They
destroy the fish food which lies below the ocean floor. Their daytime catches net millions of shrimps
scooped up from the mud. In their nets they bring up the life of the sea".
Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of
Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all
waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the
welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern (Sec. 63,
R.A.C.) which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.
h. Lacson-Magallanes Company, Inc. v. Pano

(G.R. No. L-27811. November 17, 1967)
Sanchez, J.
FACTS:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture
land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao. On January 9, 1953,
Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the above public land
to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc., and, on April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was
officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land. On January 26,
1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the
released area. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc., in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire
released area. This was protested by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment
that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. The Director
of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision giving due course to the
application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his companions.
A move to reconsider failed. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on appeal
by Jose Paño for himself and his companions held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed
the same. The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines, and, the Executive Secretary
Juan Pajo, "by authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the
Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared
that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend
on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;"
and (2) directed that the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map1749, Project No. 27,
of Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of
convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to
reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision
to the Court of First Instance praying that judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect; and (2) that the decision of
the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUES:
1. Whether decisions of the Director of Lands "as to questions of facts shall be conclusive when
approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is controlling not only upon courts
but also upon the President.
2. Whether the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power (It is
argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter)
3. Whether one department head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot
intrude into the zone of action allocated to another department secretary
RULING:
1. NO. The President can rule on the correctness of a decision of a department Secretary. The
President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive
departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint
them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their
acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his
department secretaries. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President
reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control simply
means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter."
2. NO. the Chief Executive may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does
not command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an
auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under
our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
3. NO. The Executive Secretary acts "by authority of the President," his decision is that of the
President's. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of
the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive
Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive," that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully
assailed.
i. Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board

(G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015)
Sereno, C.J.
FACTS:
The Toll Regulatory Board was created under Presidential Decree No. 1112 in order to
regulate the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities. Presidential Decree No. 1113 was
also enacted granting Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now Philippine
National Construction Company or PNCC) the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and
maintain toll facilities at the North and South Luzon Expressways for a period of thirty years starting
May 1, 1977. Presidential Decree no. 1894 amended 1113, granting PNCC the right, privilege and
authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities not only in the North and South Luzon
Expressways but also Metro Manila Expressway, provided that the franchise granted a thirty-year
term to PNCC from the date of completion of the project.
PNCC and CITRA, an Indonesian company, passed a Joint Investment Proposal of the
financing, design and construction of the Metro Manila Skyways. It was approved by the TRB. PNCC
and CITRA entered into a Business and Joint Venture Agreement. They established CITRA Metro
Manila Tollways Corporation. In the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA), the
construction and design of the roads were primary and exclusive privilege of the CMMTC while
maintenance and operation was given to PNCC Skyway Corporation.
In 1997, an Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operations Agreement was issued by TRB, PNCC
and CITRA and replaced PSC with Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) for the operation and
maintenance of the Metro Manila Skyway.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners have standing;
2. Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility;
3. Whether the assumption of toll operations by SOMCO is disadvantageous to the government.
RULING:
1. Petitioner filed as a legislator in her capacity as party-list representative of Akbayan. Hence,
petitioners do not have the requisite legal standing, and as such, she was only allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action when it infringes on their prerogatives as members of
Congress.
2. The Court has ruled that first, it is clear that Congress does not have the sole authority to grant
franchises for the operation of public utilities. Congress is not required before each and every public
utility may operate. Unless there is a law that specifically requires a franchise for the operation of a
public utility, particular agencies in the executive branch may issue authorizations and licenses for
the operation of certain classes of public utilities. The authority to operate a public utility can be
granted by administrative agencies when authorized by law.
3. The allegations of petitioners are nothing more than speculations, apprehensions, and
suppositions. It is understandable that SOMCO does not yet have a proven track record in toll
operations, considering that it was only the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation
Agreement (ASTOA) and the Memorandum of Agreement that gave birth to it.
j. Angangco v. Castillo
(G.R. No. L-17169, November 30, 1963)
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
FACTS:
Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co. wrote a letter to the Secretary of Commerce
and Industry requesting a special permit to withdraw certain items from the customs house which
were imported without dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange. These were Pepsi-Cola
concentrates which were not covered by any Central Bank release certificate. The company also sent
a letter to the Secretary of Finance who was also Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank. After failure to secure the permit from the Central Bank, its counsels approached Collector of
Customs Angangco to secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the counsel to
secure the release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a
letter to Angangco that stated that his office had no objection to the release of the concentrates but
could not take action on the request as it was not in their jurisdiction. Angangco telephoned the
Secretary of Finance who expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate.
Collector Angangco finally released the concentrates. When Commissioner of Customs learned of
the release he filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Angangco. For three
years Angangco had been discharging the duties of his office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by
authority of the President, rendered his judgment against the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to remove officials under the classified civil
service.
RULING:
The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees in the classified
civil service.
It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of
petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having
been deprived of the procedure laid down in connection with the investigation and disposition of his
case, it may be said that he has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.
The Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees
but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them
that inherent power cannot be exercised.
This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by
law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of
department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose
appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure
for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act
of 1959.
It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct action on the
administrative case of an employee under classified service even with the authority of the President
without submitting the case to the Commissioner of Civil Service
k. Hutchison Ports Philippines Limitedv.Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority

(G.R. No. 131367, August 31, 2000)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:
The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SMBA) called for bidders for the development and
operation of a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, which declared
three pre-qualified bidders, which included the International Container Terminal Services, Inc.
(ICTSI), a consortium consisting of Royal Port Services, Inc. and HPC Hamburg PortConsulting
GMBH (or RPSI); and (3) Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (or HPPL) a corporation organized in
the British Virgin Islands, representing a consortium composed of HPPL, Guoco Holdings (Phils.),
Inc. and Unicol Management Services, Inc. After evaluation of the bids, and resolution of issues
c ce i g ICTSI alifica i , SMBA a a ded he jec HPPL. The a a d as protested to
by ICTSI with the President, which later on prompted the President to direct SMBA to conduct a re-
bidding, which led HPPL to file an injunction against the re-bidding, arguing that there was already a
perfected contract since it was the winning bidder in the first bidding. During the pendency of the
case, a re-bidding was ultimately conducted where ICTSI was declared as the winning bidder. In the
petition, aside from the legality of the re-biddi g, HPPL a di g file he ca e a e i ned
due to the lack of license to engage in business in the Philippines, thus this petition.
ISSUE: Whether participating in the bidding is a mere isolated transaction, or did it constitute
engaging in or transacting business in the Philippines such that HPPL needed a license to do
business in the Philippines before it could come to Court.
RULING:
It was engaged in business in Philippines There is no general rule or governing principle
laid d a ha c i e "d i g "e gagi g i " " a acting" business in the Philippines.
Each case must be judged in the light of its peculiar circumstances. Thus, it has often been held that
a single act or transaction may be considered as "doing business" when a corporation performs acts
for which it was created or exercises some of the functions for which it was organized. The amount
or volume of the business is of no moment, for even a singular act cannot be merely incidental or
ca al if i i dica e he f eig c ai i e i d b i e . Participating in the bidding
ce c i e "d i g b i e " beca e i h he f eig c ai i e i e gage
i b i e he e. The biddi g f he c ce i c ac i b a e e ci e f he c ai
reason for creation or existence. Thus, it has been held that "a foreign company invited to bid for
IBRD and ADB international projects in the Philippines will be considered as doing business in the
Philippines for which a license is required." In this regard, it is the performance by a foreign
corporation of the acts for which it was created, regardless of volume of business, that determines
whether foreign corporation needs a license or not.
l. Pimentel v. Aguirre
(G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000)
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
On December 27, 1997, The President issued Administrative Order No 372 stating that all
government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned
and controlled corporations and local government units will identify and implement measures in Fiscal
Year 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services items.
This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to annul Section 2 of the
Administrative Order No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their
expenditures and enjoin the implementation of sec. 4 of the Order, withholding a portion of the internal
revenue allotments.
ISSUE: Whether Secs. 1 & 4 of AO 372 a e alid e e ci e f he P e ide e f ge e al

supervision over LGUs.
RULING:
Sec. 1 YES; Sec. 4 NO
The Court held that Sec. 1 of AO 372, being merely an advisory is well within the powers of
the President. It is not a mandatory imposition, and such directive cannot be characterized as an
exercise of the power of control.
Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by
way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with
national goals. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does
not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters,
provided that certain requisites are met:
(1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government;

(2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives
and the presidents of the various local leagues;
(3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance,
Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and
(4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
However, Sec. 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by
the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of a portion
f he LGU IRA clea l c a e e he C i i a d he la .
m. AMPATUAN V. HON. RONALDO PUNO

(G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
The day following the massacre of 57 men and women, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, placing the province of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and the city of
Cotabato under a state of emergency. She then directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
to undertake such measures to prevent and suppress all forms of lawlessness as may be provided
by law. Three days later, Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 273 (AO 273), transferring
supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President
to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Due to issues on terminology however,
AO 273-A a i ed, ame di g he e m a fe i g delega i g e i i i ead.
Datu Zaldy Ampatuan and other ARMM officials subsequently filed a petition for prohibition,
claimi g ha he af e aid i a ce e c ached ARMM l cal a m , a i g a ed he
DILG Secretary the power to exercise control over the ARMM, instead of mere administrative
e i i , hich i effec em e ed he DILG Sec e a ake e ARMM eai a d
ei e i egi al g e me e .
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the President issued
the Proclamation to restore peace and order in the places in concern, that the issuance was pursuant
he calli g e , a d ha he me el delega e h gh he AO he e i e e
the ARMM to the DILG Secretary as her alter ego.
In November 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre, PGMA issued Proclamation 1946,
which placed Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City under the state of emergency
(i.e., calling out the AFP and PNP). This was to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in the mentioned places.
Similarly, PGMA issued AO 273-A, hich delega ed he P e ide e i i e ARMM
to DILG Secretary.
Petitioners assailed the said presidential issuances on the ground that it encroached on the
ARMM a my pursuant to the Expanded ARMM Act and CONST., art. 10, sec. 16 and
that there was no factual basis on the declaration of the state of emergency.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the said presidential issuances violate the principle of local autonomy? NO
2. Whether or not PGMA invalidly exercised the emergency powers stated in CONST. art. 7,
sec. 18? NO
3. Whether or not PGMA had factual basis for her actions? YES
RULING:
1. No. The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law
enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the
Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice¬Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the
vacated post. The DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
2. No. The President did not proclaim a national emergency as contemplated in CONST. art. 6, sec.
23(2), only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. The calling out of the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests
in the President as stated in CONST. art. 7, sec. 18.
3. Yes. It is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for
calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. In IBP v. Zamora, SC held
that If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without
factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings
the burden of proof is with the petitioner asserting the lack of basis on the part of the president.
Both the military and police had to prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory actions from
the Mangudadatus, as they have ~1,800 personnel with ~200 firearms. On the other hand, the
Ampatuans have ~2,400 personnel with ~2,000 firearms. Likewise, intelligence reports showed the
potential involvement of rebel armed groups (RAGs) both the Ampatuans and Mangudadatus are
supported by different RAGs. The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued
Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and
hostilities in the places mentioned. PNoy even, has not withdrawn the declaration of state of
emergency.
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

4. MILITARY POWERS
a. GUDANI V SENGA
(G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006)
TINGA, J.
FACTS:
Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear
at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled on 28
Sept. 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections
emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of
an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
and then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano.
At the time of the 2004 elections, Petitioner Gen. Gudani had been designated as
commander, and co-petitioner Col. Balutan a member, of Joint Task Force Ranao by the AFP
Southern Command. Joint Task Force Ranao was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order
during the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. Gen. Gudani, Col.
Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga were among the several AFP
officers who received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the 28 Sept. 2005 hearing.
On 26 Sept. 2005, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum directing
Gudani and Balutan to attend the 28 Sept. 2005 meeting. Gen. Senga wrote a letter to Sen. Biazon,
requesting the postponement of the hearing scheduled for the following day. Then, on the evening of
27 Sept. 2005, a message was transmitted to the PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga
PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE
HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL.
The next day, before the hearing, Ge . Se ga called C mm d e T le i he la e

cell phone and asked to talk to Gen. Gudani, but Gen. Gudani refused. In response, Gen. Senga
instructed Commodore Tolentino to inform Gen. Gudani that it was an order, yet Gen. Gudani still
refused to ake Ge . Se ga call.
A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of
Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee
in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval. The two were held to
have disobeyed a legal order, in violation of Articles of War 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior
Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power
as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance
before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law
to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders
have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In
doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that
the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to
prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on
he Chief E ec i e e a c mma de -in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of
the armed force . The P e ide e ga i e a c mma de -in-chief are not hampered by the
same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legi la e f c i i he c d c f i i ie i aid f legi la i . I a m ch a i i ill-advised for
C ge i e fe e i h he P e ide e a c mma de -in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for
he P e ide d l i e fe e i h C g e igh c d c legi la i e i i ie . The im a e
did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential
prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right
to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with
the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless
obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
b. DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
(G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 and GO No.6 as to implement
it.
The reasons that the President stated for declaring such General Order to implement the
Presidential Proclamation were that over the past several months, elements in political opposition
have conspired with extreme left represented by NDF-CCP-NPA and military adventurists. This
presented a clear danger to the president as political opposition tried to oust her as president and
take over the government. On March 3, Presidential Proclamation 1017 was lifted by President
Arroyo. The Solicitor General defended the basis of President Arroyo for declaring PP 1017, was that
the intent of the Constitution was to give the President full discretionary powers in determining the
necessity to call out the AFP. Notwithstanding the SG c e i , he Magdal g i iga ed
the Oakwood mutiny and wearing or read bands on their left arms to show disgust.
Simultaneously, Oplan Hackle I (plans of bombings and attacks on the PMA alumni
homecoming in Baguio, where the President was invited) was discovered. The next morning, after
the discovery of the plan, a bomb was discovered in the campus. Also, information was intercepted
by PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao regarding PNP-SAF members that are planning to defect from the
Arroyo administration, along with Congressman Peping Cojuanco who planned out moves to bring
down said administration.
A large number of soldiers joined the rallies as critical mass and armed components to anti-
arroyo protests. Another factual basis after the issuance of the Presidential Proclamation and General
Order was the bombings of telephone communication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.
These events show a clear and present critical situation, leading the President to cancel all events
related to EDSA People Power I. Executive Secretary Mike Arroyo, declared that warrantless arrest
and takeover of facilities can be implemented. One of these warrantless arrests was Randy David
(Filipino journalist, UP professor), due to mistake of fact that he was a participant in the street rallies.
Also, Congressman Crispin Beltran (representative of Anakpawis party). The following facilities were
taken over: Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante (local news publications). This was done,
according to the PNP. to show a strong presence to tell media outlets not to connive or help-out rebels
to take down the government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Article 6 Section 23 was violated.
2. Whether PP 1017 is constitutional.
RULING:
1. The provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take
over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to
a b al he a i al eme ge c . If he i e i f he F ame f C i i a
i hh ld f m he P e ide he a h i decla e a a e f a i al eme ge c a
Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence
of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from
Congress.
The said powers of the President is additionally recognized during the state of national
emergency under PP 1017, ca call he mili a l e f ce bedie ce all he la a d
all dec ee b al ac a he i i f Sec i 17 hich ead :
In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such
as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion.
The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency, but her
exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority
from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
There must be a war or other emergency.

The delegation must be for a limited period only.
The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Thus, the warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
2. PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017
commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated
by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Pe i i e c e d ha PP 1017 i id i face beca e f i e b ead h. The claim

that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III
f he C i i a d e a chilli g effec he ci i e .
O e b ead h d c i e i a a al ical l de el ed f e i g hei face a e i

free speech cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or
even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence.
The said powers of the President is recognized in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
wherein it is stated that the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Calling-out powers)
The Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
he e e i bec me ece a , he P e ide ma call he a med f ce e e e
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
I he e e ca e i i a ed ha , i g he Office a i ellige ce e k, he i in
the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.
However, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a
greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution,
the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
Th acc di g J ice Me d a, he PP 1017 i me el a e e ci e f P e ide A

calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a e e ce f g ad a ed e .
The said powers of the President is also recognized in Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution wherein it is stated that The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Take Care powers). As
the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that
all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. In the exercise of such
function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-
in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the
Department of Interior and Local Government.
P e ide A di a ce e i limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue

decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. She can only order the
military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
A he a h i m lga e dec ee . Legi la i e e i ec lia l i hi he i ce f he
Legi la e. Sec i 1, A icle VI ca eg icall a e ha [ ]he legislative power shall be vested in
he C g e f he Phili i e hich hall c i f a Se a e a d a H e f Re e e a i e . T
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
A e e ci e of legislative power by issuing decrees.
c. AMPATUAN V PUNO
(G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)
ABAD, J.
FACTS:
The day after the infamous Ampatuan massacre happened, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City under a state of emergency. She then directed the AFP and PNP to undertake
measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence in the said areas. Three days later, President Arroyo issued Administrative Order
273 hich a fe he e i i f he ARMM f m he Office f he P e ide he De a me
f I ei a d L cal G e me (DILG). The d a fe a he cha ged
delega e/delega i g beca e f me i e ai ed e he e mi l g . I a ame ded b AO
273-A.
Petitioner contends that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she
ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But
such deployment is NOT by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section
23(2), Article VI of the Constitution. They also claim that the issuance of the AO273/AO273-A
encroached the autonomy of ARMM as a local government unit. Thus the petition of prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the
Expanded ARMM Organic Act
2. Whether President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP
and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City
RULING:
1. No. the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law
enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity
in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong,
assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found
in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker
of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor.
In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
2. No. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in
the President a stated in Section 18 of Article 7. Therefore, she did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.
d. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES V ZAMORA

(G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000)
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Because of the growing number of criminal incidents around Metro Manila, then President
Estrada gave a verbal directive to the PNP and Marines to conduct a joint visibility patrols to prevent
and suppress crimes. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of
Staff of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and
im leme he aid de . A Le e f I c i 02/2000 ( LOI ) hich de ailed he ma e f he
TASK FORCE TULUNGAN a elea ed b PNP.
The IBP questioned the necessity of calling for the Marines and filed petition to annul LOI
02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Marines, unconstitutional on the ground that: (a) There
was no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify such deployment (violates Art
2, Sec. 3 of the constitution), (b) Deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in a
civilian function of government (violates Art. 16, Sec. 5) (c)Deployment creates a dangerous tendency
to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the government. Unwittingly making the military
more powerful than hat it should be under the constitution Prescinding from its argument that no
emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment
f he Ma i e , he ci ilia a k f la e f ceme i mili a i ed i i la i f Sec i 3, A icle II.
ISSUE: Whether the deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor
does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.
RULING:
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the
i i f he LOI i elf, hich fficie l ide he me e a d b d f he Ma i e authority.
It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times,
the real authority belonging to the PNP.
In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines
joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on
police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.
Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually
appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these
operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with
the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there
can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Additionally, the Philippine experience reveals
that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution
f ce ai adi i all ci il f c i (e.g. elec i , Red C , di a e e e, e c.)
e. LACSON V PEREZ
(G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001)
MELO, J.
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed
with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and
attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National
Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were
thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion,"
which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were
filed before the Court
ISSUE: Whe he he C ca i iei fac al ba i f a e f ebelli .
RULING:
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part,
argues that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers,
being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to
"determine or interpret" what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion
cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.
The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot
be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment
might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might
decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to
gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of
the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary
in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise
of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.
DISMISSED.
f. GUAZON V DE VILLA
(G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were
conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific
target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the
policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents
were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents
were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their
briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're homes were
ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and
valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings,
spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture
to extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all
lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were
intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said
drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for
the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such
event.
ISSUE: Whether or not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.
RULING:
It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used
or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties,
it appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any
houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the
squatters and low-income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by
a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the
circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts, no permanent relief can be given.
In the meantime, where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court
temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to
the RTC of Manila.
g. SANLAKAS V REYES
(G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004)
TINGA, J.
FACTS:
AFP-- demanded the resignation of the President and other executive officials because of
the worsening corruption. Due to this, President issued Proclamation 427 and General Order 4 both
of which declared a state of rebellion and calling the AFP to suppress such rebellion. Petitioners
assert that the issuance of the respective Proclamation order 427 and General order 4 is
unconstitutional claimed:
Section 18 Article 8 of the constitution in so far that it does not authorize a declaration of a
state of rebellion.
Also they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as the congress has not delegated any power to the president.
Also, it was an unwarranted and abuse of power to exercise martial law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper.
RULING:
Acc di g A icle 18 A icle 8 f he c i i he P e ide i g a ed a e e ce f
g ad a ed e : calli g e, e e d a d he i ilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and power to declare martial law. The constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions namely
1) an actual invasion or rebellion and that 2) public safety requires the exercise of such power. The
Article not only vests to the president the commander-in-chief power but also with executive powers.
The Commander-in-chief Powers are broad enough when taken together with the provision on
e ec i e e . Th , he e ide a h i decla e a a e f ebelli i g in the main
from her powers as chief executive and draws strength from the commander-in-chief powers.
The Solicitor-general points out Sec. 4 Chapter 2 Book III (Office of the President) of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987. This provision states tha he e ide clama i gi e
notice to the nation that such state exists and that the AFP may be called upon to prevent or suppress
it. Mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.
These are purely executive powers vested on the President by Sec. 1 and 18 Art. 8 as opposed to
the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2) of Article 6.
h. KULAYAN V TAN
(G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012)
SERENO, J.
FACTS:
Three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped
by three armed men who were confirmed as members of the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG). Due to the
said kidnapping of Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni and Marie Jean Lacaba, who were all members of
the ICRC, the Sulu Crisis Management, headed by Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan, subsequently
c ea ed he Ci ilia Eme ge c F ce . Emb died i he Mem a d m f U de a di g a e he
intents and purposes of the said creation which was for the main purpose of the prevailing situation
i S l a ell a he illi g e f he ci ilia e ffe hei e ice e c e he
h age .
Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government,
confirmed that the government troops have already cornered the said military group but was forced
to pull back due to the threat of the ASG of beheading one of its hostages. This instance triggered
Gov. Tan to issue Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 declaring a state of emergency in the province,
d e he e i ac f kid a i g f he ASG a d he eed f he ca i g f eme ge c
measures. The Proclamation included the setting up of checkpoints and chokepoints, general
searches and seizures and other public safety measures.
Due to the implementation of the said Proclamation, several alleged ASG supporters were
held under the custody of the local government; hence this petition filed by respondents Jamar
Kulayan, Temogen Tulawie, Hadji Mohammand Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi and SPO1 Sattal H.
Jadjuli.
Petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian
armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private
army.
ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President.
RULING:
No. It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and
that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution
speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollary, it is only the
President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section
23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under
Section 7, Article VII thereof.
Additionally, Section 24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution prohibits private armies and other
a med g . Sec i 21 f A icle XI a e ha , The e e a i f peace and order within the
regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions
shall be the responsibili f he Na i al G e me .
Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not
authorize the organization of private armed groups similar to the CEF (Civilian Emergency Force)
convened by the respondent Governor. Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the
armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his
authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and
his own Civilian Emergency Force.
i. RUFFY V. CHIEF OF STAFF

(G.R. No. L-533, AUGUST 20, 1956)
TUASON, J.
FACTS:
During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at
designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing
petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo
area". Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo
area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt.
Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army should
desist from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before them.
RULING:
No. The Court RULING that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members
of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws
even during an occupation. The constitutionality of the 93d Article of War is assailed. This article
ordains "that any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of was shall suffer
death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may direct." The act of unbecoming of an officer
and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War RULING petitioners liable to
military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more
eligible for the military court's jurisdiction. Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and
one of the authorities "for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the
constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation."
(Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a
portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits and is dismissed with costs.
j. KURODA V. JALANDONI
(G.R. No. L-2662. MARCH 26, 1949)
MORAN, C.J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission
of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes
Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not
a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 68 is valid and constitutional.
RULING:
Yes. The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power
as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs.
Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities
incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance
incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel and
defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their
attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S.,
1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of
war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military commission has
jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice or
military occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty
agreement. (Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association Journal
June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate

this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance
and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
k. OLGAUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-54558. MAY 22, 1987)
GANCAYCO, J.
FACTS:
In 1979, Olaguer and some others, all civilians, were detained by military personnel and
they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. They were charged conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion and other various crimes. On 1980, the petitioners went to the Supreme Court and filed the
instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are
open and functioning.
RULING:
No. Military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-
in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and
utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives. Following the principle of
separation of powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of the
Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws as when an individual should be
considered to have violated the law is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be
the function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil
courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did
during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction
over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts.
To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to due process of the civilian
concerned.
l. QUILOÑA V. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL

(G.R. No. 96607, MARCH 4, 1992)
PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner, a policeman assigned at the Western Police District (WPD), was charged
before respondent General Court Martial with the crime of murder on two (2) counts, under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. The case is entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Patrolman Oscar
Quiloña."
On 14 December 1990, petitioner, through counsel, wrote a letter to President Corazon C.

Aquino, expressing his desire to be tried by a civilian court and sought a waiver of military jurisdiction,
for the reason, among others, that the "enactment of the Philippine National Police Law creates his
honest belief that he should now be under the actual and real jurisdiction of a civilian court."
Although set for oral argument on 3 January 1991, respondent court decided to have the
motion argued on the day it was filed 28 December 1990. And after a ten-minute closed-door
deliberation among the members of respondent court martial, it resumed session where it denied the
petitioner's "MOTION FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT MARTIAL TO INHIBIT ITSELF FROM
PURSUING THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED AND TO HAVE HIS CASE INVESTIGATED
BY THE CIVILIAN PROSECUTOR OR AT LEAST TRIED BY A CIVILIAN COURT.
ISSUE: Whether or not member of the Philippine National Police are within the jurisdiction of a military
court?
RULING:
The Court RULING that pursuant to R.A. 6975 which states that "SEC. 46. Jurisdiction in
Criminal Cases.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members
shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided, That the courts-martial
appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have
already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant
to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as, the Articles of War, as amended by Executive
Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, that criminal
cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this it
shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge.
The statute clearly provides for the jurisdiction of regular courts over PNP members. Even
if the statute is not yet effective on the day the petition was arraigned, it is presumed that the court
had knowledge of the statute which was signed by the President and had been submitted for general
circulation before the petition took place.
m. NAVALES V. GENERAL ABAYA

(G.R. 162318, OCTOBER 25, 2004)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted men,
mostly from the elite units of the AFP the Philippine Army's Scout Rangers and the Philippine
Navy's Special Warfare Group (SWAG) quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati
City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood).
They planted explosives around the building and in its vicinity. Snipers were posted at the Oakwood
roof deck. They claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the administration
of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Around 9:00 a.m., Pres. Arroyo gave the soldiers until 5:00
p.m. to give up their positions peacefully and return to barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the
existence of a "state of rebellion" and issued an order to use reasonable force in putting down the
rebellion. An agreement was forged between the two groups at 9:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Pres.
Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood was over. The soldiers agreed to return to
barracks and were out of the Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m. Under the Information dated August
1, 2003 filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in the "Oakwood Incident" with violation of Article 134-A
(coup d'etat) of the Revised Penal Code. Several of the accused filed for a motion praying that the
trial court would assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal in accordance
with Republic Act No. 7055. While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the
Resolution dated October 20, 2003 finding probable cause for coup d'etat against only 31, including
the petitioners, of the original 321 accused and dismissing the charges against the other 290 for
insufficiency of evidence. Petitioners herein where charged before the general martial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may assume jurisdiction.
RULING:
No. Charges filed under the RTC has been moot and academic with the resolution of the
DOJ. Petitioners now are facing charges on violation of Articles of War before the general court
martial.
In enacting R.A. 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to the civilian courts
jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within their jurisdiction, but did not divest
the military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated by the Articles of War. In view of the clear
mandate of R.A. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148) cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction
over those charged with violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64
(Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included
as service-connected offenses or crimes under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of
law, the military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses.
n. LANSANG V. GARCIA
(G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971)
CONCEPCION, C.J.
FACTS:
Two hand grenades caused 8 deaths and injury to people in the event of the Liberal Party
of the Philippines holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its
candidates in the 1971 general elections. President Marcos then announced the issuance of
Proclamation No. 889 which suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to suppress
insurrection and rebellion by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist groups. Presently, petitions for writs of habeas
corpus were filed, by a number of persons including the petitioner, who, having been arrested without
a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its validity, as
well as that of their detention.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is constitutional?
RULING:
Yes. The court abandoned the Barcelon and Montenergro doctrine that "the authority to
decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege or the writ of habeas
corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon
all other persons." It has been ruled that the Court had authority to and should inquire into the
existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the
writ. Proclamation to suspend must satisfy two (2) conditions for the valid exercise of the authority to
suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or
pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution "imminent danger thereof," and
(b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. In the petitions involved, some of it
became moot and academic for the fact that they have been already released. After deliberations,
including closed-door hearings, the Supreme Court upholds the suspension of the privilege of writ of
habeas corpus after finding satisfying evidences of a massive and systematic Communist-oriented
campaign to overthrow the government by force.
o. FORTUN V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
(G.R. NO. 190293, MARCH 20, 2012)
ABAD, J.
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family,
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In
response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946,
declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and
suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao. On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President's action. But, two days later or on
December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting
martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 1959 is constitutional.
RULING:
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem
in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has
initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its
own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that
the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than
initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such
review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress,
which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have
become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any
justiciable controversy.
p. LAGMAN, ET AL. V. MEDIALDEA, ET AL.

(G.R. NO. 231658, JULY 4, 2017)
DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The President submitted to Congress on May
25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of the proclamation. The Report pointed out that for
decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and
worsened with the passing of time. The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a
government operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the
Maute Group was conducted. The lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other criminals,
brought about undue constraints and difficulties to the military and government personnel, particularly
in the performance of their duties and functions, and untold hardships to the civilians. The Report
highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in
Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic
repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups. In addition to the Report,
representatives from the Executive Department, the military and police authorities conducted
briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives relative to the declaration of martial law.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 3888
expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be
satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate
declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same".
ISSUE: Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers,
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law.
RULING:
The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of
martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has called upon the military
to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must,
under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more difficult to restore
order and enforce the law. As such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the
Congress, and review by the Court.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies... The provision is put there, precisely, to
reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the principle of separation of powers.
During martial law, the President may have the powers of a commanding general in a theatre
of war. In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the President as the commanding general has
the authority to issue orders which have the effect of law but strictly in a theater of war, not in the
situation we had during the period of martial law. In a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function.
If in the actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the military commander
is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely because the civil courts
are closed in that area. But in the general area where the civil courts are open then in no case can
the military courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of war where
the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of
the situation in that specified critical area and it is not something that is brought about by a declaration
of the Commander-in-Chief.
A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police
power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police
e , i h he mili a a i a ce, e e blic afe a d i lace f g e me age cie
which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which remains under the
control of the State.
In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court stated that under a valid declaration of
martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without
judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press
censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x". Worthy to note, however, that the above-
cited acts that the President may perform do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights
of civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover,
the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such instance
where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to
those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties,
the Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a state of martial law.
q. LAGMAN, ET AL. V. PIMENTEL III

(G.R. NO. 235935, FEBRUARY 6, 2018)
GESMUNDO, J.
FACTS:
Congress approved the extension of martial law for one year pursuant to the letter, dated
December 8, 2017, of President Rodrigo R. Duterte.
The AFP strongly believes that on the basis of the foregoing assessment, the following are
cited as justification for the recommended extension, to wit: (1) The DAESH-Inspired DIWM groups
and allies continue to visibly offer armed resistance in other parts of Central, Western, and Eastern
Mindanao in spite of the neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of their forces in Marawi
City; (2) Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups remain capable of staging similar
atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao; (3) The CTs have been pursuing
and intensifying their political mobilization, terrorism against innocent civilians and private entities,
and guerilla warfare against the security sector, and public government infrastructures; (4) The need
to intensify the campaign against the CTs is necessary in order to defeat their strategy, stop their
extortion, defeat their armed component, and to stop their recruitment activities; and (5) The threats
being posed by the CTs, ASG, and the presence of remnants, protectors, supporters and
sympathizers of the DAESH/DIWM pose a clear and imminent danger to public safety and hinders
the speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi City, and the attainment
oflasting peace, stability, economic development and prosperity in Mindanao;
The 2nd extension of the implementation of Martial Law coupled with the continued
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao will significantly help not only
the AFP, but also the other stakeholders in quelling and putting an end to the on-going DAESH
inspired DIWM groups and CT-staged rebellion, and in restoring public order, safety, and stability in
Mindanao; and In seeking for another extension, the AFP is ready, willing and able to perform anew
its mandated task in the same manner that it had dutifully done so for the whole duration of Martial
law to date, without any report of human rights violation and/or incident of abuse of authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for extending the period of martial significantly
longer than the first.
RULING:
Indeed, with these factual bases, the military needs to intensify their efforts against these
terrorist groups through the continued imposition of martial law. Lifting martial law would remove the
leverage of the military against these terror groups during their on-going operations and would
weaken the rigorous campaign against them and allow them to continuously threaten the civilian
population. The rebellion has not been quelled. What the military has done is to resolve the Marawi
conflict but the rebellion continues to exist. Although, the conflict in Marawi has already been resolved
but still there are some elements there that continue to operate.
With respect to the extension of martial law, the last sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 18 clearly states that Congress is empowered to extend the duration of martial law. The
President's only role in such an extension is that he is the one who initiates it. Notably, even if the
President initiates the said extension, it is not immediately effective. It is only when Congress grants
the extension, after determining that invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it, that it
becomes operational. Evidently, the power of Congress is more potent than that of the President
when it comes to the extension of martial law. If Congress does not find any basis to grant the
requested extension, then it shall not exceed the sixty (60) day period of its initial declaration.
The framers of the Constitution gave Congress flexibility on the period of the declaration of
martial law. There is no specific period stated in the extension of the period of martial law because
the Constitution leaves it to Congress to decide the reasonable period for such an extension. The
rule-making power of Congress is a grant of full discretionary authority in the formulation, adoption
and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial
supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the
power as will constitute a denial of due process.
In the event that the President requires more time to quell a rebellion or invasion beyond
the granted period of extension, then his remedy is to ask for another extension from Congress. It
was emphasized therein that the final decision to extend the said declaration rests with Congress.
Whether the President states a specific period of extension or not, Congress ultimately decides on
the said period. Until it grants the extension, the sixty (60) day period of the initial declaration of martial
law prevails. In effect, by becoming the granting authority, Congress limits the President's power to
extend the period of martial law.
5. PARDON
a. People v Salle
(G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995)
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS:
The President granted pardon to Francisco Salle and Ricky Mengote, Gencilla and ten John
Does who were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the compound crime of
murder and destructive arson.However, Atty. La'o informed this Court that her verification disclosed
that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the motion
was merely a bureaucratic requirement necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison
(NBP) following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on 9 December 1993. He was
discharged from the NBP on 28 December 1993. She further informed the Court that appellant Ricky
Mengote was, on the same dates, granted a conditional pardon and released from confinement, and
that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She then prays that this Court grant
Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional
pardon. Until now, Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conditional pardon is valid.
RULING:
Pardon can be granted only whether full or conditional after conviction by final judgment. No
pardon may may be extended before a judgement of conviction becomes final, and it becomes final
when 1) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, 2) when the accused commences to serve the
sentences, 3) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing except where death penalty is
imposed by the trial court and 4) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to
appeal. The rational of final conviction is that to prevent the President from exercising executive power
in derogation of judicial power, thus appealed conviction must be brought to finality. Furthermore,
acceptance of pardon does not operate abandonment of appeal.
b. People v Bacang
(G.R. No. 116512, July 30, 1996)
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS:
Leopoldo Bacang, Francisco Palacio et al were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder. William Casido and Franklin Alcorin then filed a notice of appeal on December 8, 1993
which the court accepted. On January 11, 1996, the court received a motion to withdraw appeal of
Casido and Alcorin, it was filed on their own free will. Court required the counsel of Casido and Alcorin
to comment, it was only at that time when the court was informed that the latter were released on
conditional pardon. The Court then ordered to furnish them copies of the conditional pardon and
discharge order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conditional pardon is valid.
RULING:
No. The practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending appeals
appears to be a clear violation of the law because pardon can only be granted after conviction by final
judgment which is clearly stated in Section 19, Article VII of 1987 Constitution. No pardon, whether
full or conditional, may be extended before a judgement of conviction becomes final or during the
pendency of appeal from his conviction. The rule that acceptance of pardon does not operate
abandonment of appeal, fully binds pardon extended after January 31, 1995 which is during the
e de c f he acc ed a eal.
c. People v Casido
(G.R No. 116512, March. 7, 1997)
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS:
The Office of the Solicitor General alleged that the accused-appellants in this case, "in an
effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, applied for pardon before the Presidential
Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the
National Amnesty Commission (NAC)"; then contended that since amnesty, unlike pardon, may be
granted before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes even after conviction.
On August 11, 1992, a Presidential Committee for Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon is
constituted, with Secretary of Justice as Chairman, and the Secretary of National Defense and
Secretary of DILG as members. On December 9, 1992, President Aquino issued guidelines for the
committee. The Secretariat then process and evaluated the prisoners, they have an agreement to the
counsels of applicant Casido and file moti i hd a he a lica a eal. The c mmi ee failed
to verify the counsel of the accused and no intention to violate the Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution, and they were not also aware if Hino and Salle rulings. Applications of for amnesty were
favorably acted by National Amnesty Commission on February 22, 1996.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amnesty is valid.
RULING:
Yes. Amnesty carry with it the extinguishment of criminal liability and restoration of civil and
political rights and unlike pardon, it may be granted before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution. While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency
of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph
of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, was valid. This
Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted
on 2 June, 1994. The release then of accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin can
only be justified by the amnesty, but not by the "pardon."
d. People v. Nacional
(G.R No. 111294, September 7, 1995)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Walter Nacional, Absalon Millarnina, Efren Musa et al were charged with two counts of
murder attended by conspiracy and were convicted on those crimes. On March 1, 1994, Walter
Nacional, Zacarias Militante and Efren Musa, through counsel, moved to withdraw their appeal. They
claimed that the charges against them were political in nature "committed while they were members
of the New People's Army (NPA)." They informed the Court that as political prisoners, they applied
for and were recommended by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon for conditional pardon by
the President of the Philippines. The Court granted their motion on May 11, 1994.
On February 1, 1995, Rudy Luces, through counsel, also moved to withdraw his appeal for
becoming moot and academic. He claimed that he had been granted conditional pardon by the
President of the Philippines and had been released from prison per instruction. In its Comment, the
Office of the Solicitor General opined that Rudy Luces abandoned his appeal when he accepted the
pardon granted him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of pardon extinguish payment for civil indemnity.
RULING:
No. When pardon is granted, civil indemnity is not extinguished unless expressly remitted.
We rule that the grant of conditional pardon and the consequent dismissal of the appeals of Walter
Nacional, Zacarias Militante, Efren Musa and Rudy Luces does not exempt them from payment of
the civil indemnity. A conditional pardon, when granted, does not extinguish the civil liability arising
from the crime. The indemnity of P50,000.00 imposed by the trial court for each of the deaths of
Quirino and Joel Lagason must be shared solidarily by all the accused.
e. Monsanto v Factoran
(G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)
FERNAN, C.J.
FACTS:
Salvacion A. Monsanto, Assistant Treasurer of Calbayog City, and three others were
accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment. They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum
of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she
was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted
on December 21, 1984.|||
Monsanto requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since
the same was still vacant, she also asked for the back pay for the entire period of her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that Monsanto may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new
appointment. Deputy Secretary Factoran said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former
public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment
of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente
lite. Monsanto argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact
that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court.
There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city
treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited.
ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
RULING:
No. Pardon cannot restore forfeited public office. To insist on automatic reinstatement
because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would
be grossly untenable. Pardon cannot mask the acts of constituting the crime. The absolute
disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. Hence, the pardon granted to
Monsanto has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot
go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo
the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
f. Sabello v DECS
(G.R. No. 86787, December 26, 1989)
GANCAYCO, J.
FACTS:
Sabello is an elementary school Principal of Talisay and also the Assistant Principal of the
Talisay Barangay High School. The barangay high school was in deficit at that time due to the fact
that the students could hardly pay their tuition fees. Sabello was authorized by the the barrio council
to withdraw the P2000.00 allotted by the President in each barrio which was subsequently deposited
he Ci T ea e Office i he ame f Tali a Ba i High ch l. Sabell ge her with the
barrio council was then charged of the violation of R.A 3019 and sentenced to suffer one year
imprisonment and disqualification to hold public office. Sabello was then granted by the President an
absolute pardon. With this, he applied for the reinstatement on his office. However, he was reinstated
not to the former position but as a mere classroom teacher.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sabello merits reappointment to the position he held prior to the conviction.
RULING:
Affirmative. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code and that pardon frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Sabello was reinstated as
classroom teacher; justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position prior to
conviction but he was not entitled to payment of his back salaries because this is only afforded to
those illegally dismissed.
g. Torres v Sumulong
(G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987)
FELICIANO, J.
FACTS:
Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some
time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence
would expire on November 2, 2000.
1. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines
on condition that Sumulong would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
Sumulong accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
2. On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
3. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the Philippines
informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon
previously granted to petitioner.
4.. On September 8, 1986, the President canceled the conditional pardon of Torres.
5. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the
President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against Sumulong. He was accordingly arrested
and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may cancel the conditional pardon granted.
RULING:
Affirmative. The grant of pardon and determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional
pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The determination of a
branch of a condition of a purely pardon and the proper consequences of such breach may either be
a purely executive act not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 4 of the Revised Administrative
Code or it may be a judicial act consisting of a trial for and conviction of violation for conditional pardon
under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary in order that the convict may be recommended for violation of the
conditional pardon.
h. In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong

(G.R No. 135457, December 29, 1995)
HERMOSISIMA JR., J.
FACTS:
Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some
time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence
would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres
by the President of the Philippines on condition that Sumulong would "not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines." Sumulong accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President
the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On September 8, 1986, the President canceled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10,
1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of
Arrest and Recommitment against Sumulong. He was accordingly arrested and confined in
Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Now, Torres, apparently through his wife
and children, seeks anew relief from this court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of pardon is constitutional.
RULING:
Affirmative. A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power
or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter
subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted
to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's
consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the
supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee
complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. The Chief Executive, who in the first place was
the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corollary prerogative to
reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges
filed against him, warrants the same. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the
reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly
solely and absolutely loaded in his office.
i. People v. Patriarca
(G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2007)
BUENA, J.
FACTS:
On June 30, 1987 at about 10:00 PM in the Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon,
Phili i e a d i hi he j i dic i f hi H able C , Ne Pe le A m (NPA) membe
led by Jose Patriarca Jr. conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence and brought him to Sitio Abre,
Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO AREVALO thereby
inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice of
his legal heirs. They were charged with murder. Prior with this, Patriarca was also charged with
murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag. The RTC found him guilty and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Patriarca then filed his appeal and it was
accepted by the court.
Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty to
Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public
Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War,
and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably granted by the
National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amnesty is proper.
RULING:
Yes, it is proper. Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or
other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another,
who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and
puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.
The Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once
granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.
j. Vera v. People
(G.R. No. L-18184, January 31, 1963)
BARRERA, J.
FACTS:
Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido, Paulino Bayran, and 92
others, as John Does, were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo
Lozanes, alias Azarcon.
The Commission is convinced that the motive for the kidnapping and killing of Lt. Amadeo
Lozanes of the Hunters was the keen rivalry, between the Vera's Guerrilla Party and the Hunter's
ROTC Guerilla organizations. It is noteworthy that the Hunters were driven away by General Vera
from Pitogo in December, 1944, and that after said kidnapping and killing on February 13 and 14,
1945, Mayor Ramon Isaac of Unisan, was in turn kidnapped by the Hunters, Leopoldo Miciano,
secretary of Col. de Luna, of the Vera's Guerrilla Party, testified that General Vera told him of his
(Vera's) suspicion that Mayor Isaac was kidnapped by way of reprisal as he, Vera, had ordered the
liquidation of Lt. Lozañes
It is an established fact that when Lozañes was kidnapped, tortured, and later killed, he was
actually a lieutenant of the Hunter's ROTC Guerrilla organization then engaged in the resistance
movement, it may not be said with any amount of truth that the aforesaid killing was to further the
resistance movement at the time, as the defense intimates.
Vera contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8, dated
September 7, 1946, it is not necessary for them to admit the commission of the crime charged, citing
in support of their submission the cases of Barrioquinto, et al. vs. Fernandez, et al "in order to entitle
a person to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation (No. 8) of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary
that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or
offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within
the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation."
ISSUE: Whether or not persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having committed
the crime of which they were accused.
RULING:
Affirmative.The benefits of an amnesty proclamation, one must admit his guilt of the offense
covered by the proclamation. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance, which means that the leader admits the allegation against him, but disclaims liability
therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the
scope of the amnesty proclamation. Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 extends its provisions to "all persons
who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to
the enemy," and, hence, may not invoked, where the commission of a crime was not in furtherance
of the resistance movement, but was due to rivalry between two guerilla outfits.
6. DIPLOMATIC
a. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. EASTERN SEA TRADING

(G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961)
CONCEPCION, J.
FACTS:
Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion and
garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture
of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The
said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the
implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into
between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states, among others, that all
import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the
said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO
was implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of
Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate.
RULING:
No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at
least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of
treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme
of government than are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes
take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated
ag eeme c l .
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise
begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss
here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of
executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been
negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the
trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties,
and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements
heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on
shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them
were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in
acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others,
particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were
concluded independently of any legislation.
b. BAYAN V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. NO. 138570, OCTOBER 10, 2000)
BUENA, J.
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement
called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine
government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the
Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
hich ide ha f eig mili a ba e , , facili ie hall be all ed i he Phili i e
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other
c ac i g S a e.
ISSUE: Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.
RULING:
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held
that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of
the VFA.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must
be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution the provision in Article XVIII requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
Thi C i f he fi m ie ha he h a e ec g i ed a a ea mea ha he he
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting
state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be
sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms
of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a
treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
XI. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
1. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
a. General Principles
i. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-45081, JULY 15, 1936)
LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly
passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest
prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest
against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day,
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not
consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
di mi al f e de e . The Elec al C mmi i h e e de ied hi m i .
ISSUE: Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
RULING:
No, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.The Court DENIED the petition.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of
the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner
toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
ii. BONDOC V. PINEDA

(G.R. NO. 97710, SEPTEMBER 26, 1991)
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
In 1987 congressional election, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position
of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed as
winner, in turn, Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda,
Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision. Therein the decision it was held that Bondoc won over
Pineda. Congressman Camasura, HRET member and member of LDP, voted with the Supreme Court
Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
Congressman Camasura admitted to Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary

General, that he voted for Bondoc not only in the final tally but also in the election itself. Congressman
Cojuangco then expelled Congressman Camasura for betraying and disloyalty to LDP. Pineda also
moved for the withdrawal of Congressman Camasura from HRET and was later on was removed by
HRET chai ma .
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the act of HRET.
RULING:
Yes. What is assailed in the case at bar is the act of the House of Representatives of
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanito Camasura as a
member of the HRET. The said case is a judicial one and not encroaching upon the separation of
powers since what is in question is not the act of the congress but the act of HRET. The Supreme
Court has the jurisdiction over actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
iii. YNOT V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

(G.R. NO. 74457, MARCH 20, 1987)
CRUZ, J.
FACTS:
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate
to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for
the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of
executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the
confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner
appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not lower courts has jurisdiction on examining the constitutionality of a law.
RULING:
Yes. As the Constitution provides, the Court may "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide." In the case at bar the Court held that
hile l e c h ld b e e a bec mi g m de i e ami i g c i i al e i , he
are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review
by the highest tribunal.
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions.
The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see
how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once
and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
iv. GARCIA V. DRILON

(G.R. NO. 179267, JUNE 25, 2013)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, a R.A. 9262, e i led A Ac Defi i g
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
P e c ibi g Pe al ie The ef , a d f O he P e . She claimed be a ic im f h ical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth
by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The
trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why
the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
bmi ed he e i ed c mme a i ld be a a e ci e i f ili .
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
cla e , a d he alidi f he m dified TPO f bei g a a ed d c f a i alid la .
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for
prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality
was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the
validity of the law.
RULING:
Ye . Pe i i e c e i ha RTC ha limi ed a h i a d j i dic i , i ade a e
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality has no basis. He should have questioned the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 while the case is still in the RTC. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible time. Thus, if such question of constitutionality is not in the pleadings,
it may not be raised in the trial. Moreover, if it was not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered
in appeal.
v. MIRASOL V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. 128448, FEBRUARY 1, 2001)
QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses, sugarland owners and planters, entered into several crop loan financing
schemes secured by chattel and real estate mortgages with respondent Philippine National Bank
(PNB). In this scheme, PNB is authorized to negotiate and sell sugar produced and to apply the
ceed he a me f he Mi a l l a . P a P e ide ial Dec ee 579, Phili i e
Exchange Co. Inc. was authorized to purchase sugar allotted for export with PNB. Petitioners herein
requested for liquidation but was ignored by PNB. Petitioners filed a case before the trial court
averring that their obligations had been already paid by virtue of compensation with the unliquidated
amounts owed to them by PNB. Then the trial court, without notice to the Solicitor General, rendered
judgment holding PD No. 579 unconstitutional ordering private respondents to pay petitioners the
whole amount corresponding to the residue of the unliquidated actual cost price of sugar exported
and to pay moral damages and attorney's fees. Respondents appealed on the Court of Appeals which
reversed the findings of the constitutionality of PD No. 579 ruled by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Regional Trial Court has authority and jurisdiction to rule on PD No. 579
constitutionality.
RULING:
Yes. It has been held that Regional Trial Court have the authority and jurisdiction to rule on
the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree or executive order. However, the Solicitor
General must be notified any action assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order
clama i i a Sec i 3, R le 64 f he R le f C . Wi h he e i ed ice
the government is deprived of its day in court and it was improper for the trial court to pass upon the
constitutionalit f he e i ed PD.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there
must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the
question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of
the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been
raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
vi. CORONA V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 200242, JULY 17, 2012)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by the former Chief Justice of the Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing
the impeachment case initiated by the members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial
conducted by Senate of the Philippines. Petitioner was charged with culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption because it is provided for in Art. XI,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that "a public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office
and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law." Respondent failed to
disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required by the Constitution.
It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. The petition
argued that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent
Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause;
(2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a
"hodgepodge" of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being
all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of
alleged corruption and unexplained wealth and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of
petitioner's alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result
of an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree") considering that those documents submitted by the
prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426
(Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case becomes moot and academic.
RULING:
Yes.The present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is
DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.[18] In such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would... be entitled to and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy," was
foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the
greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more... by the comparative strength of parties,
than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt." Given their concededly political character, the
precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the
effective... functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance
in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects
of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, In the
meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than
the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and
without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar
Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of
the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from
among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.
b. Requisites for Judicial Review

i. Actual Case or Controversy
1. Guingona v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 125532, July 10, 1998)
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
The NBI conducted an investigation on the alleged participation and involvement of national
and local government officials in "jueteng" and other forms of illegal gambling. Potenciano Roque,
claiming to be an eyewitness to the networking of politicians and gambling lords, sought admission
into the Government's Witness Protection Security and Benefit Program (RA 6981). The Department
of Justice admitted Roque to the program. Thereafter, Roque executed a sworn statement before the
NBI, and on the basis thereof, the latter recommended the filing of the necessary charges. Private
respondent Pineda was included in the list of government officials who offered Roque money and
other valuable considerations, which he accepted, upon his agreement to cease conducting raids on
their respective gambling operations.
Thereafter, Pineda filed a Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano Roque to

the Witness Protection Program, but the Secretary denied the same. Thus, Pineda filed a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction with the respondent Court of Appeals. It disposed in favor of the government.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not this case presents an actual controversy.
RULING:
No. The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by petitioners do not warrant
the exercise of judicial power. The Constitution provides that judicial power "includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable." One of the requisites of judicial review is that there must be an actual case calling for
the exercise of judicial power; An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal
rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in
character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
The question must be ripe for adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In the case at bar,
it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of the
appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of Respondent Roque's testimony, inasmuch
as the assailed Decision does not appear to be in conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners
filed this suit out of fear that the assailed decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to
encourage witnesses to come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor
exemplified by this particular case. A mere apprehension, does not give rise to a justiciable
controversy.
2. John Hay People v. Lim

(G.R. No 119775, October 24, 2003)
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
The Baguio City government passed a number of resolutions in response to the actions taken
by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. BCDA entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement and Escrow Agreement with private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and
Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws
of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of
Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers.
They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full
development in accordance with the mandate of R.A. No. 7227.
Thus, the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then President Ramos declaring a portion of
Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within
the John Hay Special Economic Zone. A petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief
was filed challenging, in the main, its constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of the
Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between public respondent BCDA and
private respondents TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an actual case or controversy.
RULING:
The court is convinced that the present petition embodies crucial issues, therefore assumes
jurisdiction over the petition. More than the economic interests at stake, the development of Camp
John Hay as well as of the other base areas unquestionably has critical links to a host of
environmental and social concerns. Whatever use to which these lands will be devoted will set a
chain of events that can affect one way or another the social and economic way of life of the
communities where the bases are located, and ultimately the nation in general.
An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or

ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. The controversy needs to be definite and
concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their
adverse legal interests. There is in the present case a real clash of interests and rights between
petitioners and respondents arising from the issuance of a presidential proclamation that converts a
portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting that such proclamation
contains unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming otherwise. Other requisites of a judicial review
were complied.
3. Imbong v. Ochoa
(G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Despite the forgoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at
an uncontrollable pace. To rein in the problem, the RH law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially
the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family planning
me h d , a d e e ha i bjec i e ide f he e le igh e d c i e heal h be
achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide
information on the full range of modern family planning methods, supplies and services, and for
schools to provide reproductive health education.
After the President placed its imprimatur (signed) on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came to the Supreme Court; 14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention have been
filed, on the ground that the petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, the matter is of transcendental
importance.
The OSH a e ha he i e i li ical i a e i bei g a d c f a maj i a ia

dem c a ic ce . The OSG f he claimed ha he C ha a h i e ie cial
legi la i like he RH La . M e e , i c e d ha a a a lied challe ge , he e i i ca
prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and
that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that
RH law cannot be challe ged i face a i i a eech-regulating measure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
RULING:
The Court partially granted the Petition and declared RA 10354 as not unconstitutional except
some provisions.
In the case at bar, an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and
that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of
the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Moreover, under the RH Law, medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and
other benefits.
In view of the novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench
and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically
affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and
expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum
of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the
mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue.
4. Belgica v. Ochoa
(G.R No. 208566, November 11, 2013)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
First petition came from Samson Alcantara, President of Social Justice Society who filed a
petition for prohibition assailing that the pork barrel is unconstitutional and a writ of prohibition be
issued against respondents Franklin Drilon and Sonny Belmonte in their capacities as President of
the Senate and Speaker of the House. Another petition came from Greco Belgica and others filed an
urgent petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for an issuance of a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction to declare the Pork Barrel System which provided for the PDAF and Malampaya
Funds be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being an abuse of discretion. They also pray
for a TRO against cabinet secretaries Ochoa, de Leon, Abad, and to immediately cease any
expenditure under the funds. A third petition came from Pedrito Nepomuceno filed a petition seeking
that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional and a cease and desist order be issued against President
Noynoy Aquino and Secretary Abad from releasing the funds to Congress and instead allow their
release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the local development councils in
consultation with the respective departments.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy.
RULING:
Yes. Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy as is embodied
in Art VIII Sec 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights,
an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be ripe for
adjudication such as questions raised for constitutional scrutiny. A question is ripe when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that
something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself
as a result of the challenged action. Courts are without authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions. The Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.
5. Dumlao v. COMELEC
(G.R No. L-52245, January 22, 1980)
FACTS:
Patricio Dumlao is a former candidate for Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He filed his certificate
of candidacy for the January 30, 1980 elections. He questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
g a a ee f he C i i hich ide a ecial di alifica i ha A e i ed elec i e
provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he
is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term
of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office
f m hich he ha e i ed. A c lleag e al a ailed aid la . D mla a ail ha aid la i i la i e
of the equal protection clause and it was directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation. He sought to
prohibit COMELEC to implement the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual controversy.
RULING:
No, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition
seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. His is a question posed in
the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to
be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record. His case is clearly within the primary
jurisdiction of COMELEC as sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications if all members of
elective provincial officials as provided by section 2, Art. XII-C of the Constitution.
6. Province of Batangas v. Romulo

(G.R No. 152774, May 27, 2004)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
O Decembe 7, 1998, he P e ide E ada i ed EO N . 48 e abli hi g he P g am
f De l i Adj me a d E ali a i e ha ce he capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of
the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC. The Oversight Committee under
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-
99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the
Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion
of the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and submit the project proposals and
other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the
subsequent release of the corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and

void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001,
insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5 Billion for the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) &
imposed conditions for the release thereof. He invokes Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a
just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual controversy.
RULING:
Yes. The question of whether or not the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs of 1999,
2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code
of 1991 is undoubtedly a legal question, thus it is justiciable. There is also no need to remand the
case to the lower courts since the factual issues needed to answer the legal question are not disputed.
The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed
OCD Resolutions, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating of the principle of local autonomy.
7. Pormento v. Estrada
(G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010)
CORONA, C.J.
FACTS:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected as President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held
on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondent's candidacy and
led a petition for disqualification. However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).His motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied by the COMELEC en banc. Private respondent was not elected President the second time he
ran.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case for controversy.
RULING:
Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any re-election" will be premised
on a person's second--whether immediate or not--election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no
definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case
that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of
the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this
case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a
case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the
proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections; the same is no
longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not elected President
for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "re-election" will simply be hypothetical and
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
8. Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal

(G.R No. 132986, May 19, 2004)
FACTS:
Senator Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal an election protest Against Enrile
and other senators who won in the 1995 elections. Thereafter, petitioner filed his answer with counter-
protest. The SET conducted revision of the ballots in various provinces. Then, the SET directed the
parties to submit their evidence and memoranda.
On August 1997, the SET without resolving the election protest, held a press conference at
the SC Session Hall announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot
precincts. In the result, the name of petitioner dropped from number 11 to number 15.On September
of 1997, e i i e filed a m i e a ide he a ial e l i Pime el e a d c d c
another appreciation of ballots in the presence of all parties. He alleged that the partial results were
erroneous. In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET admitted there was an "oversight," hence,
the tally of votes for Paoay, Ilocos Norte should be made. Consequently, the 30,000 votes deducted
by the SET from those garnered by petitioner were "given back to him." But the SET denied the
motion on the ground that there was no sufficient basis to discard the partial tabulation. Petitioner
filed his motion for reconsideration but was denied by the SET in Resolution 98-02.Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not SET committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion.
RULING:
The case is moot and academic, because the process of how the SET arrived in the
determination of partials results was different to that of petitioner. The tenure of the contested
senatorial position subject of this petition expired as early as June 30, 1998. A case becomes moot
and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose
can be served in passing upon the merits. In Garcia vs. COMELEC, we held that "where the issues
have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution
of the same of no practical use or value."
9. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
(G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
FACTS:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan
(Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5
(GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring
down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the
same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David
proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is
the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups.
Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day,
Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest
issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because
of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that
the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has
no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is
an over breadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an over breadth because it encroaches upon
protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic
by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that
PP 1017 i i hi he e ide calli g e , ake ca e e a d ake e e.
ISSUE: hether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.
RULING:
The power of judicial review may be exercised only when the following requisites are present:
first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims
ce ible f j dicial e l i . I i defi i e a d c c e e, chi g he legal ela i f a ie
ha i g ad e e legal i e e ; a eal a d bstantial controversy admitting of specific relief. The
Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present
eii e e e de ed m a d academic b P e ide A i a ce f PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The C h ld ha P e ide A i a ce f PP 1021 did e de he e e

petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police
officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must
be e l ed i he e e eii .I m be e ed ha a c i ional act is not a law, it
confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation,
i e a i e.
The m a d academic i ci le i a magical f m la ha ca a ma icall di ade

the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there
is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
All he f eg i g e ce i a e e e he e a d j if he S eme C a m i f
jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 i la e he C i i . The e i e i ha he i e bei g ai ed affec he blic
i ee ,i l i g a he d he e le ba ic igh to freedom of expression, of assembly and of
the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in
the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional
g a a ee . A d la l , e de c e ed ac i a e ca able f e e i i . Ce ai l , he
petitions are subject to judicial review.
10. Lacson v. Perez

(G.R. No. 147780, May 20, 2001)
MELO, J.
FACTS:
Gloria Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a state of rebellion in the National Capital
Region. Such declaration was rooted on a the violent behavior of the angry mob who assaulted and
attempted to break into Malacanang using explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones, and
other deadly weapons. General Order No. 1 was subsequently issued to direct the AFP and the PNP
to prevent and suppress such rebellion which led to warrantless arrests against several alleged
leaders and promoters of such rebellion. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests and the declaration of
a state of rebellion, which gave a semblance of legality to arrests, the four consolidated petitions were
filed before the Court. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo ordered the lifting
of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been
rendered moot and academic.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case can be dismissed because it is moot and academic since the state
of rebellion has ceased to exist.
RULING:
No, according to Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez dissenting in this case, the lifting of the assailed
Proclamation and General Order by the President does not render moot and academic the very
serious and unprecedented constitutional issues at hand, considering their grave implications
involving the basic human rights and civil liberties of our people.
A resolution of these issues becomes all the more necessary since, as reported in the papers,
there are saturation drives being conducted by the police wherein individuals in Metro Manila are
picked up without warrants of arrest. Moreover, the acts sought to be declared illegal and
unconstitutional are capable of being repeated by the respondents. In Salva vs. Makalintal, this Court
held that "courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet
evading review' . . ."
11. Salonga v. Pano

(G.R. No. 59524, February 18, 1985)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition by Jovito Salonga invoking the his constitutional rights of life and liberty as
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to
warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, a victim of
the still unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical Center
while hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the
charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through
the issuance of an order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him. Only after four months of
detention was Salonga informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him. After the
preliminary investigation, he moved to dismiss the complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently,
the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information after finding that a prima
facie case had been established against all of the forty persons accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court can pursue a case against Salonga even if there is no prima
facie evidence against petitioner.
RULING:
No, but the Supreme Court denied the Petition of Salonga for being moot and academic,
because the Respondents Fiscal and Judge manifested that they will drop Salonga in the information
filed against his co-accused, as a co-conspirator. The respondent, Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the
motion of City Fiscal Segio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to
instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the
exclusion of Jovito Salonga as only of the accused in the information. Insofar as the absence of a
prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been
rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution. The Court has been constrained by
said actions.
12. ACOP v. GUINGONA

(G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002)
Austria Martinez, J.
FACTS:
In 1995, eleven suspected members of the gang, Kuratong Baleleng, were killed in an alleged
shootout with PNP. SPO2 delos Reyes, who was one of the officers assigned to investigate on the
incident, made a public disclosure of his findings that there was no shootout and the said members
of the gang were summarily executed. This was attested by SPO2 dela Cruz. The Senate conducted
hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding the subject incident and SPO2 delos Reyes
and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate hearings. Former Senator Roco recommended that
SPO2 del Re e a d SPO2 dela C be admi ed he g e me i e ec i g am.
Petitioners, who are among the PNP officers implicated in the alleged rubout, contend that under Sec.
3(d) for R.A. No. 6981, law enforcers are disqualified from being admitted into the witness protection
program even though they may be testifying against other law enforcers. According to the Solicitor
General, the petition has been rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2 delos
Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under the Program has already been terminated, as evidenced by the
letter of the Director of the Program addressed to OSG.
ISSUE: WON petition for judicial review should prosper despite having become moot
RULING:
Yes. Although the issue had become moot and academic, the Court find it necessary to
resolve the case for the future guidance of both bench and bar as to the applications of Sec. 3(d) and
4 of R.A. No. 6981, and for the proper disposition of the issue on whether the two policemen should
return the monetary benefits they may have received under the program.
13. SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004)
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
In 2003, three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP stormed into the Oakwood
Premiere apartments in Makati City armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives. They
demanded among other things, the resignation of Pres. Arroyo, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Chief of the PNP. The President then issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order 4, both
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Despite the
occupation ending on the same night, the President did not immediately lift the declaration and did
so after 5 days. In the interim, several petitions were filed challenging the petition of Proclamation No.
427 and General Order 4.
The Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the
declaration.
ISSUE: WON petition for judicial review should prosper despite having become moot
RULING:
Yes. The Court agrees with Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation has rendered
he ca e m . Ne e hele , c ill decide a e i , he i e m , if i i ca able f
e eii e e adi g e ie .
14. FUNA v. CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

(G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
In 2010, President Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman of the CSC. The Commission on
A i me c fi med D e a i me . The eaf e , P e . A i ed E ec i e O de N .
864 in which Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
following government owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs): a. GSIS, b. Philhealth, c. ECC and
d. HDMF. Petitioner Funa filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864.
H e e , d i g he e de c f he e i i , D e de ig a i c ld ha e e mi a ed bee
rendered invalid by the enactment of RA 10149, thus causing this petition and the main issue
tendered herein moot and academic.
ISSUE: WON petition for judicial review should prosper despite having become moot and academic
RULING:
Yes. The Court has exercised its power of judicial review in cases otherwise rendered moot
and academic by supervening events on the basis of certain recognized exceptions:
(1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

(2) the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;
(3) the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench,
the Bar, and the public; and
(4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The Court proceeded to resolve the substantive issue concerning the constitutionality of
D e e ffici de ig a i f he g ida ce f a d a e ai upon the future.
15. ARAULLO v. AQUINO III

(G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth
of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Fl e ci B ch Abad he came iha g am called he Di b eme Accele a i P g am
(DAP). The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables
the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
ea a ia i .
In 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then
Chief Justice Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators. Petitioner Araullo and several other concerned citizens
filed various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Sec. Abad manifested during his oral arguments that the DAP as a program had been
meanwhile discontinued. The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination of the DAP as
a program, and urged that its termination had already mooted the challenges to the DAP's
constitutionality.
ISSUE: WON the Court may exercise the power of judicial review.
RULING:
Yes. The first requisite in order for the Court to exercise the power of judicial review demands
that there be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power by the Court. An actual and
justiciable controversy exists in the cases at bar. The incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties
on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict
between legal rights. The issues being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness considering that the
challenged executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are averments by
the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of
public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on
account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe
for adjudication by the Court.
16. OPLE v. TORRES

(G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998)
Puno, J.
FACTS:
In 1996, Admi i a i e O de N 308, he i e k a Ad i f a Na i al
C m e i ed Ide ifica i Refe e ce S em a i ed b P e ide Fidel Ram . Se a Bla
Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He contends that the
order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to
legi la e; a d (2) ha i i de he ci i e igh i ac .
Respondents raise the issue of justiciability of the case at bar since the implementing rules of
A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
ISSUE: WON the Court may exercise the power of judicial review even though the implementing rules
of the order have yet to be promulgated.
RULING:
Yes. The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308
as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and
we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light,
the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its
result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
17. MONTESCLAROS v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang
Kaba aa a d limi ed i membe hi h a lea 15 b m e ha 21 ea f age.
Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC that SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002.
COMELEC Chairman Benipayo wrote to the House of Representatives and the Senate, inquiring on
the status of pending bills on SK and Barangay elections and expressed support to postpone the SK
election. On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill
4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age to at least 15 but
no more than 18 years of age. This was approved by the Senate and House of Representative on 11
March and 13 March 2002 respectively and signed by the President on 19 March 2002. The
petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary restraining order seeking the prevention of
postponement of the SK election and reduction of age requirement on 11 March 2002.
ISSUE: WON the proposed bill presents an actual justiciable controversy.
RULING:
No. This petition presents no actual justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any
i i f la ha i alleged be c i i al. Pe i i e a e prevent Congress from
enacting into law a proposed bill does not present actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject
to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally
enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no constitutional right or duty. At the time
petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law. After its passage, petitioners
failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional.
18. MARIANO v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995)
Puno, J.
FACTS:
At bench are petitions for prohibition and declaratory relief, assailing provisions of Republic
Act No. 7854 "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known
as the City of Makati" as unconstitutional. Mariano together with the other petitioners, assail as
unconstitutional Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati
by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the 'three consecutive term' limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of
the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress
within three (3) years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district, was not expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands
at only 450,000.
ISSUE: WON the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
RULING:
No. The petitions are based on the occurrence of contingent events, and are merely
h he ical, ch a Ma Bi a e-election which at some point may or may not happen. Thus,
said petition is not yet ripe to be an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question
of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.
19. FERNANDEZ v. TORRES

(G.R. No. 102940, November 6, 1992)
Feliciano, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek prohibit and restrain the enforcement and implementation of Item No. 1 of
DOLE Circular No. 01-91 entitled "Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures
for the Deployment of Performing Artists." Item No. 1 of the assailed DOLE Circular provides as
follows:
"1. No Filipino entertainer shall be deployed outside the Philippines except for legitimate
performing artists consisting of musicians, singers and members of dance troupes. In all cases, the
performing artists must have a track record of legitimate and reputable performance in the Philippines
for at least one year. In no case shall the performing artist be below 23 years old. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt performing artists from coverage hereof."
The labor representatives recommended that the minimum age for performing artists seeking
overseas deployment be raised from eighteen (18) years to twenty three (23) years. In the present
proceeding, petitioners allege themselves to be "qualified performing artists, mostly singers and
dancers," of ages eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years. Through counsel, they challenge the
constitutional validity of Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Solicitor General urges that the
petition at bar does not present a justiciable controversy.
ISSUE: WON the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
RULING:
No. The petitioners never sought exemption from the Secretary of Labor, and therefore cannot
claim that they have been denied of such. More so, petitioners cannot say that respondent have
continually threatened to deny all applications which may lead to their assumption that they will likely
be denied if they seek such exemption. There is no actual case or controversy for this petition is
grounded on mere hypothetical circumstances, which in fact, may or may not happen.
20. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995)
Feliciano, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free
Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates.
The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to
enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of
government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital
election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution
upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information
operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair,
impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: WON the petition presents an actual case or controversy.
RULING:
No for Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. Petitioner failed to allege any act by the COMELEC
to enforce said provision. Neither has it claimed that it sustained any actual injury.
Yes for Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772. Even though the petition may have been considered
a m a d academic COMELEC e l i cla if Ma 1995, he C ill deemed i
appropriate to pass upon this issue due to an invalid exercise of the power of eminent domain. The
Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
c m a ie d a e C melec ace am aki g f i a e e al e ih
payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity
for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers
were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized
by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing
of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
21. MACASIANO v. NATIONAL HOUSING INSTITUTE

(G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993)
Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279
or the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He alleges that said Sections "contain the seeds
of a ripening controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of
illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal
structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." Petitioner maintains that the
said provisions are unconstitutional because:
(a) They deprive the government, and more so, private property owners of their property
without due process of law and without compensation;
(b) They reward, instead of punish, what this Honorable Court has categorically declared as
unlawful acts;
(c) They violate the prohibition against legislation that takes away one's property to be given
to plain interlopers;
(d) They sweep over broadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the State; and
(e) They encroach upon the judicial power to execute its valid judgments and orders.
The Solicitor General contends: that there is no actual case or controversy with litigants
asserting adverse legal rights or interests; that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion; and
that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues
that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionally infirm.
ISSUE: WON the petition presents an actual case or controversy.
RULING:
No. The Court finds indubitable ground for the constitutional challenge, not even a necessity
to resolve it. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary, acts of political
departments are presumed to be valid based on the Doctrine of Separation of Powers.
22. BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. COLET

(G.R. No. 122241, July 30, 1996)
Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
The Congress enacted RA 8050, regulating the practice of optometry education, integrated
optometrists, among others. In Civil Case No. 95-74770, private respondents herein filed with the
RTC Manila a petition for declaratory relief, assailing the validity of the Act on the grounds that it
derogated the orderly procedure essential to the legislative process and vitiating legislative consent,
violates the due process clause of the Constitution; violates the principle against undue delegation of
legislative power; and in violation of the guarantee of freedom of speech and press. In his decision,
public respondent Judge Colet issued an order prohibiting the petitioners "from undertaking in any
form or manner, the enforcement or implementation of the Revised Optometry Law (RA 8050) or any
regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder."
The petitioners then filed this special civil action alleging that the respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
implementation of R.A. No. 8050, there being no actual case or controversy.
ISSUE: WON there is an actual case or controversy in Civil Case No. 95-74770.
RULING:
No. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet no
actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any
of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. This is plain
because Civil Case No. 95-74770 is for declaratory relief.
ii. Proper Party
1. SALONGA V. WARNER BARNES & CO., LTD.

(G.R. No. L-2246, JANUARY 31, 1951)
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the
defendant, as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York, to pay to the plaintiff the
sum of P717.82 with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until paid, and the costs.
The case was taken to this court because it involves only questions of law.
On August 28, 1946, Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York entered into a
contract with Tina J. Gamboa whereby said company insured one case of rayon yardage which said
Tina J. Gamboa shipped from San Francisco, California, on steamer Clovis Victory, to Manila,
Philippines and consigned to Jovito Salonga, plaintiff herein. According to the contract of insurance,
the insurance company undertook to pay to the sender or her consignee the damages that may be
caused to the goods shipped subject to the condition that the liability of the company will be limited
to the actual loss which is not to exceed the sum of P2,000. The ship arrived in Manila on September
10, 1946. Upon examination the surveyors found a shortage in the shipment in the amount of
P1,723.12. Plaintiff filed a claim for damages in the amount of P1,723.12 against the American
President Lines, agents of the ship Clovis Victory, demanding settlement, and when apparently no
action was taken on this claim, plaintiff demanded payment thereof from Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd.,
as agent of the insurance company in the Philippines, and this agent having refused to pay the claim.
In the meantime, the American President Lines, in a letter dated November 25, 1946, agreed
to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P476.17 and when this offer was rejected, the claim was finally
settled in the amount of P1,021.25. As a result, the ultimate liability of the defendant under the
insurance contract was reduced to P717.82 only. After trial, the court rendered judgment as stated in
the early part of this decision. The motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant having been
denied, the case was appealed to this court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is the proper party to raise the issue.
2. Whether or not petitioner may proceed with the case against Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd.
HELD:
1. Yes. Petitioner Jovito Salonga has suffered a direct injury in the case at bar, due to the
consignment deal with Tina Gamboa who shipped the rayon yardage from San Francisco.
2. No. It is claimed that a judgment, for or against an agent, in no way binds the real party in
interest. If the party sued upon is not the proper party, any decision that may be rendered
against him cannot be enforced or executed. Such would be the result of this case if it will be
allowed to proceed against the defendant, for even if a favorable judgment is obtained against
it, it cannot be enforced because the real party is not involved. The defendant cannot be made
to pay for something it is not responsible.
2. ADVOCATES OF TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. V. BANKO SENTRAL MONETARY BOARD

(G.R. No. 192986. JANUARY 15, 2013)
REYES, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners, claiming that they are raising issues of transcendental importance to the public,
filed directly with this Court this Petition for Certiorari seeking to declare that the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), replacing the Central Bank Monetary Board (CB-MB) has no
authority to continue enforcing Central Bank Circular No. 905, which "suspended" Act No. 2655, or
the Usury Law of 1916.
Petitioner "Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc." (AFTIL) is a non-profit, non-stock corporation
organized to engage in pro bono concerns and activities relating to money lending issues. It filed this
petition, joined by its founder and president, Eduardo B. Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen.
R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines, empowered the CB-MB to set
the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans and other credit operations,
within limits prescribed by the Usury Law. On March 17, 1980, the Usury Law was amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1684, giving the CB-MB authority to prescribe different maximum rates
of interest which may be imposed for a loan or renewal thereof or the forbearance of any money,
goods or credits, provided that the changes are effected gradually and announced in advance. In its
Resolution No. 2224 dated December 3, 1982, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905. Under its
General Provisions, it removed the ceilings on interest rates on loans or forbearance of any money,
goods or credits.
Petitioners contend that under Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended by P.D. No. 1684,
the CB-MB was authorized only to prescribe or set the maximum rates of interest for a loan or renewal
thereof. Thus, according to petitioners, CB Circular No. 905 is void because it violated Article 5 of the
New Civil Code. They further claim that just weeks after the issuance of CB Circular No. 905, the
benchmark 91-day Treasury bills (T-bills), then known as "Jobo" bills shot up to 40% per annum, as
a result. Finally, petitioners point out that R.A. No. 7653 did not re-enact a provision similar to Section
109 of R.A. No. 265, and therefore, BSP-MB has been stripped of the power either to prescribe the
maximum rates of interest or to suspend Act No. 2655 and continue enforcing CB Circular No. 905.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file the petition.
RULING:
No. The petitioners failed to show that they sustained any injury brought by CB Circular No.
905. Even as taxpayers, petitioners also do not claim that public funds were being misused in this
issue.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."
The real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, a party's standing is based on his own
right to the relief sought.
3. CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION V. ENERGY REGULATORY

COMMISSION
(G.R. No. 174697, JULY 8, 2010)
BRION, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to nullify Section 2.6 of the Distribution Services and Open
Access Rules (DSOAR), promulgated by respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC.
Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Associations, Inc. asserts that Section 2.6 of the
DSOAR, is unconstitutional and contrary to Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as "The Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)." Pursuant to its rule-making powers under the EPIRA,
the ERC promulgated the Magna Carta for Residential Electricity Consumers (Magna Carta), which
establishes residential consumers' rights to have access to electricity and electric service, subject to
the requirements set by local government units and distribution utilities (DUs). Article 14 of the Magna
Carta pertains to the rights of consumers to avail of extension lines or additional facilities. The same
article specifies that if a developer initially pays the cost of the extension lines but passes it to the
registered customer, the customer would still be entitled to recover the cost in the manner provided.
On January 18, 2006, the ERC modified this provision when it issued the DSOAR. Section 2.6.1
reiterates the old rule requiring consumers located beyond 30 meters from existing lines to advance
the costs of the requested lines and facilities. Section 2.6.2 likewise provides that the costs advanced
by consumers may be refunded at the rate of 25% of the annual gross distribution revenue derived
from all customers connected to the line extension. However, Section 2.6.2 amends Article 14 of the
Magna Carta by limiting the period for the refund to five years, whether or not the amount advanced
by the consumer is fully paid. The petitioner seeks to nullify Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, on the
following grounds: (1) it is unconstitutional since it is oppressive and it violates the due process and
equal protection clauses; (2) it contravenes the provisions of the EPIRA; and (3) it violates the
principle of unjust enrichment. Petitioner claims that Section 2.6 of the DSOAR is unconstitutional as
it is oppressive to the affected end-users who must advance the amount for the installation of
additional facilities.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners has legal standing to challenge a statute or government act.
RULING:
No. Petitioners do not question the DSOAR provision as a residential end-user and it cannot
do so because the challenged provision only refers to the rights and obligations of DUs and residential
end-users. Thus, neither the petitioner nor its members can claim any injury, as residential end-users,
arising from the challenged Section 2.6 of the DSOAR. Nor cite any benefit accruing to them as
residential end-users that would result from the invalidation of the assailed provision.
Legal standing refers to a party's personal and substantial interest in a case, arising from the
direct injury it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the challenged governmental action. The
term "interest" means a material interest, affected by the governmental action.
4. PEOPLE V. VERA
(G.R. No.L-45685, NOVEMBER 16, 1937)
LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the
writs of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may
review the actuations of the Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People
of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and
thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further
the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may
be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this
court in said case. Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine Islands and the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the
respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants in the criminal case.
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by Court of First Instance of Manila. Upon appeal, the
court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and
six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prison mayor,
but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Unjieng filed for reconsideration which was elevated
to the Supreme Court and the was remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was
convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office
(IPO). The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner
allowed the petition to be set for hearing.
The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under
probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere
in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein
that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because
Sec. 1 Art. 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its applicability
is not uniform throughout the islands. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards
and this also constitutes undue delegation of power because providing probation, in effect, is granting
freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the People of the Philippines is a proper party in the case.
RULING:
Yes. The People of the Philippines is a proper party, which has a substantial interest, as
represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of Manila. It is a rule that the person who
challenges the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest. Also, it has been
held that the State can validly challenge the validity of its own laws.
5. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ZAMORA

(G.R. No.141284, AUGUST 15, 2000)
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National
Police in visibility patrols around the metropolis for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 which detailed the manner
by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force
Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Invoking his powers
as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
The President also declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000
and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing
that the deployment of marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution because no emergency
situation would justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work;
hence, said deployment in derogation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not e i i e IBP ha he legal a di g challe ge he P e ide O de .
RULING:
No. Petitioner has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case, lacking
a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. IBP primarily anchors its standing on
its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration,
however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP
of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry.
6. DAVID V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
(G.R. No. 171396. MAY 3, 2006)
LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. In their
presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate
cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
i ge f he Ne Pe le A m (NPA), a d me membe f he li ical ii i a l
to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts
leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from
eii e c el . The S lici Ge e al a g ed ha he i e f he C i i i gi e f ll
discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He
emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While
he e lai ed ha i i e de a k a e he fac behi d he e i ed P clama i ,
however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation.
RULING:
Ye . Thi C ad ed he di ec i j e i j i dic i . I Pe le . Ve a, i held ha
he e h im g he alidi fa a em ha e a e al a d b a ial i e e i he
ca e ch ha he ha ai ed, ill ai di ec i j a a e l . The ef e, he court ruled
ha he e i i e ha e a l c a di, f he ffe ed di ec i j e li gf m illegal a e
a d la f l ea ch c mmi ed b lice eai e a PP 1017.
7. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. COMMISSION ON

HUMAN RIGHTS
(G.R. No.155336. NOVEMBER 25, 2004)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner Commission on Human Rights
Employees' Association (CHREA) challenging the Decision dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the Resolutions dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June
2000 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which sustained the validity of the upgrading and
reclassification of certain personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) despite the
disapproval thereof by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Also assailed is the
resolution dated 11 September 2002 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner.
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional
Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of its special provisions, the CHR, promulgated
Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme
among selected positions in the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of
ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga
Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary
Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17
November 1998, the CHR "collapsed" the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source
of funding for staffing modification. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading
scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied
the request. The officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the
CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request and reversed the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. It affirmed the pronouncement of the
CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in
the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR's fiscal autonomy. Petitioner
CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has locus standi.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that
the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in
the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets
the injury test.
8. AGAN V. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TERMINALS, CO.

(G.R. No.155001. MAY 5, 2003)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed the instant petitions for prohibition under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to prohibit the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from
implementing the following agreements executed by the Philippine Government through the DOTC
and the MIAA and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal
to the Government for the development of Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957, as
amended. It was endorsed to the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), which, in turn,
reviewed and approved it for bidding. The Paircargo Consortium was the only company that submitted
a competitive proposal. Later, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine International Airport
Terminals Co., (PIATCO). And for failure of AEDC to match the price proposal submitted by PIATCO,
the project was awarded to PIATCO. On July 12, 1997, the Government signed the 1997 Concession
Agreement.
Thereafter, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) and three
Supplements thereto were signed by the Government and PIATCO. Consequently, the workers of
the international airline service providers, claiming that they stand to lose their employment upon the
implementation of the said agreements, filed before this Court a petition for prohibition. Later, the
service providers joined their cause. Congressmen Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez and
Constantino Jaraula, alleging that the said contracts compelled government expenditure without
appropriation, filed a similar petition. And several employees of the MIAA likewise filed a petition
assailing the legality of these agreements.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners, NAIA concessionaires and service contractors, have locus standi.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners are facing a direct injury or threat of losing their source of income or livelihood
upon implementation of PIATCO Contracts. Thus, conferring upon them legal standing due to the
financial prejudice brought by these said contracts.
9. BAGATSING V. COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION

(G.R. No.112399. JULY 14, 1995)
QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
The petition for prohibition in G. R. No. 112399 sought: (1) to nullify the bidding conducted for
the sale of a block of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock (40% block) of Petron Corporation
(PETRON) and the award made to Aramco Overseas Company, B.V. (ARAMCO) as the highest
bidder in the bidding conducted on December 15, 1993; and (2) to stop the sale of said block of
shares to ARAMCO. The Supplemental Petition in said case sought to annul the bidding of the 40%
block held on December 15, 1993 and to set aside the award given to ARAMCO. The petitioners all
in their capacity as members of Congress, taxpayers and concerned citizens, except in the case of
Mr. Saguisag, who sued as a private law practitioner, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
taxpayer and concerned citizen.
PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." (ESSO) as a subsidiary of Esso Eastern, Inc.
and Mobil Petroleum Company, Inc. In acquiring PETRON, the government aimed to have a buffer
against the vagaries of oil prices in the international market. Indeed, PETRON helped alleviate the
energy crises that visited the country.
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50, in the exercise of her
legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, entitled "Proclaiming and Launching a Program for
the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets
thereof, and Creating the Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust."
On January 12, 1993, the Cabinet approved the privatization of PETRON as part of the Energy
Sector Action Plan. COP Chairman, President Ramos approved the privatization of PETRON up to a
maximum of 65% of its capital stock. The Petron Privatization Working Committee (PWC) was thus
formed. In a meeting of the Petron PWC held on December 15, 1993 at 12:00 noon, it decided that
Westmont Holdings (WESTMONT) was disqualified from participating in the bidding for its alleged
failure to comply with the technical and financial requirements for a strategic partner.
On February 3, 1994, PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement and on
March 4, 1994, the two companies signed the Shareholders' Agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners, as Members of Congress, have locus standi to challenge the
contract in question.
RULING:
No. Petitioners, as members of Congress, in the absence of a claim that the contract in
question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature,
petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of
Congress. However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine
laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona.
10. KMU Labor Center v. Garcia

(G.R. No. 115381, December 23, 1994)
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Then DOTC Secretary Oscar M. Orbos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then
LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers
rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.
This range was later increased by LTFRB thru Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing,
am g he , ha The e i i g a h i ed fa e a ge em f l mi 15 e ce f
provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized
fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate a he ba i f he e a ded fa e a ge.
In March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the
DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare
without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of 20% of the existing fares.
Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a petition before LTFRB,
which was denied. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for a TRO.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to raise issues on transportation fares.
RULING:
Petition granted. The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of
the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an
i ca i f he c j i dic i a d j if he e e ci e f he c emedial e i hi
behalf. Petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury
and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has
shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement
of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses,
trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in
passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly,
their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.
11. Paguia v. Office of the President

(G.R. No. 176276, June 25, 2010)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia, as citizen and taxpayer, filed an original action for the writ of
certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's nomination of respondent former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. as permanent representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner
argues that respondent Davide's age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies
him from holding his post.
In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the
Sec e a f F eig Affai ai ed he f ll i g i e : 1) e i i e a di g b i g he i
because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law; 2) neither petitioner's citizenship nor
his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davide's appointment because
he remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve
the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds; and 3) the suit is in truth a
petition for quo warranto, which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, has legal standing to bring the subject
suit.
RULING:
The SC held that access to citizen suits is granted on the narrowest ground, when issues of
a ce de al im a ce calli g ge e l i a e ai ed. The a ame e f he
determination of allowing third party suits are: (1) character of the funds or assets involved in the
controversy; (2) clear disregard of constitutional and statutory prohibition; and (3) lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest to bring suit. None of the foregoing is present in the
case.
Pe i i e Pag ia i i ca aci a ed b i g legal ac i . Pag ia e i f m he ac ice

f he la ba him f m e f mi g a ac i i , i fc , hich e i e he a lica i f
law, legal procedu e, k ledge, ai i g a d e e ie ce. Pe i i e ac f e a i g a e i i
raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules
of statutory construction falls within the proscribed conduct.
12. Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo

(G.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 292 was issued whereby the National Labor Relations Commission
became an agency attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for policy and program
coordination and for administrative supervision. On 02 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code
was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715 declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the
DOLE for program and policy coordination only while the administrative supervision was turned over
to the NLRC Chairman. Executive Order No. 185 dated 10 March 2003 supervision of NLRC reverted
to the Sec. of Labor and Employment. Petitioners, composed of ten labor unions assailed the
constitutionality of EO 185 for allegedly revert the set-up prior to RA 6715, which only Congress can
do. Solicitor General contend that petitioners have no locus standi to assail the validity of E.O. No.
185, not even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are exempt from paying
taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Even assuming that their individual members are
taxpayers, respondents maintain that a taxpayer suit will not prosper as E.O. No. 185 does not require
additional appropriation for its implementation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the labour unions have legal standing to assail the constitutionality of EO 185.
RULING:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit. For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger
of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As labor unions it
cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of
the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse,
revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
13. Domingo v. Carague

(G.R. No. 161065, April 15, 2005)
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the legality of Resolution No. 2002-05 of the
Commission on Audit (COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The petitioners alleged
therein that this Plan is intrinsically void for want of an enabling law authorizing COA to undertake the
same and providing for the necessary standards, conditions, restrictions, limitations, guidelines, and
parameters. Petitioners further alleged that in initiating such Organizational Restructuring Plan
without legal authority, COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that petitioners
have no legal standing to file the present petition since they have not shown "a personal stake in the
outcome of the case" or an actual or potential injury that can be redressed by our favorable decision.
In essence, it is alleged that the petitioners are not a party in interest, but the petitioners claim
otherwise by reason that the matter is of public concern. The said Organizational Restructuring Plan
is not just a mere reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA, with a "spillover effect" upon
its audit performance. This will have an impact upon the rest of the government bodies subject to its
audit supervision, thus, should be treated as a matter of transcendental importance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to institute the instant petition.
RULING:
Petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan. There was also an admission that "they do not seek any affirmative relief nor
impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents" and "are not motivated by any desire
to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit
or gain." Hence, the petitioners do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit.
He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and substantial has the standing
to sue. A party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can
be redressed by a favorable decision in order to warrant an invocation of the court.
14. Cutaran v. DENR

(G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001)
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
FACTS:
Cutaran et al. assails the validity of DENR Special Orders 31 and 25, and Department
Administrative Order 2 for being issued without prior legislative authority.
In 1990, the Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special Order no.
31 entitled "Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation
of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region". The special task force created was
authorized to accept and evaluate and delineate ancestral land claims within the said area, and after
due evaluation of the claims, to issue appropriate land titles in accordance with existing laws. On
January 15, 1993, the Secretary of the DENR issued Special Order no. 25 entitled "Creation of
Special Task Forces provincial and community environment and natural resources offices for the
identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide" and Department
Administrative Order no. 02, containing the Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no.
25.
In 1990, the same year Special Order no. 31 was issued, the relatives of herein petitioners
filed separate applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) over the land they
respectively occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. In 1996 the applications were denied by
the DENR Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and
Applai tribes to which they belong are not among the recognized tribes of Baguio City. Hence, this
petition for prohibition originally filed with the Court of Appeals. CA held that the assailed DENR
Special Orders Nos. 31, 31-A, 31-B issued in 1990 prior to the effectivity of RA 7586 known as the
National Integrated Protected Areas Systems (NIPAS) Act of 1992, are of no force and effect "for pre-
empting legislative prerogative" but sustained the validity of DENR Special Order No. 25, and its
implementing rules by the appellate court on the ground that they were issued pursuant to the powers
delegated to the DENR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
RULING:
There is no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve. The adverse legal interests involved
are the competing claims of the petitioners and heirs of Carantes to possess a common piece of land.
Since the CALC application of the Heirs of Carantes has not yet been granted or issued, and which
the DENR may or may not grant, there is yet no actual or imminent vi la i f e i i e a e ed
right to possess the disputed land.
The C ca le he ba i f e i i e ec la i ha he DENR ill a e he

application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act, which directly causes
or will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before
the jurisdiction of the Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being
evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR.
15. Joya v. PCGG

(G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993)
BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS:
All thirty-five (35) petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus r
seeking to enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with
the auction sale by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century
silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the
preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain
respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the
artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts
and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act,"
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have legal standing to file the subject petition.
RULING:
None. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from
different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit
and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. Similarly, as alleged in the
petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and
dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to
them.
The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be
understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the
government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just
compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or
statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper
parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights
which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal
owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not
possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer
can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can
prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon
the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure
involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to
note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private
sources and not with public money.
16. TELEBAP v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP)
is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as
citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters.
Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due
process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during
the period of election.
ISSUE: Whether TELEBAP has standing in this suit.
RULING:
None. In the case at bar, as will presently be shown, petitioner's substantive claim is without
merit. To the extent, therefore, that a party's standing is determined by the substantive merit of his
case or preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner TELEBAP must be held to be without standing.
Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury fairly is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm
as a result of the operation of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881.
Nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest as registered voters since this case
does not concern their right of suffrage. Their interest in §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 should be precisely in
upholding its validity.
Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the exercise
by Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that
he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute.
Nor indeed as a corporate entity does TELEBAP have standing to assert the rights of radio
and television broadcasting companies. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if it can be shown
that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the third party cannot
assert his constitutional right, or that the eight of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court
is allowed to espouse the third party's constitutional claim. None of these circumstances is here
present. The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not
entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies.
17. Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.

(G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994)
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS:
This action seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease"
executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on-line lottery system, also known as "lotto."
Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock domestic

corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are
committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal.
Petitioners submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with
the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery
system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic."
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioners do not appear to have the legal
standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to maintain this suit.
RULING:
Yes. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark
Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821)." Insofar as
taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether
i h ld be e e ai ed, hat it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not."
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of
Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate
and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts,
decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it
raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of
the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and
moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the
billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition
and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier
which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
18. Tatad v. Secretary of Energy

(G.R. Nos. 124360 and 127867, November 5, 1997)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes" which ends twenty six (26) years
of government regulation of the downstream oil industry.
The petition is anchored on three arguments:
First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff
differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective
investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source
refined petroleum products from abroad.
Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil
industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law.
Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1)
Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed
in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is
foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and
executive order.
RULING:
Yes. In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on
a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance
to the people. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, we stressed:
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are,
however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at
bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not
the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.
19. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004)
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
For the automation of the counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004 elections,
Comelec awarded the Contract to "Mega Pacific Consortium" an entity that had not participated in
the bidding. Despite this grant, the poll body signed the actual automation Contract with "Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc.," a company that joined the bidding but had not met the eligibility requirements.
On May 29, 2003, petitioner and four other individuals and entities protested the award of the
Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process
had been conducted."
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi in this case.
RULING:
Yes. As taxpayers, they are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of
public funds," or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; or when petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law." In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not
a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek
to restrain respondents from implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from making any
unwarranted expenditure of public funds pursuant thereto. Moreover, our nation's political and
economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence,
there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is "a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest"; 18 in other words, it is of "paramount public interest" and "transcendental
importance."
20. LIM v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002)
DE LEON, JR. J.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States in 1951, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
"Balikatan 02-1 . The e f Ame ica i Phili i e il i ima el ooted in the
international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic
events that occurred on September 11, 2001.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
RULING:
Ye . The C ela ed i ge le a ie a di g file i beca e f he im dial
importance of the issue involved. Although the Court agreed with the Solicitor General in his
contentions that (1) they may not file suit in their capacities as taxpayers inasmuch as it has not been
shown that "Balikatan 02-1" involves the exercise of Congress' taxing or spending powers, (2) their
being lawyers does not invest them with sufficient personality to initiate the case, and (3) petitioners
have failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of direct personal injury, it reiterated its decision in
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. In cases of transcendental importance, the Court may relax the standing
requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the
right of judicial review.
21. KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO

(G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
In Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, the Court declared invalid the contract between Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the provision
in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries through a
collaboration, association, or joint venture. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement
(ELA) for online lottery equipment and accessories on January 25, 1995.
Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because (1) It is the same
a he ld c ac f lea e; (2) i i ill i la i e f PCSO cha ter; (3) it is violative of the law
regarding public bidding it has not been approved by the President and it is not most advantageous
to the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has standing to sue.
RULING:
No. The parties in the previous and the present case may be the same, but the case is not.
Strictly speaking, standing is concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is
actually involved. The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties-in-interest". It is
true that the present action involves not a mere contract between private individuals but one made
by a government corporation. There is, however, no allegation that the public funds are being
misspent so as to make this action a public one and justify relaxation of the requirement that an action
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. Question as to the nature or validity of
public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can be raised in an
appropriate case before the Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman.
22. CHAVEZ vs PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

(G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all
facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation
("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal
Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to
Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has legal standing to sue.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here.
First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a
constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly
information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution
and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from
alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution,
compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation. Moreover, the petition raises
matters of transcendental importance to the public.
23. TATAD vs GARCIA

(G.R. No. 114222, April 6, 1995)
QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
In 1989, DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA to provide a mass
transit system along EDSA and alleviate the congestion and growing transportation problem in the
metropolis. Certain corporations were invited to prequalify for the bids and it was awarded to EDSA
LRT Consortium. DOTC and the latter then entered into an agreement to build the light railway transit
under a Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) scheme. Upon full or partial completion and viability
thereof, ESDA Consortium shall deliver the use and possession of the completed portion to DOTC
which shall operate the same. DOTC shall pay private respondent rentals on a monthly basis through
an Irrevocable Letter of Credit. The rentals shall be determined by an independent and internationally
accredited i ec i fi m be a i ed b he a ie . A ag eed , EDSA C i m ca i al
shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come from the
earnings of the EDSA LRT III. After 25 years and DOTC shall have completed payment of the rentals,
ownership of the project shall be transferred to the latter for a consideration of only US $1.00.
Petitioners opposed the implementation of the said agreement insofar as it grants EDSA LRT
CORPORATION, LTD., a foreign corporation, the ownership of EDSA LRT III, a public utility, and that
it violates the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have standing to sue.
RULING:
Yes. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts
entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in
contravention of the law (Kilosbayan vs Guingona) and to disallow the same when only municipal
contracts are involved (Bugnay vs. Laron). For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is
not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as
taxpayers to institute the present action.
24. BRILLANTES vs COMELEC

(G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC
to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the
COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and
materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. On October 29, 2002, the
COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization program for the 2004 elections
consisting of three (3) phases, to wit: (1) PHASE I Computerized system of registration and voters
validation or the so-called "biometrics" system of registration; (2) PHASE II Computerized voting
and counting of votes; and (3) PHASE III Electronic transmission of results.
The SC, in a previous ruling, declared COMELEC Resolution No. 6027, implementing Phase
II of the AES, unconstitutional. Despite that, the COMELEC nevertheless ventured to implement
Phase III of the AES through an electronic transmission of advanced "unofficial" results of the 2004
elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
Petitioners claimed that it would allow the usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass
the votes for President (Pres.) and Vice-President (VP) and encroach upon the authority of the
National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) to conduct the "unofficial" quick count.
RULING:
Yes. Since the implementation of the assailed resolution obviously involves the expenditure
of funds, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention, as taxpayers, possess the requisite
standing to question its validity as they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation. Most of the petitioners-in-intervention are also representatives of major
political parties that have participated in the May 10, 2004 elections. On the other hand, petitioners-
in- intervention Concepcion and Bernas represent the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections
(NAMFREL), which is the citizens' arm authorized to conduct an "unofficial" quick count during the
said elections. They have sufficient, direct and personal interest in the manner by which the
respondent COMELEC would conduct the elections, including the counting and canvassing of the
votes cast therein. Moreover, the petitioners-in-intervention Drilon and De Venecia are, respectively,
President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, the heads of Congress, which
is exclusively authorized by the Constitution to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President.
They have the requisite standing to prevent the usurpation of the constitutional prerogative of
Congress.
25. JUMAMIL vs CAFÉ

(G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005)
CORONA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jumamil questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution No. 7 which
provided for an initial appropriation of P 765,000 for the construction of stalls around a proposed
terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire. The same was amended by
Resolution No. 10 appropriating a further amount of P1,515,000 for the construction of additional
stalls in the same public market.
Prior to the passage of these resolutions, respondent Mayor Cafe had already entered into
contracts with those who advanced and deposited (with the municipal treasurer) from their personal
funds the sum of P40,000 each. Some of the parties were close friends and/or relatives of the public
respondents. After completion, the stalls were leased through a public raffle limited to said individuals.
Jumamil, as taxpayer, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of the ordinances. The lower
courts declared Jumamil to lack legal standing because he was not a party to the contract entered
into.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has legal standing.
RULING:
No. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity but parties suing as
such must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation. In the case at bar, petitioner did not seasonably allege his interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of public funds or the specific injury to him as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned resolutions and contracts. It was only in the "Remark to Comment" he filed in this Court
did he first assert that "he (was) willing to engage in business and (was) interested to occupy a market
stall." Such claim was obviously an afterthought.
26. ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN

(G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001)
BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS:
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress
upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which
divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to
subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it
suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The terms which the petitioner challe ge f ice f ag e e a e c mbi a i , e ie a d
a a ed . Beca e f hi , he e i i e e he facial challe ge he alidi f he la .
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has legal standing to sue.
RULING:
Yes. The onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging
the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing; there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm,
"To doubt is to sustain."
Petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The

doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked
against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified
either by a saving clause or by construction. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
27. IMBONG vs OCHOA

(G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
R.A. 10354, The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates
(1) the right to life of the unborn; (2) the one subject-one title rule; (3) he right to health and the right
to protection against hazardous products; (4) the right to religious freedom; among others.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi in this case.
RULING:
Yes. Notwithstanding the fact that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against
the petitioners and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive,
the Court leaned on the transcendental importance doctrine. It states that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."
In cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury
to the party claiming the right of judicial review. Considering that it is the right to life of the mother and
the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking
action.
iii. Earliest Opportunity
1. MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
(G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
COMELEC e ba c a i ed e i i e a Ac i g Di ec IV f he Ed ca i a d
Information Department (EID) on February 1999. On February 2000, Chairperson Demetriou
renewed the appointment of e i i e i a Tem a ca aci . C mmi i e Ja ie agai
e e ed he a i me f eii e he ame i i i a Tem a ca aci . O Feb a
2001.
On March 2001, The President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed ad interim, Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven
years and all expiring on February 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position
of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and assumed their
positions as COMELEC Commissioners.
On June 2001, The President renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2008.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum addressed to

petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco
Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department Petitioner then filed an
instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on
temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.
ISSUE: Whether or not the instant petition provides for all the requisites before the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review.
RULING:
Yes. The requisites are all present, which earliest opportunity is thus present.
Petitioner filed the instant petition only on August 3, 2001, when the first ad interim
appointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not the date of filing of the
petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The
earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent
court that can resolve the same, such that, "if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered
at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal." Petitioner questioned
the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her
petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before
a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the
time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon. There is no doubt petitioner raised the
constitutional issue on time.
2. ESTARIJA V. RANADA
(G.R. No. 159314, June 26, 2006)
QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and Davao
Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc. (DTASI) filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct
before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner Estarija, Harbor Master of the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port in Davao City.
Thereafter, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative case, finding Estarija
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Estarija filed a motion for reconsideration and assails RA 6770, otherwise known as "The
Ombudsman Act 1989" as unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional
powers that are not provided for in the Constitution. The Court of Appeals (CA) held that the attack
on the constitutionality of RA 6770 was procedurally and substantially flawed. The constitutionality
issue was belatedly raised in the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question of constitutionality of RA 6770 was raised at the earliest possible
opportunity.
RULING:
Yes, the question of constitutionality of RA 6770 was raised at the earliest possible
opportunity.
Petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 in his motion for the
ec ide a i f he Omb d ma deci i . Ve il , he Omb d ma ha j i dic i e e ai
questions on the constitutionality of a law. Thus, when petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality
of RA 6770 before the CA, the constitutional question was raised at the earliest opportune time.
Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when a
constitutional issue may be passed upon.
3. UMALI V. GUINGONA
(G.R. No. 131124, March 29, 1999)
PURISIMA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. President Fidel
V. Ramos, received a confidential memorandum against petitioner for alleged violations of internal
revenue laws, rules and regulations.
On receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President Ramos authorized the
issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of Umali and immediately referred the Complaint
against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for
investigation.
The PCAGC found prima facie evidence to support six (6) charges of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance against petitioner. Acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC,
President Ramos issued an Administrative Order dismissing petitioner with forfeiture of retirement
and all benefits under the law.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Office of the President, petitioner
brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction before the RTC of Makati which dismissed
the same. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed the petition when its jurisdiction was invoked,
hence, petitioner found its way to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner raised the issue at its earliest opportunity for judicial review.
RULING:
As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his
motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise
the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.
4. ZANDUETA V. DELA COSTA

(G.R. No. 46267, November 28, 1938)
VILLA-REAL, J.
FACTS:
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable
Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District,
comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines
in his favor on June 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly on September of the same year.
On November 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the
"Judicial Reorganization Law", took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the
Commonwealth and new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth
Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan,
issued in accordance with said Act.
As the National Assembly adjourned on November 1937, without its Commission on

Appointments' having acted on said ad interim appointment, another ad interim appointment to the
same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath, before
discharging the duties thereof.
On May 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the
aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the Secretary of
Justice on the same month and year.
President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa,
judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifty Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment
was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can question the Constitutionality of the Commonwealth Act No.
145.
RULING:
No, the petitioner cannot question the Constitutionality of the Commonwealth Act No. 145.
The respondent, in answer to the petition, admits some of the facts alleged therein and denies
the rest, and alleges, as one of his special defenses, that the petitioner is estopped from attacking
the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, for having accepted his new appointment as
judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, issued by virtue thereof, to preside over the Courts
of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, and for having taken the necessary oath, entering into the
discharge of the functions of his office and performing judicial as well as administrative acts.
iv. Lis Mota
1. KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIHIRAP V. ROBREDO

(G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014)
BRION, J.
FACTS:
The members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus
Homeowners' Association as well as the individual petitioners, Fernando Sevilla, Estrelieta Bagasbas,
Jocy Lopez, Elvira Vidol and Delia Frayres, were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and located
in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs).
These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure
projects in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners.
On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
before the Court, seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the public
respondents) to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their
implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.
The petitioners argue that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend their constitutional right
to due process because they warrant evictions and demolitions without any court order. They point
out that Section 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the impairment of liberty of
abode unless there is a court order. Moreover, Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 violate their right to
adequate housing, a universal right recognized in Article 25 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and Section 2 (a) of RA 7279. The petitioners further complain that the respondents had previously
conducted evictions and demolitions in a violent manner, contrary to Section 10, Article 13 of the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not can the Court can exercise their power of judicial review in this case.
RULING:
No. The issue of the case is not the lis mota of the case.
Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action"; it is rooted in the principle of
separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the
executive and legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government.
This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of
showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question
that he raised is unavoidable. If there is some other ground upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of constitutionality should be avoided. Thus,
to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.
2. PLANTERS PRODUCTS V. FERTIPHIL

(G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008)
REYES, R.T., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) and private respondent Fertiphil are private
corporations incorporated under Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and
distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1465 which provides for, to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a
capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be
collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied
by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines.|
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With
the return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No.
1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in
Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive,
invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged
that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain
its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465
was a valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry
in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the
burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutionality of LOI 1465 cannot be collaterally attacked.
RULING:
No, LOI cannot be collaterally attacked in a complaint for collection.
The resolution of the constitutional issue is not necessary for a determination of the complaint
for collection.
Fertiphil counters that the constitutionality of the LOI was adequately pleaded in its complaint.
It claims that the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is the very lis mota of the case because the trial
court cannot determine its claim without resolving the issue.
The constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is also the very lis mota of the complaint for collection.
Fertiphil filed the complaint to compel PPI to refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground
that the law imposing the levy is unconstitutional. The thesis is that an unconstitutional law is void. It
has no legal effect. Being void, Fertiphil had no legal obligation to pay the levy. Necessarily, all levies
duly paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be refunded under the civil code principle against
unjust enrichment. The refund is a mere consequence of the law being declared unconstitutional. The
RTC surely cannot order PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI unconstitutional. It is the
unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the refund. The issue of constitutionality is the very lis
mota of the complaint with the RTC.
3. TARROSA V. SINGSON
(G.R. No. 111243, May 25, 1994)
QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
Appointment of Respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas
for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, is being questioned by the
petitioner as a "taxpayer".
The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance of his functions as
such official until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and respondent
Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing public funds in
payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson.
Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which
have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue raised is the lis mota of the case at bar.
RULING:
The instant petition is in the nature of quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of
respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of
Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor
General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or
exercised by another. To uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the
courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the
governmental machinery.
The Court refrains from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in
deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution
thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case.
4. TY V. TRAMPE
(G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995)
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alejandro B. Ty is a resident of and registered owner of lands and buildings in the
Municipality (now City) of Pasig, while petitioner MVR Picture Tube Inc. is a corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws and is likewise a registered owner of lands and buildings
in said Municipality.
Respondent Aurelio C. Trampe is being sued in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch
163, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region. sitting in Pasig, whose Decision
dated 14 July 1994 and Order dated 30 September 1994 in Special Civil Action No. 629 (entitled
"Alejandro B. Ty and MVR Picture Tube. Inc. vs. The Hon. Secretary of Finance, et al.") are sought
to be set aside.
Respondent Secretary of Finance is impleaded as the government officer who approved the
Schedule of Market Values used as basis for the new tax assessments being enforced by
respondents Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Pasig and the legality of which is being
questioned in this petition.
On 06 January 1994, respondent Assessor sent a notice of assessment respecting certain

real properties of petitioners located in Pasig. Metro Manila in a letter dated 18 March 1994,
petitioners through counsel "requested the Municipal Assessor to reconsider the subject
assessments."
Not satisfied, petitioners on 29 March 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by respondent Judge, a Petition for Prohibition
with prayer for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and void the new
tax assessments and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments. In a
Decision 4 dated 14 July 1994, respondent Judge denied the petition "for lack of merit".
ISSUE: Whether or not the approval of the Schedule of Market Values used as a basis for the new
tax assessments can be questioned.
RULING:
It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented
in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are
properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the
case. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record
if the case can be disposed of on some other found such as the application of a statute or general
law.
5. ARCETA V. JUDGE MAGROBANG

(G.R. No. 152895, JUNE 15, 2004)
QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 in an Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
The information reads that Arceta issued a check amounting to P740,000 to an Oscar Castro
payable to cash.
The said accused well-knowing that at the time of issue did not have sufficient funds or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment.
Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on
the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional. She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine
still in place, such a move would be an exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court
would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence.
Thereafter, Arceta was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. However, she
manifested that her arraignment should be without prejudice to the present petition or to any other
actions she would take to suspend proceedings in the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. Blg. 22 may be question on the issue of the case.
RULING:
No, the Court did not find the question to be very lis mota.
After minute scrutiny of petitioners' submissions, we find that the basic issue being raised in
these special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus concern the unconstitutionality or
invalidity of B.P. Blg. 22.
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine
that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1)
an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case. Only when
these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality
or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to counsel's spirited advocacy in both cases, we
are unable to agree that the abovecited requisites have been adequately met.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative.
c. Fiscal Autonomy
i. Bengzon v. Drilon
(G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992)
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
e ealed d i g he ime f f me P e ide Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain
retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions.
Congress felt a need to restore these laws to standardize retirement benefits among government
officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) claiming the law
should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by
P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the
case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non-publication and in
effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB)
for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did
he all me i he f ll i g ma e : C g e made a i em e i led: Ge e al F d Adj me ;
included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the government;
among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the
retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already
deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
RULING:
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them
in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set
aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to
enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president
to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of
an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the
Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: The
Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its
entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general
adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but
did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.
ii. Nitafan v. CIR

(G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987)
Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS:
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to
prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of withholding taxes
from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which
is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en banc had already reaffirmed
the directive of the Chief Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and
the judges of the judiciary but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue
once and for all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax.
RULING:
No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations, was NOT
to exempt justices and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like members of
the other branches of the government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the
constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They
have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries
of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased? Yes. The Congress may
pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and such increase will immediately
take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law
increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary, but such
will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the effectivity of
such law.
iii. In Re: Clarifying and Strengthening The Organizational Structure and Administrative Set-
Up of the Philippine Judicial Academy
(A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA, January 31, 2006)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
The instant administrative matter has its roots in the Resolution of the Court promulgated on
February 24, 2004, clarifying and strengthening the organizational structure and administrative set-
up of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA).1 Pursuant to said resolution, the positions of SC
Chief Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer with Salary Grades (SG) 25 and 23,
respectively, were created in the following Divisions of the PHILJA: Publications Division, and
External Linkages Division (Research, Publications and Linkages Office); Mediation Education and
Management Division (Judicial Reforms Office); Corporate Planning Division, and Administrative
Division (Administrative and Finance Office).
However, in its Notice of Organization, Staffing, and Compensation Action (NOSCA) dated
May 5, 2005, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) downgraded said positions and
their corresponding salary grades.
Meantime, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of Administrative Services, the Court
issued a Resolution on July 5, 2005, retaining "the originally proposed titles and salary grades of SC
Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23) in the [PHILJA]".
Thereafter, in a Memorandum addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated
October 10, 2005, PHILJA Chancellor, Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, requested the Court
to issue another resolution retaining the position titles and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, in light of the NOSCA issued by the DBM downgrading
said positions. Chancellor Melencio- He e a i ked he C Re l i f N embe 21, 1995
(Re: Requests for Upgrading of the Positions of Chief Justice Staff Head, Judicial Staff Head, Director
IV [Chief, Fiscal Management and Budget Office], Director III, Chief of Division and Assistant Chief
of Division with corresponding change in Position Titles, if Warranted),3 which she alleged the DBM
violated by such downgrading. According to the PHILJA Chancellor, to allow the DBM to disregard
such resolution would "undermine the independence of the Judiciary and impinge on the Supreme
C e e ci e f i fi cal a m e e l g a ed b he C i i ."
Upon the recommendation of the Office of Administrative Services, the Court issued a
Resolution on November 8, 2005, resolving to "deny the request of Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-
Herrera for the issuance of another resolution retaining the position titles and salary grades of SC
Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23), as the resolution
dated 5 July 2005 will suffice."
I c m lia ce i h he C Re l i da ed Oc be 18, 2005 efe i g he Mem a d m

of Justice Melencio-Herrera for evaluation, report and recommendation, Atty. Edna E. Diño, Office of
the Chief Attorney, submitted her Report dated December 1, 2005. She recommended that the Court
reiterate its July 5, 2005 Resolution (retaining the originally proposed titles and salary grades of the
positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer [SG 25] and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer [SG 23]).
She, like i e, ec mme ded ha he DBM be di ec ed im leme he C Re l i f
February 24, 2004 and July 5, 2005, as it (DBM) had "no authority to revise a Resolution of this Court
issued in the exercise of its constitutional mandates of fiscal autonomy and administrative supervision
over court personnel."
ISSUE: Whether or not DBM has authority to revise a Resolution of the Court issued in the exercise
of its constitutional mandates of fiscal autonomy and administrative supervision over court personnel.
RULING:
The primary role of the DBM is to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization
Law of "providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions."
Pursuant to its mandate, the DBM is authorized to evaluate and determine whether a proposed
reclassification and upgrading scheme is consistent with applicable laws and regulations. The task of
the DBM is simply to review the compensation and benefits plan of the government agency or entity
concerned and determine if it complies with the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this
regard. Thus, the role of the DBM is "supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the
proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to [government] officials and
employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws."
As such, the authority of the DBM to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court
personnel on matters of compensation is even more limited, circumscribed as it is by the provisions
of the Constitution, specifically Article VIII, Section 37 on fiscal autonomy and Article VIII, Section 68
on administrative supervision over court personnel. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside
control.
The authority of the DBM to "review" the plantilla and compensation of court personnel
extends only to "calling the attention of the Court" on what it may perceive as erroneous application
of budgetary laws and rules on position classification. The DBM may not overstep its authority in such
a way as to cause the amendment or modification of Court resolutions even if these pertain to
administration of compensation and position classification system. Only after its attention to an
allegedly erroneous application of the pertinent law or rule has been called by the DBM may the Court
amend or modify its resolution, as its judgment and discretion may dictate under the law.
In this instance, the change of two position titles was made apparently to conform to position
titles indicated in the personnel services itemization for all government positions, clearly oblivious of
the fact that positions in the Judiciary are peculiar only to that branch of government. It appearing
that the salary grades of 25 and 23 are proper positions equivalent to those of SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, respectively, under the Salary Standardization Law, and
that the Court prescribed those position titles only after consideration of the nature of work and
functions that the holders of those positions must perform, there is no reason to amend the
Resolutions of 24 February 2004, and of 5 July 2005, so as to reflect the position titles and salary
grades stated in the NOSCA for the same positions.12
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Court REITERATES its Resolution of July 5, 2005
retaining the originally proposed titles and salary grades of the positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23) in the Philippine Judicial Academy. The
Department of Budget and Management is DIRECTED to implement the Resolutions of the Court
dated February 24, 2004 and July 5, 2005.
iv. Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased
by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
(A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012)
FACTS:
This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion issued by the Legal Services Sector,
Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment
amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the
Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme
Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to
the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its
guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No.
03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated
August 5, 1998.
Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her Memorandum dated August

10, 2010, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house
computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned
the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal
and disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two
previous instances involving two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,5 the COA upheld
the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More
importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget
and resources. Full autonomy, among others,6 contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the
all ca i a d ili a i f he J dicia e ce , ba ed i de e mi a i f ha i eed .
The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided
or required by law in the course of the discharge of its functions. To allow the COA to substitute the
C lic i he di al f i e ld be a am a e c achme i hi j dicial
prerogative.
ISSUE: Whether or not in-house computation should be followed.
RULING:
The COA a h i c d c -audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted
fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours
Thi a h i , h e e , m be ead l i ligh f he C fi cal a m , b al

in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence
and Court rulings on these matters.
v. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND

NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE
JUDICIARY and RE: REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
[PCIJ] FOR THE 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH [SALN] AND
PERSONAL DATA SHEETS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES.
(A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, August 26, 2014)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
In a letter, dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center
for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth
(SALN) of the Justices of this Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal
Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating
their database of information on government officials.
In her Letter, dated August 13, 2009, Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ,
likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), for the
same above-stated purpose.
The two requests were ordered consolidated by the Court on August 18, 2009. On the same
day, the Court resolved to create a special committee (Committee) to review the policy on requests
for SALN and PDS and other similar documents, and to recommend appropriate action on such
requests.
On November 23, 2009, the Committee, chaired by then Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-
Nazario submitted its Memorandum dated November 18, 2009 and its Resolution dated November
16, 2009, recommending the creation of Committee on Public Disclosure that would, in essence, take
over the functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies
of, or access to, SALN, and other personal documents of members of the Judiciary.
Meanwhile, several requests for copies of the SALN and other personal documents of the
Justices of this Court, the CA and the Sandiganbayan (SB) were filed.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SALN and other personal documents of the Justices should be released.
RULING:
In essence, it is the consensus of the Justices of the above-mentioned courts and the various
judges associations that while the Constitution holds dear the right of the people to have access to
matters of concern, the Constitution also holds sacred the independence of the Judiciary. Thus,
although no direct opposition to the disclosure of SALN and other personal documents is being
expressed, it is the uniform position of the said magistrates and the various judges associations that
the disclosure must be made in accord with the guidelines set by the Court and under such
circumstances that would not undermine the independence of the Judiciary.
d. Appointment
i. In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta

(A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998)
NARVASA, CJ.
FACTS:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and
Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly
prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the
President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
ISSUE: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of
the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of
Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
RULING:
D i g he e i d a ed i Sec. 15, A . VII f he C i i m h immedia el bef e
the next presidential electi a d he e d f hi e m he P e ide i ei he e i ed make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean
that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein
unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every
6 years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of
the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling
of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of
any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.
ii. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council

(G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just
days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential
election. Under Section 4(1), in relation Sec i 9, A icle VIII, ha aca c hall be filled i hi
i e da f m he cc e ce he e f f m a li f a lea h ee mi ee e a ed b he
J dicial a d Ba C cil f e e aca c . Al c ide i g ha Sec i 15, A icle VII (E ecutive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process
of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its e i i g ac ice, he JBC a ma icall c ide ed f he ii f

Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales;
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January
25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because
the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from
its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended
the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so
in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department)
was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article
VIII am le e ic i limi a i he P e ide e a i membe f the Supreme
C e e i i de e de ce f m li ical ici i de a d i i la i f m li ical
e e , ch a i ge alifica i f he ii , he e abli hme f he JBC, he
specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only
do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether
the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section
4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from
the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.
RULING:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court
shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
he P e ide Ac i g P e ide emd e efe he Membe f he S eme C .
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
he P e ide Ac i g P e ide emd e efe he Membe f he S eme C .
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect
the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only
to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd
to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if
they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in
respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely
inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
e. Judicial and Bar Council
i. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council

(G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme
C Chief J ice f ll i g Re a C a de a e.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate,
competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
I a ic la , Pa ag a h 1 Sec i 8, A icle VIII f he C i i a e ha (1) A J dicial

and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
S eme C , a d a e e e a i e f he i a e ec . I compliance therewith, Congress, from
the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the
JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
e i i ed a icame al legi la i e b d , he eb all ca i g a e e e a i e f he Na i al
A embl he JBC. The h a e, h e e , a m dified a l jive with the change to
bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The
respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having
a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding
adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to
be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of
balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to
be membe f he JBC d e e de JBC e f idi g bala ce ga ; ha he
presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six
(6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
ISSUE: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of
whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the
functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8,
A icle VIII f he 1987 C i i ha i he h a e, a e e e a i e f C g e , he e f he
i g la le e a ecedi g e e e a i e f C g e i e i cal a d lea e mf a
other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind,
that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that
more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have,
in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous
in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.
Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body
of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle
hi ca e, i bec me a a e ha he d C ge ed i A icle VIII, Sec i 8(1) f he
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional
Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members
of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude
that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or
among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
Wi h he e de c e i ha each e e e a i e h ld be admi ed f m he
Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of
C i i al C mmi i , held ha C g e , i he context of JBC representation, should be
considered as one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and
that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers
conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is
required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of
j dicial ffice . He ce, he e m C g e m be ake mea he e i e legi la i e de a me .
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the
Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having
more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would ega e
the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
C i i .
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of
it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with
an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit.
Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is
the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.
Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what the tides of time may be. It cannot be
simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims
and caprices of the government and the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions before the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial
and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined
to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition
is immediately executory.
ii. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council

(G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
The Judicial Bar Council (JBC) as mandated by the constitution is composed of only seven-
members, however on 1994 it was substantially altered. An eighth member was added to the JBC as
two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously having one-half (1/2) vote each.
The JBC En Banc, on 2001, decided to allow the two representatives be entitled with one full vote
each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature.
SECTION 8. (1) A JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL IS HEREBY CREATED UNDER THE
SUPERVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT COMPOSED OF:
The Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,

The Secretary of Justice, and
A representative of the Congress as ex officio Members,
A representative of the Integrated Bar,
A professor of law,
A retired Member of the Supreme Court, an
A representative of the private sector.
It is this issue that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of
he c e i he h a e a e e e a i e f C g e . I i hei he ha he h e ,
the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of
C ge , ch ha he ab e ce f ei he di e he e m f i b a i e mea i g a e e ed
under the Constitution.
In simplistic terms, the House of Representatives, without the Senate and vice-versa, is not
Congress. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise
their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constituti eak f a e e e a i e f m C g e , i h ld
mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members,
two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The word C g e ed i A icle VIII, Sec i 8(1) f he C i i i ed i i
generic sense. No allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that
is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.
It i e ide ha he defi i i f C ge a a bicame al b d efe its primary function

in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
he le f each h e i he ce . The ame h ld ei C ge -legislative powers. An
inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
he e m C g e m be ake mea he e i e legi la i e de a me . The C i i
mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to
the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
iii. Jardeleza v. Sereno

(G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza
(Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence,
he was interviewed.
However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself CJ Sereno,
ill be i ki g a imi le agai him. I i i ked beca e Ja dele a i egrity is in question.
During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized
Ja dele a i eg i a d bi . Ja dele a a e ed ha he ld defe d him elf ided ha d e
process would be observed. His request was denied, and he was not included in the shortlist.
Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to
include him in the list claiming the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in
excluding him, despite having garnered enough votes to qualify for the position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available during JBC proceedings in cases where
an objection or opposition to an application is raised.
RULING:
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically
de ig a e a a lica e i leme d e ce .
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
N i h a di g bei g a cla fi , he igh be hea d a d e lai e elf i a aili g.
I ca e he e a bjec i a a lica alifica i i ai ed, he b e a ce f d e

ce ei he c adic he f lfillme f he JBC d ec mme d. Thi h ldi g i a
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Its adherence to the precepts of due
process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently
denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a
clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound
and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply
the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear
the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an
exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the
shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This
consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets
of due process.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact
that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
iv. Aguinaldo, et al v. Aquino, et al

(G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016)
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
On June 11, 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) issued Presidential Decree
No. 1486, creating a special court called the Sandiganbayan, composed of a Presiding Judge and
eight Associate Judges to be appointed by the President, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal
and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government owned or controlled corporations. A few
months later, on December 10, 1978, President Marcos also issued Presidential Decree No. 1606,
which elevated the rank of the members of the Sandiganbayan from Judges to Justices, co-equal in
rank with the Justices of the Court of Appeals; and provided that the Sandiganbayan shall sit in three
divisions of three Justices each.5 Republic Act No. 7975 was approved into law on March 30, 1995
and it increased the composition of the Sandiganbayan from nine to fifteen Justices who would sit in
five divisions of three members each. Republic Act No. 10660, recently enacted on April 16, 2015,
created two more divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three Justices each, thereby resulting in six
vacant positions.
On July 20, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine Star and
Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an announcement calling for applications or
recommendations for the six newly created positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.8
After screening and selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to President Aquino six shortlists
contained in six separate letters, all dated October 26, 2015.
President Aquino issued on January 20, 2015 the appointment papers for the six new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, namely: (1) respondent Musngi; (2) Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz (R.
Cruz); (3) respondent Econg; (4) Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega (Mendoza-Arcega); (5)
Justice Karl B. Miranda (Miranda); and (6) Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses (Trespeses). The appointment
papers were transmitted on January 25, 2016 to the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, who
took their oaths of office on the same day all at the Supreme Court Dignitaries Lounge. Respondent
Econg, with Justices Mendoza-Arcega and Trespeses, took their oaths of office before Supreme
Court Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno); while respondent Musngi, with Justices R.
Cruz and Miranda, took their oaths of office before Supreme Court Associate Justice Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza).
According to petitioners, the JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution to reduce the
politicization of the appointments to the Judiciary. It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and
select nominees recommended for appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with at least
three qualified nominees for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary to be submitted to the President,
who, in turn, shall appoint from the shortlist for said specific vacancy. Petitioners emphasize that
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous as to the mandate of the
JBC to submit a shortlist of nominees to the President for "every vacancy" to the Judiciary, as well as
the limitation on the President's authority to appoint members of the Judiciary from among the
nominees named in the shortlist submitted by the JBC.
In this case, the JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven nominees each, for the
six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st
Associate Justices. Petitioners contend that only nominees for the position of the 16th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice may be appointed as the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the same
goes for the nominees for each of the vacancies for the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. However, on January 20, 2016, President Aquino issued the
appointment papers for the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
ISSUES: Whether President Aquino, under the circumstances, was limited to appoint only from the
nominees in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy.
RULING:
The Court answers in the negative.
The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It is a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process, intended to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of
political pressure and partisan activities. The extent of the role of the JBC in recommending
appointees vis-a-vis the power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary was discussed
during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) on July 10, 1986
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or
limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she
considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end,
the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. On this score, the
Court finds herein that President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering
of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of
the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
f. Supreme Court
i. Jurisdiction
1. FORTICH vs. CORONA

(G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large
parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of
farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a
number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the
farmers.
Beca e f hi blackmail , he OP e-opened the case and through Deputy Executive

Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, li icall m i a ed , i - i e l i
November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory.
ISSUE: WON he i - i e l i , i ed af e he igi al deci i had bec me fi al a d

executory, had any legal effect.
RULING:
No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29,
1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the
said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its
jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
a ailed Wi -Wi Re l i . Sec i 7 f Admi i a i e O de N . 18 a d Sec i 4, R le 43 f
the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be
taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was
e mi ed be filed i e ce i all me i i ca e , a ided i he ec d a ag a h f
Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first
motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996
to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and
substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory,
was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or

quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble
purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all.
2. DE CASTRO VS. JBC

(G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from
the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after
the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio
member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the
office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they
have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated
on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation,
and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine
Star.
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing
the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report,
or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno
in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of
nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the
prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the
act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.
A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998
of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago
City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case,
by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the
power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
ISSUES: W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination?
RULING:
There is a justiciable issue
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of
the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which
of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet
vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices,
although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing
President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the
next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates,
a d he i e ie fc i i al e e , a ma be eeded.
The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are
preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons
persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
3. LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 118509, December 1, 1995)
MELO, J.
FACTS:
On June 23, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., a licensed real estatebroker was given formal authority
by BPI to sell the lot for P1,000.00 per square meter. The owners of the Philippine Remnants
concurred this arrangement. Broker Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim of petitioner company who agreed
to buy the land. On July 9, 1988, Revilla formally informed BPI that he had procured a buyer, herein
petitioner.
On July 11, 1988, petitioner's officials, Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai, went to BPI to
confirm the sale. Vice-President Merlin Albano and Asst. Vice-President Aromin entertained them.
The parties agreed that the lot would be sold at P1,000.00 persquare meter to be paid in cash. The
authority to sell was on a first come, first served and non-exclusive basis; there is no dispute over
petitioner's being the first comer and the buyer to be first served. Alfonso Lim then asked if it was
possible to pay on terms. The bank officials stated that there was no harm in trying to ask for payment
on terms because in previous transactions, the same had been allowed. It was the understanding,
however, that should the term payment be disapproved, then the price shall be paid in cash.
Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay on terms had been frozen.
Alfonso Lim went to BPI on July 18, 1988 and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano.
The payment was refused because Albano stated that the authority to sell that particular piece of
property in Pasig had been withdrawn from his unit. The same check was tendered to BPI Vice-
President Nelson Bona who also refused to receive payment.
An action for specific performance with damages was thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by
petitioner against BPI. In the course of the trial, BPI informed the trial court that it had sold the property
under litigation to NBS on July 14, 1989.
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed
and the complaint dismissed on 12 August 1994. It was held that no contract of sale was perfected
because there was no concurrence of the three requisites enumerated in Article 1318 of the Civil
Code.
On its decision in Dec. 1, 1995, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the questioned
judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the 10 June 1991 judgment of Branch 151 of the
RTC of The National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig, Metro Manila except for the award of
P10,000,000.00 damages, which was deleted.
O Ma ch 26, 1996, M i f Rec ide a i a g a ed. Pe i i e ition to the

MR was denied. The SC sets aside Dec. 1, 1995 decision and affirmed in toto the decision of CA.
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration by Petitioner.
ISSUE: WoN the case should be referred to the court en banc.
RULING:
The Petitioner is contending that the case should be referred to the court en banc because as
the doctrines laid down in Abrenica v. Gonda and De Gracia, 34 Phil. 739, Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba,
43 SCRA 473, and Villonco Realty Co. v. Bormaheco, Inc., et. al., 65 SCRA 352, have been modified
or reversed.
The court held that a more circumspect analysis of these cases vis-a-vis the case at bench
would inevitably lead petitioner to the conclusion that there was neither reversal nor modification of
the doctrines laid down in the Abrenica, Talosig and Villonco cases. In fact, the inapplicability of the
principle enunciated in Abrenica and Talosig to this case has already been extensively discussed in
he C e l i , he ce he ame ill be add e ed a ew. As regards the case of Villonco,
petitioner mistakenly assumes that its case has a similar factual milieu with the former. The Court
finds no further need to elaborate on the issue, but will simply point out the significant fact that the
offer of the buyer in Villonco, unlike in this case, was accepted by the seller, Bormaheco, Inc.;
andVillonco involves a perfected contract, a factor crucially absent in the instant case as there was
no meeting of the minds between the parties.
What petitioner bewails the most is the present composition of the Third Division which
delibe a ed i ae e de m i f ec ide a i a d b a maj i e e e ed he
unanimous decision of December 1, 1995. More specifically, petitioner questions the assumption of
Chief Justice Narvasa of the chairmanship of the Third Division and arrogantly rams its idea on how
each Division should be chaired, i.e., the First Division should have been chaired by Chief Justice
Narvasa, the Second Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior Justice and the Third Division by
Mr. Justice Regalado, the third in line. We need only to stress that the change in the membership of
he h ee di i i f he C a i e i able b ea f M . J ice Felicia e i eme . Such
reorganization is purely an internal matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business
at all. I fac , he c e agge ed e -up in the chairmanships of the Divisions is similar to that
adopted in 1988. In that year, the Court Thi d Di i i a like i e chai ed b he Chief J ice
Fernan, while the First and Second Divisions were headed by the next senior Justices--Justices
Narvasa and Melencio-Herrera, respectively.
ACCORDINGLY, e i i e m i f ec ide a i a d motion to refer the case to the

Court En Banc are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY, without prejudice to any and all appropriate
actions that the Court may take not only against counsel on record for the petitioner for his
irresponsible remarks, but also against other persons responsible for the reckless publicity anent this
ca e calc la ed malici l e de he e le faith and confidence in the integrity of this Court.
4. Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board

(G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010)
Velasco, Jr. J.
FACTS:
President Marcos issued PD 1112 authorizing the establishment of toll facilities on public
improvements. It acknowledged the huge financial requirements and the need to tap the resources
of the private sector to implement the gover me i fa c e g am . PD 1112 all ed he
collection of toll fees for the use of certain public improvements that would allow a reasonable rate of
return on investments. The same decree created the Toll Regulatory Board, vesting it with the power
to enter into contracts for the construction, maintenance, and operation of tollways, grant authority to
operate a toll facility, issue the necessary Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) and fix initial toll rates, and
adjust it from time to time after due notice and hearing. PD 1113 was issued granting the Philippine
National Construction Corporation for a period of 30 years, a franchise to operate toll facilities in the
North Luzon and South Luzon Expressways. Subsequently, PD 1894 was issued further granting the
PNCC a franchise over the Metro Manila Expressway and the expanded delineated NLEX and SLEX.
Then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise provision. In 1993, the Government
Corporate Counsel held that the PNCC may enter into a joint venture agreement with private entities
without going into public bidding. On February 1994, the DPWH together with other private entities
executed a MOU to open the door for entry of private capital in the Subic and Clark extension projects.
PNCC entered into a financial and technical JVAs with entities for the toll operation of its franchised
areas. Several Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOA) were entered for the South Metro
Manila Skyway, NLEX Expansion, and South Luzon Expressway Projects.
Petitioners seek to nullify the various STOAs and assail the constitutionality of Sections 3(a
and d) of PD 1112 in relation to Section 8(b) of PD 1894. Insofar as they vested the TRB the power
to issue, modify, and promulgate toll rate changes while given the ability to collect tolls.
ISSUE: Whether or not the TRB may be empowered to grant authority to operate the toll
facility/system.
RULING:
The TRB was granted sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to
operate the toll facility/system. By explicit provisions of the PDs, the TRB was given power to grant
administrative franchise for toll facility projects. The limiting thrust of Article 11, Section 11 of the
Constitution on the grant of franchise or other forms of authorization to operate public utilities may, in
context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of qualified Filipino citizens or
corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as contracts; and (c) no such
authorization shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an
explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative
authority, under the power of subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to
some administrative agencies.
5. JARDELEZA v. SERENO
(G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza
(Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence,
he was interviewed.
However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself CJ Sereno,
ill be i ki g a imi le agai him. I i i ked beca e Ja dele a i eg i i i e i .
During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized
Ja dele a i eg i as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due
process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.
Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to
include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion
in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases
where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.
RULING:
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically
denigrate an applica e i leme d e ce .
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
N i h a di g bei g a cla fi , he igh be hea d a d e lai e elf i a aili g.
In cases where an objection to a a lica alifica i i ai ed, he b e a ce f d e
ce ei he c adic he f lfillme f he JBC d ec mme d. Thi h ldi g i a
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of
due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently
denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a
clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound
and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply
the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an
exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the
shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This
consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets
of due process.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact
that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
6. People v. Redulosa
(G.R. No. 94594, March 29, 1996)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Appellant Romeo Redulosa (alias Micmic Redulosa, Romeo Solon and Micmic Solon) and
Roselo Carton were accused of kidnapping for ransom with murder. The information alleged:
That on or about the 3rd day of December, 1981, at about 8:00 oclock A.M., and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon, with the use of a motor vehicle, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, did then and there
kidnap or detain one Christopher Jason Tan, aged 9 years, or deprive him of his liberty by bringing
him to Tan-awan, Carcar, Cebu, and at the same time demanding money in the amount of
P100,000.00 from the parents of said Christopher Jason Tan as ransom for the liberty of said
Christopher Jason Tan, and upon failure of said parents to come up with the full amount of P
100,000.00, with deliberate intent and intent to kill, with treachery, abuse of superior strength, evident
premeditation, and in disregard the respect due the offended party on account of his age, did then
and there stab with the use of a bladed weapon aforesaid Christopher Jason Tan several times on
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries:
STAB WOUNDS ON DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE BODY:
as a consequence of which said Christopher Jason Tan died.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can grant requests to dismiss an appeal for crimes with capital
punishment.
RULING:
In its resolution dated April 30, 1987, in Administrative Matter No. 87-5-3173-0, this Court
ruled:
(1) that notices be given to all the accused in the pending cases before the Court wherein the death
penalty has been imposed, advising said accused that the death penalty imposed upon them has
been officially commuted to reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) by virtue of the abolition of the
death penalty under the 1987 Constitution and that with such abolition of the death penalty their cases
are no longer subject to automatic review by this Court, and
(2) to GRANT said accused a period of thirty (30) days from notice within which to file a written
statement, personally signed by them with the assistance of their counsel, stating whether or not they
wish to continue with their said cases as an appealed case.
(a) If they file such statement that they wish to continue with this Courts reviewing their conviction as
an appealed case, the Court will do so, rendering a judgment of affirmance, modification of the penalty
or reversal as may be warranted by the evidence and applicable law; and
(b) If they file a statement that they are satisfied with the judgment of the trial court whose death
penalty has now been commuted to reclusion perpetua, or if they fail to file any statement within the
30-day period herein given, the Court will dismiss the case and remand the same to the trial court for
execution of judgment.
This ruling is now embodied in Circular No. 9 dated May 20, 1987 of this Court. Consequently
this case has remained in this Court only because of appellants decision to continue his case as an
appealed case. However, as appellant had the right to continue with his case as an appealed one, so
does he have a right - subject to the approval of this Court - to terminate the appeal by withdrawing
it.[1] Both the appellants counsel and the Solicitor General urge approval of appellants motion.
7. Garcia v. People
(G.R. No. 106531, November 18, 1999)
PARDO, J.
FACTS:
On September 29, 1986, the Provincial Fiscal of Guimaras filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Iloilo City, an information charging petitioners with murder for the killing of one Jose Estrella.
After due trial, on September 21, 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting
petitioners of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
pay jointly and severally, the heirs of Jose Estrella the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, to suffer
the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.
On September 24, 1990, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of
the decision. However, on September 2, 1991, the trial court denied the motion. On September 5,
1991 petitioner received notice of the order of denial. Petitioners did not interpose an appeal from the
decision by the filing of a notice of appeal. Thus, the decision became final on September 17, 1991.
Accordingly, the trial court issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners.
On November 13, 1991, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to lift warrant of arrest
and to allow accused to appeal, arguing that there was no need for them to appeal the decision as
the same was subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court.
On January 17, 1992, the trial court denied the motion.
On February 14, 1992, the trial court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court must automatically review a trial c decision
convicting an accused of a capital offense and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
RULING:
No. The issue is not new. We have consistently ruled that it is only in cases where the penalty
actually imposed is death that the trial court must forward the records of the case to the Supreme
Court for automatic review of the conviction.
As the petitioners did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their desire to appeal
from the decision convicting them of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, the
decision became final and unappealable.
8. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
(G.R. No. 135789, January 31, 2002)
PARDO, J.
FACTS:
The Case is a petition for certiorari to nullify two (2) resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, namely:
(1) Resolution dated April 13, 1998 ordering the lifting of the writ of sequestration over the assets,
shares of stocks, property, records and bank deposit of Hans M. Menzi Holdings and Management
Inc. (HMHMI); and
(2) Resolution dated August 21, 1998 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was prima facie factual basis for the issuance of a writ of sequestration
over the assets, shares of stock, property records and bank deposits of HMHMI.
RULING:
We deny the petition. The issue is factual.
It is well settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions or final
orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law.[19] A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts;
or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented,
the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.[20] A question of facts exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability
of the situation.[21]
The Supreme court is not a trier of facts. It is not the Courts function to examine and weigh all
over again the evidence presented in the proceedings below.[22]
At any rate, we agree with respondents that the Sandiganbayan has full authority to decide
on all incidents in the ill-gotten case, including the propriety of the writs of sequestration that the
PCGG initially issued. Based on the evidence the PCGG submitted so far to the Sandiganbayan, the
late Hans M. Menzi owned the Bulletin Publishing Corporation almost one hundred (100%) per cent
since 1957, except those Bulletin shares sold to U.S. Automotive corporation in 1985, those converted
to treasury shares in 1986, and those sold to the general public at public offerings. In the absence of
competent evident showing thus far that President Ferdinand E. Marcos or his cronies ever acquired
Bulletin shares of the late Hans M. Menzi or HMHMI that might be subject to sequestration, we may
not void the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in question.
9. Fabian v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998)
REGALADO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which participated in the bidding for government
construction projects including those under the First Manila Engineering District (FMED), and private
respondent Nestor V. Agustin, incumbent District Engineer, reportedly taking advantage of his official
position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. After misunderstandings and unpleasant
incidents, Fabian eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against Agustin in a letter-
complaint. The Graft Investigator of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding private respondent
guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits
under the law. On a motion for reconsideration, Agustin was exonerated of the administrative charges.
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can resolve the constitutionality of Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 not raised in the trial.
RULING:
Yes. Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved
i hich ca e i ma be ai ed a a ime he c m i . The C e me m
may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The
court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.
10. CARPIO-Morales vs. CA

(G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov 10, 2015)
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner
Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar
Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against
the implementation of the Joint Order dated March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-
0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him and several other public
officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the
Resolution5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s
petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining
the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman.
RULING:
OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against
her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She
advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise
insulated it from judicial intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable
from the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or
political pressure would."
Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the
Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. the
concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its
constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its]
freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget
cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair
said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the
ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman
from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis
to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are
apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence,
the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional
writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale
of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.
11. ESTIPONA V. LOBRIGO

(G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017)
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation
of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation
in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession.
Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations
of said law violates:
1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power
of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
RULING:
YES.
The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of
our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass
upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of
the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the
legi la i e a d e ec i e b a che f g e me . T ei e a e, he C a h i m lga e
rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional
independence.
12. Republic v. Sereno

(G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006,
Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations
known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no
ec d Se e file f a e mi i e gage i limi ed ac ice f fe i . M e e ,
of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)
were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which
he edl ced f m he fili g cabi e da e f UP . The Omb d ma like i e had
no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum,
for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief
Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which
a e all e i SALN Decembe 31, 2011 f h e i he g e me a d SALN a f
Decembe 31, 2011 f h e f m he i a e ec . The JBC a ceme f he ided ha
a lica i h i c m le e -of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or
c ide ed f mi a i . Se e e e ed i a le e JBC ha i ce he e ig ed f m UP La
on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and
only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno
like i e added ha c ide i g ha m f he g e me ec d i he academe a e m e ha
15 ea ld, i i ea able c ide i i fea ible e ie e all f h e file , a d ha he
clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the
le e a delibe a ed . De i e hi , a e he JBC, Se e a aid ha e c m le e
e i eme . O A g 2012, Se e a a i ed Chief J stice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno,
alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives
proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta,
the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other
findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her
1990 SALN, but a decla ed i i ea a d b e e ea SALN , fail e f he h ba d
to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in
representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking
he C igi al j i dic i de Sec i 5(1), A icle VIII f he C i i i ela i he
special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of
he e a di a i f a a decla e a id Se e a i me a CJ f he SC a d
to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for
Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual
bias for having testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of
Representatives.
Contentions:
Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to
question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v.
Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the
h a e ma be em ed f m ffice i Sec i 2, A icle XI f he C i i mea s that Members
of the SC may be removed through modes other than impeachment.
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under
Sec i 11, R le 66 i ce Se e a ge i l came ligh d i g he im eachme t
proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition
de he ma im ll m em cc i egi ( ime agai he ki g ) e ci i d e
operate against the government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who
partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable
to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which
to know the disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which
created a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints
involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that
this is not a political question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the
provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.
OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show
that she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the
Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG
failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The
failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a
candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be considered as a defense
since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed
by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):
Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing
Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon.
Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment
Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by
impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing certain high-
ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will prevent them from
performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno further
a g e ha he d ma Sec i 2 f A icle XI l alifie he e al im able af e he
impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the
SC has no jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case
because the President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than
impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the
e be he le j dge f all c e ela i g he alifica i f he P e ide a d he Vice-
President. There is no such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the
cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such
would result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised
disciplinary power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank
and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC
disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated
b he OSG, he C g e check he SC h gh im eachme ld be rendered inutile.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that
a eii f a a m be filed i hi e (1) ea f m he ca e f e a d f m
he di c e f he di alifica i .
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs
because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular.
OSG failed to overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had
been cleared of all administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question
which can only be decided by the JBC and the President.
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot
give rise to the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an
inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.
Intervenors arguments:
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she
possessed the integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not
she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional
requirement; what is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that
alifica i ch a ci i e hi , age, a d e e ie ce a e e f ceable hile cha ac e i ic ch
as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.
ISSUE: Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for
quo warranto.
RULING:
A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs,
i cl di g a a . A di ec i ca i f he SC igi al j i dic i i e ch i i
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC
is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition
is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered
to exercise its power of judicial review. T e e ci e e ai i e ie i g a im eachable ffice
appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the C
duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are
essentially judicial in character i call f he e e ci e f he S eme C c i i al d
and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be
abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including
the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.
To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the

eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules
hile im eachme i a li ical ce i dica e he i la i f he blic . I quo warranto
proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the
appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo
warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it
public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given
permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the
national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.
iii. Rule-Making Power
1. PRIMICIAS v. OCAMPO
(G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953)
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
FACTS:
Section 129 of the Revised Administrative Code. He chartered a vessel of Philippine registry
to an alien without the approval of the President, and iled to submit to the Collector of Customs the
manifests and a he ica ed d c me f he e el A a c ic. He al failed b ai he
necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of the vessel to a foreign
port. Before the trial, petitioner invokes Section 49 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which
provides that the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court or
the Court of First Instance may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
The CFI dismissed the petition stating that the rule-making power vested in the Supreme Court
expressly omits the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: W/N the right to trial with the aid of assessor is impaired by the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court
RULING:
NO. The right to trial with the aid of assessors is a substantive right and as such, are not
embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and Section 2477 of the Administrative Code grant this right to a party litigant. This right has been
declared absolute and substantial by the Supreme Court in several cases where the aid of assessors
had been invoked. Inclusion of trial by assessor in the Rules of Court would be a travesty of its rule-
making power, as directed by the Constitution to be limited to powers referring to pleading, practice,
and procedure. While our Constitution has given the power to adopt the rules of procedure to the
Supreme Court, such grant did not preclude Congress from enacting any procedural law or altering,
amending, or supplementing any of the rules that may be promulgated by the Supreme Court.
2. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS v. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994)
NOCON, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner, First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. was granted its application to amend its Board of
I e me Ce ifica e f Regi a i b cha gi g he c e f i egi e ed d c f m gla ed
fl ile ce amic ile . Ma i a a filed a m i f econsideration. The Court of Appeals
required petitioner to comment on the case, and issued a temporary restraining order against the
implementation of the BOI decision. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that
the CA has no appellate jurisdiction over the BOI case, contending that it is exclusively vested in the
Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of EO 226. CA dismissed the petition, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction over the BOI case.
RULING:
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed Article 82 of EO 226 insofar as the manner and method
of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of
the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should
now be brought to the CA. The argument that Article 82 of EO 226 cannot be validly repealed by
Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right, which under the Constitution cannot be
modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power is not entirely
defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 grants the right of appeal from
decisions of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such
appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court
has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.
3. IN RE: INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

(49 SCRA 22, 9 January 1973)
PER CURIAM
FACTS:
The Supreme Court created the Commission on Bar Integration to ascertain the advisability
of unifying the Philippine Bar. The Congress then passed House Bill 3277, an act providing for the
integration of the Philippine bar and appropriating funds therefor. President Marcos signed the
measure and became Republic Act No. 6397, which authorizes the Supreme Court to adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE: W/N the integration of the Philippine Bar is constitutional
RULING:
YES. RA 6397 ei he c fe a e e e ic he C i he e e,b i a
mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will raise the standards of the legal professions, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. The Courts have inherent power
to supervise and regulate the practice of law. Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with
public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance
i h he la e blic e ibili ie . Gi e e i i g Ba c di i , he m efficie mea f
doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues
to the Integrated Bar.
4. ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

(G.R. No. 132601, 19 January 1999)
PER CURIAM
FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted for rape of his common law e e ea ld da gh e a d a
sentenced to death penalty. He filed for a motion for reconsideration raising the constitutionality of
RA 6759 or the Death Penalty Law. The motion were denied. Thereafter, RA 8177 was passed
amending Article 8 of the RPC, in which the mode of execution was changed from electrocution to
lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement RA 8177
and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. Petitioner
filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from
carrying out the execution. The Supreme Court issued a TRO. Respondent assailed the issuance of
the TRO arguing that the action not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached
on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: W/N the TRO issued by SC encroached upon the powers of the Executive in granting a
reprieve, and the Legislature in promulgating such rules
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court has the constitutional power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts as provided in Art. VII Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution.
There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction
to amend, modify, or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final
for the purpose of enforcing the judgment, while the latter terminates when the judgment becomes
final. The power of Congress under the 1937 and 1973 Constitution to repeal, alter or supplement
rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure was taken away by the present constitution in the
expansion of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court in the furtherance of its independence.
5. Writ of Amparo
a. CANLAS V. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

(G.R. No. 182795, 5 June 2008)
REYES, R.T., J.
FACTS:
Petitioners are settlers in a certain pace of land. Their dwellings have been demolished or is
about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They filed a petition for writ of amparo to
summon some unprincipled Land Officials as they allege to answer their participation in the issuance
of fraudulent titles to NAPICO.
ISSUE: W/N writ of amparo is proper in this case
RULING:
NO. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that it shall be available to any person whose
rights to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of final judgment of the court is
not included among the enumeration of rights covered by the writ. There must be a clear allegation
of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected for a writ of amparo to be
issued. Their claim to dwelling does not constitute right to life, liberty an security.
b. TAPUZ V. DEL ROSARIO

(G.R. No. 182484, 17 January 2008)
BRION, J.
FACTS:
Spouses Sanson filed a complaint before the MCTC of Baruanga-Malay, Aklan for forcible
e i h damage agai he T a . The Sa allege ha he 1 hec a e f la d a
e ide ced b he TCT i hei ame, a d ha he T a came i he e a med i h b l
and suspected firearms, with force and intimidation, and took possessions of the disputed property
and built a nipa and bamboo structure. The MCTC ruled in favor of the Sansons. Petitioners appealed
to the RTC, which was denied. The sheriff of Aklan served the notice to vacate and for demolition to
he T a . Pe i i e came he S eme C a i gf h ee emedie : ce i a i, i f
habeas data, and writ of amparo.
ISSUE: W/N i f am a ma be i ed f he T a i hi ca e
RULING:
NO. The writ of amparo is fatally defective with respect to content and substance. The writ of
amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It was not conceived to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. It cannot be issued as well on the basis of amorphous and uncertain grounds. As the
threat posed to petitioners seemed to be purely properly-related and focused on a land dispute, the
proper remedy sought for may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on
the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
c. CARAM v. SEGUI
(G.R. No. 193652, 5 August 2014)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Constantino III, to which she became
pregnant without the benefit of marriage. She intended to have the child adopted through Sun and
Moon Home for Children, which shouldered all her hospital and medical expenses. She voluntarily
surrendered the baby by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. Thereafter, a
certificate was issued declaring the baby as legally available for adoption. The baby was matched
with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was commenced. Petitioner changed her mind
about the adopted and asked DSWD to suspend the adoption proceedings. DSWD responded,
through Atty. Segui, informing her that the certificate effectively terminated her parental authority.
Petitioner then filed a petition for the issuance of writ of amparo seeking custody of the baby.
ISSUE: W/N a petition for a writ of amparo is proper
RULING:
No. There was no enforced disappearance in this case. The Court enumerated the three
eleme c i i g e f ced di a ea a ce : (1) he e be a a e , de e i , abd c i , a
form of deprivation of liberty; (2) it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State or a political orga i a i ; (3) ha i be f ll ed b he S a e li ical ga i a i
refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person; (4) that the
intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of law for a prolonged period
f ime. The e a di a ea a ce beca e he e de DSWD e e c cealed he bab
whereabouts, and the adoption proceedings were conducted in accordance with law.
6. Writ of Habeas Data
a. Lee v Ilagan
(G.R. No. 203154, 8 October 2014)
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Ilagan, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy,
he f me c mm la a e . Acc di g him, me ime i J l 2011 he i i ed J
condominium and rested or a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera
missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered from
the digital camera showing him and another woman. He denied the video and demanded the return
f he came a, b he ef ed. The had a al e ca i he e Ilaga allegedl lammed J head
against a wall and then walked away. Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including
a case for violation of republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilizing the
said video. The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the other
woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data.
RTC i ed he i a d di ec ed Lee a ea bef e he c a d d ce Ilaga digi al

camera, as well as the original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days from
receipt. In her return, Lee admitted keeping the memory card of the digital camera and reproducing
he ide b l e a e ide ce i he ca e he filed agai Ilaga . Ilaga eii h ld
be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in the cases she filed
against him and she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person
of Ilagan.
The RTC g a ed Ilaga e i i a d de ed he e f he ide Ne i a d e j i ed

Lee f m e d c i f he ame. I di ega ded Lee defe e ha she is not engaged in the
collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her acts to reproducing the same and showing it
he e (Na lc m) i la ed Ilaga igh i ac a d h milia ed him. I cla ified ha i
ruling only on the return of the video and not on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Lee filed
the instant petition before the Supreme Court
ISSUE: WON the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan
RULING:
AM No. 08-01-16 SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was
conceived as a response given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a
judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals, which is defined as the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination
of data about oneself.
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of the habeas data now stands as
a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party. Thus, in order to support a petition or the
issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires the petition sufficiently
allege , am g he , he ma e he igh i ac i i la ed h ea e ed a d h i affec
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. In other words, the petition must adequately
show that there exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right to life, liberty,
or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue
to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague of doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan has not able to sufficiently alleged that his right to
privacy in life, liberty, or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction of the
subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video, which he
fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption,
he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty
or security.
b. Gamboa v Chan
(G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012)
Sereno, J.
FACTS:
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as
someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification,
PNP Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby
ca i g he i cl i i he Re e me a i f i di id al mai ai i g PAG . C e di g ha
her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the
PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE: WON the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy
is invoked as ed he a e i e e i e e i g he igh life, libe ec i .
RULING:
NO. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum
e f ce e igh he h a d i f ma i al i ac . I eek ec a e igh
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in
order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence
that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible
to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained
that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
[T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of
Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
c. Vi ares St. Theresa s College

(G.R. No. 202666, 29 September 2014)
Velasco,Jr., J.
FACTS:
I Ja a 2012, A gela Ta , a high ch l de a S . The e a C llege (STC), l aded
on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing
only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher,
Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She
h ed he aid ic e STC Di ci li e-in-Charge for appropriate action.
La e , STC f d Ta e al ha e i la ed he de ha db k a d ba ed hem f m
ma chi g i hei g ad a i ce em ie ched led i Ma ch 2012. The i ue went to court but
despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from
barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The i ac e i g f hei child e Faceb k acc a e a F ie d O l . The ,

thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without
their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos
and by subsequently showing them STC fficial . Th , he Faceb k acc f he
children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digi al image ha e ed a STC C m e Lab a ;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the
child e igh i ac .
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
RULING:
Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing
or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the
b i e f ga he i g, c llec i g, i g da a i f mation regarding the person, family, home
a dc e de ce f he agg ie ed a .
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy
tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of
privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy
l . E ide ce ld h ha ha hei ( a ) Faceb k e e bli hed a P blic .
Facebook has the following settings to con l a h ca ie a e hi all ( file
page):
(a) Public the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends l he e Faceb k f ie d a d hei f ie d ca ie he h ;
(c) Friends onl he e Faceb k f ie d ca ie he h ;
(d) Custom the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook
user; and
(e) Only Me the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The defa l e i g i P blic and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose
a e i g he ha P blic . If i i e ha he de c ce ed did e he bjec f hi
case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their
classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates
who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that
Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of
privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did i la e he de igh i ac . The ma e hich he ch l ga he ed he

pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who
showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered
them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students
according to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the first
place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).
7. Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (AM No. 09-6-8-SC): MMDA v Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay
(G.R. No. 17947-48, 8 December 2008)
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be
jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water
quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and
Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup
of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
RULING:
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to
confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific
pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence
f a ecific ll i i cide , a l g a a e ali ha de e i a ed a deg ee he e i
state will adve el affec i be age. Sec i 17 & 20 a e f ge e al a lica i a d a e f
specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude
and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general
pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial
in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes
a c i i g ma dam , he C urt may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives
with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative
inaction or indifference.
ii. Change of Venue
1. People v Gutierrez
(G.R. No. 142905, March 18, 2002)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:
A group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province
of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in
barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise
burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman
named Vicenta Balboa.
After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two information for arson with homicide and for arson, charging that the seventeen
private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons, for the crimes.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47V
and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the
hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and
personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The respondent judge declined the transfer.
Beca e f he l e c de ial, he filed a ca e f ce i a i a d ma dam he

Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of venue can be allowed.
RULING:
Though the Secretary of Justice is not authorized to transfer specific and individual cases, the
Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and
inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts "can by
appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make
the judiciary an effective institution of government". One of these incidental and inherent powers of
courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring
site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of
justice, so demands.
The requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied in the filing of the criminal case
in Ilocos Sur. The holding of the trial is a matter of venue rather than jurisdiction. There is factual
basis that the witnesses claim: (1) 82 of the armed suspects are still unidentified; (2) Vincent
Crisologo, private respondent, belongs to an influential family in the province; (3) it is not shown that
the Executive branch is able or willing to give these witnesses full security during the trial and possible
murderous assault after; (4) confirmation and promotion of Judge Gutierrez was actively supported
by Cong. and Gov. Crisologo.
iv. Administrative Supervision
1. Fuentes v Ombudsman Mindanao

(G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001)
PARDO, J.
FACTS:
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao filed a criminal complaint charging Judge
Renato A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e). The Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao through Graft Investigation Officer II Marivic A. Trabajo-Daray issued an
order directing petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit within ten days. Petitioner filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all
records to the Supreme Court. The Graft Investigation Officer, however, denied the motion of
petitioner. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner maintained that the respondent Ombudsman-
Mindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
initiated a criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3[e]. According
to petitioner, public respondent encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. According to the Court, the Ombudsman may not
initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge,
pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action. The Court stressed that Article VIII, Section 6 of the
Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land.
No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence
of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his
official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence
of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
RULING:
No. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
Sec. 15. P e , F c i a d D ie . - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the

following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at
a age, f m a i e iga age c f G e me , he i e iga i f ch ca e .
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint
before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section
6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the
land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
Pe i i e e i ed de di ec i g he a achme f g e me e a di i ga
writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may
be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of
execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial
action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to s e i e he c . N he e i fficial f
the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary
thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not--
and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for
rendering an unjust judgment or order.
2. Maceda v Vasquez
(G.R. NO. 102781, 22 April 1993)
Nocon, J.
RULING:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner
Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been
rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into
he SC c i i al d f e i i e all inferior courts.
RULING:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
C e f admi i a i e e i i e all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over
all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial
c cle k. B i e f hi e ,i i l he SC ha ca e ee he j dge a d c e el
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the
SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
v. Consultations/Decisions
1. Prudential Bank v. Castro

(A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988)
En banc
FACTS:
In the Macro Textile Mills Corporation (Macro) v. Prudential Bank, Macro filed the complaint
alleging that Go Cun Uy, President and General Manager of Macro, had no authority to mortgage
their property and that his execution of the mortgage was due to the fraudulent manipulations of the
petitioner Prudential Bank. Through a summary judgment, respondent Judge Jose Castro resolved
the case declaring the mortgage null and void and ordering Prudential Bank to pay Macro more than
PHP 33 million in damages plus a e fee . The la e m ed f ec ide a i , h e e i a
de ied l f f ma b al f lack f me i . C e e l , e de j dge c ide ed
his decision to be final and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Petitioner instituted an
administrative complaint against respondent judge for committing serious and grave misfeasance.
The Supreme Court found respondent judge to be guilty for showing partiality towards Macro
and was accordingly dismissed from service. The latter filed for a motion for reconsideration, however,
the Court denied it with finality upon a Minute Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court disregarded the Constitutional provision in promulgating the Minute
Resolution against respondent judge.
RULING:
NO. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is inapplicable because this is an administrative
case. And even if it were, the Minute Resolution stated the legal basis for their denial of the motion
for reconsideration. Lack of merit, which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis pursuant
to the Rules of Court.
2. Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

(G.R. No. 13585, December 6, 2000)
En banc
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa and several intervenors to the case assail the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the
I dige Pe le Righ Ac f 1997 (IPRA) a d i Im leme i g R le a d Reg la i . The
contend that they amount to an u la f l de i a i f he S a e e hi e la d f he blic
domain, as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Petitioners also contend that, by providing for
an all-e c m a i g defi i i f a ce al d mai a d a ce al la d , ch ma i la e he
rights of private landowners.
In addition, petitioners also question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and making customary law
applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the
ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1 which they claim
i f i ge he P e ide e fc l e e ec i e de a me .
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
RULING:
After deliberation of the petition, the Supreme Court en banc were equally divided. Seven
members voted to dismiss the petition, while seven others voted to grant such. The case was
redeliberated upon, however, after such, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule
56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is dismissed.
3. Mendoza v. Court of First Instance of Quezon, 9th Judicial District, Gumaca Branch
(G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973)
Fernando, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Norberto Mendoza motioned for reconsideration for the Supreme Court Minute
Resolution dismissing his petitions for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. The
Court ruled that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that his confinement was marked
by illegality or that the order cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the minute resolution violated Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
RULING:
NO. According to jurisprudence (Jose v. Santos), what is expected of the judiciary is that the
decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as
established. Nor is there any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the
requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not
unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain
of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs.
4. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 82273, June 1, 1990)
En banc
FACTS:
Petitioner Joaquin Borromeo filed a complaint for damages against personnel of the Third
Division of the Supreme Court, namely Atty. Julieta Carreo, Division Clerk of Court; Atty. Afredo
Marasigan, Asst. Division Clerk of Court; and Atty. Jose Ilustre, Chief of the Judicial Records Office.
All three allegedly usurped judicial functions by issuing a biased, fake and unconstitutional
Re l i a d E f J dgme i hi ca e d cke ed a G.R. N . 82273 hich ca ed B me
grave moral shock, mental anguish, sleepless nights, severe embarrassment and endless worry,
thus, the group must be condemned to pay moral damages in the amount of not less that PHP
50,000.00. The alleged fake e l i hich di ed f B me eii c m lie i h he
constitutional requirements governing resolutions refusing to give due course to petitions for review.
B me m i f ec ide a i was received by the Court more than a month after the release
of the resolution, so it was noted to have merely reiterated the same arguments and already passed
upon by the Court and was, therefore without merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged minute resolution was valid.
RULING:
YES. The Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as
final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with
the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is led
merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The
resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis. As emphasized
i j i de ce (I Re: We ce la La e a), he C i d b d e de ig ed Deci i
all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a
legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
5. Solid Homes v. Laserna

(G.R No. 166051, April 8, 2008)
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
Respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe bought a parcel of land from petitioner Solid
Homes, Inc. (SHI). Both parties agreed upon a systematic payment wherein a down-payment shall
be paid upon signing of the contract, with the remaining balance payable for a period of three years
at a monthly installment. When 90% had been paid, the respondents demanded the execution and
delivery of the property upon final payment of the balance, but SHI did not comply. Respondents filed
a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which then directed the
petitioner to comply with the execution.
SHI appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, who in turn, modified the decision
rendered previously. Upon appeal, the Office of the President (OP) affirmed the same, who later,
denies their move for reconsideration. The case was elevated Court of Appeals (CA), but was
dismissed for lack of merit. The same denied the motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition
alleging that the Decision made was in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Decision runs afoul of the mandate of the Constitution.
RULING:
NO. The constitutional mandate that the decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based does n ecl de he alidi f mem a d m deci i , hich
adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior
tribunals. Memorandum decisions are a species of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 40, B.P. 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency,
practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts.
To be valid, it cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower
court only by means of remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily
and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by
reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision should actually embody the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the
lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.
6. Dizon v. Judge Lopez

(A.M. No. RTJ-96-1339, September 5, 1997)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Engr. Fernando Dizon filed a complaint charging respondent Judge Lilia Lopez with
the violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency and falsification in connection with
her decision in the criminal case wherein petitioner was a respondent. The promulgation of the
judgment in the case consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to
imprisonment, without serving him a copy of the decision.
Dizon alleged that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a copy of the decision until
almost one (1) year and eight (8) months after the promulgation of its dispositive portion constitutes
a violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits courts from rendering
decisions without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based;
and Section 15 of the same, which provides that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions
within three (3) months from the date of their submission.
Judge Lopez claimed that when the decision was promulgated, her decision was already
prepared. She simply withheld its dispositive portion to prevent leakage in the process of preparing
it. She further stated that she gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II) for typing and
incorporating into the text of the decision the dispositive portion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge Lopez violated Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Pursuant to Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, merely reading the dispositive
portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him,
stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is based. Thus, it is obvious that the respondent
failed to render her decision within three (3) months as required by Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the
Constitution. The proper recourse for the judge should have been an application for an extension of
time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of the decision until she had finished it. What
must be promulgated must be the complete decision, as there would be no more reason to keep the
dispositive portion a secret, once the judgment has been promulgated.
7. People v. Baring
(G.R. No.137933, January 28, 2002)
En banc
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Valentin Baring was convicted of statutory rape committed against the
seven-year old granddaughter of his common-law wife. Because of the penalty imposed, his case
was automatically sent to the Supreme Court for review. Through his counsel, he filed a petition
before the Court to dismiss the cause that is subject for automatic review claiming that the decision
rendered by the lower court is bereft of material facts supporting the conviction; the medico-legal
certificate is not reliable since the physician who conducted the examination was not presented as a
witness, depriving him of his right to cross-examination; the case of attempted homicide filed by the
ic im g a dm he a i i all di mi ed; a d ha he a me el a fall g a d a he
person is responsible for the crime charged against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed on account of the decision rendered by the
lower court.
RULING:
NO. The trial court's decision may cast doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant. Such doubt
may be engendered not by the lack of direct evidence against accused-appellant, but by the trial
court's failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility of the evidence
presented for or against the accused, the assessments made from the evidence presented, and the
conclusions drawn therefrom after applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision. A decision need
not be a complete recital of the evidence presented, so long as the factual and legal bases are clearly
and distinctly laid down.
8. Martinez v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 123547, May 21, 2001)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister, Manuela, sold a vacant lot at Villa
Fe Subdivision in Cabanatuan City to petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish priest
of Cabanatuan City, for the sum of PHP 15,000.00. They agreed upon that Martinez would give a
down-payment of PHP 3,000.00 and that the balance would be payable by installment. After
construction of their house on the lot and completion of payment, the deed of sale, however, was
never delivered.
After some time, Martinez discovered that De la Paz had sold three lots, including the one
sold to him, to private respondent spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion after receiving a letter
from Reynaldo claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they vacate the property and
remove their improvements thereon. Martinez, through his counsel, demanded the execution of the
deed of sale from De la Paz and informed Veneracion that he was the rightful owner of the property.
Veneracion, in turn, brought an action for ejectment before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against
Martinez, which ruled adversely against him and held that Martinez and his mother were, in good
faith, the rightful possessors of the land. Veneracion then appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
which found them the rightful owners of the land, and ordered for Martinez to vacate said land.
Martinez thereafter filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the
ruling of the RTC. Martinez assailed the ruling, alleging that the CA overlooked relevant facts which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion, and that the denial his motion for
reconsideration is in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whe he CA i la ed Sec i 14, A icle VIII f he C i i i de i g eii e

motion for reconsideration.
RULING:
NO. The requirement embedded in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution was fully
complied with when the CA, in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution that it
found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not raised anything new. It is provided
for in their resolution that the points and arguments raised by Martinez have been considered and
passed upon in the Decision, therefore, they find no reason to disturb the same.
9. Komatsu Industries v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998
Regalado, J.
FACTS:
National Investment and Development Corp. (NIDC) granted Komatsu Industries Phils. Inc.
(Komatsu) a direct loan of PHP 8 million and a PHP 2 million guarantee to secure Philippine National
Bank (PNB). As security thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by Komatsu in favor
of NIDC, covering among others, a parcel of land in Makati. A Mortgage Deed was then executed
c ce i g he ame la d, i fa f PNB a d NIDC. U f ll a me f e i i e acc ih
NIDC and credit line with PNB, NIDC executed a Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage for
the return of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the mortgaged land. It was then found that there
were some accounts chargeable to Komatsu on deferred letters of credit opened and established
settled by PNB with foreign lie , b came l he la e k ledge af e e e al ea .
Upon making the request, the TCT of the land in question was returned to PNB. However, the land
covered by the TCT was extra-judicially foreclosed by way of Chattel Mortgage. Petitioner then
contested the foreclosure, alleging that the release by the NIDC had the effect of releasing the real
estate mortgage. The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled adversely against petitioner, thus, was prompted
to file a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. For failure to sufficiently show that
the CA committed any reversible error in its judgment, the petition was denied, rendered in a minute
resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the minute resolution is in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
RULING:
NO. A a ed i j i de ce (N i , e . al. . C f A eal , e . al), e l i ae
deci i i hi he c i i al e i eme f Sec i 14, A icle VIII. The me el h ld ha
the petition for review should not be entertained and the petition to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully
explain the Court's denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals' decision.
10. Tichangco v. Enriquez

(G.R. No. 150629, June 30, 2004)
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
Sometime in March 1996, Renato Tichangco, in behalf of the occupants of various parcels of
land in Gagalangin and Sunog Apog in Tondo, Manila, filed a land title verification request with the
Land Registration Authority (LRA). The verification request was prompted by an alleged claim of
ownership of a certain Manotok over the land which petitioners occupy, and which allegedly have
been identified as Area for Priority Development under the Urban Poor Law.
The LRA-Task Force issued a report stating that a part of the land belonged to Ricardo
Manotok. Public respondent LRA Administrator Alfredo Enriquez, upon being directed to review and
evaluate the records on the issuance of Transfer Certificate Titles (TCT) by the Office of the Solicitor
General, rendered the assailed decision finding no legal ground to initiate an action for the nullification
of the assailed certificates of title.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the resolution of public respondent. In its decision, no
mention of the completion of the magnetic survey was made. Petitioners, in elevating the case to the
Supreme Court, argue that the CA did not comply with the requirement laid down in Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
RULING:
NO. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution deals with the disposition of petitions for review
and of motions for reconsideration. In appellate courts, the rule does not require any comprehensive
statement of facts or mention of the applicable law, but merely a statement of the "legal basis" for
denying due course. Thus, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a
collegiate appellate court, after deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the questions raised
are factual or have already been passed upon; or cites some other legal basis. There is no need to
explain fully the court's denial, since the facts and the law have already been laid out in the assailed
Decision.
g. Tenure of Justices/Judges
i. In Re First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzales

(A.M. No. 88-4-5433, 15 April 1988)
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
The Court considered the 1st Indorsement dated March 16, 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez,
Ta dba a /S ecial; P ec f a di g M . J ice Ma cel B. Fe a a le e -complaint,
da ed 14 Decembe 1987 i h e cl e f he c ce ed em l ee f he S eme C ,
ge he i h a eleg am f Mig el C e c , f c mme i hi (10) da f m ecei he e f. M .
Justice Fernan had brought this first Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the
important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.
Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded to Mr. Justice Marcelo
B. Fernan a letter-complaint. The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC as an
anonymous letter.
The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought
by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking Gonzales to do something about the matter.
The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul
Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the
SC Court in an administrative case, which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any
i e e i b M . Ra l G ale . M . C e c , e hele , e c age M . G ale file
responsive pleading to the Supreme Court en banc.
The Court furnished to Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez a copy of the per curiam Resolution which the
Court resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr. Justice Fernan for utter
lack of merit. In the same Resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show
cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations
against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cuenco, the Court had granted him an extension of
up to 30 March 1988. Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating
to, inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988,
he C de ied i h fi ali M . C e c M i f Rec ide a i .
ISSUE: WON a Supreme Court Justice can be disbarred during his term of office.
RULING:
NO. A public officer who, under the Constitution, is required to be a Member of the Philippine
Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such police officer.
Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the
Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from
office.
Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the
Constitution, members of the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above provision
proscribes removal from office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may
be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an office
which carries the penalty of removal from such, would be violative of the clear mandate of the
Constitution.
The impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of
honor, trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted shall
nevertheless be held liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
The court is not saying that its Members or other constitutional officers are entitled to immunity
from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other
supposed misbehavior. What the court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement
that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A member of the
Supreme Court must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route of impeachment, and
then only he may be held liable either criminally or administratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong
or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
ii. People v Gacott

(G.R. No. 116049, 13 July 1995)
Regalado, J.
FACTS:
The Second Division of the SC resolved to reprimand Judge Gacott of the RTC and fine him
with P10,000 for gross ignorance of the law. In this motion for reconsideration, he questions the
competence of the Second Division to administratively discipline him. He claim ha he cla e The
SC e ba c hall ha e he e di ci li e j dge de hei di mi al f Sec 11, A
VIII of the Constitution means that only the full Court, not a division thereof, can administratively
punish him.
ISSUE: WON only the Court sitting en banc that can administratively discipline judges
RULING:
No. There are two situations envisaged in Art VIII, Sec 11. The first clause which states that
he SC e ba c hall ha e he e di ci li e j dge f l e c i a decla a i f he g a
of that disciplinary power to, and a determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the
Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard
and decided by the Court en banc since it would result in an absurdity. To require the entire Court to
participate in all administrative cases would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the
adjudication of cases in the Court. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to
adopt a systematic plan to expedite decisions/resolutions and the very purpose of authorizing the
C i e ba c i di i i . The ec d cla e decla e ha he C e ba c ca de he
dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations xxx and
ed he e . E ide l , i hi i a ce, he admi i a i e ca e m be delibe a ed a d
decided by the full Court itself. Nonetheless, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed
suspension of one year or a fine of P10,000 or both that the administrative matter may be decided in
division.
iii. Caiobes v Ombudsman

(G.R. No. 132177, 19 July 2001)
Buena, J.
FACTS:
On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the
RTC of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a criminal complaint for physical
injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person
in authority. On June 13, 1997, the respondent Judge lodged another complaint against the petitioner,
this time and administrative case with the Supreme Court praying for the dismissal of petitioner from
the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. On June
25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within 10 days
from the receipt thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affida i , e i i e filed a E -Parte Motion for
referral to the Honorable S eme C , a i g ha he Office f he Omb d ma h ld i
investigation of the case, and refer the same to the SC which is already investigating the case.
Petitioner contended that the SC, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a
preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both
being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.
On August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the SC
stating that under Sec 15 (1) of RA 6770, it s within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal
cha ge . I like i e de ied e i i e m i f ec ide a i .
ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the criminal complaint pending
resolution of the SC for appropriate action.
RULING:
YES. Under Sec. 6, Art. VIII f the Constitution, it is the SC which is vested with exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the
Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or
court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases
against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the SC for determination as to whether
an administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether as
administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already
pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter
unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative
authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court
passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it
does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of
its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This
is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence. It is only the SC that can
e ee he j dge a d c e el c m lia ce i h all la , a d ake he e admi i a i e
action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
iv. Fuentes v Ombudsman-Mindanao

(G.R. No. 124195, 23 Oct 2001)
Pardo, J.
FACTS:
On Jan. 15, 1996, Director Valenzuela of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
recommended that petitioner Judge Fuentes be charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of
RA 3019, Sec 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the SC with acts unbecoming of
a judge for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution the petitioner issued. Petitioner
alleged that the respondent encroached on the power of the SC of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel. The Solictor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an
investigation because the Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which would verify the
propriety of the issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court Administrator has not
field any administrative case against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the present
inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his
official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence
of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
RULING:
NO. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel, form the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and
court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
af l f he i de e de ce f he j dicia a d he d c i e f e a a i f e . Pe i i e
questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of execution
were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or
void for lack of excess jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under
the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme
Court that is tasked to supervise the courts.
h. Periods for Decision
i. Young v. De Guzman
(A.M. No. RTJ-96-1365, February 18, 1999)
VITUG, J.
FACTS:
In verified letter-complaint, dated 26 March 1996, Robert G. Young, President of Banawe
Realty Development Corporation, Charged Judge Pastor V. De Guzman, Jr., of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 60, with unreasonable delay in the disposition of Civil Service No. 873-
R, entitled "La Commercial Company, et al. vs. China Banking Corporation," for recovery of unpaid
rentals owing from store space lessees and accounting of all rentals due and demandable, as well as
the proceeds and receivables from the sales of units, over a condominium property. During the
pendency of the case, La Commercial Company was substituted by Inter Realty Development
Corporation, While China Banking Corporation was substituted by Banawe Realty Development
Corporation. On 16 July 1990, the condominium building was destroyed by a relatively strong
earthquake, prompting the parties to file a manifestation to the above effect along with a joint motion
to dismiss the case, with the Court. On 01 December 1994, counsel for both parties submitted,
reiterating the above motion to dismiss, an opposition to a request for answers by written
interrogatories caused to be made by the manager of Prudential Bank of Baguio City. The motion
remained unresolved until the institution, months later, of the instant administrative case. Instead,
complainant averred, Judge De Guzman had acted "with indecent haste" on a collateral issue
granting Atty. Helenea M. Dauz, former counsel of Banawe Realty Development Corporation,
attorney's fees amounting to P250,000.00 issuing forthwith a writ of execution to enforce the award.
It was unfortunate, he said, that the issue on the withdrawn rentals, submitted for resolution on 04
August 1995, remained unresolved because he had to take a prolonged leave of absence due to
sickness until, in fact, he finally had to file, on 16 February 1996, an application for retirement on total
disability which the Court approved on 18 June 1996. Respondent Judge denied that he had hastily
decided the motion for payment of attorney's fees to Atty. Helenea Dauz, which, he said, indeed took
him three months to resolve in favor of Atty. Dauz and only because no opposition was filed by
Banawe Realty. The petition to reverse the said order, he stressed, was even dismissed by the Court
of Appeals on 26, June 1996.
The Office of the Court Administrator, to which the case was referred for evaluation, report
and recommendation, opined that respondent Judge had failed to abide by paragraph 1.2 of
Administrative Circular No. 4.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge failed to abide to the rules of periods of decision.
RULING:
No. It is truly the duty of every judge to resolve cases filed before him with good dispatch; no
less than the Rules of Court commands that justice must be administered without unnecessary delay.
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct generally admonishes a judge to dispose of the business of
his court promptly. Nevertheless, the judge must not sacrifice for expediency's sake the fundamental
requirements of due process nor to forget that he must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek
the truth, to know and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially,
all to the end that justice is done to every party.
Respondent Judge, in this instance, evidently felt that the issues raised could only be resolved
properly if and after all the parties concerned would have been fully heard. He made it clear in his
order of 20 December 1990 that the issue presented, i.e., the entitlement to the rental deposits
demanded, would require the question of ownership to be first resolved. The matter was judicial in
nature. This administrative case would not be the right forum for it. There was utterly no showing that
respondent Judge had been motivated by, or had acted in, bad faith or malice. With regard to the
claim that respondent resolved the motion for payment of attorney's fees to Atty. Helenea Dauz with
undue haste, the order of 11 April 1995 would show that the motion was granted only when Banawe
Realty had failed to file any comment thereon, let alone an opposition thereto, despite the opportunity
given by the trial court.
ii. Sanchez v Vestil

(A.M No. RTJ-98-1419, October 13, 1993)
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
In a complaint dated July 3, 1996, Atty Raul A. Sanchez charged Presiding Judge Augustine
A. Vestil of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, with (1) grave misconduct, (2) graft,
(3) gross ignorance of the law and (4) falsification of his certificate of service in relation to Special
Proceedings No. MAN 185 entitled Intestate Estate Proceedings of the Deceased Jose D. Sanchez.
Aside from the mentioned case, so far as known to this representation, the following some criminal
cases submitted to the court for decision which has gone beyond the NINETY (90) day reglementary
period. In this connection, respondent would like to respectfully inform this Honorable Supreme Court
that he has been exerting utmost efforts reducing his case load which at one time reaches more than
one thousand one hundred (1,100) cases including the almost seven hundred (700) unloaded to him
in 1993. Almost EVERY SATURDAY and during some holidays, respondent with two or three of this
staff have been reporting for work at no additional compensation.
After the judicial audit was conducted, the Court, in its Resolution dated December 3, 1997,
adopted the following recommendations of the OCA and directed respondent (1) to concentrate
meanwhile in deciding with dispatch those cases which have remained unresolved beyond the
constitutionality prescribed ninety days and (2) to explain within ten days from notice the reason for
the delay in the resolution of said cases. The Court further directed the Fiscal Management and
Budget Office of the OCA to withhold the salary of respondent until he has decided the said cases
and has submitted copies of the decision to the Office of the Court Administrator.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge should be sanctioned.
RULING:
Yes. The Court reiterate that a "judge, as the person presiding over the court, is the visible
e e e ai f he la a d j ice, a d ha " a j dge' fficial c d c h ld be f ee a d ai ed
by the appearance of impropriety, and his or her personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in
performance of judicial duties, but also in his or her everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
E ide l , he ac f he ei e de j dge ha e bee c i e i h he c d c e ec ed
of his stature and profession. Judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads which prevent them from
disposing their cases within the reglementary period, may ask for additional time. While the certificate
of service of respondent judge contained a statement that there were cases before his sala that were
still undecided beyond the reglementary period, he made no attempt to request an extension of time.
iii. Bernardo v. Fabros

(A.M. No. MTJ-99-1189, May 12, 1999
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
The Court stresses this principle in resolving the February 29, 1996 sworn Complaint of Fe T.
Bernardo, in which Judge Amelia A. Fabros (Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9) was
charged with failure to decide Civil Case No. 150796, an ejectment case, within the reglementary
period of thirty days. In her Comment filed on June 26, 1997, Judge Fabros admitted that she failed
to decide the said case within the prescribed period due to oversight. She offered no excuse for the
omission, but assailed the legal a di g f c m lai a . I he d : While he ca e a
submitted for decision on June 11, 1996 it was only on December 23, 1996 that it was decided. The
explanation is simply that in the course of [my] working as the Presiding Judge of Branch 9 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila there was an oversight. There was a failure to record the due date
when it should be decided. I offer no excuses. I cannot even say that because of the volume of work
now facing Metropolitan Trial Court Judges it is virtually impossible to monitor each and every case.
My court receives an average monthly input of raffled cases at the rate of 157 a month. I have 994
pending cases as of April 1997. Despite this I am able xxx to the best of my ability xxx resolve an
a e age f 42 ca e a m h.
ISSUE: Whether the act of the judge constitute gross dereliction of duty .
RULING:
Yes. The failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary period constitutes gross
dereliction of duty. The gravity of this offense depends on several factors, including the number of
cases not decided on time, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, and the
presence of other aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Respondent admits that she failed to decide the aforementioned case within the thirty-day
period prescribed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. For this reason, she should be
administratively sanctioned.
Constitutional Law 1
(1) Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS 267 SCRA 408 (1997) ........................................... 7
(2) Lambino vs. COMELEC GR 174153 (2006) ........................................................ 8
(3) Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137 ........................................................................... 9
(4) Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936) ........................................ 10
(5) Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. vs. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III et al, GR 209287,
July 1, 2014 ............................................................................................................. 11
(6) Francisco vs. House of Representatives GR, 160261 (Nov 10, 2003) .................. 12
(7) Mariano vs. Comelec, GR 118577 ...................................................................... 13
(8) Montesclaros vs. Comelec, GR 152295 (2002) ................................................... 14
(9) Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, 710 SCRA 1,89, Nov 19, 2013 ......................... 15
(10) Ocampo vs Enriquez GR 225973, November 8, 2016 ....................................... 16
(11) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 ................................................... 17
(12) Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560 (2001) .................................................. 18
(13) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 ................................................... 19
(14) Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, Gr 203335, February 11, 2014 ............... 20
(15) Gonzales III v. Office of the President .............................................................. 21
(16) Vinuya v. Romulo, GR 162230, April 28, 2010 ................................................ 22
(17) Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835 ..................................................................... 23
(18) Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780 ............................................................................ 24
(19) Defunis v. Odegard .......................................................................................... 25
(20) Interational Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia, GR 209271, December 8, 2015 .................................... 26
(21) David vs. Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006 [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez] ....... 27
(22) Belgica, et al vs. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, et al, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 [Per
J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc] ..................................................................................... 28
(23) KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, GR 115381, December 23, 1994 [Per J. Kapunan,
First Division] ......................................................................................................... 29
(24) IBP vs. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000 [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc] ....... 30
(25) Tanada vs. Tuvera, GR L-63915, April 24, 1985 [Per J. Escolin, En Banc]....... 31
(26) Ople vs. Torres, GR 127685, July 23, 1998 [Per J. Puno, En Banc] .................. 32
(27) Information Technology Foundation vs. ComElec, GR 159139 [Per J. Panganban,
En Banc].................................................................................................................. 33
(28) Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, GR 113375, May 5, 1994 [Per J. Davide, En Banc] . 34
(29) Ocampo, et al vs. Admiral Enriquez, GR 225973, November 08, 2016 [Per J.
Peralta, En Banc] ..................................................................................................... 35
(30) Arigo vs. Swift, et al, GR 206510, Septeber 16, 2014 [Per J. Villarama, En Banc]36
(31) MIRASOL VS CA ........................................................................................... 37
(32) SAYSON VS SINGSON.................................................................................. 39
(33) REPUBLIC VS PURISIMA ............................................................................. 41
(34) UP VS DIZON ................................................................................................. 42
(35) RAYO VS CFI ................................................................................................. 44
(36) FAROLAN VS CTA ........................................................................................ 45
(37) REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN ............................................................. 46
(38) SANTIAGO VS REPUBLIC ........................................................................... 47
(39) DOTC VS SPS. ABECINA .............................................................................. 48
(40) AMIGABLE VS CUENCA .............................................................................. 49
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(41) EPG CONSTRUCTION VS VIGILAR ............................................................ 50

(42) TORIO v. FONTANILLA ................................................................................ 51
(43) ARIGO v. SWIFT G.R. No. 206510 ................................................................. 52
(44) Holy See vs. Rosario G.R. 101949 (1994) ........................................................ 53
(45) USA vs Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645 ....................................................................... 54
(46) MINUCHER VS. COURT OF APPEALS ........................................................ 55
(47) REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON ..................................................... 56
(48) DFA v. NLRC G.R. No. 113191 ...................................................................... 57
(49) ATCI v. Echin 632 SCRA 528 (2010) .............................................................. 58
(50) Animos vs. PVAO G.R. No. 79156 .................................................................. 59
(51) USA v. Reyes, GR No. 79233 (1993) ............................................................... 60
(52) Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990) ................................................................. 61
(53) Nessia v. Fermin, 220 SCRA 615 (1993) .......................................................... 62
(54) Caloocan City v. Allarde, GR No. 107721 (2003) ............................................ 63
(55) Pable Ocampo v. HRET, GR No. 158466 (2004).............................................. 64
(56) Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649 (2013) ............................................ 65
(57) Villavivencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 (1919) .................................................... 66
(58) Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979) ............................................................... 67
(59) Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115 (1957) ........................................................ 68
(60) Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR, 704 SCRA 216 (2013) ................... 69
(61) IN RE GARCIA ............................................................................................... 70
(62) PEOPLE VS LAGMAN ................................................................................... 71
(63) ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR ............................................................................. 72
(64) REPUBLIC VS MANALO .............................................................................. 73
(65) SALONGA VS CRUZ ..................................................................................... 74
(66) SERRANO DE AGBAYANI VS PNB ............................................................. 75
(67) CIR VS SAN ROQUE POWER CORP ............................................................ 76
(68) MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III, JULY 1,201477
(69) MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III, FEBRUARY 3,
2015 (ENBANC) ..................................................................................................... 78
(70) MAGALLONA VS ERMITA .......................................................................... 79
(71) Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral ......................... 80
(72) Reagan v CIR , 30 SCRA 968 (1969) ............................................................... 81
(73) People vs Gozo 53 SCRA 476 .......................................................................... 82
(74) Lee vs. Director of Lands GR 128195 .............................................................. 83
(75) Republic vs Chule Lim GR 153883 .................................................................. 84
(76) Calilung vs Datumanong GR 160869 ............................................................... 85
(77) Republic vs Nora Sagun GR 187567 (2012) ..................................................... 86
(78) In re Ching, Bar Matter 914 (1999) .................................................................. 87
(79) Co v HRET 199 SCRA 692 .............................................................................. 88
(80) Bengson v HRET GR 142840 .......................................................................... 89
(81) So v Republic 513 SCRA 268 (2007) ............................................................... 90
(82) David vs. Agbay G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015 .......................................... 92
(83) Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec GR 162759 August 4, 2006 .......................... 93
(84) JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña GR 83820 25 May
1990 ........................................................................................................................ 94
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(85) Valles v COMELEC GR 137000, Aug. 9, 2000 ................................................ 95

(86) MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al. GR
221697 , GR 221698-700 March 8,2016 .................................................................. 96
(87) DEPT OF AGRICULTURE VS NLRC GR 104269 November 11, 1993 ......... 98
(88) Philippine Agila Sattelite Inc. vs. Lichauco G.R. No. 142362, May 3, 2006 ..... 99
(89) Lansang vs. CA G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000 .................................... 101
(90) Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124 ............................................................ 102
(91) Bayan v Exec Secretary GR 138570 ............................................................... 103
(92) Pamatong v Comelec GR 161872 ................................................................... 104
(93) Garcia v Drilon 699 SCRA 352 ..................................................................... 105
(94) PASEI v Drilon 163 SCRA 386...................................................................... 106
(95) UP BOR v CA GR 134625`............................................................................ 107
(96) CoTesCUP v Secretary of Education GR 216930 ........................................... 108
(97) University v CA 230 SCRA 761 ..................................................................... 109
(98) SSS vs CA 175 SCRA 686 ............................................................................. 110
(99) Oposa v Factoran GR 101083......................................................................... 111
(100) Republic v Albios 707 SCRA 5584 (2013) ................................................... 112
(101) Imbong vs Ochoa, 721 SCRA 584 (2013)..................................................... 114
(102) Roe vs Wade, 410 US 113 ............................................................................ 115
(103) Limbona vs Conte Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786 ............................................... 116
(104) Mamiscal vs Abdullah 761 SCRA 39 (2015) ................................................ 117
(105) In RE Laureta and Maravilla 148 SCRA 382 ................................................ 118
(106) INS vs Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) .............................................................. 119
(107) Arnault vs Balagtas, 97 Phil 358 (1955) ....................................................... 120
(108) Belgica vs Ochoa, Jr, 710 SCRA 1(2013) ..................................................... 121
(109) Mendoza vs People, 659 SCRA 681 (2011) .................................................. 122
(110) NPC Drivers and Mechanical Association vs Napocor, 503 SCRA 138 (2006)123
(111) Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 ............................................. 125
(112) US v. Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1.............................................................................. 126
(113) CoTeSCUP v. Secretary of Education, G.R. 216930, October 2018 .............. 127
(114) Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 ..................................................... 128
(115) People v. Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 .................................................... 129
(116) Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. 177597, (2008) ................................................... 130
(117) Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335,
Feb. 11, 2014 ......................................................................................................... 131
(118) Powell v. McCormack 395 US 486............................................................... 132
(119) Pobre v Defensor-Santiago 597 SCRA 1 (2009) ........................................... 133
(120) Aquino III vs COMELEC 617 SCRA 623 (2010) ......................................... 134
(121) Aldaba vs. COMELEC 611 SCRA 147 (2010) ............................................. 135
(122) Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014) ..................................................... 136
(123) Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008) ............................................... 137
(124) Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013 ............ 138
(125) Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009) ........................................................... 139
(126) Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010) .................................................. 140
(127) Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010) ................................................ 141
(128) Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766 ....................................................... 142
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(129) Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. v Comelec, 201 SCRA 786 (2013)
.............................................................................................................................. 143
(130) Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015 .................................................. 144
(131) Abang Lingkod vs. Comelec 2013 ................................................................ 145
(132) Akbayan vs HRET ....................................................................................... 146
(133) Aquino vs. Comelec ..................................................................................... 147
(134) Abayon vs HRET ......................................................................................... 148
(135) Santiago vs Guingona ................................................................................... 149
(136) Avelino vs Cuenco ....................................................................................... 150
(137) Alejandrino vs Quezon ................................................................................. 151
(138) De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan ...................................................................... 152
(139) Pobre vs. Defensor Santiago ......................................................................... 153
(140) Philconsa vs. Mathay .................................................................................... 154
(141) Ligot vs. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)........................................................ 155
(142) People vs. Jalosjos, GR 132875-76, February 3, 2000................................... 156
(143) Adaza vs Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985) ...................................................... 157
(144) Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982) ................................................ 158
(145) Liban vs. Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011) ............. 159
(146) Macalintal vs. COMELEC, GR 157013, July 10, 2003 ................................. 160
(147) Abakada Group Party list vs. Purisima, GR 166715, August 14, 2008 .......... 161
(148) Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 .................................. 162
(149) Arnault vs. Nazareno, GR L-3820, July 18, 1950.......................................... 163
(150) PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation vs. Senate, GR 180308, June 19, 2012164
(151) Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers 549 SCRA 77 and
564 SCRA 152) ..................................................................................................... 165
(152) Balag v. Senate GR 234608 .......................................................................... 166
(153) Senate v. Ermita GR 169777 ........................................................................ 167
(154) Belgica v. Executive Secretary GR 208566 .................................................. 168
(155) Araullo v Abad GR 209287 .......................................................................... 169
(156) Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and
Management GR 164987 ....................................................................................... 170
(157) Arnault v. Balagtas 97 Phil 358 .................................................................... 171
(158) Imbong v. Ochoa 721 SCRA 146 ................................................................. 172
(159) Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 ................................................................... 173
(160) Abbas v. SET ............................................................................................... 174
(161) Bondoc vs Pineda ......................................................................................... 175
(162) Codilla vs De Venecia .................................................................................. 176
(163) Cunanan vs Tan ............................................................................................ 177
(164) Velasco vs Belmonte .................................................................................... 178
(165) Ty-Delgado vs HRET ................................................................................... 179
(166) Republic vs Sandiganbayan .......................................................................... 180
(167) Estrada vs Arroyo ......................................................................................... 181
(168) Macalintal vs PET ........................................................................................ 182
(169) Pormento vs Estrada ..................................................................................... 183
(170) Laurel vs Garcia ........................................................................................... 184
(171) Marcos v. Manglapus ................................................................................... 185
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(172) Saguisag v. Ochoa ........................................................................................ 186

(173) Funa v. Ermita .............................................................................................. 187
(174) Funa v. Agra ................................................................................................ 188
(175) De Castro v. JBC .......................................................................................... 189
(176) Velicaria-Garafil v. OP................................................................................. 190
(177) Manalo v. Sistosa ......................................................................................... 192
(178) Hontiveros-Baraquel v. TollRegulatory Board .............................................. 193
(179) Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape TanonStrait, et al v. Secretary
Angelo Reyes, et al ................................................................................................ 194
(180) Kulayan v. Tan ............................................................................................. 196
(181) Ampatuan vs Puno ....................................................................................... 198
(182) Fortun vs Arroyo .......................................................................................... 199
(183) Lagman vs Medialdea .................................................................................. 200
(184) Monsantos vs Factoran Jr. ............................................................................ 201
(185) Rosa-Vidal vs Comelec ................................................................................ 202
(186) Saguisag vs Ochoa Jr. ................................................................................... 203
(187) Bayan vs Exec Secretary .............................................................................. 204
(188) Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission ..................................................... 205
(189) Chavez vs. JBC ............................................................................................ 206
(190) Jardeleza vs. Sereno ..................................................................................... 207
(191) Villanueva vs JBC ........................................................................................ 208
(192) RE: COAopinion on the computation of the appraised value of the properties
purchased by the retired Chief / associate justices of the supreme court A.M. NO. 11-7-
10-SC JULY 31, 2012 ........................................................................................... 209
(193) RE: Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of RA NO 10154,
Requiring retiring government employees to secure a clearance of pendency/non-
pendency of case/s from the Civi Service Commission .......................................... 210
(194) RE: Save the SC judicial independence and fiscal autonomy movement v abolition
of judiciary development fund(JDF) and reduction of fiscal autonomy UDK-15143, Jan.
21, 2015 ................................................................................................................ 211
(195) RE: Petition for recognition of exemption of the GSIS from payment of legal fees
612 SCRA 193 (2010) ........................................................................................... 212
(196) Cayetano v Monsod ...................................................................................... 213
(197) Gaminde v COA.......................................................................................... 214
(198) Brillantes v Yorac ....................................................................................... 216
(199) CSC v DBM ................................................................................................. 217
(200) Funa v Duque ............................................................................................... 218
(201) Sarmiento v Comelec ................................................................................... 219
(202) Ambil v Comelec ......................................................................................... 220
(203) Brillantes v comelec ..................................................................................... 221
(204) Sandoval v comelec ...................................................................................... 222
(205) Al haj v comelec .......................................................................................... 223
(206) General v Roco ............................................................................................ 224
(207) CSC v salas .................................................................................................. 225
(208) Office of the ombudsman v CSC .................................................................. 226
(209) Vistan v nicolas ............................................................................................ 227
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(210) Domingo v zamora ....................................................................................... 228

(211) OP v Buenaobra ........................................................................................... 229
(212) Capablanca v. CSC ....................................................................................... 230
(213) DBP v. COA 231 SCRA 202 ........................................................................ 231
(214) Bustamante v. COA...................................................................................... 232
(215) DBP v. COA GR 88435 ............................................................................... 233
(216) Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan .............................................................................. 234
(217) Roxas v. Vasquez ......................................................................................... 235
(218) People v. Velez ............................................................................................ 236
(219) Ledesma v. CA............................................................................................. 237
(220) Ombudsman v. Madriaga ............................................................................. 238
(221) Ombudsman v. Madriaga ............................................................................. 239
(222) Caoibes v. Ombudsman ................................................................................ 240
(223) Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan ........................................................................... 241
(224) Orap v. Sandiganbayan ................................................................................. 242
(225) Canonizado vs Aguirre ................................................................................. 244
(226) Carino v CHR .............................................................................................. 245
(227) PBM Employees v. PBM Co. ....................................................................... 246
(228) MMDA v. Viron Trans. ................................................................................ 247
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(1) Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS 267 SCRA 408 (1997)
ISSUE: Whether or Not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10,
are self-executing.
FACTS: The GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Government under
Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself
and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
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(2) Lambino vs. COMELEC GR 174153 (2006)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomple e, inade a e o an ing in e en ial e m and condi ion o implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution
FACTS: Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section
73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. They alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of
all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%)
of its registered voters. They also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
igna e of he 6.3 million indi id al .The Lambino G o p ini ia i e pe i ion change he
1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and
Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled
T an i o P o i ion . The e p opo ed change ill hif he p e en Bicame al-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the
basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a
people ini ia i e o amend he Con i ion. The e i no need o e i i hi Co ling in
San iago decla ing RA 6735 incomple e, inade a e o an ing in e en ial e m and
condi ion o co e he em of ini ia i e o amend he Con i ion. An affirmation or
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must
decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.
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(3) Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137
ISSUE: Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
FACTS: On the last day in office President John Adams names forty-two justices of the peace
and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Law, to take
control of the federal judiciary before the Thomas Jefferson took office.The commission was
signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State, John Marshall but they
eno deli e ed befo e he e pi a ion of Adam e m a P e iden . When he ne P e iden
Thomas Jefferson took office he refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were
invalid because they have not been deli e ed befo e he end of Adam e m a p e iden .
William Marbury was one of the intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace.
Marbury directly went tothe supreme court to file his complaint, refusing for a writ of Mandamus
to compel Jeffe on Sec e a Jame Madi on o deli e he commi ion . A ha ime The
Judiciary Act 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of
Mandamus toany courts appointed or persons holding office, under the authority of the United
States
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus. To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate
jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a
mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a
paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a
matter of original jurisdiction.
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(4) Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936)
ISSUE: Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction.
FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935,
he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,
which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before
the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things,
that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of
said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No.
6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of
a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created
by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent
of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art.
VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
election protest filed by Ynsua.
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(5) Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. vs. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III et al, GR 209287,
July 1, 2014
ISSUE: Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal
protection, constitutional?
FACTS: In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et al. maintain that the issues in these
consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized because the
Co in e p e a ion of a ing can be o e ned b legi la ion con ide ing ha a ing i
defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue. They
aver that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations constitute savings
and may be used for augmentation and that the Court should apply legally recognized norms and
principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion. On their
part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the
Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all moneys under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP) used for alleged augmentation of appropriation items that did not
have actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts
recommended by the President for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the
budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and
regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating thenational economy,
the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the
Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the
projects mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of
the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of
the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within the
parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be carried
out through legal methods.
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(6) Francisco vs. House of Representatives GR, 160261 (Nov 10, 2003)
ISSUE: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked to determine the
validity of the second impeachment complaint pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution.
FACTS: An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven Asociate
Justices was filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on 22
October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative Gilbert
Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives et al, most of which
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
p o i ion of Sec ion 5, A icle XI of he Con i ion, no impeachmen p oceeding hall be
ini ia ed again he ame official mo e han once i hin he pe iod of one ea . Sena o
Aquilino Pimintel Jr, filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction
of the Senate as the impeachment court be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provision of
Article XI of the Constitution.
DECISION: The second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution
RATIO DECIDENDI: Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action
taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine,
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
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(7) Mariano vs. Comelec, GR 118577
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality
of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854
FACTS: The petitioners assails certain provisions of RA 7854, Section 51 on the ground that it
attempts to alter or restart the "3-consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, disregarding
the term previously served by them which collides with Section 8 Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the constitution
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of
a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from
complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that
he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position
in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise
this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over
which this Court has no jurisdiction.
13 | P a g e
(8) Montesclaros vs. Comelec, GR 152295 (2002)
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction imputable to respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date
since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation
set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed
"operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May
2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of age for membership in the SK.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy
requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement
of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK
elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July
15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age
requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for
membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to
the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of
1991.
14 | P a g e
(9) Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, 710 SCRA 1,89, Nov 19, 2013
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislati
FACTS: The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers
who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3)
other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practice Ac . Al o ecommended o be cha ged in he complain a e ome of he la make
chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. Whistle-blowers alleged
that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off
Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System"
be declared unconstitutional
DECISION: The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations
discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
"involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words,
"there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are
already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something
had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself
as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional
issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions." Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by
the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System."
Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged
funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD
910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social
Fund are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened
injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
15 | P a g e
(10) Ocampo vs Enriquez GR 225973, November 8, 2016
ISSUE: [1] Would respondents gravely abuse their discretion in allowing Marcos' burial in the
LNMB? [2] Would Marcos' burial be violative of the 1987 Constitution, jurisprudence and the
law?
FACTS: President Duterte allowed the burial of President Marcos's remains in the Libingan ng
Mga Bayani (LNMB). He ordered herein respondent's superior to prepare the burial.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is not. The Supreme Court found for the respondents. It is the
President's discretion to allow who should be buried in the LNMB. In fact, even Congress may
and can enact a law allowing anyone to be buried therein. Since the LNMB is under the authority
of the AFP and the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is the President, it is within the President's
discretion to allow or disallow the burial of anyone in the LNMB. The Pantheon Law does not
cover the LNMB. It is merely a national shrine converted into a memorial shrine. Hence, anyone
buried therein would not be treated as a hero and would not be labeled as one who is worth
emulating or who is an inspiration to the youth.
16 | P a g e
(11) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition present an actual case or controversy even though the RH
Law is not yet effective
FACTS: On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH Law is an
enhancement measure to fortify and make effec i e he c en la on con acep ion, omen
health and population control. Petitioners assail its constitutionality because according to them, it
violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote. The proponents of the RH law, however, contend that the petitions do not
present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They
claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication
since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing
that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The petition present an actual case or controversy even though RH Law
is not yet effective. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination. The fact of the law or act in question being not yet
effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the
controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty. Here, an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Hence, the court shall take cognizance
of the case.
17 | P a g e
(12) Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560 (2001)
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague

FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Estrada was prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law). He assailed,
however, that the Plunder Law does not constitute an indictable offense because of its failure to
provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word
"pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to Estrada, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Tha Plunder Law is not unconstitutional for being vague. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long
as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free
speech cases, but not to penal statutes.
18 | P a g e
(13) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014
ISSUE: Whe he o no he RH La canno be challenged on i face beca e i i no a

speech regulating measure
FACTS: On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH Law is an
enhancemen mea e o fo if and make effec i e he c en la on con acep ion, omen
health and population control. Petitioners assail its constitutionality because according to them, it
violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote. The proponents of the RH law, however, assails the propriety of the facial
challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on
its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech,
but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason
for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Consequently,
considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of the petitions and to determine if the RH
Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny.
19 | P a g e
(14) Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, Gr 203335, February 11, 2014
ISSUE: Whether or not aiding or abetting libel on the cyberspace is consitutional.

FACTS: RA 10175 (Cybercrime Law) was enacted, which aims to regulate access to and use of
the cyberspace. Petitioners filed petitions to declare several provisions of Cybercrime Law
unconsitutional and void. One of the assailed provisions is Section 5, which punishes the aiding
or abetting and attempt in the commission of Cybercrimes such as libel. Petitioners argue that
such provision suffers from overbreadth, creating chilling and deterrent effect on protected
expression. The OSG, however, contends that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on
aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude
that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and
jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the
innocent.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial
challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the
doctrine must be carefully delineated. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to
the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the
assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the
statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech
constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking
in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into
silence. Here, the terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect
on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.
Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace
is a nullity.
20 | P a g e
(15) Gonzales III v. Office of the President
ISSUE: Whether or not a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative

disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a
justiciable not a political question.
FACTS: Rolando Mendoza (Mendoza) was dismissed in the PNP on account of the extortion
incident, which led him to hijack a tourist bus that resulted his death and several others on board.
Said inciden i on acco n of Mendo a plea o he Office of he Omb d man o econ ide hi
case. President Benigno Aquino III created an Incident Investigation and Review Committee
(IIRC) to conduct an investigation relative to the incident of hostage-taking. Subsequently, IIRC
charged and dismissed Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III (Gonzales), who handled
Mendo a ca e. Gon ale a g e ha he Office of he P e iden ha no admini a i e
disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the
Ombudsman) is a justiciable not a political question. A justiciable question is one which is
inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds
that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a
political branch of the government. Here, in resolving the petitions, the Court does not inquire
in o he i dom of he Cong e choice o g ant concurrent disciplinary authority to the
President, but as to whether the statutory grant violates the Constitution.
21 | P a g e
(16) Vinuya v. Romulo, GR 162230, April 28, 2010
ISSUE: Can the Supreme Court decide as to whether the Philippine government should espouse
claims of its nationals against Japan?
FACTS: The petitioner Malaya Lolas is an organization established for the purpose of
providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during World
War II. Malaya Lolas filed a petition to compel the respondents to espouse their claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of
Justice and other international tribunals. According to them, the general waiver of claims by the
Philippine government in the peace treaty with Japan is void.
DECISION: Dismissed.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The question whether the Philippine government should espouse
claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political
branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest
of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could
petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant
petition for certiorari.
22 | P a g e
(17) Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can take cognizance of the case
FACTS: On November 26, 1998, President Joseph Estrada created the Preparatory Commission
on Consitutional Reform (PCCR) by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 to study and recommend
proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Consitution, and the manner implementing
the same. On November 9, 1999, Petitioner, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the
consitutionality of the creation of the PCCR. On December 20, 1999, the PCCR submitted its
recommendations to the President, and was dissolved by the President on the same day.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The case has become moot and academic. An action is considered
"moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have
become academic or dead. The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on
December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent
he f nd allo ed o i . Th , he PCCR ha cea ed o e i , ha ing lo i ai on d e e.
Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve. The
staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief
prayed for by petitioner.
23 | P a g e
(18) Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitions have been rendered moot and academic
FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) issued Proclamation No.
38 declaring a state of rebellion in the NCR. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing
the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Petitioners assail the declaration of a
state of rebellion and the warrantless arrest allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no
basis both in fact and in law. On May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of
the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Petitions have been rendered moot and academic when GMA lifted
the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila.
24 | P a g e
(19) Defunis v. Odegard
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic

FACTS: DeFunis was denied admission at the University of Washington Law School, a state-
operated institution. He sued a state education official, Odegaard, as well as the law school
admissions committee on the basis that it had violated the Equal Protection Clause because its
policies and procedures had resulted in discrimination against him because of his race. He sought
a mandatory injunction from the trial court that would compel Odegaard to grant him admission
into the first-year law school class because his application had been unconstitutionally denied.
He prevailed in the lower court and was admitted to the law school, pending Odegaard's appeal.
The state Supreme Court eventually ruled that the law school admissions policy was
constitutional.DeFunis received a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which stayed
the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court until the U.S. Supreme Court had resolved the
case. DeFunis was already in his third and final year of law school when the Court granted his
petition.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Because petitioner will complete law school at the end of the term for
which he has registered regardless of any decision, the case is moot. Mootness here does not
depend upon a "voluntary cessation" of the school's admissions practices, but upon the simple
fact that petitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed policy to permit him to complete the
term. The case presents no question that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," since
petitioner will never again have to go through the school's admissions process, and since it does
not follow that the issue petitioner raises will in the future evade review merely because this case
did not reach the Court until the eve of petitioner's graduation.
25 | P a g e
(20) Interational Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v.

Greenpeace Southeast Asia, GR 209271, December 8, 2015
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is moot and academic.

FACTS: On September 24, 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking was executed pursuant to
collaborative research and development project on eggplants. The petitioners conducted field
trials for "bioengineered eggplants," known as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt talong).
Bt talong contains the crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bt, which produces the CrylAc
protein that is toxic to target insect pests. The Cry1Ac protein is said to be highly specific to
lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer, the most destructive insect pest to
eggplants. Subsequently, respondents filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan alleging that the field
trials violated their consitutional right to health and a balance ecology considering that BT talong
is presumed harmful to human health and the environment
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The case is no moo and academic. An ac ion i con ide ed moo
when it presents a justiciable controversy becasue the issues involved have become academic or
dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. The case
fall nde he capable of epe i ion e e ading e ie e cep ion o he moo ne p inciple.
The human and environmental health hazards posed by the introduction of a genetically modified
plant which is a very popular staple vegetable among Filipinos is an issue of paramount public
interest.
26 | P a g e
(21) David vs. Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006 [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez]
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic.

FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. President
Arroyo by virtue of the powers vested upon her by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution commanded the Armed Forces of the Philippines to maintain peace and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act
of insurrection or rebellion. Comes petitioners Randolf S. David, et al, who was arrested without
warrant on the basis of PP 1017 and was brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was
finger printed, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect. He was also treated brusquely
by policemen and was charged with violation of BP Blg. 880 and later on detained for 7 hours
and was released thereafter due to insuffiecieny of evidence. The petition herein assailed PP
1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requireents for the imposition of Martial Law; and (3) it
violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of press, speech and of assembly.
DECISION: The petition was PARTLY GRANTED.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The case was partly granted since the court finds and so holds PP 1017
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent ot suppress
lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
However, PP 1017's extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless
violenece as well as decrees promulgated by the President; (3) to imposed standards on media or
any form of prior restraint on the press are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The court also rules
that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislation,
cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business afftected with public
interest.
27 | P a g e
(22) Belgica, et al vs. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, et al, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 [Per J.
Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic.

FACTS: On September 3, 2013, petitioners Belgica et al filed an Urgent Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Prayer for the immediate issuance of TRO and or writ of Preliminary
injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of
the GA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive's lump-sum, discretionary
funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
DECISION: The petition was PARTLY GRANTED.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the
abolition thereof does not actually terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does
no ha e con i ional a ho i o n llif o ann l he legal e i ence of he PDAF. The moo
and academic p inciple canno op he Co f om deciding he ca e con ide ing ha : (a)
petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public interest,
(c) he e i a p ac ical need fo a defini i e ling on he em con i ionali o g ide he
bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the national budget is an
annual occurrence.
28 | P a g e
(23) KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, GR 115381, December 23, 1994 [Per J. Kapunan, First
Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not Kilusang Mayo Uno has legal standing to file a petition against LTFRB.
FACTS: The Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center (KMU) assails the constitutionality and validity
of a memorandum which, among others, authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to
increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application therefore with the
LTFRB, and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency.
DECISION: The petition was GRANTED.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue. The requirement of LOCUS
STANDI inheres from the definition of judicial power. In the case at bench, petitioner, whose
members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the
implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a
clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the
challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses,
trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase
in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public.
Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.
29 | P a g e
(24) IBP vs. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000 [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality of calling the AFP to
assist PNP to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Ejercito Estrada directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of
Staff and Philippine National Police Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal
or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed a petition seeking
to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Solicitor
General contend that petitioner has no legal standing to assail.
DECISION: The petition was DISMISSED.
RATIO DECIDENDI: IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to
uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no other
basis in support of its locus standi. While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit standing.
However, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure. The Court relaxed the rules on standing and resolved the issue
now.
30 | P a g e
(25) Tanada vs. Tuvera, GR L-63915, April 24, 1985 [Per J. Escolin, En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners have legal standing.

FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring
the instant petition and that it is not required for a law to be published when the date of its
effectivity are expressly mentioned in said laws. Petitioners then contended that the publication
of said Presidential Issuances is a public right and that compelling the respondent to publish it is
a public duty that does not need any other specific interest from the petitioner to be given due
course.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the Court agrees with petitioners that although they are private
citizens, the subject of the Petition is a public right and thus they, being citizens of this country,
have the proper interest in seeing this case resolved.
31 | P a g e
(26) Ople vs. Torres, GR 127685, July 23, 1998 [Per J. Puno, En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit.

FACTS: Admini a i e O de No 308, o he i e kno n a Adop ion of a Na ional
Computerized Identifica ion Refe ence S em a i ed b P e iden Fidel Ramo on 12
December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the
right to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds,
(1) ha i i a pa ion of he po e o legi la e; and (2) ha i in de he ci i en igh o
privacy.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a
Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the
i e of Admini a i e O de No 308 i a pa ion of legi la i e po e . Ople conce n ha
the Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable.
The blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and the power of
executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.
32 | P a g e
(27) Information Technology Foundation vs. ComElec, GR 159139 [Per J. Panganban, En

Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not ITF has standing to file the case.

FACTS: RA 8046 was passed on 07 June 1995 authorizing COMELEC to conduct nationwide
computerized election system. Gloria Arroyo allocated php 2.5 billion fund for the automated
election system on 24 January 2003. The bidding process commenced on the same month and
o of he 57 bidde i a a a ded o MPC and TIMC. Al ho gh DOST e al a ion epo
states that the two obtained a number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Five individuals
and entities protested the matter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. Abalos rejected
the protest, hence the present petition.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The case at bar is a matter of public concern and imbued with public
interest, it is of paramount public interest and transcendental importance. Taxpayers are allowed
o e hen he e i a claim of illegal di b emen of p blic f nd o if p blic mone i being
deflec ed o an imp ope e, o hen pe i ione eek o e ain a ing of p blic f nd
h o gh he enfo cemen of an ncon i ional la .
33 | P a g e
(28) Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, GR 113375, May 5, 1994 [Per J. Davide, En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan has standing to maintain instant suit.

FACTS: Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 42) hich g an i he a ho i o hold and cond c cha i eep ake ace , lo e ie
and other simila ac i i ie , he PCSO decided o e abli h an on- line lottery system for the
purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before
March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system,
the Berjaya Group Berhad became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Berjaya
Group Berhad organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation
known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), hich a in ended o be
the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would
be offe ed and deli e ed o PCSO. KILOSBAYAN bmi ha he PCSO canno alidl en e
into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the
PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lo e em in collabo a ion o a ocia ion i h
the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.
respondents allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing our
resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be
e ol ed in hei fa o . A pa anding befo e hi Co i a p oced al echnicali hich i
may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In
the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, 29 this Court brushed aside this technicality because
he an cenden al impo ance o he p blic of he e ca e demand ha he be e led p omp l
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
34 | P a g e
(29) Ocampo, et al vs. Admiral Enriquez, GR 225973, November 08, 2016 [Per J. Peralta,
En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.
FACTS: During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo
R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He won the May 9, 2016 election, garnering
16,601,997 votes. At noon of June 30, 2016, he formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in
the Malacañang Palace. August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin
N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims,
legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions
because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a
result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
35 | P a g e
(30) Arigo vs. Swift, et al, GR 206510, Septeber 16, 2014 [Per J. Villarama, En Banc]

FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said
e el o en e and e i he e i o ial a e of he Philippine and o a i e a he po of S bic
Ba fo he p po e of o ine hip epleni hmen , main enance, and c e libe . On January 6,
2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop
for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its
next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the
Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have
been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-
salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of
such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events
violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
DECISION: The petition was DENIED.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Petitioners have legal standing Loc andi i a igh of
appea ance in a co of j ice on a gi en e ion. Specificall , i i a pa pe onal and
b an ial in e e in a ca e he e he ha ained o ill ain di ec inj a a e l of he
act being challenged, and call fo mo e han j a gene ali ed g ie ance. Ho e e , he le
on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.
36 | P a g e
(31) MIRASOL VS CA
ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional
without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the
resolution of the Trial Court. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuance
FACTS: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.Philippine National Bank (PNB)
financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing
scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and
sell the latter'ssugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.President
Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX)
to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The
decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government.
Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked
PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other
loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB
asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed
to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded
to extra judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if
properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its
stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings
from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. On August 9, 1979, the
Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB.
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order.
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in this Court, but in all regional trial courts The purpose of the mandatory
notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his
intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the
Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must
stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to
actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice
is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no
ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. In all actions assailing
the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor
General is mandatory. Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are
void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private
property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of
judicial review. Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this
power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of
37 | P a g e
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case
38 | P a g e
(32) SAYSON VS SINGSON
ISSUE: WON the mandamus suit of the respondent (Singson) involving a money claim against
the government, predicated on a contract is valid
FACTS: "In January 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of
spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer
Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. ... It was
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It is
noted in the approval of the said requisition that "This is an exception to the telegram dated Feb.
21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." ... So, a canvass or public
bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967. The committee on award accepted the bid of the
Singkier Motor Service for the sum of P43,530.00. ... Subsequently, it was approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16,1967 the Secretary sent a letter-
order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to immediately deliver the
items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00. ...It would appear that a purchase order signed
by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer and the Procurement Officer, was addressed
to the Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of
Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then made inquiries about the reasonableness of the
price. ... Thus, after finding from the indorsements of the Division Engineer and the
Commissioner of Public Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and
reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no less than the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications with the verification of V.M. Secarroa representative of the Bureau
of Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the
retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00 to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the
Supervising Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of
P34,824.00 to Singson. On June 10,1967, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from
Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which
states: "In view of excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by
vouchers already submitted this Office direct all highway auditors refer General Office payment
similar nature for appropriate action." ... In the interim it would appear that when the voucher
and the supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts among the
suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI(Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts
of the caterpillar tractors in the Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64
only which is P40,000.00 less than the price of the Singkier. ... In view of the overpricing the
GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works in a third indorsement of July 18,
1967. ... The Secretary then circularized a telegram holding the district engineer responsible for
overpricing." What is more, charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer and
the civil engineer involved. It was the failure of the Highways Auditor, one of the petitioners
before us, that led to the filing of the mandamus suit below, with now respondent Singson as sole
proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of
P8,706.00, the contract in question having been upheld. Hence this appeal by certiorari
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law,
morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim
39 | P a g e
against the State but an ordinary action for specific performance. the suit disguised as one for
mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the
State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State.
In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office,
under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim
against the government may be filed: "In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims,
other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within
sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims
need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid
shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by
him." Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final
decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days
from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States,
pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the
President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a
private person or entity. "Once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to
prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative
proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be
specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling
of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should have
been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter.
40 | P a g e
(33) REPUBLIC VS PURISIMA
ISSUE: WON he e ponden deci ion i alid

FACTS: A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn
Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a
money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent
Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration
Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a
court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery
of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions.
Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the
motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit
affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued
without its consent. "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to
the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law
which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in
itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a
principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government
enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to
the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice
thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims
by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal
to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the
cited Providence Washington Insurance
DECISION: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has
operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of
injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist,is, from an objective
appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the
determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the
verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a
fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [ Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v.
Republic of the Philippines] ***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting
through a duly enacted statute as pointed out byJustice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever
counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the
government
41 | P a g e
(34) UP VS DIZON
ISSUE: Was UP's funds validly garnished?

FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement
with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation
of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second
billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the
Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then
on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion.
The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the
UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of
the UP but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City. Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June
3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of
time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final and
executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their previous
motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On
June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the
RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff
served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of
the funds. Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment.
(Garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State) Despite its establishment as a
body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a legitimate
government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States
constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government
instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated
under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly
appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in
Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest
accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust
fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose,
and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds
that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property
ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. A
marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly
stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made
between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability
on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to
42 | P a g e
be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. The Constitution strictly mandated that "no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of
the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim
against the UP.
43 | P a g e
(35) RAYO VS CFI
ISSUE: Whether respondent National Power Corporation performs a governmental function

with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam; and Whether the power of
respondent National Power Corporation to sue and be sued under its organic charter inclu
FACTS: On Oc obe 26, 1978, phoon Kading ck B lacan. D e to this, the National
Power Corporation (NPC), through its plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez, simultaneously
opened 3 floodgates of Angat Dam.The opening of the floodgates caused several towns to be
inundated (the town of Norzagaray was the most affected one). It resulted to a hundred deaths
and damage to properties that were worth over a million pesos. Petitioners (victims) filed a
complaint for damages against NPC, including plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez.
Respondent filed counterclaims and put p a pecial and affi ma i e defen e ha in he
ope a ion of he Anga Dam, i i pe fo ming a p el go e nmen al f nc ion , hence i
canno be ed i ho he e p e con en of he S a e. Pe i ione oppo e he defen e,
contending that the NPC is not performing governmental but merely proprietary functions and
that under its own organic act, Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6395, it can sue and be sued in
any court. CFI dropped the NPC from the complaint and left Chavez as the sole party-defendant.
DECISION: Upon a mo ion fo econ ide a ion, he CFI led ha pe i ione eliance on Sec.
3 of RA 6395 is not tenable since the same refer to such matters that are only within the scope of
the other corporate powers of said defendant and not matters of tort as in the instant cases. Being
an agency performing a purely governmental function in the operation of the Angat Dam, said
defendant was not given any right to commit wrongs upon individuals. To sue said defendant for
tort may require the express consent of the State. PETITION DISMISSED.
RATIO DECIDENDI: SC reversed the CFI decision and GRANTED petitioners to reinstate
their complaint against the NPC.It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private
corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter.
(R.A. No. 6395). As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its
own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. Moreover, the charter provision that the
NPC can e and be ed in an co i i ho alifica ion on he ca e of ac ion and
accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.
44 | P a g e
(36) FAROLAN VS CTA
ISSUE: Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050
yardsactually lost by the private respondent.
FACTS: S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port
of Manila carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading
(Bagong Buhay). The import was classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of theTariff and
Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of
P11,350.00. The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment
upon hearing the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito net made of nylon under
Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon re-examination, it turns out that
the shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as previously declared. Thus the Collector
of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the government. Private respondent filed a petition
on August 20, 1976 for the release of the questioned goods which the Court denied. On June
2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales were released to Bagong Buhay after several motion. The
sixteen remaining bales were missing. The respondent claims that of the 143,454 yards released,
only 116,950 yards were in good condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents
demand that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it
actually lost.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the
private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's
claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the
Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which
ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted
echnicall in o a i again he a e. On hi poin , he poli ical doc ine ha a e ma no be
ed i ho i con en , ca ego icall applie . A an ninco po a ed government agency
without any separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity
from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty, namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental
function of collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary function. Thus private
respondents claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.
45 | P a g e
(37) REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN
ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke state immunity.

FACTS: The PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities
and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent
Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest due to
his involvement incases of ill-gotten wealth. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken
over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by and registered under the
name of private respondent. As sequester of the 227 shares formerly owned by Benedicto, PCGG
did not pay the monthly membership fee. Later on, the shares were declared to be delinquent to
be put into an auction sale. Despite filing a writ of injunction, it was nevertheless dismissed. So
petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement
which contains a general release clause where petitioner agreed and bound itself to lift the
sequestration on the227 NOGCCI share ackno ledging ha i a i hin p i a e e ponden
capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his
profession. Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner that the subject shares of
stock could not have been ill-gotten Benedicto filed a Motion for Release from Sequestration and
Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be
specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the
pa ie Comp omi e Ag eemen in ha ca e. I a g an ed b he ha e e e o de ed o be
put under the custody of the Clerk of Court. Along with this, PCGG was ordered to deliver the
shares to the Clerk of Court which it failed to comply with without any justifiable grounds. In a
last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state
immunity from suit.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private
respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and
placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its
officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional
legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations
arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by
entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is
implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the
corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.
46 | P a g e
(38) SANTIAGO VS REPUBLIC
ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
FACTS: On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for
revocation of a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the
Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr.
Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting
facilities and water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot thereon
which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7, 1974. That
because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from compliance with
an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision
which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the respondent on
the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is
discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground of
constitutional mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a
waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be
implied. In this case it must be emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the
Republic or any of its agency being a Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach
of the conditions of such donation. The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of
dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified, set aside and declare to be without force and effect.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this
case, observing the procedure set forth in the rules of court. No cost.
47 | P a g e
(39) DOTC VS SPS. ABECINA
ISSUE: Whether or not DOTC may properly invoke state immunity

FACTS: In February 1993, the DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
(Digitel) a contract for the management, operation, maintenance, and development of a Regional
Telecommunications Development Project (RTDP) under the National Telephone Program,
Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1). Later on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte,
donated a one thousand two hundred (1,200)square-meter parcel of land to the DOTC for the
implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. However, the municipality erroneously
included portions of the respondents' property in the donation. Pursuant to the FLAs, Digitel
constructed a telephone exchange on the property which encroached on the properties of the
respondent spouses. It argues that while the DOTC, in good faith and in the performance of its
mandate, took private property without formal expropriation proceedings, the taking was
nevertheless an exercise of eminent domain. The Department prays that instead of allowing
recovery of the property, the case should be remanded to the RTC for determination of just
compensation.
DECISION: NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENTDOMAIN BECAUSE NO
EXPROPRIATIONPROCEEDINGS WERE HELD.
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide
by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not
more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to
be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public
use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, tobe judicially ascertained, it
makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
48 | P a g e
(40) AMIGABLE VS CUENCA
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior
expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel
wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had
been expropriated by the government. Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the
Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She
also sought payment for compensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees. The
defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not
give its consent to be sued.
DECISION: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public
use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit. The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the
taking.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
49 | P a g e
(41) EPG CONSTRUCTION VS VIGILAR
ISSUE: Whether or not the Principle of State Immunity is applicable in the case at bar.
FACTS: (1983) The herein petitioners-contractors, under contracts with DPWH,constructed
145 housing units but coverage of construction and funding under the saidcontracts was only for
2/3 of each housing unit. Through the verbal request andassurance of then DPWH
Undersecretary Canlas, they undertook additional constructionsfor the completion of the project,
but said additional constructions were not issued payment by DPWH.With a favorable
recommendation from the DPWH Asst. Secretary for LegalAffairs, the petitioners sent a demend
letter to the DPWH Secretary. The DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment subject to
whatever action COA may adopt.(1992) Through the request of then DPWH Secretary De Jesus,
the DBM releasedthe amount for payment but (1996) respondent DPWH Secreatry Vigilar
denied themoney claims prompting petitioners to file a petition for mandamus before the
RTCwhich said trial court denied. Hence, this petition.Among others, respondent-secretary
argues that the state may not be suedinvoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the
State also known as the RoyalPrerogative of Dishonesty
DECISION: Petition Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of
invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. The
State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice
50 | P a g e
(42) TORIO v. FONTANILLA
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable.

FACTS: On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2
resolutions: one for management of the town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of
the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, organized a
sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council
appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and
another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed. Vicente
Fon anilla a pinned nde nea h and died in he af e noon of he follo ing da . Fon anilla
heirs filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were the
municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members. In its Answer,
defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs
sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental
functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents.
DECISION: Yes. The Municipality of Malasiqui was held liable.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is
liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to
the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
51 | P a g e
(43) ARIGO v. SWIFT G.R. No. 206510
ISSUE: Whether or not immunity from suits can be invoked within territorial waters.
FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
e el o en e and e i he e i o ial a e of he Philippine and o a i e a he po of S bic
Ba fo he p po e of o ine hip epleni hmen , main enance, and c e libe . On Jan a 6,
2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop
for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its
next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the
Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles eastsoutheast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have
been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
DECISION: Yes. Immunity from suits can be invoked within territorial waters, except from the
exceptions set by UNCLOS.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their
flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to
compl i h he le and eg la ion of he coa al S a e ega ding pa age h o gh he la e
internal waters and the territorial sea.
52 | P a g e
(44) Holy See vs. Rosario G.R. 101949 (1994)
ISSUE: Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding
selling a lot to a private entity.
FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the
name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio,
which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for
his residence. Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to
respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a
dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to
evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy
See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the
earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the
P100,000 earnest money. The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation. Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific
performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for
lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit
DECISION: Petiton granted.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of
concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its
subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as
petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters
living in said property.
53 | P a g e
(45) USA vs Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645
ISSUE: Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
FACTS: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one
of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of
repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its
price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an
acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which
was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the
petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were
awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against
the US.
DECISION: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of
the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.
54 | P a g e
(46) MINUCHER VS. COURT OF APPEALS
ISSUE: Whether the Doctrine of State Immunity from suit is applicable herein.
FACTS: Viola ion of he Dange o D g Ac of 1972, a filed again Min che
follo ing a b -b ope a ion cond c ed b Philippine police na co ic agen accompanied b
Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized.
Minucher was later acquitted by the court. Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-
up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had
acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
DECISION: Case was dismissed.
RATIO DECIDENDI: A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state.
55 | P a g e
(47) REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from suit.
FACTS: Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered
into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade
and Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units
and was to take effect in a period of four years. When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim
a med he po i ion of Chief of Admini a ion, he allegedl fo nd e ponden o k and
services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance
Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement. The respondent claims
that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against the
petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit.
DECISION: Yes. The Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity
from suit.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity
when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into
by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions.
56 | P a g e
(48) DFA v. NLRC G.R. No. 113191
ISSUE: Whether the ADB is correct in invoking its immunity from suit.
FACTS: On January 27, 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case for his alleged
illegal dismissal by Asian Development Bank and the latter's violation of the "labor-only"
contracting law. Two summonses were served, one to the ADB and the other through the DFA.
Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its
President and Office, were covered by an immunity from legal processes except for borrowing,
guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank (the "Charter") and the Agreement Between the Bank and the Government of
the Philippines regarding the Banker's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement). The Labor
Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its
diplomatic immunity from suit. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, the DFA referred
the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void
jugdgment".
DECISION: Yes. The stipulations of both the Charter and the Headquarter's Agreement
establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the
purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of
every form
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Bank's officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts
performed by them in their official capacity. The granting of these immunities and privileges are
treaty covenants ans commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government. Being an
international organization that has been extended diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of
the municipal law.
57 | P a g e
(49) ATCI v. Echin 632 SCRA 528 (2010)
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically
ip la e ha e ponden emplo men hall be go e ned b he Ci il Se ice La and
Regulations of Kuwait.
FACTS: Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner,
Ministry of PublicHealth of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year
contract with a monthlysalary of US$1,200.00. Within a year, Respondent was terminated for not
passing the probationaryperiod which was under the Memorandum of Agreement. Ministry
denied e ponden e e and he e ned o he Philippine ho lde ing he o n fai .
Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against
ATCI forillegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered
ATCI to pay her$3,600.00, her salary for the three months unexpired portion of the contract.
ATCI appealed Labo A bi e deci ion, ho e e , NLRC affi med he la e deci ion and
denied pe i ione ATCI mo ion fo reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the Court Appeals
contending thattheir principal being a foreign government agency is immune from suit, and as
such, immunity extendedto them.
DECISION: Petition denied.

RATIO DECIDENDI: According to RA 8042: The obligations covenanted in the
recruitmentagreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are
not coterminouswith the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to
end the agreement,the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under
the agreement do not at allend, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employeesrecruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment
agreement. In international law, the party whowants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law.Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreignlaw is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
58 | P a g e
(50) Animos vs. PVAO G.R. No. 79156
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against PVAO can be considered a suit against the state.
FACTS: Isidro Animos is a World War II veteran, having been a member of the USAFFE and
the guerilla forces thereafter. Originally, the case was a suit for mandamus by the petitioners
against PVAO, for the payment of full pension benefits, retroactive to 1947, under Republic Act
No. 65, a amended. Ho e e , he pe i ione claim a denied on he ba i ha Animo
di abili a onl con ide ed pa ial, a he han o al, acco ding o he R le on Di abili
Ra ing , h p ecl ding he ma im m pa men of hi pen ion benefi . The petitioner submits
that the rating system adopted by PVAO is null and void.
DECISION: No. The doctrine of immunity from the suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
RATIO DECIDENDI: When officers and agents of the government are sued in their individual
capacity, the cloak of protection from the government is removed. According to the doctrine in
R i . Cabah g: We hold ha nde he fac and circumstances alleged in the amended
complaint, which should be taken on its face value, the suit is not one against the Government, or
a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel them to act in accordance with the
rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment
and recognition until the contending architects have established their respective rights and
in e e in he f nd e ained and in he c edi fo he o k done . Hence, he complain cannot
be considered a suit against the state because it is a well-settled principle of law that we may
consider a public official liable in his personal private capacity for the damage caused by his acts
when done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.
59 | P a g e
(51) USA v. Reyes, GR No. 79233 (1993)
ISSUE: Whether or not Bradford enjoys state immunity

FACTS: Nelia T. Montoya, an American citizen employed as an identification checker at the
U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters in Quezon City, filed a complaint against Maxine Bradford, also an American
ci i en o king a a manage a JUSMAG Head a e ac i i e change, fo damage d e o
the oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as store
manager of the NEX JUSMAG. This was due to the incident on January 22, 1987 when Bradford
ea ched Mon o a bod and belonging hile he la e a al ead in he pa king area after
b ing ome i em NEX JUSMAG e ail o e, he e he had p cha ing p i ilege . B adfo d
then invoked his non-suability on the ground of state immunity.
DECISION: No, Bradford does not enjoy state immunity.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is expressly
declared in the Constitution. It also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of its duties. However, it is a different matter
where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and
injurious to the rights of plaintiff. In other words, the doctrine of immunity from suit will not
apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. Here, Bradford acted beyond his authority when he searched
Montoya in the parking lot, that is, outside of NEX JUSMAG. Hence, he may be sued in his
private and personal capacity.
60 | P a g e
(52) Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990)
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US
ArmedForces
FACTS: Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin, filed for damages and equal employment
opportunity complaint against Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi, both officers of the Base
Education Office at Clark Air Base. The former was allegedly rejected for a position of Guidance
Counselor in the said institution because of her sex, color, and origin. The respondents defended
that they are immune from suit for acts done made by them inperformance of their official
governmental functions.
DECISION: No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all
its acts orthe acts of its agents in the Philippines.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is expressly
declared in the Constitution. It also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of its duties. However, it is a different matter
where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and
injurious to the rights of plaintiff. In other words, the doctrine of immunity from suit will not
apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. Here, the respondents were found guilty of discriminating against
Shauf on account of her sex, origin and color. Hence, the respondents may be sued in their
private and personal capacity.
61 | P a g e
(53) Nessia v. Fermin, 220 SCRA 615 (1993)
ISSUE: Whether or not Fermin was acting within the scope of his authority.
FACTS: Nessia was the Deputy Municipal Assesor of Victorias, Negros Occidental. He filed a
complaint for recovery of damages and reimbursement of expenses against respondent Fermin
and Municipality of Victorias. He alleged that respondent deliberately ignored and caused non-
pa men of he o che beca e he defied he la e e e o register and vote in the local
elec ion . On he o he hand, Fe min co n e ed ha Ne ia claim co ld no be app o ed
because they exceeded budgetary appropriations. The Municipality, for its part, added that
Nessia was also at fault since he did not give justification for drawing funds in excess of the
budget.
DECISION: No, he acted maliciously and intended to prejudice Nessia

RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that while it is true that Fermin may not be compelled
by mandamus to approve vouchers because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations, he may,
nevertheless, be held liable for damages under Art. 27 for malicious inaction because he did not
act on the vouchers. It is apparent that public officials are called upon to act expeditiously on
matters pending before them. For only in acting thereon either by signifying approval or
disapproval may the plaintiff continue on to the next step of the bureaucratic process. On the
other hand, official inaction brings to a standstill the administrative process and the plaintiff is
left in the darkness of uncertainty. In this regard, official "inaction" cannot be equated with
"disapproval."
62 | P a g e
(54) Caloocan City v. Allarde, GR No. 107721 (2003)
ISSUE: Is Judge Allarde correct in ordering the garnishment of City funds to satisfy the
judgment in favor of Santiago?
FACTS: The City Mayor, through an ordinance, abolished the position of Assistant City
Administrator and 17 other positions from the plantilla of the local government of Caloocan.
Later, all dismissed employees were paid their back wages except respondent Santiago who was
only partially paid. When the City Council of Caloocan enacted appropriation Ordinance No.
0134, Series of 1992 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago, Judge
Alla de i ed an o de fo he Ci of Caloocan o deli e o he RTC a manage check fo he
satisfaction of the judgment. When the City Mayor refused to sign the check intended for
San iago pa men , J dge Alla de o de ed he She iff o ga nish the funds of the City of
Caloocan. The order was questioned by the City contending their public funds are beyond the
reach of garnishment.
DECISION: Yes, Judge Allarde's action were proper.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The rule is and has always been that all government funds may not be
subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by
law. However, the rule admits a qualification, that is, when there is a corresponding
appropriation as required by law. In other words, the rule on the immunity of public funds from
seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are
already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the
government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial
processes. Here, the amount was allocated for the back-pay obligation. Hence, The judgment of
the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.
63 | P a g e
(55) Pable Ocampo v. HRET, GR No. 158466 (2004)
ISSUE: Whether or not the candidate who has the second highest vote should be declared as
winner considering that the duly-elected representative is not eligible for the office.
FACTS: Mario B. Crespo aka Mark Jimenez, a duly-elected congressman of the 6th district of
Manila, was declared ineligible for the position in which he was elected for lack of residency in
the district and was ordered to vacate his office. Ocampo then averred that since Crespo was
declared as such, he should be declared the winner, having garnered the second highest number
of votes.
DECISION: No, it is not the proper procedure.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The fact that the candidate who had the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or ineligible for office does not give rise to the right of the candidate
who garnered the second highest vote to be declared winner. To do otherwise would be anathema
to the most basic precepts of republicanism and democracy. Therefore, the only recourse to
ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to hold another election.
64 | P a g e
(56) Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649 (2013)
ISSUE: Is the rule on succession in the Local Government Code applicable?

FACTS: Rommel Arnado is a natural bon Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship upon his
naturalization as an American citizen. Subsequently, he renounced his American citizenship and
ran as a Mayor of Lanao del Norte. After he was proclaimed the winner, the COMELEC anulled
such proclamation and consequently directed that the order of succession under the Local
Government Code be followed. Maquiling, another candidate for mayor, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the election intervened the case, claims that he should be
proclaimed as the winner.
DECISION: No, it is not applicable.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's candidacy
involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission on election offenses as provided for
in the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing
as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office. Arnado being a non-
candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. The old doctrine was that the vice
mayor or the vice governor, as the case may be, shall succeed the disqualified winning candidate,
not the candidate for the same position who had received the next highest vote.
65 | P a g e
(57) Villavivencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 (1919)
ISSUE: Whether or not mayor of Manila had the power to deport the women without their
knowledge.
FACTS: In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly rounded up, put
on a ship, and sent to Davao as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against him. The
Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the
fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of residence. This case justifies one of
the basic rights of citizen, the right of domain. Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together
with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night
of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to
Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of
the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
DECISION: No, he did not have such power.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the
prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action.
On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or
regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still,
as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as
every other citizen.
66 | P a g e
(58) Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979)
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed Letter of Instruction is invalid and violated constitutional
guarantees of due process.
FACTS: This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an
early warning device mandatory for motor vehicles. It is assailed in this prohibition proceeding
as being violative to the constitutional guarantee of due process in as far as the rules and
regulations for its implementation are concerned.
DECISION: No, the LOI is valid.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power
and there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As
identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police
power was clearly intended to promote public safety. In addition, the UN and the Vienna
Convention, both ratified by the Philippine Government recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices. The Constitution provides that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word.
67 | P a g e
(59) Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115 (1957)
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
FACTS: Lao Ichong, representing himself and other resident-aliens who are engagedin the
retail industry in the Philippines petitioned the Supreme Court to declare RA1180 (An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business) as unconstitutional. One of the provisions of the Act was the
prohibition of persons, not Filipino citizens, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations not wholly-owned by citizens of the Philippines from engaging directly or indirectly
in the retail trade. Petitioners said that the act denies them the equal protection of laws and
deprives them of their liberty and property without due process.
DECISION: Yes, a law may supersed a treaty or a generally accepted principle.

RATIO DECIDENDI: In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised
gene all accep ed p inciple and i h RA 1180. The e al p o ec ion of he la cla e doe no
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enfo ced ; and, ha he e al p o ec ion cla e i no inf inged b legi la ion hich applie
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
cla and ho e ho do no .
68 | P a g e
(60) Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR, 704 SCRA 216 (2013)
ISSUE: Whether or not Deutsche Bank is no longer entitled to the treaty relief due to failure to
comply with the application first with the BIR.
FACTS: Deutsche Bank applied for a tax refund by virtue of the preferential rate of 10% BPRT
provided by the RP-Germany Tax Treaty as it had erroneously paid the regular 15% rate. When
the matter was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals, the tax refund was denied due to the failure
of the taxpayer to file an application with the BIR prior to the availment of the preferential tax
rate under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
DECISION: Deutsche bank is still entitled.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that the BIR must not impose additional requirements
that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the failure to strictly comply with RMO 1-2000 will not
deprive the taxpayer of the benefits provided under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty for as long as it
possesses all the requirements stated therein. It went on to state that at most, the application for a
tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to
the relief under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
69 | P a g e
(61) IN RE GARCIA
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may enable Garcia to practice law in the Philippines?
FACTS: Arturo E. Garcia, a Filipino citizen, finished a law course in Spain and was thereafter
allowed to practice law. He contends that he is entitled to practice law in the Philippines without
submitting himself to the bar examinations under the Treaty of Academic Degree and the
Exercise of Professions between the Philippines and Spain.
DECISION: No. The treaty only applies to Filipino citizens desiring to practice their
profession in Spain and Spanish citizens desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Since, Garcia is a Filipino citizen, he is therefore subject to the laws of
his own country. The executive department may not encroach upon the constitutional
prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
70 | P a g e
(62) PEOPLE VS LAGMAN
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1 is constitutional?

FACTS: In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman, a Filipino citizen whom have attained the age of 20, is
being compelled by Section 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1, otherwise known as the Na ional
Defen e La o join and ende he mili a e ice. Lagman ef ed o join the military and
argued the provision was unconstitutional. He also defended that reason he does not want to
serve the military is because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not
wish to kill or be killed.
DECISION: Yes. Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 is constitutional.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Because it is the duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. Thus, the National Defense Law, may require its citizens to
compulsory render military e ice. Sec. 4, A . II of he Con i ion a e ha The p ime
duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to
render personal military or civil e ice.
71 | P a g e
(63) ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR
ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement
FACTS: Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas City. Estrada
requested an investigation of respondent for cohabiting with a man not her husband and having a
child with the latter while she was still married.Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a
grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed
to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Escritor admitted
the above-mentioned allegations but denies any liability for the alleged gross immoral conduct
for the reason that she i a membe of he eligio ec Jeho ah Wi ne and Wa ch To e
Society and her conjugal arrangement is approved and is in conformity with her religious
beliefs.
DECISION: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage o bigam cha ge again e ponden o he pa ne . Th he S a e
interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a
distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
72 | P a g e
(64) REPUBLIC VS MANALO
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Manila RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the joint order?
FACTS: Republic of the Philippines, represented in this case by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC), filed a complaint for civil forfeiture. In the said civil forfeiture cases, the
Republic sought the forfeiture in its favor of certain deposits and government securities
maintained in several bank accounts by the defendants therein, which were related to the
unlawful activity of fraudulently accepting investments from the public, in violation of the
Securities Regulation Code as well as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001. In a Decision
dated May 21, 2009, the CA granted respondents' petition, ruling that the Manila RTC gravely
abused its discretion in denying respondents' separate motions for intervention. Feeling
aggrieved, the Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA.
DECISION: No. The petition must be dismissed for having become moot and academic. A
case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or use.
RATIO DECIDENDI: In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner
would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.In this case ,
the Manila RTC's rendition of the Decision dated September 23, 2010 as well as the Decision
dated February 11, 2011 and the Amended Decision dated May 9, 2011 by virtue of which the
assets subject of the said cases were all forfeited in favor of the government, are supervening
events which have effectively rendered the essential issue in this case moot and academic, that
is, whether or not respondents should have been allowed by the Manila RTC to intervene on the
ground that they have a legal interest in the forfeited assets.
73 | P a g e
(65) SALONGA VS CRUZ
ISSUE: Whether or not Salongas alleged remarks are protected by thefreedom of speech.
FACTS: Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act
after he was implicated, along with other 39 accused, byVictor Lovely in the series of bombings
in Metro Manila. He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive
organizations for two reasons 1) because his house was used as contact point; and because of his
remarks during the party of RaulDaza in Los Angeles. Heallegedly opined about the likelihood
of a violent struggle in the Philippinesif reforms are not instituted immediately by then President
Marcos.
DECISION: Yes the petitioners is a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression.
RATIO DECIDENDI: In PD 885, political discussion will only constitute prima facieevidence
of membership in a subversive organization if such discussionamounts to conferring with
officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or
enterprise thereof. In the case,there is noproof that such discussion was in furtherance of any
plan tooverthrow the government through illegalmeans. Lovely also declared thathis bombing
mission was not against the government, but directedagainst aparticular family. Such a
statement negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment.
74 | P a g e
(66) SERRANO DE AGBAYANI VS PNB
ISSUE: WON the action prescribed?

FACTS: In 1939, Agbayani borrowed P450 from PNB secured by a realty mortgage. In1944,
the loan matured but PNB could not collect because it was at thistime of the war. In 1945,
Pres.Osmena issued the Debt Moratorium Law (EO #32), suspending the payment of loans for
four years due to the ravagesof war. In 1948, RA 342 extended the Debt Moratorium Law for
another eight years (up to 1956). In 1953, however, the SC declared RA 342 as unconstitutional
in the case of Rutter v Esteban. In 1959, PNB filed a suit for payment of the loan.
DECISION: No. The action could still prosper.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The period from 1945 when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when
itwas declared unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose ofprescription since the
Debt Moratorium Law was operative during this time. Ineffect, only 7 years had elapsed (1944-
45, 1953-59). Indeed, it would be unjust topunish the creditor who could not collect prior to
1953 because the DebtMoratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that his respect
foranapparently valid law made him lose his right to collect. Art. 7 of the Civil Code which
provides that, "When the courtsdeclare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be voidand the latter shall govern."
75 | P a g e
(67) CIR VS SAN ROQUE POWER CORP
ISSUE: WON San Roque is entitled to tax refund?

FACTS: On October 11, 1997, San Roque entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)
with the National Power Corporation (NPC) by building the San Roque Multi- Purpose Project in
San Manuel, Pangasinan. The San Roque Multi-Purpose Project allegedly incurred, excess input
VAT in the amount of P559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001 which it declared in its Quarterly
VAT Returns filed for the same year. San Roque duly filed with the BIR separate claims for
refund, amounting to P559,709,337.54, representing unutilized input taxes as declared in its
VAT returns for taxable year 2001. However, on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed amended
Quarterly VAT Returns for the year2001 since it increased its unutilized input VAT To the
amount of P560,200,283.14. SanRoque filed with the BIR on the same date, separate amended
claims for refund in the aggregate amount of P560,200,283.14. On April 10, 2003, a mere 13
days after it filed its amended administrative claim with the CIR on March 28, 2003, San Roque
filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. CIR alleged that the claim by San Roque was
prematurely filed with the CTA.
DECISION: No. SC granted the petition of CIR to deny the tax refund or credit claim of San
Roque.
RATIO DECIDENDI: San Roque is not entitled to a tax refund because it failed to comply
with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirement of waiting 120 days before filing its judicial
claim. On April 10, 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its amended administrative claim with the
CIR on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the CTA, which showed
that San Roque did not wait for the 120-day period to lapse before filing its judicial claim.
Compliance with the 120-day waiting period is mandatory and jurisdictional, under RA8424 or
the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Failure to comply renders the petition void. Article 5 of the Civil
Code provides, "Acts executed against provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity." Section 112(D) of the 1997 Tax Code is
clear, unequivocal, and categorical that the CIR has 120 days to act on an administrative claim.
The taxpayer can file the judicial claim(1) Only within 30 days after the CIR partially or fully
denies the claim within the 120-day period, or(2) only within 30 days from the expiration of the
120- day period if the CIR does not act within the 120-day period.
76 | P a g e
(68) MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III, JULY 1,2014
ISSUE: 1.Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." 2. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other execu
FACTS: Senator Jinggoy Estrada, in his privileged speech, revealed that some senators had
been allotted an additional PHP50 million each as incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice Corona. As a response, Department of Budget and Management
Secretary Abad explained that the funds released had been part of the DAP, a program designed
by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. The DAP is a stimulus
package intended to fast track public spending and to push economic growth by investing on
high-impact budgetary programs, activities, or projects to be funded from the savings generated
during the year as well as from unprogrammed funds. Petitioners contend that the appropriations
funded under the DAP, being an appropriation that set aside public funds for public use, should
require an enabling law for its validity. Petitioners also question the constitutionality of such
realignments and transfers pursuant to Section 25 (5) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
DECISION: 1.No. The SC held that the DAP did not violate this constitutional provision.
2.Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
RATIO DECIDENDI: 1.DAP was merely a program of the Executive and is not a fund nor is
it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, no additional
funds were withdrawn from the Treasury; otherwise, an appropriation law would have been
signed. Funds already appropriated were merely realigned. 2. DAP being in violation of Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely: (a)
The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration
of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the
end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained
in the General Appropriations Acts; (b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the
Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and (c) The
funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act.
77 | P a g e
(69) MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III, FEBRUARY 3, 2015

(ENBANC)
ISSUE: Whether or not the DAP realignments or transfers are unconstitutional?

FACTS: Section 24 and 26(2), Article VI, 1987 When President Benigno Aquino III took
office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised
ha he econom needed a im l plan. B dge Sec e a Flo encio B ch Abad hen came
up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as
a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign
f nd f om lo mo ing p ojec o p io i p ojec in ead of ai ing fo ne ea
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn
b he E ec i e. Once i hd a n, he e f nd a e decla ed a a ing b he E ec i e and
said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to
stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was
attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
DECISION: Yes. The Court held that for the transfer of appropriated funds to be valid
RATIO DECIDENDI: Such transfer must be made upon the concurrence of the following
requisites, namely: (1) there is a law authorizing the president, the Senate President, the Speaker
of the HOR, the Chief Justice of the SC, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to
transfer such funds within their respective offices; (2) the funds to be transferred are savings,
generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) the purpose of the transfer
is to augment an item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices. That law,
generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs
should expressly authorize such transfers. Whereas the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid
provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the DAP, such transfers were unconstitutional.
DAP also failed to comply with the second requisite since the DAP transfers are not savings
contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the
GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, discontinued, or abandoned. The GAA does not refer to
savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of
savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis for the transfers, further,
savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. However, under the DAP, funds are
already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and subsequently being
declared as savings by the Executive through the DBM.
78 | P a g e
(70) MAGALLONA VS ERMITA
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional for reducing the Philippine
Maritime Territory?
FACTS: Magallona, et. al., assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act 9522 which mandates
he adj men of he co n a chipelagic ba eline and cla if ing the baseline regime of
nearby territories. Historically, Republic Act No. 3046 is the ruling law which demarcates the
maritime baselines of the Philippines, as an archipelago. Republic Act No. 3046 follows the
framing of the Convention on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958, which codifies
the sovereign rights of the states over their territorial sea. Republic Act No. 9522 aims to amend
Republic Act No. 3046 by complying with the terms of United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea III which took between 1973 and 1982.
DECISION: No. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III) has
nothing to do with the acquisition or loss territory.
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is a multilateral treaty regulating sea use rights over maritime zones.
Baseline laws such as Republic Act 9522 are enacted pursuant to UNCLOS III and only serves
to mark out specific basepoints from which baselines are drawn straight or curve, and to serve
and to start as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of maritime zones and
continental shelf.
79 | P a g e
(71) Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional for reducing the Philippine
Maritime Territory?
FACTS: The MOA on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of
Peace of 2001 is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the joint efforts of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached
between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.
DECISION: The MOA on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all
come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now
nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source
of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other
oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or
a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.
80 | P a g e
(72) Reagan v CIR , 30 SCRA 968 (1969)
ISSUE: Whether or not a sale made on a foreign military base is excluded from tax
FACTS: Petitioner questioned the payment of an income tax assessed on him by public
respondent on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the US
Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base. Petitioner contends
that the base is outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond the jurisdictional power to tax.
DECISION: The decision of the CTA asof May 12, 1966 denying the refund of P2,979.00 as
the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The said foreign military bases is not a foreign soil or territory for
purposes of income tax legislation. Philippine jurisdictional rights including the power to tax are
preserved.
81 | P a g e
(73) People vs Gozo 53 SCRA 476
ISSUE: Whether or not the State can exercise administrative jurisdiction within the naval base
leased by the Philippines to the American armed forces.
FACTS: Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the
municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification,
alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity on the pretext that her house
was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the
well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she in effect seek to
emasculate the State's sovereign rights by the assertion that the latter cannot exercise therein
administrative jurisdiction.
DECISION: The appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found the
accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No.
14,
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the
bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains
not only jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of.
82 | P a g e
(74) Lee vs. Director of Lands GR 128195
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot can revert back to the owner.
FACTS: The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during
the effectivity of the1935 Constitution which prohibits aliens to acquire private agricultural
lands, save in cases of hereditary succession.Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified
to acquire the land in question. The former owners filed with theCourt of First Instance, Capiz an
action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land.
DECISION: The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of title in
Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, and dismisses the petition,
without prejudice.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The land is now in the hands of Filipinos. If the land was invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in
the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is valid.
83 | P a g e
(75) Republic vs Chule Lim GR 153883
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim complied with the legal requirement in electing her citizenship
FACTS: Chule Y. Lim filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte. She claimed that she was born on 29
October 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City.
The Court finding the petition sufficient in form and substance ordered the publication of the
hearing of the petition.
DECISION: The instant petition for review is DENIED. Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of
Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following corrections in the birth record of respondent
Chule Y. Lim, to wit: 1. Her family name from "YO" o "YU"; 2. He fa he name f om "YO
DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)"; 3. Her status from "legitimate" to
"illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and, 4.
Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the
father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
in en ion in a a emen o be igned and o n o b he pa conce ned befo e an office
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Go e nmen of he Philippine .
84 | P a g e
(76) Calilung vs Datumanong GR 160869
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual

allegiance
FACTS: Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates
Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. In its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.
85 | P a g e
(77) Republic vs Nora Sagun GR 187567 (2012)
ISSUE: Has Norma complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine
citizenship?
FACTS: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after
getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Said document was notarized but was not recorded and registered with the Local
Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
DECISION: Petition Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot
assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine
citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot
now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship
when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
86 | P a g e
(78) In re Ching, Bar Matter 914 (1999)
ISSUE: Whe he o no Ching ho ld be allo ed o ake he la e oa h

FACTS: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964.
Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law
degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was
advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his
oa h. Appa en l , Ching fa he a a Chine e ci i en b hi mo he a a Filipino ci i en. His
parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate
child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent.
Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public
accountant a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a
municipality in La Union.
DECISION: The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the
Philippine Bar.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of CA No. 625 or fourteen years after he had reached
the age of majority. The age of majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. The
Supreme Court noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It
eem i can be e ended an f he ). Ching pecial ci c m ance can be con ide ed. I i
not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a
public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching
didn gi e an e plana ion h he bela edl cho e o elec Filipino ci i en hip (b I g e i
simpl beca e he ne e ho gh he Chine e no n il he applied o ake he ba ). The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
ci i en hip and, he eaf e , file he ame i h he nea e ci il egi . Ching n ea onable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
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(79) Co v HRET 199 SCRA 692
ISSUE: Whether or Not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines
FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar
was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests
against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a
natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district
of Northern Samar.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court interprets Sec 1, Par 3 of Art 4 above as applying not only to
those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been
born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was
enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he
was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
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(80) Bengson v HRET GR 142840
ISSUE: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of
the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-bo n ci i en.
FACTS: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born
in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted
in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship
for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
co n . He a na ali ed in US in 1990. On Ma ch 17, 1994, e ponden C eac i ed hi
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was
elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished
from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry
of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
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(81) So v Republic 513 SCRA 268 (2007)
ISSUE: Whether or not Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized
Filipino citizen
FACTS: He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in
No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average
annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is
single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of
Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473. On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the
petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons
concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The
entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general circulation in the
City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be posted in
public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.9 During the hearing, petitioner
presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal
con l an and ad i e of he So famil b ine . He o ld all a end pa ie and o he
social functions hosted by petitioner famil . He kne pe i ione o be obedien , ha d o king,
and possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications mandated by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10)
years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the
University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of
some school organizations and mingled well with friends. The RTC granted the petition on June
4, 2003.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the
political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current
and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by
naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial
naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the
form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. First. C.A. No.
473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws the former covers all aliens regardless of
class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives,
who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To
reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is
administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a
need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be
inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the
legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship
which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien
has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
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qualifications and disqualifications. In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the

applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of
his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law,
a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime;
who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose
affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the
person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community;
that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and
that his word may be taken on its face al e, a a good a an of he applican o hine . e
do no ag ee i h pe i ione a g men ha e ponden i p ecl ded f om e ioning he RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize
the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent
to the granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship,
with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its
failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.
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(82) David vs. Agbay G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a
Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225
FACTS: Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization.
Upon retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the
beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion
where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. Petitioner filed a
Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha Agbay
opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own
land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172
of the RPC against the petitioner. Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. The CENRO ejec ed pe i ione MLA, ling
ha pe i ione b e en e-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his
MLA which was void ab initio. An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed
before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner. Since the crime for
which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed before he had
reacquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen. Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior
to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under
the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance. For the purpose of determining the
citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in
Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats
those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other
words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
pa ag aph of hich cla ifie ha ch polic go e n all ca e af e he ne la effec i i .
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino
citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian
citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen,
naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses
his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six
months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive
effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in
finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
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(83) Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec GR 162759 August 4, 2006
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1
year residency.
FACTS: Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their
right of suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec,
however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to
comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article
5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship
under RA 9225 may exercise their right to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003, RA 9189. Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the
residency requirement in Section 1 of the same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was
practically set forth to provide a system wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same
time, not residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote. The Court held that present day
duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189
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(84) JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña GR 83820 25 May
1990
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine Citizenship cannot
be presumed.
FACTS: On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition
for disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen. In 27
January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation Commission that Osmeña is an American Citizen. According to the
evidence presented, Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of
Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the Late President Sergio Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder of
a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and been continuously residing in the Philippines since
birth and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines. COMELEC dismissed the
petition for Disqualification for not having been timingly filed and for lack of sufficient proof
that private respondent is not s Filipino citizen and Osmeña was proclaim of winning candidates
for obtaining the highest number of votes.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmeña had lost his
Filipino Citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63 these are : 1. By
naturalization in foreign country; 2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and 3. By
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or Law of the foreign country.
The evidence clearly shows that Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the
three (3) mentioned hereinaboved or any other modes of losing Philippine citizenship. The
1987 Con i ion, A icle IV, Sec ion 5 a e D al allegiance of ci i en i iniminical o he
na ional in e e and hall be deal i h b la ha no e oac i e effec .
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(85) Valles v COMELEC GR 137000, Aug. 9, 2000
ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and
an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for
governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is
an Australian.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the
1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29,
1916, also known as the Jones Law. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan.
5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were
the laws in force at the time of her bi h, Tele fo o da gh e , he ein p i a e e ponden
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. The signing into law of the 1935
Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship, xxx So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by
virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing
her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
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(86) MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al. GR

221697 , GR 221698-700 March 8,2016
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen (2)
Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
FACTS: In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016
would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. Grace Poe was born in 1968.,
found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY
POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in
1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. On December 2004, he returned to the
Philippine d e o hi fa he de e io a ing medical condi ion, ho hen e entually demice on
February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally
went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005. On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her
petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered
as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as
appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the
RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped
using her American passport. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her
candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born
Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as
Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of
citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE
is qualified as candidate for Presidency.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For
that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) he e i high p obabili ha Poe pa en a e Filipino , a being ho n in he ph ical
features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro,
Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos,
con e en l p o iding 99% chance ha Poe bilogical pa en a e Filipino . Said p obabili
and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence. (2)
The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as
to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be
natural born citizens. (3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born
citizenship as to the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN
Convention Law. As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because
she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled
with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile
in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the
96 | P a g e
US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225.
Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.
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(87) DEPT OF AGRICULTURE VS NLRC GR 104269 November 11, 1993
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.
FACTS: The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed
and requested by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioner Department of
Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be
provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards
were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several
guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages
against the DA and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA
jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the
complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus,
the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce
and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the
City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA. The petitioner charges the NLRC
with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults
the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it
claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the
petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its
immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any
circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the
state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine go e nmen con en and bmi
to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied,
hich co ld e e a a ba i of ci il ac ion be een p i a e pa ie . n this case, The DA has not
pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered
into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in
character. But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.
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(88) Philippine Agila Sattelite Inc. vs. Lichauco G.R. No. 142362, May 3, 2006
ISSUE: Is the suit one against the state?

FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. is a duly organized corporation, whose
President and Chief Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was
established by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia,
concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. The Philippine
government, through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU to secure from the International
Telecommunication Union the required orbital slots and frequency assignments for the
Philippine satellite. The government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International
Telecommunication Union two orbital slots, designated as 161º East Longitude and 153º East
Longitude, for Philippine satellites. PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr.,
seeking for official Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of the two
aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its satellites. Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied
in a le e confi ming he Philippine Go e nmen a ignmen of Philippine o bi al lo 161E
and 153E o PASI fo i a elli e . PASI averred that after having secured the confirmation
from the Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations for the launching, operation and
management of its satellites, including the availment of loans, the increase in its capital.
However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly
emba ked on a c ade o malign he name of Michael de G man and abo age he b ine s of
PASI. Agg ie ed b Licha co ac ion , PASI and De G man in i ed a ci il complain
against Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC. The complaint, alleging three
causes of action, was for injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages. The third
ca e of ac ion, fo damage , imp ed e e al ac o Licha co a pa of he alleged c ade o
malign the name of plaintiff De Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of
official functions against an officer of the government by a private citizen that would result in a
charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State
itself, although the latter has not been formally impleaded. However, government immunity from
suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to
protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from
a tortious act in the performance of his duties. As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three
causes of action against Lichauco: one for injunction against her performing any act in relation to
orbital slot 153º East Longitude; one for declaration of nullity of award, seeking to nullify the
alleged award of orbital slot 153º East Longitude; and one for damages against Lichauco herself.
As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official functions by an officer of
the government will result in a charge against or financial liability to the government that the
complaint must be regarded as a suit against the State itself. However, the distinction must also
be raised between where the government official concerned performs an act in his/her official
and jurisdictional capacity and where he performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the
availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the
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proper party- defendant or respondent. As to the first two causes of action, the Court ruled that
the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be
properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of
action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the
nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are for the
revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it
been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit
would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC
itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been
considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case. The doctrine,
a mma i ed in Sha f . Co of Appeal a e : While he doc ine appea o p ohibi onl
suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials
of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that
if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded
against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been
formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be
applicable nde all ci c m ance . It is a different matter where the public official is made to
account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As
was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al.
vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.: Ina m ch a he S a e a ho i e onl legal ac b i office ,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts,
for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the
State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a
State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the
State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit
against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice
100 | P a g e
(89) Lansang vs. CA G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed against the petitioner is in reality a complaint against
he S a e, hich co ld no p o pe i ho he S a e con en
FACTS: Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and Jose Iglesias
were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 to occupy a portion of Rizal Park by
the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged
in the development of national parks. Private respondents were allegedly given office and library
space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. Private respondent GABI was to remit to
NPDC 40% of the profits derived from operating the kiosks. After the EDSA Revolution,
petitioner Lansang, the new Chairman of the NPDC, sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner
terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the
premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. On the day of the supposed
eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction against petitioner.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed
against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit
must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public
official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of
the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where
the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the
rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising
from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does its apply where the public official is clearly being
sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may
have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the case, the petitioner is being
sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. It is also evident the
petitioner is sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from
Rizal Park. The important question to consider is whether or not petitioner abused his authority
in ordering the ejectment of GABI. The Court found no evidence of such abuse of authority.
Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of lease contract.
That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a
matter of accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so, petitioner may validly
discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the
park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and do not claim a vested right to continue to
occupy Rizal Park.
101 | P a g e
(90) Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity (2) Whether or not the State is
liable for damages
FACTS: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program.
There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores
were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola
Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant
recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be
compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola
massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers
involved in the incident.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed
by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11
merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the
finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party
decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way
bind the State. The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who
allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the
scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The
military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable
for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.
102 | P a g e
(91) Bayan v Exec Secretary GR 138570
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

FACTS: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a
Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the
Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated
for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine
Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in
effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18,
1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia
Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary
Rodolfo Se e ino J ., o e change no e on he complemen ing a egic in e e of he Uni ed
States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific egion. Bo h ide di c ed, among o he hing ,
the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5,
1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the
VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the
letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel
of the rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such
affairs purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less,
maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three
political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred
to it by law.
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(92) Pamatong v Comelec GR 161872
ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold office

FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported
by a registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of
Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal
access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,
by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates,
i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he
is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law
in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language
of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
104 | P a g e
(93) Garcia v Drilon 699 SCRA 352
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.
FACTS: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Tempo a P o ec ion O de again he h band, Je , p an o R.A. 9262, en i led An Ac
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Vic im , P e c ibing Penal ie The efo , and fo O he P po e . She claimed o be a ic im of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part
of petitioner. The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance
of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner
failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as i o ld be an a e ci e in
f ili . Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validi of he modified TPO fo being an n an ed p od c of an
in alid la . The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and
the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus,
this petition is filed.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the
trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
105 | P a g e
(94) PASEI v Drilon 163 SCRA 386
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order
No. 1.
FACTS: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
con i ional alidi of Dep . O de No. 1 (1998) of DOLE en i led G ideline Go e ning he
Tempo a S pen ion of Deplo men of Filipino Dome ic and Ho ehold Wo ke . I claim
that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in
violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further,
PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent
have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino
female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to
which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female
contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well
settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that: (1) Such
classification rests on substantial distinctions (2.) That they are germane to the purpose of the
law (3). They are not confined to existing conditions (4.) They apply equally to al members of
the same class In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept.
Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on
the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things,
o he e i emen of p blic afe a ma be p o ided b la . Deplo men ban of female
domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule
making powers.
106 | P a g e
(95) UP BOR v CA GR 134625`
ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to
substantive due process.
FACTS: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program
in Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work
required and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense. After going over her
dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism. However,
respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a passing
mark except Dr. Medina. UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated
disapproval. Hence, she expressed her disappointments over the CSSP administration and
a ned Dean Pa . Ho e e , Dean Pa e e he e cl ion of Celine name f om he li of
candidates for graduation but it did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine
graduated. Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended
that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the
charges against her. CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to
withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree. The Board sent her a letter indicating that they
resolved to withdraw her Doctorate Degree recommended by the University Council. She sought
an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by
President Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully
withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed
heard several times. Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge
that private respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense. In
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's
side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have
been denied due process. In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against
her and given opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation
which she submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla
committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities
explaining her position. It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to
have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the
U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the
agenda of the Board of Regents.
107 | P a g e
(96) CoTesCUP v Secretary of Education GR 216930
ISSUE: Whether the K to 12 Law violates petitioners' right to substantive due process and equal
protection of the laws.
FACTS: In an attempt to bolster petitioner case against the K to 12 Law, petitioners also raised
the following policy issues: 1)K to 12 only increases the resource gap by creating more need for
resources. The solution to the problem is closing the resource gap by giving priority to education
in the budget and public spending program of the government and addressing the issue of
poverty and malnutrition and programs aimed at alleviating if not eradicating poverty in the long
run but instead government comes up with the K to 12 Law which is a copycat and elitist
solution.275 2)K to 12 is problem-ridden. Instead, what we need is to prioritize deficiencies in
personnel, facilities and materials; and a nationalist-oriented curriculum relevant to the needs of
the people.276 3)The Philippine government does not have enough funds to add two (2) more
years of senior high school.277 4)Student-teacher ratio is far from ideal.278 5)Teachers are paid
low salaries.279 6)There is no assurance that senior high school results in good employment.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: Policy matters are not the concern of the Court. To reiterate,
government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.
It is not for the Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Stated
otherwise, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short,
the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner
all these are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions
does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. When the validity of a
statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine
whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power.Further, the
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary, in the
determination of actual cases and controversies, must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the government.The Court, despite its vast powers, will not review the wisdom, merits, or
propriety of governmental policies, but will strike them down only on either of two grounds: (1)
unconstitutionality or illegality and/or (2) grave abuse of discretionFor having failed to show any
of the above in the passage of the assailed law and the department issuances, the petitioners'
remedy thus lies not with the Court, but with the executive and legislative branches of the
government.
108 | P a g e
(97) University v CA 230 SCRA 761
ISSUE: Wheter or not the That Mandamus will not lie to compel the respondents to enroll
petitioning students because of their academic deficiencies and that this refusal of respondent
university falls within its right to do so under the academic freedom clause o
FACTS: Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael
Kim So and Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San
Agustin (USA) who were refused re-admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two
semesters of school year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not
lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II With Related Learning Experience). Its
persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely choose their field of study and
finish a college degree and worse, no other school within the city and nearby areas is willing to
accept them due to the difference in the curriculum and school residency requirement. Thus, they
filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, to command
petitioner USA to re-admit them. Aside from the prayer for re-admission, they also prayed for
actual and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each of them. Submitting a joint
answer to the petition, petitioner USA and the other petitioners, Dean Concepcion Cajilig and
Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda, Mary Espino, Rhodora Azucena, Ma. Dulce Socorro Posa
and Cosette Monteblanco admitted having barred private respondents from finishing their
Nursing course but justified the decision not to re-admit them as being in pursuance of the
school's policy that only students with grades of at least 80% in any major Nursing subject,
including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, are allowed enrollment in the following year.
Private respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their below 80% performance rating.
To buttress petitioners' stance, they placed reliance on Section 9(2) of the Education Act of 1982
(B.P. Blg. 232) which recognizes the right of students to freely choose their field of study subject
to existing curricula, and to continue their course up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2) thereof vesting in
institutions of higher learning the right to determine on academic grounds who shall be admitted
to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of study and research.Additionally,
petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of action for mandamus under the
premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which has been violated
neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty to re-admit them, since petitioner
USA is a private educational institution not performing public functions and duties. Under the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to academic
freedom.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: Equally mandated by Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the 1987
Constitution is that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined as the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them - free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Said
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.
That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent.
109 | P a g e
(98) SSS vs CA 175 SCRA 686
ISSUE: whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security System
Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return to
work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS)
FACTS: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners,
alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting
for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported
to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work;
that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the
strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike
and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be
ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went
on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of
the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of
union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion
of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and
permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to
other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after
the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed
acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: The court ruled that Government employees may, therefore, through
their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If
there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to
strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to
pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of
the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to
Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions
of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof
and government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law
and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
110 | P a g e
(99) Oposa v Factoran GR 101083
ISSUE: Do the petitioner-mino ha e a ca e of ac ion in filing a cla i o p e en he

mi app op ia ion o impai men of Philippine ainfo e ?
FACTS: A a pa e cla i a filed b mino J an An onio Opo a, e al., ep e en ing
their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to: 1. Cancel all
existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country; 2. Cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and granting the plaintiffs
ch o he elief j and e i able nde he p emi e . The alleged ha he ha e a clea
and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in
allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation
and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the following grounds: 1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of
their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
h hm and ha mon of na e hich indi pen abl incl de, in e alia, he j dicio
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conse a ion of he co n fo e , mine al,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the
future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
diffe en l , he mino a e ion of hei igh o a o nd en i onmen con titutes at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.
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(100) Republic v Albios 707 SCRA 5584 (2013)
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void.
FACTS: Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later
on filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their marriage,
they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention
of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after
the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and
never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because
he never processed her petition for citizenship. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio. The RTC ruled in her favor. In decla ing he e ponden
marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from
i incep ion. In i e ol ion den ing he OSG mo ion fo econ ide a ion, he RTC en on o
explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent
to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal
before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC decision. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA
ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA
found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered
into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife
or build a family. The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: No, e ponden ma iage i no oid. The court said: Ba ed on he
above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply
with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal
ie hich a nece a o accompli h hei goal. The co al o e plained ha The e i no la
that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or
law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be decla ed alid. No le han o Con i ion decla e ha
marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
112 | P a g e
contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered
in o hen i i he need of he pa ie , and j a ea il n llified hen no longe needed.
113 | P a g e
(101) Imbong vs Ochoa, 721 SCRA 584 (2013)
ISSUE: SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health

(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the: Right to life Right to health Freedom of religion
and right to free speech Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) Freedom of e
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. The RH Law
violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The RH Law
violates the right to religious freedom. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on
involuntary servitude. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. The RH Law
violates the right to free speech. The RH La i oid-for- ag ene in iola ion of he d e
process clause of the Constitution. The RH La in de in o he one of p i ac of one famil
protected by the Constitution PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review over the controversy. Power of Judicial Review Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge Locus Standi Declaratory Relief One Subject/One Title Rule
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: SUBSTANTIAL Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this
stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members
could express their own views on this matter. Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states:
The S a e ecogni e he anc i of famil life and hall p o ec and eng hen he famil a a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
he nbo n f om concep ion.
114 | P a g e
(102) Roe vs Wade, 410 US 113
ISSUE: Whe he o no a oman igh o p i ac a p o ec ed b he con i ion incl de he

right to abort her child.
FACTS: This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas, which granted the
declaratory relief prayed for by the plaintiff who challenged the constitutionality of the Texas
Criminal abortion laws; but denied issuing an injunction against enforcement of such statutes.
In 1970, No ma L McCo e ( Jane Roe ), a p egnan single woman (allegedly a result of
rape), filed a suit against the defendant, District Attorney Henry Wade questioning Texas State
Laws which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the
p po e of a ing he mo he life. She argues that said laws are unconstitutionally vague and
that they abridge her right of personal privacy as guaranteed and protected by the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Later, she amended her complaint as to represent or
s e on behalf of he elf and all o he omen imila l i a ed; he eb becoming a cla i.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Ye . The igh of p i ac i b oad eno gh o encompa a
oman deci ion he he o no o e mina e he p egnanc . We therefore conclude that the
right of personal privacy includes abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and
m be con ide ed again impo an a e in e e in eg la ion. A a e c iminal
abortion statute of the current Texas type that exempts from criminality only a lifesaving
procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of
the interests involved (such as liberty interests), is violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fo een h Amendmen .
115 | P a g e
(103) Limbona vs Conte Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786
ISSUE: Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as
they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what
is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous
Government and was later elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly. Congressman
Datu invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly for consulations and dialogues
on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII
hopefully resulting to chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and
may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as
mandated by the Commission. Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner addressed all
Assemblymen that there shall be no se ion in No embe a o p e ence in he ho e
committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang
pampook . In defiance of Pe i ione ad ice, Af e decla ing he p e ence of a o m, he
Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of
the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past
acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so
minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements
of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish
their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in
the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse. the Decree PD 168 established
in e nal a onom in he o egion [ ]i hin he f ame o k of he na ional o e eign and
e i o ial in eg i of he Rep blic of he Philippine and i Con i ion, i h legi la i e and
executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein
116 | P a g e
(104) Mamiscal vs Abdullah 761 SCRA 39 (2015)
ISSUE: Whether or not Mamiscal had validly effected a divorce from his wife is a matter that
must first be addressed by the Shari'a Circuit Court which, under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code),enjoys exclusive original jurisdictio
FACTS: Mamiscal and Adelaidah decided to have divorce repudiated Adelaidahs (talaq)
embodied in an agreement (kapasadan) but later on they reconciled. Despite such, Adelaidah still
filed the Certificate of Divorce (COD) with the office of Abdullah for registration. Albeit the
same was not signed by Mamiscal it was annotated in the certificate that it was executed in the
presence of two witnesses and in accordance with Islamic Law. Abdullah then issued the
Certificate of Registration of Divorce finalizing the same.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the administrative matter against Macalinog S. Abdullah, Clerk of
Court II, Shari'a Circuit Court, Marawi City, for partiality, violation of due process, dishonesty,
and conduct unbecoming a court employee is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, without
prejudice. The complaint of Baguan M. Mamiscal against Macalinog S. Abdullah is hereby
REFERRED to the Office of the Mayor, Marawi City and the Civil Service Commission for
appropriate action.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court ruled that they do not have jurisdiction to impose the proper
di ciplina ac ion again ci il egi a . Sha i a Ci c i Co hich, nde he Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code) enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction to
resolve disputes relating to divorce. The civil registrar is the person charged by law for the
recording of vital events and other documents affecting the civil status of persons. The Civil
Registry Law embraces all acts of civil life affecting the status of persons and is applicable to all
persons residing in the Philippines. The test of jurisdiction is the nature of the offense and not the
personality of the offender. The fact that the complaint charges Abdullah for "conduct
unbecoming of a court employee" is of no moment. Well-settled is the rule that what controls is
not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint. Unless jurisdiction
has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to
it.
117 | P a g e
(105) In RE Laureta and Maravilla 148 SCRA 382
ISSUE: WON privacy of communication was violated

FACTS: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of
the her case(aland dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it
was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was
railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.Illustre also threatened in
he le e ha , he e i no hing final in hi o ld. Thi ca e i fa f omfini hed b a long ho .
She h ea ened ha he o ld call fo a p e confe ence. Ill e le e ba icall a ack he
participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was
previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The
letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was
issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to
retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was
also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre wrote
le e o he o he j ice (Na a a, He e a,C ), again i h mo e h ea o e po e he kind
of j dicial pe fo mance eadil con i ing a e of j ice. T e o he h ea , Illustre later
filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly
rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of
using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty LAURETA
was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to thepress, without any copy
furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were
charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is
charging them with contempt.They claim that the letters were private communication, and that
they did not intend to dishonor the court.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of
conce n fo he en i e co .The e i no indic i e ep i al in ol ed he e. The Co a ho i
and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from
the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and
ethics of the legal profession.
118 | P a g e
(106) INS vs Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983)
ISSUE: Whether a single house can vote to override an executive decision such that it violates
the principle of separation of powers.
FACTS: An immigration law passed by Congress holds that the attorney general can suspend
he depo a ion of an illegal immig an if he immig an o ld ain e e e ha d hip a a
result. Additionally, if either the Senate or House of Representatives voted by majority to veto
he a o ne gene al deci ion ega ding depo a ion. Chadha a a den ho had emained
in the US with an expired Visa. The attorney general held that he should remain in the US due to
hardship. The House of Representatives vetoed the decision to grant amnesty, thereby sustaining
the deportation order. Chadha brought this litigation after the legislative veto.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, Act invalidated. The court recognize the argument of efficienc
regarding a single house vote. Efficiency is achieved by this measure because the attorney
general may frequently override deportation and calling both houses of the legislature to vote for
each instance would be time consuming and burdensome. However, the constitution is very clear
that legislative decisions are to be bicameral. There are reasons relating to fair representation of
states that maintain this justification as paramount, particularly when weighed against arguments
of efficiency. The act of overriding an executive veto is inherently legislative and therefore
requires bicameral, legislative support.
119 | P a g e
(107) Arnault vs Balagtas, 97 Phil 358 (1955)
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has authority to punish recalcitrant witness?

FACTS: Arnault continuously withheld information. This time about an affidavit supposedly
giving details surrounding the acquisitions of the estates. To this he gave the name Jesse Santos
as the person he gave the amount to.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Judgment appealed reversed. Provided the contempt is related to the
exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course of legislative process, the
legislative authority is supreme. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power or necessary to effectuate said power.
120 | P a g e
(108) Belgica vs Ochoa, Jr, 710 SCRA 1(2013)
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on separation of powers, non-
delegability of legislative power and checks and balances.
FACTS: Petitioner sought that the annual pork barrel system be declared unconstitutional and
null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretition.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The post enactent measures including project identification, fund
relelase, and fund alignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and does not
allow legislature to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere belongs to
the executive department.
121 | P a g e
(109) Mendoza vs People, 659 SCRA 681 (2011)
ISSUE: Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme Court recommend to the
President, the grant of executive clemency to a convict?
FACTS: Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a
special law known as the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the
Social Security Service (SSS) contributions to his employees. The offense is criminal in nature.
Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted his fault, as he said, he acted in good faith. But still, the Court
has to render judgment and apply the proper penalty how harsh it may be dura lex sed lex). The
Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison term. Considering the circumstances, the
court the Court transmitted the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems
appropriate but are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. It is
clearly stated in the Revised Penal Code which provides; Whene e a co ha kno ledge of
any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of
legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the
execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result
in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice
and he inj ca ed b he offen e.
122 | P a g e
(110) NPC Drivers and Mechanical Association vs Napocor, 503 SCRA 138 (2006)
ISSUE: The issue was whether or not NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 were
properly enacted.
FACTS: On J ne 8, 2001, Rep blic Ac 9136, o he i e kno n a he Elec ic Po e Ind
Refo m Ac of 2001 (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. It took effect on 26 June 2001. Under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law,[2] a
new National Power Board (NPB) of Directors was formed. An energy restructuring committee
(Restructuring Committee) was also created to manage the privatization and the restructuring of
the National Power Corporation (NPC), the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO),
and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Corporation (PSALC). On November 18 , 2002,
pursuant to Section 63[3] of the EPIRA Law and Rule 33[4] of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR), the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124, which provided for
G ideline on he Sepa a ion P og am of he NPC and he Selec ion and Placement of
Pe onnel. Unde hi Re ol ion, the services of all NPC personnel shall be legally
terminated on January 31, 2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits provided therein. On
the same day, the NPB approved NPB Resolution 2002-125, constituting a Transition Team to
manage and implemen he NPC Sepa a ion P og am. Contending that the assailed NPB
Resolutions were void, petitioners filed, in their individual and representative capacities, the
present Petition for Injunction to restrain respondents from implementing NPB Resolution Nos.
2002-124 and 2002- 125.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Co Deci ion, i en b J ice Mini a V. Chico-Nazario,[5]
held that the Resolutions were invalid, because they lacked the necessary number of votes for
their adoption. Under Section 48, the power to exercise judgment and discretion in running the
affairs of the NPC was vested by the legislature upon the persons composing the National Power
Board of Directors. When applied to public functionaries, discretion refers to a power or right
conferred upon them by law, consisting of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to
the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, and uncontrolled by the judgment or
conscience of others. Presumably, in naming the respective department heads as members of the
board of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive departments on
the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen that had made them eligible to occupy their
present positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their
duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions.
Their personal judgments are what they must exercise in the fulfillment of their responsibilities.
There was no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions involved the exercise of
discretion, not merely a ministerial act that could be validly performed by a delegate.
Re ponden eliance on Ame ican Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents[6] was misplaced.
The Court explicitly stated in that case that, in exercising their own judgment and discretion,
administrative officers were not prevented from using the help of subordinates as a matter of
practical administrative procedure. Officers could seek such aid, as long as the legally authorized
official was the one who would make the final decision through the use of personal judgment. In
the present case, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB Resolutions 2002-124
and 2002-125, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive departments
123 | P a g e
and not the secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution.
This action violates the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to
employ their own sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the NPC.
124 | P a g e
(111) Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may issue an EO that can increase tariff rates
FACTS: The President issued an EO 438 which imposed, across the board, including crude oil
and other oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings
on said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and appropriate action. The
President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of
imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products
DECISION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the delegation is constitutional. The Court said that although the
enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the Legislative, it
does not follow that EO in question, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure are
prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article
VI of the 1987 Con i ion p o ide : The Cong e ma , b la a ho i e he P e iden o
fi a iff a e and o he d ie o impo Th , he e i e plici con i ional pe mi ion
for Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress]
may impose. This referred to the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President to
issue said EOs.
125 | P a g e
(112) US v. Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 2868 is a delegation of power and is thus unconstitutional
FACTS: The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section
1, authorizing the governor-Gene al fo an ca e e l ing in an e ao dina i e in he p ice
of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for
ca ing o he p po e of he Ac . Th , on A g 1, 1919, he Go e no -General signed EO
53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang Tang Ho was caught selling a ganta of rice
at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher than that fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found
guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative
powers.
DECISION: The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said
Act authorized the Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to
effect the law. The said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify
what conditions the Governor-Gene al hall i e he p oclama ion a he aid Ac a e fo an
ca e . I al o failed o define e ao dina i e ha ch p oclama ion b he Go e no -
General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and
emergency measures by the Governor-General,
126 | P a g e
(113) CoTeSCUP v. Secretary of Education, G.R. 216930, October 2018
ISSUE: Whether the K to 12 Law constitutes an undue delegation of power

FACTS: On May 15, 2013, Congress passed the K to 12 law, which took effect on June 8,
2013. This essentially adds 2 more years to the then-current 10-year scheme of the Philippine
education system.
DECISION: Petitions were denied; RA No 10533 (K to 12 Law), among others, was declared
constitutional
RATIO DECIDENDI: There is no undue delegation of legislative power in the enactment of
the K to 12 law. To determine this, there are two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. For completeness test, the law must be complete when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. For sufficient
standard test, it mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate's authority; limits must be specified. The K to 12 law's lack of
provision on labor does not render the law incomplete. Clearly, under the two tests, the K to 12
law, is complete in all essential terms and conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the
power delegated to the DepEd, CHED and TESDA.
127 | P a g e
(114) Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
ISSUE: Whehter or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue

delegation of legislative power
FACTS: Pursuant to the Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President issued
EO Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129, creating 33 municipalities enumerated in the margin.
Petitioner Pelaez alleged that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA No. 2370, and
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of RA No.
2370 stated: "Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their nams changed
except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress."
DECISION: EOs were declared null and void
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, there is undue delegation of power. Section 10 (1) of the
Constitution's Article VII states that: "The President shall have control of al the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may
be provided by law, and take care that the laws are faithfully executed." The Constitution is clear
in saying that only general supervision can be exercised over the local governments. No more
authority that that of checking or supervision may be done. In this case, by creating the 33
municipalities, the law conferred upon the President more power over the local governments.
128 | P a g e
(115) People v. Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90
ISSUE: Whether or not the case constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the
latter were the legislative department of the Government
FACTS: Private respondents were charged with violating RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers), for which they have been convicted of. The penal provision, Section 32 of said
Act, states that "x x x upon conviction, [they] may be punished by a fine of not less than one
hundred pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court." Respondents posited that said
penalty merely indicated as imprisonment is too broad and should not be enforced.
DECISION: Decision and resolution of respondent judge are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
RATIO DECIDENDI: There is undue delegation of legislative powers. Section 32 of RA 4670
provides an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with no maximum or minimum period set
by legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion, without benefit of
sufficient standard. This cannot be allowed, as it vests in the courts a power and a duty
essentially legislative in nature and is thus violative of the rules on separation of powers as well
as non-delegability of legislative powers.
129 | P a g e
(116) Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. 177597, (2008)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress can delegate to the Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces
FACTS: On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19 of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution
7902 renaming the legislative district combining the said provice with Cotabato as "Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." Sema, here petitioner, questioned the Resolution
combining the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato CIty into a single legislative district.
DECISION: Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants
to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create
provinces and cities. Thus, SC declares VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. COMELEC Resolution 7902 is VALID.
RATIO DECIDENDI: SC ruled that Section 19, RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void. Only Congress can create provinces
and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of
legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution.
130 | P a g e
(117) Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335,
Feb. 11, 2014
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress validly delegated its legislative power when it gave the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national
cybersecurity plan
FACTS: Petitioners, as taxpayers, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the
Court. They seek to nullify the several sections of RA 10175, otherwise known as the
"Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012". They claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law
for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate constitutional rights. The government in
turn posits that the law merely seeks to put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings,
and prevent attacks in the system.
DECISION: The following were declared void for being unconstitutional: Section 4(c)(3), 12
and 19 of RA 10175.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the delegation is valid. The Court referred to the two tests for valid
delegation: the completeness test and sufficient standard test. The Cybercrime law was deemed
to be complete in itself when it directed CICC to formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan. Sufficient standards were also clear when the law provided for the definition
of cybersecurity. The definition served as the parameters within which CICC should work in
formulating the plan. The formulation of the cybersecurity plan is also consisted with the policy
of the law; the policy was clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been
considered as sufficient standard.
131 | P a g e
(118) Powell v. McCormack 395 US 486
ISSUE: Does the House have a textual commitment in the constitution to determine the
qualifications of its members?
FACTS: During the 89th Congress, it was found that Plaintiff had engaged in deceptive and
possibly illegal actions surrounding his service as chairman of the Committee on Education and
Labor. After his reelection to the 90th Congress, he was asked to step aside while the other
representatives were sworn in. Also, he was later asked to inform the Governor of New York that
his seat was vacant. Plaintiff sued, alleging the House did not have the constitutional authority to
deny his seat when he met the qualifications expressly set forth for Representatives in Article I of
the United States Constitution (Constitution).
DECISION: Yes. Case reversed and remanded.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The Defendants-Respondents, members of Congress including the
Speaker of the House John W. McCormack (Defendants), argued that the House has broad
powers under Article I, Section: 5 of the Constitution to determine the qualifications of its
membership. Plaintiff argued and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court)
agreed, the ratification debates and historical context of the framers limit the qualifications to
those set forth in the Constitution. The Supreme Court also notes that to hold otherwise would
n llif he f ame deci ion o e i e o-thirds vote for expulsion.
132 | P a g e
(119) Pobre v Defensor-Santiago 597 SCRA 1 (2009)
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or

subjected to disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech.
FACTS: In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago as
a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting
members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ post.
Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court, including Sen.
Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified. Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed
the instant petition before the Court, contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a
total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he
wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-
Santiago.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should
be afforded parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof."
Although there was no express admission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed say
those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as an
implied admission. Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the
lady senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse
that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the
Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the controversy her utterances had managed to stir.
Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament
or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should be
noted that "[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good."
133 | P a g e
(120) Aquino III vs COMELEC 617 SCRA 623 (2010)
ISSUE: w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the

creation of a new legislative district in a province? Held:
FACTS: The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2
distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No.
9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. Petitioners
contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision
reads: (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional,
because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district. The use by the subject provision of
a comma o epa a e he ph a e each ci i h a pop la ion of a lea o h nd ed fif
ho and f om he ph a e o each p o ince poin o no o he concl ion han ha he 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant
prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of
not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office. Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but
is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. Advertisements
134 | P a g e
(121) Aldaba vs. COMELEC 611 SCRA 147 (2010)
ISSUE: RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of
250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1
FACTS: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No.
9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. On 1 May
2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate
legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of
Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693
relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) ha he p ojec ed pop la ion of he M nicipali of Malolo ill be 254,030 b he ea
2010 using the population g o h a e of 3.78 be een 1995 o 2000.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Con i ion e i e ha fo a ci o ha e a legi la i e di ic , he ci m ha e a
pop la ion of a lea o h nd ed fif ho and. House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated
Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) a a ho i ha he pop la ion of he Ci of Malolo ill be 254,030 b he ea
2010. The Ce ifica ion a e ha he pop la ion of Malolo , B lacan a of Ma 1, 2000 i
175,291. The Ce ifica ion f he a e ha i a i ed pon he e e of Ma o Danilo
A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as
a lone cong e ional di ic of he P o ince of B lacan. First, certifications on demographic
projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics
Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be
issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal
population projections must be as of the middle of every year. Moreover, the Certification states
ha he o al pop la ion of Malolo , B lacan a of Ma 1, 2000 i 175,291. The Ce ifica ion
also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000.
Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will
grow to only 241,550 in 2010. Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a
legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited
Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or
speculative.
135 | P a g e
(122) Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014)
ISSUE: Whether or not Naval can be elected as a member of Sanggunian constituting a new
three-period term on a different district.
FACTS: From 2004 to 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the
Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. Upon the creation of RA 9716, the
legislative districts of Camarines Sur has been reapportioned moving the distric of Naval to the
Secon District. In the 2010 & 2013 elections, Naval won again as member of the Sanggunian and
subsequently questioned by Julia as another member of the Sanggunian positing the three-
consecutive term which is viloaltive of the Constitution
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Naval violated Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code when he filed
his COC despite knowledge of his ineligibility
136 | P a g e
(123) Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)
ISSUE: Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a city,
involve the division and conversion of a local government unit, necessitating a plebiscite
FACTS: On Oc obe 10, 2006, Caga an de O o hen Cong e man Con an ino G. Ja a la
filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone
Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro or RA No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de
O o legi la i e di ic f om one o o. Fo he elec ion of Ma 2007, CDO o e o ld be
classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of
residence. On March 13, 2007, COMELEC promulgated a resolution implementing the said act.
Bagabuyo filed a petition at the Supreme Court asking for the nullification of RA 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds. Petitioner argued that COMELEC cannot
implement a law without the commencement of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the
division and conversion of a local govt. unit.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Co pheld e ponden a g men a ing ha ch la onl
increased the representation of CDO in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod. Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries under Art. X
Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a plebiscite , while legislative apportionment or
reappo ionmen nde A . VI, Sec.5 need no . The e a al o no change in CDO e i o ,
population, income and classfication
137 | P a g e
(124) Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of
the House of Representative. 2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruli
FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative
of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation
of pe i ione COC. On Oc obe 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the
g o nd ha he pe i ione COC con ained ma e ial mi ep e en a ion . Re ponden alleged ha
the petitioner is an American citizen because of her failure to comply with the requirements of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: 1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House
of Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be . the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of
Representative. 2. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American
citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner
claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January
18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never
recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of
her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA.
138 | P a g e
(125) Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)
ISSUE: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of
the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? (2)I he 2% h e hold and alifie
votes prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? (3
FACTS: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party
list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of
he legal g o p of COMELEC na ional boa d of can a e o decla e he pe i ion moo and
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the
winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before
the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: 1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House
of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation
of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of
the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5
(2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the a ainmen of he -broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the Ho e of Rep e en a i e . (3) No.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by
vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
139 | P a g e
(126) Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010)
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional
guaranteesagainst the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma. 2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened
FACTS: The COMELEC (Second Division)dismissed the Petition for registration of the
petitioner on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs,
and advocates sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for
advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it ³ or any of
itsnominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulationsrelating to the elections. Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be
exposing our youth to anenvironment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: omelec ci a ion of he Bible and he Ko an in den ing pe i ione
application was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of
the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular
p po e ( ha i , he cond c p ohibi ed o o gh o be ep e ed i de imen al o dange o s to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than
out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing
registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society. The LGBT community is not exempted
from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation.
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by
any international laws to which we adhere.
140 | P a g e
(127) Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010)
ISSUE: 1) whether mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPP's nominees
motu proprio or to cancel AGPP's registration; (2) whether the COMELEC can be enjoined
from giving due course to AGPP's participation in the May 10, 2010... elections, the canv
FACTS: GPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent
to Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, It filed its Certificate of Nomination
together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees wherein the first nominee is Mike
Arroyo. Several petitions for disqualification of Arroyo emerged but have been dismissed both
by Comelec Second division and comelec en banc. In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10,
2010 elections the required percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled
A o o, a AGPP fi nominee, o i in he Ho e of Rep e en a ives. He was proclaimed as
AGPP d l -elected party-list representative in the House of Representatives. On the same day,
A o o ook hi oa h of office, a AGPP Rep e en a i e. And, hi name a , he eaf e , en e ed
in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. Thereafter two (2) separate petitions for
quo warranto were filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
e ioning A o o eligibili a AGPP ep e en a i e in he Ho e of Rep e en a i e . The
HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing Arroyo to file his
Answer to the two petitions
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: For a writ of mandamus to issue (in G.R. No. 191998), the mandamus
petitioners must comply with Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides: "In the
present case, the mandamus petitioners failed to comply with the condition that there be "no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Under Section 2, in
relation with Section 4, of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 (quoted below), any... interested
party may file with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against a party-list nominee
141 | P a g e
(128) Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being
qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al
then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
DECISION: Remanded to COMELEC

RATIO DECIDENDI: No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
following prevailing decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming
elections. However, since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list
system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the
COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to
participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons. First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that
the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties
applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,"
clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional
terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of
party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system. Hence, the clear
intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but
also for non-sectoral parties.
142 | P a g e
(129) Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. v Comelec, 201 SCRA 786 (2013)
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC for
issuing Resolution without due process?
FACTS: On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled
Irrevocable Covenant, containing the list of nominees to share power in their sharing power
agreement. The COMELEC issued a Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP
No. 12-191 (PLM) stating that the list of nominees submitted to them shall be permanent. This is
in lieu of the empty seat in Congress after the 2010 elections following the resignation of Rep.
Kho. Two SENIOR CITIZENS were allocated seats in the House of Representatives, the first
being Rep. Arquiza, and Rep. Kho as the second. Rep. A i a, hono ing Rep. Kho
resignation, a ed ha hei fo h nominee hall ake he la e ea con ide ing ha he hi d
nominee, Datol, has previously been expelled from the party. COMELEC claims that they shall
stay true to the list presented by SENIOR CITIZENS, regardless of Da ol (being he hi d
nominee) expulsion. Also that the resignation of Rep. Kho shall not be recognized because it will
change the order of nominees.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: There is grave abuse on the part of COMELEC for violating due
process. Instead, the COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No.
12157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without conducting any further proceedings. The
Court ruled that the Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections En
Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. is concerned, and
that the Commission on Elections En Banc is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list
organizations during the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to
based on the total number of votes it garnered during the said elections.
143 | P a g e
(130) Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015
ISSUE: Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting

party-list representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from his
party-list organization, on the other
FACTS: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64[1] in relation to Rule 65,[2] seeking to annul the
Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January 2013 of the COMELEC.
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed
its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10
May 2010 Elections.[4] On 6 March 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees,
with petitioner Lico as first... nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee. On 8
December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups
Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives,[7] and thereafter assumed office. Several months prior
to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop
issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement
signed by its nominees.[8] Under the agreement,... petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list
Representative for the first year of the three-year term. On 5 December 2011, or almost one year
after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating
Koop for disloyalt The said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second Division,
prayed that petitioner Lico... be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating
Koop's representative in the House. Ating Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts
inimical to the party-list group, such as malversation, graft and corruption
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to
expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it
nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter
beyond its purview. The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of
petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee
as party-list representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed
the petition for lack of... jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner
Lico from the House of Representatives. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution[34]
endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of
Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case... upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee,
and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives.[35] In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath;
and... he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case The jurisdiction of the HRET is
exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the
validity of the title of the proclaimed winner
144 | P a g e
(131) Abang Lingkod vs. Comelec 2013
ISSUE: Whether national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations are required under
the law to show their genuineness and bona fide existence in determining if they are eligible for
registration with the Commission on Elections
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari filed by Abang Lingkod challenging the May 2013
resolution issued by COMELEC cancelling the Abang Lingkod's party-list registration.
COMELEC says that it is not enough that the party-list organization claim representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented because representation is easy to claim. Records shows that
Abang Lingkod failed to stablish its track record which is important to prove that the party-list
continuously represents the marginalized. Abang Lingkod merely offered pictures of some
alleged activities they conducted after the 2010 elections. These pictures appears to be edited.
Under The Party-Li S em Ac , a g o p egi a ion ma be cancelled for declaring unlawful
statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that did not occur is
tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this ground that the Commission cancels
ABANG LINGKOD egi a ion.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: A party, by law, is either "a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties."17 A political party is defined as: x x x an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A
party is a national party "when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region."
On the other hand, a sectoral party: x x x refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to
any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.
145 | P a g e
(132) Akbayan vs HRET
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
FACTS: Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a
seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the
others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list
nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay
represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical
Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Petitioner Palparan countered that the
HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that
was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that
he a j Ban a nominee. Con e en l , an e ion in ol ing hi eligibili a fi
nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that
party-list group, not before the HRET.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections,
it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
Sec ion 5, A icle VI of he Con i ion,5 iden ifie ho he membe of ha Ho e a e: Sec.
5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied) Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-li nominee a e elec ed membe of he
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction
to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC j i dic ion o e elec ion con e ela ing o hi alifica ion end and he
HRET o n j i dic ion begin .
146 | P a g e
(133) Aquino vs. Comelec
ISSUE: Whe he e idenc in he ce ifica e of candidac ac all conno e domicile o

warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly
registered political party, and MateoBedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked
the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the
Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative
of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence
but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated
not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident
of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and
unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent
certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to
establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead
of b ing one. While a lea e con ac ma be indica i e of pe i ione in en ion o e ide in
Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of
one o iginal domicile.
147 | P a g e
(134) Abayon vs HRET
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
FACTS: petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon.
They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since
she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an
incumbent congressional district representative. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the
House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections,
it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
Section 5, Article VI of he Con i ion,5 iden ifie ho he membe of ha Ho e a e: Sec.
5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied) Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-li nominee a e elec ed membe of he
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction
to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC j i dic ion o e elec ion con e ela ing o hi alifica ion end and he
HRET o n j i dic ion begin .10 The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-
list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
148 | P a g e
(135) Santiago vs Guingona
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of
respondent as Senate minority leader
FACTS: During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were
both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was
declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the
agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming
position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised
he majo i , hile onl ho e ho had o ed fo him, he lo ing nominee, belonged o he
mino i . Ho e e , ena o belonging o he Laka -NUCD-UMDP Party number 7 and,
thus, also a minority had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed
this case for quo warranto.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The e m majo i ha been j diciall defined a n mbe of ime .
When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply mean he n mbe
g ea e han half o mo e han half of an o al. The plain and nambig o o d of he bjec
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than
one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the
majo i , m ch le he mino i , in he aid bod . And he e i no ho ing ha he f ame
of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.In effect, while the
Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting
more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
o e fo him hall ip o fac o con i e he mino i , ho co ld he eb elect the minority
leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become
the minority leader.
149 | P a g e
(136) Avelino vs Cuenco
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to
declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session
of he Sena e, Tanada e e o deli e a peech in o de o fo m la e cha ge against then
Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by
his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech.
The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then
walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the
session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was
recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In
fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of
the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days
immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven
will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will
of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body
being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or
more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here
about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the
resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow
of a doubt.
150 | P a g e
(137) Alejandrino vs Quezon
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null and void?
FACTS: Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de
Vera. He was deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of being a senator. He
filed mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon from
executing the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly
controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the petition.No court has ever held and no court will ever hold that it
possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature to take any particular action.
Also, if the Court does not have any authority to control the Philippine Senate, it has likewise no
authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the same.
151 | P a g e
(138) De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from
the mandate of R.A. 3019.
FACTS: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of
Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
P ac ice Ac , a amended). Af e he acc ed pleaded no g il , he p o ec ion filed a Mo ion
To Suspend The Acc ed Penden e Li e. In i Re ol ion da ed 6 J ne 1997, he
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the
Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as
may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August
1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C.
de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days
from notice.Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives;
Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose
Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property
Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the
doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of
RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the
above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.Its purpose
is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses
or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance while
in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand,
the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction
against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline,
maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
152 | P a g e
(139) Pobre vs. Defensor Santiago
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or

subjected to disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech
FACTS: In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
delivered the following remarks: x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I
am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel
like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit
on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would
rather be in a different environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x x Her speech came as
a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting
members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ post.
Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court, including Sen.
Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified. Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed
the instant petition before the Court, contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a
total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he
wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-
Santiago.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: o, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she
should be afforded parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof."
Although there was no express admission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed say
those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as an
implied admission. Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the
lady senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse
that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the
Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the controversy her utterances had managed to stir.
Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament
or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should be
noted that "[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good."
153 | P a g e
(140) Philconsa vs. Mathay
ISSUE: Whether or not the salary increase was constitutional?

FACTS: RA 4134 provided for increase of salary of Senate President, Speaker of the House and
members of the Senate and House of Representatives. This took effect on 30 June 1966.
However record show that the increase was implemented on 1964.Philippine Constitution
Association assailed the validity of RA 4134, stating that this is in violation of Section 14 Article
6 of he Con i ion, No inc ea e in aid compen a ion hall ake effec n il af e he
expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and House of Representatives
approving such increase. Thus the petition for writ of prohibition.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when
the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have
expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation may not be disbursed
until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act)
authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also
violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.
154 | P a g e
(141) Ligot vs. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to such retirement benefit

FACTS: Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969)
but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of
hi Co nanimo deci ion in Philcon a . Ma ha . He lo hi ne bid and filed fo
retirement claim. House of Representative issued a treasury warrant using the unapproved
amo n . Cong e A di o did no ign he a an . Pe i ione e e fo econ ide a ion a
denied, hence the petition.
RATIO DECIDENDI: To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms
expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of
office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond
that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency.
155 | P a g e
(142) People vs. Jalosjos, GR 132875-76, February 3, 2000
ISSUE: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply
to validly incarcerated persons in general?
FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.
DECISION: Denied.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any
reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution.
The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable
by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellan
status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.
156 | P a g e
(143) Adaza vs Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985)
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the
province simultaneously.
FACTS: Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their
respective term of office expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa
(BP) elections in 1984 and respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath
of office as the governor. Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom, claiming
to be the lawful occupant of the position.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A
member of the BP may not hold any other office in the government. A public office is a public
trust. A holder thereof is subject to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he
cannot complain of any restrictions on his holding of more than one office. The contention that
Pacana, as a mere private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides that governors, or
members of Sanggunian or barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of candidacy be
considered on forced leave of absence from office. When respondent reassumed the position of
vice-governor after the BP elections, he was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition is
denied.
157 | P a g e
(144) Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982)
ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the
SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution
FACTS: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation
(IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto
proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which
the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could
appea a co n el befo e an admini a i e bod , and SEC a an admini a i e bod .
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. Assemblyman
Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero.
Follo ing he no a i a ion of A embl man Fe nande p cha e, he filed a mo ion fo
intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The SEC g an ed lea e o in e ene on he ba i of Fe nande o ne hip of he aid
10 shares.
DECISION: The intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC No. 1747 falls within the
ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of
another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could
theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in
litigation. However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in
IPI, ep e en ing 10 ha e o of 262,843 o anding ha e . He ac i ed hem af e he fac
that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before
the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more,
before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent
Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection,
he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. The
Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an
administrative body, it is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11,
Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear
actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.
158 | P a g e
(145) Liban vs. Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011)
ISSUE: Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute?
Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13,
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution
FACTS: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon
Ci Red C o Chap e , filed i h he S p eme Co ha he led a Pe i ion o Decla e
Richa d J. Go don a Ha ing Fo fei ed Hi Sea in he Sena e against respondent Gordon, who
was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during
his incumbency as Senator. Gordon filed a motion for partial reconsideration on a Supreme
Court decision which ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
did not disqualify him from being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is
unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and the Congress is precluded by the
Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC
as a private corporation. Gordon takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which
addressed the constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Gordon
avers that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a
rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case.
DECISION: No, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue
because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither
strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation. The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of
the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the
very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the
parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the
court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be
left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable. PNRC is a Private Organization
Performing Public Functions the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. It does not
have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. It
is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained
through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. The PNRC is not
government-owned but privately owned.
159 | P a g e
(146) Macalintal vs. COMELEC, GR 157013, July 10, 2003
ISSUE: Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid & constitutional?
FACTS: A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of
the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he
has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public
funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a
taxpayer and as a lawyer. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs.
Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder
immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the
Philippines.
DECISION: Partly granted.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Con a o pe i ione claim ha Sec ion 5(d) ci c m en he
Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress
p o ide a em of ab en ee o ing ha nece a il p e ppo e ha he alified ci i en of he
Philippine ab oad i no ph icall p e en in he co n . The pe i ion a pa tly granted,
Sections 17(a), 18(b), 19(c), 20(d) are declared void for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-
A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commision, such as
COMELEC. Pursuant to Section 30 of RA No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law
continues to be in full force and effect.
160 | P a g e
(147) Abakada Group Party list vs. Purisima, GR 166715, August 14, 2008
ISSUE: Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of
separation of powers under the Constitution
FACTS: Petitioners, Abakada Guro Party list invoking their right as taxpayers, filed a petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from
implementing and enforcing said law. RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to
encourage their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board. Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative
function should have been deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the congressional
oversight committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation of powers, as it
ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy.
DECISION: Partially granted.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
Ho e e , o fo e all he dange of cong e ional enc oachmen be ond he legi la i e phe e,
the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself,
any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it
e e ci e i legi la i e po e , i m follo he ingle, finel o gh and e haustively
con ide ed, p oced e pecified nde he Con i ion, incl ding he p oced e fo enac men
of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation
161 | P a g e
(148) Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry that is sought by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee should
be granted
FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they
obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government
owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained
in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. Enrile subsequently took
ad an age of he Sena e p i ilege ho pon hich he in i ed o ha e an in i ega ding he
ma e . The SBRC ejec ed Lopa and Beng on plea. Hence hi pe i ion.
DECISION: Granted.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look in to a possible violation of Sec.5 of RA
No.3019, o he i e kno n a The An i-G af and Co p P ac ice Ac . In o he o d , he
purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or
not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged
sale of the 36 or39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be,
therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not
eall in aid of legi la ion beca e i i no ela ed o a p po e i hin he j i dic ion of
Congress.
162 | P a g e
(149) Arnault vs. Nazareno, GR L-3820, July 18, 1950
ISSUE: Whether or not the senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session
FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Arnault to relieve him from his confinement
in the New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by
the Senate on May 15, 1950. The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two
parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the
Sena e o gh o e ol e a he appa en i eg la i of he go e nmen pa men o one E ne
Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5million for his alleged interest
in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited any
way long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited
from the transaction at the expense of the government.
DECISION: Denied.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session. There is no sound reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last
session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to
punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function
without impediment or obstruction.
163 | P a g e
(150) PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation vs. Senate, GR 180308, June 19, 2012
ISSUE: Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312
FACTS: Petitioners Locsin and Andal are bot directors and corporate officers of PHC, as well
as nominees of the government to the board of directors of both POTC and PHILCOMSAT filed
a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assails and seeks to enjoin the implementation of and
nullify Committee Report No. 312 submitted by respondents Senate Committees on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and on Public Services (respondents Senate Committees) on
June 7, 2007 for allegedly having been approved by respondent Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines (respondent Senate) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution provides that the Senate or
the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Such conferral of the legislative
power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate
Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. The
respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312,
given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries.
164 | P a g e
(151) Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers 549 SCRA 77 and 564
SCRA 152)
ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive
privilege
FACTS: The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to
conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then
invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman
Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed
PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking
e ec i e p i ilege . In pa ic la , he ef ed o an e he e ion on (a) he he o no
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize
it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for
contempt.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court found the Senate to have gravely abused its
discretion in citing the petitioner for contempt for his refusal to answer questions propounded to
him in the course of legislative inquiry. The Co decla ed ha he e being a legi ima e claim
of e ec i e p i ilege, he i ance of con emp o de ffe f om con i ional infi mi .
Executive privilege: 2 kinds: presidential communications (between president and executive
official) and deliberative process (between executive officials only)
165 | P a g e
(152) Balag v. Senate GR 234608
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has power to impose the indefinite detention of a person
cited in contempt during its inquiries
FACTS: Balag, leader of Aegis Juris Fraternity filed a petition before the SC after senators
ordered him detained in Senate premises for being uncooperative in the probe into the death of
the UST Law Student Horacio "Atio" del Castillo III. During the Senate inquiry, Balag
repeatedly invoked his right against self-incrimination when asked if he headed the fraternity
DECISION: Denied for being moot and academic. However, the period of imprisonment under
the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only
last until the termination of the legislative inquiry.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court declared the case as moot and academic but the petition
presents a critical and decisive issue that must be resolved and capable of repetition. This issue
must be threshed out as the Senate's exercise of its power of contempt without a definite period is
capable of epe i ion, i aid, adding ha he indefini e de en ion of pe on ci ed in con emp
impairs their constitutional right to liberty. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Senate has no
power to impose the indefinite detention of a person cited in contempt during its inquiries.
166 | P a g e
(153) Senate v. Ermita GR 169777
ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress,
valid and constitutional?
FACTS: In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation. The
Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military
in the so-called Glo iaga e Scandal . Said official e e no able o a end d e o lack of
consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress
DECISION: Partly Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is
covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact
that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the
public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh
the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
167 | P a g e
(154) Belgica v. Executive Secretary GR 208566
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislati
FACTS: Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA
of 2013 hich p o ided fo he 2013 PDAF, and he E ec i e l mp-sum, discretionary funds,
such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and
null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court
issue a TRO against respondents
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures
which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle
of epa a ion of po e . Cong e ole m be confined to mere oversight that must be confined
to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action
or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation
or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation
of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
168 | P a g e
(155) Araullo v Abad GR 209287
ISSUE: Whether or not the DAP, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the
DAP, violated Sec 25(5) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
FACTS: Maria Carolina Araullo filed a petition before the Supreme Cort questioning the
validity of DAP (Disbursement Accelaration Program). That, it is unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutional rule which provides that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. DBM Secretary Abad argued that the DAP
is based on GAA (General Appropriations Act) (Savings and augmentation provisions)

RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, it violated Sec 25 (5) of Article VI of the Costitution. The
augmentation is, according to the ponencia, and defined in Art. VI, Sec. 25 (5) of the 1987
Con i ion, and a ho i ed i hin each ea Gene al App op ia ion Ac (GAA), i he e of
clearly-identified savings in the expenditures of government departments and offices to augment
clearly-identified, actual deficiencies within those respective government departments and
offices. What augmentation is not, however, is to allocate what was not authorized as an
expenditure in the GAA. It is not a transfer of executive department savings to legislative lump
sum allocations (cross-border augmentation) b i e of he la e ncon i ionali , o a
the very least, because such itself violates Art. VI Sec. 25 (5)
169 | P a g e
(156) Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and
Management GR 164987
ISSUE: Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is

unconstitutional and illegal
FACTS: LAMP filed an action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the
implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in
Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). LAMP,
this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and,
thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude
into an executive function.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof
was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of
Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent
evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common
e e ci e of n c p lo Membe of Cong e , he Co canno ind lge he pe i ione e e
for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
170 | P a g e
(157) Arnault v. Balagtas 97 Phil 358
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has authority to punish recalcitrant witness

FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of
Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding
Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted
business in relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The
circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion case Arnaultvs.
Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for
defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry. Arnault eventually divulged
that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal.
Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations, adopted
Resolution No. 114.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: The question raised by the petitioner was the legality of his detention by
order of the Senate for his refusal to answer questions put to him by one of its investigating
committees. The Supreme Court refused to order his release and deferred to the discretionary
authority of the legislative body to punish contumacious witnesses for contempt. The exercise of
the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme
and is not subject to judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute disregard
of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional
limitations.
171 | P a g e
(158) Imbong v. Ochoa 721 SCRA 146
ISSUE: Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution
FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule.
According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed
legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent to
act as a population control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not
a bi h o pop la ion con ol mea e, and ha he concep of e pon ible pa en hood and
ep od c i e heal h a e bo h in e ela ed a he a e in epa able.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
ho ha bo h ep od c i e heal h and e pon ible pa en hood a e in e ela ed and ge mane
to the overriding objective to control the population growth. Considering the close intimacy
be een ep od c i e heal h and e pon ible pa en hood hich bea o he a ainmen of he
goal of achie ing ainable h man de elopmen a a ed nde i e m , he Co find no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation.
172 | P a g e
(159) Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27
ISSUE: Whether or not the statutes in question which contain special provisions as to the date
they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette
FACTS: Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation, and
administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this case has no legal
personality or standing. Further, they argued that the publication in the Official Gazette in
necessary for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own
effectivity dates
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: . Yes. Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of
publication is material for determining the date of the effectivity which must be 15 days
following the completion of its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes to effect. Publication of laws is part of substantive due process
173 | P a g e
(160) Abbas v. SET
ISSUE: Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are
sitting in the tribunal
FACTS: On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election
contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators-elect. With the
exemption of Senator Estrada, the senators filed for motion for disqualification or inhibition from
the hearing and resolution on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of
merit and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or
disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case
where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment.
174 | P a g e
(161) Bondoc vs Pineda
ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with election
protests in the HRET by reorganizing the representation of the majority party in the HRET?
FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the petitioner (NP) and Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates for
Congressman of the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed the winner having
ga ne ed a o al of 31,700 o e compa ed o Bondoc 28,400 o e . The pe i ione filed a
protest with the HRET, composed of 9 members, 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, 6 members of
the House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties. A decision
was reached declaring Bondoc as the winner by 23 votes, another recount was insisted by the
LDP members of the tribunal which increased Bondoc to 107 votes more than Pineda .
Congressman Camasura (LDP) along with the Justices, voted to proclaim Bondoc as the winner.
Thereafter, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was expelled from
the LDP for allegedly helping organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and inviting
LDP membe o join. The Ho e o ed fo Cong. Cma a emo al f om he HRET and ha
his vote be withdrawn.
DECISION: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: No, pursuant to Sec. 17 of Art. VI, the HRET is sole judge of all
contests in relation to the election, returns and qualification of their members. It is created as
non-partisan court to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for determination of contests.
The House cannot just shuffle and manipulate the political component for their benefit and
in e e . The alleged pa di lo al of Cong. Cama a, a a ea on fo hi emo al f om he
party, when he voted in favor of Bondoc, undermines the independence of the HRET. Such
members of the HRET have security of tenure. They can only be replaced in cases of term
expiration, death, permanent disability, resignation from the party. Disloyalty is not a valid cause
of termination.
175 | P a g e
(162) Codilla vs De Venecia
ISSUE: Whe he o no e ponden p oclama ion a alid.

FACTS: Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district
of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending.
Responden mo ed fo he pen ion of pe i ione p oclama ion. B i e of he Comelec e
pa e o de , pe i ione p oclama ion a pended. Comelec la e on e ol ed ha pe i ione
was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was
proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new
e ol ion decla ed e ponden p oclama ion a n ll and oid. Re ponden made hi defiance
and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to
the office he won.
DECISION: Petition for mandamus is granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: The e ponden p oclama ion a p ema e gi en ha he ca e
against petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found
that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and
for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take
the seat in office since he did no ep e en he elec o a e choice. Since he alidi of
e ponden p oclama ion had been a ailed b pe i ione befo e he Comelec and ha he
Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had
become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions
or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail ince e ponden
eligibility was not the issue.
176 | P a g e
(163) Cunanan vs Tan
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid.

FACTS: Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as acting
Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration. Carlos Cunanan was formerly
appointed in the same position but was later on rejected by the Commision of Appointment
prompting the President to replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent. Filing
the quo warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of the
convened Commission of Appointments citing irregularities as to the numbers of members
comprising the same.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was
ruled that such is a power vested in the Congress as they deem it proper taking into consideration
the proportionate numbers of the members of the Commission of Appointment members as to
their political affiliations. However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right
which they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of
the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn over the office in contention.
177 | P a g e
(164) Velasco vs Belmonte
ISSUE: Does HRET have the jurisdiction over BB?

FACTS: COMELEC ha cancelled BB CoC, ac ing pon he pe i ion of AA, fo alleged
mi ep e en a ion in BB CoC. While he mo ion fo reconsideration field by BB was pending,
the election was held and BB was proclaimed as winner by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
CC filed an Election Protest in the HRET. COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality on its
cancella ion of BB CoC. De pite it, Speaker DD administered the oath of office to BB. BB
challenged COMELEC ac ion and he S p eme Co pheld ha he e a no g a e ab e of
di c e ion b COMELEC. AA filed fo an immedia e e ec ion of COMELEC p e io
resolution and to declare CC as winner. COMELEC declared the proclamation of BB as null and
void. CC filed a petition for the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to compel Speaker DD to
proclaim him as winner, despite notice given to him by COMELEC.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: NO. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives. BB is not a bona fide member of the
House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation.. When BB took her oath of office
before respondent Speaker DD in open session, BB had no valid COC NOR a valid
proclamation. In view of the foregoing, BB has absolutely no legal basis to serve as a Member of
the House of Representatives, and therefore, she has no legal personality to be recognized as a
party-respondent at a proceeding before the HRET.
178 | P a g e
(165) Ty-Delgado vs HRET
ISSUE: WON the HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving
moral turpitude
FACTS: Philip Arreza Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of libel. On 9
October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner filed a petition
for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the
Commission on Elections on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving
moral turpitude. She argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year
period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse. HRET held that Pichay did not participated
the writing of the libelous articles but his conviction was in line with his duty as the president of
he p bli hing compan . Ba ed on he ci c m ance , he HRET concl ded ha Picha
conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of
libel. the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving
mo al pi de. Since Picha ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of
candidacy and he was never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives, the votes cast for him were considered stray votes.
179 | P a g e
(166) Republic vs Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Whether or not the Swiss funds can be forfeited in favour of the Republic, on the basis
of he Ma co e la f l income?
FACTS: Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture
before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356
million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in
escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five
account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks. Moreover, the petition
sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the
Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired
property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. Before the case was set
for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements were executed by the
Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the
assets of the Marcos family to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets
presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under their conditions contained therein.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore
legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture
of the Swiss funds. The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of
respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by
law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution,
Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument from the Government
or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities." Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution,
Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from
the Government or any other source." In fact, his management of businesses, like the
administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973
Constitution.
180 | P a g e
(167) Estrada vs Arroyo
ISSUE: Whether or not Estrada permanently unable to act as President.

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case,
p a ing fo j dgmen confi ming pe i ione o be he la f l and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the p o i ion of he Con i ion.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Ye , Sec ion 11 of A icle VII p o ide ha Cong e ha he l ima e
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing
his functions. Bo h ho e of Cong e ha e ecogni ed e ponden A o o a he P e iden .
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no
longe empo a . Cong e ha clea l ejec ed pe i ione claim of inabili y. Even if petitioner
can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave
on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
181 | P a g e
(168) Macalintal vs PET
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional.
FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration
reiterates his arguments that Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the
creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and that the PET violates Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution. In order to strengthen his position, petitioner cites the concurring
opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Ca o in Ba ok C. Bi aogo . The Philippine T h
Commission of 2010 that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a public office which
cannot be created by the president, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress.
Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create
the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of
legislature.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court reiterates that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of
the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution. With the explicit
provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with
latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by
PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in
the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line
between the PET and the Supreme Court. We have previously declared that the PET is not
simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as
intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate,
from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
182 | P a g e
(169) Pormento vs Estrada
ISSUE: Whether or not Joseph Estrada is disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010
elections according to the phrase in the Constitution which states that "the President shall not be
eligible for any re-election"?
FACTS: Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification against former President Joseph
Estrada for being a presidential candidate in the May 2010 elections. The petition was denied by
COMELEC second division and subsequently by COMELEC en banc. Pormento then filed the
present petition for certiorari before the Court. In the meantime, Estrada was able to participate
as a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest
number of votes.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent
did not win the second time he ran. The issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any re-
election" will be premised on a person second election as President. Assuming an actual case or
controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the
May 10, 2010 elections; the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that election,
private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "re-
election" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
183 | P a g e
(170) Laurel vs Garcia
ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.
FACTS: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi
property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations
Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino
created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in
Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to
avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved
by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed
true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by
real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and
civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a
policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur. Considering the
properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public
dominion must be faithfully followed.
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(171) Marcos v. Manglapus
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
iolen people po e e ol ion and a fo ced in o e ile. Ma co , in hi dea hbed, ha
signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering
the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward,
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Marcos filed for a
petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
doc men and p e en he implemen a ion of P e iden A ino deci ion o bar Marcos from
e ning in he Philippine . Pe i ione e ion A ino po e o ba hi e n in he co n .
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without
due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to
travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a
court order.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive
po e . Acco ding o Sec ion 1, A icle VII of he 1987 Philippine Con i ion, he e ec i e
po e hall be e ed in he P e iden of he Philippine . Ho e e , i doe no define ha i
mean b e ec i e po e al ho gh in he ame article it touches on exercise of certain powers
by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices,
the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pa don (a VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this
list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the
Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged
to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the
Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can
do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to
maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
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(172) Saguisag v. Ochoa
ISSUE: Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities.
FACTS: EDCA or Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between the
Philippines and America wherein it authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and
conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. After eight rounds of
negotiations for two years, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to the
Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified
EDCA on 6 June 2014. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that
to do so was no longer necessary. Senators file Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105.91. The
resolution expresses the "strong sense" of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and
effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not
expressly granted by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the
P e iden m " ake nece a and p ope ep o ca in o e ec ion he la . I i he
President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests
(commander-in-chief powers). EDCA is considered an executive agreement, therefore may be
bound through the President without the need of senatorial votes for its execution. The right of
the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage
186 | P a g e
(173) Funa v. Ermita
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent
with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been
appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices f
FACTS: On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria
Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC). Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of
the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006. On September 1,
2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista
was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in
concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his
capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the
constitutionality of Bautista's appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on
the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to
hold any other office or employment.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office. On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads: Sec. 7. Unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. Thus, the Court ruled these sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general
and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter
prohibitions.
187 | P a g e
(174) Funa v. Agra
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual
or multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputie
FACTS: Petitioner alleges that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was appointed by the president to be the
Acting Secretary of Justice and that Agra was also aubsequently appointed as Acting Solicitor
General in concurrent capacity. Respondent has a diferrent story, he alleged that he was assigned
to be the Acting Solicitor General first then was subsequently assigned to be the Acvting
Secretary of Justice. Agra also alleged that he relinquished his position as Acting Solicitor
General but kept performing his duties until his successor was appointed. Nothwithstanding the
conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding the two offices
concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for puposes of resolving the
constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: According to the Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two
exceptions: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice Presided to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex
officio capaci ie a p o ided b la and a e i e b he p ima f nc ion of he official
offices. The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary
to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that the nature and duties of
the two offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one
person to retain both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the
decla a ion of Ag a de igna ion a he Ac ing Sec e a of J ice, conc en l i h hi
designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express
provisions of the Constitution.
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(175) De Castro v. JBC
ISSUE: Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice
FACTS: These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
p e iden ial elec ion. Unde Sec ion 4(1), in ela ion o Sec ion 9, A icle VIII, ha acanc
hall be filled i hin nine da f om he occ ence he eof f om a li of a lea h ee
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Ba Co ncil fo e e acanc . Al o con ide ing ha
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the
JBC a oma icall con ide ed fo he po i ion of Chief J ice he fi e mo enio of he
Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice
Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The
OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary.
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers
devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the
Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to
reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can
be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the
powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is
dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
189 | P a g e
(176) Velicaria-Garafil v. OP
ISSUE: Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution
FACTS: The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty.
Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil, who was appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor
General, as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza, who was appointed
Prosecutor IV of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A. Villanueva , who
was appointed Administrator for Visayas of the Board of Administrators of the Cooperative
Development Authority, and Francisca B. Rosquita, who was appointed Commissioner of the
National Commission of Indigenous Peoples, as petitioners; and G.R. No. 212030 with Atty.
Eddie U. Tamondong, who was appointed member of the Board of Directors of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority, as petitioner. Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in
several government offices. The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution reads: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety. Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March
2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start
of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes
as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety." None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception. On 30
June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2
recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which
violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
DECISION: the petitions in G.R. Nos. 203372, 206290, and 212030 are DENIED, and the
petition in G.R. No. 209138 is DISMISSED. The appointments of petitioners Atty. Cheloy E.
Velicaria-Garafil (G.R. No. 203372), Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (G.R. No. 206290), Irma A.
Villanueva, and Francisca B. Rosquita (G.R. No. 209138), and Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (G.R.
No. 212030) are declared VOID.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid
(which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to
appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; The President's exercise of his power to
appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the
exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the
appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and
evidence of the transmittal; It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There
should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could
happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the
appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the
appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of
190 | P a g e
its issuance. (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment
paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment.
Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office
is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They
cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the
appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of
office during the appointment ban.
191 | P a g e
(177) Manalo v. Sistosa
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by the President were valid even without the
confirmation of Commission on Appointments
FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments
issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the Philippine
National Police who were promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director without
their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation under
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as the
Local Government Act of 1990. On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the
Department of Interior and Local Government was signed into law by former President Corazon
C. Aquino. In accordance therewith, on March 10, 1992, the President of the Philippines, through
then Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, promoted the fifteen (15) respondent police
officers herein, by appointing them to positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of
Chief Superintendent to Director. The appointments of respondent police officers were in a
permanent capacity. Without their names submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation, the said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective
positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary
Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Appointments are valid. PNP, herein respondents, do not fall
under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by Commission on
Appointments. Section 116 Article VII provide for four groups of government to be appointed by
President: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. It is well-settled that only
presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the
first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Congress cannot by
law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
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(178) Hontiveros-Baraquel v. TollRegulatory Board
ISSUE: Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility
FACTS: The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created on 31 March 1977 by Presidential
Decree No. (P.D.) 1112 in order to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government, the
collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private sector. On the same date,
P.D. 1113 was issued granting to the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Corporation or PNCC) the right, privilege,
and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll
Expressways for a period of 30 years starting 1 May 1977. TRB and PNCC later entered into a
Toll Operation Agreement, which prescribed the operating conditions of the right granted to
PNCC under P.D. 1113. On 27 November 1995, the Republic of the Philippines through the
TRB as Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll
Operation Agreement (STOA) covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the
South Metro Manila Skyway. Under the STOA, the design and construction of the project roads
became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of CMMTC. The operation and
maintenance of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility
of the PNCC Skyway Corporation (PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC, which undertook
and performed the latter's obligations under the STOA. On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the
Philippines, through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed Amendment to the
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA). Under the ASTOA, Skyway O & M
Corporation (SOMCO) replaced PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1
of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Petitioners argue that the franchise for toll operations was
exclusively vested by P.D. 1113 in PNCC, which exercised the powers under its franchise
through PSC in accordance with the STOA.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility. In
Francisco v. TRB, the court held: It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in
relation to Section 4 of P.D. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a
qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to
issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC. First, there is nothing in P.D. 1113 or P.D.
1894 that states that the franchise granted to PNCC is to the exclusion of all others. Second, if we
were to go by the theory of petitioners, it is only the operation and maintenance of the toll
facilities that is vested with PNCC. This interpretation is contrary to the wording of P.D. 1113
and P.D. 1894 granting PNCC the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and
maintain the North Luzon, South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways and their toll facilities.
Third, aside from having been granted the power to grant administrative franchises for toll
facility projects, TRB is also empowered to modify, amend, and impose additional conditions on
the franchise of PNCC in an appropriate contract, particularly when public interest calls for it.
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(179) Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape TanonStrait, et al v. Secretary

Angelo Reyes, et al
ISSUE: Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
and statutes
FACTS: Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition,
are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters
in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-
Osorio as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who
allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also
impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her
express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among
others. On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered
into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This
contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included
surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX,
assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas
sampling in Tañon Strait. On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-
102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a
block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. JAPEX
committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. On March 6,
2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore
oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX
began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the
western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008. The petitioners insist that
SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts
are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, the Court held that the deletion of the
words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In
fact, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom)
to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to
service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate
or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime. In summarizing the matters
discussed in the ConCom, the Court established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is
the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this
Court enumerated in La Bugal: Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards,
among which are these requirements: (1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with
a general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to
attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country. (2) The President shall be the signatory for the government
because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have
been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can
194 | P a g e
withstand public scrutiny. (3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall
report it to Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.69cralawlawlibrary. Adhering to the
aforementioned guidelines, the Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance
with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
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(180) Kulayan v. Tan
ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of President?
FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio
Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the
Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail
when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management
Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee
convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of
Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in
the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said
declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It
also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on
the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and
natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the
PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures
including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan,
et al. contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires,
and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the
chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: It has already been established that there is one repository of executive
powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of
the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became
known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. While the President is still
a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military, making he ci ilian p e iden he na ion p eme mili a
leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a
civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The
Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and
talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to
determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of
the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. Given the foregoing,
Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding.
In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a
state of emergency and called upon Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency
Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.
196 | P a g e
An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not
be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
197 | P a g e
(181) Ampatuan vs Puno
ISSUE: Wheter or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called
out the AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindano,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
FACTS: On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, placing he P o ince of Mag indanao and S l an K da a and he
Ci of Co aba o nde a a e of eme genc . She di ec ed he AFP and he PNP o nde ake
such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
inciden of la le iolence in he named place . Th ee da la e , he al o i ed AO 273
an fe ing pe i ion of he ARMM f om he Office of he P e iden o he DILG. She
subsequently issued AO 273-A, hich amended he fo me AO ( he e m an fe ed in AO
273 a amended o delega e , efe ing o he pe i ion of he ARMM b he DILG).
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as
understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: SECTION 23.
x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof The
President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did
not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
198 | P a g e
(182) Fortun vs Arroyo
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Proclamation of Martial Law and suspension of the
privelege of Habeas Corpus in 2009 in Central Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight
days is constitutional
FACTS: On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan
family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao. Believing
that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of
persons that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, on December
4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring... martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas
of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the
President's action. But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the
President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
DECISION: Moot and Academic; Political Issue; Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the
Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense
jointly... since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a
power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the
Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own
review powers, which is... automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its
express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as
its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or...
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress
before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Here, President Arroyo withdrew
Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on
the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has
nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and... restoration of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy
199 | P a g e
(183) Lagman vs Medialdea
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privelege of writ of habeas corpus
FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the
factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the Constitution). The main basis of
the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the
report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in
Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the
ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to
or at the time of the declaration. The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual
basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and
Proclamation. The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to
ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. The pe i ione co n e -evidence were derived solely from unverified
news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the
contents thereof. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice
removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than
proving the truth of the matter asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just
pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other
independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.
200 | P a g e
(184) Monsantos vs Factoran Jr.
ISSUE: Whether or not public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?
FACTS: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant
treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She
was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed
the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she
was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the
rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon,
petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as
assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of
Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new
appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. Petitioner wrote
the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of
her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled
to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50 The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of
he P e iden . Dep E ec i e Sec e a Fac o an denied Mon an o e e a e ing ha
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.
201 | P a g e
(185) Rosa-Vidal vs Comelec
ISSUE: Whether or not former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having
been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?
FACTS: On Sep 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the crime of plunder with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On Oct 2007, President Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon to Estrada thereby restoring his civil and political right
upon which Estrada received and accepted. On Nov 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of
candidacy for the position of President and has earned 3 oppositions in the COMELEC. In 2012
Estrada filed a COC vying for the position of Manila City Mayor. Then, Risos-Vidal, petitioner,
filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada. Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for
Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for
public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Es ada igh o
seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former
President Gloria M. Arroyo. Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada
for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as
Mayor of Manila.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. The pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering
he n alified e of he e m ci il and poli ical igh a being e o ed. J i p dence
educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory
clause tha e plain he ea on fo he enac men , all in od ced b he o d he ea .
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the
operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part
of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon
conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned
commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
202 | P a g e
(186) Saguisag vs Ochoa Jr.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.) constitutional
FACTS: petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE,
AND SET - ASIDE its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING
the instant consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA) entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of
America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its
implementation. petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5]
In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to
comply with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their
arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7] Petitioners
assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer to the
initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of the
provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities
except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as
referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied the plain meaning of the words in the
particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has been established by a subsisting treaty,
latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the Constitution did
not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the
Philippines.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: The EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops
has long been authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty
(MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was
well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties. Thus, we find no reason for
EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines' legal regime through
the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued policy to enhance our
military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise. This
Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting
the Decision. Principles: On verba legis interpretation... verba legis Petitioners' own
interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an absurdity, which
legal construction strictly abhors. The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous
language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a construction
that changes its meaning With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno's theory of "initial entry" mentioned above ventured into a construction of the provisions
of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language
and meaning of the said constitutional provision.
203 | P a g e
(187) Bayan vs Exec Secretary
ISSUE: Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) unconstitutional

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty
by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the
concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the
treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in
the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation
of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25,
A icle XVIII of he 1987 Con i ion, hich p o ide ha fo eign mili a ba e , oop , o
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Sena e . . . and ecogni ed a a ea b he o he con ac ing S a e.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be
under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c)
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of
the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in
[in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
204 | P a g e
(188) Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping
the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the
PTC from performing its functions.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the
power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked
for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the
Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that
would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there
is no impropriety in the funding.
205 | P a g e
(189) Chavez vs. JBC
ISSUE: Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been met.
FACTS: In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as
two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
Re ponden a g ed ha he c of he con o e i he ph a e a ep e en a i e of Cong e .
It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent
and manda o componen of Cong e , ch ha he ab ence of ei he di e he e m of i
substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice
by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of
its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
peak of a ep e en a i e f om Cong e , i ho ld mean one ep e en a i e each f om bo h
Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Co po e of j dicial e ie i bjec o e e al limi a ion ,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) he pe on challenging he ac m ha e anding o challenge; he m ha e a pe onal
and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present,
especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in
issue. The Co di ag ee i h he e ponden con en ion ha pe i ione lo hi anding o
sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
pe onal ake on he ca e i impe a i e o ha e loc andi, hi i no o a ha onl official
nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition
for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the
J dicia . Albei hea il p blici ed in hi ega d, he JBC d i no a all limi ed o he
nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all
o e he co n ma be affec ed b he Co ling. Mo e impo an l , he legali of he e
process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The
claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
206 | P a g e
(190) Jardeleza vs. Sereno
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in
cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.
FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of
candidates. Hence, he was interviewed. However, he received calls from some Justices that the
Chief Justice herself CJ Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked
beca e Ja dele a in eg i i in e ion. D ing he mee ing, J ice Ca pio di clo ed a
confidential info ma ion hich cha ac e i ed Ja dele a in eg i a d bio . Ja dele a
answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His
request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist. Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari
and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list on the grounds
that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having
garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not
a oma icall denig a e an applican en i lemen o d e p oce . The Co doe no b h a ide
the unique and special nature of JBC p oceeding . No i h anding being a cla of i o n,
he igh o be hea d and o e plain one elf i a ailing. In ca e he e an objec ion o an
applican alifica ion i ai ed, he ob e ance of d e p oce nei he con adic he
fulfillment of he JBC d o ecommend. Thi holding i no an enc oachmen on i
discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process
supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies
the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and
capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply
the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that
an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness. Consequently, the Court is
compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the
President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the
violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. True,
Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the
JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
207 | P a g e
(191) Villanueva vs JBC
ISSUE: W/N the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts
before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional
FACTS: Petitioner applied for a position as a judge in a second level court but JBC did not
include his name in the list of applicants since he failed to qualify. This is because the JBC put
priority to incumbent judges who served their position for at least five years and petitioner
hereonly served as judged for more than a year. The petitioner assailed, inter alia, the authority
of the JBC to add another qualification (5-year-qualitification) because thesaid qualification was
already prescribed
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: The said added 5-year-qualification being assailed by the petitioner is
constitutional since as stated in the Sect. 8 (5), Art.VIII, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary. Consequently, it was also stated in the said provision thatonly the
persons nominated by the JBC is transmitted to the president that will choose whom to nominate
as judge in the judiciary.
208 | P a g e
(192) RE: COAopinion on the computation of the appraised value of the properties
purchased by the retired Chief / associate justices of the supreme court A.M. NO. 11-7-10-
SC JULY 31, 2012
ISSUE: W/N COA in e fe ence, in hi ca e, iola e he j dicia a onom .

FACTS: Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) found that an
underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five retired Supreme Court justices
purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their
incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property
Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the
purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the
subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint
Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc in
A.M. No. 03- 12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No.
98-569-A4. Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer,
recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the
CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the
Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of
government property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous
instances involving two retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices, the COA upheld the in-
house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More
importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its
budget and resources.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: The COA a ho i o cond c po -audit examinations on
constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the
1987 Con i ion. Thi a ho i , ho e e , m be ead no onl in ligh of he Co fi cal
autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the
existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters. Any kind of interference on how these
retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal
autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty
and p i ilege of he Chief J ice and he S p eme Co En Banc o manage he J dicia o n
affairs.
209 | P a g e
(193) RE: Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of RA NO 10154,

Requiring retiring government employees to secure a clearance of pendency/non-pendency
of case/s from the Civi Service Commission
ISSUE: W/N the said provision is applicable to members of the judiciary

FACTS: Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. (RA) 101541 states that: Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek
Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from his/her employer agency,
Civil Service Commission (CSC),Office of the Ombudsman, or in case of presidential
appointees, from the Office of the President.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) exclusively vests in the Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
pe onnel.3 A ch, i o e ee he co pe onnel compliance i h all la and ake he
proper administrative action against them for any violation thereof. The requirement of seeking a
Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from the Civil Service
Commission embodied in Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 10154 is declared INAPPLICABLE to retiring employees of the Judiciary
210 | P a g e
(194) RE: Save the SC judicial independence and fiscal autonomy movement v abolition of
judiciary development fund(JDF) and reduction of fiscal autonomy UDK-15143, Jan. 21,
2015
ISSUE: W/N petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this court to grant the
petition and issue a writ of mandamus.
FACTS: Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in
order to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the
perceived hostility of Congress. In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino
citizen, and a concerned taxpayer. He filed this petition as part of his "continuing crusade to
defend and uphold the Constitution" because he believes in the rule of law. He is concerned
about the threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development
Assistance Fund. The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the
President after the promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence. Petitioner
argues that Congress "gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court. Petitioner points out that Congress is
exercising its power "in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
ho ili b aboli hing he J dicia De elopmen F nd (JDF) of he S p eme Co . Wi h
regard to his prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, petitioner avers that Congress
should not act as "wreckers of the law" by threatening "to clip the powers of the High
Tribunal[.]" Congress committed a "blunder of monumental proportions" when it reduced the
j dicia 2015 b dge . Pe i ione p a ha hi co e e ci e i po e o
"REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws
affecting the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to
better serve public interest and general welfare of the people."
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the
Constitution, is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for
judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. The court held that there is no actual case or controversy
and that the petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill.
211 | P a g e
(195) RE: Petition for recognition of exemption of the GSIS from payment of legal fees 612
SCRA 193 (2010)
ISSUE: W/N the legislature can exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on
GOCCs and local government units
FACTS: The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under
Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the ROC. The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its
cha e , RA 8291 (The GSIS Ac of 1997) Re i ed o commen on he GSIS pe i ion, he OSG
main ain ha he pe i ion ho ld be denied. On hi Co o de , he Office of he Chief
Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on the petition of the GSIS and the
comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption
from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The GSIS is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and
distinct from that of its individual members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its
rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members. More
importantly, the Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the
payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of
he Co independence fiscal autonomy. Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital
o ce of he Co financial e o ce b al o comp i e an e en ial elemen of he Co
fiscal independence. The 1987 Constitution also took away the power of Congress to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
212 | P a g e
(196) Cayetano v Monsod
ISSUE: W/N the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?
FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission
on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of
office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the
validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).
In the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court said that, Appointment is an
essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
213 | P a g e
(197) Gaminde v COA
ISSUE: W/N the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as
stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
FACTS: The President appointed petitioner Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission. The Commission on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the
appointment. On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the
President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998, opined that petitioner's term of office would
expire on February 02, 2000, not on, February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion,
petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon
Alma G. de Leon; wrote the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not
Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries
notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02,1999. On February 18,
1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that "the term of
Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment
conformably with the constitutional intent." Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident
Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance disallowing in audit the salaries and
emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999.
Petitioner appealed the disallowance but the Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the
disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner's term of office may be properly addressed by
mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and
that the Commission was bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with
the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration;
however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion in Decision No. 99-
129.
DECISION: Her appointment expired on February 02, 1999, but is entitled to received her
salary and other emoluments
RATIO DECIDENDI: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her expired on February 02, 1999.
However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to
receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. The terms of the first
Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution
must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and
qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and
three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration
of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate
starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions
under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987
Constitution. In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and
"tenure." "The term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The
term means the time during the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term
214 | P a g e
during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the
hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent." We thus see the regular interval of vacancy every two (2) years, namely, February
02, 1994, for the first Chairman, February 02, 1992, for the first five-year term Commissioner,
and February 02, 1990, for the first three-year term Commissioner. Their successors must also
maintain the two year interval, namely: February 02, 2001, for Chairman; February 02, 1999, for
Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, and February 02, 1997, for Commissioner Ramon P.
Ereñeta, Jr.||
215 | P a g e
(198) Brillantes v Yorac
ISSUE: W/N the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the
absence of the regular Chairman.
FACTS: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named
chairman of the fact-finding commi ion o in e iga e he Decembe 1989 co p d e a a emp .
Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional provision that
ensures the independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body
and he pecific p o i ion ha (I)n no ca e hall an Membe (of he Commi ion on Elec ion )
be appoin ed o de igna ed in a empo a o ac ing capaci . Brillantes contends that the choice
of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be
resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines
violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the President of the
Philippine ho ld he efo e be ained fo ea on of admini a i e e pedienc , o p e en
disruption of the functions of the COMELEC.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commi ion a independen . The a e no nde he con ol of he P e iden of he
Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts
its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own
discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court
as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the
regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even
with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The lack of a statutory rule covering the
situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending
the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by
the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the
President.
216 | P a g e
(199) CSC v DBM
ISSUE: W/N DBM polic of No Repo , No Relea e i con i ional

FACTS: CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance
of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the
extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. General Appropriation Act of 2002
(GAA) appropriated total funds to the CSC but they claimed that there is an unreleased balance.
To CSC, this balance was intentionally withheld by DBM on the basis of its no report, no release
policy. DBM proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance of CSC budget was not
on account of any failure on CSC part to submit the required reports; rather, it was due to a
shortfall in revenues. Moreover, DBM contends that CSC did not exhaust administrative
remedies as it could have sought clarification from DBM Secretary regarding the extent of fiscal
autonomy before resorting to Court. Second, even assuming that administrative remedies were
exhausted, there are no exceptional and compelling reasons to justify the direct filing of the
petition with Supreme Court instead of the trial court, thus violating the hierarchy of courts.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: DBM polic of No Repo , No Relea e may not be validly enforced
against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution which states: The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. It is under such situation that a
relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is
allowed. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
217 | P a g e
(200) Funa v Duque
ISSUE: W/N the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of
the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or mul
FACTS: Then president GMA issued EO 864 which allows tge chairman of the CSC to be in
the board of trustees/directors of certain GOCCs. Funa asserts that EO 864 and Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the independence of the CSC, which was
constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and political pressures due to the
significance of its government functions. He further asserts that such independence is violated by
the fact that the CSC is not a part of the Executive Branch of Government while the concerned
GOCCs are considered instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the Government. In this
situation, the President may exercise his power of control over the CSC considering that the
GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member are attached to the Executive Department. Funa
claims that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the
prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from holding any other office
or employment. A conflict of interest may arise in the event that a Board decision of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning personnel-related matters is elevated to the CSC
considering that such GOCCs have original charters, and their employees are governed by CSC
laws, rules and regulations. Respondents submit that the prohibition against holding any other
office or employment under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution does not cover
positions held without additional compensation in ex officio capacities.
DECISION: Yes. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex
officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF.
RATIO DECIDENDI: While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to
hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words,
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants. .Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally
not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch, hence when the CSC
Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF, he may exercise powers and functions which are not anymore derived from his position
as CSC Chairman
218 | P a g e
(201) Sarmiento v Comelec
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections en banc may hear and decide pre-
proclamation cases classified as special cases.
FACTS: Petitioners impugned the challenged resolutions of the Commission on Elections in
pre-proclamation cases classified as special cases.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides that
election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and
decided by a division of the commission. The commission, sitting en banc, does not have the
authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.
219 | P a g e
(202) Ambil v Comelec
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions of the
COMELEC.
FACTS: On 04 Jun 1998, respondent Jose Ramirez filed an election protest with the
COMELEC challenging the result of the 11 May 1998 elections where petitioner Ruperto Ambil,
Jr. was proclaimed the duly-elected governor of Eastern Samar. On 24 Feb 2000, Commissioner
Japal Guidani retired from the service prior to the finalization of his proposed resolution in the
Ramirez protest. In said resolution, Commissioner Julio Desamito had dissented while
Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco did not indicate her vote.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: Article IX-A, Section 7 provides that any decision, order or ruling of
each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. The Court interpreted the provision to mean
final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers. The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC
en banc, not a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division.
220 | P a g e
(203) Brillantes v comelec
ISSUE: Whe he o no COMELEC ma cond c nofficial ab la ion of p e iden ial elec ion
results based on a copy of the election returns.
FACTS: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election
system for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of
national and local elections. COMELEC subsequently approved Resolution 6712 adopting the
policy that the precint election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately
transmitted electronically in advance to the COMELEC in Manila. Petitioners questioned the
constitutionality of the quickcount as being preemptive of the authority vested in Congress to
canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President under Article VII, Section 4 of the
Constitutuion.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The a ailed e ol ion p , nde he g i e of an nofficial
tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election results, the sole and exclusive
authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President.
221 | P a g e
(204) Sandoval v comelec
ISSUE: whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for
the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After
canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed
petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day.
Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's
proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend
the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers
proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that
there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an
incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the
proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari
seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having
been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and
hearing. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the
benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private
respondent's allegations.
222 | P a g e
(205) Al haj v comelec
ISSUE: Whether or not the grounds assailed by the petitioners constitute grounds for
declaration of failure of election.
FACTS: Petitioner assail the resolution of the Commission on elections en banc dismissing
their petition to declare a failure of elections in the Municipality of Munai, Province of Lanao del
Norte. In their petition, petitioners Tawantawan M. caruntongan and Nasser Manalao, candidates
for Municipal Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively, enumerated the following as grounds for
declaration of failure of election: 1.Massive vote buying; 2.Illegal assignment of Rakim Paute as
Election Officer of Munai; 3.Appointment of disqualified BEIs; 4.Shoot-out on the eve of the
election between unidentified armed men and members of the Philippine Army escorting election
forms and paraphernalia in barangay Cadulawan; 5.Transfer of polling places without notice;
6.Absence of voting booths in barangay Tambo and cadulawan; and 7.Non-signing of the
Vo e Regi a ion Fo m. The COMELEC di mi ed he pe i ion beca e he g o nd elied
upon are not those which constitute grounds for declaration of failure of election.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Under Article 1, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly
states the only three instances wherein a failure of election may be validly declared are when: 1)
the election in any polling places has not been held on the date fixed in account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; 2) the election in any polling place had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, or 3) after the voting and during
the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous cases. This enumeration is exclusive and restrictive. It limits the power of the
Commission to annul the results of an election only to those instances where the election is not
held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect. The latter phrase should be understood in its
literal sense, which is, nobody was elected. Moreover, the irregularities pointed out by the
petitioners such as vote-buying, fraud, and terrorism are grounds for an election contest and may
not, as a rule, be invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the greater number
of electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of only relative few.
223 | P a g e
(206) General v Roco
ISSUE: Whether or not a CES eligibility is sufficient to acquire security of tenure.

FACTS: Respondent Ramon S. Roco was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos on 26
Aug 1996 as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office in Region V, a position
equivalent to CES rank Level V. He was re-appointed to the same position by then President
Joseph Estrada. From his appointment in 1996, respondent was not a CES eligible and was only
conferred CES eligibility by the Career Executive Board on 13 Aug 1999. On 07 Sep 1999,
petitioner Luis Mario General, who was not a CES eligible, was appointed by then President
Estrada as Regional Director of LTO-V. Pursuant thereto, DOTC Undersecretary Herminio B.
Coloma, Jr., as officer-in-charge of the department, issued a memorandum directing petitioner
General to assume the said office immediately and for respondent Roco to report to the Office of
the Secretary.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Two requisites must concur in order for an employee in the career
executive service may attain security of tenure: CES eligibility and appointment ot the
appropriate CES rank.
224 | P a g e
(207) CSC v salas
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee.

FACTS: On 07 Oct 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR chairman as
internal security staff member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His
employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on 03 Dec 1991, allegedly
for loss of confidence.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: t is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a
position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The occupant of a
particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why
he was chosen by the appoin ing a ho i a he la e belief ha he can ha e a clo e
relationship with the occupant. Where the position occupied is remote from that of the
appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant.
225 | P a g e
(208) Office of the ombudsman v CSC
ISSUE: Whe he o no de Je appoin men ma be p ope l changed f om empo a a

to permanent despite non-compliance with the eligibility requirement for the position of Graft
Investigation Officer III.
FACTS: On 31 Jul 2002, Melchor Arthur Carandang, Paul Elmer Clemente, and Jose Tereso de
Jesus, Jr. were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Civil Service Commission approved such appointments on the condition that appointees must
obtain CES or CSE eligibility to acquire security of tenure. Carandang and Clemente had been
conferred with CSE eligibility on 06 Jun 2003.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: Under P.D.No. 807, Section 9(h) which authorizes the CSC to approve
appointments to postitions in the civil service, except those specified therein, its authority is
limited only to whether or not the appointee possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate
eligibility, nothing else. Third level eligibility is not required for third level officials appointed
by the Ombudsman in light of the provisions of the Constitution vis a vis the Administrative
Code of 1987.
226 | P a g e
(209) Vistan v nicolas
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge engaged in electioneering while still an MTC judge.
FACTS: Complainant Leonila Vistan alleged that as early as 10 Feb 1987, prior to the start of
the campaign period, and while still an MTC judge, respondent Ruben Nicolas started circulating
handbills/letters addressed to electoral constitutents in the second district of Bulacan indicating
his intention to run for a congressional seat.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a
member of the Bench, respondent took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy,
demeaned the statude of his office, and must be pronounced guilty of gross misconduct, a clear
violation of Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
227 | P a g e
(210) Domingo v zamora
ISSUE: whether EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid.

FACTS: On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No.
813 (EO 81 for brevity) entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining
the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports. Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew
B. Gonzales (Secretary Gonzales for brevity) issued Memorandum No. 01592 on January 10,
2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the service, all
remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS effective March 15, 2000.On
January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594 reassigning the BPESS
staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied
with their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition. petitioners argue that EO 81 is void
and unconstitutional for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain
that the Presidents issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners
also challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure.Petitioners
seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. During the pendency of the case, Republic Act
No. 9155 (RA 9155 for brevity), otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of
2001, was enacted on August 11, 2001. RA 9155 expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred
the functions, programs and activities of the DECS relating to sports competition to the PSC.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: We dismiss this petition for being moot and academic. As manifested
by both petitioners and respondents, the subsequent enactment of RA 9155 has rendered the
issues in the present case moot and academic. Since RA 9155 abolished the BPESS and
transferred the DECS functions relating to sports competition to the PSC, petitioners now admit
that it is no longer plausible to raise any ultra vires assumption by the PSC of the functions of the
BPESS. Moreover, since RA 9155 provides that BPESS personnel not transferred to the PSC
shall be retained by the DECS, petitioners now accept that the law explicitly protects and
preserves their right to security of tenure.
228 | P a g e
(211) OP v Buenaobra
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent being a presidential appointee and a holder of a non-career
service postion could be removed from service at the pleasure of the President.
FACTS: The Office of he Omb d man Special P o ec ion Office filed an info ma ion
against Nita Buenaobra, chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino, with the Sandiganbayan
for violation of Section 4(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for allegedly causing undue injury to the
government through gross inexcusable negligence in connection with the unauthorized reprinting
of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino. The Sandiganbayan ordered a reinvestigation while the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) conducted a parallel administrative investigation
against respondent charging her with the same acts and ommissions subject of the
Sandiganba an ca e. On 11 Ap 2003, pe i ione adop ed PAGC ecommenda ion and
dismissed respondent from office.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Non-career service personnel enjoy security of tenure. They may not be
removed without just cause and observance of due process.
229 | P a g e
(212) Capablanca v. CSC
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC can conduct an investigation regarding the irregularity of
Capablanca CSP-CAT.
FACTS: Eugenio Capablanca was appointed into the PNP with the position of PO1 with
temporary status. He passed both the PNP Entrance Examination conducted by the National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer
Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) he was subsequently
conferred permanent status. The CSC conducted an investigation because of irregularities
regarding Capablanca CSP-CAT. Capablanca averred that only the NAPOLCOM had sole
authority to conduct police entrance exams.
DECISION: Yes. The CSC can conduct an investigation.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is
mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. Jurisprudence has held
that Appointees to Police Officer and Senior Police Officer positions in the Philippine National
Police must have passed any of the following examinations: a) PNP Entrance Examination; b)
Police Officer 3rd Class Examination; and c) CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination. The
CSC is mandated to conduct the qualifying entrance examination (CSC Police Officer Entrance
Examination) for Police Officer 1.
230 | P a g e
(213) DBP v. COA 231 SCRA 202
ISSUE: Whether or not COA is allowed to conduct post-audit.

FACTS: DBP conducted a public bidding for one unit of uninterruptible power supply (UPS).
Thereafter, DBP issued Purchase Order No. 0137 to Voltronics for P1,436,539.25 inclusive of
customs duties and taxes. COA sent a notice to the chairman of DBP notifying him of the
disallowance of the amount representing customs duties and taxes and at the same time holding
him, along with other petitioners, jointly and severally liable for the aforementioned sum. They
submit the contrary on the ground that the transaction in question had already been approved and
passed in audit in accordance with the pre-audit system then obtaining and the later circular
requiring post-audit should not be applied retroactively
DECISION: Yes. COA can conduct post-audit.

RATIO DECIDENDI: While it is true that the applicable procedure in force at the time of the
questioned transaction was COA Circular 86-257 requiring a pre-audit, there is nothing to
preclude COA from conducting a post-audit of the already pre-audited transaction. Article IX
(D) Section 2(1) of the Constitution expressly grants respondent Commission the power to
conduct a post-audit.
231 | P a g e
(214) Bustamante v. COA
ISSUE: Whether or not such denial to give due course to the appeal of Bustamante constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS: Benito Bustamante, Regional Legal Counsel for the National Power Corporation
(NPC). Pursuant to NPC policy, in addition to the use of a government vehicle, Bustamante
claimed his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. On May 31, 1990, he
received an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable dated April 17, 1990 from Regional Auditor
Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation allowance.
Bustamante moved for reconsideration but was denied due course.
DECISION: No. The denial to give due course does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
RATIO DECIDENDI: COA Circular No. 75-6 prohibited the use of government vehicles by
officials provided with transportation allowance. This includes the NPC which Bustamante avers
is not mentioned in the said circular. Said circular was within the powers of the COA provided
by the Constitution.
232 | P a g e
(215) DBP v. COA GR 88435
ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution vests in the COA the sole and exclusive power to
examine and audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external
auditors under any circumstance
FACTS: After learning that the DBP had signed a contract with a private auditing firm for
calendar year 1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP Chairman that the COA resident
auditors were under instructions to disallow any payment to the private auditor whose services
were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary. On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the
COA Chairman a copy of the DBP's contract with Joaquin Cunanan& Co., signed four months
ea lie on Ma ch 5, 1987. The DBP Chai man' co e ing hand i en no e o gh he COA
concurrence to the contract. During the pendency of the DBP Chairman's note-request for
concurrence, the DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount of P487,321.14
despite the objection of the COA. On October 30, 1987, the COA Chairman issued a
Memorandum disallowing the payments, and holding the following persons personally liable for
such payment.
DECISION: No. COA does not have the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit
government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external auditors under any
circumstance.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire
Section 2, Article IX-D is that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the
other hand, the COA's authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and
regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive. As the constitutionally
mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA's findings and conclusions necessarily
prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are
concerned. The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest
the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither
by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual
examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and
their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets
escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.
233 | P a g e
(216) Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as
appeals would be concerned.
FACTS: Rufino Nuñez assailed the validity of P.D. 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as
amended by P.D. 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan for estafa through
falsification of public documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public
officials, in several cases.
DECISION: No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan does not violate equal protection insofar as
appeals would be concerned.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special
court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be
denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service.
234 | P a g e
(217) Roxas v. Vasquez
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may review or interfere with the prosecutorial prerogative of
the Ombudsman.
FACTS: Manuel C. Roxas was the Chairman, while Ahmed S. Nacpil was a Member, of the
Bids and Awards Committee of the PC-INP who invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of
fire trucks. The COA subsequently discovered that while the disbursement voucher indicated the
bid price has discrepancy. DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for violation
of Republic Act No. 3019 against Roxas and Nacpil.
DECISION: Yes. The Court may interfere with the prosecutorial prerogative of the
Ombudsman.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Ordinarily, the Court will not interfere with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probable guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. However, the Court found that the case at
bar falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule, more specifically, the constitutional
rights of the accused are impaired and the charges are manifestly false. In cases where the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor were unable to agree on whether or not probable cause
exists, the Court may interfere with the findings and conclusions.
235 | P a g e
(218) People v. Velez
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 when it
treated the "Joint Motion for Reconsideration/ Reinvestigation" of Velez as a motion for
reconsideration under Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 and when it granted the "Motio
FACTS: Ignacio Salmingo filed an affidavit-criminal complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against Edwin Velez, mayor of Silay City, et al. for violation of R.A. 3019. After
finding probable cause, Ombudsman recommended the filing of information against the
malefactors. Velez filed with the Sandiganbayan a joint motion for reconsideration which was
granted.
DECISION: No. The Sandiganbayan did not violate R.A. 6770 or AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Records show that when the Office of the Ombudsman approved the
resolution prepared by the Graft Investigator, the Information was filed prematurely against the
respondents. The Office of the Ombudsman must have realized this when Velez et al. filed with
the Sandiganbayan their Joint Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation and thus agreed to
treat the Motion as a motion for reconsideration under Sec 27 of RA 6770. By its agreement, the
Office of the Ombudsman merely corrected itself when it denied the motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation filed by Velez with the Office of the Ombudsman on the sole
ground that the Information had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the
Ombudsman is vested under the Constitution with investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Said
office, through the Special Prosecutor, has direct control over the prosecution of the case. The
Office of the Ombudsman merely exercised its investigatory and prosecutorial powers.
236 | P a g e
(219) Ledesma v. CA
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has encroached into the power of the Bureau of
Immigration over immigration matters.
FACTS: An investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the
Temporary Resident Visas of two foreign nationals. Graft Investigator resolved the
administrative case suspending petitioner for a year. The criminal case was dismissed.
DECISION: No. The Ombudsman has not encroached into the power of the Bureau of
Immigration over immigration matters.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the
1987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated
to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the
government, or any of its subdivisions, agency or instrumentality.
237 | P a g e
(220) Ombudsman v. Madriaga
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose
administrative sanctions over public officials.
FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman charging Gertudes Madriaga with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1
of Rule VI of the rules implementing R.A. 6713.
DECISION: Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative
sanctions over public officials.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Article XI, Section 13 of the Constitution grants petitioner
administrative disciplinary powers to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agent, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient, and direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate actions against a public official or employee at fault and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution and ensure compliance therewith.
238 | P a g e
(221) Ombudsman v. Madriaga
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose
administrative sanctions over public officials
FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman charging Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary School and
Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same school, with violation of Section 1 of Rule
IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. They
were subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, they were meted out the
penalty of six (6) months imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-
month suspension meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo
(Gertrudes) is merely recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman
administrative disciplinary power to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770
echoes the constitutional g an o he Omb d man of he po e o ecommend he impo i ion
of penalty on erring public officials and employees and ensure compliance therewith. The Court
notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute" an officer or employee akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the
refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication
that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually
mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the
Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been
settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission
of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect
of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be
taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in R.A. 6770
intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this
case would be the head of the BID. The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in
conjunction with the phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority
as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770. In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose
administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is
mandatory within the bounds of the law. The implementation of the order imposing the penalty
is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
239 | P a g e
(222) Caoibes v. Ombudsman
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the criminal
complaint pending resolution of the Supreme Court for appropriate action
FACTS: Judge Jose Caoibes, Jr. and Florentino Alumbres were embroiled in an altercation
resulting to the latter filing before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for
physical injuries, malicious mischief and assault upon a person in authority against the former.
Alumbres also filed an administrative case against Caoibes with the Supreme Court.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, Under Section C, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the
Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a crminal
complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves administrative matter.
240 | P a g e
(223) Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Zaldivar sought to restrain Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from
proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of criminal cases were filed by said Tanodbayan
without legal and constitutional authority.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Under the Constitution, the Special Prosecutor is a mere subordinate of
the Tanodbayan and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or
orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution cases but only conduct the same if
instructed to do so by the Ombudsman.
241 | P a g e
(224) Orap v. Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation
of a complaint charging a municipal judge and his clerk of court with violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019 and, upon a finding of prima facie case, proceed to
FACTS: Three informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special
Prosecutor Rodolfo B. Aquino, charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Court of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The information, duly approved by Hon. Juan A. Sison, then Chief Special
Prosecutor of the Tanodbayan, were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. SB-020, 021 and 022.
Likewise charged under Criminal Case No. 020 was Melanio B. Fernandez, petitioner's Clerk of
Court. The fourth information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-189, was filed against
petitioner, also for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The gravamen of all these
charges was to the effect that the accused on different occasions unlawfully and feloniously
received and took various sums of money from several persons in connection with Criminal Case
No. 2032 of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem entitled, "People vs. Pepito F. Iglesias", for
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to
property. Before his scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations
on the ground that the officer who signed the same had no authority to do so and that, corollarily,
the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged. After due hearing, the
respondent court denied petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner verbally moved for the
reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was denied. Hence, the instant recourse.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that the Tanodbayan has such
authority. The Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman, but as prosecutor as well. As
ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited to complaints initiated against officers and
personnel of administrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a) of the law. As prosecutor,
however, the authority of the Tanodbayan is primary and without exceptions. His powers are
defined in Sections 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607. Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term,
confers upon the Tanodbayan, through the Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors,
the exclusive authority to "conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to direct and control the prosecution of said
cases therein." If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court personnel lie outside the
investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee could ever be brought
to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of proper officer or
entity authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation on complaints of such nature against
them. This absurd situation the law could never have intended, considering that the Office of the
Tanodbayan was purposely created to "give effect to the constitutional right of the people to
petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity
and efficiency in the government service." The informations in question have complied with the
substantial and formal requirements of the law. They carry the certification of the investigating
prosecutor as to the existence of a prima facie case. They also bear the approval of the Chief
Special Prosecutor, as required by Section 11 of PD 1606. As petitioner is charged with
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which are within the jurisdiction of the
242 | P a g e
Sandiganbayan as defined under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, the said court validly acquired
jurisdiction over the informations in question.
243 | P a g e
(225) Canonizado vs Aguirre
ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioners were removed by virtue of abolition

FACTS: The commissioners of NAPOLCOM were appointed separately, in various years and
their terms had not expired at the time amendatory law RA 6975 was passed. RA 8551 declared
the terms of sitting commissioners upon its effectivity.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as a collegial body
within the DILG. Whereas, RA 8551 made it an agency attached to the department for policy
and program coordination. This does not result to a creation of a new office.
244 | P a g e
(226) Carino v CHR
ISSUE: Whether or not, CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher,
among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School
Teache A ocia ion (MPSTA) and Alliance of Conce ned Teache (ACT) nde ook ma
conce ed ac ion o d ama i e and highligh hei pligh e l ing f om he alleged fail e of
he p blic a ho i ie o ac pon g ie ance ha had ime and again been b o gh o he la e
attention. The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They
complained to CHR.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No, the Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say,
determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed
upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having
in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on
said matter, if still timely. The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under
the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it
has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and
determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights. The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by
the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have. Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to
in e iga e, canno and no and e ol e on he me i (adj dica e) he ma e in ol ed in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so
even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed.
245 | P a g e
(227) PBM Employees v. PBM Co.
ISSUE: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of
the Pasig Police. After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming
Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned
demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was
not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable
constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for
redress of grievances. The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would
interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was
backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed
through with the rally. A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal
that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should
not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to
cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed
fo a iola ion of he No S ike and No Locko cla e of hei Collec i e Ba gaining
Agreement. The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO
were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy
of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter
their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and
property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the
hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions." The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and
of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when
exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and omen b hom e hall be go e ned.
246 | P a g e
(228) MMDA v. Viron Trans.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional.

FACTS: To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President
i ed E ec i e O de (E.O.) 179, P o iding for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass
Transportation System. As determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in
Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles
and commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes. To decongest
traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a
recommendation, proposing the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares, and the construction of mass transport terminal facilties to provide a more
convenient access to mass transport system to the commuting public. The project provided for
nde hi E.O. a called G ea e Manila T an po S em (P ojec ) he ein he MMDA
was designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro Manila Council the
governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support of the project. The
respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus
operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed the
constitutionality of E.O. 179 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the
E.O., insofar as it permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of
property without due process; that it contravened the Public Service Act which mandates public
utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating
as common carriers; and that Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the
latter to order the closure of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional. The
MMDA argued before the Court that there was no justiciable controversy in the case for
declaratory relief filed by the respondents; that E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that
the President has the authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179
was a valid exercise of police power.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: B de igna ing he MMDA a implemen ing agenc of he G ea e
Manila T an po S em, he P e iden clea l o e epped he limi of he a ho i confe ed
by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued
by former President Aquino in her exercise of legislative powers. This executive order
reorganized the Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
and defined its powers and functions. It mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning,
programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote,
develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to
the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated
programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is
authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to
ensure the effective implementation of the law. The President may also exercise the same power
and authority to order the implementation of the mass transport system project, which admittedly
i one fo an po a ion. S ch a ho i p ing f om he P e iden po e of con ol o e all
executive departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws under the Constitution.
247 | P a g e
Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project,
must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the
primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of
networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish
and implement a project such as the mass transport system. By designating the MMDA as
implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority
conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. In the absence of a specific grant of authority to
it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic
Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of
metro-wide services, including transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion has
been recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not granted police
power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units,
there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to
enact ordinances, approveresolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the
MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Greater Manila Transport System as envisioned
by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the
project. It follo ha he MMDA canno alidl o de he elimina ion of e ponden
terminals. Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise
of such power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest of
the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic
congestion is a public, not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt
need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so
determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the
inefficient connectivity of existing transport system. With the avowed objective of decongesting
traffic in Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass transport system to
the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities. Common
carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled
to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking
a ea . The Co fail o ee ho he p ohibi ion again e ponden e minal can be
considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary,
he elimina ion of e ponden b e minal b ing fo h he di inc po ibili and he e all
harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from
one site to another. Moreover, an order for the closure of bus terminals is not in line with the
provisions of the Public Service Act. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle
parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by provincial
bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable
terminal sites.
248 | P a g e
1/19/2020 C n i 1 Dige Jean Ra
Jean Ra
S i ing La Sch l
C n i 1 Dige
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Javellana vs. Executive Secretary

50 scra 33 March 31, 1973
Ponente Concepcion, C.J
The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition but when the crucial
question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief six members of the court Justices
Makalintal Castro Barredo Makasiar Antonio and Esguerra voted to dismiss the petition
Concepcion together Justices Zaldivar Fernando and Teehankee voted to grant the relief being
sought thus upholding the 1 73 Constitution
Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the Plebiscite then Ratification Cases
FACTS
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16 1 67 Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No 2 which was amended by
Resolution No 4 of said body adopted on June 17 1 6 calling a Convention to propose amendments
to the Constitution of the Philippines
Said Resolution No 2 as amended was implemented by Republic Act No 6132 approved on August 24
1 70 pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on
November 10 1 70 and the 1 71 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1
1 71
While the Convention was in session on September 21 1 72 the President issued Proclamation No 10 1
placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law
the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Then the
President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No 73 submi ing to the Filipino people for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1 71
Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor as well as se ing the plebiscite for said
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15 1 73
h ://jhen di . d e .c m/ja ellana- -e ec i e- ec e a / 1/25

Then Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections the Treasurer of the Philippines
and the Auditor General to enjoin said respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential
Decree No 73 in any manner until further orders of the Court upon the grounds inter alia that said
Presidential Decree has no force and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite the se ing of
guidelines for the conduct of the same the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be
answered by the voters and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose are by the Constitution
lodged exclusively in Congress and there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed
Constitution set for January 15 1 73 there being no freedom of speech press and assembly and there
being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof
The President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No 10 1 for the
purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution He then announced the postponement of
the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution No formal action to this effect
was taken until January 7 1 73 when General Order No 20 was issued directing that the plebiscite
scheduled to be held on January 15 1 7 be postponed until further notice Said General Order No 20
moreover suspended in the meantime the order of December 17 1 72 temporarily suspending the
effects of Proclamation No 10 1 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution
Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite the Court deemed
it fit to refrain from deciding the aforementioned cases for neither the date nor the conditions under
which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially The Congress then scheduled
to meet in regular session and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No 73 was that the
President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor
which Congress unquestionably could do particularly in view of the formal postponement of the
plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with among others the leaders of Congress and
the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases
The petitioners in Case G R No  L 35 4 filed an urgent motion praying that said case be decided
as soon as possible preferably not later than January 15 1 73
Then the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three 3 cases to comment on said
urgent motion and manifestation not later than Tuesday noon January 16 1 73 Prior thereto or
on January 15 1 73 shortly before noon the petitioners in said Case G R No L 35 4 riled a
supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents
praying
… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as
the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and
its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Commi ee and its Chairman,
Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be
assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials
concerned, the so called Citizens Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to
have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in
paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.
On the same date the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G R No L 35 4
to file file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P M Tuesday January 16 1 73 and se ing the
motion for hearing on January 17 1 73 at 30 a m While the case was being heard on the date last
mentioned at noontime the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that upon
instructions of the President he the Secretary of Justice was delivering to him the writer a copy of
Proclamation No 1102 which had just been signed by the President Thereupon the writer returned to
the Session Hall and announced to the Court the parties in G R No L 35 4 inasmuch as the hearing in
connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had according to
information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice signed said Proclamation No 1102 earlier that
morning
The Ratification Case

On January 20 1 73 Josue Javellana filed Case G R No L 36142 against the Executive Secretary and the
Secretaries of National Defense Justice and Finance to restrain said respondents and their subordinates
or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present
Constitution referring to that of 1 35 The petition therein filed by Josue Javellana as a Filipino
citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit for himself and in behalf of all citizens
and voters similarly situated was amended on or about January 24 1 73 After reciting in substance the
facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases Javellana alleged that the President had announced

the immediate implementation of the New Constitution thru his Cabinet respondents including and
that the la er are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
Constitution upon the ground that the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies that the same are without power to
approve the proposed Constitution that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification
by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution and that the election held to ratify the proposed
Constitution was not a free election hence null and void
ISSUE S
1. Whether the issue of the validity of Proclamation No 1102 is a justiciable or political and therefore
non justiciable question
2. Whether the Constitution has proposed by the 1 71 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly
with substantial if not strict compliance conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions
3. Whether the aforementioned proposed Constitution has acquiesced in with or without valid
ratification by the people acquiesced permission given by silence or passiveness Acceptance or
agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections
4. Whether petitioners are entitled to relief
5. Whether the aforementioned proposed Constitution is in force
HELD
1. On the first issue involving the political question doctrine Justices Makalintal Zaldivar Castro
Fernando Teehankee and myself or six 6 members of the Court hold that the issue of the validity of
Proclamation No 1102 presents a justiciable and non political question Justices Makalintal and Castro
did not vote squarely on this question but only inferentially in their discussion of the second question
Justice Barredo qualified his vote stating that inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the
people the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an
approval and in the affirmative the Court should keep hands off out of respect to the people s will but
in negative the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the
1 35 Constitution been complied with Justices Makasiar Antonio Esguerra or three 3 members of
the Court hold that the issue is political and beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry
2. On the second question of validity of the ratification Justices Makalintal Zaldivar Castro Fernando
Teehankee and myself or six 6 members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the
1 71 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV section 1 of the
1 35 Constitution which provides only one way for ratification i e in an election or plebiscite held in
accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters
Justice Barredo qualified his vote stating that A s to whether or not the 1 73 Constitution has been
validly ratified pursuant to Article XV I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding
the meaning and intent of said Article the referendum in the Citizens Assemblies specially in the
manner the votes therein were cast reported and canvassed falls short of the requirements thereof In
view however of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there
was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1 73 Constitution
without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications I am constrained to
hold that in the political sense if not in the orthodox legal sense the people may be deemed to have cast
their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV
hence it may be said that in its political aspect which is what counts most after all said Article has been
substantially complied with and in effect the 1 73 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified
Justices Makasiar Antonio and Esguerra or three 3 members of the Court hold that under their view
there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification
3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed
Constitution no majority vote has been reached by the Court
Four 4 of its members namely Justices Barredo Makasiar Antonio and Esguerra hold that the people
have already accepted the 1 73 Constitution

Two 2 members of the Court namely Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free
expression and there has even been no expression by the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law Justice
Fernando states that I f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect
that independently of the validity of the ratification a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by
the people must be accorded recognition by the Court I am not at this stage prepared to state that such
doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of
ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant
feature of martial law
Three 3 members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and or competence to rule on the
question Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that Under a
regime of martial law with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted
they have no means of knowing to the point of judicial certainty whether the people have accepted
the Constitution
4. On the fourth question of relief six 6 members of the Court namely Justices Makalintal Castro
Barredo Makasiar Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition Justice Makalintal and Castro
so voted on the strength of their view that T he effectivity of the said Constitution in the final analysis
is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than
judicial an therefore beyond the competence of this Court 0 are relevant and unavoidable 1
Four 4 members of the Court namely Justices Zaldivar Fernando Teehankee and myself voted to
deny respondents motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions
5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four 4 members of the Court
namely Justices Barredo Makasiar Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the
people s acceptance thereof
Four 4 members of the Court namely Justices Makalintal Castro Fernando and Teehankee cast no
vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with
judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution and
Two 2 members of the Court namely Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1 71 Constitutional Convention is not in force with the result that there are not enough
votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force
ACCORDINGLY by virtue of the majority of six 6 votes of Justices Makalintal Castro Barredo
Makasiar Antonio and Esguerra with the four 4 dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices
Zaldivar Fernando and Teehankee all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed This being the
vote of the majority there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in
force and effect
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CO KIM CHAN v. VALDEZ TAN KEH

75 Phil 113 September 17, 1945
Ponente Feria, J.
FACTS
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation with the Court of First
Instance of Manila After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation Judge Arsenio
Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas
MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the
Philippines and without an enabling law the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines the
Philippine government under the Japanese
The respondent judge of the lower court refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceeding of
civil case No 3012 of said court which was initiated under the regime of the so called Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines He argued that the

proclamation issued by Gen Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgements of the courts of the said governments He also argued that the said
governments during the Japanese occupation were not de facto governments
ISSUE
Whether the governments established in the Philippines Philippine Executive Commission and
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military regime were de facto governments
HELD
The Supreme Court ruled that the Philippine Executive Commission which was organized by Order No
1 by the Commander of the Japanese forces was a civil government established by the military forces
and therefore a de facto government of the second kind The source of its authority comes from the
Japanese military it is a government imposed by the laws of war The same is true with the Republic of
the Philippines Apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other
government by the Filipino people was in truth and reality a government established by the Japanese
forces of occupation
In political and international law all acts and proceedings of the legislative executive and judicial
department of a de facto government is valid Being a de facto government judicial acts done under its
control when they are not political in nature to the extent that they effect during the continuance and
control of said government remain good
All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before
and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true and
original sovereign

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LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES v. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986
NOTE There is no Full Text of this case This is a Minute Resolution made by the Supreme Court
FACTS
On February 25 1 6 President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power On March 25 1 6 proclamation No 3 was issued providing
the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines
ISSUE
Whether the government of President Corazon Aquino is legitimate
HELD
Yes The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable ma er it belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge The Court further held that the people have accepted the
Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country It is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and law a de jure government The community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the new government
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ANASTACIO LAUREL v. ERIBERTO MISA

77 Phil 856 January 30, 1947
FACTS
The accused was charged with treason During the Japanese occupation the accused adhered to the
enemy by giving the la er aid and comfort He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his

allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time Also he claims that he cannot be tried under a
change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was
replaced already by the Republic
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of treason as defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended and
that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic
ISSUE
Whether the absolute allegiance of a Filipino citizen to the government becomes suspended during
enemy occupation
HELD
No The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of
their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because
the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier It
remains vested in the legitimate government
What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of a sovereignty with the control and government of
the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant The political laws which
prescribe the reciprocal rights duties and obligation of government and citizens are suspended in
abeyance during military occupation
DISSENTING OPINION
During the long period of Japanese occupation all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended
This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law adopted by our Constitution
Art. II, Sec. 3 as part of law of the nation.
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the
invading power whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced
government if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants such
obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces for the maintenance of the law and order
and for the proper administration of the country

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RAMON RUFFY, ET AL. v. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY

75 Phil 875 August 20, 1946
Ponente Tuanson, J.
FACTS
During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines military men were assigned at designated military
camps all over the country Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band to
move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the Bolo area A certain Captain
Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the Bolo area by the new
authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command Captain Beloncio was thus
allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was commi ed which was at
the time of war and Japanese occupancy
HELD
The Court ruled that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed Forces
were still covered by the National Defense Act Articles of War and other laws even during an
occupation The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 5th
Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial Moreover they were operating
officers which made them even more eligible for the military court s jurisdiction


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WILLIAM F. PERALTA v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

75 Phil 285 November 12, 1945
Ponente Feria, J.
FACTS
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as
defined and penalized by Act No 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines The
petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan
and which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair
trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused
ISSUE
Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No 7 is constitutional
HELD
Yes it is constitutional There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No 7 since the criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of
nations It is merely a governmental agency The sentence rendered likewise is good and valid since it
was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No 65 All
judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon
reoccupation of the Islands as such the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political
complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid

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DALE SANDERS, ET AL. v. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, ET AL.

162 SCRA 88 June 10, 1988
Ponente Cruz, J.
FACTS
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services director of the US Naval Station NAVSTA in Olongapo
City Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens permanently residing
in the Philippines and were employed as game room a endants in the special services department of
NAVSTA On October 3 1 75 the respondents were advised that their employment had been converted
from permanent full time to permanent part time In a le er addressed to petitioner Moreau Sanders
disagreed with the hearing officer s report of the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent
part time plus back wages Respondents allege that the le ers contained libelous imputations which
caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed for damages against petitioners
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have
been sued for damages
HELD
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to
account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties Sanders as director of the
special services department of NAVSTA undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a
hand in their employment work assignments discipline dismissal and other related ma ers The same
can be said for Moreau Given the official character of the above described le ers it can be concluded
that the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government There should be no
question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately
liable has given its consent to be sued The private respondents must pursue their claim against the
petitioners in accordance with the laws of the Unites States of which they are all citizens and under
whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were commi ed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction
over the case


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MARIANO E. GARCIA v. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ET AL.

16 SCRA 120 January 31, 1966
Ponente Regala, J.
FACTS
The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action to collect a sum of money
against the above defendants He suffered injuries while undergoing a 10 month military training at
Camp Floridablanca Pampanga He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1 57 with
the Adjutant General s Office which later disallow his claim for disability benefit After further demands
of the plaintiff the same Adjutant General s Office denied the claim alleging that the Commonwealth
Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610 which took effect January 1 1 50 That by the reason of the
injuries suffered by plaintiff he was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled
and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim plaintiff was deprived of his
disability pension from July 1 4 totaling no less than Php 4 000 at the rate of P20 per month and
suffered moral damages and a orney s fees the amount of Php 2 000 The Philippine Veterans
Administration and the Chief of Staff of AFP file separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject ma er of the complaint that the plaintiff
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court that the complaint states no cause
of action and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations Acting on the said Motion
the Court of First Instance on March 2 1 62 rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the ground
that action has prescribed Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been denied the plaintiff
has interposed this appeal
ISSUE
Whether the lower court has jurisdiction on the said ma er and dismissing the complaint on ground it
being the money claim against the government
HELD
The court affirmed the lower court s decision on dismissing the complaint for the simple reason that the
Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject ma er it being a money claim against the
government If there is a money claim against the government should be filed with the Auditor General
Plus under the doctrine of state immunity the state cannot be sued without its consent Moreover it is in
line with the principle that the State cannot be charged without its content as provided by the
Commonwealth Act 32 Sec 1 that in all cases involving the se lement of accounts and claims other
than those of accountable officers the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days
Also if all administrative remedies have been made and if superior administrative officers could grant
relief it is not necessary to entertain actions against the administrative officers as established by the rule

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL. v. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, ET AL.

182 SCRA 644 February 26, 1990
Ponente Cruz, J.
FACTS
The cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity In GR No 76607
private respondents re suing several officers of the US Air Force in connection with the bidding for
barbering services in Clark Air Base In GR No 001 Luis Bautista was arrested following a buy bust
operation for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act Bautista then filed a complaint for damages
claiming that because of the acts of the respondents he lost his job In GR No 7 470 Fabian Genove filed
a complaint for damages against petitioner for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force In GR No
025 complaint for damage was filed by the respondents against petitioners for injuries allegedly
sustained by plaintiffs All cases invoke the doctrine of state immunity as ground to dismiss the same

ISSUE
Whether the petitioners are immune from suit
HELD
It is clear that the petitioners in GR No 001 were acting in the exercise of their official functions They
cannot be directly impleaded for the US government has not given its consent to be sued In GR No
7 470 petitioners are not immune for restaurants are commercial enterprises however claim of
damages by Genove cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence presented Barber shops are also
commercial enterprises operated by private persons thus petitioners in GR No 76607 cannot plead any
immunity from the complaint filed In GR No 025 the respondent court will have to receive the
evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions before it can be known in
what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident
CARMEN FESTEJO v. ISAIAS FERNANDO,

50 O.G. 1556 March 11, 1954
Ponente DIOKNO, J.
FACTS
The defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works without authority obtained first from the CFI
of Ilocos Sur without obtaining first a right of way and without the consent and knowledge of the
plaintiff and against her express objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of
land and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on to the
damage and prejudice of the plaintiff
ISSUE
Whether the is a suit against the state
RULING
No the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff s land defendant
commi ed acts outside the scope of his authority When he went outside the boundaries of the right of
way upon plaintiff s land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness he must be
held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law
There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff s land southeasterly of the right of way innocently
for the surveys clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for the right of way It is a general rule
that an officer executive administrative quasi judicial ministerial or otherwise who acts outside the
scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to
personal liability in a civil suit He cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting
under the color of his office and not personally
SEPARATE OPINION
To my mind the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee Isaias
Fernando is a party in this case not in his personal capacity but as an officer of the Government
According to said pleading the defendant is Isaias Fernando Director Bureau of Public Works
Moreover in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint it is alleged
That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works is in charge of irrigation projects and
systems and the official responsible for the construction of irrigation system in the Philippines
We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system referred to in the complaint
of which the defendant Isaias Fernando according to the same pleading is in charge and for which he
is responsible as Director of the Bureau of Public Works are established and operated with public
funds which pursuant to the Constitution must be appropriated by law Irrespective of the manner in
which the construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works the system or canal is
therefore a property of the Government

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, ET AL.

78 SCRA 470 August 31, 1977
Ponente FERNANDO, Acting C.J.
FACTS
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7 1 72 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a
pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an
alleged breach of contract the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines Inc At that
time the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration Inc v Customs Arrastre Service where Justice
Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or
entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown had been
applied in 53 other decisions Respondent Judge Amante P Purisima of the Court of First Instance of
Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4 1 72 Hence the petition for certiorari and
prohibition
ISSUE
Whether the respondent s decision is valid
RULING
No The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision
of the present Constitution The State may not be sued without its consent
The doctrine of non suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the 1 35
Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which to para phrase Holmes negates
the assertion of any legal right as against the state in itself the source of the law on which such a right
may be predicated Nor is this all even if such a principle does give rise to problems considering the
vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general
welfare it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued
applicability Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties They could still proceed to seek collection of
their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them
subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication We could thus correctly conclude as we did
in the cited Providence Washington Insurance decision Thus the doctrine of non suability of the
government without its consent as it has operated in practice hardly lends itself to the charge that it
could be the fruitful parent of injustice considering the vast and ever widening scope of state activities
at present being undertaken Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist is from an
objective appraisal of all factors minimal In the balancing of interests so unavoidable in the
determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal the verdict
must be as it has been these so many years for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of
constitutional law
The consent to be effective must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed
out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil Thus whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration
agreed to have no binding force on the government
VICTORIA AMIGABLE v. NICOLAS CUENCA

FACTS
Victoria Amigable rightfully owned a lot in Cebu City which was used by the government for Mango
and Gorordo Avenues without her permission and without proper negotiation of sales Because of this
she filed a case in CFI Cebu
Defendants argue that 1 Action was premature 2 Right of action has already been prescribed 3
Government cannot be sued without its consent and 4 Cebu already agreed to use the land as such

CFI rendered a decision which states that Amigable cannot restore and recover her ownership and
possession of the said land and thus dismissed the complaint on grounds that state may not be sued
without its consent
ISSUE
Whether petitioner Amigable may rightfully sue the government without its consent
RULING
Yes Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of
title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government
the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot
Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale the aggrieved party may properly maintain
a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a
citizen The only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and
should have done years ago To determine just compensation of the land the basis should be the price or
value at the time of the taking
ILDEFONSO SANTIAGO v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET

AL.
87 SCRA 294 December 19, 1978
Ponente FERNANDO, J.
FACTS
Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the terms that
the Bureau should construct a building and install lighting facilities on the said lot
When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot Santiago filed a case pleading for the
revocation of such contract of donation but the trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit
against the government and should not prosper without the consent of the government
ISSUE
Whether the respondent government has waived its immunity from suit
RULING
Yes The government s waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of
donation The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did not comply with such
terms Thus the donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the court Also to not allow the donor to be
heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so advances The Court of First
Instance is hereby directed to proceed with the case
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. GREGORIO PERFECTO

43 Phil. 887 October 4, 1922
Ponente MALCOLM, J.
FACTS
Mr Gregorio Perfecto published an article in the newspaper La Nacion regarding the disappearance of
certain documents in the Office of Fernando M Guerrero the Secretary of the Philippine Senate Its
article suggested that the difficulty in finding the perpetrators was due to an official concealment by the
Senate since the missing documents constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the
investigation of oil companies This resulted to a case being filed against Mr Perfecto for violation of
Article 256 of the Penal Code He was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court and again in the Court
of First Instance of Manila Perfecto filed an appeal in the Supreme Court to dismiss the case on the
ground that Article 256 was not in force anymore
ISSUE
Whether Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code SPC is still in force and can be applied in the case at bar
HELD
No The Court stated that during the Spanish Government Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect
Spanish officials as representatives of the King However the Court explains that in the present case we
no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect Also with the change of
sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American it means that the invoked provision of the
SPC had been automatically abrogated The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be political in
nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants thus the Court emphasized that it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated Hence Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and
cannot be applied to the present case Therefore respondent was acqui ed
REASONS FOR THE DECISION

Three members of the court believe that Article 256 has been abrogated completely by the change from
Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines rendering it inconsistent with democratic
principles of government Article 256 of the Penal Code is goes against fundamental principles of the
American system of government This article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United
States established its authority in the Philippine Islands
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA v. HON. ELIAS B. ASUNCION

114 SCRA 77 May 31, 1982
Ponente MAKASIAR, J.
FACTS
petitioner Bernadita Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI of Leyte now Associate
Justice of CA with acts unbecoming of a judge when the la er purchased a property which was
previously the subject of litigation on which he rendered decision Respondent and his wife were also
members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc to which their shares and interests in
said property were conveyed According to the petitioner respondent allegedly violated Article 14 1 5
of the New Civil Code and Article 14 1 and 5 of Code of Commerce Sec 3 of Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act Sec 12 XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of Canons of Judicial Ethics
ISSUE
Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provisions
HELD
No The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency The judge bought the property in
1 65 2years after his decision became final Further Asuncion did not buy the property directly from
any of the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon who then sold the property to
Asuncion There was no showing that Galapon acted as a dummy of Asuncion Also Macariola did
not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition or that what she got were insignificant
portions of the land
The Court held that respondent Judge Asuncion s acts did not constitute an Act Unbecoming of a
Judge but he was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities for next time

GREGORIO PERFECTO v. BIBIANO MEER

Ponente BENGZON, J.
FACTS
The Collector of Internal Revenue required plaintiff appellee to pay income tax upon his salary as
member of this Court during the year 1 46 After paying the amount he instituted this action in the
Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal his salary not being taxable for
the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution
ISSUE
Whether the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1 46 amount to a diminution thereof
HELD
Yes The Supreme Court held that unless and until the Legislature approves an amendment to the
Income Tax Law expressly taxing that salaries of judges thereafter appointed salaries of judges are not
included in the word income taxed by the Income Tax Law Two paramount circumstances may
additionally be indicated to wit First when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines
1 13 taxable income did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from
diminution That was the prevailing official belief in the United States which must be deemed to have
been transplanted here and second when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved in 1 35
the prohibition against diminution off the judges compensation the Federal principle was known that
income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA v. SATURNINO DAVID

93 Phil. 696 August 31, 1953
Ponente MONTEMAYOR, J.
FACTS
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugo s salaries
A case was filed However upon construing Article VIII Section of the constitution it shows that
judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of
salaries from the said judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 13 of RA 5 0 is constitutional
HELD
No Section 13 of RA 5 0 is unconstitutional The said provision is a violation of the separation of
powers Only courts have the power to interpret laws Congress makes laws but courts interpret them
The collection of income taxes in judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by the
Article VIII Sec of the Constitution The compensation shall not be diminished during their
continuance of their service Section 13 of RA 5 0 stated that no salary received by any public officer of
the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes This specific part of RA 5 0 is in contrary with
what is Article VIII Sec has provided
DAVID G. NITAFAN, et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, et al.

152 SCRA 284 July 23, 1987
Ponente MELENCIO HERRERA, J.
FACTS
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to prohibit the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue CIR from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary which is
unconstitutional Earlier however or on June 7 1 7 the Court en banc had already reaffirmed the
directive of the Chief Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the
judges of the judiciary but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to se le the issue once and
for all
ISSUE
Whether the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax
HELD
No The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution based on their deliberations was NOT to exempt
justices and judges from general taxation Members of the judiciary just like members of the other
branches of the government are subject to income taxation What is provided for by the constitution is
that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their continuance in office They have a fix salary
which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress But the salaries of the judges shall be
subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased

Yes The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and such
increase will immediately take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary at the time of the
passing of the law increasing their salary shall benefit immediately
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary but such will only be
applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, et al.

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
Ponente BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS
The GSIS pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government decided to sell through
public bidding 30 to 51 of the outstanding shares In a close bidding only two 2 bidder participated
the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel and RenongBerhad a Malaysian firm First the MPH has a lower bid
compare to the Malaysian firm but later matched the bid of the Malaysian firm with all the compliance
of the bidding rules imposed by the GSIS on the contracts
Perhaps apprehensive the respondent GSIS has disregarded the matching bid and that the sale of 51 of
the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with RenongBerhad The petitioner
came to the court on prohibition and mandamus The court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm
The petitioner invoked Sec 10 second par Article XII The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1 7
constitution In the grant of rights privileges and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony the state shall give preference to qualified Filipinos Respondent opposing that the
provision is not self executing and requires implementing legislation and Manila Hotel does not fall
under the term national patrimony
ISSUE
Whether the provisions of the Constitution are self executing
HELD
No under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy the constitution is the fundamental paramount and
supreme law of the nation it is deemed wri en in every statute and contract A provision which lays
down a general principle is usually not self executing But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means if which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected is self executing Sec 10
second par Article XII of the 1 7 constitution is a mandatory positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation It is per se judicially
enforceable When our constitution mandates that in the grant of rights privileges and concessions

covering national economy and patrimony the state shall give preference to qualified Filipinos It means
that qualified Filipino shall be preferred And when our constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject consequently if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce
such constitutional right such right enforce itself by its own inherent potency and puissance and from
which all legislations must take their bearings Where there is a right there is a remedy Ubi jus
ibiremedium
Whether the 51% share of Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony
No the national patrimony that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race In its plain and ordinary meaning the term
patrimony pertains to heritage When the constitution speaks for patrimony it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines as the constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos Manila Hotel has become a landmark a living
testimonial of Philippines heritage Verily Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony for sure 51 of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51
will have actual control and management of the hotel Wherefore the respondents are directed to cease
and desist from selling 51 of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RenongBerhad And accept
the matching bid of the manila prince hotel corporation
BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., et al. v. HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, et al.

59 SCRA 183 September 17, 1974
Ponente MAKALINTAL, C.J.
FACTS
Enrile then Minister of National Defense pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest
of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them Hence
Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile Enrile s answer contained a
common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of
Martial Law
ISSUE
1. Whether Aquino s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law
2. Whether the petitions for writ of habeas corpus should be suspended contending that the
proclamation of Martial Law was unconstitutional
HELD
1. YES The Constitution provides that in case of invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger
against the state when public safety requires it the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law In the case at bar the state
of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared therefore there is a clear and imminent
danger against the state The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President s order
2. YES The petitions should be dismissed with respect to petitioners who have been released from
detention but have not withdrawn their petitions because they are still subject to certain restrictions
Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect
to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation to suppress
invasion insurrection rebellion or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION v. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455 January 7, 1986

FACTS
Eleven petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 3 which calls for special
national elections on February 7 1 6 for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines
BP 3 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the
calling of the special election Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos le er of conditional
resignation did not create the actual vacancy required in Section Article 7 of the Constitution which
could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the
regular elections for such positions in 1 7 The le er states that the President is irrevocably vacat ing
the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and
qualified as President by taking his oath office ten 10 days after his proclamation
The unified opposition rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that
the incumbent President actually resign vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa as acting President their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention
for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election They have not insisted that President Marcos
vacate his office so long as the election is clean fair and honest
ISSUE
Whether B P Blg 3 unconstitutional
HELD
No There are less than 10 required votes to declare BP 33 unconstitutional Thus petitions are
dismissed writs are denied The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of
an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7 1 6 in as much as there
are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 3 unconstitutional
The events that have transpired since December 3 Cory declared bid for presidency as the Court did
not issue any restraining order have turned the issue into a political question from the purely
justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the
President s office which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the
scheduled election since there is no issue more political than the election The Court cannot stand in the
way of le ing the people decide through their ballot either to give the incumbent president a new
mandate or to elect a new president
IN RE SATURNINO v. BERMUDEZ
145 SCRA 160 October 24, 1986
FACTS
Saturnino Bermudez as a lawyer questioned the validity of the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article
XVIII of the proposed 1 6 Constitution which provides in full as follows
Sec. 5. The six year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,
for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.
Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers he then asks the Court to
declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who among the present
incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President
Ferdinand E Marcos and Vice President Arturo M Tolentino being referred to as the incumbent
president
ISSUE
Whether said provision is ambiguous
HELD
No The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action Petitioner s
allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous it being a
ma er of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers
therein to incumbent President Corazon C Aquino and Vice President Salvador H Laurel and to no
other persons and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30 1 2 for purposes of
synchronization of elections Hence the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding
on the second Monday of May 1 2 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice President
under said 1 6 Constitution In previous cases the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon
C Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to
the 1 73 Constitution
IN RE LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO

June 29, 1992 210 SCRA 589
Ponente PADILLA, J.
FACTS
Petitioner Assoc Justice Puno a member of the Court of Appeals CA wrote a le er dated Nov 14 1 0
addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA It appears from
the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20 1 0 but took his
oath of office on Nov 2 1 2 The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court
IAC pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg 12 An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds
Therefor and For Other Purposes He was then appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an
appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice In Edsa Revolution in Feb 1 6
brought about reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary A Screening Commi ee
was created When Pres Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No 33 as an exercise of her legislative
power the Screening Commi ee assigned the petitioner to rank no 11 from being the assoc justice of
the NEW CA However the petitioner s ranking changed from no 11 he now ranked as no 26 He
alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order of
Pres Aquino The court en banc ranted Justice Puno s request A motion for consideration was later filed
by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking They contend that the petitioner
cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at
the date of his last appointment
ISSUE
Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate
any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No 33
HELD
The present CA is a new entity different and distinct from the CA or the IAC for it was created in the
wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in
the people power A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as as sudden radical and
fundamental change in the government or political system usually effected with violence A
government as a result of people s revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family
of nations or countries like the US Great Britain Germany Japan and others In the new government
under Pres Aquino it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power Therefore it is the
present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking
ALFREDO M. DE LEON v. HON. BENHAMIN B. ESGUERRA

153 SCRA 602 August, 31, 1987
Ponente MELENCIO HERRERA, J.

FACTS
Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain together with other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores Municipality of Taytay Pronice of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Barangay
Election Act of 1 2
Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra which provided the
designation of respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of the same barangay and the other
respondents as members of the barangay Council of the same barangay and municipality Petitioners
maintain that Sec 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1 2 provides that the terms of office shall be six 6
years which shall continue until their successors shall have elected and qualified Also in accordance
with the recent ratification of the 1 7 Constitution it seems that respondent OIC Governor no longer
had the authority to replace them as well as designate successors
Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited
from taking over their positions
ISSUE
Whether the designation of successors is valid
HELD
No memoranda has no legal effect The Court ruled in the negative SC declared that the Memorandum
issued by respondent OIC Governor designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores has no legal force and effect
February 1 7 is within the prescribed period But provisional constitution was no longer in effect
then because 1 7 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision Article XVIII sec 27 states
that all previous constitution were suspended
The 1 7 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2 1 7 By that date therefore the
provisional constitution must be deemed to have been superseded Effectivity of the Constitution is also
immediately upon its ratification
When did the 1987 Constitution take effect

The Supreme Court with only one dissent ruled in De leon vs Esguerra that the 1 7 Constitution took
effect on February 2 1 7 which is the date of its ratification in the plebiscite by virtue of its provision
under Article XVIII Section 27 that it shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose This provision was unanimously approved by thirty
five votes in favor and none against in the Con Com of 1 6
The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification that is the date the
people have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution The act of voting by the people is the act of
ratification It should not be on the date of the proclamation of the President since it is the act of the
people In fact there should be no need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the President if there
is it is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act done by the people The COMELEC on the
other hand should make the official announcement that the votes show that the Constitution was
ratified but the canvass is merely a mathematical confirmation of what was done during the plebiscite
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
Ponente DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS
A y Jesus S Delfin founding member of the Movement for People s Initiative filed with the COMELEC
a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People s Initiative
citing Section 2 Article XVII of the Constitution Acting on the petition the COMELEC set the case for
hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published After the hearing the arguments between
petitioners and opposing parties the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their

memoranda and or oppositions memoranda within five days On December 1 1 6 Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition
under Rule 65 raising the following arguments among others
1. That the Constitution can only be amended by people s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by
Congress to which no such law has yet been passed and
2. That R A 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people s initiative on the Constitution unlike in
the other modes of initiative
ISSUE
Whether RA No 6735 is sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people s initiative
HELD
NO R A 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution
Under the said law initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND The people
are not accorded the power to directly propose enact approve or reject in whole or in part the
Constitution through the system of initiative They can only do so with respect to laws ordinances or
resolutions The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted approved or rejected amended
or repealed denotes that R A No 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution
Also while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative
and Referendum no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution This means that the main
thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws If R A No 6735 were intended
to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution it could
have provided for a subtitle therefor considering that in the order of things the primacy of interest or
hierarchy of values the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local laws
While R A No 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on
national and local laws it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution
The foregoing considered further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits
of elective national and local officials is an amendment to and not a revision of the Constitution is
rendered unnecessary if not academic
COMELEC Resolution No 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss
the Delfin Petition TRO issued on 1 December 1 6 is made permanent
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

41 SCRA 702 October 16, 1971
Ponente BARREDO, J.
FACTS
The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections from undertaking
to hold a plebiscite on November 1 71 at which the proposed constitutional amendment reducing
the voting age in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years shall be
submi ed for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1 71 and the subsequent implementing resolutions by declaring said resolutions to be
without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines The
Constitutional Convention of 1 71 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the
Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a
convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions
of Congress held on March 16 1 67 and June 17 1 6 respectively The delegates to the said Convention
were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof
Republic Act 6132

ISSUE
Whether it is within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1 71 to order the holding of a
plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment s
HELD
The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submi ed to the people in a single
election or plebiscite We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submi ing the same
for ratification of the people on November 1 71 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent COMELEC in that direction are null
and void lt says distinctly that either Congress si ing as a constituent assembly or a convention called
for the purpose may propose amendments to this Constitution The same provision also as definitely
provides that such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submi ed to the people for their
ratification thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many elections or plebiscites may be held to
ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or
convention and the provision unequivocally says an election which means only one
The petition herein is granted Organic Resolution No 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1 71 and
the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention insofar as they provide for the holding of a
plebiscite on November 1 71 as well as the resolution of the respondent COMELEC complying
therewith RR Resolution No 6 5 are hereby declared null and void The respondents COMELEC
Disbursing Officer Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined
from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution In view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case the Court declares this decision immediately executory
All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submi ed to the people in a single
election or plebiscite In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may
be validly held it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent
appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole In the present context where the
Convention has hardly started considering the merits if not thousands of proposals to amend the
existing Constitution to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with
this requirement
The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No 1
violated Sec 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submi ed to
the people in a single election or plebiscite Moreover the voter must be provided sufficient time and
ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution not separately but
together
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD v. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER
73 SCRA 333 October 12, 1976
Ponente MARTIN, J.
FACTS
COMELEC Resolution No 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No 6766 An Act Providing for
an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region last October 23 1 which paved for a call of a
plebescite fo its ratification original schedule was reset from December 27 1 to January 30 1 0 On
September 27 1 76 Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16
to declare without force and effect PD Nos 1 and 1033 as well as PD 1031 Petitioners contend that
the president has no power to propose amendments to the new constitution as such the referendum
plebiscite has no legal basis
Allegations of Sanidad
1 Unconstitutional as it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the
press

2 Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press because of its
penal provisions in case of violation
Responses of COMELEC
1 Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press but only a
valid implementation of the power of the COMELEC to supervise and regulate media during election or
plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX C Section 4 of the 1 7 Constitution and Section 11 of RA
6646
2 Does not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and or from campaigning for or against
the Organic Act He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the
COMELEC space and airtime magazine periodical in the province
ISSUE
Whether the president have authority to propose amendments to the Constitution
HELD
The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable
question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to perform such act is
in question The president has the authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers are
generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis The time for deliberation of the referendum
plebiscite questions 3 weeks is not too short especially since the questions are issues of the day and the
people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law
Section 1 of COMELEC Resolution No 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional TRO made
permanent due to the following reasons
1. It has no statutory basis
2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner s freedom of expression for no justifiable
reason
3. Affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the
forum where the right to expression may be exercised
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, et al. v. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998
Ponente PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS
Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto
under Rule 66 Section 5 Rules of Court seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T Guingona Jr as
minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader
Senator Ople and Sen Franklin M Drilon were likewise elected as president and as majority leader
respectively He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while
only those who had voted for him the losing nominee belonged to the minority.
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate minority, Sen Juan M Flavier manifested
that the senators belonging to the Lakas NUCD UMDP Party numbering seven 7 and thus also a
minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader
The following session day the debate on the question continued with Senators Santiago and Tatad
delivering privilege speeches On the third session day the Senate met in caucus but still failed to
resolve the issue
The following day Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo
warranto alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader a position that according to them rightfully belonged
to Senator Tatad
ISSUE
Whether there is an actual violation of the Constitution
HELD
However the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution the
laws the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House The term majority when
referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate it simply means the number greater than half or
more than half of any total In effect while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate
must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof it does not
provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority who could
thereby elect the minority leader No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader
While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker it is
however dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress All that
the Charter says under Art VI Sec 16 1 is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary. The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise
of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision Therefore such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself not by the Court
The term majority simple means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. The plain
and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause mean that the Senate President must obtain
the votes of more than one half of all the Senators
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.

G.R. No. G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Ponente CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS
Within a period of 1 year 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario Davide The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing
of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law
the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress On 22 July 2002 the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the
Commi ee on Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund JDF
On 2 June 2003 former President Joseph E Estrada filed an impeachment complaint first impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G Davide Jr and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The complaint
was endorsed by House Representatives and was referred to the House Commi ee on Justice on 5
August 2003 in accordance with Section 3 2 of Article XI of the Constitution The House Commi ee on
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted
to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance The following day or on 23
October 2003 the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G Davide Jr founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above mentioned House Resolution The second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement Impeachment signed by at least 1 3 of all the Members
of the House of Representatives Various petitions for certiorari prohibition and mandamus were filed
with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives et al most of which petitions contend
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that n o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
ISSUE
Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings
HELD
The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second
impeachment complaint More importantly any discussion of this would require this Court to make a

determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense Such a determination is a purely political

question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation
The Court s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1
Article VIII of our present 1 7 Constitution The moderating power to determine the proper allocation of
powers of the different branches of government and to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself which is the
power of the court to se le actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. As
indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission judicial review is indeed an integral component of the
delicate system of checks and balances which together with the corollary principle of separation of
powers forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are
utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in
our Constitution Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of ma ers within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government And the judiciary in turn with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution
CHARLES BAKER v. JOE CARR

396 US 186
FACTS
Apportionment cases had often been brought under the Guaranty Clause of Article IV Section 4 of the
United States Constitution Constitution in which the United States guarantees to the individual states
a republican form of government The Supreme Court of the United States Supreme Court has long
held that such challenges present a political question not addressable by the courts In the current case
Appellants challenged the state apportionment of legislatures under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Charles Baker P was a resident of Shelby County Tennessee Baker filed suit against Joe Carr the
Secretary of State of Tennessee Baker s complaint alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn
its legislative districts since 1 01 in violation of the Tennessee State Constitution which required
redistricting according to the federal census every 10 years Baker who lived in an urban part of the
state asserted that the demographics of the state had changed shifting a greater proportion of the
population to the cities thereby diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections and sought the remedy of reapportionment or
at large elections The district court denied relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a
political question and would therefore not be heard by the court
ISSUE
Whether federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative
apportionment
HELD
Yes Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment
The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political question The case did not
present an issue to be decided by another branch of the government The court noted that judicial
standards under the Equal Protection Clause were well developed and familiar and it had been open to
courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an act is arbitrary and
capricious and reflects no policy When a question is enmeshed with any of the other two branches of
the government it presents a political question and the Court will not answer it without further
clarification from the other branches
A district court dismissed the case upon the ground among others that the issue was a political one
but after a painstaking review of the jurisprudence on the ma er the Federal Supreme Court reversed
the appealed decision and held that said issue was justiciable and non political inasmuch as …
d eciding whether a ma er has in any measure been commi ed by the Constitution to another branch of
government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been commi ed, is itself a delicate
exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution.
WALTER NIXON v. UNITES STATES

506 US 224 October 14, 1992
FACTS
Walter Nixon a former Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi was sentenced to prison for lying under oath to a federal grand jury The Petitioner refused
to resign from his post and continued to draw his salary while incarcerated In the ensuing impeachment
trial the Senate invoked Rule XI which allowed a Senate commi ee to receive evidence and testimony
The commi ee provided full transcripts and summaries to the entire Senate and more than the necessary
two thirds voted to impeach on two of the three articles Nixon now appeals arguing that Rule XI
violates the impeachment trial clause Art I Section 3 cl 6 of the United States Constitution
Constitution
ISSUE
Whether the constitutionality of Senate Rule XI is non justiciable because it involves a political question
HELD
Yes Judgment Affirmed A controversy is non justiciable because of the political question doctrine for
one of two reasons First if there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department is present Second if a there is a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving the controversy Baker v Carr 36 U S 1 6 217 A lack of
judicially manageable standards may strengthen a conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable
commitment
Nixon s claim that the word try required proceedings in the nature of a judicial trial was rejected by
the Court The conclusion that the use of the word try in the first sentence of the Impeachment Trial
Clause lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate s
actions is fortified by the existence of the three very specific requirements that the Constitution does
impose on the Senate when trying impeachments The Members must be under oath a two thirds vote is
required to convict and the Chief Justice presides when the President is tried These limitations are quite
precise and their nature suggests that the Framers did not intend to impose additional limitations on the
form of the Senate proceedings by the use of the word try in the first sentence

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THE ADONIS CASES 2011
propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of a
constitutional convention.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISSUES:

(1) Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?
PHILIPPINES (2) WON Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the
Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional convention?
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES HELD:

SECTION 27, ARTICLE 18, 1987 CONSTITUTION YES as to both issues. The constituent power or the power
DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA to amend or revise the Constitution, is different from the law-making power
(G.R. NO. 78059. AUGUST 31, 1987) of Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution and at the same time call for a Constitutional Convention to
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: propose amendments.
FACTS: Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner Alfredo amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative
M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as
S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours— to
Rizal. make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same
a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said
OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their
"by authority of the Minister of Local Government." authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the
Also on February 8, 1987, Esguerra signed a Memorandum, same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution
antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, — they are the very source of all powers of government, including the
et al., as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Constitution itself .
Municipality. Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly,
Petitioners maintain that with the ratification of the 1987 amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their
Constitution, Esguerra no longer has the authority to replace them and to authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do
designate their successors. not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond
However, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same
Provisional Constitution, which provided: at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws,
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is
employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such eminently political character of treaty-making power.
appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
ISSUE: Whether the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners IMBONG VS. COMELEC
was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 35 SCRA 28 (1970)
1987.
FACTS:
HELD: Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both
NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year interested in running as candidates in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
deadline under the Provisional Constitution, the same must be deemed to filed separate petitions for declaratory relief, impugning the
have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution constitutionality of RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as
reading: candidates.
“This Constitution shall take effect immediately Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes Resolution No.2 which called for the Constitutional Convention to propose
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and Constitutional amendments. After its adoption, Congress, acting as a
shall supersede all previous Constitutions.” legislative body, enacted R.A. 4914 implementing said resolution,
restating entirely the provisions of said resolution.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Thereafter, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional Constitution must be passed Resolution No. 4 amending the Resolution No. 2 by providing that
deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, Section “xxx any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates,
2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution could not be relied on by the election of delegates to, and the holding of the Constitutional Convention
respondent OIC Governor. The memorandum dated February 8, 1987 by shall be embodied in an implementing legislation xxx”
the respondent OIC Governor could no longer have any legal force and Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132,
effect. implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A.
The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. The 4914.
canvass of the votes thereafter is merely the mathematical confirmation of
what was done during the date of the plebiscite, and the proclamation of ISSUE: May Congress in acting as a legislative body enact R.A.6132 to
the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which implement the resolution passed by it in its capacity as a Constituent
was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when Assembly?
they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.
HELD:
YES. The Court declared that while the authority to call a
Constitutional Convention is vested by the Constitution solely and
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES exclusively in Congress acting as a constitutional assembly, the power to
SECTIONS 1 & 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987 CONSTITUTION enact the implementing details or specifics of the general law does not
GONZALES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS exclusively pertain to Congress, the Congress in exercising its
(GR. NO L-28196, NOVEMBER 9, 1967) comprehensive legislative power (not as a Constitutional Assembly) may
pass the necessary implementing law providing for the details of the
CONCEPCION, C.J.: Constitutional Conventions, such as the number, qualification, and
FACTS: compensation of its member.
The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously. The The reasons cited by the Court in upholding the
first, proposing amendments to the Constitution so as to increase the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. 6132 are as follows:
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as 1. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly
provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180. The second, pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution, has authority to
calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the propose constitutional amendments or call a convention for
convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each the purpose by ¾ votes of each house in joint session
representative district, to be elected in the general elections. And the third, assembled but voting separately.
proposing that the same Constitution be amended so as to authorize 2. Such grant includes all other powers essential
Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become to the effective exercise of the principal power by necessary
delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without implication.
forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress 3. Implementing details are within the authority of
passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, became Republic the Congress not only as a Constituent Assembly but also in
Act No. 4913 providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power which
in the aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for approval by the encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary
people, at the general elections. The petitioner assails the constitutionality implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from
of the said law contending that the Congress cannot simultaneously
San Beda College of Law 1

Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
the ambit of legislative action so long as it does not
contravene any provision of the Constitution; and THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
4. Congress as a legislative body may thus enact SECTIONS 1 & 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987 CONSTITUTION
necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps which TOLENTINO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Congress as a Constituent Assembly has omitted. (GR. NO. L-34150, OCTOBER 16, 1971)
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS:
A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, in which, the delegates
ARTICLE XVII, SECTION 15, 1973 CONSTITUTION to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of resolutions
OCCENA VS. COMELEC and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The
G.R. NO. L-56350, APRIL 2, 1981 Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1, amending section one of
article 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines so as to lower the voting age
FERNANDO, C.J.: to 18. Said resolution also provided in its Section 3 that the partial
FACTS: amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings is suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be
against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other
constitutional amendments. Petitioners urged that the amendments portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire
proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits Constitution.
of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No.
successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved
was to revise and not to amend. by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they are in
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both contravention to Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution. Under the said
members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 provision, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to
Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.
assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law.
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 and March 12, ISSUE:
1981. Is the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention constitutional?
ISSUES:
Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is already in effect. HELD:
Whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
propose amendments. Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the
Whether or not the three resolutions are valid. Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite, as well
as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith are null
HELD: and void.
1.Yes. it is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of The Court is of the opinion that in providing for the
the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the
Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the
declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the
to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no Convention implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1,
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the
and effect." ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are
With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment;
the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution,
is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together
instability was removed. The Supreme Court can check as well as with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the
coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is
there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that
constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the
suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are
Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the
latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. proposed amendment. No one knows what changes in the fundamental
During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To
least ten cases may be cited. be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the
2. Yes.The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether
indubitable. The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of
explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The
Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in
the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the almost every part and aspect of the existing social and political order
Members thereof." One of such powers is precisely that of proposing enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed
amendments. Article XVII, Section 15 of the 1973 Constitution in its plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish and
to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of which presently he is not given any idea? Clearly, there is improper
of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article submission.
on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon
the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as
a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments SANIDAD VS. COMELEC
embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. 73 SCRA 333 (1976)
FACTS:
3. Yes.The question of whether the proposed resolutions constitute President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for a national referendum
amendments or revision is of no relevance. It suffices to quote from the on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“Barangay”) to resolve,
opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its
Commission on Elections to dispose of this contention. Whether the replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an powers.
entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, amending P.D. 991 by
system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the declaring the provisions of P.D. 229 applicable as to the manner of voting
people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be and canvassing of votes in barangays for the national referendum-
no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the plebiscite of October 16, 1976. P.D. 1033 was also issued, declaring
present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no therein that the question of the continuance of martial law will be
argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the submitted for referendum at the same time as the submission of his
'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether (President) proposed amendments to the Constitution through a plebiscite
the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed on October 16, 1976.
would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for Prohibition and Preliminary
sovereign people." Injunction, seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting
WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. said Referendum-Plebiscite on the basis that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitution, there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the

constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution, hence, all elective officials, amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of Art.VI,
the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no legal basis. Section 4 of Art.VII, and Section 8 of Art. X of the Philippine Constitution?”
Petitioner Guzman filed another action asserting that the The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of
power to propose amendments to or revision of the Constitution during the the petition and the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for
transition period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-
under sec.16, Art. XVII of the Constitution. Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and
A similar action was instituted by petitioners Gonzales and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as intervenors-
Salapantan arguing that: oppositors. Senator Roco moved to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
1. Even granting him legislative powers under the martial law, ground that it is not the initiatory party cognizable by the COMELEC.
the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to Petitioners filed a special civil action directing respondents
propose amendments to the Constitution, COMELEC and Delfin’s Petition to directly propose amendments to the
2. A referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions Constitution through the system of initiative under sec.2 of Art. XVII of the
of 1935 and 1973, 1987 Constitution. Petitioners raise the following arguments:
3. The submission of the proposed amendments in such a 1. The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend
short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity, the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
4. To lift martial law, the President need not consult the people Congress. No such law has been passed.
via referendum, and 2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the
5. Allowing 15-year-olds to vote would amount to an Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. It only provides
amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage for the effectivity of the law after the publication in print media
to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above. indicating that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional
The Solicitor General, in his comment for respondent amendments because the latter takes effect only upon ratification
COMELEC, maintains that: and not after publication.
1. Petitioners have no standing to sue 3. COMELEC Resolution No.2300, adopted on January 16,
2. The issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial 1991 to govern the “conduct of initiative on the Constitution and
cognizance of the court initiative and referendum on national and local laws”, is ultra vires
3. At this state of the transition period, only the incumbent insofar as initiative or amendments to the Constitution are
President has the authority to exercise constituent power concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
4. The referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization. regulation for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
Constitution. Only the Congress is authorized by the Constitution
ISSUES: to pass the implementing law.
Do the petitioners have the standing to sue? 4. The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of the Presidential Constitution, to the revision thereof. Extending or lifting of the term
Decrees 991, 1031, and 1033 political or judicial? limits constitutes a revision and is therefore outside the power of
2. Does the President possess the power to propose the people’s initiative.
amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required 5. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people’s
machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his initiative, neither the COMELEC nor any other department, agency
proposal, in the absence of an interim National Assembly? or office of the government has realigned funds for the purpose.
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed The Supreme Court gave due course to this petition and
amendments within the time frame allowed therefore a sufficient granted the Motions for Intervention filed by Petitioners-Intervenors DIK,
and proper submission? MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator Roco.
HELD: ISSUES:
1. YES. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the 1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a
disbursement of public funds may be enjoined upon the theory that self-executing provision?
the expenditure of public funds by the State for the purpose of 2. Whether R.A.6735 is a sufficient statutory
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of implementation of the said constitutional provision?
such funds. 3. Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid?
2. It is a judicial question. 4. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national
3. YES. If the President has been legitimately discharging the and local officials as proposed would constitute a revision, or an
legislative functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason amendment to the Constitution?
why he cannot validly discharge the function of that assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, HELD:
although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This is not to say NO. Although the mode of amendment which bypasses
that the President has converted his office into a constituent congressional action, in the last analysis, it is still dependent on
assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. congressional action. While the Constitution has recognized or granted
Rather, with the Interim Assembly not convened and only the that right, the people cannot exercise it if the Congress for whatever
Presidency and Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute reason, does not provide for its implementation.
necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for 1. NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply
and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the with the power and duty of the Congress to enact the statutory
Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme implementation of sec.2, Art.XVII of the Constitution. Although said
Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without Act intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to
constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that the Constitution, it is deemed inadequate to cover that system and
actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would accordingly provide for a local initiative required for proposing
leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate or create in the Constitutional changes.
powers of the State a destructive vacuum. After all, the constituent 2. NO. The COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prescribes
assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to
are mere agents of the people. the Constitution is void, as expressed
4. YES. Art. XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to in the Latin maxim “Potestas delegate non delegari potest. In every
the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states case of permissible delegation, it must be shown that the
that “it shall be held not later than 3 months after the approval of delegation itself is valid.
such amendment or revision.” The period from September 21 to 3. The resolution of this issue is held to be unnecessary, if not
October 16, or a period of three weeks is not too short for free academic, as the proposal to lift the term limits of elective local and
debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The national officials is an amendment to the Constitution and not a
issues are not new. They are the issues of the day, and the people revision. Thus, the petition was granted, and the COMELEC is
have been living with permanently enjoined from taking cognizance of any petition for
5. them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficiently law
The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of
martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for the system.
discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for
constitutional amendments.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 174153, OCTOBER 25, 2006
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC FACTS:
270 SCRA 106, MARCH 19, 1997 On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153,
namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with
FACTS: other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an
Private respondent Delfin filed with the COMELEC a initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
“Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
by People’s amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Art. will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of
XVII of the 1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
2300. The proposed amendments consist of the submission of this The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the
proposition to the people—“Do you approve the lifting of the term limits of support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum

(12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by These three specific amendments are not stated or even
at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly
by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first
submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification. shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended signed the petition.
Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
ISSUE:
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. CAMPOS RUEDA
Constitution through a people's initiative. (G.R. No. L-13250, Oct. 29, 1971)
HELD: FACTS:
NO. The court declared that Lambino Group's initiative is This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda,
void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the administrator of the estate of the deceased Doña Maria de la Estrella
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent Collector of
must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the former the
petition." sum P161,874.95 as deficiency state and inheritance taxes, including
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the interests and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties
people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella
face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira
be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire (Maria Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up
an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise she left, among
These essential elements are present only if the full text of others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines." Then came this
the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their portion: "On September 29, 1955, petitioner filed a provisional estate and
assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. On
amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a the same date, respondent, pending investigation, issued an assessment
petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of for estate and inheritance taxes which tax liabilities were paid by
the proposed amendments. petitioner.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either On November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed . . .
written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the where intangible personal properties with were claimed as exempted from
petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation, issued
every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the another assessment for estate and inheritance taxes. In a letter dated
full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is January 11, 1956, respondent denied the request for exemption on the
physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the
the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, respondent demanded the
amendments before signing. payment OF deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including ad valorem
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties . . . . In a letter
state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed dated February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on the following day,
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our petitioner requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant claim for tax exemption of the intangible personal properties and the
American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the imposition of the 25% and 5% ad valorem penalties. However, respondent
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the denied this request, in his letter dated May 5, 1956 . . . and received by
framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed petitioner on May 21, 1956. Respondent premised the denial on the
amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover]
containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, a mere principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, respondent
the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as demanded the payment of deficiency estate and inheritance taxes
valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories." including surcharges, interests and compromise penalties
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from
the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity ISSUE:
and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties Is Tangier a foreign country?
who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably HELD:
their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against Yes. It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified
their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a
gather the signatures. politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The through a government functioning under a regime of law. 9 It is thus a
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed obedience its commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic
amendments. organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who to promote the general welfare. Correctly has it been described by Esmein
signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed as "the juridical personification of the nation." This is to view it in the light
changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect its historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people
of the proposed changes, among which are: occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of
1. The term limits on members of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and
the legislature will be lifted and thus members maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it
of Parliament can be re-elected then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming
indefinitely; within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. McIver
2. The interim Parliament can similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain
continue to function indefinitely until its within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into
members, who are almost all the international relations. With the latter requisites satisfied,
present members of Congress, decide to call international law does not exact independence as a condition of
for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the statehood. So Hyde did opine.
members of the interim Parliament will
determine the expiration of their Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international
own term of office; personality petitioner has not successfully made out a case. It bears
3. Within 45 days from the repeating that four days after the filing of this petition on January 6, 1958
ratification of the proposed changes, the in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, it was specifically held by us:
interim Parliament shall convene to "Considering the State of California as a foreign country in relation to
propose further amendments or revisions to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax Court,
the Constitution. that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled to exemption from the

inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in the PVTA VS.CIR
Philippines." There can be no doubt that California as a state in the [GRN L-32052 JULY 25, 1975]
American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite of international
personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the FACTS:
meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Private respondents filed with the CIR a petition, alleging
their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the
regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.
BACANI V. NACOCO Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to
[GRN L-9657 NOVEMBER 29, 1956] them and the amount allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration denied the allegations. The then Presiding Judge
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent Court sustained the claims of private
FACTS: respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to the date
The plaintiffs are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to
of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case pay the same, minus what it had already paid. Petitioner claims that the
No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut matter is beyond the jurisdiction of the CIR as it is exercising
Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of C.A.
defendant, requested said stenographers for copies, of the transcript of 444, invoking the doctrine announced in the leading Agricultural Credit
the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs and Cooperative Financing Administration decision, and the distinction
complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth
transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation.
for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the
amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for ISSUE: Whether or not the traditional classification of function of
said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. government as ministrant and constituent applicable in the case at bar.
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor
General disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the recovery of HELD:
the amounts paid. The respondents argue that National Coconut No. The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the
Corporation may be considered as included in the term "Government of needs of the times was clearly pointed out by the present Chief Justice.
the Republic of the Philippines" for the purposes of the exemption of the Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are
legal fees provided for in Rule 1-30 of the Rules of Court. exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to
promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people - these latter
ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a part of the Government of the functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of
Philippines by virtue of its performance of government functions. the government."
Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively: "The growing
HELD: complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
No, NACOCO does not acquire that status for the simple classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say
reason that it does not come under the classification of municipal or public obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and
corporation. To resolve the issue in this case requires a little digression on initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally,
the nature and functions of our government as instituted in our and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public
Constitution. To begin with, we state that the term "Government" may be welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,' continue to
defined as "that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that
independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else
upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
authority of prescribing them" (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted
when referring to the national government, has reference to what our as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle
Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the concerning the promotion of social justice."
legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v. National
functions of government are exercised. These functions are twofold: Coconut Corporation, based on the Wilsonian classification of the tasks
constitute and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very incumbent on government into constituent and ministrant in accordance
bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that with the laissez faire principle.
are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and
and are merely optional. the Resolution of respondent Court, denying a motion for reconsideration
To this latter class belongs the organization of those are hereby affirmed.
corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote certain
aspects of the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut
Corporation. These are what we call government-owned or controlled THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS V. MONTE DE PIEDAD
organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private corporation (G.R. NO. L-9959, DECEMBER 13, 1916)
under the Corporation Law.
But while NACOCO was organized for the ministrant function TRENT, J.:
of promoting the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate FACTS:
power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury
to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the
and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto a central relief
“Government of the Republic of the Philippines" used in board was appointed to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed
section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that and allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution.
government. entity through which the functions of the government are By order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these
exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those allotments, together with the names of those entitled thereto, was
arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be published in the Official Gazette of Manila. These were later distributed up
provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are what to the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of $365,403.85.
we call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de
which are given a corporate personality. separate and distinct from the Piedad, the Philippine Government, by order, directed its treasurer to turn
government and 'which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their over to the former the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of
powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law $20,000 each and were received on the following dates: February 15,
and of their corporate charters. March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the
As this Court has aptly said, "The mere fact that the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons, and
Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made, the
public corporation" (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, Philippine Islands filed a suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover,
46 Phil., 586-597). "By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of
Company, the Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far the Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with interest. After due trial,
as respects the transactions of the corporation. Unlike the Government, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed and
the corporation may be sued without its consent, and is subject to made the following contentions:
taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an agency or that the $80,000, given to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros,
instrumentality of government." (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. were so given as a donation, and that said donation had
Springer, 50 Phil., 288.) been cleared;
that the Government of the Philippine Islands has not subrogated
the Spanish Government in its rights, as regards an
important sum of money abovementioned;
that the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this
payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or

the cestuis que trustent, thus, the plaintiff is not the proper
party to bring the action;
that the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
the prescription of this suit brought by the Insular CO KIM CHAN V. VALDEZ TAN KEH
Government against the defendant appellant. 75 PHIL 113, SEPTEMBER 17, 1945
ISSUES: FERIA, J:
Whether or not the $80,000 received by Monte de Piedad was in form of FACTS:
donation. Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus praying that the
Whether or not the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return respondent judge be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case no.
the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan, was 3012 which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
wiped out on the change of sovereignty. Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of the
Whether or not the Government is a proper party to the case under the islands.
doctrine of parens patriae. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and
Whether or not the Philippine Government is bound by the statute of continue the proceedings on the following grounds: (1) the proclamation
limitations. issued on October 23, 1944 by Gen. Mac Arthur had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
HELD: courts of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and
1.No.Documentary evidence shows that Monte de Piedad, after setting the Republic established during the Japanese occupation;(2) the lower
forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic in the absence
$100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, there be of enabling law granting such authority; (3) the government established in
transferred to it the sum of $80,000. The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was not a de facto
the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of government.
Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the
$80,000 be given to it as a donation. ISSUES:
The Department of Finance, acting under the orders of the 1. Whether the government established during the Japanese
Governor-General, understood that the $80,000 was transferred to the occupation was a de facto government.
Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." 2. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts
Furthermore, the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as existing in the Philippines under the Phil. Executive Commission
March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a returnable loan, and and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and
without interest." Thus, there cannot be the slightest doubt the fact that remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the
the Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and Philippines by the US and Filipino forces.
not as a donation. 3. Whether the proclamation issued by Gen. Mac Arthur
declaring “all laws, regulations and processes of any other
2.No. Court ruled that if legal provisions are in conflict with the political government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth are
character, constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, they became null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to of enemy occupation and control” has invalidated al judgments and
the United States, but if they are among "that great body of municipal law judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts.
which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and 4. Whether the courts of Commonwealth, which were the same
are still in force unless they have been repealed by the present courts existing prior to and continue during the Japanese military
Government. occupation of the Philippines may continue those proceedings in
From the nature and class of the subject matter, it is clear said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and
that it falls within the latter class. They are laws which are not political in liberated by the US and Filipino forces and the Commonwealth of
any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the the Philippines were reestablished.
right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities
and charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting "provident HELD:
institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable 1. YES. The government established under the names of
institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines
investment in securities are concerned, under the general supervision of during the Japanese occupation was a civil government and a de facto
the Insular Treasurer. government of the second kind: that which is established and
maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the
3.Yes.The ground upon which the right of the Government to maintain the enemy in the course of war. The distinguishing characteristics of this
action rests on the fact that the money, being given to a charity became a kind of de facto government are; (1) that its existence is maintained by
public property, only applicable to the specific purposes to which it was active military power within the territories, and against the rightful
intended to be devoted. It is but within those limits consecrated to the authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that while it
public use, and became part of the public resources for promoting the exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens
happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. To deny the who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do
Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not
public policy. warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Sohier vs. Mass.
General Hospital, ruled that: “insane persons and person not known, or
not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who are often in 2. YES. Being a de facto government, it necessarily follows that
capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those
sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and
beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the change of valid, and, by virtue of the well known principle of postliminy in
government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or
legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being
exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.” 3. NO. The phrase “processes of any other government” is
Chancelor Kent says: In this country, the legislature or government of the broad and may refer not only to judicial processes, but also to
State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional processes of the
nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established
interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com., 508, in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into
note.) consideration the fact that, according to the well-known principles of
international law, all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not
4.No. In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is of a political complexion, of the de facto government during the
stated as follows: Japanese occupation were good and valid before and remained so
In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular
limitations do not as a general rule run against the sovereign or sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have
government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise where the been, the intention of the Gen. Mac Arthur, in using the phrase
mischief to be remedied are of such a nature that the state must “processes of any government” to refer to judicial processes, in
necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in concert or violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable
in competition with her citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his construction of the said phrase is that it refers to governmental
private rights by suit in the name of the state or government, so that the processes other than judicial processes, or court proceedings, for
latter is only a nominal party. according to a well-known statutory construction, statute ought never
In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is construction remains.
exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a
trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the 4. YES. Although in theory, the authority of the local civil and
United States. judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is military occupation takes place, in practice, the invader does not
affirmed. usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but

continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the
country to which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented. If the ISSUES:
proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the 1. Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino
military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission and the citizens were suspended during the Japanese occupation.
so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason the same 2. Whether the petitioner can be prosecuted for the crime of
courts, which become reestablished and conceived of as having been treason by giving aid and support to the enemy during the
in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Japanese occupation.
Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the
proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of HELD:
enacting laws conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings. 1. NO. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
CONCEPT OF THE STATE enemy’s occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
PEOPLE V. GOZO sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier and if its
53 SCRA 476, OCTOBER 26, 1973 is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested
in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the
FERNANDO, J: titular government must be distinguished from the exercise of the
FACTS: rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the US transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olangapo City. She existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out
demolished the house and built another one in its place without securing a of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the
building permit from the City Mayor of Olangapo City. The City Court of so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the
Olangapo found her guilty of violating a municipal ordinance that requires exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
permit from the municipal mayor for construction of building as well as any government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
modification, repairs or demolition thereof. temporarily to the occupant; x x x and that as a corollary of the
On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Gozo put in issue the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists
validity of such ordinance by invoking due process. She likewise during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to
questioned the applicability of the ordinance to her in view of the location their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore
of her dwelling within the naval base leased to the American Armed there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
Forces; she contended that the municipal government cannot exercise
therein administrative jurisdiction.
2. YES. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was applicable
ISSUES: to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
1. Whether municipal ordinance is valid? government because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were
2. Whether the municipal corporation retains its administrative still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy’s
jurisdiction over the area where Gozo’s house was located? occupation.
Just as a citizen or subject of a government or
HELD: sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason
committed in a foreign country, in the same way a inhabitant of a
1. YES, the municipal ordinance is valid. The authority to territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit
treason against his own legitimate or sovereign if he adheres to the
require building permits is predicated upon the general welfare clause.
Its scope is wide, well-nigh all embracing, covering every aspect of enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort.
public health, public morals, public safety, and the well being and good
order of the community.
CONCEPT OF THE STATE
RUFFY VS. CHIEF OF STAFF
2. YES, the municipal corporation retains its administrative 75 PHIL 875, AUGUST 20, 1946
jurisdiction over the said area. By the agreement, the Philippine
Government merely consents that the United States exercise TUASON, J:
jurisdiction in certain cases. This consent was given purely as a matter FACTS:
of comity, courtesy or expediency. The Philippine Government has not During the Japanese occupation, herein petitioner, Ramon
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine Ruffy, a Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary, retreated
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses in the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy. He organized and
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States led a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat Team or Bolo Area. The said
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th Military District, which has been
such offenses. The Philippine jurisdiction retains not only jurisdictional recognized and placed under the operational control of the US Army in the
rights not granted, but also such ceded rights as the United States South Pacific.
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. Sometime later, Col. Jurado effected a change of command
Moreover, the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, in the Bolo Area. Major Ruffy who was then acting as Commanding Officer
is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive for the Bolo Area was relieved of his position. Later on or on October 19,
capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction. x x x A state is 1944, Lieut. Col Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners. It was this
not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the murder which gave rise to petitioner’s trial.
exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it The trial court convicted petitioner and he now filed this
does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed instant petition with the contention that he was not subject to military law
with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are at the time the offense for which he had been placed on trial was
still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be dimished, but it does committed. Petitioners contended that by the enemy occupation of the
not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American Philippines, the National Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating
armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. they and governing the existence of the Philippine Army including the Articles
are not and cannot be foreign territory. of War, were suspended and in abeyance during such belligerent
occupation. He also assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War
which provides that “any person subject to military law who commits
CONCEPT OF THE STATE murder in the time of war should suffer death or imprisonment for life, as
LAUREL V. MISA the court martial may direct.” Petitioner argued that the said law was in
77 PHIL 856, JANUARY 30, 1947 violation of Article VII, section 2 of the Constitution since 93d of Article of
War fails to allow a review by the Supreme Court of judgments of courts
PER CURIAM: martial imposing death or life imprisonment.
FACTS:
Sometime in May 1945, Anastacio Laurel, herein petitioner, ISSUES:
a Filipino citizen, was arrested by the US Army and was interned, under a 1. Whether petitioner was subject to military law at the time the
commitment order “for his active collaboration with the Japanese during alleged offense was committed.
the Japanese occupation”. He was charged with treason as defined and 2. Whether 93d of Articles of War was constitutional.
penalized by Art. 114 of the Penal Code. But in September 1945, he was
turned over to the Commonwealth government and since then he has HELD:
been under the custody of the Director of Prisons.
Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus mainly
1. YES, petitioner was subject to military law at the time the
asserting that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the alleged offense was committed. The rule that laws of political nature or
reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the affecting political relations are considered superseded or in abeyance
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil
citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine bind the enemies in arms.
Republic. By the occupation of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the
officers and men of the Philippine army did not cease to be fully in the

service, though, in a measure, only in measure, they were not subject The most significant recommendation of the Commission
to the military jurisdiction, if they were not in active duty. In the latter was for the deceased and other victims of Mendiola incident to be
case, like officers and soldiers on leave of absence or held as compensated by the government.
prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of breach of the Due to the recommendation, petitioners filed a formal letter
discipline of the command or of a neglect of duty x x x; but for an act of demand for compensation from the government to which the latter did
unbecoming of a gentleman or an act which constitutes an offense of not take heed. The group then instituted an action for damages against
the class specified in the 95th Article of War, they may in general be the Republic of the Philippines together with military officers and
legally held subject to military jurisdiction and trial. personnel involved in Mendiola incident.
Moreover, petitioners, by their acceptance of appointments as Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed the complaint as
officers in the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th against the Republic of the Philippines on the basis that there was no
Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army waver by the state. Hence, the petition for certiorari.
amenable to the Articles of War. x x x As officers in the Bolo Area and
the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under the orders of a ISSUE:
duly established and duly appointed commanders of the United States Whether the State by virtue of the administrative order waived its immunity
Army and thus covered by Article 2 of the Articles of War which from suit?
provides for persons subject to military law.
HELD:
NO. Firstly, recommendation made by the commission does
2. YES, 93d of the Articles of War was constitutional. It does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the state. In
not violate Article VII, section 2 of the Constitution which provides that effect, the same shall only serve as a cause of action on the event that
“the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its any party decides to litigate his or her claim. The commission is merely a
original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed preliminary venue.
is death or life imprisonment”. Court Martial are agencies of executive Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President
character, and one of the authorities “for ordering of courts martial has Aquino may have said or done, the same are not tantamount to the state
been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President having waived its immunity from suit.
as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation”. Unlike courts of The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply in
law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. this case, as when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative
x x x court martial are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive official action on the part of the state nor the affirmative discharge of any
power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander in obligation which belongs to the state in its political capacity, even though
Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants.
his authorized military representatives.
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

FESTEJO VS. FERNANDO
94 PHIL 504 (1954)
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE
FACTS:
IMMUNITY Plaintiff Carmen Festejo filed an action against defendant
Isaias Fernando, Director of Bureau of Public Works for unlawfully taking
possession of portions of her three parcels of land and causing the
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY construction of irrigation canal without obtaining right of way and without
SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO II her consent or knowledge.
162 SCRA 88 (1988) The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiff Festejo. On appeal,
defendant Fernando invoked his being a public officer of the government
FACTS: of the Philippines and thus, enjoys immunity from suit and should be
Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers absolved from liability for damages.
(deceased) were both employed as game room attendants in the special
services department of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA). They were ISSUE: May defendant invoke immunity from suit?
advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-
time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protect the conversion HELD:
and to institute grievance proceedings. The hearing officer recommended NO. Ordinarily, the officer or employee committing the tort is
the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus personally liable and may be sued as any other citizen and held
back wages. answerable for whatever injury.
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Commanding
Officer of Subic Naval Base, petitioner Sanders, Special Services Director
of NAVSTA, disagreed with the recommendation and asked for its THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
rejection. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
Moreau, even before the start of the grievance hearings, U.S.A VS. GUINTO
sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the (G.R. NO. 76607 FEBRUARY 26, 1990)
private respondent’s status and requested concurrence therewith.
Private respondents filed suit for damages claiming that the CRUZ, J.
letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule FACTS:
and had caused them mental anguish, and prejudgment of the grievance In the first case, the private respondents are suing several
proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. They officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with
make it clear that petitioners were being sued in their personal capacity. A the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed by the base.
petitioner and was denied. In the second case, private respondents filed a complaint for
damages against private petitioners for his dismissal as cook in the U.S.
ISSUE: Were the petitioners performing their official duties when they did Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station.
the acts for which they are being sued for damages? In the third case, private respondent, who was employed as
a barracks boy in a U.S. Base, was arrested following a buy-bust
HELD: operation conducted by the individual petitioners, officers of the U.S. Air
YES. It is clear in the present case that the acts for which Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators.
the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners
discharge of their official duties. Sanders as director of the special claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.
services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its In the fourth case, a complaint for damages was filed by the
personnel including the private respondents and had a hand in their private respondents against the private petitioners, for injuries allegedly
employment, work, assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants.
matters. The act of Moreau is deadly official in nature, performed by him According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them
as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their
Personnel in matters involving the special department of NAVSTA. bodies and caused extensive injuries to them.
These cases have been consolidated because they all
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was
REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the
220 SCRA 124 (1993) ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.
FACTS:
By reason of the Mendiola massacre, wherein 12 rallyists ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of State Immunity is not applicable
died in their quest for “genuine agrarian reform”, President Aquino issued thereby making the State liable
Administrative Order No.11 which created the Citizen’s Mendiola
Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation for the HELD:
disorders, death and casualties that took place.

NO. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not
liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the No, the Memorandum of Agreement did not constitute an implied consent
strength of the evidence, which have been carefully examined. by the State to be sued because it was intended to professionalize the
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being industry and to standardized the salaries of the security guards. It is
sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule merely incidental to the purpose of RA No. 5487 which is to regulate
is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and the organization and operation of private security agencies.
equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not The State is deemed to have given tacitly its consent to be
petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the sued when it enters into a contract. However, it does not apply where
activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish the contact relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
them - between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe. (G.R. NO. L-11154, MARCH 21, 1916)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of TRENT, J.
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. FACTS:
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of Merritt, while riding his motorcycle was hit by an ambulance
an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to owned by the Philippine General Hospital. A driver employed by the
be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply hospital drove it. In order for Merritt to sue the Philippine government, Act
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this No. 2457 was enacted by the Philippine Legislature authorizing Merritt to
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing
the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. A suit was
function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for then filed before the CFI of Manila, which fixed the responsibility for the
nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. collision solely on the ambulance driver and determined the amount of
There is no question that the United States of America, like damages to be awarded to Merritt. Both parties appealed from the
any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of damages and defendant in
it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity, as in the rendering the amount against the government.
cases at bar. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. A State may ISSUE: Whether or not defendant, Government of the Philippines, waived
be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be its immunity from suit as well as conceded its liability to the plaintiff when it
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters enacted Act No. 2457
into business contracts.
The private respondents invokes Article 2180 of the Civil HELD:
Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent. NO. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its
The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff,
officers are designated "special agents," the United States government or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any
should be liable for their torts. cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability pre-existing liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject
and liability and a misconception that the two terms are synonymous. to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the The Government of the Philippines Islands is only liable, for
applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special
suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can agents. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. special official. The special agent acts in representation of the state and
When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility
suability. The government may be held liable under this rule only if it first performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his
allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent. office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a
even if he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise
its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government and to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions
not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts. imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical
The complaints against the petitioners in the court below office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down
were aptly dismissed. by the law of civil responsibility. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent.

SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICE, INC. VS CA SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
(G.R. NO. 91359, SEPTEMBER 25, 1992) AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA
(G.R. NO. L-26400 FEBRUARY 29, 1972)
FACTS:
A suit was filed against the PC Chief for failure to act on the MAKALINTAL, J.
request by petitioner seeking to set aside the findings of PADPAO FACTS:
expelling it from PADPAO and considering its application for renewal of its Amigable is the registered owner of a lot covered by a
license even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO. A Motion Transfer Certificate of Title, where no annotation in favor of the
to Dismiss was filed invoking that it is a suit against the State which had government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of
not given its consent. the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango
ISSUES: and Gorordo Avenues.
Whether or not the action taken by the petitioners is a suit against It appears that said avenues already existed since 1921. In
the State. 1958, Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines,
Whether of not the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are liable in their requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated
private capacities. by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who
Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement constitute as an disallowed it. Amigable then filed in the court a quo a complaint against
implied consent of the State to be sued the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and
HELD: possession of the land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
Yes, it is a suit against the State, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA being She also sought the payment of compensatory damages for the illegal
instrumentalities of the State exercising the governmental function of occupation of her land, moral damages, attorney's fees and the costs of
regulating the organization and operation of private detective the suit. The Government had not given its consent to be sued.
watchmen or security guard agencies. Even if its action prospers, the
payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government
State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for the under the facts of the case
purpose.
HELD:
No, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called YES. Where the government takes away property from a
to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
duties, without malice, gross negligence or bad faith, no recovery may expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
be held against them in their private capacities. maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the

doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. The Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985, which dismissed the
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and
followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State.
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with then Court of First
compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by the Land
such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use land, consisting of four (4)
defined in the judgment." If there were an observance of procedural lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio
regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged
unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a
what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is not too Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale
much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase
which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was
judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon his purchase of the
a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various
could still be appropriately invoked. improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which
survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24,1954.
On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the
REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
204 SCRA 212 (1991) Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of
Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its
FACTS: successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing
The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private
private respondents Bienvenido Tantoco and Dominador Santiago, et al. property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded therefrom.
Private respondents jointly moved “to strike out some Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the
portions of the complaint and for bill of particulars of other portions”, which property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of
motion was opposed by the PCGG. The Sandiganbayan gave the PCGG ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest
45 days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations. be declared legally valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to
Private respondents then presented a “Motion to leave to file cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.
interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court”.
The Sandiganbayan denied private respondents’ motions. ISSUE:
Private respondents filed an Answer to with Compulsory Whether or not the State can be sued for recovery and
Counterclaim. In response, the PCGG presented a “Reply to possession of a parcel of land
Counterclaim with Motion to Dismiss compulsory counterclaim.” HELD:
Private respondents filed a pleading denominated A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not
“Interrogatories to Plaintiff”, and “Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff” as permitted, except upon a showing that the State hasconsented to be sued,
well as a motion for production and inspection of documents. either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language
The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua
and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents sponte at any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a
respectively. derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be
The PCGG moved for reconsideration, arguing that the construed instrictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation
documents are privileged in character since they are intended to be used is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate
against the PCGG and/or its Commission in violation of Sec.4 of EO No. from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an
1, V12: act of the legislative body. Also, it is noteworthy, that as pointed out by the
a) No civil action shall lie Solicitor General, that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of
against the the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a
Commission or any "reconstituted" possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the
member thereof for duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo
anything done or Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was
omitted in the authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be
discharge of the task validly made only in case of loss of the original. These circumstances
contemplated by this raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacion
Order. posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the
b) No member or staff by dubiousness of said document is the fact that "possessory information
the Commission shall calls for an area of only 100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by
be required to testify or respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to
produce evidence in 701-9064 hectares.
any judicial, legislative
or administrative
proceedings THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
concerning matter UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. RUIZ
within its official 136 SCRA 487 (1985)
cognizance.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated two Resolutions. The first, FACTS:
denying reconsideration of the Resolution allowing production of the Petitioner invited the submission of bids for repair of its
documents, and the second, reiterating, by implication the permission to wharves and shoreline in the Subic Bay Area. Eligion and Co. responded
serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff. to the invitation and submitted bids. Said company was requested by
telegram to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding
ISSUE: Is the PCGG immune from suit? company, and from which it complied.
Later, the United States, through its agents, informed said
HELD: company that it was not qualified to receive an award at the project for the
NO. The state is of course immune from suit in the sense poorly completed projects it awarded to third parties. The company sued
that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic petitioner for specific performance and if no longer possible, for damages.
that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds It also asked for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants
its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The from entering into contracts with others.
PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while The United States entered a special appearance for the
assuming of an act for the State. The suggestion that the State makes no purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
implied waiver of immunity by filing a suit except when in doing so it acts matter of the complaint and the persons of the defendants, the subject
in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-governmental capacity, matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual
is unacceptable. It attempts a distinction without support in principle or defendants as agents of the defendant United States of America, a foreign
precedent. On the contrary, “the consent of the State to be sued may be sovereign which has not given its consent to this suit or any other suit for
given expressly or impliedly.” Express consent may be manifested either the cause of action asserted in the complaint.
through a general law or a special law. Implied consent is given when the US filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the writ. The trial
State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a contract. court denied the motion and issued a writ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO FELICIANO ISSUE: Whether the US may be sued?
AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. NO. 70853; MARCH 12, 1987 HELD:
No. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State
FACTS: from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or

waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of On the other hand, this Court has considered the following
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure gestionis:
Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And (1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of three
because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at
distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to American servicemen
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA
result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark
restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA
States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to
Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a
[1984].) governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. In the absence of legislation defining what activities and
Stated differently, a state may be said to have descended to the level of transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as constituting acts
an individual and can be thus deemed to have tacitly given its consent to jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they
be sued only when the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign may be.
functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state
which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be
undisputed a function of the government of the highest order, they are not the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. The engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or
conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a
shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States of America especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession
of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had expired, As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):
They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been
vacated. "There is no question that the United States of America, like
any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only
THE HOLY SEE VS. DEL ROSARIO JR when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no
238 SCRA 524 (1994) such waiver may be implied."
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands
FACTS: in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction
Lot 5-A is registered under the name of the petitioner The can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has
Holy See. This lot is contiguous to lots 5-B and 5-D registered in the denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made
name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). These three lots were sold for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission
through an agent Msgr. Domingo Cirilos Jr. to Ramon Licup. Licup or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to
assigned his rights to private respondent Starbright Sales Ent. Inc. (SSEI). dispute said claim.
Due to refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots, a dispute Under Art.31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on
arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of eviction and Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil
clearing the land. SSEI insists that petitioner should clear the property of and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
the squatters. Petitioner refused and proposed that either SSEI undertake relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
the eviction or that the earnest money be returned. Msgr. Cirilos returned receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for
the P100,000.00 earnest money, and the property was sold to Tropicana the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic
Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). envoy with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards
SSEI filed suit for annulment of sale, specific performance the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.
and damages against Msgr. Cirilos, PRC, and Tropicana. Moreover the Department of the Foreign Affairs has formally
The petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss for lack of intervened and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. It was denied on the duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines
ground that petitioner “shed off its sovereign immunity by entering into the and as such is exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights,
business contract” in question. privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this court.
A motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this The determination of the executive arm of the government
special civil action for certiorari. that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic
immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts. Where
ISSUE: Did the Holy See properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non- the plea of immunity is reacquired and affirmed by the executive branch, it
suability? is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the
executive arm of the government in conducting the country’s foreign
HELD: relations.
YES. In the case at bar, lot 5-A was acquired as a donation
from the archdiocese of Manila for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nuniciature in the Philippines. The subsequent disposal was made THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
because the squatters living thereon made it impossible for petitioner to REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR
use it for the purpose of the donation. Petitioner did not sell lot 5-A for 54 SCRA 84 (1973)
profit or gain.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, FACTS:
each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or A decision was rendered in a Special Proceeding against the
absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a Republic of the Philippines thereby confirming the arbitration award of
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or P1,712,396.40 in favor of respondent corporation. After the decision
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with became final and executory, respondent judge issued an order directing
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to the sheriff to execute the said decision, and the corresponding alias writ of
private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 execution was thus issued.
SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Hence the sheriff served notices of garnishment with several
Law 194 [1984]). banks especially the monies due to the AFP in the form of deposits
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the writ. PNB and Philippine
the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has Veterans Bank received such notice. As certified by the AFP Comptroller,
created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries these funds of the AFP with the said banks are public funds for the
which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing whether pensions, pay, and allowances of its military and civilian personnel.
a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceedings,
or an act jure imperii. challenges the validity of the Order issued by Judge Villasor declaring the
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of decision final and executory and subsequently issuing an alias writ of
sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely connected with execution directed against the funds of the AFP in pursuance thereof.
the discharge of governmental functions. This is particularly true with
respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized ISSUE:
business activities and international trading. May the writs of execution and notices of garnishment be sued against
This Court has considered the following transactions by a public funds?
foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a
foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers HELD:
(Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for NO. Although the State may give its consent to be sued by
the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States of private parties, there is corollary that public funds cannot be the object of
America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment status of base garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued has been
employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]). previously granted and the state’s liability has been adjudged.

Thus in the case of Commission of Public Highways vs. San to garnishment. Such is not the case here. Garnishment would lie. The
Diego, such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Supreme Court, in a case brought by the same petitioner precisely
Teehankee. The universal rule that where the state gives its consent to invoking such doctrine, left no doubt that the funds of a public corporation
be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment.
claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the It is well settled that when the government enters into
stage of execution and that the power of the courts ends when the commercial business, its abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be
judgment is rendered, since the government funds and properties may not treated like any other corporation. (Manila Hotel Employees Association
be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such vs. Manila Hotel Company)
judgment, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific object is
appropriated by law.

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS. NLRC 110 SCRA 460 (1981)
227 SCRA 693 (1993)
FACTS:
FACTS: During the height of the infamous typhoon Kading, the NPC,
The DAR and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract acting through its plant superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, opened or
for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental caused to be opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat
entity. Several guards of the agency assigned to the petitioner’s premises Dam. The many unfortunate victims of the man-caused flood filed with the
filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13 th month respondent court eleven complaints for damages against the NPC and
pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and Benjamin Chavez. NPC filed separate answers to each of the eleven
overtime pay as well as for damages, before the Regional Arbitration, complaints and invoked in each answer a special and affirmative defense
against the petitioner and the agency. The Executive Labor arbiter that in the operation of the Angat Dam, it is performing a purely
rendered a decision finding the petitioner and the agency jointly and governmental function. Hence, it cannot be sued without the express
severally liable for the payment of the money claims. The decision consent of the State. The respondent court dismissed the case on the
became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter then issued a writ of grounds that said defendant performs a purely governmental function in
execution which resulted in the property of the petitioner being levied. The the operation of the Angat Dam and cannot therefore be sued for
petitioner asserts the rule of non-suability of the State. damages in the instant cases in connection therewith.
ISSUE: ISSUE: Was the NPC performing a governmental function with respect to
Can the Department of Agriculture be sued under the contract entered the management and operation of the Angat Dam?
with the agency?
HELD:
HELD: YES. However, it is not necessary to determine whether
YES. The basic postulate under Art. X section 3 of the NPC performs a governmental function with respect to the management
Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its consent” is not and operation of the Angat Dam. It is sufficient to say that the government
absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed itself
circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. As a government owned
conveys “that the State may not be sued without its consent.” Its import and controlled corporation, it has personality of its own, distinct and
then is that the State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be separate from that of the government. Moreover, the charter provision that
given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made the NPC can sue and be sued in any court is without qualification on the
through a general law waiving the immunity of the State from suit which is cause of action as the one instituted by the petitioners.
found in Act 3083, where the Philippine government “consents and
submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could serve as basis of civil action THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
between private parties.” Implied consent on the other hand, is conceded BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES
when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to ASSOCIATION
counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. 1 SCRA 340 (1961)
In this situation, the government is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested FACTS:
itself of its sovereign immunity. The rule relied upon by the NLRC is not, Bureau of Printing Employees Association filed a case
however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the against herein petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, and
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability. Distinction must still Mariano Ledesma. The complaint alleged that Salvador and Ledesma
be made between one which was executed in the exercise of its sovereign have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or
function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. In the coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly the
instant case, the petitioner has not pretended to have assumed a capacity members of the complaining association, in the exercise of their right to
apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the self-organization, and by discriminating in regard to hiring and tenure of
questioned contract, not that it could have in fact performed any act their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing their union
proprietary in character, but be that as it may, the claims of private activities. Answering the complaint, Salvador and Ledesma denied the
respondents arising from the contract for security services clearly charges, and contended that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical
constitute money claims for which Act 3083 gives the consent of the state personality to sue and be sued.
to be sued.
However, when the State gives its consent to be sued, it ISSUE: Can the Bureau of Printing be sued?
does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestricted execution against
it. When the State waives immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the HELD:
other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has any liability. NO. As a government office, without any juridical capacity, it
cannot be sued.
The Bureau of Printing is an instrumentality of the
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY government; it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
PNB VS. PABALAN Secretary. It is designed to meet the printing needs of the government. It
83 SCRA 595 (1978) is primarily a service bureau. It is obviously not engaged in business or
occupation for pecuniary profit. It has no corporate existence. Its
FACTS: appropriations are provided for in the budget. It is not subject to the
A judgment was rendered against Philippine Virginia jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.
Tobacco Administration (PVTA). Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of Any suit, action or proceeding against the Bureau of Printing
execution followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the government
respondent PVTA which were deposited with the Philippine National Bank itself. The government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over
(PNB). PNB objected on the constitutional law doctrine of non-suability of its objection.
a state. It alleged that such funds are public in character.
ISSUE: Was the contention of PNB correct? THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
MOBIL PHILS. EXPLORATION, INC. VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE
HELD: SERVICE
NO. It is to be admitted that under the present Constitution, 18 SCRA 1120 (1966)
what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law
has been set forth in express terms: “The State may not be sued without FACTS:
its consent.” If the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad
offices in the government, then, certainly such a provision would lie a bar consigned to Mobil Philippines. The Customs Arrastre later delivered to

the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil On October 10, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision for
Philippines Exploration Inc. the plaintiffs, and defendants Municipality of san Fernando, La Union and
filed suit in the CFI against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs. The
of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered cases plus other complaint against the driver and the owner of the passenger jeep was
damages. dismissed.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new
the ground that not being a person under the law, defendants cannot be trial. However, respondent judge issued another order denying the motion
sued. for reconsideration of the order for having been filed out of time. Hence,
After the plaintiff opposed the motion, the court dismissed this petition.
the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor
the Bureau of Customs is suable. ISSUE: Whether the municipality is liable for the tort committed by its
employee?
ISSUE: Can the Customs Arrastre Service or the Bureau of Customs be
sued? HELD:
NO. The test of liability of the municipality depends on
HELD: whether or not the driver acting in behalf of the municipality is performing
NO. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery governmental or proprietary functions. It has already been remarked that
of the national government in the operations of arrastre service, pursuant municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
to express legislative mandate and a necessary incident of its prime competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not
governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
contrary. functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they
The Bureau of Customs has no personality of its own apart were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be
from that of the government. Its primary function is governmental, that of sued, the state merely gives the claimants the right to show the defendant
assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was inflicted or
other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines, and penalties. To this that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this,
function, arrastre is a necessary incident. Although said arrastre function the claimants cannot recover.
is deemed proprietary, it is necessarily an incident of the primary and In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the municipality insists that he was on his way to Naguilan River to get a load
same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For of sand and gravel for the repair of the San Fernando municipal street.
otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity
necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity granted as to the of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the
end should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end. dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
After careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence,
we arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION VS COURT OF APPEALS discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger,
167 SCRA 28 (1988) tragic and deplorable though, it may be imposed on the municipality no
duty to pay the monetary compensation.
FACTS:
Ernest Simke went to Manila International Airport to meet his
future son-in-law. While walking towards the viewing deck or the terrace THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he slipped over an MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN VS. FERNANDEZ
elevation about four inches high, and he fell on his back and broke his 130 SCRA 56 (1984)
thigh bone.
He filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict with FACTS:
the CFI of Rizal against the Civil Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the In Civil Case No. 604-B, the then CFI of Bulacan rendered
entity empowered to administer, operate, manage, control, maintain, and judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to respondents
develop the MIA. Judgment was rendered in his favor, and on appeal to Imperio, et al. When the judgment became final, respondent judge issued
the Court of Appeals, judgment was affirmed. a writ of execution to satisfy the same. Petitioner municipality filed a
motion to quash the writ on the ground that the municipality’s property or
funds are public exempt from execution. The motion was denied. The
ISSUE: Whether the CAA, being an agency of the government, can be respondent judge issued another order requiring both the municipal and
made a party defendant? provincial treasurer to comply with the money judgment. When the
treasurers failed to do so, respondent judge issued an order for their arrest
HELD: and that they will be released upon compliance, hence the present
YES. Not all government entities whether corporate or not petition.
are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the
character of the objects for which the entity was organized. The CAA is ISSUE: Whether the funds of the municipality in the hands of the
not immune from suit it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private Provincial and Municipal Treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel,
entity. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive respectively are public funds which are exempt from execution?
prerogative of the state, may more than the construction of public roads,
be undertaken by private concerns. The CAA was created not to maintain HELD:
a necessity of the government, but to run what is essentially a business YES. Municipal funds in possession of municipal and
even if the revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of provincial treasurers are public funds exempt from execution. The reason
travel and the convenience of the traveling public. for those was explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois
‘that are held in trust for the people intended and used for the accomplices
of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created and that to
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially
MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION VS. JUDGE FIRME impede, even defeat and in some instance destroy said purpose.” Thus it
195 SCRA 692 (1991) is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel as well as those in the possession of
FACTS: the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan are also public funds and as such they
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, is a are exempt from execution.
municipality corporation. Respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme is Besides PD 447, known as the Decree on Local Fiscal
impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge, while private Administration, provides in section 3 (a) that “no money shall be paid out
respondents are heirs of the deceased Laureano Banina, Sr. of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other
On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a specific statutory authority.” Otherwise stated, there must be a
passenger jeep, a gravel and sand truck, and a dump truck of the corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union which was driven by Alfredo the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid
Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeep including out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang
Banina, Sr. died. Bayan has passed any ordinance to this effect.
The heir of Banina, Sr. instituted a complaint for damages
against the owner and driver of the passenger jeep. However, the
aforesaid defendant filed a third party complaint against the petitioner and THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
the driver of the dump truck of the petitioner. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Thereafter, the private respondents amended the complaint 190 SCRA 206 (1990)
wherein the petitioner and its regular employee Alfredo Bislig were FACTS:
impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and An expropriation proceeding was initiated by petitioner
raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability Municipality of Makati against private respondent Admiral Finance
of the state, prescription of cause of action, and the negligence of the Creditors Consortium Inc., Home Building System and Reality Corp., and
owner and driver of the passenger jeep as the proximate cause of the Arceli P. Jo involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located
collision. at San Antonio Village, Makati.

An action for eminent domain was filed. Attached to the Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may
petitioner’s complaint was a certification that a bank account had been be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago’s claim.
opened with the PNB. After the decision has become final and executory,
a writ of execution was issued and a notice of garnishment was served HELD:
upon the manager of PNB where the petitioner had bank accounts. Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means
However, the sheriff was informed that a hold code was placed on the of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant
account of the petitioner. in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or
The petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB cocked garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all
neither be garnished nor levied upon execution for to do so would result in government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of
the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities,
under the law. whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may
In a petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioner alleges for not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding
the first time that it has actually two accounts with the PNB, one appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a
exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property with the state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment
outstanding balance of P99, 743. 94. The other account was for the is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially
obligations and other purposes of the municipal government with a ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the
balance of P170,098,421.72. judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the
state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy
ISSUE: Whether the bank account of a municipality may be levied on judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature
execution to satisfy a money judgment against it absent showing that the will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the
municipal council has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-
funds an amount corresponding to the balance due to the RTC decision? defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as
required by law. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally
HELD: enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan
YES. Since the first PNB account was specifically opened already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992,
for expropriation proceedings it has initiated over the subject property, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for Santiago’s back-wages plus
there is no objection to the garnishment or levy under execution of funds interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgment
therein amounting to P4,965,506.40, the funds garnished in excess of of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.
P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for the municipal
government. Other statutory obligations are exempted from execution
without the proper appropriation required under the law. ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL
The funds deposited in the 2nd PNB account are public funds
of the municipal government. The rule is well-settled that public funds are PRINCIPLES AND STATE
not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided by the
statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or POLICIES
personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold
on execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing VILLAVICENCIO VS. LUKBAN
governmental activities and functions of the municipality are exempt from (39 PHIL 778)
execution. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar.
This is not to say that private respondents are left with no FACTS:
legal recourse. When a municipality fails or refuses without justifiable Respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, for
reason to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the best of all reasons, to exterminate vise, ordered the segregated district
the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in
enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the the City of Manila, closed. The women were kept confined to their houses
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds. The court will not in the district by the police. At about midnight of October 25, the police,
condone petitioner’s blatant refusal to settle its obligation arising from an acting pursuant to the orders from the chief of the police and Justo
expropriation proceeding it has in fact initiated. Within the context of the Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into
state’s inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers “Corregidor” and
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the “Negros”. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in
land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its Mindanao. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for
taking. The state’s power of eminent domain should be exercised within Davao during the night of October 25, 1918.
the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that
valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid is fixed, ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the Mayor of the City of Manila is
and the municipal has had more than reasonable time to pay full constitutional.
compensation.
HELD:
CITY OF CALOOCAN VS. ALLARDE The Supreme Court condemned the mayor’s act.
G.R. NO. 107271; SEPTEMBER 10, 2003 Respondent’s intention to suppress the social evil was commutable. But
his methods were unlawfull.
FACTS: Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippines in
In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the conformity with an act of Congress. The Governor-General can order the
position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. One can
Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the
abolition. The CFI in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the right of the Mayor of the City of Manila or the Chief of Police of that City to
reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their force citizens of the Philippine Islands, and these women despite their
back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the being in a sense, lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but
decision but such was dismissed. In 1986 the City paid Santiago Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guarantees as
P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-wages. The others were paid other citizens.
in full. In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries Law defines power. The law is the only supreme power in
(supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to
back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which gives itself and
auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.
The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the The fundamental rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of
validity of the sale of motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those
exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the
sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On October victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of
5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous
included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, language of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of the
plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to commonwealth may be “government of laws and not of men”.
release the check but the City Treasurer can’t do so because the Mayor
refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the
Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of
Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to KURODA VS. JALANDONI
PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for 83 PHIL. 171
any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the
city. FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the
Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese
ISSUE: Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944,

who is now charged before a Military Commission with having unlawfully belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our
disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such commander to assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state
control the operations of members of his command, permitting them to entitles us to enforce the right, on our own, of trying and punishing those
commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant who committed crimes against our people.
civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the
laws and customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish
the illegality of EO No. 68, which established a National War Crimes ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Offices and provides that persons accused as war criminals shall be tried AGUSTIN VS. EDU
by military commission; and to permanently prohibit respondents from 88 SCRA 195
proceeding with the case of petitioner.
Kuroda argues that EO No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it FACTS:
violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also our local A presidential letter of instruction (LOI) prescribing the use of
laws, to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor triangular reflectorized early warning devices to prevent vehicular
an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering accidents was assailed for the lack of a legislative enactment that would
Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is charged of `crimes' not based authorize the issuance of said LOI. The petition quoted two whereas
on law, national and international. Hence, petitioner argues — "That in clauses of the assailed LOI: [Whereas], the hazards posed by such
view of the fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies
unconstitutional law and an illegal order, this commission is without concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
jurisdiction to try herein petitioner." and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the
said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippines can adopt the rules and regulations under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for
laid down on The Hague and Geneva Conventions notwithstanding that it the installation of road safety signs and devices.
is not a signatory thereto and whether it can create a Military Commission
to try violations of the Hague Convention? ISSUE: Whether or not a legislative enactment is necessary in order to
authorize the issuance of said LOI based on the 1968 Vienna Convention
HELD: on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.).
Yes. Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office
and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war HELD:
criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th day Not anymore. The petition must be dismissed for lack of merit. It cannot be
of July, 1947. This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. disputed that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, * * *." The
"The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to
law of the nation." which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands
in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle
In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of of international morality.
the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention
and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by
the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who have been ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, 101 PHIL. 1155
in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization,
are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and FACTS:
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade
has acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies Nationalization Law, on the premise that it violated several treaties which
of international law which are part of our Constitution. under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted principle of
international law, should be observed by the Court in good faith.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President
of his powers as Commander in Chief of all our armed forces, as upheld ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is
by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 654) unconstitutional for it is in conflict with treaties which are generally
1 when we said accepted principles of international law.
"War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation HELD:
of armed hostilities, incidents of war may remain pending which should be The Supreme Court said it saw no conflict. The reason
disposed of as in time of war. Àn important incident to a conduct of war is given by the Court was that the Retail Trade National Law was passed in
the adoption of measures by the military command not only to repel and the exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through
defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures the medium of a treaty or a contract.
those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort The law in question was enacted to remedy a real actual
have violated the law of war.' (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and
2.) Indeed, the power to create a military commission for the trial and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such
punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And, in the dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of
language of a writer, a military commission `has jurisdiction so long as a the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice, personality and insures its security and future.
or military occupation, up to the effective date of a treaty of peace, and Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the
may extend beyond, by treaty agreement.' (Cowls, Trial of War Criminals disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
by Military Tribunals, American Bar Association Journal, June, 1944.)" national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control;
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
to consummate this unfinished aspect of war, namely, the trial and state, through which and by which it protects its own personality and
punishment of war criminals, through the issuance and enforcement of insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
Executive Order No. 68. protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of occupation
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction regulated, nor the due process of the law clause; because the law is
to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the
the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to
rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of be plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international actually necessary - and that in any case such matter falls within the
law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two prerogative of the legislature, with whose power and discretion the judicial
belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the
the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and
the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to has not misled the legislature of the segment of the population affected;
the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
the recognition of rules and principles of international law as subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
contained in treaties to which our government may have been or treaty or any other conventional agreement.
shall be a signatory.
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA
committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States, 9 SCRA 230
and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with
Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties between the FACTS:

Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation HELD:
of tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Petitioner No. It is clear, under Article 1 of the Treaty, that the
Gonzales - a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn privileges provided therein are made expressly subject to the laws and,
Planters Association filed this petition, averring that, in making or regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to
attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection
respondents "are, acting without jurisdiction or in excess of with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require
jurisdiction", because RA No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippines he
RA No. 2207 - explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by must first successfully pass the required bar examinations.
"the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government Moreover, the Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens
agency.” desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain
Respondent contended among others that the Government desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a
of the Philippines has already entered into two contracts for the purchase Filipino Citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines.
of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the
agreements under international law; that such agreements became Philippines.
binding and effective upon signing thereof by representatives of the The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the
parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Act Nos. 2207 Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been
and 3452 on the one hand, and the aforementioned contracts, on the intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the
other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive
inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved - under the Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of
American jurisprudence - in favor of the one which is latest in point of time. the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents, in attempting to import foreign such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
rice, are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.
HELD: ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Yes. The respondents acted without jurisdiction or in excess PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN AND ZOSA
of jurisdiction. It is respondents contend that the Government of the 66 PHIL 13, 1938
Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the purchase of
rice, one with the Republic of Viet Nam, and another with the Government FACTS:
of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with
under international law; that such agreements became binding and and convicted of refusal to register for military training as required by the
effective upon signing thereof by representatives of the parties thereto; above-mentioned statute. On appeal, Zosa argued that he was fatherless
that in case of conflict between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the and had a mother and eight brothers to support, while Lagman alleged
one hand, and the aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter that he had a father to support, had no military leanings, and did not wish
should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with to kill or be killed; and both claimed that the statute was unconstitutional.
each other, the conflict must be resolved — under the American
jurisprudence — in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that ISSUE: Whether or not the the National Defense Law is valid, under which
petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the executive relative to the accused were sentenced.
foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot
interfere; and that the aforementioned contracts have already been HELD:
consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already paid the Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed their conviction, holding
price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in that the law in question was based on the afore-cited constitutional
favor of the sellers of said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense. principle.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said contracts as The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established. The compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty
executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except
properly be considered as executive agreements, the same are through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should
said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the The right of the Government to require compulsory military
American constitutional system, enter into executive agreements service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal
without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes
enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement 64 PHIL 201
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. FACTS:
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of
between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a
prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing
but, also, insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is International Eucharistic Congress.
signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies
branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given as of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps
regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty- third
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic
system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our Church. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent
constitutional set up and that of the United States. publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage for printing
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES ISSUE: Is there a violation of principle of separation of church and state?
IN RE: GARCIA
2 SCRA 984, 1961 HELD:
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of
FACTS: Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act.
Under the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.
Professions between the Philippines and Spain, nationals of each of the Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view.
two countries who have obtained the required degrees can practice their What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine
professions within the territory of the other. Efren Garcia, a Filipino, when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to
finished law in the University of Madrid, Spain and was allowed to practice the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the
the law profession therein. He invokes the treaty in order for him to be Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does
allowed to practice in the Philippines without taking the bar examinations. not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or
property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the
ISSUE: present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by
Whether or not the Treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Philippine Bar. Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not

issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by
church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the
of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn
the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940,
concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second
importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people". It is indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the
significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed, recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be
instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during
contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the
and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced
Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such
that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick
in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of
religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the their owners but of the riding public as well.
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations
We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with
character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the
frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
There is no violation of the principle of separation of church state.
and state. The issuance and sale of the stamps in question maybe said to
be separably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Catholic Church, was not the aim and ISSUE: Whether the rules & regulations promulgated pursuant to the
purpose of the government (to promote tourism). provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 considered as constitutional?
HELD: Yes. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
TARUC VS. DE LA CRUZ complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and
G.R. NO. 144801; MARCH 10, 2005 avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of
CORONA, J.: the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
FACTS: inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of
Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Due to petitioners’ adamant drive to the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
create dissension within the diocese by celebrating their own open mass welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
without participation from the parish priest, Bishop de la Cruz declared business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
Church. The good Bishop did so as a last resort, as he first pleaded to the health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218).
petitioners’ to cease from riling up the community against the diocese. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall
Cruz before the Regional Trial Court. They contended that their expulsion into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should
process of law. achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
ISSUE: The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the
involving the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty
institution? is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
HELD: Petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations
The Court rules that they do not have such jurisdiction. The complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be
and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.
courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,
their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
“Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people,
Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
possession of church property.” the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
Obviously, there was no violation of a civil rights in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
present case. through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex.
ALMEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS 78 SCRA 194, 1977
70 Phil. 726, 1940
FACTS:
FACTS: Respondent Gonzales is a share tenant of Angeles et al., on
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, land devoted to sugar cane and coconuts. The landowners sold the
1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the property to petitioners Almeda without notifying respondent in writing of
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn the sale. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds. Respondent
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from thus sued for redemption before the CAR.
Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 Petitioners counter that long before the execution of the
p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles and his nephew Cesar Angeles first offered
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 the sale of the land to respondent but the latter said that he had no
a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of money; that respondent, instead, went personally to the house of
the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic petitioners and implored them to buy the land for fear that if someone else
Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public would buy the land, he may not be taken in as tenant; that respondent is a
Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution mere dummy of someone deeply interested in buying the land; that
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. respondent made to tender of payment or any valid consignation in court
548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of at the time he filed the complaint for redemption.
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules The Agrarian Court rendered judgment authorizing
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national respondent to redeem the land for P24,000.00, the said amount to be
roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first

deposited by him with the Clerk of Court within 15 days from receipt of the evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of
decision. compensability under the Act once it is shown that the death or disability
On appeal, the CA affirmed the assailed decision. Their arose in the course of employment, with the burden of overthrowing it
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim.
review. This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award,
merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this
ISSUE: Is there a tenant's right of redemption in sugar and coconut lands? Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. What was said in
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission is not
amiss: "There is need, it seems, even at this late date, for [private
HELD: respondent] and other employers to be reminded of the high estate
Yes. Among those exempted from the automatic conversion accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme
to agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of the Agricultural Land of social justice and protection to labor." No other judicial attitude may be
Reform Code in 1963 or even after its amendments (Code of Agrarian expected in the face of a clearly expressed legislative determination which
Reforms) are sugar lands. Section 4 thereof states: "Agricultural share antedated the constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and
tenancy throughout the country, as herein defined, is hereby declared protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on
contrary to public policy and shall be automatically converted to resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would result in
agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of this section. . . . Provided, frustrating such a national policy." To be more specific, the principle of
That in order not to jeopardize international commitments, lands devoted social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. As between a
to crops covered by marketing allotments shall be made the subject of a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has
separate proclamation by the President upon recommendation of the resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand
department head that adequate provisions, such as the organization of from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is
cooperatives marketing agreement, or similar other workable not equality but protection.”
arrangements, have been made to insure efficient management on all
matters requiring synchronization of the agricultural with the processing
phases of such crops . . ."
Sugar is, of course, one crop covered by marketing ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
allotments. In other words, this section recognizes share tenancy in sugar SALONGA VS. FARRALES
lands until after a special proclamation is made, which proclamation shall 105 SCRA 359, 1981
have the same effect of an executive proclamation of the operation of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in any region or locality; the share tenants FACTS:
in the lands affected will become agricultural lessees at the beginning of Defendant Farrales is the titled owner of a parcel of
the agricultural year next succeeding the year in which the proclamation is residential land. Even prior to the acquisition by defendant Farrales of the
made. But, there is nothing readable or even discernible in the law land aforesaid, plaintiff Salonga was already in possession as lessee of
denying to tenants in sugar lands the right of pre-emption and redemption some 156 square meters thereof, on which she had erected a house,
under the Code. paying rentals thereon first to the original owners and later to defendant
The exemption is purely limited to the tenancy system; it Farrales.
does not exclude the other rights conferred by the Code, such as the right Farrales filed an ejectment case for non-payment of rentals
of pre-emption and redemption. In the same manner, coconut lands are against plaintiff. Judgment was later rendered in favor of defendant
exempted from the Code only with respect to the consideration and Farrales and ordering the therein defendants, including plaintiff herein and
tenancy system prevailing, implying that in other matters the right of pre- her husband, to vacate the portion occupied by them and to pay rentals in
emption and redemption which does not refer to the consideration of the arrears.
tenancy the provisions of the Code apply. Thus, Section 35 states: Evidence showed that plaintiff offered to purchase from said
"Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Sections, in the case of defendant the land in dispute, but, defendant, despite the fact that said
fishponds, saltbeds and lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts, plaintiff's order to purchase was just, fair and reasonable persistently
cacao, coffee, durian, and other similar permanent trees at the time of the refused such offer, and instead, insisted to execute the judgment rendered
approval of this Code, the consideration, as well as the tenancy system in the ejectment case.
prevailing, shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Plaintiff then filed a complaint against defendant Farrales
Eleven Hundred and Ninety-Nine, as amended." praying the latter be ordered to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land in
It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, question.
property ownership is impressed with social function. Property use
must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. ISSUE: Is the plaintiff entitled for specific performance?
The State, in the promotion of social justice, may "regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private HELD:
property, and equitably diffuse property . . . ownership and profits." No. If plaintiff's offer to purchase was, as aforesaid
One governmental policy of recent date projects the emancipation of persistently refused by defendant, it is obvious that no meeting of the
tenants from the bondage of the soil and the transfer to them of the minds took place and, accordingly, no contract, either to sell or of sale,
ownership of the land they till. This is Presidential Decree No. 27 of was ever perfected between them.
October 21, 1972, ordaining that all tenant farmers "of private agricultural Since contracts are enforceable only from the moment of
lands devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease- perfection, and there is here no perfected contract at all, it goes without
tenancy, whether classified as landed estates or not" shall be deemed saying that plaintiff has absolutely nothing to enforce against defendant
"owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not Farrales, and the fact that defendant Farrales previously sold portions of
irrigated and there (3) hectares if irrigated." the land to other lessees similarly situated as plaintiff herein, does not
change the situation because, as to said other lessees, a perfected
contract existed which is not the case with plaintiff.
It must be remembered that social justice cannot be
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under our
ONDOY VS. IGNACIO Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice
97 SCRA 611, 1980 consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away rights from
a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. Evidently,
FACTS: the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and
Petitioner Estrella Ondoy filed a claim for compensation for contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of the Court to grant.
the death of her son, Jose Ondoy, who drowned while in the employ of
respondent Virgilio Ignacio. Respondent moved to dismiss on the ground
of lack of employer-employee relationship. However, during the hearing of ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
the case, respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS. MANALO
and oiler of the fishing vessel that the deceased, a fisherman, was in that G.R. No. L-47841, October 7, 2008
ship, undeniably a member of the working force, but after being invited by
friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. FACTS:
The referee summarily ignored the affidavit of the chief-mate of The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security
respondent employer to the effect "that sometime in October, 1968, while in the first petition for a writ of amparo filed before this Court.
Jose Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the actual performance of his work with This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction,
said fishing enterprises, he was drowned and died on October 22, 1968. and Temporary Restraining Order to stop herein petitioners and/or their
That the deceased died in line of Duty." The hearing officer or referee officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
dismissed the claim for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration was basic rights and enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein
duly filed, but the then Secretary of Labor, denied such motion for petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them
reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence this petition for review. of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for compensation was validly dismissed. While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein
HELD: petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing
There is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that Petition as Amparo Petition.
the deceased was drowned while "in the actual performance of his work" On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August
with the shipping enterprise of private respondent. Even without such 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a person “emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his
decision in favor of herein respondents. Hence, this appeal. life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right
This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded
REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective not only by a deprivation of life but also of
homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the
2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.”
After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in
the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various
dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy permutations of the exercise of this right.
Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU). First, the right to security of person is “freedom from fear.” In its “whereas”
The abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates
sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and
personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men aspiration of the common people.” emphasis supplied) Some scholars
based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU postulate that “freedom from fear” is not only an aspirational principle, but
auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la essentially an individual international human right.[124] It is the “right to
Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of security of person” as the word “security” itself means “freedom from fear.”
Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the
abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.[126]
Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and emphasis supplied)
George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the
petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the
the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was for the right to security of person, viz:
the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of
the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners. subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as
abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the are established by law. emphasis supplied)
Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided
version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the
participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, “freedom from fear” is the
should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
he perfunctorily investigate. wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
Gen. Palparan’s participation in the abduction was also action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless
established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners’ captivity at to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary
the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus.
he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the “right to
them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. security” is actually the “freedom from threat.” Viewed in this light, the
Gen. Palparan’s direct and personal role in the abduction might not have “threatened with violation” Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the
been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the
during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his earlier part of the provision.
command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably
encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
process of law and without probable cause. psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be
of the writ of amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in
of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute
they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As
they assert that they are not “free in every sense of the word” as the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates.
their “movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against
have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held person.
accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily
threaten respondents’ rights to life, liberty and security.” integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim
Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an
abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the
violation of their right to security of person. human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of
Elaborating on the “right to security, in general,” respondents the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and
point out that this right is “often associated with liberty;” it is also seen as psychological invasion, viz:
an “expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel
and unusual punishment.” Conceding that there is no right to security (2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means
expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under
their rights “to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places,
detention and solitary detention places fall under the general coverage of solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo.” They submit that
the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate
person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity -
which enunciates that, “The State values the dignity of every human nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” “freedom from threat” as afore-discussed.
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action
consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of
right to security. persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of
enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation
ISSUE: Whether the Petition for issuance of Writ Amparo should be should all the more be protected from these degradations.
granted?
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right
HELD: Yes. While the right to life under Article III, Section 1[120] against torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights
guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.[130] In this case, the
all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had
guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: “The life to which each physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of
person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived provides, viz: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ...” (emphases supplied)
life and property… pervades the whole history of man. It touches every Article 3, on the other hand, provides that “(n)o one shall be subjected to
aspect of man’s existence.” In a broad sense, the right to security of torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Although

the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right
baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
viz: obligations.
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic
authorities at the time when they could reasonably have been expected to ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the VIRTUOSO VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE
circumstances in question. 82 SCRA 191, 1978
xxx xxx xxx
FACTS:
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr. filed an application for the
the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the preliminary examination
into his allegations.[131] (emphasis supplied) which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless
formality as respondent Municipal Judge failed to meet the strict standard
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable
has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of cause. He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that
women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz: tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail
imposed was clearly excessive. It was in the amount of P16,000.00, the
…gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner
women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general It was later ascertained that the petitioner is a seventeen
international law or under specific human rights conventions is year old minor entitled to the protection and benefits of the child and Youth
discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Welfare Code.
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights
and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of person. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s application for release should be
granted.
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s
rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is HELD:
built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Yes. As a minor, he could be provisionally released on
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as recognizance in the discretion of a court. This Court should, whenever
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code,
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate.
sense is a corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees full "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
respect for human rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being."
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under
threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
justice. 224 SCRA 792, 1993
FACTS:
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES The petitioner, all minors and alleges that the plaintiffs "are
MEYER VS. NEBRASKA all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the
262 US 390 [1922] full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical rainforests, duly joined and represented by their
FACTS: parents instituted a complained as a taxpayers’ class suit and prayed for
Robert Meyer, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School, the rendering of judgment ordering defendant Factoran, then Secretary of
was tried and convicted in the district of Hamilton, Nebraska under an the DENR, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
information which charged him for unlawfully teaching reading German behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
language to Raymond Partpar, a ten year old child who had not to cease and desist form receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
successfully reached the eight grade. The information was based upon approving new timber license agreements.
“An Act Relating to the Teaching of Foreign Language in the State of The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
Nebraska,” which prohibited any subject in any language other than two grounds: 1) lack of cause of action against him and 2) the issue raised
English to any person who has not successfully passed the eight grade. was a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the
ISSUE: May the State prohibit the teaching of foreign language to children aforementioned grounds. Thus, the petitioners filed a special civil action
who has not reach a certain grade level? for certiorari seeking to rescind and set aside.
HELD: ISSUE: Whether or not the said petitioners have a cause of action to
It was held that it is incompetent for the government to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of the Philippine rainforests
prohibit the teaching of the German language to students between certain and have the defendant stop form receiving, processing and approving
age levels since there is nothing inherently harmful in the language that timber license agreements.
will impair the upbringing of the child; and in fact such a subject could
improve his academic background. HELD:
Yes. The petitioners have a cause of action. The complaint
focuses on one specific fundamental legal right-the right to a balanced
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history,
PIERCE VS. SOCIETY OF SISTERS is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
262 US 390 the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
FACTS: accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.This right unites with the
The State of Oregon passed a law requiring right to health which is provided for in SEC. 15 of Article 2.
parents/guardians of children ages 8-16 to send their child to public While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
school. The manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at public found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
schools by children 8-16 who have not completed their 8th grade. the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
Society of Sisters operates a private school. It owns valuable civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
building, especially constructed and equipped for the school purposes. different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
The law has already caused the withdrawal from its school of children, preservation and self-perpetuation -- aptly and fittingly stressed by the
who would other wise continue attending the same school. Society then petitioners -- the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
filed a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the law contending that the same governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
unconstitutional. need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
ISSUE: May the State require children to attend only public schools before the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
they reach a certain age? framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
HELD: highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which the solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
government under the Constitution reposes excludes any general power second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
of the State to standardize its children by enforcing them to accept for the present generation, but also for those to come -- generations
instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of

which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations
sustaining life. were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life,
right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional
conservation of the country's forests. commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process
E.O. No.192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
the objectives which serve as the bases for policy formulation and have involved, through the exercise of police power. . . ."
defined the powers and functions of the DENR, the primary government
agency for the proper use and development of the countries natural The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of
resources. The right of the petitioners and all they represent to a balanced protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty to protect and ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
advance the said right. or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
A denial or violation of that right by the owner who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a "The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
cause of action. balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature."
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the

correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to
LLDA VS. CA health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."
231 SCRA 292, 1994 28 It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference
FACTS: Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human
The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes right. 29
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the
petitioner, seeking to stop the operation of the open garbage dumpsite in The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA,
Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the
on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter
content of the surrounding area. The LLDA conducted an on-site and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by
investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate that seeps from the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan
said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government necessary.
of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of
the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has
Environment and Natural Resources, and clearance from LLDA as provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal
required under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as amended by Presidential proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or
Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927 continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna
The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."
City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their
contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with
dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the
Camarin dumpsite. However, the City Government of Caloocan filed with Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private sector,
the RTC an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant
order with prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction. LLDA then filed a to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders
motion of Dismiss on the ground that their order was merely subject to issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed,
review of the CA and not the RTC. resulting in the thwarting of its laudable objective. To meet such
contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are
ISSUE: beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper
Whether or not the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a cease courts.
and desist order
HELD: GARCIA VS. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
Yes. The LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is 191 SCRA 288, 1990
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of FACTS:
promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of
Laguna Lake including Caloocan City with due regard and adequate Investments (BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the transfer of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to
quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under RA 4850 it naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
authorizes LLDA to “make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution.” Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981, 576 hectares of the public
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease domain located in Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for the
and desist order" were not expressly conferred by law, there is Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration, management, and
jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental
rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an corporation, located at Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily naphtha.
implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as
region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified
is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a Bataan as the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of
"toothless" paper agency. the project was the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a
Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court ruled that the joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte February 24, 1988 by BOI.
cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives by
laws of the country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. BOI, like, (1) exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the
Feliciano, declared: entire proceeds of liquidation investments in currency originally made and
at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation; and (3)
"Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in remittance of earnings on investments. As additional incentive, the House
situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the of Representatives approved a bill introduced by the petitioner eliminating
continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers the 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it is used as raw materials
and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until in the petrochemical plant.
protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such
orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East
such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several Corporation, the major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade

Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989 advising him The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also
of BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification of its project tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and women who, like
by changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason Antaeus, need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.
adduced for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation,
and the presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) "Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance
depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation. in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is
more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a
The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than President battlecry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed
Aquino expressed her preference that the plant be established in Bataan among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
in a conference with the Taiwanese investors, the Secretary of National
Defense and The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of
social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the
Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the transfer of the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution
project to Batangas, BPC filed its request for approval of the amendments. affirmed this goal, adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the
Its application is as follows: "(1) increasing the investment amount from acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property
US$220 million to US$320 million; (2) increasing the production capacity and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.' Significantly, there
of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian
changing the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or liquefied reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the
petroleum gas;" and (4) transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to soil."
Batangas. BOI states that it has taken a public position preferring Bataan
over Batangas as the site of the petrochemical complex, as this would The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these
provide a better distribution of industries around the Metro Manila area. In sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social
advocating the choice of Bataan as the project site for the petrochemical Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere
complex, the BOI, however, made it clear in its view that the BOI or the provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the
government for that matter could only recommend as to where the project following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform
should be located. The BOI recognizes and respects the principle that the program.
final choice is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis
provide the funding or risk capital for the project. The cases involved have been consolidated because they concern
common legal questions, including serious challenges to the
ISSUE: constitutionality of RA 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Whether or not there was abuse of discretion on the part of the Board of Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and other supplementary to RA 6657 such
Investments for yielding to the wishes of the investor, the national interest as PD 27 (providing for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for
notwithstanding? distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27) Pres. Proc. 131
HELD: (instituting CARP) and EO 229 (providing the mechanics of
YES. under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of implementation of CARP) RA 6657 is the most recent legislation, signed
the State to "regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments into law by Pres. Aquino on June 10, 1988.
within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and
priorities." The development of a self-reliant and independent national ISSUE: WON RA 6657, PD 57, Proc. 31 & Eos 228 & 229 considered as
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, valid and constitutional?
Article II of the Constitution.
HELD:
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It YES. The assailed laws are considered as a valid exercise of both police
should not be treated like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making power and of eminent domain. The extent that it sets retention limits is an
venture, or even an assembler of cars or manufacturer of computer chips, exercise of police power. It must be noted that like taxation, the power of
where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The eminent domain could be used as an implement of police power of the
petrochemical industry is essential to the national interest. state. The expressed objective of the law was the promotion of the welfare
of the farners, which came clearly under the police power of the state. To
In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given achieve this purpose, the law provided for the expropriation of agricultural
unprecedented favors, but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it lands (subject to minimum retention limits for the landowner) to be
surrenders even the power to make a company abide by its initial distributed among the peasantry. As the ponencia observed:
choice, a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous
machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the
interests of the Filipino people. question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the
abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution.
from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of
is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the
way it deems best for the national interest.` physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to
the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise
One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.
part said he would not mind having a government run like hell by
Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions
not even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands
BOI allows to dictate what we shall do with our heritage. under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private
agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property
and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES them to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.
ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM
175 SCRA 343, 1989 The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever
found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum
FACTS: retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of
challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing his the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our
eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its
to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes
resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and
increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos.
Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today,
as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life
Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today.
sustaining soil, and crushed him to death. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution
itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the
invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died. prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their
deliverance.

Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be Congressman Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on
tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation Muslim Affairs of the House of Representative invited the petitioner in his
under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos capacity as speaker of the Assembly to participate in consultation and
will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially dialogue regarding the charting of the autonomous government of Muslim
appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Mindanao to be held in Manila.
Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time. Petitioner sent a telegram through the Secretary of the
Assembly to all the members thereof informing that “there will be no
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this session this November” in view of the invitation of Cong. Matalam.
difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session and declared
the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the seat of the Speaker vacant. This was reiterated in another session on
the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just November 5 of same year.
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less Respondents allege that because the Sangguniang
conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in
were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no their affairs, much less strike down their acts.
illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may ISSUE:
therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now
payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other
payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous
indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of governments of Region IX and XII?
value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar
scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law HELD:
in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which Yes, it may assume jurisdiction. In resolving this case the SC
they presumably agreed in principle. made a differentiation between decentralization of administration and
decentralization of power.
In relation thereto, the just compensation to be made by the Government There is Decentralization of administration when the
in the form of financial instruments and not money is justified by the central government delegates administrative powers to political
revolutionary character of of the scheme and the need to allow the subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
government time to raise the funds needed. process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable,"
and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
BASCO VS. PAGCOR and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government
197 SCRA 52, 1991 of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over
FACTS: them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to
Petitioners seek to annul the Philippine Amusement and law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter - PD 1869, because it is their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order. Petitioners also claim hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
that said PD has a "gambling objective" and that Section 13 par 2 of the governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
same PD which exempts PAGCOR from paying any tax, any kind of term autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
income or otherwise as well as fees, charges as levies of whatever nature future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
whether national or local is violative of the principles of local autonomy for An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
it is a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never
fees. meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the
central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree
ISSUE: Whether or not the local autonomy clause is violated by PD 1869 No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "the President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." In
HELD: the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is
The petitioner’s contentions are without merit for the made to discharge chiefly administrative services.
following reasons:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation hits no ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
inherent right to impose taxes PAMATONG VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
2. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress.
It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere FACTS:
creatures of Congress" which has the power to "create and
abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of
powers". Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Candidacy for President. Respondent Commission on Elections
Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of
Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The
exemptions or even take back the power. decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda
3. The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they
long been revoked. Only the National Government has the power to believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of
Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a Resolution No. 6558. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
consequence of the issuance of "licensesor permits" is no longer docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s
vested in the City of Manila. Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants
4. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of
the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC
controlled corporation with an original charter. declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who
could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
5. The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for
by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative'' law, its "exemption petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.
clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to
local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his
violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” under Section 26,
autonomy. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Article II of the 1987 Constitution,[by limiting the number of qualified
Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does not make local candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign
governments sovereign within the slate or an - imperiurn in imperio. and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues
that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the
electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose
their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since
he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
LIMBONA VS. MANGELIN president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
170 SCRA 786, 1989 numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in
FACTS: other countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise
Petitioner is the elected speaker of the Batangas, pampook attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by
of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brefity). Respondents are members of the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and
said Assembly. reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates
since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his program of

government. respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the
civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
ISSUE: Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees had
Whether the constitutional provision ensuring “equal access to allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the
opportunities for public office” creates a constitutional right to run for or civil service examinations for sanitarians.
hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency?
ISSUE: Whether or not Legaspi should be allowed such right
HELD:
NO.Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional HELD:
provision ensuring “equal access to opportunities for public office” is the The constitutional right to information on matters of public
claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, concern is recognized in the Bill of Rights. These constitutional
particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and
law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.
The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self- For every right of the people recognized as
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those
treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Only governments operating
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for under fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as to shield
legislative or executive action.[3] The disregard of the provision does not individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be
give rise to any cause of action before the courts. constitutional. Without a government's acceptance of the limitations
imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties,
An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the
determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and
wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, “The State shall liberty, the ultimate illusion.
broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both
dynasties.” Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the
successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records,
“broaden” to the phrase “ensure equal access,” and the substitution of the documents, papers and in addition, government research data used
word “office” to “service.” He explained his proposal in this wise: as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the
I changed the word “ broaden” to “ENSURE New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this
EQUAL ACCESS TO” because what is important would time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article II,
be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it Section 28 thereof, to wit:
would necessarily mean that the government would be
mandated to create as many offices as are possible to Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
accommodate as many people as are also possible. implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public interest. (Art. II, Sec. 28).
public service. So, in order that we should not mandate
the State to make the government the number one In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by
employer and to limit offices only to what may be what this Court declared as an imperative duty of the government officials
necessary and expedient yet offering equal concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a
opportunities to access to it, I change the word public nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general
“broaden.” [7] mphasis supplied) applicability. We granted Mandamus in said case, and in the process, We
found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to
enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people . . . That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to
as possible into public office. The approval of the “Davide be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
amendment” indicates the design of the framers to cast the reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden. discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, at 39)
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to
be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the The absence of discretion on the part of government agencies in
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means allowing the examination of public records, specifically, the records
and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs.
that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Ozaeta, supra:
[8] Words and phrases such as “equal access,” “opportunities,” and
“public service” are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty
to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the
records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which
the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the
opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. . . . (Subido v.
the provisions[9] of the Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates” Ozaeta, supra at 388).
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452[10] dated December 10, 2002
outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that
give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said
is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of right to information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is case, We recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy
records relating to registered lands. However, the regulations which the
Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:
LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION . . . prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that
150 SCRA 530, 1987 damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference
with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other
FACTS: employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public make inspection may be insured . . . (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383,
concern is invoked in this special civil action for Mandamus instituted by 387).
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra,
in a municipal judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the public of the public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the
criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter knowledge of those real estate transactions which some believed to have
No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was been registered in violation of the Constitution.
filed against the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow
examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the
the Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles
to open and view the subject records, We absolved the respondent. In for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly
effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him declares as a State policy that:
upon the manner of examining the public records were reasonable.
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to
statement that the authority to regulate the manner of examining public positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly
records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2. [2]).
made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access
to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in Public office being a public trust, [Const., Art. XI, Sec: 1] it is the
which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions
availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the
the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that
damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public
with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, interest. For Mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must
that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the
assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra). constitutional guarantee.
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and
to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that
part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil
any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore,
not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
of Mandamus in a proper case. government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the
public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, from the Civil Service Commission.
the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern,
propriety of the issuance of the writ of Mandamus in this case is, whether and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access
the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
constitutional guarantee. the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of Mandamus, therefore lies.
access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality
of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v.
Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the
same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE
[1939]), access to information of general interest aids the people in 170 SCRA 256, 1989
democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974] by
giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation. FACTS:
Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to respondent Belmonte,
But the constitutional guarantee to information on General Manager of GSIS, requesting the latter to furnish him the list of
matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before
official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then
provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may First Lady Imelda Marcos.
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as The Deputy General counsel of the GSIS wrote back the
those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the petitioner turning down his request on the ground that there exists a
availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed confidential relationship between the GSIS and all those who borrow from
by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or it, which confidence it is the GSIS is duty bound to preserve.
one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform
therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or the acts sought by petitioner to be done, in pursuance of their right to
public concern. information
This question is first addressed to the government agency HELD:

having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, Yes. The people’s right to information is limited to matters of
this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be
access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the provided by law. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the
burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, government and its employees and administration of various insurance
or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a
the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the public character. It is the legitimate concern of the public to ensure
constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of
advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against maximizing the benefits to insured government employees.
release . . ." To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the
by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought
and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus. clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
Furthermore, the "constituent-ministrant" dichotomy
In determining whether or not a particular information is of characterizing government function has long been repudiated. That the
public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would
concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope
Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may of the right to information.
want to know, either 1because these directly affect their lives, or Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the
2
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public
in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents,
importance, as it relates to or affects the public. and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
The public concern invoked in the case of Tañada v. Tuvera, supra, was It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government
the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of

the people's right of access to official records. It is further contended that sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading
since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when
function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime
policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the
applicable only to "official" transactions. negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously
discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.
First of all, the "constituent ----ministrant" dichotomy The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks
characterizing government function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the
v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption
[G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter
Court said that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign suspended all its military actions.
attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya
service to the people. from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security
exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001
simply agreed “that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their
Moreover, the intent of the members of the next meeting.”
Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include government-owned A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on
and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing
within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading
manifest from the records of the proceedings to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on
and considering further that government-owned and controlled May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many
corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002
are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away
entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the
created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad’s position as chief peace
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.
transparency in government dealings. In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious “consensus”
examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be ever embodied in an instrument – the MOA-AD which is assailed
avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591,
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962. Commonly impleaded as
inspect the records may be insured respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain and the
However, although citizens are afforded the right to Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon,
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official Jr. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato[and Vice-Governor
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right
public concern. to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies
of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD
AQUINO-SARMIENTO VS. MORATO and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
203 SCRA 515, 1991 petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. This initial
petition was followed by several other petitions by other parties. The Court
FACTS: ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
Petitioner, a member of respondent MTRCB, wrote its
records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's ISSUE:
records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board Whether there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters
members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state
the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987
accordingly. Petitioner's request was denied by respondent Morato on the Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under
ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991?
film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the
nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private HELD:
and personal. YES. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
Petitioner counters that the records she wishes to examine shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
are public in character and other than providing for reasonable conditions papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents have no government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's records. afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the Court has recognized the
ISSUE: Was the respondents’ denial of petitioner’s request proper? statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was
eventually accorded constitutional status.
HELD: The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both
We find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been
the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.
review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,the Court ruled
violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. that access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to
May the decisions of respondent Board and the individual acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a
members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
private? Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) political significance. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a
existence is public in character; it is an office created to serve public democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
interest. it being the case, respondents can Jay no valid claim to privacy. nation’s problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they
The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity are denied access to information of general interest. Information is
and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
the discharge of public duties. the times. As has been aptly observed: “Maintaining the flow of such
information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its
dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES ceases.”
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTOBATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to
GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008 cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general
interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a
better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation, so that they
FACTS: may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an
military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed

public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by
the people. Issue: Whether or not the enactment of DO No. 1 is a valid exercise of
police power.
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
Held: Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. Police power has been
That the subject of the information sought in the present defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." It
fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not
concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of owe its origin to the Charter. It is a fundamental attribute of government
real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. It
for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. However, police
eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS power is not without its own limitations. It may not be exercised arbitrarily
funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery or unreasonably.
of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth,[120] and the identity of It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of
party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. a police power measure. The only question is whether or not it is valid
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public under the Constitution.
concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity The concept of police power is well-established in this
of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1)
include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but
character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled that the right to has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
information “contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the comprehensive embrace.
consummation of the transaction.” Certainly, a consummated contract is "Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."
defects. It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain
reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government
government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."
intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from "The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, with self-protection, and it is not inaptly termed the 'law of overwhelming
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,
retreat by the State of its avowed “policy of full disclosure of all its and welfare of society."
transactions involving public interest.” It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.
Intended as a “splendid symmetry” to the right to information under According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in
the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
II of the Constitution. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the
while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of
even if nobody demands. individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is
principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the
with the people’s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the greater number.
State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is
vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it
public officials at all times accountable to the people. may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose. advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further
private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear
misuse of the power.
DO No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it
does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes.
“Equality before the law" admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
STATE (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. It is the avowed
objective of DO No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female
overseas workers. Discrimination in this case is justified.
Police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not
POLICE POWER mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. The Labor
Code itself vests the DOLE with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON. whereof. Hence it is a valid exercise of police power.
DRILON
G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988, SARMIENTO, J. ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
101 PHIL. 1155
Facts:
FACTS:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to
Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. The said law provides for a
Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners
the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of from engaging from retail trade in our country.
the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF Nationalization Law, on the premise that it violated several treaties which
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted principle of
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the international law, should be observed by the Court in good faith.
measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it
"does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is
females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is unconstitutional for it is in conflict with treaties which are generally
held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police accepted principles of international law.
power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, PASEI, HELD:
challenges the validity of Department Order No. 1 (deployment ban) of the The Supreme Court said it saw no conflict. The reason
DOLE on the following grounds: 1) it is discriminatory as it only applies to given by the Court was that the Retail Trade National Law was passed in
female workers; 2) it is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. The
respondents invoke the police power of the Philippine State.

the exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986, YAP, J.
the medium of a treaty or a contract.
The law in question was enacted to remedy a real actual Facts: Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as
threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance the Bouncing Check Law punishes a person "who makes or draws and
and control of the retail business and free the citizens and country issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is
which it protects its own personality and insures its security and subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
future. credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."
disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that it offends the
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt and it
business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; contravenes the equal protection clause.
that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
state, through which and by which it protects its own personality and Issue: Whether or not the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police
insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal power.
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of occupation Held: Yes. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police
regulated, nor the due process of the law clause; because the law is power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
be plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to
actually necessary - and that in any case such matter falls within the public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law
prerogative of the legislature, with whose power and discretion the judicial can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently
department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it
law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally
has not misled the legislature of the segment of the population affected; punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise
and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty of its police power. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. Wherefore, the
treaty or any other conventional agreement. decision rendered by the respondent judge is hereby set aside.
Recent statistics of the Central Bank show that one-third of
the entire money supply of the country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion,
WALTER LUTZ, et. al vs. ANTONIO ARANETA, consists of peso demand deposits; the remaining two-thirds consists of
G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955, REYES, J.B L., J. currency in circulation. These demand deposits in the banks constitute the
funds against which, among others, commercial papers like checks, are
Facts: Plaintiffs seek to recover tax from the respondent alleging that such drawn. The magnitude of the amount involved amply justifies the
is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the legitimate concern of the state in preserving the integrity of the banking
sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public system. Flooding the system with worthless checks is like pouring garbage
purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action having into the bloodstream of the nation's economy.
been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs appealed the The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends
case directly to the Supreme Court. the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of tax under the CA No. 567 is a not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
valid exercise of police power. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the
Held: Yes. The tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of
power. The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
sources of the state's wealth and therefore directly or indirectly affecting against imprisonment for debt.
the welfare of so great a portion of the population of the State is affected
to such an extent by public interests as to be within the police power of the
sovereign.The decision appealed from is affirmed. DECS v San Diego
180 SCRA 233, Cruz, J.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
et. al Facts: The petitioner disqualified the private respondent who had actually
vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM taken and failed four times the National Medical Admission Test from
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, CRUZ, J. taking it again under its regulation. But the private respondent contends
that he is still entitled and hence, applied to take a fifth examination based
Facts: In these consolidated cases, petitioners primarily assail the on constitutional grounds: right to academic freedom and quality
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. education, due process and equal protection. He filed a petition for
Nos. 228 and 229 arguing that no private property shall be taken for public mandamus. The respondent judge declared the said rule invalid and
use without just compensation. The respondent invokes the police power granted the petition.
of the State.
Issue: Whether or not the three flunk rule is a valid exercise of police
Issue: Whether or not the taking of property under the said laws is a valid power.
exercise of police power or of the power of eminent domain.
Held: Yes. The police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the
Held: It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain. The cases present public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Thus, the subject of the
police power for the regulation of private property in accordance challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to
becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents
may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. While
taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere constitutional right to be a doctor. The private respondent has failed the
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of NMAT five times and this is sufficed to say that he must yield to the
the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. The Court upheld
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer- the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the
beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
of the power of eminent domain. Wherefore, the Court holds the competence and preparation for a medical education. The decision of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. respondent judge is reversed.
Nos. 228 and 229. However, the title to all expropriated properties shall be
transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their
respective owners. Ynot v IAC
148 SCRA 659, Cruz, J.
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO vs. HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Facts: President Marcos issued E.O. 626-A amending E.O. 626, which
et.al prohibits the transport of carabaos or carabeefs from one province to

another for the purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of
these animals. The petitioner had transported six carabaos from Masbate
to Iloilo where they were confiscated for violation of the said order. He
sued for recovery and challenges the constitutionality of the said order.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
The lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos. He appealed
the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court which upheld the lower City of Manila v Chinese Community
court. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. 40 Phil 349, Johnson, J.
Issue: Whether or not the purpose of E.O. 626-A is a valid exercise of Facts: The plaintiff prayed that certain lands be expropriated for the
police power. purpose of constructing a public improvement into an extension of Rizal
Avenue, Manila which is necessary for the plaintiff to exercise in fee
Held: No. We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial simple of certain parcels of land. The defendant on the other hand,
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, contends that the expropriation was not necessary as a public
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty improvement and that the plaintiff has no right to expropriate the said
in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes. The lower
one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than court declared that there was no necessity for the said expropriation.
moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them Hence, this appeal.
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented Issue: Whether or not the Courts can inquire into the necessity of
by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of expropriation of delegate, such as the City of Manila?
the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their Held: The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a
transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the must exist conferring the power upon it.
end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain
that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and
meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed of eminent domain cannot be questioned by courts, but the general
was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the
conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal
such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must
impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for
to the government. conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But
by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the
he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the
P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined inquire into.
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed When the courts come to determine the question, they must
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of
and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised
thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions
In the instant case, the challenged measure is an invalid imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. The authority of
the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, the city of Manila to expropriate private lands for public purposes, is not
worse, is unduly oppressive. Moreover, there was no such pressure of denied as provided in its Charter. However, if the court, upon trial, finds
time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails,
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in
destruction. Thus, the Court cannot say with equal certainty that it accordance with law. In the instant case, the record does not show
complies with the second requirement, that there be a lawful method. The conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided that there exists a
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose necessity for expropriation. The decision of the lower court is affirmed.
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. Executive
Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional.
Republic v PLDT
City Gov’t of Quezon City v Ericta 26 SCRA 620, Reyes, J.B.L., J.
122 SCRA 759, Gutierrez, Jr., J
Facts: The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity
Facts: Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition seeking to annul exercising governmental powers through its branches and
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, requiring private cemeteries to instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications.
reserve 6% of its total area for the burial of paupers, on the ground that it While the respondent, Philippine Long Distance Telephone has the power
is contrary to the Constitution. The petitioner contends that the said order to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the
was a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of
The respondent court declared the said order null and void. Hence, this messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the
instant petition. telephone systems of other countries. Sometime in 1933, the defendant
and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby
Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid telephone messages, could automatically be transferred to the lines of
exercise of police power. PLDT; and vice-versa. The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its
own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own
Held: No. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT
Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, to enable government offices to call private parties. The respondent
trades, and occupation as may be established or practice in the City.' said that the bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private
(Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537). The ordinance in question not Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities. The
only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park petitioner prayed commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with it,
cemetery. As defined, police power is 'the power of promoting the through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and system. The lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the
property'. In the instant case, Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties
Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an were not in agreement. Both parties appealed.
outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without
due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no Issue: Whether or not the Bureau of Telecommunications has the right to
reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and
percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial the PLDT.
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The Held: Yes. It is true that parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area where no agreement was made between them. Freedom to stipulate such
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private violence, intimidation or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil
cemeteries. As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has apparently overlooked
welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract
any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. with it, the Republic, in the exercise of the sovereign of eminent
The petition for review is hereby dismissed domain, may require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the Government Telephone System and that of
PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject

to the payment of just compensation. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a
interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a
that condemnation would be for public use. moment's duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596);
"lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or
recurring at every moment" (Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963
People v. Fajardo edition.) The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy
GR 12172, Aug. 29 1958 of (real) property should be construed to mean "a limited period" not
indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of
Facts: The municipal council of Baao, Camarines Sur stating among one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under
others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the
plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a
the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land
with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from
adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By express
name, located along the national highway and separated from the public provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook
plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the
that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public time the property was first occupied by the AFP . It is claimed that the
plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again “INTENTION” of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as
the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements.
with the construction of the building without a permit, because they But this "INTENTION" cannot prevail over the clear and express
needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the
destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased language employed by the parties, and the terms of the contract,
property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are conclusive in the
ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal. absence of averment and proof of mistake or fraud the question
being not what the intention wag, but what is expressed in the
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. language used. Moreover, in order to judge the intention of the
contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the intention of the lessee
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently Castellvi's property,
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year basis? Why
bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s property was the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not the
without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency Republic expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the
is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the Republic itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at
comfort and happiness of residents. the same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected into a jet air base?" It might really have been the intention of the Republic
on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned to expropriate the lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere
under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view notice much less an implied notice of such intention on the part of the
of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not, bind
constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually
purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally commenced in court.
achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard. Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present
in the instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as
lessee.
Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi
GR No. 20620, Aug.15, 1974 Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen M. circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is present
vda. de Castellvi from 1 July 1947, by virtue of a contract of lease, on because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the
succeeding year). The Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as
refused. The AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
termination of the contract because it would difficult for the army to vacate property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property
the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and
worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained
the property. Castellvi then brought suit to eject the Philippine Air as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as
Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the
Republic filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent domain provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return
against the respondents over the 3 parcels of land. In its complaint, the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was
the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because
above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed
Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare.The court monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent
authorizes the Republic to take immediate possession of the lands upon domain on June 26, 1959.
deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.In 1961,
the trial court, rendered its decision in the ejectment case, finding that the It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's property for purposes of
unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when
meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just; and required the the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We
Republic to pay interests. find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the
"taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that
Issue: Whether the taking of Castellvi’s property occurred in 1947 or in the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent,
1959. or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the
owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use,
Held: The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's property should were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi
be deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement. property in 1947.
In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on the
subject of "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of "taking" (in eminent Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract
domain) as follows: between the parties was one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in
reality a more or less permanent right to occupy the premises under the
"Taking”under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as guise of lease with the 'right and privilege' to buy the property should the
entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, lessor wish to terminate the lease," and "the right to buy the property is
under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or merged as an integral part of the lease relationship . . . so much so that
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way the fair market value has been agreed upon, not as of the time of
as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial purchase, but as of the time of occupancy". 15 We cannot accept the
enjoyment thereof." Republic's contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to
a permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease
Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land in the
present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain. instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Article
1669, Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated (Rule
present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the 67, Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it be accepted that the Republic
Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi. would enter into a contract of lease where its real intention was to buy, or
why the Republic should enter into a simulated contract of lease ("under

the guise of lease", as expressed by counsel for the Republic) when all the and that it had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim
time the Republic had the right of eminent domain, and could expropriate because the government had not given its consent to be sued.
Castellvi's land if it wanted to without resorting to any guise whatsoever. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
Neither can we see how a right to buy could be merged in a contract of
lease in the absence of any agreement between the parties to that effect. Issue: Can the appellant sue the government?
To sustain the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby
in order to secure a low price for a land which the government intends to Ruling: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government
expropriate (or would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate with appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed
the owner of the land to lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the
expropriate the same when the lease is about to terminate, then claim that appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she
the "taking" of the property for the purposes of the expropriation be could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in
reckoned as of the date when the Government started to occupy the question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of
property under the lease, and then assert that the value of the property ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion
being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the lease, in spite of the by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time
fact that the value of the property, for many good reasons, had in the because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only
meantime increased during the period of the lease. This would be relief available isfor the government to make due compensation
sanctioning what obviously is a deceptive scheme, which would have the which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the
effect of depriving the owner of the property of its true and fair market due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or
value at the time when the expropriation proceedings were actually value thereof at the time of the taking.
instituted in court. The Republic's claim that it had the "right and privilege" As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled
to buy the property at the value that it had at the time when it first thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it
occupied the property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease contract. was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In
What was agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of the lease agreement addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of
was that, should the lessor require the lessee to return the premises in the which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
same condition as at the time the same was first occupied by the AFP, the (NOTE: The owner does not need to file the usual claim for
lessee would have the "right and privilege" (or option) of paying the lessor recovery of just compensation with the Commission on Audit if the
what it would fairly cost to put the premises in the same condition as it was government takes over his property and devotes it to public use without
at the commencement of the lease, in lieu of the lessee's performance of the benefit of expropriation. He may immediatetly file a complaint with the
the undertaking to put the land in said condition. The "fair value" at the proper court for payment of his property as the arbitrary action of the
time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease agreement, does not refer to government shall be deemed a waiver of its immunity from suit.) Cruz, pg.
the value of the property if bought by the lessee, but refers to the cost of 74)
restoring the property in the same condition as of the time when the Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC
lessee took possession of the property. Such fair value cannot refer to the GR No. 119694, May 22, 1995
purchase price, for purchase was never intended by the parties to the
lease contract. It is a rule in the interpretation of contracts that "However Facts:
general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the
comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those constitutional validity of resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent
upon which the parties intended to agree" (Art. 1372, Civil Code). Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec
directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of news
(A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” paper and magazine publishers.
of property for purposes of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No.
enter a private property. Second, the entrance into private property must 2772, providing for a Comelec Space, which is a free print space of not
be for more than a momentary period. Third, the entry into the property less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general
should be under warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth, the property circulation in every province or city.
must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must the issuance of a Temporary restraining order, PPI asks us to declare
be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial Comelec resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that
enjoyment of the property. it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property
property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to for public use without just compensation.
have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Issue: May COMELEC compel the members of print media to donate
Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the “Comelec Space”?
power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation
by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) Held: NO. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space"
that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or
property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the purposes. The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be
Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. appraised under the public of expropriation of private personal property for
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private
compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the property for public use need to be examined here: one is the
complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the
sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to
undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been
Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959. The suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the
“taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the power of imminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative
just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of 26 authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
June 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.) enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be
shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use it, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just
Amigable v. Cuenca compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of
GR No. 26400, August 15, 1974 paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to
be avoided by respondent Commission. There is nothing at all to prevent
Facts: Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu City. newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772.
portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a
Amigable's counsel wrote to the President of the Philippines, requesting constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind
payment of theportion of her lot which had been appropriated by the of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec
government. The claim was indorsed tothe Auditor General, who purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of
disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement. Thus, Amigable filed in thecourt a eminent domain.
quo a complaint, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that
Cuenca(Commissioner of Public Highways) for the recovery of ownership Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to
and possession of her lot. "donate" "Comelec space," may be sustained as a valid exercise of the
On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its decision holding police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too casually
that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the to require prolonged consideration on their part. Firstly, there was no
recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to show
government cannot be sued without its consent, that it had neither original that the police power - essentially a power of legislation - has been
nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff's claim for constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission. Secondly,
compensatory damages, being a money claim against the government; while private property may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate

exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to (NHI) as the birthplace of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo.
show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful On the opinion of Secretary of Justice, he said that the place must be
taking under the police power. subjected to the power of eminent domain since places invested with
unusual historical interest is a public use which such power may be
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy authorized. Thus, Republic, through the office of Solicitor General
instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national instituted a complaint for expropriation and filed an urgent motion for the
emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and issuance for an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the
without regard the the individual business condition of particular property. The trial court issued an order authorizing Republic to take over
newspapers or magazines located in different parts of the country, to take the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the
private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The petitioners moved to
made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for dismiss the complaint since such expropriation would constituted an
the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 application of funds directly or indirectly for the use, benefit, or support of
of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated Iglesia ni Cristo, which is contrary to the provision of Section 29 (2) Article
response to such necessity available to Comelec. Section 2 does not VI of the 1987 Constitution.
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
Issue: Whether or not the “public use” requirement of Eminent Domain is
extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-
Sumulong v. Guerrero meter parcel of land as declared by the NHI as a national landmark?
GR 48685, Sept 30,1987
Held: Yes.According to Justice Black, term “public use” means one
Facts: On December 5,1977, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a which confers benefit or advantage to the public and it is not
complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately 25 confined to actual use by public. It may also be said to mean public
hectares, (in Antipolo Rizal) including the lots of Lorenzo Sumulong and usefulness, utility or advantage, or what is productive of general
Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 benefit.
square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by
valued by the NHA at P1.00 per square meter adopting the market value the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a
fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees public need or a public exigency. 16 Black summarizes the
prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. characterization given by various courts to the term; thus:
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional
properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the and statutory basis for taking property by eminent
Philippine National Bank, representing the “total market value” of the domain. For condemnation purposes, "public
subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree 1224 which use" is one which confers same benefit or
defines “the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized advantage to the public; it is not confined to
housing upon payment of just compensation.” On 17 January 1978, Judge actual use by public. It is measured in terms of
Buenaventura Guerrero issued the order issuing a writ of possession in right of public to use proposed facilities for which
favor of NHA. Sumulong and Vidanes-Balaoing filed a motion for condemnation is sought and, as long as public
reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the has right of use, whether exercised by one or
possession of their property without due process of law. This was, many members of public, a "public advantage" or
however, denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme "public benefit" accrues sufficient to constitute a
Court. public use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont.
457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773.
Issue: Whether the taking of private property for “socialized housing,”
which would benefit a few and not all citizens, constitutes taking for “public Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the
use.” exercise of the right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain,
means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from
Held: Yes. The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to particular individuals. But each and every member of society need not be
certain limitations imposed by the constitution (1973), i.e. that private equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it;
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation” (Art. if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient.
IV, sec. 9); and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or
protection of the laws” (Art. IV, sec. 1). advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It may be limited to
The term “public use” has acquired a more comprehensive the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common,
coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or and not for a particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the
employment by the public has been added the broader notion of public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and
indirect public benefit or advantage. Specifically, urban renewal or inconvenience. A "public use" for which land may be taken defies absolute
redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances
a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of
but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an
Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and increase in population and new modes of communication and
ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586. 17
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said,
sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing measures however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional
does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by
all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has the public" has long been discarded.
to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a
at once. “Socialized housing” falls within the confines of “public use”. time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to
specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is
covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines
The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer,
"cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise
terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever
areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. requirement of public use.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason
valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, has viewed the Constitution a
protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of landowners accept dynamic instrument and one that "is not to be construed narrowly or
unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local pedantically" so as to enable it "to meet adequately whatever problems the
assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself,
less analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept
occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to of public use which is just as broad as "public welfare."
do so. Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest
that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to
be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent
Manosca vs. Court of Appeals domain" when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This
G.R. No. 106440 , 29 January 1996 attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little
consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of,
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land which was later declared as not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the
national landmark due to being ascertained by National Historic Institute power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to

recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the The Supreme Court ruled that there was no compliance with
culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding the first requisite since the mayor sought to exercise the power of eminent
and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. domain pursuant to a resolution only. Ordinance is not synonymous to
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived resolution. An ordinance is a law, possesses a general or permanent
by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well character, and makes third reading for its enactment necessary. On the
be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely other hand, a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would of a lawmaking body on a specific matter, temporary in nature and its
actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not enactment required only the decision of majority of all the Sanggunian
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. members
EPZA vs. Dulay

G.R. No. L-59609, 29 April 1987
Facts: A certain parcel of land was reserved by the President of the POWER OF TAXATION
Philippines for petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) for the
establishment of an export processing zone. However, not all of the Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications
reserved area was public land. The petitioner made an offer to purchase G.R. No. L10405, 29 December 1960
the lands registered in the name of the private respondent, but, the parties
failed to have an agreement on the sale of the property. Thus, the Facts:
petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of possession against private respondent on the Court of First On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as
Instance of Cebu. The respondent judge favored the petition and issued a Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief,
writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take into possession the with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An
said property. Having determined the just compensation as only the issue Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953,
to be resolved, the respondent judge issued an order regarding the contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for the
appointment of certain persons as commissioners who are tasked to construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of Pasig
report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be feeder road terminals, that, at the time of the passage and approval of
expropriated. Consequently, commissioners were appointed and, said Act, the said feeder roads were "nothing but projected and planned
afterwards, recommended in their report that the amount of P15.00 per subdivision roads within the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal"
square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the near Shaw Boulevard, not far away from the intersection between the
properties. Subsequently, petitioners objected to the said order on the latter and EDSA, which projected feeder roads "do not connect any
grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Section 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of government property or any important premises to the main highway"; that
the Rules of court on the ascertainment of just compensation through the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on which
commissioners. said feeder roads were to be construed) were private properties of
respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval
of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May,
Issue: Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of
Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the
insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was
compensation is concerned. accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor would
submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two of
them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was,
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the P.D. No. 1533, which however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote
eliminates the court’s discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void, since Act. No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the
constitutes an impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. The construction of the projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal
determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial council of Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the present "has not made any
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the endorsement thereon" that inasmuch as the projected feeder roads
Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without in question were private property at the time of the passage and
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate approval of Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00
that its own determination shag prevail over the court's findings. Much less therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension
can the courts be and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was illegal and,
therefore, void ab initio"; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was
made by Congress because its members were made to believe that
Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation the projected feeder roads in question were "public roads and not
G.R. No. 127820, 20 July 1998 private streets of a private subdivision"'; that, "in order to give a
semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the
Facts: A complaint for expropriation was filed by the Municipality of aforementioned appropriation", respondents Zulueta executed on
Parañaque against V.M. Realty Corporation involving two parcels of land December 12, 1953, while he was a member of the Senate of the
located at Parañaque, Metro Manila. The complaint was in pursuant to Philippines, an alleged deed of donation of the four (4) parcels of
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993. The complaint land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the
was for the purpose of alleviateing the living conditions of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized deed of donation was, on the same date, accepted by the then
housing project. Previously, an offer for the sale of the property was made Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous condition, said
by the petitioner, however, the latter did not accept. The Regional Trial donation partook of the nature of a contract; that, such, said
Court of Makati issued order authorizing the petitioner to take possession donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting
of the subject property upon deposit to the Clerk of Court of an amount members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value base on its current tax interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is
declaration. However, upon the private respondent’s motion to dismiss, unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the
the trial court nullified its previous order and dismissed the case. Thus, construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. But the appellate court funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the
affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta,
Issue: Whether the contested item of Republic Act No. 920

Issue: Whether or not the exercise of the power of eminent domain is unconstitutional and, therefor, illegal?
valid.
Held: No. The P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in
question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were
Held:The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU public or private property when the bill, which, latter on, became Republic
can exercise the power of eminent domain: (1) An ordinance is Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the
enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to
private property.(2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the purpose, and hence, was null and void.
landless.(3) There is payment of just compensation, as required
under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval
laws.(4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in
not accepted. question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a

judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the
unconstitutionality of said appropriation. political subdivisions thereof.
Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested

only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its
enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
officer of the State for the purpose of administering GR L-19201, 16 June 1965
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,"
which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated
Republic Act No. 920 is unconstitutional, since the legislature is without P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias,
power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose and Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the
the project feeder roads are at the time private properties. The right of construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total samount
the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, was actually spent for the purpose intended. On 3 March 1958, MB Estate
and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for filed the donor’s gift tax return. Under date of 29 April 1960, the
public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued as assessment for donee’s gift
purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which
appropriation of state funds can be made for other than for a public petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including
purpose. surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from 15 May 1958 to 15 June 1960,
and the compromise for the late filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a
protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. The
Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of the City of Manila protest and the motion for reconsideration presented to the Commissioner
G.R. No. L-4817, 26 May 1954 of Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed to the CTA on 2
November 1960. After hearing, the CTA affirmed the decision of the
Facts: An ordinance was approved by the Municipal Board of the City of Commissioner of Internal Revenue except the imposition of compromise
Manila which imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising penalty of P20. Fr. Lladoc appealed to the Supreme Court.
various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the tax by a
fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more Issue: Whether a donee’s gift tax may be assessed against the
than six months or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of Catholic Church.
the court. The ordinance was in pursuance to paragraph (1) Section 18 of
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila which empowers the Municipal Held: Yes. The phrase “exempt from taxation,” as employed in the
Board of said city to impose a municipal occupation tax, not to exceed Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
P50 per annum, on persons engaged in the various professions above taxes. Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts
referred to the plaintiffs, after having paid their occupation tax, now being from taxation cemeteries, churches and personages or convents,
required to pay the additional tax prescribed in the ordinance. The appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used
plaintiffs paid the said tax under protest. The lower court declared the exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the
validity of the law authorizing the enactment of the ordinance, but payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as
declared the latter illegal and void since its penalty provided for the non- property taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise taxes. A donee’s
payment of tax was not legally authorized. gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of
property by way of gift inter vivos. Its assessment was not on the property
Issue: Is this ordinance and the law authorizing it constitute class themeselves. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon
legislation, are unjust and oppressive, and authorize what amounts to the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of
double taxation? receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property
used for religious purposes does not constitute an impairment of the
Held: NO. To begin with defendants' appeal, we find that the lower court Constitution.
was in error in saying that the imposition of the penalty provided for in the
ordinance was without the authority of law. The last paragraph (kk) of the
very section that authorizes the enactment of this tax ordinance (section Abra Valley College vs. Aquino
18 of the Manila Charter) in express terms also empowers the Municipal GR L-39086, 15 June 1988
Board "to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not
exceed to(sic) two hundred pesos fine or six months" imprisonment, or Facts: Petitioner Abra Valley College is an educational corporation
both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense." Hence, the and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the SEC in 1948.
pronouncement below that the ordinance in question is illegal and void On 6 July 1972, the Municipal and Provincial treasurers (Gaspar Bosque
because it imposes a penalty not authorized by law is clearly without and Armin Cariaga, respectively) and issued a Notice of Seizure upon the
basis. petitioner for the college lot and building (OCT Q-83) for the satisfaction of
said taxes thereon. The treasurers served upon the petitioner a Notice of
Secondly, In raising the hue and cry of "class legislation", the burden of Sale on 8 July 1972, the sale being held on the same day. Dr. Paterno
plaintiffs' complaint is not that the professions to which they respectively Millare, then municipal mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of
belong have been singled out for the imposition of this municipal P 6,000 on public auction involving the sale of the college lot and building.
occupation tax; and in any event, the Legislature may, in its discretion, The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.
select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that The petitioner filed a complaint on 10 July 1972 in the court
discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes a quo to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure” and the “Notice of
and leave the others untaxed. (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 4, 4th ed., pp. Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of
3393-3395.) Plaintiffs' complaint is that while the law has authorized the real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. On 12 April 1973,
City of Manila to impose the said tax, it has withheld that authority from the parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the
other chartered cities, not to mention municipalities. We do not think it is trial court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the
for the courts to judge what particular cities or municipalities should government, holding that the second floor of the building is being used by
be empowered to impose occupation taxes in addition to those the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and
imposed by the National Government. That matter is peculiarly rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment,
within the domain of the political departments and the courts would and thus the property is not being used “exclusively” for educational
do well not to encroach upon it. Moreover, as the seat of the National purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant
Government and with a population and volume of trade many times petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before
that of any other Philippine city or municipality, Manila, no doubt, the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so
that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a Issue: Whether the College is exempt from taxes.
higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces.
Held: Yes. While the Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes,”
Thirdly, Plaintiffs brand the ordinance unjust and oppressive because they reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to
say that it creates discrimination within a class in that while professionals facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
with offices in Manila have to pay the tax, outsiders who have no offices in accomplishment of the main purposes. While the second floor’s use, as
the city but practice their profession therein are not subject to the tax. residence of the director, is incidental to education; the lease of the first
Plaintiffs make a distinction that is not found in the ordinance. The floor cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered incidental to the
ordinance imposes the tax upon every person "exercising" or "pursuing" — purposes of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of
in the City of Manila naturally — any one of the occupations named, but the property for purposes mentioned in the Constititution.
does not say that such person must have his office in Manila. What
constitutes exercise or pursuit of a profession in the city is a matter of Adonis Notes: The SC stated that if only the judge had read the 1973
judicial determination. The argument against double taxation may not be Constitution, he should have known the difference between the 1935 and
invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed the 1973 Constitution and he could not have summarily dismissed the
by the city (1 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely case. There is a substantial distinction between the 1935 and the 1973
recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the Constitution. In the 1935 Constitution the requirement for exemption for
requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the real property taxes is “exclusively” , while the 1973 Constitution requires

“actually, directly & exclusively”. The SC remanded to the Court of Origin SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
for further hearing. (excerpts from Sababan Notes) property without due process of law, nor any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil.
Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual
liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but
are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any
ART. III – BILL OF RIGHTS differences of race, of color, or of nationality.
c. The, equal protection clause. —

SEC.1 DUE PROCESS OF LAW The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
Ichong vs. Hernandez limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
GR L-7995; 31 May 1957 is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. Petitioner enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for
property without due process of law. In answer, the respondents contend making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the who do not.
State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of
national economic survival. d. The due process clause. —
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation
Issue: Whether or not the enactment of R.A No. 1180 is constitutional. enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for
Held: Yes. The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in
the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious
control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the
power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private
and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for is applied.
the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real.
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist.
petition is denied. THE BALANCING IS THE ESSENCE or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the
that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is
and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The
constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation
the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
without due process of law ; In answer, the Solicitor-General and the reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if
Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the distinction and classification has been made, there must be a
valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is reasonable basis for said distinction.
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival;
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —
a. The police power. — Now, in this matter of EQUITABLE BALANCING, what is the proper place
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the
police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and
attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force
and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or
consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of
to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public
considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although
police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless
the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative
and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear,
of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative
consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate
application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
the issue accordingly resolved.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has —
become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and
from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility,
expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self- prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and
protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free
governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been
Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in
demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and
proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme
become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. welfare of its citizens.
Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public
interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so The Due Process of Law Limitation.
we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by
which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by
welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the legislature decisive. —
police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police
thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the United States
equal protection clause. that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been
b. Limitations on police power. — held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable,
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall
following provisions of our Constitution: have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to
be attained. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and Ynot vs IAC
in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is GR No. 74457, 20 March 1987
free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of
by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. The carabaos of
authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while
by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the
to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued
and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power
of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.
that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs.
New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.) Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due
Process.
The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy
under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into Held: Yes. The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is
effect. Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the
reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His
infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness. claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according
the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note guaranteed by due process.
that accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting
purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a
the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only
economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an
of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the
to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement
free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after
our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but
our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the
security, will be at the mercy of other people. pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the
not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of insolence of power.
the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this
bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with
wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and because they are intended as a safeguard against official
endanger our national security it respects existing arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the
rights. jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play.
survival. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land,"
which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. Torres condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
GR 98050, 17 March 1994 after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured
beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance,
Facts: The PhilPhos Movement for Progress (PMPI), a labor organization would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
composed of supervisory employees of the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer
Corporation, filed a certification election on July 7, 1989 with the This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for,
Department of Labor and Employment. The move was not contested by to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. (1)The
the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation management and in fact conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary
was supported by a position paper submitted to the Mediator-Arbiter on evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or
August 11, 1989. The management hailed the creation of a supervisor’s there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
union provided that they meet all the necessary legal requirements. ultimately presumed therefrom. (2)There are instances when the need for
On October 13, 1989 the Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order for the expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
holding of the elections excluding the technical, professional and summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose,
confidential employees. Then on November15, 1989 respondent PMPI which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to
prayed for the inclusion of technical, professional and confidential the safety and lives of the people. (3)Pornographic materials,
employees. On December 14, 1989 both parties submitted their position contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may
papers on the said subject matter. Mr. Milado, allowing the membership of be summarily destroyed. (4)The passport of a person sought for a criminal
other employees as stated, granted the petition of PMPI. Petitioner then offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the
moved to have the technical, professional and confidential employees country he has fled. (5) Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in
removed from the membership of the PMPI on April 16, 1990 to the the interet of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public
Secretary of Labor and Employment and a decision was made on August morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted
7, 1990 dismissing the appeal and the subsequent motion for without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
reconsideration. Then on July 8, 1991 the Court issued a temporary involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare
restraining order against the holding of the certification election scheduled from a clear and present danger.
on July 12, 1991 pending judicial review.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed
Issue: Whether or not PHILPHOS was denied due process when a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00,
respondent Mediator-Arbiter granted the amended petition of respondent which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos
PMPI without according PHILPHOS a new opportunity to be heard. when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at
Held: No. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the fair play.
action or ruling complained of. Where, as in the instant case,
petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and
Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual
the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also
sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In
Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the
confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
instead, it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its
appeal to the Secretary of Labor

Alonte v. Savellano Issue: Was petitioner deprived of PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS?
GR 131652, March 9, 1998
Held: Yes. The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
Facts: On December 5, 1996, an information for rape was filed against amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in total disregard of the
petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Biñan Laguna and Revised Rules on Evidence and existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he
Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-Lyn rendered a Decision in the case a quo on the basis of two (2) affidavits
Punongbayan. (Punongbayans and Balbins) which were neither marked nor offered
On December 13, 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through into evidence by the prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner
her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State an opportunity to cross-examine the affiants thereof, again in violation
Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court of petitioners right to due process (Article III, 1, Constitution).
Administrator a petition for a change of venue and to have the case The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or rendered a Decision in the case a quo without conducting a trial on
on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and the facts which would establish that complainant was raped by
counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance. petitioner (Rule 119, Article III, 1, Constitution), thereby setting a
On June 28, 1997, Atty. Ramon C.Casano on behalf of dangerous precedent where heinous offenses can result in conviction
petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on without trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses could end up
the ground that it had become moot in view of complainant’s affidavit of with the same result).
desistance. Jurisprudence acknowledges that DUE PROCESS IN
On August 22, 1997, ACSP Guiab filed his comment on the CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, in particular, require (a) that the court or
motion to dismiss. Guiab asserted that he was not aware of the desistance tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to
of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, would hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is
not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who had lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the
direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
for the denial of the motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion to rendered only upon lawful hearing.
change venue. The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat
On September 17, 1997, the case was assigned by raffle to strange way the case has proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after
Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, the waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did
Jr.,presiding. proceed on the merits but that-
On October 7, 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Atty. “The two (2) accused did not present any
Balbin, submitted to the Manila court, a compliance where she reiterated countervailing evidence during the trial. They
her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance. did not take the witness stand to refute or deny
However, in an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge under oath the truth of the contents of the
Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest private complainant's aforementioned affidavit
of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion without prejudice to, and which she expressly affirmed and confirmed in
independent of, this Courts separate determination as the trier of facts, of Court, but, instead, thru their respective
the voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in lawyers, they rested and submitted the case
the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State for decision merely on the basis of the private
Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab. complainant's so called 'desistance' which, to
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered them, was sufficient enough for their purposes.
himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation They left everything to the so-called
(NBI), while Concepcion, in his case, posted the recommended bail 'desistance' of the private complainant.”
of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both According to petitioners, however, there was no such
pleaded not guilty to the charge. The parties manifested that they were trial for what was conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from the
waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano, arraignment of the accused, was merely a proceeding to determine
both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance executed
merits.4 According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the by Punongbayan.
prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of the While Judge Savellano has claims that petitioners-accused
voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, their respective counsel of choice; that none of their counsel interposed an
the prosecution presented private complainant Juvie-lyn Punongbayan intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after
followed by her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the she attested, in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the
validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. She stated that voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits - one detailing the rape and
she had no intention of giving positive testimony in support of the charges the other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was
against Alonte and had no interest in further prosecuting the action. missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to
Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist because of confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a personal one and may be
the harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no waived.”
pressures nor influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of It should be pointed out, however, that the existence of
desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her parents received a single the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver
centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance. requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayans parents, who affirmed their circumstances and likely consequences." Mere silence of the holder
signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their consent to their of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the
daughters decision to desist from the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the
was signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his presence and that he deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course
was satisfied that the same was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally, of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to
Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of private prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the
complainant and her parents not to pursue the case, the State had no purpose;18 (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to
further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent
She, then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Judge for the purpose; and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act
Concepcion. charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was order of trial.20 There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and
submitted for decision." there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of
to Bail." During the pendency thereof, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that
lead counsel for petitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC Manila, cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
Branch 53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings.
1997, of the decision on the case. The counsel for accused Concepcion
denied having received any notice of the scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty.
Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not
attend the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering from Aniag vs. Commission on Elections
mild hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the GR 104961, 7 October 1994
other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to
have been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of
the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded: Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused scheduled on 11 May 1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion guilty issued Resolution 2323 (”Gun Ban”), promulgating rules and regulations
beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons,
on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of

security agencies or police organizations, and organization or no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently
maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. Pursuant to the superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged-
“Gun Ban,” Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without
Representatives, wrote Congressman Francisc B. Aniag Jr., who was then affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular
Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of the 2 aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding
firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Aniag rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending
immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose
from his house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress. The as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to
policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates
as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges
firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-
of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. Thereafter, the faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature
police referred Arellano’s case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to
inquest. The referral did not include Aniag as among those charged with petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would
an election offense. The City Prosecutor invited Aniag to shed light on the adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public
circumstances mentioned in Arellano’s sworn explanation. Aniag considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to
explained that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not
complying with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued
Congress. The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.
recommending that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made
“unofficial” charge against Aniag be also dismissed. Nevertheless, the by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to
COMELEC directing the filing of information against Aniag and Arellano its “QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.” It, however, insists that notice and
for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of BP 881 otherwise known as the hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to
Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of RA 7166 the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate
is bereft of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the manner by which COMELEC proceeded The NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is
against petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
Constitution reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more
than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
Held: Yes. The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against power. The NTC order violates procedural due process because it
petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution was issued motu proprio, without notice to PHILCOMSAT and
The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the without the benefit of a hearing. Said order was based merely on an
PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he “initial evaluation,” which is a unilateral evaluation, but had
subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for PHILCOMSAT been given an opportunity to present its side before
such offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate
petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service
is violative of due process which requires that the procedure could have been shown and demonstrated to NTC. Reduction of
established by law should be obeyed. rates was made without affording PHILCOMSAT the benefit of an
The COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the chance explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial
to be heard because he was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. PHILCOMSAT
regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the
petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of explanation regarding the inspector who issued the report on which NTC based its questioned
incident. This does not satisfy the requirement of due process the order. While the NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final
essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such rate-fixing
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. Due order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
process guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the requirement of reasonableness.
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
Such constituted a violation of his right to due process.
Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR)
that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless 69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940
search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized
during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor
the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather
set aside. material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this
averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the
Philippine Communication Satellite Corp. v. Alcuaz Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
GR 84818, Dec 18, 1989 That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the
NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the
Facts: By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the Philippine Communications Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted “a franchise to Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such
places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated Issue: Whether or not the motion for new trial should be granted.
equipment and facilities for international satellite communications.” Since
1968, It has been leasing its satellite circuits to PLDT, Philippine Global Held: Yes. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is
Communications, and other telecommunication companies. It was exempt given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in
from the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunications Commission his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
(NTC). However, pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 196, it was placed involved.
under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of NTC, including all its It must be noted that the CIR is a special court. It is more an
facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said executive administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
order, NTC required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite certificate of nation. CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
public convenience.. On 9 September 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
an application for authority to continue operating and maintaining the technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules
same facilities, to continue providing the international satellite of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem
communications services, and to charge the current rates applied for in just and equitable. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free
rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can
authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the facilities, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
applied for. The NTC extended the provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT, investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary
but it directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified reduced rates through a rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
reduction of 15% on the present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT assailed character:
said order.
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's
Issue: Whether the NTC is required to provide notice and hearing to cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
PHILCOMSAT in its rate-fixing order, which fixed a temporary rate (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
pending final determination of PHILCOMSAT’s application. (3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
Held: YES. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to parties affected;

(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases
its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross
know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision examination. An ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING conducted to
rendered. investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed
with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the
March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation
as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no right
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our
CAPULONG previous ruling in Alcuaz.
222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993 Respondent students' contention that the investigating
committee failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth because
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after
died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10,
at the Capitol Medical Center. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent
a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions.
tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also
required respondent students to submit their written statements within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students
received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Investigating
Committee found a prima facie case against respondent students for People vs. Vera
violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." GR 45685, Nov. 16, 1937
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the
formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the Facts: The instant petition stems from the application for bail filed by Co
charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent Unjieng. He claims that he is innocent of the crime charged against him,
students guilty of violating Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation that he has no existing criminal record and that he would observe proper
in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the conduct in the future if his application for bail is granted. The application
members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the was referred to the Insular Probation Office, but was consequently denied.
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. The denial was premised on the ground that Act No. 4221 provides
Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. probation only to those provinces with available funds for the salary of
Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are probation officers, and the province referred to has no sufficient funds.
currently enrolled. This was granted. A day after the expiration of the Thus, petitioner now comes before the Court assailing the constitutionality
temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to of the Act for being violative of the equal protection clause.
investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and
Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection
argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the guarantee?
original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and
reinstatement of the students was ordered. Held: Yes. The probation act is in violation of the said constitutional
guarantee. It constitutes as a class legislation which discriminates against
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students. persons of the same class and favor others. Person’s with similar
circumstances may be afforded with the privilege of probation merely due
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural to the discretion of the provincial officers. Hence, the Court ruled that the
due process. The Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required said order is not constitutional.
respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. In the case at bar, the resultant inequality may be said to
Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although
counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation perhaps this is necessarily the result in every case. In the instant case,
were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
elements of notice and hearing. probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In
The Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming
university herein, thus: within the purview of the law would be able to enjoy the benefits of
probation in one province while another person similarly situated in
(1) the students must be informed in WRITING of the nature and another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
cause of any accusation against them; discrimination. While inequality may result in the application of the law and
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in al
with the assistance of counsel, if desired: cases the necessary result. Whatever may be the case, it is clear that
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them Section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and inequality are permitted or allowed.
and We are of the opinion that Section 11 of Act. 4221 permits of
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad.
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear We see no difference “BETWEEN A LAW WHICH DENIES EQUAL
and decide the case. PROTECTION” and a “LAW WHICH PERMITS OF SUCH DENIAL”. A
law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrmmination, it is within the
were not met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner constitutional prohibition.
Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and
required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within
twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident, the records
show that instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through Ichong vs. Hernandez
their counsel, copies of the charges. While of the students mentioned in GR 7995, May 31, 1957
the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others
failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to Facts: -supra-
February 18, 1991 to file their statements.
Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause?
adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20,
30
1991. It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Held: None. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them. merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
very start of the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty- enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class,
Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
respondent students. grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall
Respondent students may not use the argument that within such class and those who do not.
since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in
now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as
As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no
the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been
resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted “CLEARED” for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the
country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is
illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty excessive BUT BECAUSE IT FAILS TO CONSIDER VALID
and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES IN SITUATION AMONG INDIVIDUAL
living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino ALIENS WHO ARE REQUIRED TO PAY IT. Although the equal
customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it
and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and
go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of
experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being
disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or
that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee
seem. or a highly paid executive.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or
really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has
He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any
and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action,
the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates
interest in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard,
indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
retail distribution to his hands. grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to
pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price
the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere Stabilization Board, where a law granted a government agency power to
guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme
exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in
actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a
national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.
trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso that the authority
to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon
violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled
legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other. discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the
distinction. — power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade The ordinance in question violates the due process of
by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some
may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we (Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a
answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will
Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the
the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory,
bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due
and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The
established by the Constitution. shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is
given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.)
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions
and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the Dumlao vs. Comelec
equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a GR 52245, Jan. 22, 1980
wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. Facts: The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former
Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the
(Adonis Notes: Under the abovementioned case, the case was decided constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory
under the 1935 Constitution wherein PARITY RIGHTS were granted to and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
U.S. Citizens.) Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho "Sec. 4. Special Disqualification - In addition to violation of
GR 29646, Nov. 10,1978 section 10 of Art. XII-C of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby
Facts: City ordinance No 6537, prohibits aliens from being declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
employed or engaged or participate in any position or association or enumerated in section 1 hereof.
business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual,
without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila is Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official
being questioned by the private respondent for allegedly in violation of the (1)who has received payment of the retirement benefits to
equal protection guarantee. The trial court ruled in favor of the nullity of which he is entitled under the law and (2)who shall have
the ordinance. On appeal, petitioner argues that the ordinance cannot be been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
invalidated on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation, office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified
because it apples to pure tax or revenues measures and said ordinance is to run for the same elective local office from which he has
not such but is an exercise of the police power of the state. retired."
Issue: Whether or not the said ordinance is unconstitutional? Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed
insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is
Held: The ordinance is unconstitutional. The contention that it was based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.
not purely a tax or revenue measure because its principle purpose was for
regulation has no merit. It is obvious that THE ORDINANCE WAS Issue: Whether or not said provision violates the equal protection
PURPOSELY FOR THE RAISING OF MONEY UNDER THE GUISE OF guarantee?
A REGULATION. Further, the assailed ordinance violates the equal
protection clause. To require a person to get a work permit before he Held: No. Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is
can be employed from the Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several
will is tantamount to the denial of the basic right of a person to petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions
engage in a means of livelihood. Aliens once admitted cannot be based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the
deprived of life without due process of law. COMELEC. This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax purposeful discrimination.
or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the
has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational

classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is
age, have been validly classified differently from younger germane to the purpose behind the measure . Unquestionably, it is the
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily for Filipino female overseas workers." 17 This Court has no quarrel that in
retirable. the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of
age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or
might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General
has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the HIMAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994, KAPUNAN, J.:
other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be
good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from Facts: Petitioner, a policeman was implicated in the killing of Benjamin
government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the
elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from informations for murder and attempted murder were filed, the trial court
government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on
to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975. In response, petitioner filed a motion to
local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. lift the order for his suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to 90 days.
has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to Respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was,
blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for likewise, denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari and mandamus to set
government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift
that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and petitioner's preventive suspension. Petitioner posits that as a member of
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a the Philippine National Police, he is covered by the Civil Service Law,
change of mind, he would like to assume again . It is for the very particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days. He claims that an
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil
protection, neither does it permit such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal
Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated. protection of laws.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause
does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That Issue: Whether or not the imposition of preventive suspension of over
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable 90 days is a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws?
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all
those belonging to the same. The purpose of the law is to allow the
emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in Held No. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over
question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
"even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the
theoretical inconsistencies. requirements in Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated" and the
(NOTE: The questioned law is germane to the purposes for which it was succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and
enacted) shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused" are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that
if the case is not terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive
suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, inc. vs. Drillon terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment.
GR 81958, June 30, 1988
We disagree.
Facts: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, inc. (PASEI), is a
domestic corporation engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear,
workers, male and female for overseas employment. PASEI seeks to plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the
challenge the constitutionality of the Department Order No. 1 series of suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave
1998 of the Department of Labor. Said order prohibited and suspended offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until
the overseas deployment of Filipina Domestic and household workers. the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the
Their main contention is that the order is invalid for the DOLE erroneously termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section
exercised police power, which is an adjunct on the powers of congress, providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from
and not executive in character. Moreover, it alleged that there was a arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand
violation of the equal protection clause for it only sought to suspend the independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension.
deployment of Filipina workers, thus there was discrimination. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be
finished.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause?
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment,
Held: No. The Court is satisfied that the classification madeN - the should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no.
preference for female workers - rests on substantial distinctions. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the terminated within ninety (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the
domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails
a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be
maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably
compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to
caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of
victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can
Government's efforts. compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In liberty by habeas corpus.
the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated
instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an identical Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive
Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal
of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of
are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which
a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill- states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to
treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or all personnel of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the
arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are
evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the
this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with R.A. 6975.
as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the
inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the

PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the
suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall *Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law
continue until the case is terminated. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the
present state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These
cases all stemmed from charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed
of R.A. 3019 reads as follows: Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
on National Defense relative to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the
meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section
concerned becomes all the more clear. 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436
The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start
preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are
where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and running, an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office
which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated. upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another
The reason why members of the PNP are treated position without forfeiting his seat.
differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and
badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political
witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative campaign. The intention to impose a strict limitation on the
discussions. participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a political campaigns is unmistakable.
serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending,
his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact officers and employees is presently reflected and implemented by a
that the accused is in uniform and armed. number of statutes. (e.g. Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and Section 55,
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or Chapter 8 – both of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
privilege. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the of 1987). Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus
equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely Election Code) further makes intervention by civil service officers and
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances employees in partisan political activities an election offense. The intent of
and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the
Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan
classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If political activities is too plain to be mistaken.
the classification is based on real and substantial differences; is
germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the
class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding apolitical
may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover
guarantee. elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that “[t]he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
Quinto vs. COMELEC corporations with original charters.” This is because elected public
G.R. No. 189698, February, 22. 2010 officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan
Puno. CJ: political activities almost all year round, even outside of the
campaign period. Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a
Note: The SC reversed its December 1, 2009 decision via the MRs of political office, elective positions included.
COMELEC and movant-intervenors
*Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section
FACTS: In preparation for the 2010 elections, the Commission on 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the Equal Protection
Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 8678 – the Guidelines on Clause
the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official
Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-
2010 National and Local Elections. Sec. 4 of Resolution No. 8678 resigned provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal
provides that “Any person holding a public appointive office or position x x protection clause of the Constitution in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive
x shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of Secretary, et al.
his certificate of candidacy (automatic resignation) however it exempts
those elected officials saying that “Any person holding an elective office or The petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal protection challenge
position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of against Section 14, with the end in view of having the deemed-resigned
candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.” provisions “apply equally” to both elected and appointive officials. We
Sec.13(par. 3) of Republic Act (“R.A.”) No. 9369 provides: “x x x any held, however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a
person holding a public appointive office or position x x x shall be reasonable classification, as there are material and significant distinctions
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office x x x.” between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the contention that
Sec. 66 of BP Blg. 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, reads: “x x x Any Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the
person holding a public appointive office or position x x x shall be Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his Constitution, failed muster.
certificate of candidacy.”
Petitioners were appointive officers of the government who were planning In said case, the Court ruled that:
to run in the 2010 elections sought the nullification of Sec. 4(a) on the “Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
ground, among others, that it is discriminatory and violates the equal appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
protection clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled in their mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
favor. This prompted the COMELEC to file a motion for reconsideration term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.
and the movant-intervenors with their own motion for reconsideration-in- On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
intervention. their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
ISSUES: 1) Whether the assailed decision is contrary to the constitutional entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
proscription against the participation of public appointive officials and appointing authority.
members of the military in partisan political activity.
2) Whether the assailed provisions do not violate the equal Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is
protection clause when they accord differential treatment to elective and that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
appointive officials. Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
3) Whether the assailed provisions do not suffer from the Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the
infirmity of overbreadth. civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote.
HELD: YES to all. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees
holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part
The Court now rules that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of in political and electoral activities.
the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Biraogo et al. v. The Philippine Truth Commission
Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two GR No. 192935; December 7, 2010
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their J. Mendoza
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within FACTS:
the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification. Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon
material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE vs. HONORABLE CONRADO M.
under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.” G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995
The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection To put this case in perspective it should be stated at the outset that it does
clause. It held that (i) in regulating the speech of its employees, the state not concern a demand by a citizen for information under the freedom of
as employer has interests that differ significantly from those it possesses information guarantee of the Constitution. Rather it concerns the power of
in regulating the speech of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must the Office of the Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection with an
therefore balance the legitimate interest of employee free expression investigation conducted by it vis-a-vis the claim of privilege of an agency
against the interests of the employer in promoting efficiency of public of the Government.
services; (iii) if the employees’ expression interferes with the maintenance
of efficient and regularly functioning services, the limitation on speech is Facts: Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the Economic
not unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), while Perez is Chief of the
or latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be covered by any EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces
statutory restrictions. Therefore, insofar as government employees are tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation
concerned, the correct standard of review is an INTEREST-BALANCING of an anonymous letter, written by an employee of the EIIB and a
APPROACH, a means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit concerned citizen, alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled
between the governmental interests and the prohibitions in question. positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. There were unfilled
positions because one hundred ninety (190) personnel were dismissed,
and allegedly, these 190 personnel continued to receive their salaries as
“ghost agents.”
*Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section Petitioner Almonte denied the allegations and asked that the
66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth complaint be dismissed and the case considered closed. Similarly
petitioner Perez, budget chief of the EIIB, denied savings had been
First, according to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law realized from the implementation of of E.O. No. 127 (dismissal of 190
are overly broad because they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants personnel.)
holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of position being T he Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman's office,
held by the employee running for elective office and the degree of Jose F. Saño asked for authority to conduct a preliminary investigation.
influence that may be attendant thereto. Such a myopic view obviously Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a subpoena to petitioners
fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the Almonte and Perez, requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and
government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum to the
bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a Chief of the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all
“powerful political machine” that has amassed “the scattered documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all
powers of government workers” so as to give itself and its evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for
incumbent workers an “unbreakable grasp on the reins of power.” 1988."
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the
Second, the assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of subpoena duces tecum. Respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to
law are overly broad because they are made to apply indiscriminately to quash the subpoena in view of the fact that there were no affidavits filed
all civil servants holding appointive offices, without due regard for the type against petitioners. But he denied their motion to quash the
of elective office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that petitioners were not being forced to
character, or in the national, municipal or barangay level. The Court ruled produce evidence against themselves, since the subpoena duces
that: A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules tecum was directed to the Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In
and guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of certificates of addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records a Section of
candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all
political parties, in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all
Local Elections. Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the documents, salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988,
restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."
specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for reconsideration, stating that, the
Elections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate case, and subject to such
character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA limitations as may be provided by law" and that the complaint in this case
8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for is unsigned and unverified, thus the case is not an appropriate one.
partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and Local According to them, those complainants who wrote the letter should be
Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against identified and should sign the complaint. Otherwise, their right under the
Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable. Similarly, a considered review of equal protection clause of the Constitution will be violated. The motion for
Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in reconsideration, having been denied, hence, this petition.
conjunction with other related laws on the matter, will confirm that these
provisions are likewise not intended to apply to elections for Issue: WoN petitoner’s right to equal protection of the laws has been
nonpartisan public offices. The only elections which are relevant to violated.
the present inquiry are the elections for barangay offices, since
these are the only elections in this country which involve Held: NO. The Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on
nonpartisan public offices. In this regard, it is well to note that from any complaint filed "in any form or manner" concerning official acts or
as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, omissions. (Art. XI, § 12): The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
Congress has intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form
governed by SPECIAL RULES, including a separate rule on deemed or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
resignations which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
Code. owned or controlled corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained The Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides in § 26(2): The Office
only where, in the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever
speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester form concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint
(due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs immediately and if it finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the
the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or same and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the reasons
conduct to go unpunished. Facial overbreadth has likewise not been therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first
invoked where a limiting construction could be placed on the challenged furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the
statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two
cure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the hours from receipt thereof. If the answer is found satisfactory, it shall
statute. dismiss the case.
Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan the Court held that
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting testimony given at a fact-finding investigation and charges made in a
incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as they pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient basis for the
actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of Ombudsman to commence investigation, because a formal complaint was
having arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible really not necessary. Rather than referring to the form of complaints,
inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute. therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI, § 12 means any
case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be "illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient." The phrase "subject to such limitations as

may be provided by law" refers to such limitations as may be provided by within the city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the
Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations.
imposed by the courts. Such limitations may well include a
requirement that the investigation be concluded in camera, with the Issue: Whether or not the ordinance violates the equal protection
public excluded, as exception to the general nature of the clause.
proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman. A reconciliation is
thereby made between the demands of national security and the Held: Yes. The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall
requirement of accountability enshrined in the Constitution. any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." The equal
What has been said above disposes of petitioners' protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and
contention that the anonymous letter-complaint against them is nothing does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
but a vexatious prosecution. It only remains to say that the general classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
investigation in the Ombudsman' s office is precisely for the purpose which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the
of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed against hasty, law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
malicious, and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;
State from useless and expensive trials. There may also be benefit (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
resulting from such limited in camera inspection in terms of increased A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned
public confidence that the privilege is not being abused and increased ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar
likelihood that no abuse is in fact occurring. produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none
Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar
protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and Company, Inc., was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular
fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central,
Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now,
even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax
In the first place, there can be no objection to this because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar
procedure because it is provided in the Constitution Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
itself.
In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the
filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the
framers of the Constitution took into account the well- ART.2 SEARCHES & SEIZURES
known reticence of the people which keep them from
complaining against official wrongdoings.
PEOPLE vs. MARTI
Thirdly, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from G.R. No. 81561, January 18,1991
the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those subject to its jurisdiction are FACTS: Andre Marti went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export
public officials who, through official pressure and Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations them 4 gift- wrapped packages. The packages were not inspected by
held against them. On the other hand complainants are Anita Reyes, the proprietress, as Marti refused, who assured her that the
more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his
afford to hire lawyers friend in Zurich. However, before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau
. of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes, proprietor and
The Ombudsman is designated by the Constitution husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating procedure, opened
"protectors of the people" and as such they are required by it "to act the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar
promptly on complaints in any form or manner against public officials or order emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused. He squeezed one of the
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from
corporation." Even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the
presumptively privileged, this decision would only justify ordering their cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job
inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. Above all, there must be Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and requested a laboratory
a scrupulous protection of the documents delivered. The Court thus examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. It
dismissed the petition, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified
documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with by the forensic chemist of the Narcotics Section of the NBI.
all the safeguards outlined in this decision. ` Thereafter, an information was filed against appellant for
violation of R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). Appellant contends that the
evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and
(NOTE: Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the privacy of communication and therefore argues that the same should be
aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified held inadmissible in evidence.
complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed ,"
while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman ISSUE: Whether or not an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation
anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the state?
there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the
Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting RULING: NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. This
the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person, whether
people which keep them from complaining against official citizen or alien, from interference by government.The contraband in
wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the the case at bar came into possession of the government without the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable
agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are searches and seizures.
public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government
complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
afford to hire lawyers. ) only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made at
the behest or initiation of the proprietor of a private establishment
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., vs. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
G.R. No. L-23794, February 17, 1968, BENGZON, J.P., J.: the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be invoked for only the act of private
Facts: In1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection
No. 4 imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to
the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
countries." Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the CFI with G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967
service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City
of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government
that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the (respondent prosecutors), several judges (respondent judges) issued a
equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, aside from total of 42 search warrants against petitioners & or the corporations of
being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the
Administrative Code.The respondent asserted that the tax ordinance was persons named and/ or the premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or

residences, and to seize several personal properties as the "subject of Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion
the offense; stolen or embezelled or the fruits of the offense," or that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal
offense" as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
(TCC), NIRC and the RPC." blundered," upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null & unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the
void, said petitioners Stonehill, et.al. filed w/ the SC this original action for exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, such as the common-law
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction. action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who
procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in
Issues: the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
1. Whether the right against unlafwful search and seizures may be without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as
invoked by artificial beings? may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given
2. Whether or not the search warrants in question were validly
up this approach and eventually adopted THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE,
issued? realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
3. Whether or not the articles seized by virtue of the warrants are constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
admissible in evidence? seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of
Held: evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is
1. YES. Artificial beings are also entitiled to the guarantee that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
although they may be required to open their books of accounts for constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
examination by the State in the exercise of POLICE POWER. against the offending official may have been protection enough; but
that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
2. YES. Two points must be stressed in connection with Art. III, controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
Section 2 of the Constitution: (a) that no warrant shall issue but upon wrong, will that wrong be repressed".
probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado
therein; and (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search
seized. of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution
None of these requirements has been complied with. of June 29, 1962 are null and void.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural
and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Soliven vs. Makasiar
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and GR No. 82585, November 14, 1988
Revised Penal Code."No specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense Facts: Petitioner Luis Beltran contends, among others, that his
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the constitutional rights were violated when respondent judge issued a
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of a probable warrant of arrest against him without personally examining the
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or Petitioner contends that the Constitution now requires the judge to
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
laws. determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to The basis for his contention was the fact that the word “personally” was
wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our added after the word “determined”, and the phrase “other responsible
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy officers as may be authorized by law” was omitted.
of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice
or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be Issue: Is the petitioner’s contention correct?
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw
the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what Held: No. The pertinent Constitutional provision is highlighted herein
would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in below:
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by
legal means. Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in secure in their persons, houses, papers and
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit effects against unreasonable searches and
to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by seizures of whatever nature and for any
providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
search warrant shall not issue upon probable cause in connection with warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added upon probable cause to be determined
thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for personally by the judge after examination
more than one specific offense." under oath or affirmation of the complainant
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the and the witnesses he may produce, and
application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the particularly describing the place to be
description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to searched and the persons or things to be
wit: seized.
"Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, journals, correspondence, The addition of the word "personally" after the word
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973
typewriters, and other documents and/or Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
papers showing all business transactions authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
including disbursement receipts, balance Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the
sheets and related profit and loss complainant and his witnesses determination of probable cause for the
statements." issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the
records pertaining to ALL business transactions of petitioners herein, existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, THE JUDGE IS
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the NOT REQUIRED TO PERSONALLY EXAMINE THE COMPLAINANT
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly AND HIS WITNESSES.
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
major objective: the elimination of general warrants. submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
General search warrants are outlawed because they and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
of peace officers. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their probable cause.
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges
Rights-- THAT THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED BE PARTICULARLY would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation
DESCRIBED-- as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
elimination of general warrants. cases filed before their courts.
3. NO. Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondent- Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures Silva vs. Honorable Presiding Judge of RTC of Negros Oriental
under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and GR No. 81756, October 21, 1991
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.

Facts: On June 12, 1986, Villamor, Jr., chief of the PC Narcom issuing a warrant of arrest. The trial court ruled in favour of Chan but
Detachment in Dumaguete City, Province of Negros Oriental, filed an dismissed the petition with respect to Fu Yan Fun. Both petitioners and
Application for Search Warrant with the RTC against petitioners Silva. respondent appealed.
Respondent Judge, on the same day issued Search Warrant No. 1, Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Sec. 37 (a) of the
directing the police officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the Immigration Act of 1940, which states that, “The following aliens shall be
residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of RA 6425 otherwise known as arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or any
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. During the search conducted by the police other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
officers, they also seized money belonging to petitioner Antonieta Silva warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the
amounting to P1,231.40. Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground deportation as
Thereafter, Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the charged against the alien xxx.” Petitioners contend that the above
said amount on the ground that the search warrant only authorized the provision trenches upon the constitutional mandate in Art. III, Sec. 1 (3).
police officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint, and They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue
that said officers failed or refused to make a return of the said search warrants of arrest.
warrant in violation of Sec. 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is
Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ right to personal liberty and security of unconstitutional.
homes against unreasonable searches and seizures as contemplated in
Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution was violated. Held: No. The Court held that, Sec. 1 (3), Art. III does not require judicial
intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in
Held: Yes. The abovementioned section and Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an
the Rules of Court provide that the judge must, before issuing a search order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power AS A STEP
warrant, determine, whether there is probable cause by examining PRELIMINARY OR INCIDENTAL TO PROSECUTION OR
the complainant and witness through searching questions and PROCEEDINGS FOR A GIVEN OFFENSE OR ADMINISTRATIVE
answers.The Court held that the judge failed to comply with the legal ACTION, not as A MEASURE INDISPENSABLE TO CARRY OUT A
requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witness in the VALID DECISION BY A COMPETENT OFFICIAL , such as legal order
form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in
existence of probable causes as provided in the said statutory provision. pursuance of a valid legislation.
The depositions of the witnesses did not only contain It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to
leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it
propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were deems hurtful. Owing to the nature of the proceeding, the
merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeographed and all deportation of an alien who is found in this country in violation of
that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks law is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. This is
provided. so, although the inquiry devolves upon executive officers, and their
“The 'probable cause' required to justify the issuance of a findings of fact, after A fair though summary hearing, are made
search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce conclusive.
a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof.Of the 8 The determination of the propriety of deportation is not
questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to identity. The 3rd and 5th a prosecution for, or a conviction of, crime; nor is the deportation a
are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the punishment, even though the facts underlying the decision may
description of the personalities to be seized, which is identical to that in constitute a crime under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply
the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not
examination conducted WAS GENERAL IN NATURE AND MERELY want. The coincidence of local penal law with the policy of congress is
REPETITIOUS of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization purely accidental, and, though supported by the same facts, a criminal
will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements or probable prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are separate and
cause upon which a warrant may issue." independent.
Likewise, this Court previously declared that search warrants In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth
issued are invalid if it is due to the failure of the judge to examine the in Section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution aforesaid requiring that
witness in the form of searching questions and answers. Pertinent portion the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not
of the decision reads: extend to deportation proceedings.
"Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florencio The view, we, here express funds support in the discussions
Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. RESPONDENT JUDGE during the constitutional convention. The convention recognized, as
DID NOT EXAMINE HIM 'IN THE FORM OF SEARCHING QUESTIONS sanctioned by due process, possibilities and cases of deprivation of
AND ANSWERS'. ON THE CONTRARY, THE QUESTIONS ASKED liberty, other than by order of a competent court.
WERE LEADING AS THEY CALLED FOR A SIMPLE 'YES' OR 'NO' Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of
ANSWER. As held in Quintero vs. NBI, 'the questions propounded by sovereignty. Such power is planted on the "accepted maxim of
respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of foreigners within its dominions." So it is, that this Court once aptly
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements remarked that there can be no controversy on the fact that where aliens
for issuance of a valid search warrant." are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is to the effect that temporary
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must visitors who do not depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted
strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that them are subject to deportation by the Commissioner of Immigration, for
he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally having violated the limitation or condition under which they were admitted
examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching as non-immigrants (Immigration Law, Sec. 37(a), subsection (7) C.A. 613,
questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement as amended).
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As "the capricious disregard by And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the
the judge in not complying with the requirements before issuance of Commissioner to issue warrants of arrest was challenged as
search warrants constitutes abuse of discretion". unconstitutional because "such power is only vested in a judge by Section
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused 1, paragraph 3, Article III of our Constitution", this Court declared —
their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is "This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of
highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named as appellant Ng Hua To as temporary visitor is subject to certain
one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of contractual stipulations as contained in the cash bond put up by
money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the him, among them, that in case of breach the Commissioner may
search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal property (a) subject require the recommitment of the person in whose favor the bond has
of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of been filed. The Commissioner did nothing but to enforce such
committing an offense and NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to
or other proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge prepare the ground for his deportation under section 37 (a) of
Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected the motion of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would render such
petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her seized money. power nugatory to the detriment of the State."
It is in this context that we rule that Section 37 (a) of the
Immigration Act of 1940 is not constitutionally proscribed.
Morano vs. Vivo
GR no. L-22196, June 30, 1967 Harvey vs. Santiago
GR No. 82544, June 28, 1988
Facts: On November 23, 1961, Petititoner Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese
citizen, arrived in the Philippines to visit her cousin, Sameul Malaps, Facts: Petitioners were among the twenty-two suspected pedophiles who
together with her minor son, with her first marriage, Fu Yan Fun. They were apprehended after a three-month surveillance by the Commission on
were permitted in the Philippines under a temporary visitor’s visa for 2 Immigration and Deportation (CID) in Pagsanjan, Laguna. They were
months after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00. She married Morano, apprehended by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Santiago.
a Filipino citizen. The Commissioner of Immigration asked them to leave Petitioner contends the validity of their detention in CID Detention Center,
the country due to the expiration of the extensions they applied for. assailing, inter alia, that respondent violated Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Instead of leaving, they petitioned the CFI of Manila for Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since CID
mandamus to compel the Commissioner to cancel petitioners’ Alien agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizures
Certificate of Registration; prohibition to stop the Commissioner from as required by the said provision.

Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-
Issues: 22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific constraints in both
the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which are substantially identical,
1. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless
contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation
arrest? proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An
2. Assuming arguendo that the arrest was not order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is
valid, is there a valid basis for the confinement of herein petitioner? preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in
3. Is the Constitutional prohibition against accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
warrantless arrest & searches applicable herein?
"It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not
constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a
punishment, it being merely the return to his country of an alien who
Held: has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside
1. YES. There can be no question that the right against unreasonable within our borders. The deportation proceedings are administrative
searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly
Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings. It is essential,
of crime or not (Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]. One of the however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient
constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is information about the charges against him, relating the facts relied
that it must be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been upon. It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the
defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced
issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a investigators. However, all the strict rules of evidence governing
cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof”. judicial controversies do not need to be observed; only such as are
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an fundamental and essential, like the right of cross-examination.
arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a
private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an
offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113,
Section 5). Alvarez vs. CFI
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937
probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3)
months during which period their activities were monitored. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the Facts: On June 3, 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury
photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo
articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of
therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12, Rule 126, 1985 Rules on Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the
Criminal Procedure). petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
2. YES. Even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was activities as a money-lender, charging usurious rates of interest in
not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the
charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the
March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his
1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the
Section 69 of the Administrative Code." A hearing is presently being information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit
conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their in question the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject
persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at any
purpose. The process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-
L-39823, February 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 543). "Where a person's mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in
detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-
criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock
for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the
L-49014, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 717). "It is a fundamental rule that a following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936,
writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four
become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning" notebooks, four check stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two
(Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 [1947]). contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts,
their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of
respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked, Under correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen
those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe bundles of invoices and other papers, many documents and loan contracts
that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psycho- with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs
sexual perversion involving children" (Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. The
Sexualis, p. 555; "Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children search for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of
are the preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third New International the petitioner who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground
Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665) [Solicitor General's Return of the Writ, on p. that the agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the articles
10]. While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search
offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion on June 8,
State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be
well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution). ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the
At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having
released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity disobeyed the order of the court.
attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued
(Callanta v. Villanueva, L-24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377; by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house
Bagcal vs. Villaraza, L-61770, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 525). and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain accounting
books, documents and papers belonging to him in his residence situated
in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date,
3. NO. The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized,
are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question
1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. be returned to him.
Section 37(a) provides in part:
(a) The following aliens shall be arrested Issue: Is the warrant of arrest herein illegally issued?
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation or any other Held: YES. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution,
officer designated by him for the purpose relative to the bill of rights, provides that "The right of the people to be
and deported upon the warrant of the secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
Commissioner of Immigration and searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
Deportation after a determination by the but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
Board of Commissioners of the existence under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
of the ground for deportation as charged produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
against the alien; persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58
provides that "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable
The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the cause and upon application supported by oath particularly
summary and indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise, describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
the very purpose of deportation proceedings would be defeated. seized." It will be noted that both provisions require that there be not

only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by seized. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly
oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its complied with but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized,
broadest sense, an “OATH” includes any form of attestation by their description must be rather general, it is not required that a
which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant
act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an could issue. The only description of the articles given in the affidavit
outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used
God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the no other more adequate and detailed description could have been
warrant, of the existence of probable cause .The true test of given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular
sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is description of the contents thereof. The description so made
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that PERJURY could be substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.
It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his
III of the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. claim that the search warrant was obtained illegally, is that the
Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board might provide
constitutional guaranties afford full protection. The term "unreasonable itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases
search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General which might be filed against him for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.
Orders, No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable (fishing expedition) At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised
meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All before the court, it clearly appeared that the books and documents had
illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable while lawful ones are really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an
reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as
or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search
including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence of warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was against the person in whose possession they were found, is
made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is
procured equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the
In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited compulsion of an accused to testify against himself. Therefore, it
authorities, it appears that THE AFFIDAVIT, which served as the appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation of the Anti-Usury Law,
therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and which it is attempted to institute against him, we hold that the search
the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.
are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the
petitioner was subjected. NOTE: In sum, the ruling may be summarized as follows:
Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the
search warrant be declared illegal and cancelled is that it was not 1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No.
supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant. In 58, relative to search and seizure, should be given a liberal
other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot be issued construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain the
unless it be supported by affidavits made by the applicant and the constitutional guaranties whole and in their full force;
witnesses to be presented necessarily by him. Section 1, paragraph 3, of
Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue but upon 2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under fundamentally restrict the enjoyment of the ownership, possession
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. and use of the personal property of the individual, they should be
Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or justice strictly construed;
must, before issuing the warrant, examine under oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing. It is 3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following
the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based solely upon the affidavit
applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge of the petitioner who had NO personal knowledge of the facts
who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the necessary to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose
take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor of seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal
General Orders, No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for
the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or violation of the Anti- Usury Law;
complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in
requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy 4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it
the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles were in the
the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated, neither could
dispense with that of other witnesses. the search and seizure be made at night;
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was
insufficient because HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS WAS NOT 5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of
PERSONAL but merely HEARSAY, it is the duty of the judge to witnesses to corroborate the applicant or complainant in cases
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts, when the
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely
of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require affidavits of other
complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause exists;
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists
probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere 6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal searched and the articles to be seized is necessary, but where, by
knowledge of the facts is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be
warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given,
affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts. as this would mean that no warrant could issue;
The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration
of the illegality of the search warrant and the cancellation thereof, the fact (Adonis Notes: The conjunctive word “AND” in Art. 3, sec.3 is not to be
that it authorized its execution at night. Section 101 of General Orders, meant as BOTH Complainant & Witness should each produce affidavits.
No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively The Judge may require the affidavit solely of the complainant if it is itself
asserted in the affidavit that the property is on the person or in the place sufficient to establish probable cause. – Alvarez vs. CFI)
ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavit insufficient and
the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the Soriano Mata vs. Judge Josephine Bayona
contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be GR 50720, March 26, 1984, De Castro J.
made at night.
One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his Facts: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as
contention that the warrant was issued illegally is the lack of an amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano
adequate description of the books and documents to be seized. Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97 of illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the
General Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented, which Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government
shall serve as the basis for determining whether probable cause exists authorities concerned.”
and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the
discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is
the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under
of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, oath and must be in writing.
and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona replied, “it is with the
court”. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached
them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO
search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994, MELO, J.
invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The motion was denied by the Judge, stating that the court has Facts: Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros, RTC Judge
made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Arturo de Guia issued in the morning of September 4, 1991 a search
Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of warrant authorizing the search and seizure of an "undetermined quantity
352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its
certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the paraphernalias" in the premises of appellant's house. However, the search
search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal warrant was not implemented immediately due to the lack of police
case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when personnel to form the raiding team. At about 9 o'clock in the evening of
these documents are to be attached to the records. Mata came to the that day, a raiding team was finally organized. In the final briefing of the
Supreme Court and prayed that the search warrant be declared invalid for raiding team at the police station, it was agreed upon that PO1 Venerando
its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Luna will buy shabu from appellant and after his return from appellant's
Rules of Court house, the raiding team will implement the search warrant. A marked
money consisting of a P100 bill bearing serial no. PQ 329406 was given
by the Station Commander to PO1 Luna and entered in the police logbook
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant was valid. PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to appellant's house to implement
the search warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del Rosario and
appellant witnessed the search at appellant's house. SPO3 de la Cruz and
Held: NO. We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for PO3 Francisco found a black canister containing shabu, an aluminum foil,
being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. a paltik .22 caliber atop the TV set, three used ammunitions in a cup and
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but three wallets, one containing the marked money. SPO1 Novero found
upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other inside a show box aluminum foils, napkins and a burner.
responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under Normando del Rosario was charged with Illegal Possession
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce". of Firearm and Ammunitions and Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs.
More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the
constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the Issues:
judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
1. Whether or not the implementation of the search warrant was
lawful and that the object seized may be used to prove Del
their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to
Rosario’s guilt?
any affidavits presented to him.
2. Whether the ammunition was validly seized as an incident to a
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
lawful arrest?
thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in
writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to
attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
Held:
order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence
1. No. According to the version of the prosecution, during the alleged buy-
or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the
bust operation, accused-appellant handed over to Veneracion Luna, the
person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
alleged poseur-buyer, a quantity of shabu, and Luna in turn paid accused-
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
appellant a marked 100 bill and then returned to the police station and
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites
informed the raiding team that he had already bought the shabu from
of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
accused-appellant. Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded to the house
rendering the search warrant invalid.
of accused-appellant to implement the search warrant. The version of the
The judge's insistence that she examined the
prosecution is highly incredible. The record is devoid of any reason why
complainants under oath has become dubious by petitioner's claim
the police officers did not make any attempt to arrest accused-appellant at
that at the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers
the time he allegedly sold the shabu to Veneracion Luna who was
connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after
accompanied by another police officer. That was the opportune moment to
he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not
arrest accused-appellant. The version foisted by the prosecution upon
attached to the records, he did not find any certification at the back
this Court is contrary to human experience in the ordinary course of
of the joint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier, before he
human conduct. The usual procedure in a buy-bust operation is for
filed his motion to quash the search warrant and for the return of the
the police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment
articles seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of
he hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is the
the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do
every reason why such a police operation is called a "BUY-BUST"
not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that his
operation. The police poseur-buyer "buys” dangerous drugs from
xerox copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case
the pusher and "bust" (arrests) him the moment the pusher hands
does not show also the certification of respondent judge. This doubt
over the drug to the police officer.
becomes more confirmed by respondent Judge's own admission, while
We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in
insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not
a small canister was actually seized or confiscated at the residence of
take the deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would
accused-appellant. in consequence, the manner the police officers
be to hold a judicial proceeding which will be open and public", such that,
conducted the subsequent and much-delayed search is highly irregular.
according to her, the persons subject of the intended raid will just
Upon barging into the residence of accused-appellant, the police officers
disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else.
found him lying down and they immediately arrested and detained him in
Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure
the living room while they searched the other parts of the house. Although
the defect of the warrant? Be that as it may, there was no "deposition in
they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called
writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable disregard of the
in only after the policemen had already entered accused-appellant's
statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.
residence (pp. 22-23, tsn, December 11, 1991), and, therefore, the
Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to
policemen had more than ample time to plant the shabu.
stop the illegal gambling that lures every man, woman and child, and even
At any rate, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of
the lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends meet justifies her
possession of the shabu contained in a canister and allegedly seized
action. She claims that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal
at his house, for the charge against him was for selling shabu. Sale
"masiao" lottery, she thought it more prudent not to conduct the taking of
is totally different from possession.
deposition which is done usually and publicly in the court room.
Moreover, the search warrant implemented by the raiding
Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is
party authorized only the search and seizure shabu and paraphernalia
sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement
for the use thereof and no other. “ the described quantity of
verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its
meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in
paraphernalia". A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon
empowering a raiding party to undertake a finishing expedition to
oral examination. 4 A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken
seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating
in writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or
to a crime. The Constitution itself and the Rules of Court, specifically
other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and
mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the
usually subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The searching questions
things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for
propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses
the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned,
must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as
much less described with particularity, in the search warrant.
long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the
commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized
2. NO. Neither may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the
by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to
course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, Del Rosario's arrest was
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or
far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized,
investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even
the same is not admissible in evidence.

surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of
their duties.
Umil v. Ramos
GR 81567, 9 June 1990 (It was held that when a police officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the distrurbances created thereby, and
Facts: The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a
(RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the warrant. The offense is deemed committed in the presence or within the
NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound view of the officer.)
at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the
hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZA
of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM G.R. No. 95902, February 4, 1992, Regalado, J.:
soldiers the day before. Dural was then transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined Facts: CIC Taduran together with S/Sgt. Molinawe and other officers
thereat, Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman received from a confidential informer that there was an ongoing illegal
who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Sgt. Molinawe gave the
at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car.Consequently, Dural was money to Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for
referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. After agreeing on the
thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted and later on Don
information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a plastic" which was later
“Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.” identified as marijuana, and received payment therefor. Thereafter,
A petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a report regarding his
behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court said purchase of marijuana. Subsequently, Major Zeidem ordered a team
issued the writ of habeas corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed. Umil and to conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the
Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where same date, appellant, Lonceras and Segovia was arrested. The
charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against constables were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they
them, and they were accordingly released. apprehended the three accused.
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of appellant.
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a
for the crime of rebellion. plastic syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized
by any search warrant. The RTC found Rodrigueza guilty of violating
the Dangerous Drug Act.
Held: Yes. Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples
Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a Issue: Whether or not the evidence confiscated during the raid conducted
continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza is admissible in evidence.
justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to Held: NO. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the
State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling
involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer.
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the
act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification. Based on the very
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of
a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released appellant
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody. This act
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana
the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if did take place, is decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and
the offense is bailable. The absence of a judicial warrant is no legal inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a buy-bust operation . It is
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having been
violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus of duty by an agent of the law.
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be
of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. valid, must generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued
by the proper government authority. True, in some instances, this
Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and
People v. Sucro seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, (1) when the owner of
GR 93239, 18 March 1991 the premises waives his right against such incursion; (2) when the
search is incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) when it is made on vessels
Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to and aircraft for violation of customs laws; (4) when it is made on
monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s house. immigration laws; (5) when it involves prohibited articles in plain
Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. view; or (6) in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises
These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a
was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as search may be validly made even without a search warrant.
Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the
area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not
Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the
Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence,
Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly
ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of violated. The NARCOM agents could NOT have justified their act by
the chapel. invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the
The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already
corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their
teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily
from Macabante. could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest without warrant is lawful. (In the case at bar, the police officer, acting as poseur-buyer
in a “buy-bust operation”, inst5ead of arresting the suspect and taking him
Held: Yes. Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest into custody after the sale, returned to police headquarters and filed his
is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal report. It was only in the evening of the same day that the police officer,
Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched without a warrant, arrested the suspect at the latter’s house where dried
for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of marijuana leaves were found and confiscated. It was held that the arrest
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. and the seizure were unlawful.)
Castiller. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from
the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals
insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance . However, warantless G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992, FELICIANO, J.:
search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed.
The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual Facts: On July 2, 1991, petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-
commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the
accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Eldon Maguan's
cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked

over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an
left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
down petitioner's car plate number. Verification at the LTO showed that Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained
the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.The security guard of the bake under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the
shop positively identified Go as the same person who had shot Maguan. constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
The police launched a manhunt for petitioner. On July 8, 1991, seizures has not been violated.
Petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify
news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. That be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of
same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or
against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been
Prosecutor filed an information for murder before the RTC. Counsel for upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as follows:
petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate
release and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless "Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the
arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had effect that he had been stopped and searched
been conducted before the information was filed. without a search warrant by the military manning
the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating
Issue: W/N a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan the details of the incidents which amount to a
Police in respect of petitioner Go. violation of his right against unlawful search and
seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
Held: NO. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure determine whether there was a violation of
provides that “a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, Valmonte's right against unlawful search and
arrest a person”: seizure. Not all searches and seizures are
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
arrested has committed, is actually committing, forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
or is attempting to commit an offense; determined by any fixed formula but is to be
(b) When an offense has in fact just been resolved according to the facts of each case.
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside
has committed it; and the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on
(c) xxx the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a
vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not
In this case, there was no lawful warrantless arrest of constitute unreasonable search.
petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. Petitioner's
"arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither considered as a security measure to enable the
could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints
none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot destabilize the government in the interest of public
Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting. That notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of
information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
ROMEO POSADAS vs. CA lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all
G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990, GANCAYCO, J. of which are reported in media, most likely brought
about by deteriorating economic conditions - which all
Facts: On October 16, 1986, Patrolman Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very
Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of Davao least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right
assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a of the state to protect its existence and promote
surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were public welfare and an individual's right against a
within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner warrantless search which is however reasonably
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They conducted, the former should prevail.
approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the
INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
by the two notwithstanding his resistance.They then checked the "buri" susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform in the same
bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
revolver, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
(tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
and asked him to show the necessary license or authority to possess conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price
firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and community."
ammunitions in the RTC wherein after a plea of not guilty.Petitioner was
found guilty of the offense charged. Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military
or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no
Issue: W/N the warrantless search on the person of petitioner is valid. question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike
in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
Held: Yes. At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected of the police officers to inspect the same.
that he was hiding something in the buri bag. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the
However, there are many instances where a warrant and possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile
foremost of which is the "STOP AND SEARCH" (a.k.a. STOP & FRISK and much too late.
without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints. As
between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or In People vs. CFI of Rizal, this Court held as follows:
police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is
no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that ". . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the
unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that are exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not
he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question,
search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of

probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured." Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this rule and cannot see how
The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the we can agree with the prosecution.
Solicitor General:
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an
"The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. We therefore
and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either
suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
police officer seeks to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the
case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or
repeatedly walked past a store window and returned to a spot where they while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
apparently conferred with a third man. This aroused the suspicion of a offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
police officer. To the experienced officer, the behavior of the men
indicated that they were sizing up the store for an armed robbery. When These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the
the police officer approached the men and asked them for their names, time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking
they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting
him around and frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been
the same to the other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by
for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal Mengote in their presence.
search and seizure was put up. The United States Supreme Court held
that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was
appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion
possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
make an arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had
than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintain have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding
the status quo while obtaining more information. . . . his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made
the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional them less so, if at all. It might have been different if Mengote had been
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason
violated." to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was
arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after
PEOPLE vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion. He was not skulking
G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992, CRUZ, J. in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing
clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of
Facts: On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District (WPD) received a the noonday sun.
telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-
looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of
in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith them innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and he was
dispatched to the place. Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
narrated that they saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not
was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified been shown what their suspicion was all about . In fact, the policemen
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only
unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The because of the telephone call from the informer that there were
suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to
accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard.(COMPARE THIS WITH PP
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified vs. POSADAS). The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked
as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
pocket. The weapons were taken from them.
An information was filed against the accused-appellant It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily
before the RTC for illegal possession of firearms. The Court convicted arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even
Mengote for violation of PD 1866 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. It if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer-
is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion
admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure. No warrant therefor that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing
having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not
incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal
unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of
security.
Issue: W/N Mengote can be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, the Court sustained the
Held: NO. There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an warrantless arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his
illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon
That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v.
Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the Claudio, the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was
justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the
prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot seat before him. His suspicion aroused, he surreptitiously examined the
profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed." bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the
warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground
The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not that probable cause had been sufficiently established.
applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of
Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule The case before us is different because there was nothing to support
113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows: the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes
and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or private it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been
person may without a warrant, arrest a person: committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being
attempted in their presence.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, where the Court held that
the warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has effected while he was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed
committed it; and nor was he actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the
presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements
have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that

Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the In a SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST, as
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed. the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search.
committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the search can be made the process cannot be reversed. At bottom,
police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the
Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or
or the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was
only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which
revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it. may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the
means of escaping or committing violence.
Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto
Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an
of Danganan's house. overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime
had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
At the time of the arrest in question, the accused- committed.
appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in
abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been
apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being one incidental to a lawful arrest.
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope
presence. There was nothing to support the arresting officers' of a "STOP-AND-FRISK" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing
suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
abdomen. Par. (b) is no less applicable because has not been shown We merely hold today that where a police officer observes
that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
that had yet to be committed. and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
SAMMY MALACAT vs. CA conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997, DAVIDE, JR., J. an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such
a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . .
Facts: In response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo
Yu, a member of the WPD, along with 3 other policemen were on foot Other notable points of Terry are that while probable
patrol along Quezon Blvd, Quiapo when they chanced upon 2 groups of cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
Muslim-looking men posted at opposite sides of Quezon Blvd. The men holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu and his frisk." A “genuine reason” must exist, in light of the police officer's
companions observed the groups for about 30 mins. The members fled experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
when they approached one of the groups. However, Yu caught up with the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-
petitioner. Upon searching the latter, he found a fragmentation grenade and-frisk" serves a TWO-FOLD INTEREST: (1) the general interest of
tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." One of Yu’s companions effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber pistol was recovered. that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
Sammy Malacat was charged with violation of Sec.3 of PD appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
1866 for illegal possession of hand grenade. possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police
Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest of petitioner is valid. officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals
is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
Held: No. Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a used against the police officer.
grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were invalid, as will be
discussed below. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures invalid:
is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a
seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days
to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part: corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.
Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search
peace officer or a private person may, without a petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony,
warrant, arrest a person: contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased
before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest expressly declares
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or his companions were "immediately collared."
is attempting to commit an offense;
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could
(b) When an offense has in fact just been have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes
committed, and he has personal knowledge of were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us incredulous since
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already
committed it; and 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were
merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or
(c) When the person to be arrested is a trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination:
prisoner who has escaped . . .
Q And what were they doing?
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section A They were merely standing.
5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that
under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Q You are sure of that?
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited A Yes, sir.
to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk." create any commotion.
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless A None, sir.
search as a "stop and frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from the
accused as an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant A None, sir.
requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe
concepts of a "STOP-AND-FRISK" and of a SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to
A LAWFUL ARREST. These two types of warrantless searches differ in Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the
terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
and in their allowable scope. between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was

indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as FACTS: Accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged for violation
noted by the trial court: of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. Accused Mikael
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
were not yet aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. December 1988 as a tourist. On May 11, 1989, the accused went to
They did not see any bulging object in his person. Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada. An order to establish a checkpoint in the
said area was because it was reported that in that same morning a
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the During the inspection, suspecting the bulge on accused's
Constitution. waist, CIC Galutan required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag with
objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one
PEOPLE vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain
G.R.No. 74869, July 6, 1988, CRUZ, J. hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Before the accused alighted from the
bus, he stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Facts: Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them.
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo A teddy bear was found in each bagand when the officers opened the
City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, teddy bears it also contained hashish.
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him
to their headquarters for investigation. ISSUE: Whether the search made by the NARCOM officer was illegal
The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later having no search warrant issued.
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as
marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act HELD: No. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
was filed against him. secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a
received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest
on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person
on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and under the following circumstances stated in Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the rules
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer on criminal procedure.
had pointed to him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. In his defense, Aminnudin accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made
alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the
bag was confiscated without a search warrant. foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not
Issues: armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
1. W/N the arrest was legal? personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of
2. W/N the seized effects may be used as evidence as the search the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to
was allegedly an incident to a lawful arrest? believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
Held: circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects
1. No. There was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. searched. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has
The accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable
to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in suspiciously and attempted to flee.
the case of Roldan v. Arca, for example. It was held that vessels and Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused
aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting
secured. suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM
conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that
arrest and search Aminnudin. His name was known. The vehicle was a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited
identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the drugs in his possession.
information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from
warrant. Yet they did nothing to comply Moreover, the accused- Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime When NARCOM received the information, a few hours
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done before the apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling
so. from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the police
warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located
been shown that they were caught red-handed, as result of what are at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged
popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113 in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some
was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed
was in the act of selling the prohibited drug. out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the spot information, the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search
was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing warrant.
was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused was
was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was
the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a BULGE
carrier of the marijuana that the suddenly became suspect and so on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused
arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only
determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent
man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present
2. NO. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there his identification papers when required to do so?
was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under (1)The receipt of information by NARCOM that a
the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was possession, plus (2) the suspicious failure of the accused to produce
inadmissible. his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something
illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the
198 SCRA 401, G.R. No. 91107, 19 Jun 1991 personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM
officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening

one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of
to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the
(2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the
accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties
passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and
accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago filed charges
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law against the Chief of Police and the Customs Commissioner.
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
ISSUE: Where petitioners allowed to search and seize the questioned
Espano vs. CA artices even without a warrant?
G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998
HELD: Yes. The policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any
FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs
Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the
and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,
Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and
of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and
identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying
two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But
went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling
marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge
was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991, or justice of the peace . . ." It is our considered view, therefore, that
petitioner posted bail 3 and the trial court issued his order of release on except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
July 29, 1991. exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search
and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred laws.
in convicting him on the basis of the following: (a) the pieces of evidence
seized were inadmissible; (b) In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his
companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized
ISSUE: W/N the marijuana confiscated from the house in addition to the the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and amended
marijuana confiscated while Espano waa frisked may be used as petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not
evidence? even allege that there was a search. All that they complained of was,
"That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without
HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against any search warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police,
unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which where they were detained."
provides:
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature obtaining in the instant case. The guaranty of freedom from
and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant,
seized." because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the
as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the language of the Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the
under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.
marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan
and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions. "The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent
development, which has multiplied by quantity production and taken
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the possession of our highways in battalions, until the slower, animal-
trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare.
initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense
warrantless search made inside the appellant's house became quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they
unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of
warrant. Such search cannot fall under "SEARCH MADE silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world
INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST," the same being limited to before their advent. The question of their police control and
body search and to that point within reach or control of the person reasonable search on highways or other public places is a serious
arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called
committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was "bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which is itself is no small matter.
admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a
be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control. vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their
active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the which the law especially guards from search and seizure without
DOCTRINE OF SEARCH MADE INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST. process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized
The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and
were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem a
beyond the reach and control of petitioner. condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our
criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile
upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is
Papa vs. Mago unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial
G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968 question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made."
FACTS: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police
the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information received Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by
on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the
effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws,
following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila, We have thus
two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of resolved the principal and decisive issue in the present case.
Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted
surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate
No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the People vs. Musa
counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993

FACTS: In the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a
leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian, warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and
test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful
received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the
selling marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled
agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested
informer, to the house of Mari Musa to which house the civilian informer and money or property found upon his person which was used in the
had guided him. The same civilian informer had also described to him the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might
appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper- furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of
wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the
office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus cause." Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-
Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money
be marijuana. found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy- without arrest and search warrants.
bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for
which purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then
Sali Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic
a receipt. The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up bag hanging in a corner.
security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's
raising his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful
two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles. arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
Belarga's team was composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt. Amado premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the
Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong. "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
Mari Musa, while the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at evidence.
strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt.
Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from The "PLAIN VIEW" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch
where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of his house, unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The
gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, "PLAIN VIEW" DOCTRINE is usually applied where a police officer is
Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Furthermore, the
wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of
marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right the doctrine:
hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped
towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house. "What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which
four persons inside his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification -
The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
house, the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's wife, slipped lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find unconnected with a search directed against the accused - and permits the
the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to
containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
was then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At something incriminating at last emerges."
Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-
wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa. It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in
"plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of
The appellant assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the apparent from the "plain view" of the object. Stated differently, it
appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged must be “IMMEDIATELY APPARENT” to the police that the items that
signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve the marked subject to seizure.
money but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he
gave the marked money to his wife. Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in
Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to
"cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen." find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the
They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their
they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The
questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another
contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that these are before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker v. California, where the
admissible in evidence. police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent
kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM
agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious
ISSUE: May all the evidence herein confiscated be exluded under the intention of fishing for more evidence.
exclusionary rule?
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one
HELD: NO. Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask
every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures by providing the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to
in Article III, Section 2, the following: respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v.
California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was
complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain
view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an
violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. observer.
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain
and seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic
Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, the Court stated that "[t]he most important bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to
exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest."

The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in RAMIREZ vs. CA
any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by FACTS:
virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D.
wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the
pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."
G.R. NO. 83988 SEPTEMBER 29, 1989 In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and
FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to
Command (NCRDC) was activated to maintain peace and order, the costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion.
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. (Conversation attached
checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed below)
and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a
of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not
at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other
the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had than a participant to the communication.
gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected Private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant. with SC, which forthwith referred the case to the CA.
CA promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and seizure without in the present court's order is null and void. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
case is illegal. which CA denied. Hence, this petition.
HELD: No. Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being ISSUE:
harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act
grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine parties to the conversation.
checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners'
right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights. The constitutional HELD:
right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right First, legislative intent is determined principally from the
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would
from a consideration of the circumstances involved. be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and
had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine being authorized by all the parties to any private
whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which or cable, or by using any other device or
are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the record such communication or spoken word by
facts of each case. using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein,
these do not constitute unreasonable search. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a any private communication to secretly record such communication
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded party other than or different from those involved in the private
as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation
and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator"
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in under this provision of R.A. 4200.
such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records,
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions ---- which all sum up moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in
to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the persons.
former should prevail. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is together with the deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
an orderly society and a peaceful community. specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the
acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
SEC. 3 PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
AND CORRESPONDENCE communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication"
to a point of absurdity. The word COMMUNICATE comes from the latin

word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting nilapastangan mo ako.
signification, , as in a CONVERSATION, or signifies the "process by CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.
a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)". Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non- Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or (G.R. No. 107838, February 20, 1996)
thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private Mendoza, J.,
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the
legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" FACTS: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" 1982, Cecilia entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and
and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below: forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
fear from their conversations being overheard. But Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
this statement ignores the usual nature of seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their against her husband. Dr. Martin, hence brought an action for the recovery
lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations of the documents and papers and for damages against Cecilia. The trial
are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, court rendered its judgment declaring Dr. Martin as the capital/exclusive
agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti- owner of the said properties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
social desires of views not intended to be taken the trial court.
seriously. The right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has expressly been
assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, ISSUE: Whether or not the documents and papers seized by Cecilia
the framers of our Constitution must have recognized are admissible in evidence against Dr. Martin.
the nature of conversations between individuals and
the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his HELD: NO. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible
feelings and of his intellect. They must have known in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
communication between individuals — free from her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."Any
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them
arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, following the principle that in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized her.
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses
by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against
CONVERSATION: the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am. subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, any communication received in confidence by one from the other during
nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo. communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon. what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic) of fidelity that each owes to the other.
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing
ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, FELIPE NAVARRO vs COURT OF APPEALS
kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999,MENDOZA, J.
ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review
mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi Facts:
ka sa akin makakahingi. Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Ike Lingan, who were
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up reporters of the radio station together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the
to 10:00 p.m. Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a
hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act.
paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and
kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita). took a picture. This called the attention of Dante Liquin, the floor manager,
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko. who together with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko. demanded to know why he took a picture which resulted to a heated
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on argument. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun,
your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang he ran out of the joint followed by his companions. They went to the police
nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa. station to report the matter. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon. motorcycle who were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa. corner for around fifteen minutes. Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, cursed him. Petitioner Navarro
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako. then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana — Jalbuena. At this point, Lingan intervened. The two then had a heated
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. exchange. As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him
Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako. with the handle of his pistol. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako. his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung the forehead which floored him. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena
paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the
nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko. deceased. This was submitted as evidence.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon. Issue:
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union. Whether or not the tape is admissible as evidence in view of RA 4200
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka which prohibit wire tapping?
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa
akin, dahil tapos ka na. Held: No, it may not. Sec. 1 of RA 4200 provides that “ It shall also be
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob. unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts

penalized in the next preceding sentence to knowingly possess any tape TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATION. When the
record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies access code of the control programs of the particular computer
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty,
after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate
to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the the data stored within the system.
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions
thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That It is plain and the SC held that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that
the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be
criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper
shall not be covered by this prohibition safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to
of PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS. Since the exchange between track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons
petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is to access confidential information and circumvent the right against
not prohibited. Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by
voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable
personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the
the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we
persons such are claimed to belong. consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or
placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
OPLE v. TORRES encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to
G.R. No. 127685; July 23, 1998; Puno, J. prevent.
FACTS: The SC rejected the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual
Petitioner Blas Ople prays that the SC invalidate Administrative Order No. has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. THE
System" on two important constitutional grounds: one, it is a usurpation of REASONABLENESS OF A PERSON'S EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on DEPENDS ON A TWO-PART TEST: (1) whether by his conduct, the
our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether
this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. The
factual circumstances of the case determine the reasonableness of
the expectation. However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or
ISSUE: diminish this expectation. The use of biometrics and computer technology
Whether AO 308 violates the constitutionally mandated right to privacy in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation
of privacy.
HELD. Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the Next, the Solicitor General urges the SC to validate A.O. No. 308's
subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an abridgment of the right of privacy by using THE RATIONAL
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to RELATIONSHIP TEST. He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308
privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic
government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of
The SC prescinds from the premise that the right to services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, concludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. The SC was not
justified by some COMPELLING STATE INTEREST and that it is impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, the SC upheld the
NARROWLY DRAWN. constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a
A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities,
need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's
conveniently transact business with basic service and social right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public
security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.
and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A.
debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the 3019 is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019
issuance of A.O. No. 308. BUT WHAT IS NOT ARGUABLE IS THE itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were
BROADNESS, THE VAGUENESS, THE OVERBREADTH OF A.O. NO. prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid
308 WHICH IF IMPLEMENTED WILL PUT OUR PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO abuses. In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a
PRIVACY IN CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is
not narrowly drawn. They must satisfactorily show the presence of
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is
Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the
establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to
308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by
not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information the Constitutions.
alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims
that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
contribute to the "generation of population data for development government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to
planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on
for identification but the generation of other data with remote the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the
relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
the identification of the individual through his PRN.
Thus, the petition was GRANTED.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308
cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said
administrative order, an individual must present his PRN every time he
deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. SECTION 4
His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded
— whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency.
The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments,
income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN,
the better the chance of building a huge formidable information base
through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered THE UNITED STATES vs FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL.
for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918.
this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert
invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province
our authorities to resist. It does not provide who shall control and of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the
access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. Executive Secretary charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of
These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and
the integrity of the information. THERE ARE ALSO NO CONTROLS asking for his removal.

The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of
first instance for the 7th Judicial District requesting investigation, proper "The DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS rests upon
action, and report. The justice of the peace was notified and denied the public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration
charges. The judge of first instance, having established guilt, of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances
recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent be removed afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.'"
from his position as justice of the peace and it is ordered that the
proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive Privilege is classified as either ABSOLUTE or QUALIFIED. With the first,
Secretary.Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words
judge of first instance granted the motion, documents were introduced suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice.
asserting that the justice of the peace was the victim of prosecution, and The rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
that charges were made for personal reasons. He was then acquitted.
Thereafter, in 1916, a criminal action for libel against the defendants who "A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which
earlier initiated the petition for the judge’s removal was instituted. The CFI the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he
of Pampanga found the defendants guilty. has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained incriminatory matter which
Issue: Whether or not the defendants are guilty of a libel of Roman without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable."
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of
Pampanga. A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a
complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the
Held: No.The Constitution of the United States and the State character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer
constitutions guarantee the right of freedom of speech and press and the or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the
right of assembly and petition. We are therefore, not surprised to find statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief
President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle
Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the
down the inviolable rule "That no law shall be passed abridging the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-
freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All
peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of
grievances." justice and of public affairs. The DUTY under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones person in good faith believe he is acting in pursuance thereof
Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the
for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are not mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A
unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the
the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
American people demanded before giving their approval to the person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective
Constitution. functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case
out of the privilege.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare
verbiage. The language carries with it all the applicable jurisprudence of In the usual case MALICE can be presumed from defamatory words.
great English and American Constitutional cases. And what are these PRIVILEGE destroys that PRESUMPTION. The onus of proving malice
principles? Volumes would inadequately answer. But included are the then lies on the plaintiff.
following:
The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable
demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to cause will amount to proof of malice.
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of
free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive
unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.
reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to the
criticism does not authorized defamation. Nevertheless, as the basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition,
individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute must be
common good. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic Law, and having
Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary - to any or all the sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of
agencies of Government - PUBLIC OPINION should be the constant this case with these principles.
source of liberty and democracy.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a
vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or
criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as
public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges
of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus
not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. On the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as
contrary, it is a DUTY which every one owes to society or to the State to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the
to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for
the duty of all know of any official dereliction on the part of a them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is
magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens - to secure the
to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish removal from office of a person thought to be venal - were justifiable.
them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens
the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which
their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were
but only in a despotism." sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince
him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the
The RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION is the necessary petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of
consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the the peace was proper. And finally the charges and the petition were
right of free speech. ASSEMBLY means a right on the part of citizens submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Executive Secretary.
PETITION means that any person or group of persons can apply, The present facts are further essentially different from those
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the established in other cases in which private individuals have been
government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling convicted of libels of public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood,
and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the calumny, against the man and not the officer, have been the causes
charges made. of the verdict of guilty.
(1)Public policy, (2)the welfare of society, and (3)the orderly administration We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the
of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional
inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest
adoption of the DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGE.

endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them
for their good citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted. Ayer Production PTY Ltd. vs. Capulong
GR 82380, April, 29, 1988, FELICIANO, J.
FACTS:
People vs. Alarcon The petitioner informed private respondent Juan Ponce
GR 46551, Dec. 12, 1939 Enrile about the projected motion picture entitled "The Four Day
Revolution" enclosing a synopsis of it, the full text of which is set out
FACTS: As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of first below: The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series about People
Instance of Pampanga in criminal case No. 5733, The People of the Power—a unique event in modern history that-made possible the Peaceful
Philippines vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al., convicting the accused therein — revolution in the Philippines in 1986. Faced with the task of dramatizing
except one — of the crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory these remarkable events, screenwriter David Williamson and history Prof
letter, signed by Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the Al McCoy have chosen a "docu-drama" style and created [four] fictitious
President of the Philippines. characters to trace the revolution from the death of Senator Aquino, to the
A copy of said letter found its way to the herein respondent, Feb revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from the country.
Federico Mañgahas who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of Private respondent Enrile replied that "he would not and will
general circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an article not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
published by him in the issue of that paper of September 23, 1937. The name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or
objectionable portion, written in Spanish, is inserted in the following television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial
petition of the provincial fiscal of Pampanga, filed with the Court of First exploitation". Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private
Instance of that province on September 29, 1937. On the same date, the respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script. On 23 February
lower court ordered the respondent to appear and show cause. The 1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with application for Temporary
respondent appeared and filed an answer, alleging that the publication of Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion with the Regional Trial Court of
the letter in question is in line with the constitutional guarantee of freedom Makati seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four
of the press. Day Revolution". The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the
mini-series without private respondent's consent and over his objection,
ISSUE: constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy.
Whether the publication of the letter in question is within the ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ right to freedom of expression
purview of constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, hence the outweigh private respondent Enrile’s right to privacy?
accused cannot be held guilty in contempt of court?
HELD: YES. The freedom of speech includes the freedom to film and
HELD: produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in
1. YES. The elements of contempt by newspaper publications theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our day and age,
are well defined by the cases adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. motion pictures are a universally utilized vehicle of communication and
Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or medium of expression. Along with the press, radio and television, motion
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication for
proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily information, education and entertainment. Motion pictures are important
punish able by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of
ended. It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues
impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits
before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. is considerable. Importance of motion pictures as an organ of public
What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as
newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court to well as to inform. There is no clear dividing line between what involves
administer justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained,
pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression."This freedom is
decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That, we available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned
believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that the letter motion picture companies. Furthermore, the circumstance that the
complained of was published after the Court of First Instance of production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected
Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of
and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The freedom of speech and of expression.
fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the The counter-balancing claim of private respondent is to a
accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the right of privacy. The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the
important consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into
modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that
could not have been influenced by the questioned publication. person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited
If it be contended, however, that the publication of the from him or to be published about him constitute of apublic
questioned letter constitutes contempt of the Court of Appeals where the character. Succinctly put, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY cannot be
appeal in the criminal case was then pending, as was the theory of the invoked resist publication and dissemination of MATTERS OF
provincial fiscal below which was accepted by the lower court, we take PUBLIC INTEREST. The interest sought to be protected by the right
the view that in the interrelation of the different courts forming our of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the
integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an
representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.
contempts in vindication of the authority and de corum which are not Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, on which private respondent
its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and relies heavily, recognized a right to privacy in a context which included a
this last court be comes thereby charged with the authority to deal with claim to freedom of speech and of expression. Lagunzad involved a suit
contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal. for enforcement of a licensing agreement between a motion picture
The Solicitor-General, in his brief, suggests that "even if producer as licensee and the widow and family of the late Moises Padilla
there had been nothing more pending before the trial court, this still had as licensors. This agreement gave the licensee the right to produce a
jurisdiction to punish the accused for contempt, for the reason that the motion picture portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate
publication scandalized the court. The rule suggested, which has its origin of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros
at common law, is involved in some doubt under modern English law and Occidental during the November 1951 elections and for whose murder,
in the United States, "the weight of authority, however, is clearly to Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and
the effect that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted under his men were tried and convicted. In affirming the judgment of the lower
our constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press." Other court enforcing the licensing agreement against the licensee who had
considerations argue against our adoption of the suggested holding. As produced the motion picture and exhibited it but refused to pay the
stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that "newspaper stipulated royalties, the Court, through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera,
publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the said:
courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute "Neither do we agree with petitioner's
criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts; that the submission that the Licensing Agreement is
rule is otherwise after the case is ended. In at least two instances, this null and void for lack of, or for having an illegal
Court has exercised the power to punish for contempt "on the cause or consideration, while it is true that
preservative and on the vindicative principle, on the corrective and petitioner had purchased the rights to the book
not on the retaliatory idea of punishment". Contempt of court is in entitled 'The Moises Padilla Story,' that did not
the nature of a criminal offense, and in considering the probable effects dispense with the need for prior consent and
of the article alleged to be contemptuous, every fair and reasonable authority from the deceased heirs to portray
inference consistent with the theory of defendant's innocence will be publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in
indulged, and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the that of his mother and the members of his
guilt of one of constructive contempt for interfering with the due family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, ([1895],
administration of justice the doubt must be resolved in his favor, and he 147 NY 434, 42 NE, 31 LRA 286. 49 Am St
must be acquitted. Rep 671), 'a privilege may be given the
surviving relatives of a deceased person to
protect his memory, but the privilege exists for

the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings was as yet uncompleted and hence NOT exhibited to any audience.
and to prevent a violation of their own rights in Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what
the character and memory of the deceased.' the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other
words, NO "CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER" of any violation of any
Petitioner's averment that private respondent right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.
did not have any property right over the life of
Moises Padilla since the latter was a public 2. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-
figure, is neither well taken. Being a public bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos
figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy Avenue in February 1986, and the train of events which led up to that
in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and
invade a person's privacy to disseminate public concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners' argue, of international interest. The
information does not extend to a fictional or subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this
novelized representation of a person, no matter country and as such, must be regarded as having passed into the
how public a figure he or she may be (Garner public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and
v. Triangle Publications, DCNY, 97 F. Supp., expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The subject
564, 549 [1951]). In the case at bar, while it is matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and
true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and CERTAINLY
true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner NOT TO THE PRIVATE LIFE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT PONCE
admits that he included a little romance in the ENRILE. Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story of
film because without it, it would be a drab story Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his immediate family,
of torture and brutality." what we have here is not a film biography, more or less fictionalized,
of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is not
In Lagunzad, the Court had need, as we have in the instant case, to principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile; but it
deal with contraposed claims to freedom of speech and of is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan
expression and to privacy. Lagunzad the licensee in effect claimed, Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change
in the name of freedom of speech and expression, a right to produce of government in February 1986.
a motion picture biography at least partly "fictionalized" of Moises
Padilla without the consent of and without paying pre-agreed 3. The extent of the intrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan
royalties to the widow and family of Padilla. In rejecting the Ponce Enrile that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of
licensee's claim, the Court said: "The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be LIMITED IN
CHARACTER. The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the
Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioner's synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally described as such
contention that the Licensing Agreement intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful
infringes on the constitutional right of freedom historical account. Private respondent does not claim that
of speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any
and as a newspaperman, he had the right to part of the private life of private respondent or that of any member of
express his thoughts in film on the public life of his family.
Moises Padilla without prior restraint. The right
of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a 4. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of
preferred position in the 'hierarchy of civil public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private
liberties' respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a
"public figure:"
The prevailing doctrine is that the CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER RULE is such a "A PUBLIC FIGURE has been defined as a person who, by his
limitation. Another criterion for permissible accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
limitation on freedom of speech and of the profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in
press, which includes such vehicles of the his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public
mass media as radio, television and the personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included
movies, is the 'BALANCING-OF-INTERESTS in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation
TEST'. The principle 'requires a court to take by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional
conscious and detailed consideration of the baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however,
interplay of interests observable in a given broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and
situation or type of situation' explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy,
and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It
In the case at bar, the interests observable are includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public
the right to privacy asserted by respondent and attention is focused upon him as a person.
the right of freedom of expression invoked by
petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least,
those interests, we hold that under the their right of privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less
particular circumstances presented and indiscrimately, in the decisions" that they had sought publicity and
considering the obligations assumed in the consented to it, and so could not complain when they received it; that their
Licensing Agreement entered into by personalities and their affairs had already become public, and could no
petitioner, the validity of such agreement will longer be regarded as their own private business; and that the press had a
have to be upheld particularly because the privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who
limits of freedom of expression are reached have become legitimate matters of public interest. On one or another of
when expression touches upon matters of these grounds, and sometimes all, it was held that there was no liability
essentially private concern. when they were given additional publicity, as to matters legitimately within
the scope of the public interest they had aroused.
Whether the "BALANCING OF INTERESTS TEST" or the "CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER TEST" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other matters of public
the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The interest, was held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public
production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The to know what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the press
Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, and other agencies of information to tell it. 'NEWS' includes all
constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of events and items of information which are out of the ordinary
privacy." humdrum routine, and which have 'that indefinable quality of information
which arouses public attention.' To a very great extent the press, with its
1. It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the experience or instinct as to what its readers will want, has succeeded in
instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the making its own definition of news, as a glance at any morning newspaper
respondent Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by will sufficiently indicate. It includes homicide and other crimes, arrests and
petitioners. The respondent Judge has restrained petitioners from filming police raides, suicides, marriages and divorces, accidents, a death from
and producing the entire proposed motion picture. It is important to note the use of narcotics, a woman with a rare disease, the birth of a child to a
that in Lagunzad, there was no prior restrain of any kind imposed upon the twelve year old girl, the reappearance of one supposed to have been
movie producer who in fact completed and exhibited the film biography of murdered years ago, and undoubtedly many other similar matters of
Moises Padilla. Because of the preferred character of the constitutional genuine, if more or less deplorable, popular appeal.
rights of freedom of speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of
invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint upon the exercise of such Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia,
freedoms. The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint does not, of of his participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of
course, mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a the change of government in February 1986. Because his
person claiming to exercise such constitutional freedoms. The participation therein was major in character, a film reenactment of
respondent Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role played
an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of
complaint by the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily NARROWER than that of
Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion picture an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the

seclusion of simple private citizenship. He continues to be a "public Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended
figure." After a successful political campaign during which his party is himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. It
participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly is well to note that the revelation of the identity of the person alluded to
referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public came not from petitioner Borjal but from private respondent himself when
place, the Senate of the Philippines. he supplied the information through his 4 June 1989 letter to the editor.
Had private respondent not revealed that he was the "organizer" of the
5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case FNCLT referred to in the Borjal articles, the public would have remained in
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the blissful ignorance of his identity. It is therefore clear that on the element of
right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the identifiability alone the case falls.
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or We now proceed to resolve the other issues and pass upon the pertinent
reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private findings of the courts a quo on wether the disputed articles constitute
respondent in the EDSA Revolution. There must, further, be no privileged communications as to exempt the author from liability.
presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent
and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every
facts. The proposed motion picture should not enter into what Mme. defamatory imputation is presumed to be
Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as "matters of malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
essentially private concern." To the extent that "The Four Day and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private except in the following cases:
respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are
directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA 1) A private communication made by any
Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's privacy cannot be person to another in the performance of any
regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be legal, moral or social duty; and,
carried out even without a license from private respondent.
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings
Borjal vs. Court of Appeals which are not of confidential nature, or of any
GR 126466, Jan. 14, 1999, BELLOSILLO, J. statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by
FACTS: Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the public officers in the exercise of their functions.
incorporators of Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc.,
owner of The Philippine Star. Between May and July 1989 a series of
articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION may be either absolutely
column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities privileged or qualifiedly privileged. ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED
of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private COMMUNICATIONS are those which are not actionable even if the
respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI,
mentioned. Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint with the of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from
National Press Club (NPC) against petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct. liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
He accused petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of leverage to Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED
obtain contracts for his public relations firm, AA Borjal Associates. In turn, COMMUNICATIONS containing defamatory imputations are not
petitioner Borjal published a rejoinder to the challenge of private actionable unless found to have been made without good intention
respondent not only to protect his name and honor but also to refute the or justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications"
claim that he was using his column for character assassination. 7 and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks."
Apparently not satisfied with his complaint with the NPC, private
respondent filed a criminal case for libel against petitioners Borjal and Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within
Soliven, among others. the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as
correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private
ISSUE: Whether the disputed articles constitute privileged communications nor fair and true report without any comments or
communications as to exempt the author from liability. remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not
privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an
HELD: YES. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since FAIR
victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. COMMENTARIES ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST are likewise
It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis
the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the
third person could identify him as the object of the libelous Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. Art.
publication. III, Sec. 4, provides: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people to
Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in the case at peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
bar. grievances. In the case of U.S vs. Bustos, this Court ruled that
publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are
The questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This
respondent Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. The first constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the
of the Jaywalker articles which appeared in the 31 May 1989 issue of legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing
The Philippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that private libels.
respondent was the person referred to therein. Surely, as observed
by petitioners, there were millions of "heroes" of the EDSA The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom
Revolution and anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an of the press. To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to
"organizer of seminars and conferences." As a matter of fact, in his petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing
June 1989 column petitioner Borjal wrote about the "so-called First violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in the
National Conference on Land Transportation whose principal organizers freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos:
are not specified" . Neither did the disclose the identity of the conference
organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names where 'Public policy, the welfare of society, and the
private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was described as Executive orderly administration of government have
Director and Spokesman and not as a conference organizer. The printout demanded protection of public opinion. The
and tentative program of the conference were devoid of any indication of inevitable and incontestable result has been the
Wenceslao as organizer. The printout which contained an article entitled development and adoption of the doctrine of
"Who Organized the NCLT?" did not even mention private respondent's privilege.'
name, while the tentative program only denominated private respondent
as "Vice Chairman and Executive Director," and not as organizer.
The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule
No less than private respondent himself admitted that the FNCLT that privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of
had several organizers and that he was only a part of the public opinion.
organization, thus -
To reiterate, FAIR COMMENTARIES ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC
Significantly, private respondent himself entertained doubt that he INTEREST are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
was the person spoken of in Borjal's columns. The former even called for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
up columnist Borjal to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
the subject articles. His letter to the editor published in the 4 June 1989 false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
issue of The Philippine Star even showed private respondent Wenceslao's judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
uncertainty - nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a
PUBLIC PERSON IN HIS PUBLIC CAPACITY, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public

official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is health, or any other legitimate public interest.
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it
might reasonably be inferred from the facts. 2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and
peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion
There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of
public interest. In his testimony, private respondent spelled out the Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free
objectives of the conference thus - speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful
means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and
x x x x The principal conference objective is to explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that
come up with a draft of an Omnibus Bill that will the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in
embody a long term land transportation policy for a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and
presentation to Congress in its next regular become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to
session in July. Since last January, the National be sheltered by the Constitution." What was rightfully stressed is the
Conference on Land Transportation (NCLT), the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in
conference secretariat, has been enlisting a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right
support from all sectors to ensure the success of likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give
the project.25 [TSN, 29 July 1991, p. 15.] vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For
if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to
Private respondent likewise testified that the FNCLT was raising funds non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nor is this the sole
through solicitation from the public - reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to
be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with
The declared objective of the conference, the composition of its things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be
members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true
to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is
imbued with PUBLIC INTEREST. An organization such as the FNCLT guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder
aiming to reinvent and reshape the transportation laws of the country and in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of
seeking to source its funds for the project from the public at large cannot dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a
dissociate itself from the public character of its mission. As such, it cannot rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of
but invite close scrutiny by the media obliged to inform the public of the violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As
legitimacy of the purpose of the activity and of the qualifications and pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise,
integrity of the personalities behind it. United States v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or less
disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against
grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling
is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will
be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers."
It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked,
REYES vs.BAGATSING riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be
GR 65366, Nov. 9, 1983, Fernando, J. avoided. To give free rein to one's destructive urges is to call for
condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by
FACTS: intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-
Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful 3. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear
march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as
starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States the place where the peace rally would start. The Philippines is
Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage,
public property, a short program would be held. of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: "Whenever the title of streets and
The filing of this suit for mandamus with alternative prayer parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on October 20, 1983 was due use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not been informed of any of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. It discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public
turned out that on October 19, such permit was denied. Petitioner was places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of
reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views
strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
and at the place applied for." To be more specific, reference was made to absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the
persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and
elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
a large number of people is expected to attend." denied." The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v.
Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a denial of freedom of expression v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically affirmed that
arising from the denial of the permit? plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus
nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed Reference was made to such plaza "being a promenade for public use,"
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the
grievances." Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta.
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern
without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous 4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets
restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas
libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the
proceedings unless there be a "clear and present danger of a matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should
substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." Freedom of grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court
assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for categorically declared: "Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to case of Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that
be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, case, the statute of New Hampshire P. L. chap. 145, section 2, providing
much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom that `no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be
of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the
that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, selectmen of the town or from licensing committee,' was construed by the
Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing
consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid.
free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned
the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme
not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of Court, held that à statute requiring persons using the public streets
the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the
grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the
case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are
right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the
governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to
exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity

to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded the rights to free
discretion to issue or refuse license, . . .'" Nor should the point made speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.
by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be
ignored. "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order without Pita vs. Court of Appeals
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted GR 80806, Oct. 5, 1989
abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in
order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign
of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing,
civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxiliary Services Bureau,
good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila,
on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and
social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other
desired to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and
be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M.
circumstances would be entitled to protection." Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several
officers and members of various student organizations. Among the
5. There is a novel aspect to this case. If the rally were confined to publications seized, and later burned, was “Pinoy Playboy” magazines
Luneta, no question, as noted, would have arisen. So, too, if the march published and co-edited by Leo Pita. On 7 December 1983, Pita filed a
would end at another park. As previously mentioned though, there case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
would be a short program upon reaching the public space between injunction seeking to enjoin and or restrain Bagatsing, Cabrera and their
the two gates of the United States Embassy at Roxas Boulevard. agents from confiscating his magazines or from otherwise preventing the
That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic
the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the
Coalition. The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of
Diplomatic Relations and binding on the Philippines. The second speech and of the press.
paragraph of its Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special
duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission Issue: Whether the Mayor can order the seizure of “obscene” materials as
against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the a result of an anti-smut campaign.
peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity." The Constitution
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land, " To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a Held: NO. We cannot quarrel with the basic postulate suggested by
restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law, it appellant that seizure of allegedly obscene publications or materials
should be a part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there deserves close scrutiny because of the constitutional guarantee
were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or protecting the right to express oneself in print (Sec. 9, Art. IV), and
disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, the protection afforded by the constitution against unreasonable
there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as searches and seizure (Sec. 3, Art. IV). It must be equally conceded,
the terminal point would be the Embassy. Moreover, respondent however, that freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the
Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature
the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of that is offensive to public morals, Also well settled is the rule that the
five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery; and for right against unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes certain
other purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra exceptions, as when there is consent to the search or seizure, or
vires, its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, search is an incident to an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or
in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free movable structure
speech and peaceable assembly. Even if shown then to be
applicable, that question still confronts this Court. The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being
asked to pronounce what "OBSCENE" means or what makes for an
By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an obscene or pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, the
assembly should inform the licensing authority of (1)the date, (2)the Court laid down THE TEST, in determining the existence of obscenity,
PUBLIC PLACE where and (3)the time when it will take place. If it as follows: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene,
were a PRIVATE PLACE, only the consent of the owner or the one is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other
be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to article charged as being obscene may fall." "ANOTHER TEST," so
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the Kottinger further declares, "is that which shocks the ordinary and
permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an common sense of men as an indecency." Kottinger hastened to say,
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear however, that "[w]hether a picture is obscene or indecent must
and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If depend upon the circumstances of the case," and that ultimately, the
he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of
a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. the community reached by it."
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, About three decades later, this Court promulgated People v. Go Pin, 10 a
they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech prosecution under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. Go Pin was also
and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are even hazier:
highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciary, - even more so than on the other . . . We agree with counsel for appellant in part. If such
departments - rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits
respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and
sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no
felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of offense committed. However, the pictures here in question
judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for
the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic
precedence and primacy. Clearly then, to the extent that there may be qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that
inconsistencies between this resolution and that of Navarro v. the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain
Villegas, that case is pro tanto modified. So it was made clear in the and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the
original resolution of October 25, 1983. exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not
be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures
9. Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not
No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies exactly artists and persons interested in art and who
or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and
foreign mission or chancery; and for other purposes. It is to be admitted improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of
that it finds support in the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, love for excitement, including the youth who because of their
that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield
than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these
satisfied, it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act pictures.
the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could
still be challenged. It could be argued that a case of unconstitutional
application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine
peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no lines have neither been drawn nor divided. It is easier said than done to
proof that the distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that say, indeed, that if "the pictures here in question were used not
issue was obviated. Should it come, then the qualification and exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes," the
observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.

It was People v. Padan y Alova, 13 however, that introduced to Philippine
jurisprudence the "redeeming" element that should accompany the work, "To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and
to save it from a valid prosecution. We quote: sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test."
. . . We have had occasion to consider offenses like the As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a
exhibition of still or moving pictures of women in the nude, political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be
which we have condemned for obscenity and as offensive said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a
to morals. In those cases, one might yet claim that danger, a danger that must not only be (1) clear but also, (2) present,
there was involved the element of art; that to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government
connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts
might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present
nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for,
nakedness, as models in tableaux vivants. But an DUE PROCESS.
actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts
of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown
it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of
offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said
nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a
influence specially on the youth of the land. . . . search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, the Court, following The Court of Appeals has no "quarrel that . . . freedom of the press is not
trends in the United States, adopted the test: "Whether to the average without restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from
person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals." 36 Neither do
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Kalaw- we. But it brings us back to square one: were the "literature" so
Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the confiscated "pornographic"? That "we have laws punishing the author,
sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "DOMINANT publisher and sellers of obscence publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201, Revised
THEME" of the work rather than isolated passages, which were Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No. 969)," is also fine,
central to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that but the question, again, is: Has the petitioner been found guilty under the
"contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters of what statute?
is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the
determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by
consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due
enforcers. process.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes

"obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to
recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem. Apparently, the Hence, we make this resume.
courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of
free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of 1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant
opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
what is acceptable to society. And "[t]here is little likelihood," says Tribe,
"that this development has reached a state of rest, or that it will ever do so 2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought
until the Court recognizes that obscene speech is speech nonetheless, to be seized are "obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of
although it is subject ---- as in all speech ---- to regulation in the interests an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
of [society as a whole] ---- but not in the interest of a uniform vision of how
human sexuality should be regarded and portrayed." 3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed
"obscene:" the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in and on His Honor's sound discretion. (a matter of judicial
the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut ---- determination)
provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply
because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual 4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue
tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step the search warrant prayed for;
with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears,
say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present 5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of
generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the the Revised Penal Code;
thirties yet their works are considered important literature today. 29
Goya's La Maja desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but 6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may
now adorns the world's most prestigious museums. assess whether or not the properties seized are indeed "obscene"
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or
matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men applicable statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power
and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than under the Civil Code or the Revised Penal code.
resolved it.
What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is NOTE: In other words, the determination of what is “obscene” is a judicial
not, and has not been, an easy one to answer, as it is far from being a function.
settled matter. We share Tribe's disappointment over the discouraging
trend in American decisional law on obscenity as well as his pessimism on SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. V. COMELEC
whether or not an "acceptable" solution is in sight. G.R. No.147571; May 5, 2001
In the final analysis perhaps, the task that confronts us is less heroic Facts: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the
than rushing to a "perfect" definition of "obscenity", if that is Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair
possible, as evolving standards for proper police conduct faced with Election Act). Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election
the problem, which, after all, is the plaint specifically raised in the survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local
petition. levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as
publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the
However, this much we have to say. other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to
the last day of the elections on May 14,2001. Petitioners claimed that
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of said provision, which prohibited the publication of surveys affecting
free expression, although not its protection. In free expression national candidates fifteen days before an election, and surveys
cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of affecting local candidates seven days before an election. Respondent
the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006
State interference and action. But, so we asserted in Reyes v. as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral
Bagatsing, "the burden to show the existence of grave and process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election.
imminent danger that would justify adverse action . . . lies on the . . .
authorit[ies]." Issue: Whether or not §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or press.
conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present
danger." "It is essential for the validity of . . . previous restraint or Held: YES. The Supreme Court in its majority opinion concluded that the
censorship that the . . . authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal disputed provision constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of the
of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require." freedom of speech, expression and the press.

The O’Brian Test
To be sure, §5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression,
and the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in
affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days United States v. O'Brien: "[A] government regulation is sufficiently
immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before a justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
local election. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if
rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, “any system expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First
of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater
presumption against its constitutional validity. . . . “. The Government than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."
‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of
such restraint.’There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from
validity that inheres in every legislation. content-neutral regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the
review of such laws." It is noteworthy that the O'Brien test has been applied
Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, by this Court in at least two cases. Under this test, even if a law furthers
which gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be
or utilization of franchise for the operation of media of communication, no invalidated if such governmental interest is "not unrelated to the
presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure like §5.4. For as we have suppression of free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose is
pointed out in sustaining the ban on media political advertisements, unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should
the grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 is limited to nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression
ensuring “equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply” as is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in
well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such question.
media facilities for “public information campaigns and forums
among candidates.” This Court stated: Our inquiry should accordingly focus on these two considerations as
applied to §5.4. To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution According to the Court, Section 5.4 was invalid because of three reasons:
may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises (1) it imposed a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it
in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory was a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of though such suppression was only for a limited period, and (3) the
securing equal opportunity among candidates for political governmental interest sought to be promoted could be achieved by
office, although such supervision or regulation may result means other than the suppression of freedom of expression. The
in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free petition for prohibition was granted.
press.
First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion of the O’Brien test because the
MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN dissents. He rejects as inappropriate the test of causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental
clear and present danger for determining the validity of §5.4. Indeed, as interest makes such interest “not unrelated to the suppression of
has been pointed out in Osmeña v. COMELEC, this test was originally free expression.” By prohibiting the publication of election survey
formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech results because of the possibility that such publication might
cases. Hence, while it may be useful for determining the validity of laws undermine the integrity of the election, §5.4 actually suppresses a
dealing with inciting to sedition or incendiary speech, it may not be whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion
adequate for such regulations as the one in question. For such a test is concerning the same subject matter by NEWSPAPER COLUMNISTS,
concerned with questions of the gravity and imminence of the danger as RADIO AND TV COMMENTATORS, ARMCHAIR THEORISTS, AND
basis for curtailing free speech, which is not the case of §5.4 and similar OTHER OPINION MAKERS. In effect, §5.4 shows a BIAS for a
regulations. particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring PERSONAL
OPINION to STATISTICAL RESULTS. The constitutional guarantee of
Instead, MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN purports to engage in a form of freedom of expression means that “the government has no power to
balancing by “weighing and balancing the circumstances to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
determine whether public interest [in free, orderly, honest, peaceful its content.”[11] The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the
and credible elections] is served by the regulation of the free expression falls within one of the few unprotected categories dealt with in
enjoyment of the rights”. After canvassing the reasons for the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,[12] thus:
prohibition, i.e., to prevent last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of
bandwagon effect to favor candidates, misinformation, the “junking” of There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
weak and “losing” candidates by their parties, and the form of election prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
cheating called “dagdag-bawas” and invoking the State’s power to Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
supervise media of information during the election period (pages 11-16), the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words ¾ those which by their
the dissenting opinion simply concludes: very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
Viewed in the light of the legitimate and significant objectives of Section and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
5.4, it may be seen that its limiting impact on the rights of free speech and may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
of the press is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. Indeed, it is a mere order and morality.
restriction, not an absolute prohibition, on the publication of election
surveys. It is limited in duration; it applies only during the period when the Nor is there justification for the prior restraint which §5.4 lays on protected
voters are presumably contemplating whom they should elect and when speech. In Near v. Minnesota,[13] it was held:
they are most susceptible to such unwarranted persuasion. These surveys
may be published thereafter. (Pages 17-18) [The] protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. . . . No
The dissent does not, however, show why, on balance, these one would question but that a government might prevent actual
considerations should outweigh the value of freedom of expression. obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of
Instead, reliance is placed on Art. IX-C, §4. As already stated, the transports or the number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the
purpose of Art. IX-C, §4 is to “ensure equal opportunity, time, and primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene
space and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates publications. The security of the community life may be protected against
therefor for public information campaigns and forums among incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly
candidates.” Hence the validity of the ban on media advertising. It is government . . . .
noteworthy that R.A. No. 9006, §14 has lifted the ban and now allows
candidates to advertise their candidacies in print and broadcast media. Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition
Indeed, to sustain the ban on the publication of survey results would imposed by §5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a
sanction the censorship of all speaking by candidates in an election on the limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a
ground that the usual bombasts and hyperbolic claims made during the limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct,
campaigns can confuse voters and thus debase the electoral process. absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category
of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen
In sum, the dissent has engaged only in a balancing at the margin. (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days
This form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the immediately before a local election.
challenged legislation and leaves freedom of speech, expression,
and the press with little protection. For anyone who can bring a This sufficiently distinguishes §5.4 from R.A. No. 6646, §11(b), which this
plausible justification forward can easily show a rational connection Court found to be valid in National Press Club v. COMELEC and
between the statute and a legitimate governmental purpose. In contrast, Osmeña v. COMELEC] For the ban imposed by R.A. No. 6646, §11(b)
the balancing of interest undertaken by then Justice Castro in Gonzales v. is not only authorized by a specific constitutional provision, but it
COMELEC,[7] from which the dissent in this case takes its cue, was a also provided an alternative so that, as this Court pointed out in
strong one resulting in his conclusion that §50-B of R.A. No. 4880, which Osmeña, there was actually no ban but only a substitution of media
limited the period of election campaign and partisan political activity, was advertisements by the COMELEC space and COMELEC hour.
an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of expression.
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is
unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction

of free expression is only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to meet ISSUE: Was the Mayor’s refusal to grant the permit to peaceably
criterion of the O’Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not assemble violative of the Constitution?
greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As
already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on HELD: YES. The rights of freedom of speech and to peacefully
voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, “junking” of weak or “losing” assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are
candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called “dagdag- fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
bawas.” Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they guaranteed by the Constitution. The exercise of those rights is not
cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of absolute; it may be regulated so that it shall injure the equal
expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by enjoyment of others having equal rights, or the rights of the
punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such rights
apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. is the "police power"--- the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the
Thus, under the Administrative Code of 1987,[17] the COMELEC is given health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
the power: welfare of the people--- exercised by the legislative branch by the
enactment of laws regulating those rights, and it may be delegated to
To stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities, and cities authorizing
and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false their legislative bodies, called municipal and city councils to enact
election propaganda, after due notice and hearing. ordinances for the purpose.
This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained SEC. 1119 is susceptible to two constructions:
in §5.4. Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate bogus
survey results calculated to mislead voters. Candidates can have their (1)That the Mayor has unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to
own surveys conducted. No right of reply can be invoked by others. No grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly;
principle of equality is involved. It is a free market to which each candidate -or-
brings his ideas. As for the purpose of the law to prevent bandwagon (2)That the applicant has the right to a permit, which shall be granted
effects, it is doubtful whether the Government can deal with this natural- by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to
enough tendency of some voters. Some voters want to be identified with determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the
the “winners.” Some are susceptible to the herd mentality. Can these be purpose, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places
legitimately prohibited by suppressing the publication of survey results by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize
which are a form of expression? It has been held that “[mere] legislative the risk of disorder.
preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well
support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient The Court adopted the second construction; the ordinance only
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the confers upon the Mayor the discretion, in issuing the permit, to
maintenance of democratic institutions.” determine or specify the streets or public places where the meeting
may be held. It does not confer upon him unfettered discretion to
Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, refuse to grant the license. A statute requiring persons using the
expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty public streets to procure a special license therefor from the local
presumption of invalidity. Indeed, "any system of prior restraints of authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its assembly, WHERE THE LICENSING AUTHORITIES ARE STRICTLY
constitutional validity. . . . The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of LIMITED, in the issuance of licenses, to consider the time, place, and
showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.'" There is thus a manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the
reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation. public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide
Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, proper policing. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to authorizing the
which gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for
enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the operation of media of holding of meetings.
communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure like
§5.4. For as we have pointed out in sustaining the ban on media The Municipal Board is empowered only to regulate the use of
political advertisements, the grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. streets, parks, and the other public places. "REGULATE" includes
IX-C, §4 is limited to ensuring "equal opportunity, time, space, and the the power to control, govern, and restrain, but not suppress or
right to reply" as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for prohibit. The legislative police power of the Municipal Board to enact
the use of such media facilities for "public information campaigns and ordinances regulating reasonably the exercise of the fundamental
forums among candidates." personal rights of the citizens in the streets and other public places
cannot be delegated to the Mayor by conferring upon him
NOTE: The power to regulate, does not include the power to prohibit. unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and
control his action by which its impartial execution can be secured or
partiality and oppression prevented.
ASSEMBLY & PETITION “An ordinance in that case subjects to the unrestrained will of a
single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties
PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO under it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or control
G.R. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948,Feria, J. his action. His action or non-action may proceed from enmity or
prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and other
FACTS: Primicias, via petition for mandamus, sought to compel Fugoso to improper influences and motives easy of concealment.”
issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda to
petition the government for redress of grievances. An ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power is
void. In the exercise of police power, the council may, in its
The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power discretion, regulate the exercise of such rights in a reasonable
to the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, the legislative body of the manner, but cannot suppress them, directly or indirectly, by
City. It has been granted the following legislative powers, to wit: "(p) to attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any
provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays, disturbances, other officer. The discretion with which the council is vested is a
and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of streets, avenues ... legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not
parks, cemeteries and other public places." Thus, the Municipal Board discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and
enacted sections 844 and 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, which arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant.
prohibit, as an offense against public peace, and penalize as a
misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, "It is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations
tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in create public disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or create or
a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any manifestly threaten some tangible public or private mischief that the
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." SEC. 1119 states that the law interferes."
streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use
of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the "Ordinances to be valid must be reasonable; they must not be
same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by oppressive; they must be fair and impartial; they must not be so
ordinance or regulation… Provided that the holding of any parade or framed as to allow their enforcement to rest on official discretion”
procession in any street or public places shall only be done if a Mayor’s
permit is secured… “Where the granting of the permit is left to the unregulated discretion
of a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than
The Mayor’s reason for refusing the permit was his reasonable ground to partial and discriminating in its practical operation.” (The Court cited
believe, based on previous utterances and the fact that passions on the a U.S. case)
part of the losing groups remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will The power of municipalities to regulate the use of public streets is
be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people conceded. The privilege of a citizen to use the streets may be
in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute. The authority of a
threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order. However, municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and
petitioner’s request was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting." convenience of the people in the use of public highways is
consistent with civil liberties, a means of safeguarding the good
order upon which they ultimately depend. Where a restriction of the

use of highways is designed to promote the public convenience in the
interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some 1. Whether or not the decision of responded violates the
civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. As constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and
regulation of the use of the streets for parades and processions is a free speech?
traditional exercise of control by local government, the question is whether 2. Whether or not the suspension meted out by the school
that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right authorities are not violative of due process?
of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and
the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to Held:
public places.
1. NO. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the
The Court, citing a U.S. case, held: “A municipal ordinance requiring invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it
the obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been
streets, highways, public parks, or public buildings of the city and disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression,
authorizing the director of public safety, for the purpose of which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any
preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to refuse matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which "is
to issue a permit (and not merely to regulate) when after not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing . . . of a
investigation of all the facts and circumstances pertinent to the clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
application, he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is right to prevent." In the above case, a permit was sought to hold a
not a valid exercise of the police power. peaceful march and rally from the Luneta public park to the gates of the
United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away, where in an open space
Streets and parks have immemorially been held in trust for the use of of public property, a short program would be held, Necessarily then, the
the public and have been used for purposes of assembly, question of the use of a public park and of the streets leading to the
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public United States Embassy was before this Court. We held that streets
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has been a part and parks have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The public and have been used for purposes of assembly to
privilege of a citizen to use the streets and parks for communication communicate thoughts between citizens and to discuss public
of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; issues.
it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in The situation here is different. The assembly was to be held
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in NOT in a public place but in private premises, property of respondent
consonance with peace and good order; BUT IT MUST NOT, IN THE University. There is in the Reyes opinion as part of the summary this
GUISE OF REGULATION, BE ABRIDGED OR DENIED. relevant excerpt: "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
If the Ordinance “does not make comfort or convenience in the use where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place,
of streets or parks the standard of official action,” instead, it enables only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
a single official to refuse a permit on his MERE OPINION that such possession is required." Petitioners did seek such consent. It was
refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage, IT granted. According to the petition: "On August 27, 1982, by virtue of a
IS VOID. It can be an instrument of arbitrary suppression of free permit granted to them by the school administration, the Supreme Student
expression of views on national affairs. Council where your petitioners are among the officers, held a General
Assembly at the VMAS basketball court of the respondent University."
Moreover, the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws There was an express admission in the Comment of private respondent
cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or University as to a permit having been granted for petitioners to hold a
authority, except police regulation which are conferred upon the student assembly. The specific question to be resolved then is
legislative body of a municipal corporation. The police power to regulate whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action
the use of streets and other public places has been conferred by the and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to
Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City. The Legislature has not peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
conferred upon the Mayor the same power.
Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech.
Besides, a grant of unregulated and unlimited power to grant or refuse a They were entitled to do so. They enjoy the said right like the rest of the
permit for the use of streets and other public places for processions, citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their
parades, or meetings, would be null and void. Under our democratic thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this
system of government, no such unlimited power may be validly granted to case. They do not, shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national expression at the schoolhouse gate. While, therefore, the authority of
emergency. educational institutions over the conduct of students must be
recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional
"FEAR OF SERIOUS INJURY cannot alone justify suppression of free safeguards. On a more specific level, there is persuasive force to this
speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the formulation in the Fortas opinion: The principal use to which the
bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech, there schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities.
speech is practiced; that the danger apprehended is imminent and Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the
the evil to be prevented is a serious one.” Imminent danger can justify students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of
prohibition ONLY IF the evil apprehended is relatively serious. That attending school; it is also an important part of the educational
speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the
not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or
serious injury to the state. on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his
opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he
does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the
MALABANAN v. RAMENTO requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school'
G.R. No. L-62270; May 21, 1984, Fernando, J. and without colliding with the rights of others. . . . But conduct by
the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it
Facts: Petitioners were students of Gregorio Araneta University, stems from time, place, or type of behavior - materially disrupts
granted by the school authorities to hold a meeting, however they must classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
comply with some terms and conditions. Instead of following the terms and of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
conditions, the students continued their march to the Life Science building, guarantee of freedom of speech."
outside the area stated in the permit. Classes were disturbed due to the
noise. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by
their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the the student leaders. If in the course of such demonstration, with an
University authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely
as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
employee, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types.
noise created. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed through a They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if
memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the
to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
Building. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the
CFI of Rizal and before the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the
Respondent, Ramento, as director of the National Capital Region, found exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of their
petitioners guilty of the charge of holding an illegal assembly which was applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises
characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of
for one academic year. disciplinary action for conduct, which "materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
Issues:

One last matter. The objection was raised that petitioners failed to there was no actual disruption of classes. Petitioners therefore ask for
exhaust administrative remedies, That is true, but hardly decisive. exoneration or, in the alternative, award of back wages for the period of
Here, a purely legal question is presented. Such being the case, three (3) years when they were not allowed to work while awaiting
especially so where a decision on a question of law is imperatively resolution of their appeals by the MSPB and CSC, deducting the period of
called for, and time being of the essence, this Court has invariably six (6) months' suspension eventually meted them.
viewed the issue as ripe for adjudication. What cannot be too
sufficiently stressed is that the constitutional rights to peaceable assembly ISSUES:
and free speech are invoked by petitioners. Moreover, there was, and 1. WON the public school teachers were involved in a “strike”?
very likely there will continue to be in the future, militancy and 2. WON the teachers should be penalized for participating in
assertiveness of students on issues that they consider of great the strike?
importance, whether concerning their welfare or the general public. 3. WON penalizing the teachers for participation in the strike
That they have a right to do as citizens entitled to all the protection amounts to a denial of their right to peaceably assemble?
in the Bill of Rights.
HELD:
It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case
of Reyes v. Bagatsing, for this Court to lay down the principles for the 1. YES. The persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the mass
guidance of school authorities and students alike. The rights to actions by the conventional term "strike" did not erase the true nature of
peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed to students of the mass actions as unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of
educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss which was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers' economic
matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be grievances. The mass actions staged by Metro Manila public school
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless teachers amounted to a strike in every sense of the term, constituting
there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive as they did, a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or absence
evil that the state has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost from work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried
leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or out for essentially economic reasons — to protest and pressure the
utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be Government to correct what, among other grievances, the strikers
lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the salary
whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to standardization law insofar as they were concerned, the non-payment or
correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held delay in payment of various fringe benefits and allowances to which they
in school premises, permit must be sought from its school were entitled, and the imposition of additional teaching loads and longer
authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request teaching hours.
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic 2. YES. The teachers were penalized not because they exercised their
personnel. right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such
right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences
thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced
2. YES. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers were
incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. It does not responsible.
follow however, that the petitioners can be totally absolved for the Although petitioners contend that classes were not
events that transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms actually disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately
of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that specified, appointed by Secretary Cariño, that the prompt remedial action taken
in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the by Secretary Cariño might have partially deflected the adverse
VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer effects of the mass protests did not erase the administrative liability
than the period allowed. According to the decision of Ramento, the of petitioners for the intended consequences thereof which were the
concerted activity went on until 5:30pm. Private respondent could thus, very reason why such prompt remedial action became necessary.
take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition, even a “This Court denies the claim that the teachers were thereby denied
censure certainly not a suspension could be the appropriate penalty. their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
While the discretion of both respondent University and responded redress of grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be
Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the dictate of fairness upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised within reasonable
calls for a much lesser penalty. If the consent of proportionally limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare.” The public school
between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not teachers in these mass actions did not exercise their constitutional
followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise rights within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed acts
to a due process question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it prejudicial to the best interest of the service by staging the mass
is the holding of this court that a one-week suspension would be protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and
punishment enough. refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had
the teachers availed of their free time - recess, after classes, weekends or
holidays - to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper
authorities within the bounds of law, no one - not the DECS, the CSC or
DELA CRUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS even the Supreme Court - could have held them liable for their
G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999, Bellosillo, J. participation in the mass actions.
FACTS:
The respective school principals submitted reports to the 3. NO. In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission, it was held that for
Secretary of DECS regarding the participation of public school teachers the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
(petitioners) in an illegal strike and their defiance to the return-to-work redress of grievances to be upheld, like any other liberty, it must be
order issued by the DECS Secretary. The Sec. of DECS on his own filed exercised within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public
an administrative complaint against the petitioners for the said acts which welfare. The public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions
were considered as a violation of the Civil Service Decree of the did not exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable limits. On the
Philippines. For failure to submit their answers the Sec. of DECS issued contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the
an order of dismissal against the teachers which was implemented service by staging the mass protests on regular school days,
immediately. Petitioners appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board abandoning their classes and refusing to go back even after they
(MSPB) and then to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC found had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their free time
petitioners guilty of "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service" — recess, after classes, weekends or holidays — to dramatize their
for having participated in the mass actions and imposed upon them the grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the
reduced penalty of six (6) months' suspension. However, in view of the bounds of law, no one — not the DECS, the CSC or even the
length of time that petitioners had been out of the service by reason of the Supreme Court — could have held them liable for their participation
immediate implementation of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cariño, the in the mass actions.
CSC likewise ordered petitioners' automatic reinstatement in the service
without back wages. Petitioners were unhappy with the CSC decision.
They initially filed petitions for certiorari with the SC which were all referred The argument that the rights of free expression and
to the CA. The CA ruled that the questioned resolutions of the Civil assembly could not be lightly disregarded as they occupy a preferred
Service Commission finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the position in the hierarchy of civil liberties is not applicable to defend the
best interest of the service were based on reasonable and justifiable validity of the 1990 mass actions because there is a higher consideration
grounds; that petitioners' perceived grievances were no excuse for them involved here which is the education of the youth.
not to conduct classes and defy the return-to-work order issued by their
superiors; that the immediate execution of the dismissal orders of
Secretary Cariño was sanctioned under law. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION v.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals grievously PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO. INC.
erred in affirming the CSC resolutions finding them guilty of conduct G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973, Makasiar, J.
prejudicial to the best interest of the service when their only "offense" was
to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition Facts: Sometime in 1969, petitioner decided to stage a mass
the government for redress of their grievances. Moreover petitioners insist demonstration in Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the
that the mass actions of September/October 1990 were not "strikes" as Pasig Police. Respondent Company, however requested petitioner that

the first-shift workers should not participate in the strike for it will unduly So it has been stressed that the (1)“FREEDOMS OF SPEECH” and
prejudice the normal operation of the company. Despite the warning, all (2)“OF THE PRESS” as well as (3)“OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND
the workers including those who were in first-shift still participated in the OF PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES” are absolute when
rally. Prior to that, respondent company informed that workers who belong directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our
in the first-shift, who were without previous leave of absence approved by right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed,"
the company, who shall participate in the rally shall be dismissed for it is a even relying on the balancing-of-interests test.
clear violation of the existing CBA and is tantamount to an illegal strike. The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass
Respondent company then filed a charge against petitioners and later demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their
dismissed some of its employees. "concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work,"
herein petitioners are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated
Issues: Whether or not the constitutional freedoms of speech and the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine
expression of the petitioner were violated by the respondent company in Blooming Mills Co., Inc. Set against and tested by the foregoing principles
preventing some of its employees to participate in the rally and later governing a democratic society, such a conclusion cannot be sustained.
dismissed some of them. The demonstration held by petitioners was against alleged abuses of
some Pasig policemen, NOT against their employer, herein private
Held: No. There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles respondent firm, said demonstration was purely and completely an
which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar. exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right
of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They
article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid and
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts protection from what they believe were police excesses. As a matter
and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person. of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect
herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, local police officers. It was to the interest of herein private
equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more
patience with general principles.” efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well
as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the
Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes expense of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to
and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its
by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free laborers vis-a-vis the alleged oppressive police, who might have
speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other been all the more emboldened thereby to subject its lowly
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on employees to further indignities.
the outcome of no elections." Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of
the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as
behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of
the authority it was entitled to exercise. local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private
respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right the weapons afforded them by the Constitution he untrammelled
to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their
sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we absence of its employees, is a plea for the preservation merely of
cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell
want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its
Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality
all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are abused, harassed and persecuted as they believed they were by the
protected. peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in
which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual
only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human
Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit can never be fully
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars
also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish
of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions As heretofore stated, THE PRIMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM
on erring public officers and employees. OF EXPRESSION, OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND OF PETITION
FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES over PROPERTY RIGHTS has been
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at
of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police
regulation only "with narrow specificity." officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore
government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
political, economic or otherwise.
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of employees, according to the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the effect imposes on the workers the "duty . . . to observe regular working
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and hours." The strained construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that
such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not such stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage a mass
permitting dubious intrusions." The superiority of these freedoms over demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a
property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or virtual tyranny over the mind and life of the workers and deserves severe
rational relation between the means employed by the law and its condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on
object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory such a slender ground.
nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or
impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969
infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, could not have been legally enjoined by any court, for such an injunction
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of the workers, even if
evil which the State has the right to prevent. it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike. The respondent Court
of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same is not rooted

in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work." their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police
abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they right to petition for redress.
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to
the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted
non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such
namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities
total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may
maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediate be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and
action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police.
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of
of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the
Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it
position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day;
Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could
demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were
counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials
absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the
demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of
their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such
1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages
lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only
rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts one day.
in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for
dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not IV
against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional. Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of
III the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers
for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5
its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of
alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6
on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to
petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an labor . . ." Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the
unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to
Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the employees the right these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless
"to engage in concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection"; while constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer "to Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise
guaranteed in Section Three." by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of
the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor,
aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
such a common action to better shield themselves against such alleged
police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional
the workers for the morning and regular shifts should not participate in the right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its
mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal
potent means of inhibiting speech." conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be
obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection, deserves at the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of
least equal protection as the concerted action of employees in giving an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced
publicity to a letter complaint charging a bank president with immorality, confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-
nepotism, favoritism and discrimination in the appointment and promotion incrimination; or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense
of bank employees. We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, even after the
supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years.
Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) of Republic Act No. 875, "it is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm
contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to
their interests. accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which
the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the
order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the
"while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public
emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations,
prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress
the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is
shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing
brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient
joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced,
raised against the local police, were more important to them because they inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the
had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for
by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the
One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an

dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and
which to pay for competent legal services. Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is
a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one
can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a
VI. clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion,"
and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance"
a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because
pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the
answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord strict scrutiny test.
supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations
over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only Respondent’s argue:
incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that
the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and 1. Petitioners have no standing because they have not
regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The presented evidence that they had been “injured, arrested or
dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the detained because of the CPR,” and that “those arrested
aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity stand to be charged with violating Batas Pambansa [No.]
should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as 880 and other offenses.”
applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen
the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to 2. Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face.
the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning Petitioners cannot honestly claim that the time, place and
employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it manner regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the
was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and three-pronged test for such a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No.
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the 880 is content-neutral, i.e., it has no reference to content of
law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for regulated speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, serve a significant governmental interest, i.e., the interest
who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary cannot be equally well served by a means that is less
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme intrusive of free speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880
Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the leaves open alternative channels for communication of the
motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule information.
52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the
motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 3. B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the
1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of law. Section 5 requires the statement of the public
the Court of Industrial are concerned. assembly’s time, place and manner of conduct. It entails
traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and
serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes
presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; the denial of a permit on the basis of a rally’s program
so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is content or the statements of the speakers therein, except
deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, under the constitutional precept of the “clear and present
even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the danger test.” The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-
constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis neutral regulation has been recognized in Osmeña v.
mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete Comelec.
determination of the dispute can be made. It is thus seen that a
procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a 4. Adiong v. Comelec held that B.P. No. 880 is a content-
constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding
Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the public assemblies and the law passes the test for such
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the regulation, namely, these regulations need only a substantial
institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their governmental interest to support them.
defense to the said charge. 5. Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court[9] held that a
local chief executive has the authority to exercise police
power to meet “the demands of the common good in terms
of traffic decongestion and public convenience.”
Bayan vs. Ermita Furthermore, the discretion given to the mayor is narrowly
G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, Azcuna, J. circumscribed by Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e),
13 and 15 of the law.
Facts: Petitioners allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were 6. The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent.
violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was “Clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will
violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) create a clear and present danger to public order, public
No. 880. Malacanang also issued a policy denominated as “Calibrated safety, public convenience, public morals or public health”
Pre-emptive Response” (CPR) on all rallies. Said “CPR Policy” provides, and “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” both
among others: express the meaning of the “clear and present danger test.”
7. CPR is simply the responsible and judicious use of means
The rule of calibrated preemptive allowed by existing laws and ordinances to protect public
response is now in force, in lieu of maximum interest and restore public order. Thus, it is not accurate to
tolerance. The authorities will not stand call it a new rule but rather it is a more pro-active and
aside while those with ill intent are herding a dynamic enforcement of existing laws, regulations and
witting or unwitting mass of people and ordinances to prevent chaos in the streets. It does not
inciting them into actions that are inimical to replace the rule of maximum tolerance in B.P. No. 880.
public order, and the peace of mind of the
national community. Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza, for his part, submitted in his
Comment that the petition in G.R. No. 169838 should be dismissed on the
Unlawful mass actions will be ground that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a
dispersed. The majority of law-abiding permit independently of B.P. No. 880; that his denials of permits
citizens have the right to be protected by a were under the “clear and present danger” rule as there was a
vigilant and proactive government. clamor to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the
lives of other people; that J. B. L. Reyes v. Bagatsing,[11] Primicias
We appeal to the detractors of the v. Fugoso,[12] and Jacinto v. CA,[13] have affirmed the
government to engage in lawful and peaceful constitutionality of requiring a permit; that the permit is for the use
conduct befitting of a democratic society. of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No.
880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.
They assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 as well as the policy of The petitions were ordered consolidated on February 14, 2006. After the
“Calibrated Preemptive Response" or CPR and seek to stop violent submission of all the Comments, the Court set the cases for oral
dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR arguments on April 4, 2006,[14] stating the principal issues, as follows:
policy recently announced.

Issues: The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of
1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160: people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a
(a) Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations? settled principle growing out of the nature of well-
(b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness? ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights
(c) Do they constitute prior restraint? is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall
(d) Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors? not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
(e) Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
Declaration of Human Rights? community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the
Preemptive Response (CPR): power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
(a) Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness? general welfare of the people. This sovereign police
(b) Is it void for lack of publication? power is exercised by the government through its
(c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating
October 4, 5 and 6, 2005? those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may
be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns,
municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative
Held: bodies called municipal and city councils enact ordinances
for purpose.
Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as
citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition,
as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise
which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from
streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: “No law shall be
assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action grievances.” Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the
as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern
permit. without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous
restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in
libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt
I. B.P. 880 IS proceedings unless there be a “clear and present danger of a substantive
CONSTITUTIONAL evil that [the State] has a right to prevent.” Freedom of assembly
connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be
for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited,
expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom
constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935
meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA, the Court, as Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary
early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado, already upheld the consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of
right to assembly and petition, as follows: free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for
the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was
There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of
assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the right of the people
for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of
contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every
These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this
particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged
and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the
pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic
rights. As early as the onset of this century, this Court in U.S. vs. institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a
Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
as far as to acknowledge: legitimate public interest.
“It is rather to be expected that more or less 2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of
disorder will mark the public assembly of the people expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt
to protest against grievances whether real or from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: “It must never be forgotten,
imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back
always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason
the greater, the grievance and the more intense the by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order
feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of
disciplinary control of the leaders over their communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as
permitted to seize upon every instance of such an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution.” What was
crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether
a seditious and tumultuous rising against the verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be
authorities, then the right to assemble and to remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing
petition for redress of grievances would expose all parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the
those who took part therein to the severest and prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of communication
most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only
they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It
to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels
disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie
guilty individuals should be sought out and in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter.
punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-
be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not
and seditious conduct and between an essentially advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion
peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.” under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult
attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso, the Court likewise sustained the primacy of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As
of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise,
convenience in the use of streets and parks. United States v. Apurado: “It is rather to be expected that more or less
disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against
Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling
sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said: is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will
be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers.”

It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous xxx
conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To
give free rein to one’s destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to 8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to
make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date,
scheme of values. the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were
a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed
clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. The Philippines whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition
of, Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: “Whenever the title of streets and to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that
the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to
of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly,
streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed
be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the other departments
and in consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in the guise – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for
of respondents, be abridged or denied.” The above excerpt was quoted and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no
with approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so
implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes “as the sovereign prerogative
Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside of judgment.” Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the
the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as
Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such plaza they do precedence and primacy. x x x.
“being a promenade for public use,” which certainly is not the only purpose
that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in
permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally Reyes.
starting from a public park that is the Luneta.
The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:
4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the
streets to the gates of the US embassy, hardly two blocks away at
the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is NOT AN
doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the ABSOLUTE BAN OF PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES BUT A RESTRICTION
City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza THAT SIMPLY REGULATES THE TIME, PLACE AND MANNER OF
Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared: “Our conclusion THE ASSEMBLIES. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec,[20]
finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New where the Court referred to it as a “content-neutral” regulation of the
Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies
P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon
any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that
therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from it refers to all kinds of public assemblies[22] that would use public places.
licensing committee,’ was construed by the Supreme Court of New The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because
Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not
discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither are the words “opinion,”
Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice “protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of public assembly content
Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that ‘a based, since they can refer to any subject. The words “petitioning the
statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or government for redress of grievances” come from the wording of the
procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is
is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the
freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the content of the expressions in the rally.
state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of
licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade Furthermore, THE PERMIT can only be denied on the ground of
or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *. “Nor should the exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal
point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
be ignored: “Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the and Political Rights. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which
liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The Article 20
authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the
safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful
never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of assembly and association.
the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately
depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most xxx
familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a
restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to Article 29
promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be
disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in 1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone
other circumstances would be entitled to protection.” the free and full development of his personality is possible.
xxx 2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone

shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by
6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and
utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: “The question, if the respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting
rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not the just requirements of morality, public order and the general
as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; welfare in a democratic society.
not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution 3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be
protects.” There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its Nations.
peaceful character. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent
Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While
prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may Article 19.
possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant
circumstances, still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
scheduled for a specific public place – is that the permit must be for the interference.
assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language
of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
“abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of

frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.
II. THE CPR IS NULL &
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in VOID
paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the
law and are necessary: Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be
discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of
(b) For the protection of national security or of public respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the
order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Solicitor General, thus:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, THE LAW IS VERY CLEAR and is At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum
nowhere vague in its provisions. “Public” does not have to be tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if
defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Webster’s Dictionary it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it
defines it, thus: means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and
should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum
public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x tolerance, which specifically means the following:
x x 3: a group of people distinguished by
common interests or characteristics x x x. Sec. 3. Definition of terms. – For purposes of this Act:
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law xxx

refers to “rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other
form of mass or concerted action held in a public place.” So it does not (c) “Maximum tolerance” means the
cover any and all kinds of gatherings. highest degree of restraint that the military, police and
other peace keeping authorities shall observe during
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to
avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress xxx
has the right to prevent.
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is authorities. – Law enforcement agencies shall not
not relevant to the regulation. interfere with the holding of a public assembly.
However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a enforcement contingent under the command of a
precise and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test responsible police officer may be detailed and
stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters
substantive evil” in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace
not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the and order at all times.
same power independently under Republic Act No. 7160[24] is thus not
necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. – It shall
parties in their arguments. be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when
their assistance is requested by the leaders or
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that
an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no their responsibility to provide proper protection to
prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any those exercising their right peaceably to assemble
time: and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards
this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. – Every city and following guidelines:
municipality in the country shall within six
months after the effectivity of this Act (a) Members of the law enforcement contingent
establish or designate at least one suitable who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete
“freedom park” or mall in their respective uniform with their nameplates and units to which they
jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal
shall be centrally located within the parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of
poblacion where demonstrations and “maximum tolerance” as herein defined;
meetings may be held at any time without
the need of any prior permit. (b) The members of the law enforcement
contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may
In the cities and municipalities of be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash
Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high
shall establish the freedom parks within the shoes with shin guards;
period of six months from the effectivity this
Act. (c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or
any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless
This brings up the point, however, of compliance with this provision. the public assembly is attended by actual violence or
The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction
knowledge, only Cebu City has declared a freedom park – Fuente of property.
Osmeña.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. –
That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted into a golf No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed.
course, he added. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the
police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P. No. 880’s mandate that
every city and municipality set aside a freedom park within six (a) At the first sign of impending violence, the
months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have been taken for call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly
granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
revolution of 1986.
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where
Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential rocks or other harmful objects from the participants
part of the law’s system of regulation of the people’s exercise of are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or
their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is at any property causing damage to such property, the
constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance
right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;
city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law.
For without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in (c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as
effect be to deny the right. “Advance notices” should, however, be stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop
given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
proceedings. contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the
participants of the public assembly, and after allowing

a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall
immediately order it to forthwith disperse; Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right
participant shall also be made during the public Peaceably To Assemble And Petition The Government [And] For
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a Other Purposes
law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act.
Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
Section 1. Title . – This Act shall be known as “The Public
(d) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or Assembly Act of 1985.”
breach of the peace during the public assembly may
be peacefully dispersed. Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. – The constitutional right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
xxx redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and
stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life,
– When the public assembly is held without a permit liberty and equal protection of the law.
where a permit is required, the said public assembly
may be peacefully dispersed. Sec. 3. Definition of terms. – For purposes of this Act:
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. – The following shall (a) “Public assembly” means any rally, demonstration, march,
constitute violations of the Act: parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action
held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause;
(e) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular
otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether
assembly; political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for
redress of grievances.
(f) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a
member of any law enforcement agency or any The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public
person to disperse the public assembly; meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed
by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the declaration of
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully
one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of observed.
the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing
xxx and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees
resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa
enforcement unit; Bilang 227.
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing (b) “Public place” shall include any highway, boulevard,
the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza
vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems. square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people
are allowed access.
Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by
petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and (c) “Maximum tolerance” means the highest degree of
when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities
one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the
necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists same.
who can show the police “an application” duly filed on a given date
can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their (d) “Modification of a permit” shall include the change of
application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or
being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and
authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in similar changes.
which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the
procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law. Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required.-- A
written permit shall be required for any person or persons to
In sum, this Court reiterates ITS BASIC POLICY OF UPHOLDING THE organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF OUR PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY FREEDOM permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made
OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY. In several policy in (1) a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or (2) in
addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the
uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said one entitled to its legal possession is required, or (3) in the campus
that “in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily of a government-owned and operated educational institution which
against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational
marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election
that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy campaign period as provided for by law are NOT covered by this Act.
presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected
to heightened scrutiny.” Sec. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a
permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
SUMMARY:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the
names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public
1. For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to
response policy has no place in our legal firmament and be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of
must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds persons participating, the transport and the public address systems
freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by to be used.
some police agents to justify abuses.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and
responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
2. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned
as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict (c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor
freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity
as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled
from being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the public assembly.
benefit of rallyists, not the government.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly
3. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor
“permits” is valid because it is subject to the shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous
constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” place in the city or municipal building.
standard.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application. –

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall
his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and observe the following guidelines:
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, (a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal
public morals or public health. with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their
nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the
the application within two (2) working days from the date the policy of “maximum tolerance” as herein defined;
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed
granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in (b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not
his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot
application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle
office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. high shoes with shin guards;
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and (c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar
grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or
who must be heard on the matter. deliberate destruction of property.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. – No public
the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours. assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an
assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the assembly as follows:
application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant
may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. (a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking
officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any
Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the possible disturbance;
Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its
decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other
(48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at
appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such
modifying if in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
immediately executory. audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the
public assembly will be dispersed;
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be
decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed (c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer
disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank. of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to
the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to
Supreme Court. forthwith disperse;
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals (d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also
are hereby allowed. be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the
assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such
Sec. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. – Should the proposed public arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any amended;
public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public (e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the
inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to peace during the public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction
so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. – When the
flow of commerce and trade. public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required,
the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 8. Responsibility of applicant. – It shall be the duty and
responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. – The following shall constitute violations
take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended of the Act:
public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with
the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the (a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act
following: by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written
permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those
the permit; set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be
punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to otherwise peaceful assembly;
prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of
the public assembly; (b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a
permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and other official acting in his behalf;
law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held
peacefully; (c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or
acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not any official acting in his behalf;
go beyond the time stated in the permit; and
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;
any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other
persons not participating in the public assembly. (e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any
law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. – Law assembly;
enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public
assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law (f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police
officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one
(100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly
and order at all times. or on the occasion thereof:
Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. – It shall be imperative 1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as
for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that
their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising 2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is

3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and
thoroughfares; develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit; under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby
manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
sound systems. elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws
Sec. 14. Penalties. – Any person found guilty and convicted of any exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes
of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding section (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1,
shall be punished as follows: subsec. Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par [c],
Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher,
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the
of one month and one day to six months; armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec.
13, subsec. 3 Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec.
subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Ad.
and one day to six years; Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas
Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral
imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and
prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866; certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the
fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall Code).
be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days. Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view.
What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. – Every city and municipality in the country when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to
shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the
designate at least one suitable “freedom park” or mall in their Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does
respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or
centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the
meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by
permit. the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not
respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor
period of six months from the effectivity this Act. were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts
Sec. 16. Constitutionality.—Should any provision of this Act of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that
be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the
constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby. Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials
concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international
Sec. 17. Repealing clause. – All laws, decrees, letters of importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people". It is
instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof which significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed,
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,
amended, or modified accordingly. contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila,
and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Sec. 18. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect upon its Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic
approval. Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of
that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps
Approved, October 22, 1985. in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a
religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government.
We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in
Gregorio Aglipay vs. Juan Ruiz its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in
G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937, Laurel, J. character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be
Facts: -supra- frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the freedom of religion?
Held: No. The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the Andres Garces, et. al, vs. Hon. Numeriano G. Estenzo, et. al.
principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981,Aquino, J.
adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is
sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, FACTS: The barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City issued four (4)
has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for resolutions regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San
occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day.
the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and One of the resolutions further provided that the barangay council, in
aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this principle of separation of accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas
church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the
was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would
of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor
the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in as chairman of the next feast day.
the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the
Constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmea allegedly uttered
People. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso,
religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked
highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the Veloso to file against Father Osmea in the city court of Ormoc City a
Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional charge for grave oral defamation. Father Osmea retaliated by filing
guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized administrative complaints against Veloso on the grounds of immorality,
implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance
Constitution is RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, not mere RELIGIOUS of the law. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the
TOLERATION. Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmea did not accede to the
request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, however, as a constitutional ignored" the council's resolutions, the council enacted another resolution,
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father
not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a Osmea for the recovery of the image. On June 14, 1976, the barangay
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to council passed another resolution, appointing Veloso as its
his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the representative in the replevin case.
purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their against Father Osmea and Bishop Cipriano Urgel. After the barangay
Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmea

turned over the image to the council. ln his answer to the complaint for license. Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer
replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions library demanded that plaintiff deposit and pay the sum of P5, 891.45 which it
Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a paid under protest. A suit was brought by plaintiff against defendant.
member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus
Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its Issue: WON the imposition of the fees constitute an impairment of the
members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First free-exercise of religion of the petitioner as imposed on its sale and
Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said resolutions. distribution of bibles.
The lower court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the validity of the
resolutions. Held: YES. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the
ISSUE: Whether the resolutions contravene Section 5 of Article III of the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right
Constitution. can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on
the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any
HELD: NO. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San
Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently,
the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the
mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in
holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity
intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the
acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As
noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious
affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities.
The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the
masses.
The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian
of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring
the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement
would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily
be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in
connection with prayers and novenas.
The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in
their affidavits. Petitioner Garces swore that the said resolutions favored
the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and Edullantes
swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could
see the image in the church only once a year or during the fiesta. The
Court finds that the momentous issues of separation of church and
state, freedom of religion annd the use of public money to favor any
sect or church are not involved at all in this case even remotely or
indirectly. lt is not a microcosmic test case on those issues. This
case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would
never have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful
and if Father Osmea had taken the trouble of causing contributions
to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another
image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.
There can be no question that the image in question
belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmea claim that it belongs
to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image,
has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. If it
chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the
Catholic church that action would not violate the Constitution
because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private
property. The council has the right to take measures to recover
possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.
Not every governmental activity which involves the
expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of
church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public
money or property. In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was
involved was Act No. 4052 which appropriated sixty thousand pesos
for the cost of plates and the printing of postage stamps with new designs.
Under the law, the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Department
Head and the President of the Philippines, issued in 1936 postage stamps
to commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church. The purpose of
the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines. The
design of the stamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing
about the Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended. The
instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49
Phil., 627 and 55 Phil. 307, where a religious brotherhood, La
Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the purpose of
raising funds to meet the expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the
Most Holy Sacrament and the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held
accountable for the funds which it held as trustee.
Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the
annulment of the barangay resolutions, the lower court's judgment
dismissing their amended petition is affirmed.
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila The fees under Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied
G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957, Felix, J. to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. There is a difference when
religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the the tax is imposed upon the income or property of the religious
Philippines. In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has organization and one imposed against the acts of disseminating religious
been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except information. To tax the latter is impair the free exercise and enjoyment of
during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of
translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29 1953, the religious beliefs regardless of the amount of such fees.
acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, As to Ordinance No. 3000 requiring the obtention of a mayor’s permit
without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or

occupations enumerated therein, we do not find that it imposes any where it INC again won but was directed to refrain from attacking other
charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, religions. The Court of Appeals reversed the same.
nor tax the exercise of religious practices. Ordinance No. 3000
cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Issue:
Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as 1. Whether the MTRCB has jurisdiction to review petitioner's TV program
amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant- entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo?
appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff 2. Whether the action of respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV
Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121 should be sustained?
plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of Held:
religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is also 1. YES. The right to religious profession and worship has a TWO-
inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. FOLD ASPECT, viz., (1) freedom to believe and (2) freedom to act on
one's beliefs. The “first is absolute” as long as the belief is confined
"In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, it was held that an ordinance within the realm of thought. The “second is subject to regulation”
requiring that a license be obtained before a person could canvass or where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
solicit orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares or merchandise cannot welfare.
be made to apply to members of Jehovah's Witnesses who went about We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious
from door to door distributing literature and soliciting people to 'purchase' program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public
certain religious books and pamphlets, all published by the Watch Tower broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom
Bible & Tract Society. The 'price' of the books was twenty-five cents each, of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes
the 'price' of the pamphlets five cents each. It was shown that in making and ears of children. The Court reiterates the rule that the exercise of
the solicitations there was a request for additional 'contribution' of twenty- religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring
five cents each for the books and five cents each for the pamphlets. about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which
Lesser sum were accepted, however, and books were even donated in the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more
case interested persons were without funds. overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare.
A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to
On the above facts the Supreme Court held that it could not be said the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind
that petitioners were engaged in commercial rather than a religious adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern
venture. Their activities could not be described as embraced in the in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and
occupation of selling books and pamphlets. Then the Court continued: bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious
differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this
'We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free stultifying strife considering our warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism
from all financial burdens of government. See Grosjean vs. American with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. Even now, we have
Press Co., 297 U.S., 233, 250, 80 L. ed. 660, 668, 56 S. Ct. 444. We have yet to settle the near century old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which
here something quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of have been nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding between our
one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise of weird
employed in connection with those activities. It is one thing to impose a tax religious cults espousing violence as an article of faith also proves the
on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict let alone policy on the exercise of
tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax imposed by religion. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space
the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment of which is a condition for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not
of the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious
practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the 2. NO. First, The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated
resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the petitioners TV series for "attacking" either religions, especially the
privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can Catholic church. An examination of the evidence will show that the
close all its doors to all 'those who do not have a full purse. so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held
Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed
would thus be denied the needy. . . . by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they
were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and
It is contended however that the fact that the license tax can good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section
suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so. 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom
But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax - a flat of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.
tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of
Rights . . . The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of Second, even a sideglance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal
these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship that, the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the
which this Court has repeatedly struck down. . . . It is not a nominal religious program of petitioner, is not among the grounds to justify an
fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television program.
the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by the
levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose respondent Board in its Rules. This rule is void for it runs smack against
enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand
religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.
uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.'
Third, in x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents
Nor could dissemination of religious information be conditioned failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible
upon the approval of an official or manager even if the town were Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: "The constitutional guaranty
owned by a corporation as held in the case of Marsh vs. State of of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
Alabama (326 U.S. 501) or by the United States itself as held in the case carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
of Tucker vs. Texas (326 U.S. 517). In the former case the Supreme Court restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on
expressed the opinion that the right to enjoy freedom of the press and freedom of expression on the ground that there is aclear and present
religion occupies a preferred position as against the constitutional right of danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent."
property owners. In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that ". . . it
is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent animmediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA extent necessary to avoid the danger."
G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, Puno, J. Lastly, the records show that the decision of the respondent Board,
affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings
Facts: Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
organization, has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the
program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public
viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." EBRALINAG et. al. vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF
In its first course of action against respondent Board, INC SCHOOLS OF CEBU
appealed to the Office of the President where it was favored and then G.R No. 95770, March 1, 1993
again, before the Quezon City RTC alleging that the respondent Board
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring FACTS:
petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them,

All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the
their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute country, . . . — assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable
required by Republic Act No. 1265 and by Department Order No. 8 of at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be
DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. promoted by prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, L. ed. 1042, 1046.)
sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe
that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from
conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God". They feel the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as
bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols — 1 John Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free
5:21". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the
They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such
and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect
against official control SC holds that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's
However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue the Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of
constitutionality of the above provision of the new Administrative Code of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs
1987. They have targeted only Republic Act No. 1265 and the may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the
implementing orders of the DECS. flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our
ISSUE: country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious
Whether or not the expulsion of students by reason of not persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed
upholding the flag salute law is unconstitutional? before every Japanese soldier. Perhaps, if petitioners had lived through
that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting
HELD: the Philippine flag. For when liberation came in 1944 and our own flag was
YES. The 30-year old decision of SC in Gerona upholding the flag salute proudly hoisted aloft again, it was a beautiful sight to behold that made our
law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not hearts pound with pride and joy over the newly-regained freedom and
lightly to be trifled with. sovereignty of our nation.
It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling
had received legislative cachet by its in corporation in the Administrative Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our
Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to re- Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their
examine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of
sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate
flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being and cherish the Philippine flag.
expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present
generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which Estrada vs. Escritur
guarantees their rights to free speech ** and the free exercise of A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006
religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution;
Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 (NOTE: Strict neutral benevolence vis-à-vis Strict Separation/ Strict
Constitution). Neutrality)
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is
entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among FACTS:
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro
(Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Estrada requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531). 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, for an investigation of
The right to religious profession and worship has a respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for living with
TWO-FOLD ASPECT, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in
one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her
welfare act.[2] Consequently, respondent was charged with committing
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec.
the exercise of religious freedom (according to the late Chief Justice 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code.
Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135
SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999,
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of
that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but
to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have
not justified. a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s
The SC is not persuaded that by exempting the Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent
Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact, after
admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a “Declaration
shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation of Pledging Faithfulness.”
"untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the
flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes" For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the
(Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into
petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral
exclusion from the public schools where they may study the and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries
Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and where divorce is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the
learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but Jehovah’s congregation requires that at the time the declarations are
also receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities’ approval of
virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for the marital relationship because of legal impediments. Only couples
national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and who have been baptized and in good standing may execute the
spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation.
curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine As a matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their
schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared respective spouses’ commission of adultery are investigated before the
in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of declarations are executed. Escritor and Quilapio’s declarations were
the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious executed in the usual and approved form prescribed by the Jehovah’s
beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for Witnesses, approved by elders of the congregation where the declarations
dully constituted authorities. were executed, and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.
As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943): Moreover, the Jehovah’s congregation believes that once all legal
. . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the declarations
voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an ceases, and the couple should legalize their union. In Escritor’s case,
unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. . . . although she was widowed in 1998, thereby lifting the legal impediment to
When they [diversity] are so harmless to others or to the State as those marry on her part, her mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus,
we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not their declarations remained valid. In sum, therefore, insofar as the
limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in
touch the heart of the existing order. good standing in the congregation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative case herein should be dismissed? To most observers. . . strict neutrality has seemed incompatible with
the very idea of a free exercise clause. The Framers, whatever specific
HELD: applications they may have intended, clearly envisioned religion as
YES. In our decision dated August 4, 2003, after a long and arduous something special; they enacted that vision into law by guaranteeing
scrutiny into the origins and development of the religion clauses in the the free exercise of religion but not, say, of philosophy or science.
United States (U.S.) and the Philippines, we held that in resolving claims The strict neutrality approach all but erases this distinction. Thus it is
involving religious freedom (1) BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY OR not surprising that the [U.S.] Supreme Court has rejected strict neutrality,
ACCOMMODATION, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, permitting and sometimes mandating religious classifications.
intent and framework underlying the religion clauses in our
Constitution; and (2) in deciding respondent’s “plea of exemption Thus, the dilemma of the separationist approach, whether in the form
based on the Free Exercise Clause” (from the law with which she is of strict separation or strict neutrality, is that while the Jeffersonian
administratively charged), it is the COMPELLING STATE INTEREST wall of separation “captures the spirit of the American ideal of
TEST, the strictest test, which must be applied. church-state separation,” in real life, church and state are not and
cannot be totally separate. This is all the more true in contemporary
In sum, a review of the Old World antecedents of religion shows the times when both the government and religion are growing and
movement of establishment of religion as an engine to promote state expanding their spheres of involvement and activity, resulting in the
interests, to the principle of non-establishment to allow the free exercise of intersection of government and religion at many points.
religion.
(1) Religion Clauses in the U.S. Context

SECOND STANDARD: Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation
U.S. history has produced TWO identifiably different, even opposing,
strains of jurisprudence on the religion clauses. The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised on a
different view of the “wall of separation,” associated with Williams, founder
1. First is THE STANDARD OF SEPARATION, which may take of the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the Jeffersonian wall that is meant
the form of either (a) strict separation or (b) the tamer version to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the
of strict neutrality or separation , or what Mr. Justice Carpio church from the state
refers to as the second theory of governmental neutrality.
Although the latter form is not as hostile to religion as the former, Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important
both are anchored on the Jeffersonian premise that a “wall role in the public life of the United States as shown by many
of separation” must exist between the state and the Church traditional government practices which, to strict neutrality, pose
to protect the state from the church. Both protect the principle Establishment Clause questions. Among these are the inscription of “In
of church-state separation with a rigid reading of the principle. God We Trust” on American currency; the recognition of America as “one
nation under God” in the official pledge of allegiance to the flag; the
2. On the other hand, the second standard, the Supreme Court’s time-honored practice of opening oral argument with the
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY OR ACCOMMODATION, is invocation “God save the United States and this Honorable Court”; and
buttressed by the view that the wall of separation is meant to the practice of Congress and every state legislature of paying a chaplain,
protect the church from the state. usually of a particular Protestant denomination, to lead representatives in
prayer. These practices clearly show the preference for one theological
viewpoint—the existence of and potential for intervention by a god—
FIRST STANDARD: Strict Separation and Strict Neutrality/Separation over the contrary theological viewpoint of atheism. Church and
government agencies also cooperate in the building of low-cost housing
The STRICT SEPARATIONIST believes that the Establishment Clause and in other forms of poor relief, in the treatment of alcoholism and drug
was meant to protect the state from the church, and the state’s addiction, in foreign aid and other government activities with strong moral
hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two. dimension.
According to this Jeffersonian view, an “absolute barrier” to formal
interdependence of religion and state needs to be erected. Religious Examples of accommodations in American jurisprudence also
institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the abound, including, but not limited to the U.S. Court declaring the
state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate following acts as constitutional: a state hiring a Presbyterian
burdens the programs placed on believers. Only the complete minister to lead the legislature in daily prayers, or requiring
separation of religion from politics would eliminate the formal influence of employers to pay workers compensation when the resulting
religious institutions and provide for a free choice among political views, inconsistency between work and Sabbath leads to discharge; for
thus a strict “wall of separation” is necessary. government to give money to religiously-affiliated organizations to
teach adolescents about proper sexual behavior; or to provide
Strict separation faces difficulties, however, as it is deeply embedded in religious school pupils with books; or bus rides to religious schools;
American history and contemporary practice that enormous amounts of or with cash to pay for state-mandated standardized tests.
aid, both direct and indirect, flow to religion from government in return for
huge amounts of mostly indirect aid from religion. For example, less than
twenty-four hours after Congress adopted the First Amendment’s (1) Legislative Acts and the Free Exercise Clause
prohibition on laws respecting an establishment of religion, Congress
decided to express its thanks to God Almighty for the many blessings As with the other rights under the Constitution, the rights embodied in the
enjoyed by the nation with a resolution in favor of a presidential Religion clauses are invoked in relation to governmental action, almost
proclamation declaring a national day of Thanksgiving and Prayer. Thus, invariably in the form of legislative acts.
strict separationists are caught in an awkward position of claiming a
constitutional principle that has never existed and is never likely to. Generally speaking, a legislative act that purposely aids or inhibits
religion will be challenged as unconstitutional, either because it
The tamer version of the strict separationist view, the STRICT violates the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause or
NEUTRALITY OR SEPARATIONIST VIEW, (or, the governmental both. This is true whether one subscribes to the separationist
neutrality theory) finds basis in Everson v. Board of Education, where the approach or the benevolent neutrality or accommodationist
Court declared that Jefferson’s “wall of separation” encapsulated the approach.
meaning of the First Amendment. However, unlike the strict
separationists, the strict neutrality view believes that the “wall of But the more difficult religion cases involve legislative acts which have a
separation” does not require the state to be their adversary.” secular purpose and general applicability, but may incidentally or
Rather, the state must be NEUTRAL in its relations with groups of inadvertently aid or burden religious exercise. Though the government
religious believers and non-believers. “State power is no more to be action is not religiously motivated, these laws have a “burdensome effect”
used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.” The strict on religious exercise.
neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, but it is strict in holding
that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
purposes of governmental action, whether the action confers rights or governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed,
privileges or imposes duties or obligations. Only secular criteria may be not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to
the basis of government action. It does not permit, much less require, allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
accommodation of secular programs to religious belief. hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
The problem with the strict neutrality approach, however, is if As Justice Brennan explained, the “government [may] take religion
applied in interpreting the Establishment Clause, it could lead to a de into account…to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
facto voiding of religious expression in the Free Exercise Clause. As governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
pointed out by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Abington practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without
School District v. Schempp] strict neutrality could lead to “a brooding state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, exercise may flourish.” In the ideal world, the legislature would
hostility to the religious” which is prohibited by the recognize the religions and their practices and would consider them,
Constitution.Professor Laurence Tribe commented in his authoritative when practical, in enacting laws of general application. But when
treatise, viz:

the legislature fails to do so, religions that are threatened and (2) the state has failed to demonstrate a particularly important or
burdened may turn to the courts for protection. compelling governmental goal in preventing an exemption; and
Thus, what is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a (3) that the state has failed to demonstrate that it used the least restrictive
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an means.
exemption from its application or its “burdensome effect,” whether
by the legislature or the courts. Most of the free exercise claims brought In these cases, the Court finds that the injury to
to the U.S. Court are for exemption, not invalidation of the facially neutral religious conscience is so great and the advancement of public
law that has a “burdensome” effect. purposes is incomparable that only indifference or hostility could
explain a refusal to make exemptions. Thus, if the state’s objective
(2) FREE EXERCISE Jurisprudence: Sherbert, Yoder and Smith could be served as well or almost as well by granting an exemption to
those whose religious beliefs are burdened by the regulation, the Court
The pinnacle of free exercise protection and the theory of must grant the exemption. The Yoder case is an example where the
accommodation in the U.S. blossomed in the case of Sherbert v. Verner, Court held that the state must accommodate the religious beliefs of
which ruled that state regulation that indirectly restrains or punishes the Amish who objected to enrolling their children in high school as
religious belief or conduct must be subjected to strict scrutiny under required by law. The Sherbert case is another example where the Court
the Free Exercise Clause. According to Sherbert, when a law of held that the state unemployment compensation plan must accommodate
general application infringes religious exercise, albeit incidentally, the religious convictions of Sherbert.
the state interest sought to be promoted must be so paramount and
compelling as to override the free exercise claim. Otherwise, the B. PERMISSIVE ACCOMMODATION, the Court finds that the State
Court itself will carve out the exemption. may, but is not required to, accommodate religious interests. The
U.S. Walz case illustrates this situation where the U.S. Supreme Court
It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all upheld the constitutionality of tax exemption given by New York to
the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of church properties, but did not rule that the state was required to
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some provide tax exemptions. The Court declared that “(t)he limits of
“compelling state interest” intervenes. permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-
extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise
Thus, Sherbert and subsequent cases held that when government Clause.” Other examples are Zorach v. Clauson, allowing released time in
action burdens, even inadvertently, a sincerely held religious belief public schools and Marsh v. Chambers, allowing payment of legislative
or practice, the state must justify the burden by demonstrating that chaplains from public funds. Parenthetically, the Court in Smith has ruled
the law embodies a compelling interest, that no less restrictive that this is the only accommodation allowed by the Religion Clauses.
alternative exists, and that a religious exemption would impair the
state’s ability to effectuate its compelling interest. As in other C. PROHIBITED ACCOMMODATION. as when the Court finds no
instances of state action affecting fundamental rights, negative impacts on basis for a mandatory accommodation, or it determines that the
those rights demand the highest level of judicial scrutiny. After Sherbert, legislative accommodation runs afoul of the establishment or the
this strict scrutiny balancing test resulted in court-mandated religious free exercise clause, it results to a In this case, the Court finds that
exemptions from facially-neutral laws of general application whenever establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation
unjustified burdens were found. interests. To say that there are valid exemptions buttressed by the Free
Exercise Clause does not mean that all claims for free exercise
Then, in the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,[61] the U.S. Court exemptions are valid. An example where accommodation was
again ruled that religious exemption was in order, notwithstanding prohibited is McCollum v. Board of Education, where the Court ruled
that the law of general application had a criminal penalty. Using against optional religious instruction in the public school premises.
heightened scrutiny, the Court overturned the conviction of Amish
parents for violating Wisconsin compulsory school-attendance laws. Given that a free exercise claim could lead to three different results, the
The Court, in effect, granted exemption from a neutral, criminal question now remains as to how the Court should determine which action
statute that punished religiously motivated conduct. to take. In this regard, it is the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test
which is most in line with the benevolent neutrality-accommodation
The cases of Sherbert and Yoder laid out the following doctrines: (a) approach.
free exercise clause claims were subject to heightened scrutiny or
compelling interest test if government substantially burdened the Under the benevolent-neutrality theory, the principle underlying the First
exercise of religion; (b) heightened scrutiny or compelling interest Amendment is that freedom to carry out one’s duties to a Supreme
test governed cases where the burden was direct, i.e., the exercise of Being is an inalienable right, not one dependent on the grace of
religion triggered a criminal or civil penalty, as well as cases where legislature. Religious freedom is seen as a substantive right and not
the burden was indirect, i.e., the exercise of religion resulted in the merely a privilege against discriminatory legislation. With religion looked
forfeiture of a government benefit; and (c) the Court could carve out upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
accommodations or exemptions from a facially neutral law of general allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
application, whether general or criminal.
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine had five main components. First, action was 3. Religion Clauses in the Philippine Context: Constitution, Jurisprudence
protected—conduct beyond speech, press, or worship was included in the and Practice
shelter of freedom of religion. Neither Sherbert’s refusal to work on the
Sabbath nor the Amish parents’ refusal to let their children attend ninth a. US Constitution and jurisprudence vis-à-vis Philippine Constitution
and tenth grades can be classified as conduct protected by the other
clauses of the First Amendment. Second, indirect impositions on religious By juxtaposing the American Constitution and jurisprudence against that
conduct, such as the denial of twenty-six weeks of unemployment of the Philippines, it is immediately clear that one cannot simply conclude
insurance benefits to Adel Sherbert, as well as direct restraints, such as that we have adopted—lock, stock and barrel—the religion clauses as
the criminal prohibition at issue in Yoder, were prohibited. Third, as the embodied in the First Amendment, and therefore, the U.S. Court’s
language in the two cases indicate, the protection granted was interpretation of the same. Unlike in the U.S. where legislative exemptions
extensive. Only extremely strong governmental interests justified of religion had to be upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court as constituting
impingement on religious conduct, as the absolute language of the permissive accommodations, similar exemptions for religion are
test of the Free Exercise Clause suggests. mandatory accommodations under our own constitutions. Thus, our 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain provisions on tax exemption of
church property,[123] salary of religious officers in government institutions,
[124] and optional religious instruction.[125] Our own preamble also
invokes the aid of a divine being.[126] These constitutional provisions are
wholly ours and have no counterpart in the U.S. Constitution or its
(3) ACCOMMODATION under the Religion Clauses amendments. They all reveal without doubt that the Filipino people, in
adopting these constitutions, manifested their adherence to the
A free exercise claim could result to THREE KINDS OF benevolent neutrality approach that requires accommodations in
ACCOMMODATION: (a) those which are found to be constitutionally interpreting the religion clauses.
compelled, i.e., required by the Free Exercise Clause; (b) those
which are discretionary or legislative, i.e., not required by the Free The argument of Mr. Justice Carpio that the August 4, 2003 ponencia was
Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by the Establishment erroneous insofar as it asserted that the 1935 Constitution incorporates
Clause; and (c) those which the religion clauses prohibit. the Walz ruling as this case was decided subsequent to the 1935
Constitution is a misreading of the ponencia. What the ponencia pointed
A. MANDATORY ACCOMMODATION results when the Court finds that out was that even as early as 1935, or more than three decades before
accommodation is required by the Free Exercise Clause, i.e, when the the U.S. Court could validate the exemption in Walz as a form or
Court itself carves out an exemption. This accommodation occurs when permissible accommodation, we have already incorporated the same in
all three conditions of the compelling interest test are met: our Constitution, as a mandatory accommodation.
(1) a statute or government action has burdened claimant’s free exercise There is no ambiguity with regard to the Philippine Constitution’s
of religion, and there is no doubt as to the sincerity of the religious belief; departure from the U.S. Constitution, insofar as religious accommodations
are concerned. It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-

accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent Court should take off in interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal
and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution.[128] As stated in towards which this approach is directed is the protection of religious liberty
our Decision, dated August 4, 2003: “not only for a minority, however small- not only for a majority,
however large but for each of us” to the greatest extent possible
The history of the religion clauses in the 1987 Constitution shows within flexible constitutional limits.
that these clauses were largely adopted from the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution xxxx Philippine jurisprudence and commentaries on II. THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS
the religious clauses also continued to borrow authorities from U.S.
jurisprudence without articulating the stark distinction between the two We now resume from where we ended in our August 4, 2003 Decision. As
streams of U.S. jurisprudence [i.e., separation and benevolent neutrality]. mentioned, what remained to be resolved, upon which remand was
One might simply conclude that the Philippine Constitutions and necessary, pertained to the final task of subjecting this case to the careful
jurisprudence also inherited the disarray of U.S. religion clause application of the compelling state interest test, i.e., determining
jurisprudence and the two identifiable streams; thus, when a religion whether respondent is entitled to exemption, an issue which is essentially
clause case comes before the Court, a separationist approach or a factual or evidentiary in nature.
benevolent neutrality approach might be adopted and each will have U.S.
authorities to support it. Or, one might conclude that as the history of the There has never been any question that the state has an interest in
First Amendment as narrated by the Court in Everson supports the protecting the institutions of marriage and the family, or even in the
separationist approach, Philippine jurisprudence should also follow this sound administration of justice. Indeed, the provisions by which
approach in light of the Philippine religion clauses’ history. As a result, in respondent’s relationship is said to have impinged, e.g., Book V, Title I,
a case where the party claims religious liberty in the face of a general law Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code, Articles 334
that inadvertently burdens his religious exercise, he faces an almost and 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and even the provisions on marriage
insurmountable wall in convincing the Court that the wall of separation and family in the Civil Code and Family Code, all clearly demonstrate the
would not be breached if the Court grants him an exemption. These State’s need to protect these secular interests.
conclusions, however, are not and were never warranted by the 1987,
1973 and 1935 Constitutions as shown by other provisions on religion in Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically
all three constitutions. It is a cardinal rule in constitutional construction articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is
that the constitution must be interpreted as a whole and apparently a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy
conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner of rights — “the most inalienable and sacred of human rights,” in the
that will give to all of them full force and effect. From this construction, words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the
it will be ascertained that the intent of the framers was to adopt a state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds
benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religious clauses the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in
in the Philippine constitutions, and the enforcement of this intent is specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the
the goal of construing the constitution exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to
We therefore reject Mr. Justice Carpio’s total adherence to the U.S. religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the
Court’s interpretation of the religion clauses to effectively deny Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
accommodations on the sole basis that the law in question is neutral and
of general application. For even if it were true that “an unbroken line of Thus, it is not the State’s broad interest in “protecting the institutions
U.S. Supreme Court decisions” has never held that “an individual’s of marriage and the family,” or even “in the sound administration of
religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise justice” that must be weighed against respondent’s claim, but the
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate,” our own State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the
Constitutions have made significant changes to accommodate and cohabitation which respondent’s faith finds moral. In other words,
exempt religion. Philippine jurisprudence shows that the Court has the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if
allowed exemptions from a law of general application, in effect, exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent
interpreting our religion clauses to cover both mandatory and those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This,
permissive accommodations. the Solicitor General failed to do.
To illustrate, in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, the Court granted To paraphrase Justice Blackmun’s application of the compelling interest
to plaintiff exemption from a law of general application based on the Free test, the State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be
Exercise Clause. In this case, plaintiff was required by an ordinance to sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be
secure a mayor’s permit and a municipal license as ordinarily required of merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that
those engaged in the business of general merchandise under the city’s unbending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill
ordinances. Plaintiff argued that this amounted to “religious censorship any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that
and restrained the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession, to prohibition. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any
wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
people of the Philippines.” Although the Court categorically held that the against respondent or her partner. The State has never sought to
questioned ordinances were not applicable to plaintiff as it was not prosecute respondent nor her partner. The State’s asserted interest thus
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said “merchandise” for amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
profit, it also ruled that applying the ordinance to plaintiff and requiring it to Incidentally, as echoes of the words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo and Vitug, in
secure a license and pay a license fee or tax would impair its free exercise their concurring opinions in our Decision, dated August 4, 2003, to deny
of religious profession and worship and its right of dissemination of the exemption would effectively break up “an otherwise ideal union of two
religious beliefs “as the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the individuals who have managed to stay together as husband and wife
power to control or suppress its enjoyment.” The decision states in part, [approximately twenty-five years]” and have the effect of defeating the
viz: very substance of marriage and the family.
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of The Solicitor General also argued against respondent’s religious freedom
religious profession and worship carries with it the right to on the basis of morality, i.e., that “the conjugal arrangement of respondent
disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can and her live-in partner should not be condoned because adulterous
only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the relationships are constantly frowned upon by society”; and “that State laws
grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive on marriage, which are moral in nature, take clear precedence over the
evil which the State has the right to prevent. religious beliefs and practices of any church, religious sect or
denomination on marriage. Verily, religious beliefs and practices should
At this point, we must emphasize that the adoption of not be permitted to override laws relating to public policy such as those of
the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach does not mean marriage.”
that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise
claim comes before it. This is an erroneous reading of the framework The above arguments are mere reiterations of the arguments raised by
which the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio seems to entertain. Although Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago in her dissenting opinion to our Decision
benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view dated August 4, 2003, which she offers again in toto. These arguments
religion clause cases, the interest of the state should also be have already been addressed in our decision dated August 4, 2003.[154]
afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the purpose of the test In said Decision, we noted that Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago’s
—to draw the line between mandatory, permissible and forbidden dissenting opinion dwelt more on the standards of morality, without
religious exercise. categorically holding that religious freedom is not in issue.] We, therefore,
went into a discussion on morality, in order to show that:
xxx While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can eliminate
the difficult questions of judgment in determining the degree of burden on (a) The public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular for in
religious practice or importance of the state interest or the sufficiency of our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
the means adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions. Thus, when the
doctrine on the ideal towards which religious clause jurisprudence should law speaks of “immorality” in the Civil Service Law or “immoral” in the
be directed. We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or “public morals” in the
jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only Revised Penal Code, or “morals” in the New Civil Code,[159] or “moral
because of its merits as discussed above, but more importantly, character” in the Constitution,[160] the distinction between public and
because our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other,
show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the should be kept in mind;

possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although
(b) Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, the morality contemplated by laws is secular (secular
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality morality), benevolent neutrality could allow for
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state accommodation of morality based n religion (religious
interests; secularity), provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
(c) The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bar • The COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST involves a
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. three-step process. The Court explained this process in
detail, by showing the questions which must be answered in
(d) Having distinguished between public and secular morality and religious each step, viz:
morality, the more difficult task is determining which immoral acts under
this public and secular morality fall under the phrase “disgraceful and
immoral conduct” for which a government employee may be held 1. “Has the statute or government action created
administratively liable.Only one conduct is in question before this Court, a burden on the free exercise of religion?” The
i.e., the conjugal arrangement of a government employee whose partner is courts often look into the sincerity of the
legally married to another which Philippine law and jurisprudence consider religious belief, but without inquiring into the
both immoral and illegal. truth of the belief. The FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE prohibits inquiring about its truth.
While there is no dispute that under settled jurisprudence,
respondent’s conduct constitutes “disgraceful and immoral 2. The Court then asks: “Is there a sufficiently
conduct,” the case at bar involves the defense of religious freedom, compelling state interest to justify the
therefore none of the cases cited by Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago infringement of religious liberty?” In this step,
apply. There is no jurisprudence in Philippine jurisdiction holding THE GOVERNMENT HAS TO ESTABLISH
that the defense of religious freedom of a member of the Jehovah’s THAT ITS PURPOSES ARE LEGITIMATE
Witnesses under the same circumstances as respondent will not FOR THE STATE AND THAT THEY ARE
prevail over the laws on adultery, concubinage or some other law. COMPELLING.
We cannot summarily conclude therefore that her conduct is
likewise so “odious” and “barbaric” as to be immoral and 3. The Court asks: “Has the state in achieving its
punishable by law. legitimate purposes used the least instrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not
In this case, the government’s conduct may appear innocent and infringed any more thanh necessary to achieve
nondiscriminatory but in effect, it is oppressive to the minority. In the legitimate goal of the state?” The analysis
the interpretation of a document, such as the Bill of Rights, designed requires the state to show that the means in
to protect the minority from the majority, the question of which which it is achieveing its legitimate state
perspective is appropriate would seem easy to answer. Moreover, the objective is the LEAST INTRUSIVE MEANS,
text, history, structure and values implicated in the interpretation of the i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its
clauses, all point toward this perspective. Thus, substantive equality—a legitimate state end that imposes as little as
reading of the religion clauses which leaves both politically dominant and possible on religious liberties.
the politically weak religious groups equal in their inability to use the
government (law) to assist their own religion or burden others—makes
the most sense in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS
designed to protect minorities and individuals from mobocracy in a GR NO. 88211, September. 15, 1989
democracy (the majority or a coalition of minorities).
Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to THE non-violent “people power” revolution and forced into exile. Pres. Corazon
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY APPROACH that gives room for C. Aquino was declared President of the Phils under a revolutionary
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free government. However, the ratification of the 1987 Constitution further
Exercise Clause.Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held strengthened the legitimacy of Mrs Aquino’s authority. The country was far
administratively liable as the arrangement she had was “illegal per se from being stabilized, though, as continued threats from various sectors
because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very ranging from the rebels to the followers of the Marcoses and even those
nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,” the that were initiators of the people power revolution. Mr. Marcos has
Solicitor General failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could signified, in his deathbed, to return to the Phils. But Mrs Aquino
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood
does not offend compelling state interests. firmly on the decision to bar the his and his family’s return.
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the
Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the
interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end or property without due process of law, nor shall any
that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. Again, the person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this element of the test. Other
than the two documents offered as cited above which established the xxx xxx xxx
sincerity of respondent’s religious belief and the fact that the agreement
was an internal arrangement within respondent’s congregation, no iota of Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
evidence was offered. In fact, the records are bereft of even a feeble same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the means the state impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
respondent’s religious freedom. the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the
be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within
based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to
recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view
including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency
exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.
to an authority higher than the state, and so THE STATE INTEREST
sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr.
erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
IN THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING THAT SUCH STATE INTEREST
EXISTS, MAN MUST BE ALLOWED TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE Issue:
INFINITE. 1. Whether or not the right of the Marcoses of the liberty of
abode and the right to travel are violated?
2. Whether the President has the power to bar the petitioners
from returning home?
ESTRADA vs. ESCRITUR SUMMARY:
Held:
• Benevolent Neutrality recognizes that the government must 1. NO. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not
pursue its secular goals and interests, but at the same time, the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within
strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally

connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail with FGU Instance Corporation
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent as surety.
from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to
the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and
one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due
the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders hearing, both trial judges denied the same.
of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately from the "right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional right of liberty of abode is herein
On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of violated?
movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the right
to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which HELD: NO. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to
rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence
security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights and of the nature and function of a bail bond.
freedoms of others." [Art. 12(3)] as distinguished from the "right to enter The object of a bail bond is to relieve the accused of
his own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending
It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the
right to return to one's country in the same context as those power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the
court and do what the law may require of him."
The right to return to one's country is not among the The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well- operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. The result of the
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused
generally accepted principle of international law and, under our amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court,
Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the
Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be
travel and enjoys a different protection under the International nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they
deprived" thereof. would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.
2. YES. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of "The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or
the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer
Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in
anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been
nation demand. It is a (1) power borne by the President's duty to regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The
preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a (2) sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the
power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the
faithfully executed. state."
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive
power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the
as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the
Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In
is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself,
other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country,
law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the in the first place, if it were otherwise.
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited latter case, the accused was able to show the urgent necessity for her
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Faced travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the
with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the the conditions of her bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case has not
Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in satisfactorily shown any of the above. As aptly observed by the Solicitor
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and General in his comment:
uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the
national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from Country' will show that it is solely predicated on petitioner's
being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people wish to travel to the United States where he will, allegedly
have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common attend to some business transactions and search for
good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers business opportunities. From the tenor and import of
delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be
rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur thereto.
people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.] Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is absolute
necessity for him to travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears
no indication that the alleged business transactions could not
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is
G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986, FERNAN, J.: there any hint that petitioner's absence from the United
States would absolutely preclude him from taking advantage
FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal of business opportunities therein, nor is there any showing
stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc that petitioner's non-presence in the United States would
Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Following the "run" on stock cause him irreparable damage or prejudice.
brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this
jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or
and together with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities shown that his surety has agreed to it. He merely alleges that his
and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a management surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities.
committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc and for Trans-Insular Management, The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the
Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc. was granted and a assent of the surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the
management committee was organized and appointed. government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any proceedings with the
principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies
Pending disposition of SEC Case, the SEC requested the Commissioner against him.
of Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum to
this effect was issued by the Commissioner. When a Torrens title The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an
submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to absolute right. Petitioner’s contention that having been admitted to
be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the
petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding liberty, could not prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to
criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal. In all travel, is untenable.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all
absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states: means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases
pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to
except upon lawful order of the court, or when carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135,
necessary in the interest of national security, public Section 6, Rules of Court).
safety or public health."
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of
To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that the condition imposed upon
constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at all times
constitutional provision. whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under the 1987
Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail
RICARDO C. SILVERIO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS bond has remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or
G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was
but a re-affirmation of that laid down long before in People v. Uy
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
Revised Securities Act. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional
liberty. More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has
respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court
cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those
accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused
without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the
arraignment and scheduled hearings. territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel
his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party
Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to
Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information "the accused their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course
has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding
the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone
abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court". Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Petitioner's Certiorari Petition
before the Court of Appeals was likewise denied.
SEC. 7 – RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Petitioner takes the posture, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes
the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits
prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION
only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public 150 SCRA 530, 1987
health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
FACTS: -SUPRA-
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were
treated under one provision. Article III, Section 1 (4) thereof reads: ISSUE: Whether or not Legaspi should be allowed such right
"The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the HELD:
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired." The constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern is recognized in the Bill of Rights. These constitutional
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which
liberty of travel, thus: the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon
except upon lawful order of the court or when necessary in the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
the interest of national security, public safety, or public Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
health" (Article IV, Section 5). conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.
sentences and treats them differently, to wit: For every right of the people recognized as
fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those
"Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Only governments operating
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right under fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as to shield
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided constitutional. Without a government's acceptance of the limitations
by law." imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties,
without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and
impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public liberty, the ultimate illusion.
safety, or public health." In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both
the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records,
order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of documents, papers and in addition, government research data used
national security, public safety or public health" as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the
HELD: YES. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this
interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article II,
even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or Section 28 thereof, to wit:
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to
impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
"national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 public interest. (Art. II, Sec. 28).
text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987,
p. 263). In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by
what this Court declared as an imperative duty of the government officials
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a
to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime public nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general
when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued applicability. We granted Mandamus in said case, and in the process, We
certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:
party
. . . That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to
be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and

reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the But the constitutional guarantee to information on
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to
publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, at 39) official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
The absence of discretion on the part of government agencies in therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
allowing the examination of public records, specifically, the records those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the
in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed
Ozaeta, supra: by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or
one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is,
is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or
under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the public concern.
motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the
records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which This question is first addressed to the government agency
the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed,
scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny
records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the
thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. . . . (Subido v. burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern,
Ozaeta, supra at 388). or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from
the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the
It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against
of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose release . . ." To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access
sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts,
agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.
right to information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido
case, We recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the In determining whether or not a particular information is of
manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public
records relating to registered lands. However, the regulations which the concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition.
Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to: Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either 1because these directly affect their lives, or
2
. . . prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine
with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
make inspection may be insured . . . (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383,
387). The public concern invoked in the case of Tañada v. Tuvera, supra, was
the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to
Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra,
in a municipal judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the public of the public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the
criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter knowledge of those real estate transactions which some believed to have
No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was been registered in violation of the Constitution.
filed against the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow
examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the
the Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles
to open and view the subject records, We absolved the respondent. In for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly
effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him declares as a State policy that:
upon the manner of examining the public records were reasonable.
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to
statement that the authority to regulate the manner of examining public positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly
records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2. [2]).
made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access
to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in Public office being a public trust, [Const., Art. XI, Sec: 1] it is the
which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions
availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the
the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that
damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public
with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, interest. For Mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must
that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the
assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra). constitutional guarantee.
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and
to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that
part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil
any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore,
not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
of Mandamus in a proper case. government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the
public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, from the Civil Service Commission.
the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern,
propriety of the issuance of the writ of Mandamus in this case is, whether and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access
the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
constitutional guarantee. the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of Mandamus, therefore lies.
access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality
of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v.
Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the
same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE
the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 170 SCRA 256, 1989
[1939]), access to information of general interest aids the people in
democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974] by FACTS:
giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation. -SUPRA-

ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously
the acts sought by petitioner to be done, in pursuance of their right to discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.
information The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks
being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the
HELD: same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption
Yes. The people’s right to information is limited to matters of of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter
public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be suspended all its military actions.
provided by law. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya
government and its employees and administration of various insurance from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic
public character. It is the legitimate concern of the public to ensure principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security
that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard
maximizing the benefits to insured government employees. to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001
The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the simply agreed “that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their
public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought next meeting.”
clearly a matter of public interest and concern. A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on
Furthermore, the "constituent-ministrant" dichotomy August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing
characterizing government function has long been repudiated. That the Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading
GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the
not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and
of the right to information. Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many
loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002
covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away
concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only. chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad’s position as chief peace
negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in
corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its
the people's right of access to official records. It is further contended that final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious “consensus”
function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional ever embodied in an instrument – the MOA-AD which is assailed
policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591,
applicable only to "official" transactions. 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962. Commonly impleaded as
respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain and the
First of all, the "constituent ----ministrant" dichotomy Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon,
characterizing government function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA Jr. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato[and Vice-Governor
v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for
[G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
Court said that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right
attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
service to the people. respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies
of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD
exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. This initial
petition was followed by several other petitions by other parties. The Court
Moreover, the intent of the members of the ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include government-owned
and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them ISSUE:
within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is Whether there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters
manifest from the records of the proceedings of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under
and considering further that government-owned and controlled Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991?
corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions
are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions HELD: YES. The right of the people to information on matters of public
entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
transparency in government dealings. development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents may be provided by law.
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the Court has recognized the
that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was
examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be eventually accorded constitutional status.
avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been
inspect the records may be insured recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.
However, although citizens are afforded the right to In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,the Court ruled
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official that access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of political significance. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
public concern. recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a
democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
nation’s problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they
are denied access to information of general interest. Information is
needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
the times. As has been aptly observed: “Maintaining the flow of such
information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its
dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably
ceases.”
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTOBATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to
GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008 cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general
interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a
better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation, so that they
FACTS: may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an
military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed
sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by
MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when the people.
President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern

among others: (d)an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress,
That the subject of the information sought in the present (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In and (f) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of
fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public Justice to respondent Director.
concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of
real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need ISSUE: Was there undue delegation with respect to the restriction
for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service imposed on the accessibility of the Manual of Execution?
eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS
funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery HELD: YES. A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is
of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth,[120] and the identity of no undue delegation of legislative power from the Secretary of Justice to
party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere
concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity constituent unit of the Department of Justice. Further, the Department of
of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the "administration of
the correctional system." Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the Bureau
include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation
contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial with the Department of Health.
character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled that the right to
information “contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177
consummation of the transaction.” Certainly, a consummated contract is suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with,
not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules
the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, which provides:
and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its
defects. "SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. - Details of the
procedure prior to, during and after administering the lethal
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared by the
dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the Director. The manual shall contain details of, among others,
government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the the sequence of events before and after execution;
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of
intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from death; and the removal of the intravenous system.
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be
We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a limited to authorized prison personnel."
retreat by the State of its avowed “policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.” Thus, the Courts finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the
Intended as a “splendid symmetry” to the right to information under implementing rules a veritable vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has
the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the
II of the Constitution. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by
above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information not providing for a mode of review and approval thereof. Being a
on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the
while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as
even if nobody demands. the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph
principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, invalid.
with the people’s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the
State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the
vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual even
public officials at all times accountable to the people. with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose. the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of public concern
"which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of
Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice an ordinary citizen."[62] Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998 provides:
"SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of

FACTS: public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official
Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his acts, transaction, or decisions, as well as to government
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for research data used as a basis for policy development, shall
the said crime. be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law."
Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual
issues, and on its heels, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to
raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of
No. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. In the same
for the crime of rape. way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest
On February 7, 1998, this Court denied petitioner's Motion for aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
finding that Congress duly complied with the requirements for the
reimposition of the death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is
not unconstitutional.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of Chavez vs. PCGG
execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection,[4] and G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J.:
passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY
LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL FACTS:
PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC people's constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
ACT NO. 7659.[5] Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Does this right include access to the terms of government
Justice promulgated the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act negotiations prior to their consummation or conclusion? May the
No. 8177 ("implementing rules")[6] and directed the Director of the Bureau government, through the Presidential Commission on Good
of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed terms of a
compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction alleged ill-gotten wealth? More specifically, are the "General
and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Agreement" and "Supplemental Agreement," both dated December 28,
Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the 1993 and executed between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, valid and
execution by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its binding?
implementing rules as these are unconstitutional and void for being,

The Case
These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking Limitations to the Right:
(1) to prohibit and "[e]njoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from (1) National Security Matters
privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any greement with the At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that
heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to
concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
Philippines and/or abroad — including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; matters. But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the
and privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information,
(2) to "[c]ompel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and provided that they are examined "in strict confidence" and given
agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or "scrupulous protection."
relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the
Marcos heirs." conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to
reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.
The Facts
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former (2) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions
government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside
cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or
systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other
impelled him to bring this action were several news reports 2 bannered in related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of
a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news Bank Deposits Act 28) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.
items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos
assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the (3) Criminal Matters
reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those
PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information 3 and the criminals, which courts may nor inquire into prior to such arrest, detention
correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously
involving the national interest, 4 demands that respondents make public jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information
any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on
recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise covert criminal activities.
on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount
public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's (4) Other Confidential Information
economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the The Ethical Standards Act further prohibits public officials and employees
Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the from using or divulging "confidential or classified information officially
transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government. known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise public." Other acknowledged limitations to information access include
agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive
action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations
PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he of the Supreme Court.
has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the
proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become Scope: Matters of Public Concern and Transactions Involving Public
effective and binding. Interest
ISSUE: In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the information
Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public sought must be "matters of public concern," access to which may be
the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses? limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends
only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be
HELD: "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." As to the
meanings of the terms "PUBLIC INTEREST" and "PUBLIC CONCERN,"
First Substantive Issue: the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, elucidated:
Public Disclosure of Terms of Any Agreement, Perfected or Not
In determining whether or not a particular information is of
In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements pertaining public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
to a compromise settlement with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill- "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes
gotten wealth, petitioner invokes the following provisions of the exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
Constitution: subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply
Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects
government research data used as basis for policy the public.
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. Considered a public concern in the above-mentioned case was the
"legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions
Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy are eligibles." So was the need to give the general public adequate
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public notification of various laws that regulate and affect the actions and
interest. conduct of citizens, as held in Tañada. Likewise did the "public nature of
the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the
Respondents' opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions alleged borrowers (members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa)"
refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being qualify the information sought in Valmonte as matters of public
considered. As regards the assailed Agreements entered into by the interest and concern. In Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, the Court also
PCGG with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has accrued, held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit if their official
because said Agreements have not been approved by the President, and functions are public in character; hence, the records pertaining to
the Marcos heirs have failed to fulfill their express undertaking therein. such official acts and decisions are within the ambit of the
Thus, the Agreements have not become effective. Respondents add that constitutional right of access to public records.
they are not aware of any ongoing negotiation for another compromise
with the Marcoses regarding their alleged ill-gotten assets. Under Republic Act No. 6713, public officials and employees are
mandated to "provide information on their policies and procedures
The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject in clear and understandable language, [and] ensure openness of
provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent. information, public consultations and hearings whenever
appropriate . . .," except when "otherwise provided by law or when
There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within required by the public interest." In particular, the law mandates free
which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be public access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance
obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized reports of offices and agencies of government and government-
restrictions: owned or controlled corporations; and the statements of assets,
liabilities and financial disclosures of all public officials and
(1) national security matters and intelligence information employees.
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions
(3) criminal matters, and In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in
(4) other confidential information. connection with their official functions must be accessible to the
public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental

affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs other classified information.
of the government are honesty, faithfully and competently
performing their functions as public servants. Undeniably, the
essence of democracy lies in the free flow of thought; but thoughts
and ideas must be well-informed so that the public would gain a Section 8 – Right to Form Association
better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able
to criticize as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a SSS Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals
responsible, reasonable and effective manner. Certainly, it is by GR 85279, July 28,1989
ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-
informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes FACTS: A complaint for damages was filed by the SSS against the
desired by the people. officers and members of the SSS Employees Association alleging that on
June 9, 1987, said officers and members staged an illegal strike and
barricaded the entrances to the SSS building. Said action prevented non-
The Nature of the Marcoses' Alleged Ill-Gotten Wealth striking employees from reporting for work and clients from transacting
with the SSS. Said strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor
Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) Management Council that ordered the strikers to return to work. Strikers
days after the Marcoses fled the country, created the PCGG which was refused consequently incurring damages for the SSS.
primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery of vast government
resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate ISSUE: Whether or not SSS employees have the right to strike.
family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad.
HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and
Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) days later, all persons Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all
and entities who had knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
properties were warned and, under pain of penalties prescribed by law, peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
prohibited from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3].
otherwise frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the government.
On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all
additional powers to the PCGG which, taking into account the overriding workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to
considerations of national interest and national survival, required it to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
achieve expeditiously and effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it
wealth. provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority Government, including government-owned or controlled
emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-
Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art.
imbued with public interest. We may also add that "ILL-GOTTEN IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also
WEALTH," by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on provides that "[t]he right of the people, including those employed in
the aforementioned Executive Orders, "ill-gotten wealth" refers to the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art.
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution
associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is
government funds or properties; or their having taken undue silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to
advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influences or strike.
relationships, "resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing
grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
of the Philippines." Clearly, the assets and properties referred to understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the
supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government
reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right
the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged to the formation of unions or associations only, without including
by competent courts. Another declared overriding consideration for the the right to strike.
expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national
economic recovery. Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the
provision that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to
We believe the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the
petitioner has a right to respondents' disclosure of any agreement that apprehensions expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-
may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. President of the Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long.
Access to Information on Negotiating Terms When we proposed this amendment providing for self-
organization of government employees, it does not mean
But does the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to that because they have the right to organize, they also
information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the have the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are only
final agreement? This same clarification was sought and clearly talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to the
addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of Rights,
deliberations, which we quote hereunder: there is a provision that the right to form associations or
societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the
be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or strikes coming from employees exercising government
whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to functions, that could be done because the moment that is
the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the prohibited, then the union which will go on strike will be an
contract itself? illegal union. And that provision is carried in Republic Act 875.
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from the
generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but
contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our honorable
Presiding Officer. Vice-President is unfounded. It does not mean that because
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations we approve this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike.
“leading” to the consummation of the transaction? That is a different matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the now being discussed in the Committee on Social Justice
national interest. because we are trying to find a solution to this problem. We
know that this problem exists; that the moment we allow
Considering the intent of the Constitution, we believe that it is anybody in the government to strike, then what will happen if
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information happen to those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter
on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the of discussion in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, repeat, the right to form an organization DOES NOT
though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not CARRY with it the right to strike. [Record of the
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569].
communications during the stage when common assertions are still
in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure
of information in general, as discussed earlier — such as on matters

The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under Elizalde Rope Workers' Union which had with the Company a CBA
the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, containing a closed shop provision which states that Membership in the
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original employees workers covered by this Agreement.
charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1); see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of RA 875, the employer was not
the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require
employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. organization is the representative of the employees." When RA 3350 was
No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. enacted, it introduced an amendment: ... "but such agreement shall not
NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24, 1988] and are covered cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This members in any such labor organization".
being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. As a member of a sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any
labor organization, appellee resigned from the Union. Thereafter, the
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms Union asked the Company to separate Appellee from service in view of
and conditions of employment in the Government, including any the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. Appellee filed
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by an action for injunction.
LAW" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended
and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional since it infringes on the right to
terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, form lawful associations?
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their HELD: No. RA 3350 does not infringe right to association. Both the
employers. Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom of association. What the
Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is
The principle behind labor unionism in PRIVATE INDUSTRY is that the "right" to form or join associations. a right comprehends at least
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of
Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without
essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee
wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and may, as he pleases, join or refrain from Joining an association. It is,
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he
through the process of collective bargaining. should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he
himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join;
In GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT, however, it is the legislature and, and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power
where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the
this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, right to abstain from joining any union. Inasmuch as what both the
and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and
guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that BY REASON OF THE choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same
NATURE OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYER and THE PECULIAR breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations.
CHARACTER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE, it must necessarily regard The right to refrain from joining labor orgs recognized by of
the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying the Industrial Peace Act is limited. The legal protection granted to such
to public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a
that the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop. By virtue, of a
the interest of all people in the public service, and that accordingly, closed shop agreement, before RA 3350, if any person, regardless of
such conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his
could not exist in the relations between government and those whom employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining
they employ. union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union
is curtailed and withdrawn. To that all-embracing coverage of the closed
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to shop arrangement, RA 3350 introduced an exception: "but such
organize of government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law. It merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the
Thus: closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization.
SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious
improvements thereof, except those that are fixed by law, sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said
may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of
employees' organizations and appropriate government any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be
authorities. refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that
they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear,
The same executive order has also provided for the general therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional
mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes in the public provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It
sector, to wit: does not prohibit the members of said RELIGIOUS SECTS from
affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty
SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
procedures, whenever applicable, shall be followed in the notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects
resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and
government employees. In case any dispute remains fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the
unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them
existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel
the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-Management] them to join. RA 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional
Council for appropriate action. provision on freedom of association.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or

associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the In re: IBP membership dues delinquency of Atty Marcial Edillion
terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of A.C 1928, August 3 1978
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies
for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be FACTS: The IBP unanimously adopted a resolution commending to the
any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public SC to remove Marcial Edillion, a duly licensed practising lawyer, from the
Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But roll of attorneys because of his stubborn refusal to pay his membership
employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and dues despite due notice. Edillon refused to pay believing it to be an
other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, invasion of his constitutional rights as he was being compelled to be a
to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. member of the IBP and to pay its dues was a precondition to maintaining
his status as a lawyer.
ISSUE: Is compelling a lawyer to be a member of the IBP violating one’s

constitutional freedom to associate?
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union HELD: No. The SC maintains that the IBP does not make a lawyer a
GR 25246, Sept. 12,1974 member of any group of which he is not already a member of. By
virtue of his passing the Bar exams, Edillon automatically becomes
FACTS: Appellee Benjamin Victoriano is a member of "Iglesia ni Cristo", an IBP member.
an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc, and a member of the

The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect
power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the the relief. Thus, the Court declared that the continued operation and
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to enforcement of Republic Act 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
associate. oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and the same
should be declared null and void and without effect. This also holds true
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which as regards Executive Orders 25 and 32, considering that said Orders
he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the
he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.
is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but This pronouncement is most especially needed in view of the revival
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a clause embodied in said Act if and when it is declared unconstitutional or
member. invalid.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co.
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual GR 24670, Dec. 14, 1979
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may FACTS: Plaintiff Ortigas was engaged in the business of developing and
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be selling residential lots in Highway Hills Subdivision, Mandaluyong. It sold
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program to vendees Padilla and Angeles two lots (Lots 5 and 6) in installments
— the lawyers. under separate agreements of sale. The vendees transferred their rights to
Chavez. Upon completion of payment, plaintiff executed the deeds of sale
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer which contained a restriction, inter alia, that the lots shall be used by the
to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as buyer exclusively for residential purposes. The restriction was annotated in
an exercise of the police power of the state the titles of Chavez. Defendant Feati bought from her the lots and the
building restrictions were also annotated in its titles. Feati maintains that
The Court further maintains that said IBP fees is a regulatory measure the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw Blvd. to Pasig River,
intended to raise funds for carrying out its objectives and purposes of the where the lots were located, has been declared a commercial and
integration. The Court carries the constitutional power and duty to industrial zone per Resolution 27 of the Municipal Council of
promulgate rules that concern admissions and practice of law, including Mandaluyong. So, it started constructing a bank on the lots. Plaintiff
the integration of the Philippine Bar. demanded that Feati stop its construction. The latter refused, arguing that
the building was in accordance with the zoning regulations and it had
obtained building and planning permits.
Plaintiff sought the help of the court to command Feati to comply with the
Section 10 – Non-Impairment Clause restrictions annotated in its title. The trial court held that the restrictions
were subordinate to the Resolution, which was a valid exercise of
Rutter vs. Esteban police power. It upheld the classification by the Municipal Council as
G.R. No. L- 3708 May 18, 1953 having rendered ineffective the restrictions. But plaintiff, in a motion for
reconsideration which was subsequently denied, argued that said Council
FACTS: On 20 August 1941, Royal L. Rutter sold to Placido J. Esteban had no power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by Feati.
two (2) parcels of land situated in the City of Manila. To secure the
payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage over the same ISSUE: Whether the Municipal Resolution, declaring the lots as part of the
parcels of land was constituted in favor of Rutter. The deed of sale having commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, superseded the
been registered, a new title was issued in favor of Placido J. Esteban with restrictions imposed by Ortigas, which was a contractual undertaking
the mortgage duly annotated on the back thereof. Esteban failed to pay between the parties to the sale
the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that had
accrued thereon, and so on 2 August 1949, Rutter instituted an action in HELD: YES! The Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council
the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila to recover the balance due, the to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
interest due thereon, and the attorney’s fees stipulated in the contract. The municipality. Granting that the Resolution is not an ordinance, it is a
complaint also contains a prayer for the sale of the properties mortgaged regulatory measure. The general welfare clause is liberally interpreted in
in accordance with law. Esteban admitted averments of the complaint but case of doubt to give more power to local governments in promoting its
set up defense on the moratorium clause embodied in RA 342 (approved economic conditions, the social welfare and material progress of the
26 July 1948), allowing a war sufferer eight (8) years from the settlement people in the community. The exceptions are “existing vested rights”
of his claim by the Philippine War Damage Commission. After a motion for arising out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on
summary judgment has been presented by Esteban, and the requisite one hand and a 3rd party on the other, in which case, the original
evidence submitted covering the relevant facts, the court rendered terms and provisions of the contract should govern. While non-
judgment dismissing the complaint holding that the obligation which Rutter impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not
seeks to enforce is not yet demandable under the moratorium law. Rutter absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of
filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he raised for the first time the police power. The exercise of this power may be judicially inquired
constitutionality of the moratorium law, but the motion was denied. Rutter into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
appealed. unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or violation
of applicable constitutional guarantees.
ISSUE: Whether Republic Act 342 is unconstitutional for being violative of The Resolution was passed in the exercise of police
the constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order
contracts? and general welfare of the people in the locality. The lots in question
not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes
HELD: YES. Statutes declaring a moratorium on the enforcement of have flourished about the place. EDSA was a main traffic artery. The
monetary obligations are not of recent enactment. Moratorium laws have resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the
been adopted “during times of financial distress, especially when incident health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. The right to
to, or caused by, a war.” The Moratorium Law is a valid exercise by the exercise the police power is a continuing one and a business lawful today
State of its police power, being an emergency measure. Although may in the future, because of changed situation/ growth of population,
conceding that the obligations of the contract were impaired, the become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to
impairment was within the police power of the State as that power yield to the public good.
was called into exercise by the public economic emergency which The State, to promote the general welfare, may interfere
the legislature had found to exist. with personal liberty, property, business and occupations. The
The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a Resolution was reasonable, a legitimate response to a felt public need, not
moratorium statute lies in the determination of THE PERIOD OF whimsical or oppressive. The non-impairment of contracts clause will
SUSPENSION OF THE REMEDY. It is required that such suspension not bar a police power legislation, which is not likely to succumb to
be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the the challenge that because of it, contractual rights are rendered
constitution. nugatory.
Herein, obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result Existing laws are read into contracts agreed upon by the
of the issuance of Executive Orders 25 and 32 and at present their parties to fix obligations between them. The reservation of essential
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act attributes of sovereign power is also read intro contracts as a postulate of
342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the 8-year period the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against
granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government by
themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a government,
have to observe a vigil of at least 12 years before they could effect a which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order
liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period of society. The law forms part of, and is read into every contract unless
seems to be unreasonable, if not oppressive. clearly excluded therefrom in those cases allowed.
While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should
be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who

Equity will not enforce a restriction upon the use of property P40,000.00 note would in effect change the terms and conditions of
by injunction where the property has so changed in character and the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting the
environment as to make it unfit or unprofitable for use should the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms,
restriction be enforced. Since it is now unprofitable and a health-and- diminished its efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition
comfort hazard to use lots 5 and 6 for strictly residential purposes, Feati
should be permitted, on the strength of the Resolution, to use the same for
commercial purposes. There is no proviso in the Resolution expressly
declaring that the ordinance was not intended to interfere with the
agreement between the parties. Thus, even if the restrictions where
assumed by Feati, the contractual undertaking cannot be enforced
as against the police power legislation.
CRISTOPHER GAMBOA vs. HON. ALFREDO CRUZ
G.R. No. L-56291. June 27, 1988,PADILLA, J
LOZANO vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986, YAP, J Facts: On July 19, 1979, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant
of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought
Facts: -supra- to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then
detained therein together with several others.The following day, July
Issue: Whether or not BP 22 impairs freedom of contract? 20,1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner,
complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a
Held: No. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of companion." After the identification, the other detainees were brought
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the
its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to was told to sit down in front of her.
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, On July 23, 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the
under pain of sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting petitioner.
them is circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public On August 22, 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act held. On April 2, 1980, the prosecution formally offered its evidence and
not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. then rested its case.
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally On July 14, 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his
protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts . Contracts defense, manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or
which contravene public policy are not lawful. We must bear in mind Demurrer to Evidence. On August 13, 1980, petitioner filed said Motion
that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to,
commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to
become a convenient substitute for money; it form part of the counsel and to due process.
banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory
power of the state. Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of petitioner’s constitutional
right to counsel?
Ruling: No. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an

RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. THE HONORABLE SANCHO Y. INSERTO investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to
G.R. No. L-56450. July 25, 1983, GUTIERREZ, JR., J elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated
must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated proceedings to extra-judicially false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
foreclose a real estate mortgage executed by the private respondents in undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
his favor. The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed between Randolph The Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be
Tajanlangit and Esteban Tajanlangit as mortgagors on one hand and conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person
Rodolfo Ganzon as mortgagee on the other hand was to secure the arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note amounting to petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf, and that,
P40,000.00 in favor of Ganzon. while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
Thereafter, petitioner Gregorio Lira, in his capacity as ex-oficio provincial As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up
sheriff of Iloilo served personal notice of the foreclosure proceedings on was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet
the private respondents. A day before the scheduled public auction, the entitled, at such stage, to counsel. When the process had not yet shifted
private respondents filed a civil action for specific performance, damages, from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does
and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the petitioners with the not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his
respondent court. The action, sought to declare the extrajudicial lawyer. Since petitioner in the course of his identification in the police line-
foreclosure proceedings and all proceedings taken in connection therewith up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense, he was,
null and void. The trial court issued an order enjoining the provincial sheriff therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the
from proceeding with the scheduled auction sale. accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated
petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontation between
Before actual trial, the private respondents filed a "Motion For Release Of the State and him had not begun.
Real Estate And For The Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or Cash In Lieu
Thereof," to which the petitioners interposed an Opposition. The
respondent court granted the respondents' motion.
People vs. Macam
Issue: Whether or not the trial court may order the cancellation of a 238 SCRA 306,Quiason, J.
mortgage lien annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the
payment of a promissory note and substitute such mortgage lien with a FACTS: The accused –appellant was charged with the crime of robbery
surety bond approved by the same court to secure the payment of the with homicide. Accused and his brother was suddenly apprehended by the
promissory note? security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Quezon City.
They were also forced to admit certain things, after which, he together with
Held: No. The questioned court orders violate the non-impairment of all the accused were in handcuffs bore contusions caused by blows
contracts clause guaranteed under the Constitution. Substitution of the indicted on their faces during custodial investigation. Thereafter, they was
mortgage with a surely bond to secure the payment of the P40.000.00 brought to hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for
note would in effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage identification.
contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the
respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its ISSUE: Whether or not the right to counsel has been violated during
efficiency and dispensed with a primary condition. custodial investigation.
A mortgage is but an accessory contract. The consideration of the
mortgage is the same consideration of the principal contract without RULING: Yes. It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to
which it cannot exist as an independent contract. The mortgage lien critical stages of prosecution even before the trial. The law enforcement
in favor of petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is inseparable from the machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the
mortgaged property. It is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might well settle the
substitute the mortgage with a surety bond would convert such lien accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A police line-
from a right in rem, to a right in personam. This conversion can not up is considered a "critical" stage of the proceedings. After the start of the
be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the mortgagee under the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused
mortgage contract. made in a police line-up is inadmissible.
Moreover, the questioned orders violate the non-impairment of

contracts clause guaranteed under the Constitution. Substitution of
the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the payment of the

perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule,
therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the
person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not
only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled;
he must also explain their effects in practical terms. The right of a person
under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of
this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person
has been "informed" of his rights.
Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged
waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. The record of the
case is also replete with evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by
the prosecution, that the accused was maltreated and tortured for seven
(7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession.
People vs. Judge Ayson

175 SCRA 216, Narvasa, J.
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippines Airlines
assigned at its Baguio station. It was alleged that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of a plane tickets, The PAL notified him of an
investigation to be conducted. The investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL’s code of conduct. A letter was sent by Ramos PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENNY DY
stating his willingness to settle the amount. Two months after a crime of G.R. No. 74517, February 23, 1988, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Estafa was charged against Ramos. Evidence was presented by the
prosecution containing Ramos’ admission and statement, to which Facts: Felled by a gunshot wound on the neck, which caused his death
defendant’s argued that the confession was taken without the accused approximately, was Christian Langel y Philippe, a Swiss tourist who was
being represented by a lawyer and right to remain silent. vacationing on the Boracay Island together with his sister and some
friends. A police report was entered in the police blotter of the Malay
Issue: Whether or not right to custodial investigation has been violated. Police Sub-station, Malay, Aklan. Suspect Benny Dy voluntarily
surrendered to the sub-station commander with his caliber 38.
Held: NO. The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in Acting on the report, Chief of Police Tambong prepared a
"custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused Complaint charging the Accused, Benny Dy, the owner of "Benny's Bar"
persons." As the Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is situated on the Island, with the crime of Murder With the Use of
meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person Unlicensed firearms. After trial, the lower Court find the accused
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action guilty of the crime of Murder. Hence, this appeal.
in any significant way."It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, a decision described as an Issue Whether the trial court erred in holding that compliance with
"earthquake in the world of law enforcement." the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the the case.
commission of an offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be Held: No. The case history and the documentary evidence attest
informed of such right, strongly to Appellant's oral confession and voluntary surrender. The
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by
vitiates the free will shall be used against him; and the Chief of Police also attests to Appellant's oral confession.That
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before the Municipal
inadmissible in evidence. Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards facts therein stated. The fact of Appellant's surrender is further borne out
laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being by the Order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge, categorically
regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the reciting that "no warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the
suspect. accused for the reason that he is already under police custody before the
filing of the complaint."
Contrary to the defense contention, the oral confession
made by the accused to Pat. Padilla that he had shot a tourist and that the
gun he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he wanted
surrendered to the Chief of Police is competent evidence against him. The
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged
may be given in evidence against him (See. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is
that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if
he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated
verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. What
was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous statement not
People vs Pinlac elicited through questioning, but given an ordinary manner. No written
165 SCRA 674, PARAS, J. confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal
custodial investigation.
Facts: Accused Ronilo Pinlac y Libao was charged in two (2) separate
information. The trial court found the accused guilty. Hence the automatic
review. According to Pinlac, at about 2:00 P.M., April 9, 1986, three (3)
Policemen, came to his house in Taguig and arrested the accused for
robbing Mr. Sato and for killing Mr. Osamu, without any Warrant of Arrest
shown to him despite his demand. Before he was brought first to the
houses of Mr. Sato and Mr. Osamu, they walked him around and showed
him the destroyed window; and thereafter brought him inside the house. In
short, he was ordered to reenact according to what the police theorized PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES
how the crime was committed. It was at this moment that the prints of the G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995, PUNO, J.
sole of accused's shoes were all over the premises of Osamu and Sato's
houses. That during the investigation at the Police Headquarters, he was Facts: The appelant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape
tortured and forced to admit the crimes charged. with homicide against the person of a minor Khazie Mae Penecilla (four
years old). Alicando was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He
Issue:Is the constitutional right of the accused Pinlac under custodial verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the
investigation to be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations,
complied with? the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie
Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow
Held: NO. The right must be presumed to contemplate the and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and prosecution.

The appellant was arraigned and pleaded guilty. The trial G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991,Davide, Jr., J.
court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death. The case is on
automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by the trial court. Facts: In the criminal case filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
private respondent Salas and his co-accused were charged for the crime
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused. of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). At the time the Information was filed, Salas and his co-
Held: Yes. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of accused were in military custody following their arrest. A day after the
the plea of guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet, were considered filing of the original information, a petition for habeas corpus for Salas and
by the trial court in convicting the appellant. It is now familiar learning that his co-accused was filed with the Supreme Court which was dismissed in
the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence uncounselled the Court’s Resolution on the basis of the agreement of the parties under
confession or admission as provided under Section 12 paragraphs (1) and which Salas "will remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court
(3) of Article III of the Constitution. It is not only the uncounselled having custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-
confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released but
therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their
evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by person.Salas filed with the trial court a Motion to Quash the Information.
the police from the appellant. Respondent Judge denied the motion to quash. Subsequently, Salas filed
The Court have not only constitutionalized the Miranda a petition for bail, which herein petitioner opposed on the ground that
warnings in our jurisdiction. They have also adopted the libertarian since rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of
exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree". According to Presidential Decrees (PD), which amended Article 135 of the RPC, by
this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the " fruit " ) promote, maintain, or head a rebellion so the accused is no longer entitled
derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other On 5 June 1987, the President issued an Executive Order (EO) repealing,
evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all among others, the PDs and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of
evidence subsequently obtained. the RPC. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a fine
The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under
custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of Issue: Whether or not the right to bail may, under certain circumstances,
the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not be denied to a person who is charged with a bailable offense
tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged
by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 of Article III Held: Yes. Bail cannot be denied to Salas for he is charged with the crime
of the Constitution provides only one mode of waiver — the waiver must of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is
be in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
records show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden. P20,000.00. It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article
III of the 1987 Constitution which provides thus: All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
INOCENCIO BASCO vs. JUDGE LEO H. RAPATALO Salas has, however, waived his right to bail in the criminal case. In
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335. March 5, 1997, ROMERO, J. agreeing to remain in legal custody even during the pendency of the trial
of his criminal case, he has expressly waived his right to bail.This Court
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the
accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated right against unreasonable searches and seizures; the right to counsel
to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just and to remain silent; and the right to be heard. The only limitation to the
file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the waiver of right to bail is that provide in Art. 6 of the Civil Code. Rights may
court. be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
Facts: The complainant Inocencio Basco, father of the victim, charged recognized by law.
respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union
with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for People vs. Fortes
granting bail to an accused Roger Morente in a murder case without G.R. No. 90643, June 25, 1993, Davide, JR., J.
receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.
In his comment, respondent Judge alleged that he granted Facts: The conviction of Agustin Fortes for the rape of a 13-year old sixth
the petition based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as grade pupil and the denial by the trial court of his application for bail
well as the latter's recommendation setting the bailbond in the amount of pending his appeal from the judgment of conviction are questioned in
P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose these consolidated cases.
the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. In G.R. No. 90643, the accused appeals from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court. The court a quo, in its Decision, found the accused guilty
Issue: Whether a petition for bail can be granted without conducting a beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
hearing. of reclusion perpetua and pay the victim the sum of P20,000.00.
In G.R. No. 91155, the subject matter we are concerned with, the accused
Held: No. When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution seeks to annul and set aside two related orders of the said trial court
has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused denying his application for bail, filed after his conviction, to secure his
is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of provisional liberty pending the resolution of his appeal.
guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge.
"This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only Issue: Whether or not before conviction by final judgment, the accused
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence, and is therefore
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence entitled to bail as a matter of right
cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that Ruling: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that:
right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal." . . . before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty
with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.
imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion xxx xxx xxx
of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. If a party is denied the perpetua, bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
process. whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that
A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. . . .
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required is The clear implication, therefore is that if an accused who is charged with a
for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. The sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the
absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a
to the accused. It is the court's determination after a hearing that the guilt situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of
of the accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting bail. guilt is strong which would have been sufficient to deny bail even
before conviction – it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted
to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of
People vs. Donato conviction.

In the instant case, the rape for which the accused was indicted is that it may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for
punishable by reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would
Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and subsequently sentenced to be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court
serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the trial court correctly denied his granting bail should be considered void on that ground. Even if the
application for bail during the pendency of the appeal. prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection
to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing
or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the
Comendador vs. De Villa strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.
G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991, Cruz, J. The obstinate persistence of respondent judge in posturing that he did
conduct a hearing is belied by the fact that the order granting bail leaves
Facts: These four cases have been consolidated because they involve much to be desired. It does not contain the requisite summary of the
practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same evidence presented by the parties and necessary to support the grant of
incident. bail.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private
respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation
in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial ‘MANOTOC V. CA
Investigation (PTI) Panel constituted to investigate the charges against G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986, Fernan, J.
them and the creation of the General Court Martial (GCM) convened to try
them. Facts: Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc., where he acts as
GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to president and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house.
peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. Together with his co-stockholders, he filed a petition with the Securities
In G.R. No. 95020, the subject matter we are concerned with, the orders and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a management
of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are committee for the aforesaid companies, which petition was granted.
assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM Pending disposition of the SEC case, SEC requested the then
No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure and a
private respondents. memorandum to this effect was issued. When a Torrens title submitted to
and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be fake, six of
Issue: Whether or not the right to bail invoked by the private respondents its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and the
in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not vice-president of Manotoc Securities, Inc. Corresponding criminal charges
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in for estafa were filed and in all cases, petitioner was admitted to bail.
the Bill of Rights Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to
Held: Yes. The right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and
Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and both trial judges
the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of denied the same. Petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner
Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military requesting the withdrawal of the latter's memorandum, but said request
where the right to bail does not exist. The unique structure of the military was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before
should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional the CA seeking to annul the orders of the trial courts. CA denied the
coverage on the right to bail. National security considerations should also petition. Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents Petitioner filed a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite, but the Court
constitutes a damaging precedent. denied said motion. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the
would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different
from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and Issue: Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally
other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?
discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is
extended to civilians. Held: No. The object of bail is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and
the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same
time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he
were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the
accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may
require of him. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
BAYLON V. SISON available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates
A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, April 6, 1995, Regalado, J. as a valid restriction on his right to travel. To allow the accused from
leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines would render nugatory the courts'
Facts: The Office of the City Prosecutor in Dagupan City filed an orders and processes and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from
information for double murder against several accused and thereafter which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they
raffled to respondent judge. The accused filed a petition for reinvestigation would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction. Indeed, if the
which was granted by the trial court. During the reinvestigation, the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason,
accused filed a petition for bail on a Saturday, and requested that it be set he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
for hearing the immediately following Monday. On this latter date, the
prosecution filed an opposition to the petition for bail alleging, among
others, that the information was filed on the bases of the sworn statements
of several eyewitnesses to the incident which constitutes clear and strong
evidence of the guilt of all the accused. Nevertheless, a hearing on the TATAD V. SANDIGANBAYAN
petition was purportedly held by the trial court and bail was granted for the G.R. No. 72335-39, March 21, 1988, Yap, J.
provisional liberty of each of the accused. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the prosecution but the same was denied by respondent Facts: Complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed
judge. Significantly, the orders granting bail, and that denying "a report" with the Legal Panel of PSC on October 1974, containing
reconsideration thereof, became the subject of a petition for certiorari filed charges of alleged violations of RA No. 3019 against then Secretary of
by the prosecution and were subsequently annulled and set aside by CA. Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in
The private complainant filed a motion for respondent judge to inhibit the office of the PSC until December 1979, when the 1974 complaint was
himself from the case. Respondent judge denied the motion to inhibit and resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan.
later also denied the motion for reconsideration. To support and justify his The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint in April 1980 by referring the
grant of bail to the accused, respondent judge avers that time was of the complaint to the CIS, PSC, for investigation and report. In June 1980, the
essence, considering that the accused had been detained since October CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of
21, 1991 and that the prosecution failed to interpose an objection to the charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and
granting of bail and to ask for an opportunity to prove the strength of the Antonio L. Cantero. By October 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits
evidence of guilt against the accused. were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However,
it was only in July 1985 that a resolution was approved by the
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge was justified in his grant of bail to Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of the corresponding criminal
the accused. informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan in June 1985, all against
Held: While the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is petitioner Tatad. Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated
strong is a matter of judicial discretion, this discretion may be exercised the constitutional mandate of "due process" in unduly prolonging the
only after evidence is submitted to the court. The prosecution must be termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence

informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the private complainant. In this petition, Alonte avers that respondent
of the purported offenses. Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when respondent Judge rendered a decision in the case
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to thereby depriving him of his Constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
due process. Issue: Whether or not the presumption of innocence stands in favor of
Alonte.
Held: The long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by Held: NO. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of
the Tanodbayan is violative of the constitutional right of the accused to innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be given
due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So, with the prosecution as to
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial its evidence. Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution always take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case,
of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process whether in the prosecution or defense. There can be no short-cut to the
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. It has been suggested legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused
that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost
be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right
investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving. In the case at bar,
absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan does not contain any
accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners
preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not but merely seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to
yet invented a device for setting back time. discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. In People vs. Ballabare
we have said that any recantation must be tested in a public trial with
sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-
examine the recanting witness. A retraction does not necessarily negate
an earlier declaration. Hence, when confronted with a situation where a
witness recants his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the
original testimony solely on the basis of the recantation. They should
determine which testimony should be given credence through a
comparison of the original testimony and the new testimony, applying the
general rules of evidence.
GALMAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR 72670, Sept. 12, 1986
PEOPLE vs. DRAMAYO
Facts: On October 22, 1983, then President Marcos created a Fact- GR 21325, Oct. 29, 1971
Finding Board to investigate the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. The
minority and majority reports of the Board both agreed that Rolando Facts: In a drinking session, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin brought
Galman was not the assassin but was merely a fall guy of the military up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the
which plotted the assassination itself. The minority report tags 26 persons, robbery case which Dramayo and Ecubin was a prime suspect thereof.
headed by General Ver, as respondents to the case. Marcos rejected the That same night, Ecubin hit Estelito with a piece of wood on the side of the
reports of the Board and stuck to his claim that it was Galman who killed head while Dramayo repeatedly stabbed him with a short pointed bolo.
Aquino. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan acquitted the The next morning, Dramayo went to the house of the deceased and
respondents of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally informed the latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of
absolving them of any civil liability. In this petition, Petitioners Saturnina Estelito. Upon interview, the Chief of Police noticed blood stains on the
Galman, wife of the late Rolando Galman, and 29 others filed the present trousers of Dramayo and asked the latter to explain where he obtained it.
action alleging that respondent courts committed serious irregularities Dramayo answered that it was caused by his daughter who has a skin
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross ailment. It was on this basis that Dramayo and Ecubin were charged of the
violation of the constitutional rights of the sovereign people of the crime of murder. Upon trial, the lower court found Dramayo and Ecubin
Philippines to due process of law. Allegedly, then President Marcos had guilty beyond reasonable doubt basing on the testimonies offered by the
ordered the respondent courts to whitewash the criminal cases against the prosecution. In this appeal, Accused-Appellants invoke their constitutional
26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal. In his right to be declared presumptively innocent.
comment, the Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, affirmed the
allegations and revealed that Malacañang had planned the scenario of the Issue: Whether or not the Accussed-Appellants constitutional right to be
trial. Respondents-accused prayed for its denial. presumed innocent can stand against judgment of conviction against
Issue: Whether or not the trial was a mock trial and that the pre- them.
determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and Held: NO. The presumption of innocence could not come to appellants’
verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was
under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have offered by the prosecution. Accusation is not, according to the
no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even
instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit
committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a
or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore,
so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and
the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the
accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at
civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person
courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive
for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could
mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he
judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio. perpetrate the act that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is
moral certainty. With the testimony of record pointing to no other
conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by appellants, the effort of
ALONTE vs. SAVELLANO their counsel should not be attended with success.
GR 131652, March 9, 1998 By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it
is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
Facts: Juvie-lyn Punongbayan charged Bayani Alonte, the incumbent inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
mayor of Biñan, Laguna, with the crime of rape. According to certainly of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to
Punongbayan, on or about September 12, 1996, Alonte offered her a convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this
drinking water which made her dizzy and weak. Thereafter, Alonte certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with her against her will the offense.
and consent. During the pendency case, however, Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit People v. Holgado
desisting her testimonies against Alonte. Nonetheless, respondent Judge GR 2809, March 22, 1950
Savellano found Alonte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous
crime of rape. Accordingly, the accused did not present any countervailing Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First
evidence during the trial. They did not take the witness stand to refute or Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the
deny under oath the truth of the contents of the private complainant's information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without
aforementioned affidavit. They left everything to the so-called "desistance" justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of

Antero Holgado for about eight hours. On the day set for trial, he appeared to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system.
alone without the assistance of a lawyer. He was subsequently arraigned The administrative complaint is dismissed.
and pleaded guilty upon the instruction of a certain Mr. Numeriano
Ocampo. .Judgement was rendered convicting him of the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
PECHO V. PEOPLE
Issue: Whether the accused was afforded of his right G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996, Davide Jr., J
to be heard by himself and counsel?
FACTS: Petitioner and his co-accused Joe Catre were alleged to have
Held: No. Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea conspired in representing Pecho as a representative of Everson
given by the accused who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to Commercial Trading of Cotabato City, which turned out to be not-existent.
say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding Pecho was then tried and convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of
the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a Section 3(e) of R.A No. 3019.
heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, The SC modified the Sandiganbayan decision, holding the
without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the petitioner guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa through
case. falsification of official and commercial documents. Although the petitioner
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the could not be convicted of the crime charged, viz., violation of Section 3(e)
beginning. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court, Rule 112, section of R.A No. 3019, as amended — because the said section penalizes only
3, that: If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not
the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be consummated — he could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex
asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial
oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring documents, which is necessarily included in the crime charged.
attorney. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration as the conviction
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the for estafa after his acquittal from violation of R.A. 3019 constitutes double
court has four important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the jeopardy. As such, he could not be convicted without violating his right to
defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2 — be informed of the accusation against him.
After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the
aid of an attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction for estafa after acquittal from the
court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 — If the accused original crime charged violates his right to be informed of the nature of the
desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a accusation against him?
reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The HELD: NO. Under the Rules of Court, when there is variance between the
record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to offense charged in the complaint of information, and that proved or
have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or
court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense
oficio. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have charged included in that which is proved.
an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question The Court explained the objectives of the right to be
fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before informed: to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it could against him as will enable him to make his defense; second, to avail
have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
he plead guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts
violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution. alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support
a conviction, if one should be had.
AMION V. CHIONGSON In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be
A.M. No. RTJ-97-137, January 22, 1999, Martinez, J. stated: not conclusions of law. What determines the real nature and cause
of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
Doctrine: information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the
The accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his information.
choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime
which would preclude other equally competent and independent counsels which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter.
from representing him.
Facts: At the scheduled hearing of the criminal case against Amion, trial
was not held because on the day before the scheduled hearing, he was
informed that his retained counsel, Atty. Depasucat, was ill. The hearing
was reset with a warning that no further postponement would be
entertained. On the date of re-scheduled hearing, Atty. Depasucat again
failed to appear. To avoid further delay, the court appointed Atty. Jacildo
of PAO as counsel de oficio who was however, prohibited to represent a SORIANO V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE
party who has retained the services of a counsel of his own choice. At the G.R. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984, ABAD SANTOS, J.
next scheduled hearing Atty. Depasucat still did not show up in court. In
view of the fact that the victim's wife, Mrs. Vaflor and another government FACTS: Thomas Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged
witness both reside about 70 to 80 kilometers from Bacolod City, and that with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, assigned for investigation to the
the appearance of Atty. Depasucat remained uncertain, Judge Chiongson, petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the
appointed Atty. Lao-Ong from the Free Legal Aid Office to represent investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for
Amion without prejudice to the appearance of Amion's counsel de parte. dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of
Amion filed a complaint charging respondent judge with Ignorance of the Investigation which set up an entrapment.
Law and Oppression relative to the former's criminal case. Amion asserts The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner as guilty for
that his right to due process was violated and that he was deprived of his violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of R.A. 3019 which penalizes:
constitutional and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his own "Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
choice. percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection
with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge's appointment of a counsel de party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
oficio constitutes a violation of accused-complainant's right to due process under the law."
and a deprivation of his constitutional right to be defended by counsel of Petitioner contends that the preliminary investigation of a
his own choice. complaint does not constitute a "contract or transaction" and thus he
cannot be convicted for violation of R.A. 3019. And if acquitted, he cannot
Held: The concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more be subsequently convicted of direct bribery because that would violate his
aptly and specifically to a person under investigation. Even if application right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
would be extended to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such
preferential discretion cannot partake of one so absolute and arbitrary as ISSUES:(1) Whether or not preliminary investigation constitutes a
would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of "transaction or contract."
the accused and thus make the pace of criminal prosecution entirely (2) Whether or not, if previous conviction for violation of R.A.
dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the 3019 were wrong, he can now be convicted for direct bribery without
case. Moreover, Amion was not deprived of his substantive and violating his right to be informed.
constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his HELD: (1) NO. The term 'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its
defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but includes all
his counsel at the scheduled hearings. Finally, there is no denial of the kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature,
right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would
absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's desire have so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did
not. The investigation was also not a contract. Neither was it a transaction

because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which
precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is
absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the
Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No.
3019. SEPARATION OF POWERS
IN RE: MANZANO
(2) YES. The petitioner also claims that he cannot be 166 SCRA 246, 1988
convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so
would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature FACTS:
and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the Judge Manzano was designated member of the Ilocos Norte
information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of Provincial Committee on Justice by the Provincial Governor. The function
bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be of the Committee is to receive complaints and make recommendations
informed. towards the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those
who are poor.
ISSUE: May the Judge accept the designation?

BORJA V. MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-45667, June 20, 1977, FERNANDO, J. HELD:
No. The committee performs administrative functions, that
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Borja, accused of slight physical injuries, was is, functions which “involve the regulation and control over the conduct
convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of
days of arresto menor by respondent Judge Senining, despite the rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or
absence of an arraignment.. The judge proceeded with the trial in absentia such as are devoted upon the administrative agency by the organic law of
and promulgated the assailed decision. An appeal was duly elevated to its existence.
the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by respondent Judge Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court
Mendoza. Without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII,
against him. Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision was validly rendered despite administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution. This
the absence of an arraignment. declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City
HELD: NO. Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the
criminal prosecution. The Constitution requires that the accused be structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the
arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public
penal offense he has to face. This duty is an affirmative one which the officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
court, on its own motion, must perform, unless waived. To emphasize its Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
importance, no such duty is laid on the court with regard to the rights of assistance to said Committees to help promote the landable purposes for
the accused which he may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably
are rights which he must assert himself and the benefits of which he incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
himself must demand. In other words, in the arraignment the court must
act of its own volition.
It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible
loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why SEPARATION OF POWERS
the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. He is thus in a ANGARA VS. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is G.R. NO. 45081. JULY 15, 1936
not even required to do so immediately. He may move to quash.
LAUREL, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Angara and respondents Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position
of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas in the September 17, 1395 election. Petitioner was proclaimed to
be a member-elect of the National Assembly by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers. Thereafter, petitioner took his oath.
The National Assembly passed a Resolution, confirming
proclamation of Angara. Ynsua filed before the respondent Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of petitioner, and
praying that said respondent be declared elected member, or that the
election of said position be nullified.
The respondent denied petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the
Protest." Petitioner argues that: the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly, and that the Constitution
excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of
said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative
Department of the Government or the National Assembly.
The Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf
of the respondent, interposing the special defense that the Commission
has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the
election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its
jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it
by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out
the powers and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental
law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the
motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and
declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted
in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth
Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or
control of the Supreme Court, among others.
Petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of
injunction against the Commission, which petition was denied "without
passing upon the merits of the case."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in

excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed

against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous to the National Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of
its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however,
HELD: as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the
system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid delegation of power.
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The HELD:
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how
to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of
government. the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
VI of the Constitution. The nature of the present controversy shows the There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. If the conflict and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
were left undecided and undetermined, a void would be created in our complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
constitutional system, which may in the long run prove destructive of the that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
entire framework. Upon principle, reason and authority, the Supreme enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all
and qualifications of the members of the Legislature long lodged in the the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in
legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its
by no means a mere experiment in the science of government. The delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial
members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally
law were in their majority men mature in years and experience. The certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions
creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to
of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. From the the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the
deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose rule and its non-delegation the exception.
was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that
the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
to the Convention to provide for this body known as the Electoral problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious,
majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected
influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the assigned to them.
Supreme Court. The reasons for the delegation of legislative powers in
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
it had remained originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate
that power by the National Assembly. If the power claimed for the National legislation."
Assembly to regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies
cut off the power of the Electoral Commission to lay down a period within laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not
which protest should be filed were conceded, the grant of power to the have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
commission would be ineffective. promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as
The Electoral Commission in such a case would be invested the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new
with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The
subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant
only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the
transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model
authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the
from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine
cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of
authority effective whenever and wherever the National Assembly has overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the
framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate SEPARATION OF POWERS
control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral CASIBANG VS. AQUINO
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the G.R. NO. L-38025. AUGUST 20, 1979
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
MAKASIAR, J P:
FACTS:
SEPARATION OF POWERS Respondent Remigio Yu was proclaimed as the elected
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. VS. POEA Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan over his rival, petitioner, who seasonably
G.R. NO. 76633, OCTOBER 18, 1988 filed a protest with the trial court, presided by respondent Judge, who
initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable
CRUZ, J.: controversy.
FACTS: In the meantime, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; thereafter, a new
when he was killed in an accident. His widow sued for damages under Constitution was adopted. Yu moved to dismiss the election protest on the
E.O. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the
the vessel owner, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — (principally)
POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI
against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed — a political question has intervened in the case. Yu contended that "the
jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have
favor of the complainant. been superseded by the 1973 Constitution.
Petitioner came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General Respondent Judge sustained the political question theory
to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative and ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest. Hence, this petition.
remedies. Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed

ISSUE: Whether or not the electoral protest filed by the petitioner judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the
remained a justiciable question even after the 1973 Constitution was people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
adopted, thus remains to be under the jurisdiction of the Court of First authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
Instance. government."
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether
HELD: certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance
The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be
respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article settled by the Courts.
XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its The term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance,
ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to
of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity legality, of a particular measure.
and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, Such is not the nature of the question for determination in
for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the the present case. Here, the court is called upon to decide whether the
pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of
question or policy "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a
delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government." member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in
The electoral protest case herein involved has remained a the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest
Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a
respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary
question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The
of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues in connection therewith.
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure"
(Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957).
SEPARATION OF POWERS
SANIDAD V. COMELEC
SEPARATION OF POWERS G.R. NO. L-44640. OCTOBER 12, 1976
TAÑADA VS. CUENCO
G.R. NO. L-10520, FEBRUARY 28, 1957 FACTS:
Pablito Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of “Overview,” a
CONCEPCION, J.: weekly newspaper circulating in Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
FACTS: Constitutionality of Sec 19 of the Comelec Resolution 2167 which provides
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tañada and Diosdado Macapagal that during the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on
sought to oust respondent senators from the Senate Electoral Tribunal. plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
Petitioners allege that the that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for
nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing or against the plebiscite issue. Petitioner contends that it violates the
these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had freedom of expression and of the press. Hence, constitutes as a prior
"acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear restraint in his constitutional right. Solicitor General contends that it does
violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming not violate the Constitution for it is a valid implementation of the power of
membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite
oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without period and can express his news through the Comelec space & airtime.
color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the
Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec is granted the power to regulate mass
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal." media during election or plebiscite period under Article 9C of the 19987
Respondents assail the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the Constitution.
petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred HELD:
by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft It is given that what was granted to Comelec was the power
submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective political to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits, or
parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public
Commission provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines, and utilities, media communication or information to the end that equal
that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable,
forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion." equal rates therefore, for public information campaign and forums among
candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented is the possibility
ISSUE: Whether or not the case at bar raises merely a political question. that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a
candidate.
HELD: Neither the Constitution nor RA 6646 can be construed to
Willoughby lucidly states: "Elsewhere in this treatise the well- mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their
executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern plebiscite. Comelec Resolution No 2167 has no statutory basis.
themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these
discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and SEPARATION OF POWERS
executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of DAZA VS. SINGSON
government because in very many cases their action is necessarily 180 SCRA 496, 1989
dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These
considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the FACTS:
legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise Petitioner was a member of the Commission on
authority not granted him by the Constitution or by, statute, but, within Appointments representing the Liberal Party. With the organization of the
these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to LDP (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino), some congressional members
recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and belonging to the Liberal Party resigned from said party to join the LDP.
these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, When the Commission on Appointments were reorganized, petitioner was
may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the replaced by an LDP representative.
United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.). To the same effect is Petitioner contends that the organization of the LDP cannot
the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:. "It is affect the composition of the Commission on Appointments because LDP
well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of is not a registered party and has not yet shown the stability of a party.
the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions
has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory ISSUE: Does the situation present a “political question”?
provisions. "It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political
question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is HELD:
frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the

The question is justiciable. The issue is one of legality not of Petitioners rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the
wisdom. The ascertainment of the manner of forming the Commission on Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have
Appointments is distinct from the discretion of the parties to designate any force and effect.
there representatives. And even if the question were political in nature, it
would still come under the expanded power of review in Article VIII, ISSUE: Whether or the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any
Section 1. force and effect.
HELD:
DELEGATION OF POWER Yes. Section 26 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
GARCIA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY provides: “In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may
G.R. NO. 100883. DECEMBER 2, 1991 by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to
CRUZ, J P: carry out a declared national policy”.
FACTS: Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by
The petitioner challenges RA 7042 on the ground that it virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined
defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-reliant and to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds;
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and the restrictive in duration, extent or scope." The words "limited period" as used
protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in
trade practices. He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of foreign duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency
enterprises in this country and gives them unfair advantages over local powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency."
investments which are practically elbowed out in their own land with the It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
complicity of their own government. Specifically, he argues that under approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the
Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may do business in the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the
Philippines or invest in a domestic enterprise up to 100% of its capital legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of
without need of prior approval. The said section makes certain that "the its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act
SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, shall not impose any limitations on would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different
the extent of foreign ownership in an enterprise additional to those law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the
provided in this Act." delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited,
The petitioner also attacks Section 9 because if a Philippine indefinite, negative and uncertain. Furthermore, this would create the
national believes that an area of investment should be included in List C, anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple
the burden is on him to show that the criteria enumerated in said section majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In
are met. It is alleged that Articles 2, 32, & 35 of the Omnibus Investments other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to
Code of 1982 are done away with by RA 7042. It is also argued that by take them back.
repealing Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Section 4 of the Act goes far to settle the legislative intention
Code, RA No. 7042 further abandons the regulation of foreign investments of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and
by doing away with important requirements for doing business in the regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until
Philippines. the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of
Finally, the petitioner claims that the transitory provisions of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the
RA 7042, which allow practically unlimited entry of foreign investments for express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in
three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory Foreign Investment pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National
Negative List, not only completely deregulates foreign investments but Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would
would place Filipino enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act
country. was to be effective the National Assemble failed to make a provision for
this termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the effects
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a justiciable question present in the case and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or
at bar. annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law
itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not
HELD: only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones
What is present in the case at bar is not a debate on the already annulled by the legislature.
wisdom or the efficacy of the Act, but this is a matter on which the Court is It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No.
not competent to rule. As Cooley observed: "Debatable questions are for 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May
the legislature to decide. The courts do not sit to resolve the merits of 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
conflicting issues." In Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Laurel issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead
made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act,
justice or expediency of legislation." And fittingly so for in the exercise of we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National
judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," and may not annul legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9,
an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to
impractical. It is true that, under the expanded concept of the political legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the
question, we may now also "determine whether or not there has been a organic law.
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted.
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Court,
however, did not find any irregularity that exist in the case at bar.
The petitioner is commended for his high civic spirit and his DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS
zeal in the protection of the Filipino investors against unfair foreign RODRIGUEZ V. GELLA
competition. His painstaking study and analysis of the Foreign (G.R. NO. L-6266 FEBRUARY 2, 1953)
Investments Act of 1991 reveals not only his nationalistic fervor but also
an impressive grasp of this complex subject. But his views are expressed PARAS, C.J.
in the wrong forum. The Court is not a political arena. His objections to the FACTS:
law are better heard by his colleagues in the Congress of the Philippines, Petitioners herein seek to invalidate Executive Orders Nos.
who have the power to rewrite it, if they so please, in the fashion he 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum
suggests. of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second
setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities
visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and
DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS other calamities. Such Executive Orders were issued in virtue of
ARANETA V. DINGLASAN Commonwealth Act No. 671, also known as the Emergency Powers Act.
(G.R. NO. L-2044 AUGUST 26, 1949) Petitioners’ primary contention rests on the fact that the
National Assembly intended such powers to exist only for a limited period.
TUASON, J.:
FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are valid.
The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the
President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. HELD:
Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, No. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that
which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. "in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law
Concerned in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which aims to authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
control exports from the Philippines. On the other hand, case No. L-3054 restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to
relates to Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly
operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national
period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other
Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it
appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to
incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in November, meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the
1949. President, "during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such

rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national
policy declared in section 1." LAUREL, J.
Act No. 671 was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional FACTS:
provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to Petitioners, the People of the Philippines and the Hongkong
be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the
duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of
emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be the defendants, in a criminal case. Respondent Jose O. Vera, is the Judge
obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the ad interim of the seventh branch of the trial court who heard the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the
his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place when the President aforesaid criminal case.
disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts. The trial court rendered judgment, convicting Unjieng. Upon
The situation will make the Congress and the President or either as the appeal, the court modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of
principal authority to determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six
legislative powers, — in palpable repugnance to the constitutional months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the
provision that any grant thereunder must be for a limited period, judgment in all other respects.
necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the The instant proceedings have to do with the application for
arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President. probation filed by Unjieng before the trial court, under the provisions of Act
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Unjieng states in his
that the powers lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was
world war which factually involved the Philippines when Act No. 671 was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good
passed on December 16, 1941. That emergency, which naturally conduct in the future. However, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an
terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was contemplated by the opposition to the granting of probation to the Unjieng. The private
members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the actual state of prosecution also filed an opposition, elaborating on the unconstitutionality
war could prevent it from holding its next regular session of Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
Moreover, Section 26 of Article VI of the 1935 constitution, in provincial boards of several provinces
virtue of which Act No. 671 was passed, authorizes the delegation of
powers by the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 4221 constitutes an undue delegation of
emergency. The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section legislative power.
1 of the Act is one "in time of war," as distinguished from "other national
emergency" that may arise as an after-effect of war or from natural causes HELD:
such as widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly Yes. Under the constitutional system, the powers of
the typhoons that hit some provinces and cities in 1952 not only did not government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially
result from the last world war but were and could not have been independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of
contemplated by the legislators. At any rate, the Congress is available for these departments of the government derives its authority from the
necessary special sessions, and it cannot let the people down without Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each
somehow being answerable thereover. has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is
Even under the theory of some members of this court that supreme within its own sphere.
insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on a The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a
given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had been bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral
pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the
declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not
fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other
appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional
many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest.
Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power
corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President. If conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that
the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of
appropriations, none can remain in respect of special appropriations; the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the
otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the Constitution
Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism
President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or this high prerogative has been entrusted cannot relieve itself of the
otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be
effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of
make new appropriations. The specific power "to continue in force laws any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide
and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is this sovereign trust."
a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power
may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions
and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to
the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally delegate legislative powers to local authorities. "It is a cardinal principle of
functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still our system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local
has any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities; and hence while
confusion and overlapping, if not conflict. the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be
Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the delegated, the creation of the municipalities exercising local self
President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for the sake of government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation
speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people, is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the
because we have the Constitution, designed to establish a government grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to
under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. In line with such immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior
primordial objective, our Government is democratic in form and based on in cases of necessity." Doubtless, also, legislative power may be
the system of separation of powers. Unless and until changed or delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI
amended, we shall have to abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly
and be prepared to accept the consequences resulting from or inherent in may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and
disagreements between, inaction or even refusal of the legislative and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates,
executive departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases to have import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16
prompt official action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or
must be preferred to concentration of powers in any one man or group of other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize
men for obvious reasons. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine
emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions,
Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more the President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested
efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself in him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been
cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and removed by the Constitution itself.
survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions
officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution. hereinabove mentioned.
Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which
declared null and void, and the respondents are ordered to desist from reads as follows:
appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the public funds set This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
aside therein. provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at
rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
DELEGATION OF POWERS; PROBATION be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
PEOPLE V. VERA In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of
(G.R. NO. L-45685 NOVEMBER 16, 1937) legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was

complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee HELD:
or delegate of the legislature. In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho No. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly
([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the “... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder
Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern
price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA). “
crime. The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the
certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
administrative boards. ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the
regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when delegate.
the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not
agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz , the completeness test
delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
or absence of a standard or rule of action — or the sufficiency thereof — delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both
in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to
some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that is the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of and exercise a power essentially legislative.
the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all
rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in
be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its
In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial
boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally
not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions
standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to
pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the
of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any rule and its non-delegation the exception.
standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that
legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may
boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious,
the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to assigned to them.
have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With
plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary
provincial boards. to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
concerned with the simple transference of details of execution or the subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative bodies may
promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details
regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the
boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative
regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring
(G.R. NO. 76633 OCTOBER 18, 1988) the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding
the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
CRUZ, J.: discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine
FACTS: Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
P192,000.00 by the POEA for the death of her husband. The decision is WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no against the petitioner.
jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker. .
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris
when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985. DELEGATION OF POWER
His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and SECTION 1, ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the UNITED STATES VS. ANG TANG HO
vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by G.R. NO. 17122, FEBRUARY 27, 1922
the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State
Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after JOHNS, J.:
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the FACTS:
complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature
P12,000.00 for burial expenses. passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
employee or that the claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing
urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue
consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation
Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are enumerated.
Commission. Furthermore, the petitioner questions the validity of August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a
Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non- proclamation (Executive Order No. 53) fixing the price at which rice should
delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been be sold. August 8, 1919, Ang Tang Ho charged with the sale of rice at an
given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such excessive price and was accordingly convicted.
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative The question here involves an analysis and construction of
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the
price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes
ISSUE: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 is violative of the the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,

to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a
carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of right to be heard before a competent and impartial cout as guaranteed by
temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the due process. The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the said
Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or order and the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any
cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power in
of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions relation to the disposal of the confiscated properties
arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn."
The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise."
That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also
says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," HELD:
is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency No. We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable
measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property
such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and shall “be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions
effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit,
has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal ad the
left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General to say Director of the Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.” The
what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse
or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. and even corruption, One searches in vain for the usual standard and the
Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers
issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries
a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose
but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a
crime.
DELEGATION OF POWER
SECTION 1, ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
ISSUE: Whether or not the legislature under Act No. 2868 has delegated TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ
its power to the Governor-General G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987
HELD: FELICIANO, J .:
Yes. The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the FACTS:
maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand." The law The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of
is a general law and not a local or special law. medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission
Manila and other and different prices in other and different provinces in the Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the
Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the
different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education,
a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for
deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic
instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985 and
the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
their respective localities." The issuance of the proclamation by the securing certificates of eligibility for admission and from administering the
Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated NMAT.
power, and was even a sub delegation of that power. The trial court denied said petition. The NMAT was
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224
Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" with one of its basic
words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General objectives was to provide for the standardization and regulation of medical
to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and education.
what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical
rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at Education with the functions specified in Section 5 of the statute include
which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say the following:
whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not (a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a
the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the recognized college of medicine;
law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical
was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect
palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall
the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;
crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, (h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions.
proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities (Emphasis supplied)
of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at
the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for
by Executive order No. 53." applicants to medical schools and one of these is a certificate of eligibility
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education.
so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his MECS Order No. 52, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the Sports established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a
violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void. certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the
Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987.
Private respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance to
DELEGATION OF POWERS medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987 and the year
YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 1987.1988.
148 SCRA 659, NO. L- 74457, MARCH 20, 1987 The fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute or
order assailed. Petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and
CRUZ, J: (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional
FACTS: principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing
Executive Order 626-A prohibited the transport of the to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the
carabaos or carabao meat across the provincial boundaries without Board of Medical Education.
government clearance, for the purpose of preventing the indiscriminate
slaughter of those animals. ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a sufficient standard to be followed by
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in the Board
a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the
police station commander for violation of EO 626-A. The executive order HELD:
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed Yes. The standards set for subordinate legislation in the
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The petitioner claimed that exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the

Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As Then, also, the power of control of the President over
explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta — executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau,
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the
clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads . exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control, which he
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words,
forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to
regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving
Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are the President less power over local governments than that vested in him
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the
principle. process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power
over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive
departments, bureaus or offices.
DELEGATION OF POWERS In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of
SEC. 1, ARTICLE VI & SEC. 10 (1) OF ARTICLE VII, 1987 legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the
CONSTITUTION Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be
EMMANUEL PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935,
G.R. NO. L-23825, DECEMBER 24, 1965 which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory
enactment.
CONCEPCION, J.: The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null
FACTS: and void ab initio.
The President of the Philippines, pursuant to Section 68 of We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set
the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and
124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities. Petitioner regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are
instituted a special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation
injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him and his principle.
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive orders.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
void, on the ground that Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by
Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND
power. REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370
became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered I
nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the General Provisions
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and
the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the Referendum Act."
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed
upon the chief executive by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act
is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
HELD: Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the terms shall mean:
Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election
of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must called for the purpose.
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the amendments to the Constitution;
performance of his functions. a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not national legislation; and
meet these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to
fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a ordinance.
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a
this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.
the first sentence of Section 68, the President: (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two
place therein as the public welfare may require. classes, namely:
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause that c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject
the phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject
government may be transferred. a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law legislative bodies.
ordains: (d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
The President shall have control of all the executive (e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
supervision over all local governments as may be provided (f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. required number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by
and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the Commission.
the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be (g) "Local government units" refers to provinces , cities, municipalities and
vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or barangays.
offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. (h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang
governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental Nayon.
law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether (i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal
said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may be.
provided by statutory enactments. Sec. 4. Who may exercise. — The power of initiative and referendum may
Upon the other hand if the President could create a be exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions,
municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official Sec. 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or
concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the
merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at
without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.
denied to him by the Constitution. (b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as

signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at III
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on Local Initiative and Referendum
the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the Sec. 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. — (a) Not less than two thousand
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years (2,000) registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand
thereafter. (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of
(c) The petition shall state the following: municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing
or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be; the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or
c.2. the proposition; resolution.
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor; (b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein; (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the (c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The
petition. Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or (d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least (e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of
ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the
the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at required number of signatures.
least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be (f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters designated representative, in the presence of a representative of the
therein. proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or
shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be
tenper centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which established in as many places as may be warranted.
every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the (g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on
registered voters therein. Elections, through its office in the local government unit concerned shall
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been
deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the
registered voters in said barangay. proposition.
Sec. 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election shall set a (h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission
special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled shall then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be
initiative or referendum. submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of
and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities,
II forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of
National Initiative and Referendum barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the
Sec. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on
Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or Elections.
referendum. Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, Sec. 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — If the proposition is approved
the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been
general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails
referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission of the Sec. 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. — (a) The power of local initiative
sufficiency of the petition. shall not be exercised more than once a year.
Sec. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. — (a) The (b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the
Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.
national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes (c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall
cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines. adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for
majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, initiative in the manner herein provided.
approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following Sec. 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. — Any proposition or
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and
general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or
the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months
votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by
shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of the local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of
publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first
Philippines. six (6) months.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be Sec. 17. Local Referendum. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect. 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or
day of the plebiscite. approved.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the
votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-
fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission. five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of
Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of barangays.
an initiative or referendum petition: The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to referendum.
the electorate; and Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition
specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of
referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity. capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, IV
as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Final Provisions
Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a Sec. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. — The Omnibus
summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the Election Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions
organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature. of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the Sec. 20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is hereby
enactment of any legislative measure before the House of empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
over the pending legislative measures on the committee. Sec. 21. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to defray the cost of
Sec. 12. Appeal. — The decision of the Commission on the findings of the the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year.
be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of
thereof. this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Sec. 22. Separability Clause. — If any part or provision of this Act is held Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional
invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall representation in the election of representatives to the House of
remain valid and effective. Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
Sec. 23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
Approved: August 4, 1989 constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in
TOBIAS VS. ABALOS the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
239 SCRA 106 national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
FACTS: Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
The municipality of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not
only one legislative district. R.A. 7675 aims to make Mandaluyong into a participate in the party-list system.
city. The petitioner contends that the said law aims to increase the (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition
membership of the House as the conversion of Mandaluyong into a city of parties.
will result in the creation of a separate congressional district for (c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
Mandaluyong. ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of Makati into a city is adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
constitutional. members as candidates for public office. It is a national party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
HELD: of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the creation of a new the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
congressional district for Mandaluyong was but a natural consequence of comprising the region.
Mandaluyong’s conversion into a city. The Constitution provides that “a (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to
city should have a population of at least 250,000” and having met this any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
requirement Mandaluyong is qualified to be converted into a city and as advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,
provided in the Constitution entitled to at least 1 representative. (e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of
groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,
MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
242 SCRA 211, 1995 Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party,
organization, or coalition already registered with the Commission need not
FACTS: register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file
R.A. 7854, which aims to convert Makati into a city, is with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a
assailed as being unconstitutional on the grounds that R.A. 7854 aims to manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.
increase membership of the House which the Constitution fixes and that Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a
R.A. 7854 being a special law cannot change members of the Houses. party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by
filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of Makati into a city is election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to
constitutional. participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
HELD: thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
Yes. The Supreme Court held that as was already decided officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
by the Supreme Court in Tobias vs. Abalos, the Constitution provides that COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor,
the compositions of the House should not be more than 250 members, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
UNLESS otherwise provided by law. The natural result in the creation of a handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
new legislative from a special law whose purpose is to convert a professionals.
municipality into a city is sanctioned by the Constitution. The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in
MONTEJO VS. COMELEC no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
242 SCRA 45 Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC
may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse
FACTS: or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
Biliran, a sub-province of Leyte was made into a province regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
which caused the reduction of the Municipalities under the 3 rd district of grounds:
Leyte. Because of this inequality the COMELEC reapportioned some of (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
the Municipalities from one district to another. Montejo now wants to association, organized for religious purposes;
transfer a municipality (Tolosa) from his district to another district (3 rd) (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
allegedly because of some inequality in the number of registered voters. (3) It is a foreign party or organization;
COMELEC through resolution 2736 permitted the transfer. (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC have the power to reapportion directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly
districts. through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
HELD: relating to elections;
The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC does not have (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
the power to reapportion districts but only to make minor adjustments. (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
The Court added that the creation of a new province though results in an (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections
imbalance and devalue a citizen’s vote in violation of the equal protection or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
clause of the Constitution the only remedy is for Congress, to make a cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
reapportionment of the legislative districts. elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not
later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of
REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941 national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which
have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in
REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND the polling places on election day. The names of the part y-list nominees
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR shall not be shown on the certified list.
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act." party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later

than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the
five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
obtains the required number of votes. purposes of this Act.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation
given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not of this Act shall be provided in the regular appropriations for the
include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General
bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change Appropriations Act.
of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and
same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where other available funds for purposes of its information campaign on the
the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes party-list system.
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or
placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid
Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be and effective.
considered resigned. Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of Act are hereby repealed.
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days Approved, March 3, 1995.
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during 248 SCRA 300, 1995
his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term. FACTS:
Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) Montejo then incumbent congressman of the first district of
votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the House of Leyte petitions for the disqualification of Imelda Marcos as a candidate for
Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the the same position because the latter supposedly lacks the residency
party, organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the house of requirement of one-year. Marcos had only lived in Tolosa recently and
Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral have yet to “reside” in the first district for the required 1 year. The
organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: petitioner is contending that Imelda had set up residency in various places
Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be throughout her lifetime from teaching in Tacloban up to the time she
held in May 1998. married where she stayed for years in San Juan, Metro Manila.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for
purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of the party-list system. ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda Marcos lacks the residency requirement in
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list her candidacy.
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total
number of the members of the House of Representatives including those HELD:
under the party-list. No. The SC held that Tolosa remains as his “domicile of
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political origin”. Residence is to be synonymous with domicile particularly in
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of election law. Marcos domicile of origin was established in Tolosa because
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall she followed the domicile of her parents. This domicile of origin was not
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system. lost because she got married as residence and domicile have different
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following meanings under civil law.
procedure shall be observed: The SC even added that considering that her husband died
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked and she went free to choose her domicile, her intentions were manifest in
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes her actions that Tolosa was to be her domicile.
they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list AQUINO VS. COMELEC
system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That 248 SCRA 400, 1995
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total FACTS:
number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party, Butz Aquino’s residence requirement is being contended as
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than he intends to run for congress in the newly created legislative district of
three (3) seats. Makati. Butz Aquino was contending that his lease of a condo unit in
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. Makati is indicative of the fact that he has chosen Makati to be his
The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or domicile and not just residence.
coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of
votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Aquino in leasing a condo unit in Makati
according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, is indicative of his desire to make it his domicile.
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system. HELD:
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list No. The Court ruled against Aquino because his “leasing” of
representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of a condo unit is by no means indicative of his desire to make Makati his
names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to permanent home or domicile, considering that he was still a known
the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list. resident of Concepcion, Tarlac for the past 52 years of which happens to
Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a be his birthplace.
term of three (3) years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by The Supreme Court reiterated how to successfully effect a
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No chage of domicile:
party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive • Actual removal/actual change of domicile
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not • Intention to abandon former domicile and establish a new
be considered as an interruption in the continuity his service for the full one
term for which he was elected. • Definite act which correspond with the purpose
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list
representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during
his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, CO VS. HRET
he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his 199 SCRA 293, 1991
new party or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party- FACTS:
list representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next Ong, a candidate for congressional elections in his local
representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the district is being assailed as to his qualifications that his being a natural-
COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve born citizen is questionable along with not having complied with the
for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization residency requirement.
coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.
Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List ISSUE: Whether or not Ong met the qualifications and the residency
Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as requirement.
regular members of the House of Representatives.
HELD:

Yes. As to the matter of citizenship the Court ruled in Ong’s favor presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be
citing the following reasons: published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines,
• Ong’s father was already naturalized while he was just 9 on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
years old communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty,
• Ong’s mother was a Filipina plus the fact that a lot of either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
instances transpired after he reached the age of majority Hence, the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
than reinforces the fact that he elected Filipino citizenship. b. No. The letter in question is not sufficient to support
• That the fact that his brother’s citizenship was in fact already plaintiff’s action for damages. It is true that the complaint alleges that an
answered favorably by the Constitutional Commission itself. open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing that is false
As to the issue of residence, again the court ruled in Ong’s and with the intent to impeach plaintiff’s reputation, to expose them to
favor holding that he never had any intention to abandon his domicile of public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from
origin despite having stayed in Manila to study or pursue his personal their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are
career. inconsistent with the contents of said letter and cannot prevail over the
same, it being the very basis of the complaint. The very document upon
which plaintiffs’ action is based explicitly indicates that they might be
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be
DIMAPORO VS. MITRA merely unwitting tools of the planners. This statement is not derogatory to
202 SCRA 779, 1991 the plaintiffs to the point of entitling them to recover damages.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mohammad Ali Dimaporo was elected
Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
the 1987 congressional elections and took his oath of office on January 9, OSMENA V. PENDATUN
1987. On January 15, 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a G.R. NO. L-17144 OCTOBER 28, 1960
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was scheduled for FACTS:
February 17, 1990. Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr., in a privilege speech
Upon being informed of this development by the delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery
COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59.
Representatives excluded petitioner’s name from the Roll of Members of Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other
the House of Representatives pursuant to sec.67, Art.IX of the Omnibus congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee
Election Code, which states: “Any elective official whether national or local created by House Resolution No. 59 found said congressman guilty of
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a serious disorderly behavior; and acting on such report, the House
permanent capacity except for President and Vice President shall be approved on the same day-before closing its session-House Resolution
considered ipso facto (by the mere act) resigned from his office upon filing No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended and suspending him from
of his certificate of candidacy.” office for fifteen months.
Petitioner contends that he did not thereby lose his seat as
congressman because Sec.67, Art.IX of the B.P. Blg.881 is not operative ISSUES:
under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not a. Whether or not delivery of speeches attacking the Chief
applicable to the present members of the Congress. Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be
disciplined?
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner forfeited his seat, upon the filing of the b. Whether or not the resolution violated his constitutional
certificate of candidacy for another office. absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House?
HELD:
Yes. Forfeiture is automatic and permanently effective upon HELD:
the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Once the a. Yes. There is no question that Congressman Osmena made a serious
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new imputation of bribery against the President. The House is the judge of
election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The wording of the what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution
law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which
forfeiture dependent upon the future contingencies, unforeseen and can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
unforeseeable, since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of adjudication by the Courts. The house has exclusive power; the courts
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. have no jurisdiction to interfere. The theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent
refusal to interfere.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG b. No. The resolution does not violate the constitutional parliamentary
G.R. NO. L-15905, AUGUST 3, 1966 immunity for speeches delivered in the House. Our Constitution enshrines
parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege in every
FACTS: legislative assembly of the democratic world. But it does not protect him
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words
Court of First instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming of a
Jiminez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, member thereof. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the parliament
by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of the or of Congress have bee, or could be censured, committed to prison,
defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the letter suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question
is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of ZANDUETA VS. DELA COSTA
dismissal. G.R. NO. L-46267, NOVEMBER 28, 1938
ISSUES: FACTS:
a. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged While petitioner Francis Zandueta was presiding over the 5th
communication? Branch of Courts of First Instance of Manila, he received a new ad interim
b. Whether or not it is libelous? appointment, issued in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 145, to
discharge the Office of Judge in the Court of First Instance of the 4 th
HELD: Judicial District with authority to preside over the CFI of Manila and
a. No. The aforementioned publication does not fall within Palawan. The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on
the purview of the phrase “speech and debate therein” – that is to say in Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment.
Congress – used in Art.VI, sec.15 of the Constitution. Said expression The Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly
refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their disapproved the ad interim appointment of petitioner. Subsequently, the
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes President of the Philippines appointed respondent Sixto de la Costa, judge
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills of first instance of the 4th Judicial District, with authority to preside over the
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other CFI of Manila and Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the
acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against
members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized respondent and also questioned the validity of the appointment alleging
to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts that C.A. No. 145 is unconstitutional.
in question.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may proceed to question the
category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the constitutionality of C.A. No. 145 by virtue of which the new ad interim
President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress

appointment of judge of first instance of the 4 th Judicial District, to preside
over the CFI of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor? ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
SECTION 16 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION
HELD: SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA, JR.
No. Petitioner is estopped by his own act form proceeding to (G.R. NO. 134577, NOVEMBER 18, 1998)
question the constitutionality of C.A. No. 145. He likewise knew, or at least
he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to the PANGANIBAN, J.:
approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly FACTS:
and that if said Commission were to disapprove the same, it would The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R.
become ineffective and he would cease discharging the office. The Osmeña as presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998 the first regular
petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by session of the eleventh Congress. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested
the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other
C.A. No. 145. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so. When a public member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader.
official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan, as Senate
reorganized by law – which new office is incompatible with the one President, comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for
formerly occupied by him – qualifies for the discharge of the functions him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters in the performance of his During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate
duties by executing acts "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to
inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a
corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No
he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment, and he cannot consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the
question the constitutionality of the law by which he was last appointed. debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad
He was estopped form questioning the validity of said appointment by delivering privilege speeches.
alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad later
unconstitutional. He is exempted from said rule only when his non- instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5,
acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as
is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the
rightful minority leader.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ISSUES:

SECTION 14 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to settle the controversy?
PUYAT VS. DE GUZMAN, JR. 2. In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority
(G.R. NO. L-51122, MARCH 25, 1982) leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President
Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS: HELD:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary 1. Yes. This Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well
Injunction is poised against the Order of respondent Associate within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the
Commissioner of the SEC granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747. abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Before he moved to intervene he had signified his intention 2. No. While the Constitution mandates that the President of
to appear as counsel for the respondent T.C. Acero, but which was the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half
objected to by petitioners. Acero instituted at the SEC quo warranto of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will
proceedings, questioning the election for the 11 Directors of the not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could
International Pipe Industries Corporation, a private corporation. Acero thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that
claimed that the stockholder’s votes were not properly counted. Justice the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, then member of the Interim Batasang While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
Acero to which petitioner Eugenio Puyat objected on Constitutional manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All
grounds Sec.11, Art.VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other
that “no Assemblyman could appear as counsel before… any officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be
administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body. The cited such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
continue his appearance for respondent Acero. method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman

Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision. SECTION 16 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION
AVELINO VS. CUENCO
HELD: (G.R. NO. L-2821, MARCH 4, 1949)
Yes. Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention,
Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. FACTS:
Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the
the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate
be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of President and ordering the investigation thereof. When the meeting was
the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor called to order, Senator Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with
respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel. but Senator Tirona opposed said motion. The roll was called.
However, he later had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of Senator Sanidad next moved to dispense with the reading of
stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. the minutes, but this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and
He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the David.
contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading
suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the of the minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding,
is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to continuously ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes,
appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was Senator Tañada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner
objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would speak
he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the
matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at
Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for
defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein. recognition of Senator Tañada.
Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the
indirect circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. An assemblyman Senate gallery. Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's
cannot indirectly follow the constitutional prohibition not to appear as followers, moved for adjournment of session. Senator Sanidad registered
counsel before an administrative tribunal like the SEC by buying nominal his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was
amount of share of one of the stockholders after his appearance as seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of
counsel therein was contested. A ruling upholding the “intervention” would adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued.
make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblymen need to Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and
do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal herein respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and
participation in the “interest” of the client and then “intervene” in the again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote.
proceedings. That which the Constitution prohibits may not be done by Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning
indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed by Senator
the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of
the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate

President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present took the Chair theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court,
and proceeded with the session. demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department,
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction
— it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz 63 Phil., 139.)
and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order Under our form of government, the judicial department has
not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of
designated to preside over the session which suggestion was carried the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It
unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the Chair. has been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express
Upon motion of Senator Arranz which was approved, provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested
Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary. Senator Tañada, after the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a
being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said The Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the suspension which the Constitution did not impair. In any event, petitioner's
same was unanimously approved. argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of
the Chair, after the respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in
introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.
position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable
Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
said resolution was unanimously approved. PAREDES, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Senator Cuenco took the oath. GR NO. 118364. JANUARY 28, 1997
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the
respondent as acting president of the Philippines Senate. FACTS:
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners While Congressman was still Provincial Governor, charges
asked the Court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines of violations of the Anti-Graft Law were filed against him before the
senate and oust respondent. Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, he was elected to Congress. During his
second term in Congress, the Sandiganbayan imposed a preventive
ISSUE: Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? suspension on him pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law. Paredes challenged
the authority of the Sandiganbayan to suspend a district representative.
HELD:
None. The constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be suspended.
elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor
taken over, by the judiciary. HELD:
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the YES. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16(3), Article VI of the
Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, Constitution which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter
even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change alias to ‘punish its members of Congress for disorderly behavior ‘ and
the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. suspend or expel a member’ by a vote of two0thirds of the members
And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action subject to the qualification that the penalty of the suspension spoken of in
inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial deliberations. Sec. 13 of RA 3019 which is not penalty by a preliminary preventive
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity measure presenting from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by Representative.
leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a
resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might
be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
US VS. PONS
34 PHIL 729. 1916
SECTION 16 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION FACTS:
OSMEÑA VS. PENDATUN The respondent, together with Beliso and Lasarte were
(G.R. NO. L-17144, OCTOBER 28, 1960) charged with illegal importation of opium. Pons and Beliso were tried
separately on motion of counsel. Lasarte had not yet been arrested. Each
BENGZON, J.: was found guilty of the crime, charged and sentenced accordingly. Both
FACTS: appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a become final. Respondent’s motion alleged to prove that the last day of
verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28 th day
preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and of February, that Act No.2381 under which Pons must be punished if
fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special found guilty, was not passed nor approved on the 28 th of February but on
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment March 1 of that year. Also, counsel for Pons alleged that the Assembly’s
of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary clock was stopped on February 18, 1914 at midnight and left so until the
immunity. He also asked, principally, that said members of the special determination of the discussion of all pending matters among which was
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly Act NO. 2381. to prove aid allegations, counsel argued the court to go
the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges of beyond the proceedings of the Legislature as recorded in the journals.
bribery against then President Garcia with the admonition that if he failed
to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him. ISSUE: Whether or not the court may go beyond the recitals of legislature
Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated journals or just take judicial notice of said journals for the purpose of
his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered determining the date of adjournment when such journal are clear and
in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and explicitly.
third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took
up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides HELD:
that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered YES. From their very nature and object the records of the
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary. And to inquire into
subject to censure by the House. the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature when they are, as
The Special Committee during the pendency of his petition, we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the
found said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. The House spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine government was brought
approved House Resolution No. 175 declaring him suspended from office into existence, to invade and coordinate and independent department of
for 15 months. the Government and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions
of the Legislature.
ISSUE: Can the House of Representatives discipline its members as in
the case at bar?
HELD: CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., VS. GIMENEZ
Yes. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly 7 SCRA 347 (1963)
behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction
upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual FACTS:
circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be Pursuant to the provisions of RA 7609 known as the Foreign
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank issued Circular NO. 95 fixing
Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine a unified margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transaction and a
whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would memorandum establishing the procedure for application for exemption
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never from payment of said fee. In November and December 1959, and in May
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The 1960, Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., brought foreign exchange for

the importation of urea and formaldehyde and paid for the margin fee He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of
therefore. Then as petitioner, the Central Bank declaring that separate quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. When the head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza)
back issue corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund, the auditor declared the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of
of the back issue the said vouchers upon the ground that the exemption the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The
granted by the Monetary Board is in violation of Sec. 2(18_ of RA 2609, interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. Petitioner Rep. Joker
according to the pertinent portion of the Act, “urea formaldehyde” is Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order. In the course
exempted from the margin fee. The National Institute of Science and of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
Technology further affirms that “urea formaldehyde” is different from urea question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he
and formaldehyde. Hence, the separate importations of these two raw never did.
materials are not excluded from margin fee. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by
ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase “urea formaldehyde” as used in the the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been
statute should be read as “urea” and “formaldehyde.” finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on
November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
HELD: Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
NO. Hence, “urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product
which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde” as ISSUE: Whether or not the passage of RA No. 8240 is in violation of the
used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea rules of the House, hence making it null and void.
formaldehyde.” Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the term HELD:
“urea” and “formaldehyde”, not the latter as a finished product, citing in NO. First, it is clear from the foregoing facts that what is
support of this view the statements made on the floor of Senate, during alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No 8240 are
the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e. Article VI, Secs. 26-27. The
“urea formaldehyde” is a conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor Constitution provides that “each House may determine the rules of its
of the measure passed by the Congress and approved by the President. proceedings. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they
are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
227 SCRA 703. 1993 nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to
a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
FACTS: qualification. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings
The Philippine Postal Corporation implemented RA 7534, a of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders,
measure withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC and as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
MTC along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are Second, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No.
members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and
will be prejudiced by the aforementioned measure. The petitioners assail the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
the constitutionality of the measure on the ground inter alia that it is passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
discriminatory and encroached on the independence of the judiciary. Where there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is tenable. duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims
that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the
HELD: Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or
YES. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts."
may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in
presiding officers of Congress. The aforementioned measure is declared question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996
unconstitutional insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the SC, which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which
CA, RTC and MTC and other government offices. became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the
It is alleged that RA No. 7354 is discriminatory because Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, §16(4). The Journal is
while withdrawing the franking privilege of the Judiciary, it retains the regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the
same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Constitution to be recorded therein. As already noted, the bill which
Philippines, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment
Commission on Elections, former president of he Philippines, widows of has been duly proven.
former presidents of the Philippines, the national census and statistics WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
Office and the general public in the filing of complaints against public DISMISSED.
offices or officers.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept
of the due process, as unfair discrimination offends the requirement of JURISDICTION; JUDICIAL REVIEW OF HRET DECISIONS
justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate ROBLES vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
clause in Article III, Section I of the Constitution to provide for a more TRIBUNAL (HRET)
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the (G.R. NO. 86647. FEBRUARY 5, 1990)
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of
the due process clause .but if the particular act assailed partakes of an MEDIALDEA, J.
unwarranted partiality or prejudice the sharper weapon to cut it down is FACTS:
the equal protection clause. Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo
Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st district
of Caloocan City in the May 1987 elections. Petitioner Robles was
SEPARATION OF POWERS; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE proclaimed the winner. Santos filed an election protest with respondent
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA HRET, alleging that the elections were characterized by the commission of
(G.R. NO. 127255. AUGUST 14, 1997) electoral frauds and irregularities. He likewise prayed for the recounting of
the genuine ballots in all the 320 contested precincts. Petitioner alleged
MENDOZA, J. the late filing of the protest.
FACTS: The HRET issued an order setting the commencement of the
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. revision of contested ballots on September 1, 1988 and directed
They brought this suit against the respondents charging them violation of protestant Santos to identify 25% of the total contested precincts which he
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally desires to be revised first in accordance with Section 18 of the Rules of
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the the HRET. On September 7, 1988, the revision of the ballots for 75
Constitution. The present petition also challenges the validity of RA No. precincts, representing the initial 25% of all the contested precincts, was
8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue terminated.
Code by imposing so-called *sin taxes” (actually specific taxes) on the Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision while
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts. But
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. the HRET did not act on the said motions. Santos then filed an Urgent
No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest which was granted
and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it by the HRET. Hence the resumption of the revision of the ballots was
with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A ordered.
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing Robles filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. denied. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner contends in the present
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to petition that when private respondent filed the Motion to Withdraw Protest
the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing, respondent
Rep. Exequiel Javier proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case, hence when respondent HRET
which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. subsequently ordered the revision of the unrevised protested ballots,

notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without jurisdiction Commission on the other. The Electoral Commission is a constitutional
or with grave abuse of discretion. organ created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has lost its jurisdiction over the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
case. interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it
does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
HELD: adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
NO. It is noted that upon Santos’ filing of his Motion to restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
Withdraw on Unrevised Precincts on September 12, 1988, no action government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
thereon was taken by respondent HRET. The mere filing of the motion to fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the
withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and
action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the appropriate cases. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of
tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the
terminated. present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope
The Court agrees with the HRET when it held that “the and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
withdrawal becomes effective only when the motion is granted. To hold of the members of the National Assembly."
otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction (2) NO. The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of
already acquired.” The Court therefore holds that this Tribunal retains the Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
power and the authority to grant or deny Protestant’s Motion to Withdraw, "SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
if only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see to it that Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
the will of the electorate is ascertained. Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be
Since Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on the nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
Unrevised Precincts" had not been acted upon by this Tribunal before it the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior
was recalled by the Protestant, it did not have the effect of removing the Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
precincts covered thereby from the protest. If these precincts were not Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
withdrawn from the protest, then the granting of Protestant's "Urgent returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is
Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest" did not amount to imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this
allowing the refiling of protest beyond the reglementary period. constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the
In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning,
on the part of respondent tribunal in promulgating the assailed resolutions, import and significance.
a writ of certiorari will not issue. Where the court has jurisdiction over the The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation,
subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of
orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. The
cannot be corrected by certiorari. This rule more appropriately applies to grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to
respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional body has time the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
and again been upheld by the Court in many cases. Thus, “judicial review Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
of decisions or final resolutions of the HRET is (thus) possible only in the remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in
exercise of this Court’s so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, upon a the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power
determination that the tribunal’s decision or resolution was rendered by the National Assembly.
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the
ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the election of members against whom no protests had been filed at the time
part of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in issuing of its passage on December 3, 1935, cannot be construed as a limitation
the assailed resolutions, the instant petition is DISMISSED. upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have
been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election
of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide
SEPARATION OF POWERS; LEGISLATURE – ELECTORAL election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by
COMMISSION the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge
(G.R. NO. L-45081. JULY 15, 1936) of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said
LAUREL, J. election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of
FACTS: its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all
Petitioner Jose Angara and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission
Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates for the position of in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua,
Tayabas in the September 17, 1935 elections. Petitioner was proclaimed confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the
winner. Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member.
The National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 which We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was
effectively confirmed the election of petitioner to the said body. Ynsua filed acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
of petitioner. Meanwhile, on December 9, 1935, the National Assembly, in Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and
a resolution, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by them. and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
Angara then filed a petition praying for the dismissal of filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
Ynsua’s protest. He alleged that Resolution no. 8 was passed by the might prescribe.
National Assembly in the exercise of its constitutional prerogative to The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral
prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its Commission is hereby denied.
members should be presented. But said Motion to Dismiss was denied by
the Electoral Commission. Hence the present petition filed by petitioner
seeking to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking HRET
further cognizance of the protest made by Ynsua against the election of LAZATIN V. HRET
said petitioner. (G.R. NO. 84297. DECEMBER 8, 1988)
ISSUES: CORTES, J.
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the FACTS:
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy. Petitioner Carmelo Lazatin and private respondent Lorenzo
(2) Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without Timbol were candidates for Representative of the first district of
or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest Pampanga during the May 11, 1987 elections. During the canvassing of
filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous the votes, Timbol objected to the inclusion of certain election returns.
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. Since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections,
Timbol brought the matter to the COMELEC, which initially ruled the
HELD: suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate. It later ordered
(1) YES. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of
in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but votes and to proclaim the winner.
by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government Petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioner’s
within its own sphere. proclamation void ab initio and another petition to prohibit petitioner from
In the case at bar, here then is presented an actual assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so
controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature petitioner was able to assume office. Later, the COMELEC declared
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral petitioner’s proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged this

resolution before the Court, which sustained the petitioner. Thus, private discretion that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
respondent filed in the HRET an election protest against petitioner. warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the protest on the ground that it WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
had been filed late. However, the HRET ruled that the protest had been Private respondent's Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED.
filed on time. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, this petition challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over the
protest filed by private respondent. To support his contention, he cited ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial 166 SCRA 651. 1988
and city offices . — A sworn petition contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city GANCAYCO, J:
official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly FACTS:
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, On October 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent
within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. Senate Electoral Tribunal an election protest against 22 candidates of the
On the other hand, in finding that the protest was flied on LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect. Subsequently, the
time, the HRET relied on Sec. 9 of its Rules, to wit: petitioners filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification
Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and
filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed at the post resolution of the aforementioned case, as respondents therein. The
office as registered matter addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal, petitioners urged the contest to be decided by only 3 members of the
together with twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1) copy for each Tribunal.
protestee, within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these Rules on
November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the ISSUE: Whether or not the Senators-Members of the Electoral Tribunal
effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen may be compelled to inhibit themselves from hearing the contest.
(15) days from the date of the proclamation . Election contests arising
from the 1987 Congressional elections filed with the Secretary of the HELD:
House of Representatives and transmitted by him to the Chairman of the NO. It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a
Tribunal shall be deemed filed with the tribunal as of the date of effectivity Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the
of these Rules, subject to payment of filing fees as prescribed in Section Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “Judicial” and
15 hereof. “Legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of
deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
ISSUES: Senators.
1. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest Every member of the tribunal may, as his conscience
filed by private respondent. dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
2. What provision of law governs the period for filing protests sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way
in the HRET. of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that
3. Whether or not private respondent’s protest had been in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally
seasonably filed. function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its rules can confer on the 3 Justice-Members along the
HELD: power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election protest.
The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on
time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it. Protestant filed his
protest on February 8, 1988, or eleven (11) days after January 28. The ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
protest, therefore, was filed well within the reglementary period provided BONDOC VS. PINEDA
by the Rules of the HRET. 201 SCRA 792. 1991
Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election
Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched in unambiguous terms and needs GRIÑO-AQUINO, J:
no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed before the COMELEC FACTS:
contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa , or any Marciano Pineda of LDP won against his rival Dr. Emigdio
regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should be read Bondoc of NP causing the latter to file a protest in the HRET. A decision
together with Sec. 249 of the same code which provides that the had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of 23
COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, votes. Hence, the LDP members in the tribunal insisterd on a re-
returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, appreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts resulting to
elective regional, provincial and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. the increase of Bondoc’s lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman
2(2) of the 1973 Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the 1973 Camasura coted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles to
Constitution there was no provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the proclaim Bondoc as the winner of the contest. Camasura later on revealed
jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of the Batasang to his chief, notified the Chairman of the Tribunal to withdraw the
Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC. nomination and to rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET and
That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as seeks to cancel the promulgation of the tribunal’s decision in Bondoc v.
contests regarding the election, returns and qualifications of Members of Pineda.
the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under
the 1987 Constitution is readily apparent. The Constitution now vests ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives could change its
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and representatives in the HRET at the request of the dominant party.
qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 171. HELD:
The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by NO. If the HRET would reserve the interest of the party in
constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional, power, the independence of the Electoral Tribunal, as embodied in the
provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving Constitution, will no longer be protected. The resolution of the House of
municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)]. Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in the favor of NP’s
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the candidate, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the
House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to HRET to the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and
matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election Bondoc.
protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily To sanction such interference by the House of
flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. Representatives in the work of the HRET would reduce the Tribunal to a
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the 3
well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which Justices of the SC and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop.
protests may be filed before it. Consequently, private respondent's A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold
election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the of the tribunal.
HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the As judges, the members of the Tribunal must be
case. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been nonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in detachment, impartiality and independence – even independence from the
connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival political party to which they belong. Hence, “disloyalty to a party” and
candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, “breach of party discipline” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. member of the Tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the
But then again, so long as the Constitution grants the HRET HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based
the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and
returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, the recount of the votes by the Tribunal, the House of Representatives
any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a
as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. Thus, only where such grave violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Congressman Camasura is therefore null and void.
HRET's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the
exercise of the Court's collective power, since no grave abuse of

Commission and the House Electoral Tribunal. On December 1988, the
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT House of Representatives on motion of the Majority Floor Leader and over
CHAVEZ V. COMELEC (211 SCRA 315 [1992]) the objection of Congressman Daza, LP, revised the House Majority
G.R. NO. 105323 JULY 3, 1992 membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new
political alignments. On February 1989, Coseteng filed a petition for quo
FACTS: warranto and injunction praying the Court to declare as null and void the
Petitioner Francisco Chavez prays in to this Court for the election of the respondent as members of the Commission on
issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Appointments.
COMELEC from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate. And he
also prays that judgment be rendered requiring the COMELEC to re-open ISSUE: Whether or not the election of the respondents as members of the
the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces therein enumerated Commission on Appointments should be enjoined for having violated the
including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for “Chavez” votes which were constitutional mandate of proportional representation.
invalidated or declared stray and credit said scanned “Chavez” votes in
favor of petitioner. HELD:
NO. After deliberating on the petition and the comments of
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the case at bar, this Court has jurisdiction to the respondents, we hold that the petition should be dismissed not
resolve issue regarding the instant regular election protest? because it raises a political question which does not, but because the
revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments
HELD: is based on proportional representation of the political parties therein as
No. The petitioner’s proper recourse is to file a regular provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
election protest which under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election The composition of the House membership in the
Code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Thus, sec.17, Commission on Appointments was based on a proportional representation
Art.VI of the Constitution provides that “the Senate and the House of of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the the House. They represent 79% of the House membership. 88% of 12
sole judge of all contests relating to their respective Members.” The word members in the Commission would equal to 9 members, which may be
“sole” underscores the exclusivity of the Tribunals’ jurisdiction over the rounded off to 10 members from the LDP. Even if KAIBA were to be
election contests relating to their respective Members. This Court has no considered as an opposition party, its lone member represents only 4% of
jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral less than 1% of the House membership. Hence she is not entitled to one
Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments.
petitioner involving as it does, contest relating to the election of a member
of the Senate. As aforesaid, petitioner’s proper recourse is to file a regular ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
election protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning GUINGONA VS. GONZALES
senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. The proper recourse is for 214 SCRA 789. 1992
petitioner to ask not this Court but the Legislature to enact remedial
measures. FACTS:
As a result of the national elections held last May 1992, the
Senate is composed of the following members representing the political
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT affiliation: LDP – 15 Senators, NPC -5 senators, LAKAS-NUCD – 3
DAZA V. SINGSON senators, LP-PDP-LABAN – 1 senator.
180 SCRA 497, DECEMBER 21, 1989 The resulting composition of the Senate based on the rule of
proportional representation of each party is as follows.
CRUZ, J: POLITICAL PARTY
FACTS: MEMBERSHIP PROPORTION
Herein petitioner Raul A. Daza was chosen and listed as MEMBERSHIP
representative of the Liberal Party in the Commission on Appointments LDP
(CA). 15 7.5 members
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong NPC
Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized. Twenty four (24) members of the Liberal 5 2.5 members
Party resigned and joined the LDP. Based on this, the House of LAKAS
Representative revised its representation in the CA by withdrawing the 3 1.5 members
seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the LDP member Luis C. LP-PDP-LABAN 1
Singson. .5 members
The petitioner argued that he cannot be removed from CA
because his election thereto is permanent. He further contended that LDP On September 23, 1992, Senator Guingona filed a petition to
is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political prohibit respondents Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tanada from sitting
stability because it was just established recently. and assuming the position of members of the Commission on
Appointments and to prohibit Senator Neptali Gonzales from allowing
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the question raised by the petitioner is political respondents to sit as members thereof on the ground that the
in nature. proposed compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of
2. Whether or not the LDP is not entitled to a seat in the proportional representation as enunciated in Sec. 18, Art. VI of the 1987
Commission on Appointments because it does not suffice the qualification Constitution.
of being a political party.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate acted with or in excess of jurisdiction
HELD: when it designated Senator Romulo as the 8 th member of the CA upon
1. No. It is because what is involved in the case at bar is the legality, not nomination by the LDP and respondent Senator Tanada as LP nominee
the wisdom of the act of the House of Representative in removing the even if LDP and LP are entitled only to half a member.
petitioner from the CA. Even if the question were political in nature, it
would still come within the Courts power of review under the expanded HELD:
jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or ½ to
includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any converted fractional half membership into a whole membership of one
branch or instrumentality of the government. senator by adding one-half to be able to elect Senator Romulo as the 8th
2. No. In the first place, the Commission on Election has already member. In so doing, the election of Senator Romulo gave more
approved the petition of the LDP for registration as political party. representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political
Furthermore, the petitioner’s contention that LDP must prove its party – either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC. This is clearly a violation of
permanence and must exist in a longer period of time in not tenable. It is Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with the proportional
because even the Liberal Party in 1946 election is only four (4) months representation of the political parties. This provision of Section 18 on
old, yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave
Commission. any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey the rule on
proportional representation. Otherwise, the party with a majority
representation in the Senate or House of Representatives can be sheen
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT force of members impose its will on the hapless minority.
COSETENG VS. MITRA
187 SCRA 377. 1990 The SC laid down the following guidelines accordingly:
1. In the Senate, a political party or coalition must have
FACTS: at least 2 duly elected senators for every seat in the
Ablan was elected as the 12th member of the Commission on Senate.
Appointments on September 22, 1987. A year later, the LDP was 2. Where there are more than 2 political parties
organized as a political party. The House Committee, including the House represent in the Senate, a political party or coalition
representation in the Commission on Appointments had to be reorganized with a single senator in the Senate cannot
because 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives are constitutionally claim a seat in the commission.
affiliated with the LDP. Petitioner Coseteng of KAIBA then wrote a letter to
Speaker Mitra requesting that she be appointed as a member of the

Furthermore, the SC said it is not mandatory to elect 12 Moreover, an investigation of a possible violation of a law
senators and 12 members of the House of Representatives to the may be useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to correct or
Commission on Appointments. What the Constitution requires is that there strengthen that law.
be at least a majority of the entire membership.

ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO
BENGZON VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE 87 PHIL. 29, 1950
203 SCRA 767, 1991
FACTS:
FACTS: On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted a resolution
The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil case against creating a special committee to investigate on the purchase by the
Kokoy Romualdez, et al., in connection with ill-gotten wealth. During the government of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates owned by Ernest
pendency of the case, there were rumors that the properties involve in the Burt as represented by Jean Arnault.
case were already being disposed of by Romualdez. Senator Enrile in his The committee sought to determine who were responsible
privilege speech before the Senate called the attention of the Senate for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
regarding the matter. government.
On motion of Senator Mecado, the matter was referred to The special committee called and examined among other
the Committee on Acountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon witness, Jean Arnault. However, for the latter’s refusal to answer some of
Committee). The committee subpoenaed petitioner who was also one of the questions propounded on him, the name of the person to whom he
the defendants in said case. Petitioner declined to testify on the ground gave the money as well as answer to other pertinent questions in
that his testimony might unduly prejudice the defendants. The committee connection therewith, the Senate resolved to imprison him until such time
continued in its inquiry, thus the present petition for prohibition to restrain as he decided to answer relevant questions put to him in connection with
respondent from investigating. the investigation of a government transaction.
The committee commented that the Court cannot properly
inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has authority to punish petitioner for
investigations in aid of legislation under this doctrine of separation of contempt.
power. Petitioners contend that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's
inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of HELD:
legislation The Supreme Court said yes considering that he questions
were pertinent to the pursuance of the Senate Resolution.
ISSUES: The Supreme Court also held that the offender could be
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the imprisoned indefinitely by the State, it being a continuing body, provided
motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations in that the punishment did not become so long as to violate due process.
aid of legislation under the doctrine of separation of power.
2. Whether or not such inquiry is within the power of the
Congress to conduct investigation. SECTION 24 – SHALL ORIGINATE EXCLUSIVELY IN HOR
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
HELD: 235 SCRA 630, 1994
1. YES, the Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy
for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of FACTS:
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or
affairs in purported aid of legislation. exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in
system of government. Each department of the government has exclusive money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own receipts from the sale or exchange of services.
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution National Internal Revenue Code.
has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure It was challenged for alleged constitutional infirmities
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the (defects), among others:
government. Law did not originate exclusively in the House of
The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties Representative as required by Section 24, Article VI – they contended that
between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to to be considered as having originated in the HOR, it should retain the
say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In cases of essence of the House Bill.
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can
be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional defects in RA 7716, since
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. it did not originate exclusively in the House of Representative as required
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional by Sec. 24, Article VI.
boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over the other departments;
it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only HELD:
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution No. The Supreme Court held that the Senate is empowered
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to by the Constitution to concur with amendments and propose amendments,
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that even substitute the entire bill as a whole.
instrument secures and guarantees to them. A bill originating in the HOR may undergo such extensive
2. NO, the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of changes in the Senate that the result maybe rewriting of the whole; As a
both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced AND to insist
but in the present case, no legislation was apparently being that a revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House bill
contemplated in connection with the said investigation. would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with
The contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not amendments” but also to “propose amendments.”
really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out
whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
violated the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears ALVAREZ, ET AL. VS. GUINGONA, ET AL.
more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. 252 SCRA 695, 1996
The Court ruled that petitioners may not be compelled by the
respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it FACTS:
is only because SC hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of Law converting municipality of Santiago, Isabela into a city is
legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation being assailed that the Bill did not originate exclusively from HOR as
of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution since it had a
government, ordained by the Constitution. counterpart in the Senate.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE CRUZ: ISSUE: Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243,
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to
and illicit acquisitions of properties now being claimed by the PCGG for have originated in the House of Representatives.
the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to
ascertain if and how such anomalies have been committed. HELD:
It is settled that the legislature has a right to investigate the A bill of local application, such as one asking for the
disposition of the public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into conversion of a municipality into a city, is deemed to have originated from
the expenditure of all public money is an indispensable duty of the the House provided that the bill of the House was filed prior to the filing of
legislature." the bill in the Senate even if, in the end, the Senate approved its own
version.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of Another special provision vetoed by the President is on the
its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the appropriation for debt service. It provides “Use of funds. The appropriation
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in authorized therein shall be used for payment of principal and interest of
the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act foregoing and domestic indebtedness; provided, that any payment in
thereupon until it receives the House bill. excess of the amount therein appropriated shall be subject to the approval
of the President with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines;
provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the
SECTION 25 – APPROPRIATIONS liabilities of the Central Bank of Liquidators.”
GARCIA VS. MATA Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special
65 SCRA 517, 1975 provision on the appropriations for debt service without vetoing the entire
amount of P86B for said purpose.
FACTS: In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund,
Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the AFP the President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to
until his reversion to inactive status pursuant to the provisions of RA No. use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. According
2332. Petitioner filed a complaint for mandamus and recovery of a sum of to the President, the grant retirement and separation benefits should be
money, to compel the former to reinstate him in the active commissioned covered by direct appropriation specially approved for the purpose
service of the AFP, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments pursuant to Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he
and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
status. enumerated in Section 25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On the contrary,
Petitioner anchored his claim to reinstatement at paragraph petitioners claim that said provision is a condition or limitation, which is
11 of the Special Provisions for the AFP in RA 1600 which was the intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated
Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1956-57 as reads: therefrom.
THAT RESERVE OFFICERS WITH AT LEAST 10 YEARS
OF ACCUMULATED COMMISSIONED SERVICE WHO ARE STILL ON ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s contentions are tenable.
ACTIVE DUTY AT THE TIME OF THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT SHALL
NOT BE REVERTED TO INACTIVE STATUS EXCEPT FOR CAUSE HELD:
AFTER PROPER COURT-MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS OR UPON THEIR Petitioner’s contentions are without merit. Under the special
REQUEST. provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of
Respondent, Judge Mata, declared paragraph 11 of the the Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the
Special Provisions for the AFP in RA No. 1600 which was the savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best
Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1956-57 unconstitutional and therefore position to do so because they are the one who know whether there are
invalid and inoperative. savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in
Hence, this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However,
CFI. it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House as the case may
be who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of
ISSUE: Is the provision valid? approval, those two officials will have to see to it that: (1) the funds to be
aligned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures
HELD: from which the same are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment is
The SC held that the said provision used by the petitioner as for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said
a basis was a RIDER because the Constitution provides that no provision transfer or realignment is to be made.
or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill It is readily apparent that the special provision applicable to
UNLESS it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of
(Art. VI, Section 25(2)). the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of
RA 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the the amount appropriated in the bill, is an “inappropriate provision” referring
Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to to the funds other than P68B appropriated in the GAAA of 1994.
the fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling to active duty The veto power while exercised by the President is actually
and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. It a part of the legislative process. Hence, found in Article VI rather than
clearly shows that the paragraph in question does not relate to the Article VII.
appropriation. As the constitution is explicit that the provision with the
Congress can include in an appropriate to which it relates, “it follows that
any provision which does not relate to any particular item or which it
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an
DEMETRIA VS. ALBA inappropriate provision which be vetoed separately from an item. Also to
148 SCRA 208, 1987 be included in the category of inappropriate provision are unconstitutional
provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws
FACTS: because clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an appropriation bill.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 states that the The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the
President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the special provision of the item on debt services including the provisos that
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive the appropriation authorized in said item shall be used for the payment of
department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any one principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness and that
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office in the in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Bank Board of Liquidators. These provisos are germane to and have
direct connection with the item of debt service. Inherent in the power of the
ISSUE: Is the provision valid? appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. Said
provisos are appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed separately.
HELD: The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the
No. The court said that such was unconstitutional as it item on debt service can only be with respect to the proviso therein
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one requiring that any payment in excess of the amount therein, appropriated
department to any program, project, or activity of any departments without shall be the subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines.
savings in the item from which the same are to be taken. The special provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Section 25
235 SCRA 506. 1994 and Section 29 of Article VI of the Constitution.
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS: SECTION 26 – PASSING OF A BILL
The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ
approved by both Houses of Congress. It presented the bill to the 15 SCRA 489, 1965
president for the exercise of his veto power.
One of the special provisions vetoed by the President is with FACTS:
respect to the realignment of operating expenses. Whereas each member The Supreme Court was called upon in to decide the grave
of Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditures, a proportionate and fundamental problem of the constitutionality of RA 3836 “insofar as
share of the appropriation for the house which he belongs. If he does not the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick
spend for one item of expense, the questioned provision allows him to leave to Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both
transfer his allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners assail the houses (of Congress).
special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocations The constitutionality of the law is assailed on the ground that
for operational expenses to any other expense categorically claiming that the provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of
this practice is prohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of the
They argue that the Senate President and Speaker of the House, not the Constitution.
individual member of Congress, are the ones authorized to realign the
savings as appropriated.

ISSUE: W/N RA 3836 violates the Constitutional provision that every bill its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be legislation impossible.
expressed in the title thereof.
HELD: SECTION 27 – METHODS BY WHICH A BILL MAY BECOME A LAW

YES. Under RA 3836, amending CA 186, as amended by TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
RA Nos. 660 and 3096, the retirement benefits are granted to members of 235 SCRA 630, 1994
the GSIS who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of
age. This provision is related and germane to the subject of CA 186. On FACTS:
the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of RA 3836 refers to members The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or
of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
GSIS. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials would services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in
relate to subject matter, not germane to CA 186. money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross
receipts from the sale or exchange of services.
Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD National Internal Revenue Code.
151 SCRA 204, 1987 It was challenged for alleged constitutional infirmities
(defects), among others:
FACTS: It is claimed that the conference committee included
PD NO 1987 is entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram provisions not found in either the House Bill or the Senate Bill – that these
Regulatory Board.” Section 10 thereof imposes a 30% tax on gross provisions were stealthily inserted by the conference committee.
receipts on video transactions. The petitioner argued that such tax
impose is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional defects in RA 7716, since
thereof. the conference committee included provisions not found in either the
House Bill or the Senate Bill.
ISSUE: Is section 10 a RIDER?
HELD:
HELD: A third version of the bill may result from the conference
NO. The requirement that every bill must only have one committee, which is considered may result from the conference
subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive committee, which is considered an “amendment in the nature of a
enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the substitute” the only requirement being that the third version be germane to
statute seeks to achieve. Such is the case here. Taxation is sufficiently the subject of the House and Senate bills.
related to the regulation of the video industry. As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency out of
The provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably a Conference Committee, it has been explained:
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, Under congressional rules of procedure, conference
which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure
Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already
The Supreme Court thus provided the following standards agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to
whether or not a provision is embraced in the title: enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating
• Title be comprehensive enough to include the general in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and
purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are
• If all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft
subject matter expressed in the title. essentially a new bill.
• So long as they are not inconsistent or foreign to the general The result is a third version, which is considered an
subject to the title. "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which
• Regardless of how diverse it is so long as it maybe being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for Senate bills.
the method and means of carrying out the general object.
• Should not be construed as to cripple legislative power
• Given a PRACTICAL rather than a technical construction
TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO
(237 SCRA 324 [1994])
FACTS:
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO
Petitioner contends that Republic Act No. 7496 is a
227 SCRA 703, 1993
misnomer or, at least deficient f0r being merely entitled "Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme For Self Employed and Professionals Engaged
FACTS:
in the practice of their Profession". It is the petitioner's view that the said
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No.
law should be considered as having now adopted a gross income
7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its
scheme, instead of having still deductions from gross income of single
Circular No. 9228. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from
proprietorships and professionals in the computation of their, taxable net
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
income, petitioner argued that this violated the requirement for uniformity
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
in taxation and due process because single proprietorship and
Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with certain
professional were taxed differently from corporations and partnerships.
other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel
ISSUE:
that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-
WON RA No. 7496 is in violation of Art. VI Sec. 26 and 28 of the 1987
named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken
Constitution.
common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as the sending
of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its
HELD:
motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
On the basis of the language of the said questioned law, it
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on
would be difficult to accept the petitioner's view that the amendatory
the ground that its title embraces more than one subject and does not
should be considered as now having adopted a gross income, instead of
express its purposes.
as having still retained the net income, taxation scheme. The allowance of
deductible items may have been significantly reduced by the questioned
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7354 violates the Constitution for it was
law in comparison with that which has prevailed prior to the amendment,
alleged to embraces more than one subject and does not express its
limiting, however, allowable deductions from gross income is neither
purpose.
discordant with nor opposed to, the net income tax concept.
Art. VI Sec. 26 (I) of the Constitution has been envisioned
HELD:
so as (a) to prevent logrolling legislation intended to unite the members of
NO. The franking privilege from some agencies is germane
the legislature who favor anyone of the unrelated subjects in support of
to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is
the whole act; (b) to avoid surprise or even fraud upon the legislature and
the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Court
(c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its
ruled that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not
proceedings are as usually made, of the subjects of legislations. The
have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
above objective of the fundamental law appears to have sufficiently met.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body
Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of the law which
of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
could have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
The contention of the petitioner that RA No. 7496 desecrates
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
the constitutional requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable
calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
is of no merit. The contention clearly forgets that such a system of
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to RA 7496.
To require every end and means necessary for the
Uniformity of Taxation merely requires that all subjects or
accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in

objects of taxation similarly situated are to be treated both in privileges emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered
and liabilities. Uniform does nor forefend classification as long as 1.) The by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
standards that are used therefore are substantial and not arbitrary. 2.) The As to the contention that the assailed law violates the
categorization is germane to achieve legislative purpose. 3.) The law present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the
applies all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1),
4.) The classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
same class. Shifting the income taxation of individuals to the schedules absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
system, this makes the income tax depend on the kind of taxable income, Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
and maintaining for corporations the global treatment which treats in "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter
common all kinds of taxable income of the taxpayer. clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if
Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts,
TOBIAS VS. ABALOS the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the
(G.R. NO. L-114783 DECEMBER 8, 1994) glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and
enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot
BIDIN, J.; possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
FACTS:
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute Republic Act
No. 7675, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill 235 SCRA 630, 1994
which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. Pursuant to the Local
Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held to asked the people FACTS:
whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided in the statute. The exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population where services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in
18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross
R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. receipts from the sale or exchange of services.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. First, that it National Internal Revenue Code.
contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, It was challenged for alleged constitutional infirmities
Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit: (defects), among others:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace It is claimed that the conference committee included
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. provisions not found in either the House Bill or the Senate Bill – that these
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section provisions were stealthily inserted by the conference committee.
49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal
subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional defects in RA 7716, since
urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San the conference committee included provisions not found in either the
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. House Bill or the Senate Bill.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI,
Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution. Petitioners argue that the HELD:
division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional A third version of the bill may result from the conference
districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase committee, which is considered may result from the conference
in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided committee, which is considered an “amendment in the nature of a
in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners substitute” the only requirement being that the third version be germane to
contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing the subject of the House and Senate bills.
that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency out of
requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect a Conference Committee, it has been explained:
of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts Under congressional rules of procedure, conference
pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited. committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure
at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 7675 is unconstitutional. agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to
enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating
HELD: in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and
No.Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft
and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city essentially a new bill.
but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly The result is a third version, which is considered an
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and
Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated Senate bills.
under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. GONZALES VS. MACARAIG
Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the 191 SCRA 452
constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1)
"should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should FACTS:
be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the The veto of a particular section in the 1989 appropriations
general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general act was assailed for being unconstitutional on grounds that the president
subject." may not veto provisions with regard to appropriation bills and if the
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had president vetoes a provision in an appropriation bill that the entire bill
been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to should be vetoed. Further, item-veto power does not carry with it the
wit: power to strike out conditions.
“Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to veto provisions
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details with regard to appropriation bills.
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject HELD:
of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the Yes. The Supreme Court held the following:
proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied). The President can veto an item or items in an appropriations
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues, alleging bill BUT nothing less than an item or items.
that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that o Item – an indivisible sum of money dedicated
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement to a stated purpose that a distinct and severable part of a bill
of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative maybe subject to a different veto.
districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. Therefore, regard to the petitioner’s contention that if a
7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the provision in an appropriations bill is vetoed the entire bill must be vetoed
regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the cannot be sustained. The said power to veto provisions has been carried
members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment over the previous constitutions and has now been understood as
of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws broadened to include the item or items to which the provision relates.

In relation still to veto of provisions, the principle that distinct this practice is prohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution.
and severable parts of a bill maybe the subject to a different veto is They argue that the Senate President and Speaker of the House, not the
founded on Art. 6, Section 25(2) wherein provisions are limited to its individual member of Congress, are the ones authorized to realign the
operation to the appropriation to which it relates…a distinct and severable savings as appropriated.
part subject to a different veto. Therefore it doesn’t mean that if the Another special provision vetoed by the President is on the
president vetoes a provision in an appropriations bill he’ll need to veto the appropriation for debt service. It provides “Use of funds. The appropriation
entire bill. authorized therein shall be used for payment of principal and interest of
Besides, the said provisions are inappropriate in the first foregoing and domestic indebtedness; provided, that any payment in
place because the provisions should relate to a particular appropriation in excess of the amount therein appropriated shall be subject to the approval
the general appropriations bill. of the President with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines;
That said sections of the appropriation bill cannot be subject provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the
to veto if such are made to be conditions on the expenditure of funds liabilities of the Central Bank of Liquidators.”
cannot be sustained because such conditions “inappropriate.” Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special
Restrictions or conditions in an appropriation bill must exhibit a connection provision on the appropriations for debt service without vetoing the entire
with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. amount of P86B for said purpose.
Said sections were in fact general law measures, there was no necessary In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund,
connection with the schedule of expenditures. the President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to
That in any case, the sections mentioned contravene the use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. According
Constitution as it takes away the power of the President to augment any to the President, the grant retirement and separation benefits should be
item in the appropriations law of their respective offices from savings in covered by direct appropriation specially approved for the purpose
other items of their respective appropriations, since a statute has already pursuant to Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he
authorized such power. stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
enumerated in Section 25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On the contrary,
petitioners claim that said provision is a condition or limitation, which is
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated
BENGZON VS. DRILON therefrom.
208 SCRA 133, 1992
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s contentions are tenable.
FACTS:
The case involved the General Appropriations Act of 1992. HELD:
The law appropriated 500M Pesos “For general fund adjustment for Petitioner’s contentions are without merit. Under the special
operational and special requirements as indicated hereunder.” Among the provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of
several authorized uses of the fund was the adjustment of pension of the Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the
justices as authorized by an earlier law. The President vetoed the use of savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best
such fund for the adjustment of the pension of justices. position to do so because they are the one who know whether there are
The funds pertaining to the payment of the adjusted savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in
pensions of Retired Justices of the Supreme Court and CA was vetoed other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However,
and assailed as being unconstitutional. it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House as the case may
• RA 1797 was the law granted these benefits in 1957. be who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of
• Section 3-A of RA 1797 was repealed by PD 644. approval, those two officials will have to see to it that: (1) the funds to be
• Congress thought to revive RA 1797 through HB No.16297. aligned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures
• But PD 644 never became a law! (not published) from which the same are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment is
• President vetoed HB No. 16297. for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said
transfer or realignment is to be made.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto act of the President the use of such fund It is readily apparent that the special provision applicable to
for the adjustment of the pension of justices is valid. the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of
the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of
HELD: the amount appropriated in the bill, is an “inappropriate provision” referring
The Supreme Court ruled: to the funds other than P68B appropriated in the GAAA of 1994.
The veto power while exercised by the President is actually
• In declaring the veto invalid, the Court said that it was not
a part of the legislative process. Hence, found in Article VI rather than
the veto of an item. The item was the entire 500M peso
Article VII.
allocation out of which unavoidable obligations not
As the constitution is explicit that the provision with the
adequately funded in separate items could be met. What the
Congress can include in an appropriate to which it relates, “it follows that
President had vetoed was the method of meeting
any provision which does not relate to any particular item or which it
unavoidable obligations or the manner of using the 500M
extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an
Pesos.
inappropriate provision which be vetoed separately from an item. Also to
• When the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 be included in the category of inappropriate provision are unconstitutional
General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing RA provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws
1797 since PD 644 never took effect which is beyond the because clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an appropriation bill.
power to accomplish. The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the
• The Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of special provision of the item on debt services including the provisos that
1992, provisions identifying funds and savings which may be the appropriation authorized in said item shall be used for the payment of
used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme one principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness and that
Court Resolution. As long as retirement laws remain in the in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central
statute book, there is an existing obligation on the part of the Bank Board of Liquidators. These provisos are germane to and have
government to pay the adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA direct connection with the item of debt service. Inherent in the power of the
1797 and AM-91-8-225-CA. appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. Said
Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as provisos are appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed separately.
a means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating unto the Presidency The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the
legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no item on debt service can only be with respect to the proviso therein
power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much requiring that any payment in excess of the amount therein, appropriated
less to repeal existing laws. The President’s power is merely to execute shall be the subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with
the laws passed by Congress. the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines.
The special provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use
savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Section 25
SECTION 1 ARTICLE 8, 1987 CONSTITUTION and Section 29 of Article VI of the Constitution.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ
235 SCRA 506. 1994
SECTION 28 – RULE ON TAXATION, TARIFF POWERS, EXEMPTIONS
QUIASON, J.: KAPATIRAN VS. TAN
FACTS: 163 SCRA 371, 1988
The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and
approved by both Houses of Congress. It presented the bill to the CASE:
president for the exercise of his veto power. The VAT law or EO 273 is being assailed on grounds among
One of the special provisions vetoed by the President is with others that taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
respect to the realignment of operating expenses. Whereas each member The Court overruled the contention holding that such was
of Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditures, a proportionate uniform because it operates with the same effect and force in every place
share of the appropriation for the house which he belongs. If he does not where the subject may be found. It is also equitable since it is imposed
spend for one item of expense, the questioned provision allows him to only on sales of goods or services by persons engaged in business with
transfer his allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners assail the an aggregate gross annual sale exceeding 200,000.
special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocations
for operational expenses to any other expense categorically claiming that

sale of the stamps given to that church but was evidently to focus attention
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT not on the Eucharistic Congress but on its site, the idea being to attract
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS. AQUINO tourists to our country and not primarily the religious event, it was held that
162 SCRA 106, 1988 the stamp issue was not invalid.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed suit to annul and declare void the "Notice of ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Seizure" and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and building for non-payment of GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE
real state taxes and penalties. 196 SCRA 221, 1991
Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and
building for educational purposes, and not the incidental use thereof, FACTS:
determines and exemption from property taxes under Section 22 (3), PD 1177 is being assailed on its constitutionality. It is
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure and sale of subject argued that the automatic reappropriation law for servicing foreign debts is
college lot and building, which are contrary invalid because it does not appropriate a fixed amount and is therefore an
Private respondents counter that the college lot and building undue delegation of legislative power
in question which were subjected to seizure and sale to answer for the
unpaid tax are used: (I) for the educational purposes of the r college; (2) ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional.
permanent residence of the President and Director thereof, and his family
including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) for commercial purposes HELD:
because the ground floor of the college building is being used and rented Yes. The amount is fixed by the parameters of the law itself
by a commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corporation which requires the simple act of looking into the books of the Treasure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building is question are used
exclusively for educational purposes thereby exempting petitioner from ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
property taxes. OSMENA VS. ORBOS
220 SCRA 703, 1993
HELD:
NO. The lot and building are not used exclusively for FACTS:
educational purposes. It must be stressed however, that while this Court The Oil Price Stabilzation Fund (OPSF) was created to
allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase minimize the frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate
"exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, adjustments and/or changes brought about by changes in world market
Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. A Terminal Fund
emphasis has always been made that exemptions extends to facilities Balance deficit now aims to resolve the deficit by increasing petroleum
which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment prices, contravening Section 29(3), Article VI where such fund shall be
of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or paid only for the purpose for which it was created.
lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building ISSUE: Whether or not the increase of petroleum prices to resolve the
in the case at the bar for residential purposes of the Director and his Terminal Fund Balance deficit is valid.
family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is
complimentary to the main or primary purpose - educational, the lease of HELD:
the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any Yes. The Court held that it was a valid exercise of police
stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of power.
education.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived
at the conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built, ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
should be taxed, not because the, second floor of the same is being used PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ
by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the 235 SCRA 506. 1994
first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since
only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of QUIASON, J.:
the assessed tax be returned to the school involved. FACTS:
The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and
approved by both Houses of Congress. It presented the bill to the
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT president for the exercise of his veto power.
SECTION 29 – RULES ON PUBLIC MONEY One of the special provisions vetoed by the President is with
PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS respect to the realignment of operating expenses. Whereas each member
110 PHIL. 331, 1960 of Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditures, a proportionate
share of the appropriation for the house which he belongs. If he does not
FACTS: spend for one item of expense, the questioned provision allows him to
The sum of 85,000 pesos was appropriated by Congress for transfer his allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners assail the
the construction of a feeder road running through a private subdivision and special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocations
over a property owned by a private individual. Subsequently, the feeder for operational expenses to any other expense categorically claiming that
road is donated to the government. this practice is prohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution.
They argue that the Senate President and Speaker of the House, not the
ISSUE: Is the appropriation valid? individual member of Congress, are the ones authorized to realign the
savings as appropriated.
HELD: Another special provision vetoed by the President is on the
The Supreme Court annulled this item, observing that the appropriation for debt service. It provides “Use of funds. The appropriation
property sought to be improved with public funds was private in nature at authorized therein shall be used for payment of principal and interest of
the time the appropriation was made. The circumstance that the roads foregoing and domestic indebtedness; provided, that any payment in
were later donated to the government did not cure the basic defect of the excess of the amount therein appropriated shall be subject to the approval
appropriation as it was null and void ab initio. of the President with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines;
provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT liabilities of the Central Bank of Liquidators.”
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special
64 PHIL. 201, 1937 provision on the appropriations for debt service without vetoing the entire
amount of P86B for said purpose.
FACTS: In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund,
The Philippine government authorized a special stamp issue the President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to
on occasion of the observance in Manila of the 33 rd International use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. According
Eucharistic Congress under the sponsorship of the Catholic Church. The to the President, the grant retirement and separation benefits should be
petitioner, as head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the covered by direct appropriation specially approved for the purpose
measure and contended that it violated the Constitution inasmuch as it pursuant to Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he
benefited a particular region. The Supreme Court, on examining the facts, stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
discovered that the original design of the stamp featured a picture of a enumerated in Section 25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On the contrary,
Catholic chalice, but this was later rejected in favor of a map of the petitioners claim that said provision is a condition or limitation, which is
Philippines under which appeared the caption “Seat, 33rd International intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not the stamp issue was valid. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s contentions are tenable.
HELD: HELD:
Yes. As the purpose of the stamp issue were not for the Petitioner’s contentions are without merit. Under the special
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor money was derived from the provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of

the Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the It is very patent that since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was
savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best enacted without the advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision
position to do so because they are the one who know whether there are never became effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to have
savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the
other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of
it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House as the case may Energy, now ERB, remains (Cf. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of
be who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, 7 October 1994).
approval, those two officials will have to see to it that: (1) the funds to be On 27 February 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated
aligned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures Circular No.1-91, par. (1) of which specifically provides that the proper
from which the same are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment is mode of appeal from any quasi-judicial agency, including ERB, is by way
for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. If the appeal is brought
transfer or realignment is to be made. to either Court (Supreme Court or Court of Appeals) by the wrong
It is readily apparent that the special provision applicable to procedure, the only course of action open to it is to dismiss the appeal.
the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous
the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of appeals from one court to another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
the amount appropriated in the bill, is an “inappropriate provision” referring 93869, 12 November 1990).
to the funds other than P68B appropriated in the GAAA of 1994. Prior to Circular No. 1-91, the Supreme Court promulgated
The veto power while exercised by the President is actually Circular No. 2-90 dated 9 March 1990, Item No. 4 of which states that
a part of the legislative process. Hence, found in Article VI rather than "[a]n appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by
Article VII. the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed". Also, paragraph (d)
As the constitution is explicit that the provision with the of said Circular No. 2-90 also provides that "[n]o transfer of appeals
Congress can include in an appropriate to which it relates, “it follows that erroneously taken to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals to
any provision which does not relate to any particular item or which it whichever of these Tribunals has appropriate appellate jurisdiction will be
extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an allowed; continued ignorance or willful disregard of the law on appeals will
inappropriate provision which be vetoed separately from an item. Also to not be tolerated."
be included in the category of inappropriate provision are unconstitutional Consequently, the Court of Appeals was correct when it held —
provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws Contrary to petitioners' stand, the Supreme Court's Resolution dated
because clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an appropriation bill. September 8, 1992, referring "this case to the Court of Appeals for further
The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the disposition" was not a directive for this court to disregard the above
special provision of the item on debt services including the provisos that circulars and precedents. Rather the said SC resolution could mean only
the appropriation authorized in said item shall be used for the payment of that this court should dispose of the subject petition in conformity with, and
one principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness and that not in violation of, those circulars and precedents (Rollo, p. 26).
in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
Bank Board of Liquidators. These provisos are germane to and have
direct connection with the item of debt service. Inherent in the power of the
appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. Said ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
provisos are appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed separately. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMMISION ON
The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the ELECTIONS
item on debt service can only be with respect to the proviso therein G.R. NO. 125416 SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
requiring that any payment in excess of the amount therein, appropriated
shall be the subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with FACTS:
the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan (Sangguniang
The special provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use Bayan) passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993,
savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the expressing therein its absolute concurrence to join the Subic Special
AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Section 25 Economic Zone.
and Section 29 of Article VI of the Constitution. Respondents Garcia, et al. filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye
1993. The Sangguniang Bayan promulgated Pambayang Kapasyahan
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Bilang 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress to amend certain provisions
DIAZ VS.COURT OF APPEALS of R.A. No.7227, particularly those concerning the matters cited in items of
(G.R. NO. L-109698 DECEMBER 5, 1994) private respondents’ petition.
BELLOSILLO, J.: Not satisfied, private respondents resorted to their power of
FACTS: initiative. Respondent COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on
On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution (pambayang
(DLPC) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. Thereafter, COMELEC issued a
the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property in service. The Resolution directing its Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on
Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC at authentication of signatures being solicited by private respondent.
One Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting a
Thousand Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00). “Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance
On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.” It then
DLPC after deducting Fourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos promulgated said Resolution, providing for “the rules and guidelines to
(P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment which were not used govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
by DLPC in its operation. Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
before this Court assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of Bataan.
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of Contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2428, petitioner
jurisdiction. instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
In Supreme Court’s resolution of 8 September 1992, it
referred the case for proper disposition to the Court of Appeals which ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
subsequently dismissed the petition. Among the grounds given was that discretion in promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 2848
the filing of the petition for review with the Supreme Court was a wrong which govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
mode of appeal. Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that Bataan?
the resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of
Appeals to disregard the above circular. They further claimed that E.O. HELD:
No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to replace the Board of Yes. COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in
Energy provides under Sec. 10 thereof that "[a] party adversely affected promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848. The process started
by a decision, order or ruling of the Board . . . may file a petition to be by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent COMELEC
known as petition for review with the Supreme Court." made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
Based on the definitions given by the Local Government
ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 10 of E.O. No.172 is constitutional. Code (R.A. 7160): Local Initiative is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact,
HELD: or amend any ordinance; while Local Referendum is the legal process
No. The predecessor of the Energy Regulatory Board was whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve,
the Board of Energy created under P.D. No. 1206. There under, appeals amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the Sanggunian.
from the decisions of the Board of Energy were appealable to the Office of In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the
the President. However, under the Interim Rules Implementing the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, final decisions, orders, awards or body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves
resolutions of the Board of Energy were made appealable to the without the participation and against the wishes of their elected
Intermediate Appellate Court (Sec. 9). representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate
Furthermore, the 1987 Constitution, Sec. 30, Art VI provides: approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative
"No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the
concurrence." voters will simply answer “yes” or “no” in the ballot.

In the case at bar, the exercise conducted is unquestionably articles of impeachment to the senate signed by 115 represenatatives or
an Initiative. more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives. On
November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the
petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding. The political
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS tension rose during the impeachment trial particularly during the
(177 SCRA 668) December hearings when Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of
Equitable-PCI Bank testified on the existence of the Jose Velarde account.
FACTS: The impeachment trial reached its turning point when on the fateful day of
In February 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the January 16, by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the
presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and forced into opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence
exile. Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Philippines under showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
a revolutionary government. name "Jose Velarde." The non-opening of the second envelope led to the
After three years, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified resignation of the public and private prosecutors and the spontaneous
his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Aquino has outburst of anger by the people in EDSA which is now referred to as the
stood firmly in the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family - EDSA dos.
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time Petitioner’s fall from power became more apparent starting
when the stability of the government is threatened from various directions January 19 when key officials from the armed forces, the PNP and his
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward. other cabinet members withdrew support. At about 12:00 noon of January
20 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
ISSUE: Whether or not in the exercise of the powers granted by the President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to hurriedly left Malacañang Palace while leaving a press statement
the Philippines. indicating his strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of the proclamation of the respondent as President and
HELD: that he is leaving the Palace as he does not wish to “prevent the
Yes, the President has the Power under the Constitution to restoration of unity and order in our civil society.”
bar the Marcoses from returning to our country.
The Constitution says that the executive power shall be ISSUES:
vested in the President. It also enumerates certain specific powers. The 1. Whether or not the case at bar is a political question and hence, are beyond
enumeration, however, does not exhaust the totality of executive powers. the jurisdiction of this Court to decide
Tradition recognizes that the powers of the President are more than the 2. Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent
sum of enumerated executive powers. The duty of the government “to Arroyo is an Acting President.
serve and protect the people” as well as to see to the “maintenance of
peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the HELD:
promotion of the general welfare” argue towards the existence of “residual 1.)No the case at bar is not a political question. Accordingly, it is within the
instated powers.” jurisdiction of the Court to decide. In the case of Tanada v. Cuenco, the
Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political
questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
(178 SCRA 760) executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a
FACTS: great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political
On October 1989, motion for reconsideration was filed by question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this
petitioners raising the following major arguments among others: court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
1. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
country. there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
2. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
President Marcos. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt
not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
W/N the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting
the Philippines. to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court
HELD: power of doing nothing. In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People
YES. The Supreme Court held that it cannot be denied that Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of
the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which
Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the
to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I
regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.
the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause,
but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. 2. ) No. President Estrada is not on leave, he resigned from office.
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question
and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
SECTION 8 ARTICLE 7, 1987 CONSTITUTION resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
(G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001) resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not
PUNO, J.: write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang
FACTS: Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January
Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
was elected Vice-President. Both petitioner and the respondent were to and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.During his term, the Using this totality test, the Court holds that petitioner resigned as
petitioner experienced a sharp descent from power started on October 4, President. The petitioner’s resignation is shown in the following instances:
2000 when Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend a. he left Malacañang
of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and b. he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposẻ of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality
immediately ignited reactions of rage. Numerous investigations c. he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
commenced both from the Senate and the House of Representatives. presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air that on October 11, process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to
Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral letter asking the any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as
petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral soon as the disability disappears
authority to govern. d. he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
Political tensions continued to heat up as key economic serve them.
advisers and members of the cabinet defected. On November 13, in a e. he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
tumultuous session, the house of representatives finally transmitted the may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference

is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
has given up; stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
f. he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
not give up the presidency. DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
(177 SCRA 354)
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FACTS:

SECTION 11 ARTICLE 7, 1987 CONSTITUTION The special prosecutor officer filed in the Sandiganbayan an
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO information against petitioner Doromal, alleging:
(G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001) "That the above-named accused, a public officer, being then
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did
PUNO, J.: then and there wilfully and unlawfully have direct or indirect financial
FACTS: interest in the Doromal International Trading Corporation, an entity which
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito transacted or entered into a business transaction or contract with the
Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower
was elected Vice-President. Both petitioner and the respondent were to and Youth Council, both agencies of the government which business,
serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.During his term, the contracts or transactions he is prohibited by law and the constitution from
petitioner experienced a sharp descent from power started on October 4, having any interest."
2000 when Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend The information was initially annulled for the reason that the
of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and “TanodBayan” has no right to file information without the approval of the
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposẻ Ombudsman. The Special Prosecutor sought clearance from the
immediately ignited reactions of rage. Ombudsman to refile it. The Ombudsman granted clearance but advised
On November 13, in a tumultuous session, the house of that "some changes be made in the information." A new information, duly
representatives transmitted the articles of impeachment to the senate. On approved by the Ombudsman, was filed, alleging that:
November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the ". . . , the above-named accused (Doromal), a public officer,
petitioner. The impeachment trial reached its turning point when on the being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good
fateful day of January 16, by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled Government, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, participate in a
against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family
evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated
under the name "Jose Velarde." The non-opening of the second envelope in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and
led to the resignation of the public and private prosecutors and the Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or
spontaneous outburst of anger by the people in EDSA which is now participation is prohibited by law and the constitution."
referred to as the EDSA dos. Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that
On January 20, 2001, petitioner sent a letter to the Senate he, a PCGG Commissioner, has not signed any document, bid of the
and the House of Representatives claiming his inability to perform his family corporation of which he is member, submitted to DECS.
functions as a president. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took Sandiganbayn denied the motion to quash, hence this
her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m. petition.
Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives as well as the
Senate issued House Resolution Nos. 175, 176 and 178 as well as ISSUE: W/N the prohibition under Section 13 of Article VII of the
Senate Resolution nos. 82, 83 and 84 recognizing and confirming the Constitution should not apply if an accused has not signed any document
assumption of the respondent of the presidency. of any bid of the family corporation of which he is member, submitted to
After respondent has taken her oath of office, petitioner any government departments.
postulated that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to
adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of HELD:
the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate No, the provision shall still apply because the DITC
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section interest.
11 of article VII."This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting "the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their
President. deputies or assistants shall not . . . during (their) tenure, . . . directly or
indirectly . . . participate in any business." The constitutional ban is similar
ISSUES: to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law that "pursuit of private business .
1. Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President . . without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and Regulations"
2. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent shall be a ground for disciplinary action against any officer or employee in
for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada the civil service.
3. Whether or not the petitioner is immune from the charges filed against
HELD: ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1. No, petitioner is not only temporarily unable to act as president. House CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Resolution Nos. 175,176, and 178, as well as Senate Resolutions No. (194 SCRA 317)
82, 83 and 84 show that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is FACTS:
the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. President Aquino issued EO No. 284, which allows members
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold
other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions.
2.) No. Conviction in the impeachment proceedings is not a condition It was assailed for it violates the Constitution.
precedent for the criminal prosecution of the petitioner. The impeachment Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of EO No. 284 on
trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII
and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Since, the other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the
demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-
his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3,
will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article
a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional VIII.
Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have
become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal ISSUE: Whether or not an executive order allowing members of the
and civil cases may already be filed against him Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices in addition to their primary positions is valid.
3.) No. The petitioner is not immuned from the cases filed against him by
virtue of him being an unsitting president. The cases filed against HELD:
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery Invalid. In the light of the construction given to Section 13,
and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that
cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284
acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987

Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as
the 1987 Constitution itself. earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover,
those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by
designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, their making is
IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30,1998 OF considered an election offense.
HON. M. A. VALENZUELA AND HON. P. B. VILLARTA AS RTC To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative
JUDGES need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the
(298 SCRA 408 [NOVEMBER 9, 1998]) executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the
membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or
NARVASA, C.J.: should the voting on a particularly important question requiring expeditious
FACTS: resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta were Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.
appointed by the then President on March 30, 1998 as Judges of the RTC, Concerning Valenzuela’s oath-taking and “reporting for duty”
Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 62, Bago City, on May 14, 1998, it
On May 12, 1998, the Chief Justice received from Malacanang the must be noted that it is a standing practice on the appointments to the
appointments of two (2) Judge of the RTC mentioned above. The Judiciary – from the highest to the lowest court – to be sent by the Office
appointments were questioned on the view that they were made during of the President to the Office of the Chief Justice, the appointments being
the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII addressed to the appointees. It is the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court
of the Constitution. in the Chief’s Justice behalf, who thereafter advises the individual
The issue was already ventilated at the meeting of the appointees of their appointments and also the date commencement of the
Judicial and Bar Council on March 9, 1998 regarding the constitutionality pre-requisite orientation seminar to be conducted by the Philippine Judicial
of appointments of eight (8) Associate Justices to the Court of Appeals, Academy for new Judges. The procedure ensures the authenticity of the
specifically, in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. Attention was appointments, enables the Court, particularly the Office of the Court
drawn to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution reading as follows: Administrator, to enter in the appropriate records all appointments to the
Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next Judiciary a well as other relevant data such as the dates of qualification,
presidential elections and up to the end of his, term, a President or Acting the completion by the appointees of their pre-requisite orientation
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to seminars, their assumption of duty, etc. The procedure also precludes the
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public possibility, however remote of Judges acting on spurious or otherwise
service or endanger public safety. defective appointments.
On the other hand, appointments to fill vacancies in the The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on
Supreme Court during the period mentioned in the provision just quoted March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14,
could be justified by Section 4(1) of Article VII of the Constitution which 998) were unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
states: Consequently, they come within the operation of the first prohibition
Sec. 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. ** **. Any vacancy shall be filled buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in
Also pertinent although not specifically discussed is Section this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the
9 of the same Article VIII which provides that for the lower courts, the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already
President shall issue the appointments — from a list of at least three discussed, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against
nominees prepared by the Council for every vacancy — within ninety days appointments made within the period of the ban.
from the submission of the list. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court Resolved
The Court issued a Resolution which states that ”pending to DECLARE VOID the appointments signed by His Excellency the
the foregoing proceedings and the deliberation by the Court on the mater, President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
and until further orders, no action be taken on the appointments of Hon. Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch
Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta which in the meantime shall be held in 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively and to
abeyance. order them, forthwith on being served with notice of this decision, to
In compliance with the foregoing Resolution, Hon. forthwith CEASE AND DESIST from discharging the office of Judge of the
Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta filed before the Court the required pleadings Courts to which they were respectively appointed on March 30, 1998.
and other documents. It is noted that Hon. Valenzuela had already taken
his Oath of Office a Judge on May 14, 1998 and explained that he did so
because on May 7, 1998, he “received from Malacanang copy of his ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
appointment *** which contained the following direction “By virtue hereof, BINAMIRA VS. GARRUCHO
you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. (188 SCRA 154 [1990])
The Court then deliberated on the pleadings and documents
above mentioned, in relation to the facts and circumstances on record and FACTS:
thereafter resolved to promulgate the following opinion. The petitioner, Binamira, was the former General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority by virtue of the designation of the Minister
ISSUE: Whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed of Tourism with the approval of President Aquino. Subsequently,
by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless Garrucho was delegated by the President as the new Secretary of the
required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Ministry. Garucho then had taken over the position of Binamira as the
Article VIII. General Manager of Philippine Tourism Authority. Hence, this petition.
Whether the President can make appointments to the
judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of public service. ISSUES:
1. W/N a person designated to a position by a member of the
HELD: cabinet should step down to a person newly designated by
NO. The Court's view is that during the period stated in the President to that same position.
Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution — "(t)wo months immediatey 2. Distinguished designation from appointment
before the next presidential elections and up to the end his term" — the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor HELD:
allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean 1. YES. The designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his
that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that
frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the
not noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall
once every six years. be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any
In this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion,
that any "vacany shall be filled within ninety days" (in the last sentence of which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally
Section 4 (1) of Article VIII) contrasts with the prohibition Section 15, speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to
Article VII, which is couched in stronger negative language — that "a assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the
President or Acting President shall not make appointments. . ." President.
Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VI is directed against His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a
two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was
made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting
similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was
Election Code. The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, (albeit for a different reason).
Article VII consist of the so-called "midnight" appointments.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for 2. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment
filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President's power because it likewise involves the naming of a particular
of appointments, it is this Court's view that, as a general proposition, in person to a specified public office.
case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention That is the common understanding of the term. However,
of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication
filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be

replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made
is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not without the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments.
confer security of tenure on the person named. To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided
for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission
SARMIENTO VS. MISON on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in
(156 SCRA 154, 1987) the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointment.
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the
FACTS: Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section
The petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, Appointments because they are among the officers of government "whom
seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." And Section 2(c),
functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint
respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. It
from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and provides:
emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of "(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on
the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been Human Rights shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the years without re-appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's for the unexpired term of the predecessor."
appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
ISSUES: QUINTOS-DELES VS. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
1. What are the groups of officers whom the President shall (177 SCRA 259, 1989)
appoint?
2. W/N confirmation of the appointments of Commissioners of FACTS:
the Bureau of Customs by the Commission on Appointments Petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral
required. Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16,
paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. However, the
HELD: appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as
1. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, members of Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-
there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral
appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission
refer from time to time, are: before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, House of Representatives.
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments ISSUE: W/N appointment of Sectoral Representatives requires
are vested in him in this Constitution; confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; HELD:
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law YES. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives
to appoint; in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution,
Congress may by law vest in the President alone. it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are
consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first
officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to
the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Those belonging to second, third and fourth groups may be There are appointments vested in the President in the
appointed by the President without such confirmation with COA. Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no
confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and
2. NO. It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his
Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation had been
within the first group of appointments where the consent of extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution.
the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of
fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution
includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
appointments need the consent of the Commission on CALDERON VS. CARALE
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, (208 SCRA 254, 1992)
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the FACTS:
Commission on Appointments. Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 amending the Labor
Code was approved. Sec 13 thereof provides that the Chairman, the
Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT appointed by the President subject to the confirmation by the Commission
BAUTISTA VS. SALONGA on Appointment.
(172 SCRA 160, 1989) Pursuant to said law, President Aquino appointed the
Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public
FACTS: workers and employees sectors. The appointment stated that the
President Aquino designated Mary Bautista as Acting appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of
Chairman of the CHR. Later on, the President extended to Bautista a the office.
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. She took her This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality of
oath of office by virtue of her appointment as Chairman of the CHR. the permanent appointment extended by the President without submitting
Bautista received letters from the COA Secretary requesting the same to the Commission on Appointment for confirmation pursuant to
her to submit certain information and documents and to be present at a RA 6715.
meeting of the COA Committee on Justice and Judicial and Bar Council The Solicitor General contends that RA 6715 transgresses
and Human Rights, in connection with her confirmation as Chairman of Sec 16 Art VII by expanding the confirmation power of the Commission on
CHR. However, she refused to submit herself to the COA arguing that the Appointments without Constitutional basis.
latter has no jurisdiction to review her appointment as CHR Chairman.
The COA's secretary sent a letter to the executive secretary ISSUES:
informing the latter that COA disapproved Bautista's "ad interim 1. May the Congress expand the list of those whose
appointment" as Chairman of the CHR, in view of her refusal to submit to appointment needs confirmation by the Commission on
the jurisdiction of the COA. It is the COA's submission that the President Appointments?
decides to the extent another appointment to Bautista, this time, 2. When is confirmation by COA can be said to be required and
submitting such appointment/nomination to the COA for confirmation. not?
ISSUE: Whether or not confirmation of the appointments of the Chairman HELD:

of the Commission on Human Rights requires the consent of the COA. 1. NO, the Court held that the Congress may not expand the
list of appointments needing confirmation.
HELD: The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the
No, since the office is not one of those mentioned in the first second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more
sentence of Article VII, Section 16, nor is it specified elsewhere that such specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e.
appointments needs consent of the Commission, it follows that the those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.

Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the effectiveness, the mayor of Olongapo shall be appointed as chairman of
officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose the SBMA.
appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was argued that said provision violates Sec. 7 Art IX:-B
To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on which provides: that no elective official shall be eligible for appointment in
Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure.
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is It was contended that the prohibition cannot be applied due
unconstitutional because: to the presence of a law authorizing the appointment. The Local
a. it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Government Code permits the appointment of local elective official to
Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto another position or post.
appointments requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and ISSUE: Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which
b. it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. states, "Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the
16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority,"
appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation
the President of elective officials to other government posts.
2. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is
required only for presidential appointees mentioned in HELD:
the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, YES. In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the
those officers whose appointments are expressly President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City,
vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
sectoral representatives to Congress and members of Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional
the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to
and Election). conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first part., Art. IX-B, of the
Confirmation is not required when the President appoints Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be
other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.
for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code
(like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if
Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. 8 But, the
omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the
manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can
those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. prevail over the fundamental law of the land.
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

TARROSA VS. SINGSON LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(232 SCRA 553, 1994) (143 SCRA 327, 1986)
FACTS: FACTS:
President Ramos appointed respondent Singson as The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II by the
Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Petitioner argues that this appointment is city mayor, Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent”
null and void since it was not submitted for confirmation to the COA. The but the Civil Service Service Commission approved it as “temporary”
petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which subject to the outcome of the protest of the respondent.
established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the The Civil Service Commission decided that respondent was
Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides: better qualified, revoked the appointment of petitioner and ordered the
"Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers appointment of respondent in his place. The private responded was so
and functions of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised by the Bangko appointed by the new mayor, Mayor Duterte.
Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board, The petitioner, invoking his earlier “permanent” appointment,
composed of seven (7) members appointed by the President of the is now before the Court to question that order and the private respondent’s
Philippines for a term of six (6) years. title.
The seven (7) members are:
(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman of the ISSUES:
Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be head of a 1. Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a
department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better
Commission on Appointments. Whenever the Governor is unable to attend qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order
a meeting of the Board, he shall designate a Deputy Governor to act as his replacement by the latter?
his alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary Board shall 2. W/N the Civil Service Commission has the power to make a
designate one of its members as acting Chairman . . ." (Underlining permanent appointment into a temporary one.
supplied).
In their comment, respondents claim that Congress HELD:
exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the 1. NO. The Civil Service Commission is without authority to
Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person
Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion
not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the vested solely in the city mayor.
Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the 2. NO. While the principle is correct, and we have applied it
Constitution. many times, it is not correctly applied in this case. The argument
begs the question. The appointment of the petitioner was not
ISSUE: May the Congress expand the confirmation powers of the temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by
Commission on Appointments and require appointment of other Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was
government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the
16 of Article 7 of the Constitution? respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it
temporary.
HELD:
NO. In this case the Court used the same ruling as what
was held in the case of Calderon vs. Corale, where the ruled was that ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the COA and POBRE VS. MENDIETA
require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not (224 SCRA 738, 1993)
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the
Constitution. FACTS:
This controversy began when the term of office of Honorable
Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mendieta
was the senior associate Commissioner and Pobre was the second
associate Commissioner of the PRC.
Then the executive secretary sought the opinion of acting
secretary of justice on whether the President may appoint as
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC any person other than the Senior
FLORES VS. DRILON Associate Commissioner. Acting secretary of justice answered that Sec. 2
(223 SCRA 568, 1993) of PD 223 does not limit or restrict the appointing power of the President.
President Aquino then appointed the petitioner, then an
FACTS: Associate Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/Chairman.
Mayor Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman of Mendieta filed a petition for declaratory relief contesting
SBMA on account of RA 7227. Under said law, for the first year of its Pobre’s appointment as Chairman of the PRC because he allegedly

succeeded Francia as PRC Chairman by operation of law. The trial court Petitioners were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992,
ruled in favor of Mendieta. Hence, this petition. pursuant to E.O. 292 and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO
292. President Ramos issued A.O. 29, authorizing the grant of productivity
ISSUE: incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00
W/N the vacancy in the commission shall be filled by “succession” or and reiterating the prohibition 4 under Section 7 5 of A.O. 268, enjoining
“operation of law. the grant of productivity incentive benefits without the President’s prior
approval. Section 4 of AO 29 directed "all departments, offices and
HELD: agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive
NO. The Court finds unacceptable the view that every Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1 hereof [are
vacancy in the Commission (except the position of "junior" Associate hereby directed] to immediately cause the return/refund of the excess
Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or by "operation of law" for within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the
that would deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC issuance of this Order." In compliance therewith, the heads of the
Commissioner and Associate Commissioners -- "all to be appointed by the departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the
President" under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or
occasion for the President to exercise his appointing power would be allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
when the position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes Thus, petitioners seek relief from this.
vacant. We may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. Petitioners theorize that AO 29 and AO 268 violate EO 292
223, he deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the and since the latter is a law, it prevails over executive issuances.
head of the PRC and limited himself to the selection and appointment of Petitioners likewise assert that AO 29 and AO 268 encroach upon the
only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder constitutional authority of the Civil Service Commission to adopt measures
in that agency. to strengthen the merit and rewards system and to promulgate rules,
regulations and standards governing the incentive awards system of the
civil service.
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
DRILON VS. LIM ISSUE: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid
(235 SCRA 135, 1994) exercise of presidential control over the executive departments?
FACTS: HELD:
Pursuant to section 187 of the Local Government Code Yes. AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of
(Procedure for approval and effectivity of Tax Ordianance and Revenue presidential control over the executive departments. The President is the
Measures), the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised
companies and taxpayer, declared Manila Revenue Code null and void for and implemented through him. His power includes the control executive
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax departments. Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
ordianance (there were no written notices of public hearings nor were set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
copies of the proposed ordinance published). duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It
In a petition for certiorari, RTC revoked Secretary’s has been held that "the President can, by virtue of his power of control,
resolution and sustained ordinance holding that all the procedural review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision, of his subordinate in
requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can exercise
Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such this power motu proprio without need of any appeal from any party."
compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of
days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence later incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting
submitted to the trial court. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of incentive benefits without prior approval from him, and directing the refund
the LGC as unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of of the excess over the prescribed amount, the President was just
Justice to review tax ordinance and inferentially to annul them. His exercising his power of control over executive departments. The President
conclusion was that the challenged section gave the Secretary the power issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of productivity
of control and not of supervision only. The 1987 Constitution provides that incentive benefits and to prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and
President shall exercise general supervision over local governments. demoralization among government personnel by committing limited
resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards.
ISSUES: The President was only exercising his power of control by modifying the
1. Distinguish control from supervision. acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees
2. W/N Section 187 of the LGC gave the Secretary the power without appropriate clearance from the Office of the President, thereby
of control and not supervision only. resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. In the view of
the President, respondents did a mistake which had to be corrected.
HELD:
1. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an
act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do VILLENA VS. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The (67 PHIL 451)
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he FACTS:
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not It appears that the Division of Investigation of the
observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior,
conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the petitioner, as a result of which
manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse
except to see to it that the rules are followed. of authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession. The
respondent recommended to the President of the Philippines the
2. NO. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did suspension of the petitioner to prevent possible coercion of witnesses,
precisely this (See No.1), and no more nor less than this, and so which recommendation was granted. The Secretary of the Interior
performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. suspended the petitioner from office, and then and thereafter wired the
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but Provincial Governor of Rizal with instruction that the petitioner be advised
he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should accordingly. The respondent wrote the petitioner a letter, specifying the
be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as many charges against him and notifying him of the designation of a
a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was special investigator to investigate the charges. The special investigator
a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in forthwith notified the petitioner that the formal investigation would be
reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were commenced on March 28, 1939. Hence, the petition for preliminary
performing their functions is accordance with law, that is, with the injunction against the Secretary of Interior to restrain him and his agents
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the from preceding with the investigation of petitioner which was scheduled to
grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government take place on March 28, 1939.
Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision ISSUES:
1. W/N the Secretary of Interior has the power to order an
WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered investigation.
REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar 2. W/N the Secretary of Interior has the power to suspend.
as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional
but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural requirements in the HELD:
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. 1. YES. Supervision is not a meaningless thing.
It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at
least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be
REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, ET AL. VS. ANGEL C. ALCALA, ET AL. conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be
G.R. NO. 109406, SEPTEMBER 11, 1998 founded upon knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed
after careful study and investigation. The principle there
FACTS: enunciated is applicable with equal force to the present case.

The Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to Proclamation No. 469 was later issued, which exclude from
order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to the reservation made in favor of the NPC, existing under Proclamation No.
appoint a special investigator for that purpose. 335, Series of 1952, and Proclamation No. 20, Series of 1962, certain
2. YES. The Secretary of Interior is empowered parcels of land embraced therein." Lots 1,1-a, 3 and 4, containing
to investigate the charges against the pwtitioner and to appoint a approximately an area of 29,681 square meters are described therein. The
special investigator for that purpose, preventive suspension may be Proclamation further stated "that upon the recommendation of the
a means by which to carry into effect a fair and impartial Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to Section
investigation. 60 of C.A. No. 141, I do hereby grant, donate and transfer the
aforementioned parcels of land including the foreshores thereof, in favor of
Iligan City."
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT The Mayor of Iligan City wrote the Director of Lands to
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. VS. PANO inform him that the City of Iligan is the owner in fee simple of Lots 1, 1-a, 3
(21 SCRA 395, 1967) and 4 including the foreshores thereof by virtue of Proclamation No. 469,
Series of 1965, and requesting that the said property be excluded from the
FACTS: proposed auction sale." No action was taken on this request for exclusion.
Jose Magallanes, a permittee and actual occupant of a Hence, the City of Iligan filed a complaint for injunction with
1,103-hectare pasture land, ceded his rights and interests to a portion preliminary injunction against the Director of Lands, District Land Officer of
thereof to plaintiff. Subsequently, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff Lanao del Norte and the Marcelo Steel Corporation to enjoin and stop the
was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared sale and/or disposition of the afore described parcels of land.
agricultural land. President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 94 excluding
Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the from the operation of Proclamation No. 469 certain portions of the land
purchase of 90 hectares of the released area. Plaintiff corporation in turn embraced therein, situated in Iligan City and declaring the same open to
filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was disposition. Said portions of land, as described therein are Lots 1-a, 2-a
protested by Paño and his companions, claiming that they are actual and 3 of the parcels of land in question.
occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. After the trial on the merits, the court dismissed the
The Director of Lands rendered judgment, giving due course complaint and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. On appeal, the
to the application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose records of the case were certified to this Court as the issue of the validity
Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed. An appeal was of any executive order and the errors or the questions
made but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dismissed of the law raised are within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
the same.
When the case was elevated to the President of the ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to grant portions of
Philippines, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the President, public domain to any government entity like the city of Iligan.
modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Plaintiff corporation took this decision to the trial court,
praying that judgment be rendered declaring that the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect. HELD:
Plaintiff's mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141. The precept YES. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is
there is that decisions of the Director of Lands "as to questions of fact the executive officer-in-charged with the duty of carrying out the provision
shall be conclusive when approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and of the Public Land Act thru the Director of Lands who acts under his
Natural Resources. Plaintiff's trenchant claim is that this statute is immediate control.
controlling not only upon courts but also upon the President. Section 4 thereof, also provides:
"Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall
ISSUE: May the President through his executive secretary undo an act of have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or
the Director of Lands, which a law provides that such act will be any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands
conclusive when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be
Resources OR W/N the administrative decision could still be appealed to conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
the President? Resources."
Since it is the Director of Lands who has direct executive
HELD: control among others in the lease, sale or any form of concession or
YES. The President's duty to execute the law is of disposition of the land of the public domain subject to the immediate
constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. control of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and
Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the considering that under the Constitution the President of the Philippines
power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at has control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, etc., 15
pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his the President of the Philippines has therefore the same authority to
authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his dispose of portions of the public domain as his subordinates, the Director
department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the of Lands, and his alter ego the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department Resources.
secretary.
It may be stated that the right to appeal to the President
reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
departments. And control simply means the power of an officer to alter or GASCON VS. ARROYO
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the (178 SCRA 582, 1989)
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter. FACTS:
The Lopez family is the owner of two television stations,
namely: Channels 2 and 4 which they have operated through the ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation.
When martial law was declared, TV Channel 4 was closed
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT by the military; thereafter, its facilities were taken over by the Kanlaon
CITY OF ILIGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS Broadcasting System which operated it as a commercial TV station.
(158 SCRA 158 [1988]) In 1978, the said TV station and its facilities were taken over
by the National Media Production Center (NMPC), which operated it as
FACTS: the Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4 (MBS-4).
Proclamation No. 335 was issued, withdrawing from sale or After the 1986 EDSA revolution, the PCGG sequestered the
settlement and reserved for the use of the NPC certain parcels of the aforementioned TV Stations, and, thereafter, the Office of Media Affairs
public domain. took over the operation of TV Channel 4.
Meanwhile, the NPC constructed Maria Cristina Fertilizer The Lopez family, through counsel, requested President
Plant, which was sold, ceded, transferred and conveyed to Marcelo Tire Aquino to order the return to the Lopez family of TV Stations 2 and 4.
and Rubber Corporation, including the right of occupancy and use of the They made a written request to the PCGG for the return of TV Station
land described in Proclamation 335, Series of 1952. Channel 2. The PCGG approved the return of TV Station Channel 2 to the
Proclamation No. 20, Series of 1962, and Proclamation 198, Lopez family. The return was made on 18 October 1986.
Series of 1964, were subsequently issued, excluding from the operation of Thereafter, the Lopez family requested for the return of TV
Proclamation No. 335, Series of 1952, certain areas occupied by the Station Channel 4. Acting upon the request, respondent Executive
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant, and declaring the same open to disposition Secretary, by authority of the President, entered into with the ABS-CBN
under the provisions of Public Land. Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio Lopez,
The Marcelo Steel Corporation and/or the Maria Cristina Jr., an "Agreement to Arbitrate", 3 pursuant to which an Arbitration
Fertilizer Plant, through the President, Jose P. Marcelo filed in the Bureau Committee was created, composed of Atty. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., for the
of Lands a Miscellaneous Sales Application for tracts of lands for industrial Republic of the Philippines, Atty. Pastor del Rosario, for ABS-CBN, and
purposes. Director of Lands advised the public that the Bureau of Lands retired Justice Vicente Abad Santos, as Chairman.
will sell to the highest qualified bidder the tract of land covered by Thereupon, petitioners, as taxpayers, filed the instant
Miscellaneous Sales application. petition.

ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary has the power and authority to enter audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance
into an Agreement to Arbitrate. with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such
action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official
HELD: functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of
YES. Respondent Executive Secretary has the power and mal-administration; (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such
authority to enter into the Agreement to arbitrate with the ABS-CBN agencies but may not increase or add to them.
Broadcasting Corporation as he acted for and in behalf of the President
when he signed it.
Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Philippines (also known as the Freedom Constitution), which was in force ANG-ANGCO VS. CASTILLO
and effect when the "Agreement to Arbitrate" was signed by the parties 9 SCRA 619 [1963]
thereto on 6 January 1987, the President exercised both the legislative
and executive powers of the Government. As Chief Executive, the FACTS:
President was (and even now) "assisted by a Cabinet" composed of The Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade requested for special permit
Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and accountable to to withdraw Pepsi Cola concentrates from the customs house. Petitioner
the President. In other words, the Members of the cabinet, as heads of Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-angco advised the counsel for Pepsi-Cola
the various departments, are the assistants and agents of the Chief to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the No-dollar Import
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by Office. Aquiles Lopez of said office wrote petitioner, stating that it could
the Constitution or the law to act in person, or where the exigencies of the not take action on the request, as the same is not within the jurisdiction of
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and the Office. Following Secretary of Finance Hernandez’s approval of the
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and release, petitioner authorized release of the concentrates.
through the executive departments, and the acts of the heads of such When Customs Commissioner Manahan learned of said
departments, performed in the regular course of business, are, unless release, he ordered the seizure of the goods but only a portion thereof
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts remained in the warehouse. Thus, he filed an administrative suit against
of the Chief Executive. petitioner.
Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power After an investigation, respondent Executive Secretary
and authority to enter into the "Agreement to Arbitrate" with the ABS-CBN Natalio Castillo found petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in behalf of the President interest of the service and considering him resigned, with prejudice to
when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs. Petitioner wrote Pres. Garcia,
upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party thereto. asserting that the action taken by respondent had the effect of depriving
him of his statutory right to have his case originally decided by the CSC,
as well as of his right or appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals,
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT whose decision under RA 2260 is final. By authority of the President,
KILUSANG BAYAN VS. DOMINGUEZ respondent denied reconsideration, as well as the appeal. Hence, this
(205 SCRA 92, 1992) present petition.
FACTS: ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to make direct action on the
The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa entered into a case of petitioner even if he belongs to the classified service in spite of the
contract with the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Nagtitinda sa provision now in the Civil Service Act of 1959.
Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa (kilusan) for the latter's
management and operation of the Muntinlupa Public Market. When HELD:
Ignacio Bunye (petitioner in GR 91927) became Mayor of Muntinlupa, he The action taken by respondent executive Secretary, even
directed a review of such contract, claiming that the virtual, 50-year term with the authority of the President in taking direct action on the
agreement was contrary to Sec. 143 (3) of BP 337. He sought opinions administrative case, petitioner, without submitting the same to the
from the COA and the Metro Manila Commission after which the latter Commission of Civil Service is contrary to law and should be set aside.
granted the Municipality the authority to take the necessary legal steps for The following are the reasons:
the cancellation of the above contract. 1. Under sec 16 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
Consequently, upon the presentation made by Bunye with Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction
the Municipal Council, the latter approved Resolution No. 45 abrogating to decide administrative cases of all officers and employees in the
the contract. Bunye, together with men from the PC, proceeded to the classified service. The only limitation to this power is the decision of the
public market and announced to the general public that the Municipality Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil service Board of Appeals, in
was taking over the management and operation of the facility therein. The which case said Board shall decide the appeal within a period of 90 days
officers of the Kilusan filed suit for breach of contract and damages, and after the same has been submitted for decision, whose decision in such
continued holding office in the KB Building under their respective official cases shall be final. It is therefore clear that under the present provision of
capacities. the Civil Service act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes under the
Bunye, together with some heavily armed men, forcibly exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having
opened the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve them been deprived of the procedure and down therein in connection with the
the Order of then Sec. of Agriculture Carlos Dominguez, ordering 1) the investigation and disposition of this case, it may be said that he has been
take over by the Department of Agriculture of the management over the deprived of due process guaranteed by said law.
public market pursuant to the Department Regulatory and Supervisory 2. Let us now take up the power of control given to the
Power under Sec. 8 of PD 175 and Sec. 4 of EO No.3; 2) the creation of a President by the Constitution over all offices and employees in the
Management Committee which shall assume the management of Kilusan; executive department which is not invoked by respondents as justification
and 3) the disband, of the Board of Directors and 4) the turn over of all to override the specific provision of the Civil Service Act. The power
assets, properties and records to the Management Committee. Petitioners merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate
filed this petition praying that the Order to be declared null and void as the and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only means that the
respondent Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing President may set aside the judgment of action taken by the subordinate
the order. in the performance of duties.
3. Not the strongest argument against the theory of
ISSUE: W/N 28 October 1988 Order of respondent Secretary of respondents is that it would entirely nullify and set aside at naught the
Agriculture is without or in excess of jurisdiction? beneficent purpose of the whole Civil Service system as implanted in this
jurisdiction which is to give stability to the tenure of office of those who
HELD: belong to the classified service, in derogation of the provision of our
YES. P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM Constitution which provides the “No officer or employee in the civil service
explicitly mandate the manner by which directors and officers are to be shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.” The
removed. The Secretary should have known better than to disregard these power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate,
procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of the suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
KBMBPM and an on-going audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in department if they are presidential appointee or do not belong to the
exercising a power which he does not have, expressly or impliedly. classified service for to them that inherent power cannot be exercised.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are This is in line with the provision of our constitutional which says; “The
expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers in the
thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what President alone
may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution. in the courts or in the heads of department” and with regards to these
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act officers provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of
subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of 159.
acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of
plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and
programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations NATIONAL MARKET CORP. (NAMARCO) VS. ARCA
of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently (29 SCRA 648 [SEPTEMBER 30, 1969])
and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; (2)
require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management FACTS:

Respodent Arive was the Manager of the Traffic-Storage stationed in Mindoro. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro, Major
Department of the NAMARCO. Pursuant to the General Manager’s Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy,
Administrative Order, he was investigated by a committee for violating disbanded his company, and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as
Management Memorandum Order – declaring “that the allocation and Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area.
deliveries of merchansdise imported to its designated beneficiaries be During the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese
stopped” and causing the improper release of shipments intended for forces, the Bolo Area in Mindoro was a contingent of the 6th Military
delivery. District, which had been recognized by and placed under the operational
After due hearing, the investigating committee found Arive control of the US Army in the Southwest Pacific.
guilty of charges and he was dismissed. Arive appealed from the decision A change in the command in the Bolo Area was effected by
of the NAMARCO to the President. The NAMARCO was advised by the Col. Jurado, the then Commanding Officer of the Bolo Combat Team in
Office of the President of the appeal, and was asked to forward the Mindoro. Major Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as Commanding
records of the Administrative case. The Executive Secretary, presumably Officer of the Bolo Area. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners.
acting for the President, handed down a decision setting aside the After the commission of this crime, it is alleged that the petitioners
resolution of the board of directors and reinstating Arive. seceded from the 6th Military District. It was this murder which gave rise to
NAMARCO, through its General Manager, sought petitioner's trial, the legality of which is now being contested.
reconsideration, contended that the Office of the President had no A trial by the General Court Martial ensued and which
jurisdiction to review any decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors resulted to the acquittal of Ramon Ruffy and dismissal of the case as to
removing suspending or otherwise disciplining any of its subordinate Victoriano Dinglasan and the conviction of Jose Garcia, Prudente
employees, because RA 1345 (the NAMARCO Charter), which grants that Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus.
power to the General Manager and to the Board of Directors, does not The petitioners who were convicted filed suit before this
provide for an appeal to any governmental body. This motion for Court, assailing the constitutionality of 93rd Article of War. It ordains "that
reconsideration was denied twice by the Executive Secretary on the any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of war
ground that the President had jurisdiction under his constitutional power of should suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. direct" It is argued that since "no review is provided by that law to be made
The Office of the President, acting on complaints of Arive by the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life
that he had not been reinstated in spite of the denial of the NAMARCO's imprisonment or death" it violated Art. VIII See 2 par 4 of the Constitution.
two motions for reconsideration, sent a telegram to the General Manager It provides that "the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme
requesting him to act on the case and to comment within forty-eight hours; Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty
but the said General Manager neither acted on the case nor commented. imposed is death or life imprisonment.
Respondent Juan T. Arive filed against the NAMARCO and
the members of its Board of Directors an action for reinstatement. Judge ISSUE: Whether or not the 93rd of Article of War unconstitutional?
Arca ruled in his favor, ordering NAMARCO to reinstate Arive. Defendants’
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition. HELD:
NO. The petitioners are in error. This error arose from failure
ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT the preident has the power to review and to perceive the nature of courts martial and the sources of the authority for
reverse decisions of government corporations. their creation. Court Martial are agencies of executive character and one
of the authorities for ordering of court martial has been held to be attached
HELD: to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief,
YES. The Court hold that the President of the Philippines' independently of legislation.
authority to review and reverse the decision of the NAMARCO Board of Unlike court of law, they are not a portion of judiciary. They
Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive from his position in the NAMARCO and are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
to order his reinstatement falls within the constitutional power of the Congress for the President as Commander in chief to aid him in properly
President over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Under our commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein and
governmental setup, corporations owned or controlled by the government, utilized under his order Or those of his authorized military representatives.
such as the NAMARCO, partake of the nature of government bureaus or The petition is therefore has no merit and that it should be
offices, which are administratively supervised by the Administrator of the dismissed with costs.
Office of Economic Coordination, "whose compensation and rank shall be
that of a head of an Executive Department" and who "shall be responsible ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
to the President of the Philippines under whose control his functions . . . OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34
shall be exercised." (150 SCRA 144, 1987)
FACTS:
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT The petitioners were charged for subversion.
GUAZON VS. DE VILLA The respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP created the
(181 SCRA 623, 1990) respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try the criminal case filed
against the petitioners. An amended charge sheet was filed for seven
FACTS: offenses, namely: (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3)
prohibit the military and police officers represented by public respondents conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco
from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo
Manila. Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6)
The petitioners complains that police and military units attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and
without any search warrant or warrant of arrest goes to an area of more Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal
than one residence and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. Sometime thereafter, trial
in Metro Manila to search for evidence of offenses that may have been ensued.
committed. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a In the course of the proceedings the petitioners went to this
common pattern of human rights abuses. Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.
Solicitor General argues just the contrary, that it had been They sought to enjoin the respondent Military Commission No. 34 from
conducted with due regard to human rights. proceeding with the trial of their case. They likewise sought their release
from detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of their
ISSUE: W/N the President has the power to order saturation drives. arguments is that military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians
for offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial
HELD: law.
YES. There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which
denies the authority of the Chief Executive, invoked by the Solicitor ISSUE: W/N military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for
General, to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law.
lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. The Constitution grants to
Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which HELD:
would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where Military commission has no jurisdiction to try civilians when
individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of the civil courts are open.
security of the State. However, all police actions are governed by the Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions
limitations of the Bill of Rights. (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the
accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial contemplated
by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process.
RAMON RUFFY VS. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are
(G.R. NO. L-533, AUGUST 20, 1946) not courts within the Philippine judicial system.
TUASON J.
FACTS: ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
It appears that at the outbreak of war in 1941, Ramon Ruffy QUILONA VS. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL
was the Provincial Commander, Prudente M. Francisco, a junior officer, (206 SCRA 821, 1992)
and Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the Philippine Constabulary garrison

FACTS: be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under
The petitioner is a policemen assigned at the WPD. He was Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial
charged with murder before the respondent general court martial. act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon
At the scheduled arraignment on December 15, 1990, under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to
petitioner's counsel manifested to the General I Court Martial his client's proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no
desire to be arraigned and to be tried instead by a civilian court. judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much
Arraignment was reset. less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict
At the next arraignment on December 21, 1990, petitioner may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
filed a motion asking that the court mal1ial inhibit itself front pursuing the Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the
arraignment of the accused and to have his case investigated by the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
civilian prosecutor or at least tried by a civilian court. choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not
Although set or oral argument of January 3, 1991, subject to judicial scrutiny.
respondent court decided to have the motion argued on the day it was
filed. The motion was denied, the same with the motion for
reconsideration. ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Petitioner refused to enter a plea and said that he would MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN, JR.
elevate the case to the SC. Nevertheless, a plea of not guilty was entered (170 SCRA 190, 1989)
upon court order.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition. FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Monsanto and
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court martial acted with grave abuse of three accused of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
discretion. documents.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court
HELD: which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for
YES the respondent court martial acted with grave abuse of reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with then Presiden Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted.
the arraignment of the petitioner. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City
Republic Act No. 6975, 10 creating the Philippine National Treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant
Police (PNP), which took effect on 1 January 1991, provides: "SEC. 46. city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. Any provision of law to the contrary Petitioner’s letter-request was referred to the Ministry of
notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within Finance for resolution. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be
the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: x x x. Provided, further, reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not
that criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also
arraigned upon the effectivity of this it shall be transferred to the proper directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which
city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge." the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor of the
Although Republic Act No. 6975 was not yet in effect when government.
petitioner was arraigned on 28 December 1990, nevertheless, respondent Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner
court martial knew or should have known that the said Act had already wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has
been signed or approved by the President on 13 December 1990 and that wiped put the crime which implies that her service in the government has
the same was published in two (2) national newspapers of general never been interrupted and therefore the date of reinstatement should
circulation on 17 December 1990 and that it would take effect on 1 correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to
January 1991. It is precisely for this reason that respondent court martial backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not
decided to have the petitioner's motion to inhibit argued on 28 December be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4892.50.
1990 and thereafter arraigned the petitioner on the same day despite his The Ministry of Finance referred petitioner’s letter to the
vehement refusal to enter a plea. Office of the President for further review and action.
Clearly, under the circumstances obtaining in the present The respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran
case, respondent court martial acted with grave abuse of discretion denied the petitioner’s request and holds that Monsanto is not entitled to
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted
arraignment of the petitioner. her, but must secure an appointment to her former position and that she is
liable for the civil liability to her previous conviction.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT denied, hence this petition.
TORRES VS. GONZALES
(152 SCRA 272, 1987) ISSUE: W/N a public officer who had been granted an absolute pardon by
the Chief Executive is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
FACTS: without need of a new appointment.
Petitioner was convicted by the trial court of the crime of
estafa and was sentenced to prison term. Petitioner was later granted a HELD:
conditional pardon on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any NO. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to
of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he have abandoned her appeal and her conviction by the Sandiganbayan
will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner and has assumed the character of finality.
accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from The essence of pardon is the remission of guilt. Thus pardon
confinement. implies guilt. Pardon does not ipso facto reinstate a convicted felon to
The Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction. It should be
recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon noted that public office is intended primarily for collective protection, safety
granted to the petitioner. The evidence before the Board showed that on and benefit of the common good. Thus, it cannot be compromised to favor
22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with private interests. A pardon does not virtually acquit the accused of the
twenty counts of estafa, which cases were then pending trial before the offense charged.
Regional Trial Court of Rizal. The record also showed that petitioner had But the pardon restores the petitioner eligibility for
been convicted by the trial court of the crime of sedition: this conviction appointment to the said office. Thus, to regain her former post, she must
was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the
Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending
cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner. ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Thereafter, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the PEOPLE VS. SALLE
petitioner. (250 SCRA 581, 1995)
Respondent Minister issued "by authority of the President"
an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner FACTS:
was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the Accused-appellants Francisco Salle, Jr. and Rickey Mengote
unexpired portion of his sentence. were found guilty beyond reasonable, doubt as co-principals of the
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest compound crime of murder and destructive arson. Appellants seasonably
and Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional filed their notice of appeal. However, Salle filed an urgent motion to
pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the estafa withdraw his appeal in view of his acceptance of the grant of conditional
nor of the crime of sedition. pardon by the President. Mengote was also granted a conditional pardon
and was released from confinement, but the latter did not file a motion to
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is withdraw his appeal.
necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted The court granted Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and
for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon. his case is considered closed and terminated, insofar as he is concerned.
Mengote, on the other hand, has not filed any motion to withdraw his
HELD: appeal.
It depends.
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a ISSUE:
condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may W/N appeal of the case must be withdrawn for the effectivity of a pardon

granted. appeal, the appellate court modified the decision by eliminating the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-half
HELD: of the amount being involved.
YES. The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Finally, petitioner was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by
Section 19 of Art.VII of the present constitution prohibits the grant of the President, restoring him to 'full civil and political rights.' With this
pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pending of instrument on hand, petitioner applied for reinstatement to the government
his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefore, service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere classroom
if one is made, should no be acted upon or the process towards its grant teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Principal I.
should no begun unless the appeal is withdrawn or the conviction is final. Petitioner now prays to this Court for the following relief:
A judgment of conviction become final (a) when no appeal is 1. (that he be) Reinstated to his former position as
seasonably perfected" (b) when the accuse commences to serve the Elementary School Principal I;
sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, 2. His government services be made continuous since
except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) September 10, 1948 which is his original appointment until the present
then the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. time;
Thus, where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not 3. (that he be) Given his back salaries corresponding to the
yet therefore attained finality as in the case of Mengote, executive period from September 1, 1971 to November 23,1982;
clemency may not be granted to appellant 4. That all his service credits duly earned be restored;
The reason is that, the doctrine of separation of powers of 5. And, that all other rights and privileges not mentioned
demands that such exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully herein shall also be granted.
respected and kept unimpaired. The Solicitor General comments that there is no justiciable
controversy in this case because the issue involved is whether or not
petitioner merits reappointment to the position he held prior to his
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT conviction.
GARCIA VS. COA
(226 SCRA 356, 1993) ISSUE: Is there a justifiable controversy in this case where the petitioner
sought his reinstatement to his former position after given a pardon by the
FACTS: President?
Petitioner Vicente Garcia was a supervising lineman of the
Bureau of Telecommunication in Lucena City before he was summarily HELD:
dismissed on April I, 1975 on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with Yes. There is here a justiciable controversy. Petitioner
the decision of the Ministry of Public Works in Administrative Case No. claims he must be restored to the same position he was in before he was
975 for the loss of several telegraphs poles. Petitioner did not appeal the convicted on a mere technical error and for which he was given an
decision. absolute pardon.
Based on the same facts, a criminal case for qualified theft This is not a hypothetical or abstract dispute. It is not
was filed against petitioner, which was resolved acquitting petitioner. In academic or moot for, to our mind, there is a definite and concrete
view of his acquittal Garcia sought reinstatement to his former position controversy touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
which was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications. Petitioner relations. This is a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency which relief through a court decree that is conclusive in character. The case
was granted. does not call for a mere opinion or advise, but for affirmative relief.
Thereafter, Garcia filed with the respondent COA a claim for This Court held that the absolute disqualification from office
payment of back salaries effective April 1975. This was denied by COA on or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed
the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all the
the payment of back salaries and that he had not been reinstated in the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights.
service. Petitioner then appealed the COA decision to the Office of the Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not
President. Based on the recommendation of the Deputy Secretary entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment
Factoran, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari. to said office.
However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is entitled to payment of back wages after having from September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982 for he is not entitled to
been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency. automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully separated from the
government service upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his
HELD: reinstatement had been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to
YES. Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government backwages. Such right is afforded only to those who have been illegally
service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise
petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what acquitted of the charge against them.
he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. To rule In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his
otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive clemency, i.e., government service be made continuous from September 10, 1948 to the
to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded present when it is not. At any rate when he reaches the compulsory age of
to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered retirement, he shall get the appropriate retirement benefits as an
reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. Elementary School Principal I and not as a mere classroom teacher.
There is no doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations
aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.
The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision LLAMAS VS. ORBOS
which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the (202 SCRA 844, 1991)
service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself
exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing FACTS:
his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. Petitioner Rodolfo Llamas is the incumbent Vice Governor of
This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his the Province of Tarlac. He assumed the position by virtue of a decision of
former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the the office of the President, the governorship. Private respondent Mariano
issuance of the clemency. Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was
suspended from office for a period of 90 days due to a verified complaint
filed by petitioner against respondent Governor before the Department of
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Local Government charging him with the alleged violation of the Local
ISABELO T. SABELLO, VS. DECS Government Code and the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Law. Public
(G.R. NO. 87687, DECEMBER 26, 1989) respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of the
filing of this petition and is being impleaded herein in that official capacity
GANCAYCO, J. for having issued, by authority of the President, the assailed Resolution
FACTS: granting executive clemency to respondent governor.
Petitioner, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant
and also the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of executive clemency only in criminal cases based on Art. VII, Sec. 19 of the
the Division of Gingoog City. The barangay high school was in deficit at Constitution. According to the petitioner, the qualifying phrase "after
that time. Since at that time also, the President of the Philippines who was conviction by final judgment applies solely to criminal cases and no other
earnestly campaigning was giving aid in the amount of P2,000.00 for each law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has
barrio, the barrio council through proper resolutions allotted the amount of been convicted in an administrative case."
P840.00 to cover up for the salaries of the high school teachers, with the
honest thought in mind that the barrio high school was a barrio project and ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to
as such therefore, was entitled to its share of the RICD fund in question. grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
The only part that the petitioner played was his being authorized by the
said barrio council to withdraw the above amount and which was HELD:
subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the name of the YES. The President has the power to grant executive
Talisay Barrio High School. clemency in administrative case because the Constitution does not
Thus, petitioner, together with the barrio captain, were distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by
charged with the violation of RA 3019, and both were convicted. On the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. SC also

held that there are no valid and convincing reasons why the President we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
less serious than criminal offense. political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. EASTERN SEA TRADING Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
3 SCRA 351[1961] settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
FACTS: abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
The respondent was the consignee of several shipments of of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
onion and garlic. Since none of the shipments had the required certificate Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the
by the Central Bank Circular Nos. 44 and 45 for the release of goods thus House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission
imported were seized and subjected to forfeiture proceedings. The on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
Collector of Customs of Manila having been in the meantime released to the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such
the consignees on surety bonds directed the same and its surety that the changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or
amount of the bonds be paid, jointly and severally to the Bureau of factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
Customs. The Consignee thereafter sought a review with the Court of Tax disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
Appeal which reversed the decision and ordered that the bond be another.
withdrawn and cancelled. Hence, the present petition. The instant petition is therefore dismissed.
The petition is based upon the facts that insofar as the
license and a certificate authorizing the importation release of the goods ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
under the consideration are required by the Central Bank Circulars Nos. MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
44 and 45, the latter are null and void and the seizure and the forfeiture of (G.R. NOS. 86540-41, NOVEMBER 6, 1989)
the goods imported from Japan cannot implement an executive
agreement-extending the effectivity of our Trade and Financial agreement GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
with Japan-which is dubious validity, because there is no government FACTS:
agency authorized to issue the import license required by the The President in the exercise of her legislative power under
aforementioned executive order. the Freedom Constitution issued Proclamation No. 5O-A prohibiting the
courts from issuing restraining orders and writ of injunction against Asset
ISSUE: Whether the executive agreement is valid even without the 2/3 Privatization Trust (APT) and the purchases of any assets sold by it, to
concurrence of the Senate. prevent courts from interfering in the discharge, by this instrumentality of
the executive branch of government, of its task of carrying out the
HELD: expeditious dispositions and privatization of certain government
YES. The concurrence of the House of Congress is required corporations and or the assets thereof. The enforcement of such
by our fundamental law in the making of treaties which are however Proclamation was questioned by the petitioner arguing that the Court was
distinct and different from executive agreements which may validly deprived of its jurisdiction to hear the cases involved therein.
entered into without such occurrence.
The validity of the executive agreement in question is thus ISSUE: Whether Proclamation No. 50-A impair the inherent power of
present. In fact, the so-called parity right provided for in the ordinance courts as defined in See I Art VIII of the Constitution.
appended to our Constitution were prior thereto, the subject of an
executive agreement, made without the concurrence of2/3s of the Senate HELD:
of the United States. No. Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe
any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of
courts "to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
DAZA VS. SINGSON abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
(G.R. NO. 86344, DECEMBER 21, 1989) of any branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction
CRUZ, J.: of the various courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may not
FACTS: deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
After the May 11, 1987 congressional elections, the House Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987
of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the COA Constitution).
among the several political parties represented in that chamber. Petitioner While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the
Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative truth is that under the system of separation of powers set up in the
of the Liberal Party. Constitution, the power of the courts over the other branches and
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to the determination of
resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion (by them)
Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned and joined the amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the exercise of their
LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing authority and in the performance of their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII,
their former party to only 17 members. 1987 Constitution).
On the basis of this development, the House of Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT,
Representatives revised its representation in the COA by withdrawing the nor block, by any injunction, the discharge of its function and the
seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. implementation of its decision in connection with the acquisition, sale or
The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the disposition of assets transferred to it. There can be no justification for
original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency except
Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. when it violated a citizen's rights, or commit a grave abuse of discretion, or
Petitioner came to this Court to challenge his removal from acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.
the COA and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Respondent
counters that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and
so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
ISSUE: Does the instant case fall on the jurisdiction of the Court? 97 PH1LS 806 [1955]
HELD: FACTS:
Yes. Contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court has The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No.
the competence to act on the matter at bar. What is before us is not a 2706 as amended, be declared unconstitutional. This act is entitled "An
discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be Act Making the Inspection and Recognition of Private Schools and
reviewed by the Court because it is political in nature. What is involved Colleges Obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction."
here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing Petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and
the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring
question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any
Cuenco. law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such
... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship, a practice
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other abhorrent to our system of laws and government. Petitioners, obviously
words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to refer Sec. 3e of the Act which provides that before a private school maybe
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or Education.
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues The Solicitor General on the other hand pints out that none
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. of petitioners has caused to present this issue because all of them have
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we And they do not assert the Secretary has threatened to revoke their
were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, permits.

broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use
ISSUE: Whether there exists an actual case or controversy. of candidates for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioner claims
that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
HELD: COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the
There is no actual case or controversy. Mere apprehension 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be
that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw permit of required to do so again this year. Petitioner's
one the petitioners does not constitute a judicial controversy. allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is required to provide
"Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon free air time is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of §92.
the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation."
"The power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional
arises only when the interest of litigants the use of that judicial authority for ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being LEGASPI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
insufficient". G.R. NO. L-72119. MAY 29, 1987
An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to
obtain actual and positive relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere CORTES, J.
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however, FACTS:
intellectually solid the problem maybe. This is The fundamental right of the people to information on
especially true when the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for them matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for
comes into play regard for the courts duty to avoid decision of mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil
constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion. Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's
request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
JOYA VS. PCGG government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had
225 SCRA 586, 1993 allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the
civil service examinations for sanitarians.
FACTS: Solicitor General challenges the petitioner's standing to sue
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be
ordered the sale at public auction of paintings by old masters and informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees
silverware alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of President Marcos, his relatives concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to
and cronies. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition to stop show his “actual interest” in securing this particular information. He further
the auction from proceeding. argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to
furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are the proper party to file the
instant case.
ISSUES:
HELD: 1. Whether or not petitioner possesses the legal standing to bring the
No. Petitioners failed to show ownership of the artworks, present suit.
they are not proper parties to enjoin the PCGG form proceeding with the 2. Whether or not the information sought by the petitioner is within the
auction sale. They do not stand to be injured by the action of the PCGG. ambit of the constitutional guarantee of the right of the people to
The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the information on matters of public concern.
case is brought before it by a prty who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. “Legal standing” means a personal and HELD:
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will 1. YES. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
challenged. the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT possesses the right.
TELEBAP VS. COMELEC The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with
289 SCRA 337, 1998 personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of
the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the
FACTS: present suit.
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and television 2. YES. Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution reads: The right of the
broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
franchise granted by Congress. Petitioners assail the validity of Section 92 data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
of B.P. Blg. No. 881 against claims that the requirement that radio and subject to such stations as may be provided by law.
television time be given free takes property without due process of law; But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of
that it violates the eminent domain clause of the Constitution which public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all
provides for the payment of just compensation; that it denies broadcast information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers,
media the equal protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it violates etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7,
the terms of the franchise of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought
is of public interest or public concern. But then, it is not enough that the
HELD: information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given
Petitioner TELEBAP is without legal standing. In cases in case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law
which citizens were authorized to sue, this Court upheld their standing in from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
view of the "transcendental importance" of the constitutional question The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public
raised which justified the granting of relief. In contrast, in the case at bar, concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon
as will presently be shown, petitioners' substantive claim is without merit. access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
To the extent, therefore, that a party's standing is determined by the the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of
substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus,
TELEBAP must be held to be without standing. Indeed, a citizen will be therefore lies.
allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the open its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas,
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by
favorable action. Members of petitioner have not shown that they have the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
suffered harm as a result of the operation of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. Nor do
members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest as registered voters
since this case does not concern their right of suffrage. Their interest in ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
§92 of B.P. Blg. 881 should be precisely in upholding its validity. Much DUMLAO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not G.R. NO. L-52245. JANUARY 22, 1980
involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party
suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that FACTS:
he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the Petitioners question the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
questioned statute. Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection
The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition
operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution
by the enforcement of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are

hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective FACTS:
officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction,
provincial, city or municipal official, who has received with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of
under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in
be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective connection with the on- line lottery system, also known as "lotto."
local office from which he has retired. Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO decided to
2) "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its
before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. The Office of the
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact". President approved the award of the contract to, and entered into the so-
called "Contract Of Lease" with, respondent PGMC for the installation,
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 4, BP Blg. 52 is establishment and operation of the on-line lottery and telecommunication
valid. systems required and/or authorized under the said contract.
2. Whether or not the second paragraph of Section 4, BP Petitioners, question the legality and validity of the Contract
Blg. 52 is valid. of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries
HELD: "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
1. YES. Retirement from government service may or may not be a company or entity, whether domestic or foreign."
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there The petitioners also point out that paragraph 10 of the
can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a
may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and
retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a cities in the territory. However, PGMC cannot do that because it has no
retiree. franchise from Congress to construct, install, establish, or operate the
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended. Moreover,
has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot,
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, therefore, be granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section 11,
as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which requires that for a corporation to
assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is operate a public utility, at least 60% of its capital must be owned by
present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee Filipino citizens. Furthermore, since "the subscribed foreign capital" of the
has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same PGMC "comes to about 75%, as shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles
government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like of Incorporation," it cannot lawfully enter into the contract in question
to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result because all forms of gambling — and lottery is one of them — are
from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the
does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign
People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are capital is allowed.
similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause ISSUES:
does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification 1. Whether or not petitioners have the Locus standi to file the petition at
which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not bench. 2. Whether or not the challenged Contract of
violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, Lease violates or contravenes the exception in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169,
where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and
to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with"
30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. another.
Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336
[1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The HELD:
purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local 1. YES. In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary
governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute
susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws,
(Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or
547). instrumentalities.
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental
2. NO. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel aforecited cases.
(Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso 2.YES. A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate and a consideration of the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and
is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It lease under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a
condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the piece of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts association , in the least, or joint venture , at the most, exists between the
of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, contracting parties.
as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person The only contribution the PCSO would have is its franchise
disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been or authority to operate the on-line lottery system; with the rest, including
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person the risks of the business, being borne by the proponent or bidder PGMC
already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with (which represents and warrants that it has access to “all managerial and
it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the technical expertise” to promptly and effectively carry out the terms of the
term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code). contract..
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima Certain provisions of the contract confirm the indispensable
facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and role of the PGMC in the pursuit, operation, conduct, and management of
present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time the On-Line Lottery System. They exhibit and demonstrate the parties'
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering indivisible community of interest in the conception, birth and growth of the
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. on-line lottery, and, above all, in its profits, with each having a right in the
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of formulation and implementation of policies related to the business and
disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative sharing, as well, in the losses — with the PGMC bearing the greatest
body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings burden because of its assumption of expenses and risks, and the PCSO
between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person the least, because of its confessed unwillingness to bear expenses and
charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative risks. In a manner of speaking, each is wed to the other for better or for
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial worse. In the final analysis, however, in the light of the PCSO's RFP and
determination. the above highlighted provisions, as well as the "Hold Harmless Clause" of
Wherefore, paragraph 1 being consistent with the equal the Contract of Lease, it is even safe to conclude that the actual lessor in
protection clause is declared valid; while paragraph 2 is declared null and this case is the PCSO and the subject matter thereof is its franchise to
void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence hold and conduct lotteries since it is, in reality, the PGMC which operates
guaranteed to an accused. and manages the on-line lottery system for a period of eight years. (In
effect, the PCSO leased out its franchise to PGMC which actually
operated and managed the same.)
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and
KILOSBAYAN VS. GUINGONA, JR. the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby DECLARED contrary to law
G.R. NO. 113375, 5 MAY 1994 and invalid.
DAVIDE, JR., J.

Note: The separate opinions of Justices focused on the issue of Locus
standi of herein petitioners, in relation to the four (4) requirements that ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
must be satisfied before one can come to court to litigate a constitutional TATAD VS GARCIA, JR
issue, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the (GR NO. 114222, APRIL 6,1995)
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; QUIASON, J.
and (4) the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to FACTS:
the determination of the case itself. The DOTC planned to construct the EDSA LRT III. RA 6957
The Court did not resolve the issue on whether or not the was enacted, providing for two schemes for the financing, construction
Contract of Lease is in violation of section 11, Article XII of the and operation of government projects through private initiative and
Constitution. However, in the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Puno, investment: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) or Build-Transfer (BT).
he explained that: “For even assuming arguendo that PGMC is a public The notice, advertising the prequalification of bidders, was
utility, still, the records do not at the moment bear out the claim of thereafter published. Five groups responded to the invitation namely, ABB
petitioners that PGMC is a foreign owned and controlled corporation. This Trazione of Italy, Hopewell Holdings Ltd. of Hongkong, Mansteel
factual issue remains unsettled and is still the subject of litigation by the International of Mandaue, Cebu, Mitsui & Co., Ltd. of Japan, and EDSA
parties in the Securities and Exchange Commission”. LRT Consortium.
After evaluating the prequalification bids, the PBAC declared
that only the EDSA LRT Consortium "met the requirements of garnering at
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT least 21 points per criteria, except for Legal Aspects, and obtaining an
PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ over-all passing mark of at least 82 points".
(GR. NO. 113105 AUGUST 19, 1994) The EDSA LRT Consortium submitted its bid proposal to
DOTC. Finding this proposal to be in compliance with the bid
QUIASON, J.: requirements, DOTC and respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., in
FACTS: substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium, entered into an "Agreement to
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" under the
(GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on terms of the BOT Law. Secretary Prado, thereafter, requested presidential
December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on approval of the contract.
certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon, Orbos’ replacement,
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to informed Secretary Prado that the President could not grant the requested
propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to approval for the following reasons: (1) that DOTC failed to conduct actual
realign their respective operating budgets. public bidding in compliance with Section 5 of the BOT Law; (2) that the
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of law authorized public bidding as the only mode to award BOT projects,
bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to and the prequalification proceedings was not the public bidding
the President for consideration and approval. On December 30, 1993, the contemplated under the law; (3) that Item 14 of the Implementing Rules
President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become and Regulations of the BOT Law which authorized negotiated award of
Republic Act No. 7663. On the same day, the President delivered his contract in addition to public bidding was of doubtful legality; and (4) that
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed congressional approval of the list of priority projects under the BOT or BT
and on which he imposed certain conditions. Scheme provided in the law had not yet been granted at the time the
Sixteen members of the Senate led by Senate President contract was awarded. In view of the comments of Executive Secretary
Edgardo J. Angara, Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, the Chairman of the Drilon, the DOTC and private respondents re-negotiated the agreement.
Committee on Finance, and Senator Raul S. Roco, sought the issuance of The parties entered into a "Revised and Restated
the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Executive Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for
Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, EDSA" inasmuch as "the parties [are] cognizant of the fact the DOTC has
and the National Treasurer. Suing as members of the Senate and full authority to sign the Agreement without need of approval by the
taxpayers, petitioners question: (1) the constitutionality of the conditions President pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 380 and that
imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the certain events [had] supervened since November 7, 1991 which
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) necessitate[d] the revision of the Agreement". The DOTC, represented by
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Secretary Jesus Garcia vice Secretary Prado, and private respondent
Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges entered into a "Supplemental Agreement to the 22 April 1992 Revised and
(SUC's); and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit
the appropriation for debt service. System for EDSA" so as to "clarify their respective rights and
The Solicitor General claimed that the remedy of the responsibilities" and to submit [the] Supplemental Agreement to the
Senators is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they President, of the Philippines for his approval". Secretary Garcia submitted
do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits. to President Ramos the two agreements, which were approved. According
to the agreements, the EDSA LRT III will use light rail vehicles from the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republics and will have a maximum carrying
ISSUE: Do petitioner-senators have legal standing to assail the capacity of 450,000 passengers a day, or 150M a year to be achieved-
constitutionality of conditions imposed by the President in the items of the through 54 such vehicles operating simultaneously. The EDSA LRT III will
GAA of 1994? run at grade, or street level, on the mid-section of EDSA for a distance of
17.8 kilometers from F.B. Harrison, Pasay City to North Avenue, Quezon
HELD: City. The system will have its own power facility. It will also have 13
YES a member of the Senate, and of the House of passenger stations and one depot in 16-hectare government property at
Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question the North Avenue. Private respondents shall undertake and finance the entire
validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an project required for a complete operational light rail transit system. Target
appropriation bill. Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or completion date is 1,080 days or approximately three years from the
in excess of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the implementation date of the contract inclusive of mobilization, site works,
issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the initial and final testing of the system. Upon full or partial completion and
Legislature arises. To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so viability thereof, private respondent shall deliver the use and possession of
is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to the completed portion to DOTC which shall operate the same. DOTC shall
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution pay private respondent rentals on a monthly basis through an Irrevocable
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Letter of Credit. The rentals shall be determined by an independent and
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which internationally accredited inspection firm to be appointed by the parties. As
can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any agreed upon, private respondent's capital shall be recovered from the
member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. rentals to be paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come from the
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus earnings of the EDSA LRT III. After 25 years and DOTC shall have
Curiae, noted: completed payment of the rentals, ownership of the project shall be
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or transferred to the latter for a consideration of only U.S. $1.00.
individual Senators as such having a substantial interest in the question at R.A. No. 7718, an "Act Amending Certain Sections of
issue. It could likewise be said that there was the requisite injury to their Republic Act No. 6957, Entitled "An Act Authorizing the Financing,
rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi issue. Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the
Any intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Private Sector, and for Other Purposes" was signed into law by the
Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that President. The law expressly recognizes BLT scheme and allows direct
could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the negotiation of BLT contracts.
corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges ISSUES:
vested by the Constitution in his office (1) Whether or not petitioners’ as taxpayers have the legal standing to
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for institute the action.
overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available (2) Whether or not EDSA LRT Corp, a foreign corporation own EDSA LRT
only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political III, a public utility.
considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the
latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line HELD:
where the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of legislative (1) YES. The petitioners have the legal standing to institute the action.
jurisdiction begin.

Respondents claimed that petitioners had no legal standing adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
to initiate the instant action. Petitioners, however, countered that the On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs
action was filed by them in their capacity as Senators and as taxpayers. prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants,
taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties. The foregoing
government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question.
the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994]) and to Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA. 240 involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated
[1989]). and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action. executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
(2) The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the

operation of a public utility. However, it does not require a franchise before
one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
does not operate them to serve the public. KILOSBAYAN, INC VS MORATO
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently (GR NO 118910, JULY 17,1995)
and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own
said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one MENDOZA,J.
may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the FACTS:
public. The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan,
owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the
owner thereof. Contract of Lease between the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming
While private respondent is the owner of the facilities Management Corp. (PGMC) on the ground that it had been made in
necessary to operate the EDSA. LRT III, it admits that it is not violation of PSCO’s charter, the parties entered into negotiations for a new
enfranchised to operate a public utility. agreement.
In sum, private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles The parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
and collect fees from the riding public. It will have no dealings with the whereby the PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to
public and the public will have no right to demand any services from it. the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3% of the gross
amount of ticket sales derived by the PCSO from the operation of the
lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT P35,000.00 per terminal in commercial operation. The rental is to be
OPOSA VS FACTORAN, JR computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly rentals in any
(GR NO 101083, JULY 30,1993) year fall short of the annual minimum fixed rental thus computed, the
PCSO agrees to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket
DAVIDE, JR., J. sales.
FACTS: Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of
Petitioners instituted a taxpayers’ class suit against the tickets is allotted to charity. The term of the lease is 8 years, commencing
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then DENR Secretary, alleging that from the start of commercial operation of the lottery equipment first
as citizens and taxpayers of the Republic of the Philippines, they are delivered to the lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule.
“entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ its own
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." personnel. It is responsible for the loss of, or damage to, the equipment
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the arising from any cause and for the cost of their maintenance and repair.
Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of 30M hectares Upon the expiration of the lease, the PCSO has the option to purchase the
and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, equipment for the sum of P25M. A copy of the ELA was submitted to the
rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these Court by the PGMC in accordance with its manifestation in the prior case.
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is This suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in
which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; the first case.
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a legal right which has been
a ratio of 54% for forest cover and 46% for agricultural, residential, violated.
industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of
this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of HELD:
environmental tragedies. In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action,
Factoran moved to Dismiss the complaint based on two the real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with
(2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not
Respondent granted the motion. Hence, the instant petition. intervene in it, or who claim a right to take part in a public bidding but have
been illegally excluded from it.
ISSUES: These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action against the distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate,
respondent; and or consequential interest. . . . The phrase 'present substantial interest'
(2) Whether or not the issue raised is a political question which properly more concretely is meant such interest of a party in the subject matter of
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the
evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the
HELD: defendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by him.
(1) Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well But petitioners do not have such present substantial interest
as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. Denying to them the
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the the execution of government contracts. Questions as to the nature or
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and may be made can be raised in an appropriate case before the
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. The Constitution
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created requires that the Ombudsman and his deputies, "as protectors of the
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter people shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and against public officials or employees of the government, or any
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof including government-
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their owned or controlled corporations." (Art. XI, §12) In addition, the Solicitor
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the General is authorized to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be
present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation thought that a government corporation, like the PCSO, has offended
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for against its corporate charter or misused its franchise.
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
the protection of that right for the generations to come. BENGZON VS DRILON
(GR NO 103524, APRIL 15,1992)
(2) After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be FACTS:

RA 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand
Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.
rendered at least 20 years service either in the Judiciary or in any other
branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of 70 years
or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. (GR. NO. 118509 September 5, 1996)
Identical retirement benefits were also given to the members FRANCISCO, J.:
of the Constitutional Commissions under RA. 1568, as amended by RA FACTS:
3595. Subsequently, President Marcos signed PD 578 which extended Involved in the instant case is the Motion of petitioner
similar retirement benefits to the members of the Armed Forces giving Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc., for reconsideration of the Court's resolution of
them also the automatic readjustment features of RA 1797 and RA 3595. March 29, 1996, which set aside the Court's December 1, 1995 decision
However, PD 644 was issued, repealing Section 3-A of RA 1797 and RA and affirmed in toto the Court of Appeals' decision dated August 12, 1994.
3595 (amending RA 1568 and PD 578) which authorized the adjustment It is argued, albeit erroneously, that the case should be
of the pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of referred to the Court En Banc as the doctrines laid down in Abrenica v.
Appeals, Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and Gonda and De Garcia, 34 Phil. 739, Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba, 43 SCRA
the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing 473, and Villonco Realty Co. v. Bormaheco, Inc., et al., 65 SCRA 352,
rates of salaries. have been modified or reversed. A more circumspect analysis of these
Significantly, under PD 1638 the automatic readjustment of cases vis-a-vis the case at bench would inevitably lead petitioner to the
the retirement pension of officers and enlisted men was subsequently conclusion that there was neither reversal nor modification of the doctrines
restored by President Marcos. A later decree PD 1909 was also issued laid down in the Abrenica, Talosig and Villonco cases.
providing for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of What petitioner bewails the most is the present composition
the Armed Forces who have retired prior to September 10, 1979. of the Third Division which deliberated on private respondents' motions for
While the adjustment of the retirement pensions for reconsideration and by a majority vote reversed the unanimous decision of
members of the Armed Forces who number in the tens of thousands was December 1, 1995. More specifically, petitioner questions the assumption
restored, that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of of Chief Justice Narvasa of the chairmanship of the Third Division and
Appeals who are only a handful and fairly advanced in years, was not. arrogantly rams its idea on how each Division should be chaired, i.e., the
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the First Division should have been chaired by Chief Justice Narvasa, the
members of the Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions, Congress Second Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior Justice, and the
approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of Third Division by Mr. Justice Regalado, the third in line.
RA 1797 and RA 3595. Congress was under the impression that PD 644
became law after it was published in the Official Gazette on April 7, 1977. ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of petitioner as to the composition
In the explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill No. 740, of the third division meritorious.
the legislature saw the need to reenact RA 1797 and 3595 to restore said
retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and members of HELD:
the Constitutional Commissions, in order to assure those serving in the NO. We need only to stress that the change in the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional Commissions membership of the three divisions of the Court was inevitable by reason of
adequate old age pensions even during the time when the purchasing Mr. Justice Feliciano's retirement. Such reorganization is purely an internal
power of the peso has been diminished substantially by worldwide matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business at all. In
recession or inflation. President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. fact, the current "staggered" set-up in the chairmanships of the Divisions is
16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that according to her "it would similar to that adopted in 1988. In that year, the Court's Third Division was
erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere likewise chaired by then Chief Justice Fernan, while the First and Second
faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization of Divisions were headed by the next senior Justices — Justices Narvasa
compensation as articulated in RA 6758 known as Compensation and and Melencio-Herrera, respectively.
Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said that "the Government Suffice it to say that the Court with its new membership is
should not grant distinct privileges to select group of officials whose not obliged to follow blindly a decision upholding a party's case when, after
retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential its re-examination, the same calls for a rectification. "Indeed", said the
treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service servants." Court in Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, et al., 250 SCRA 130, 136, "a change
Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court of in the composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an
Appeals Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes, erroneous decision".
Jr. and Guardson R. Lood filed a letter/petition asking this Court far a
readjustment of their monthly pensions in accordance with RA. 1797. They
reasoned out that PD 644 repealing Republic Act No. 1797 did not ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
become law as there was no valid publication. PD 644 appeared for the DRILON VS. LIM
first time only in the supplemental issue of the Official Gazette, (Vol. 74, (GR. NO. 112497 AUGUST 4, 1994)
No. 14) purportedly dated April 4, 1977 but published only on September
5, 1983. Since PD 644 has no binding force and effect of law, it therefore CRUZ, J.:
did not repeal RA 1797. FACTS:
The Court acted favorably on the request. Pursuant to the The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of
above resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading as follows:
Fiscal Year 1992 certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the
payment of the adjusted pension rates due the retired Justices of the Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval of
local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with
ISSUE: Whether or not the attempt of the President to use the veto power the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be
to set aside a Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of benefits conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,
given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the constitutional grant of further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax
fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary. ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty
(30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall
HELD: render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the
YES. The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
Ombudsman must have the independence end flexibility needed in the suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of
discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period
and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the jurisdiction.
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to
our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794,
cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-
Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax
We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public
cease to be a meaningless provision. policy.
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the
General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and
its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural
The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section
the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its
use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local
in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the
allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local
governments. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is

constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at the
tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage
been observed. where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the
Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the
Court for non-compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary
failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision. However, investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is
on motion for reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the frequently waived.
decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the importance of The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is
the issues raised therein. incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of
degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is
ISSUES: difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative
(1) Whether or not the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction to consider the power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the
constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that
(2) Whether or not the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over final boundary by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This
judgments and orders of lower courts. being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should
step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to
HELD: tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a
Yes to both. We stress at the outset that the lower court had harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to
the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive
incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal system of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their
action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law source and discarding old ones.
he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him,
particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article
VIII, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or BP 129 (SECTION 9(3)), EO226 (ART. 82), AND SUPREME COURT
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, CIRCULAR 1-91
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to (GR. NO. 110571 MARCH 10, 1994)
act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of
a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than NOCON, J.:
on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually FACTS:
the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s
will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the
to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles."
which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate Opositor Mariwasa moved for reconsideration of said BOI decision. This
body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in motion having been denied, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with
its discussion. respondent court.
The CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its
decision. This TRO lapsed by its own terms 20 days after its issuance,
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed
BUSTOS VS. LUCERO a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the ground
(GR. NO. L-2068, March 8, 1949) that the CA has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-005, the
same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article
TUASON, J.: 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. The appellate court denied
FACTS: the motion to dismiss. Thus, a petition for certiorari and prohibition was
Petitioner, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with filed before this Court.
trial court, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice Petitioner claims that the CA acted without or in excess of its
of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that he might jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolution. Petitioner argues that the
cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of
the accused. The motion was denied. Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to
counsel in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs
appeared at the preliminary investigation. The justice of the peace contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from
informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with this Court.
guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel Mariwasa counters that whatever "obvious inconsistency" or
moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her "irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have been between B.P. 129 and
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal has already
provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was
section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, promulgated four years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to
present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to prescribe
trial court. rules to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of
The Supreme Court upheld the assailed denial, saying that procedure.
respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of
discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for HELD:
the purpose set out therein. Hence, the motion for reconsideration. Yes. The Supreme Court, pursuant to its Constitutional
power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
infringes section 13, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution. ( now Section courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91
5(5), Article 8, 1987 Constitution) prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final
orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial
HELD: agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of
No. The Supreme Court, in its Resolution dated March 8, procedure.
1949 opined that Section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not
adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law
law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be according to settled jurisprudence. In Inciong v. de Guia, a circular of this
said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those Court was treated as law. In adopting the recommendation of the
rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who violated Circular
normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law No. 7 of this Court dated September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular
which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979,
and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the
courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial Investigating Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for that assigning cases instead of raffling is a common practice and holding
their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.) that respondent could not go against the circular of this Court until it is
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the repealed or otherwise modified, as "Laws are repealed only by
right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary."

The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly summary proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX, Sec. 246; COMELEC Rules
repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, Sec. 2). Pre-proclamation controversies
which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased should be summarily decided, consistent with the legislators' desire that
by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidate be
defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of done with dispatch and without unnecessary delay. An election protest
E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an
BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner office. Over and, above the desire of the candidate to win, is the deep
such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with public interest to determine the true choice of he people. For this reason, it
procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of is a well-established principle that laws governing election protests must
its constitutional rule-making powers. be liberally construed to the end that the popular will expressed in the
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded election or public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be
Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the defeated
right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court
decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed of Appeals.
directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Appeal.
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

JAVELLANA VS. DILG
GRN 102549, AUGUST 10, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. In 1989, City Engineer Ernesto
ARUELO VS. CA C. Divinagracia sued Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of Local
GR NO. 107852. OCTOBER 20, 1993 Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of
FACTS: Republic Act No. 6713," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of
Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-Mayoralty candidates in authority.
Balagtas, Bulacan in the May 1992 elections. Gatchalian was proclaimed Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana has
as the duly elected vice-mayor. Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a petition continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for
seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent that purpose, as required; that petitioner, as counsel for Antonio Javiero
alteration and tampering" of votes. Aruelo also filed with the RTC a petition and Rolando Catapang, sued Divinagracia for "Illegal Dismissal and
protesting the same election. Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public ridicule; and that
Gatchalian moved to dismiss, claiming that: (a) the petition Javellana also appeared as counsel in several cases without prior
was filed out of time; (b) there was a pending protest case before the authority of the DLG Regional Director.
COMELEC; and (b) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari praying that DLG
deposit on the petition. Memoramdum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the
The COMELEC denied Aruelo's petition. However, the trial new Local Government Code (RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and
court denied Gatchalian's Motion to Dismiss and ordered him to file his null and void because:
answer to the petition. (1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution
Aruelo prayed before the CA for the issuance of a temporary and (2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial court legal and medical professions for only sanggunian members who are
from implementing the Order of August 11 1992, regarding the revision of lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their profession while
ballots. The CA belatedly issued a temporary restraining order. dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians, morticians and others
Meanwhile, Gatchalian filed with the CA another petition for certiorari (CA- are not so restricted (RA 7160, Sec. 90 (b-l]).
G.R. SP No. 28977), again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court in issuing the Order, which denied his Motion for Bill of ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned memorandum circulars and
Particulars. The CA dismissed this petition for lack of merit. Section 90 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional.
The CA rendered judgment, denying Gatchalian's petition,
but declaring, at the same time, that Gatchalian's Answer With Counter-
Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed. The appellate court also lifted
the temporary restraining order and ordered the trial court to "proceed with HELD:
dispatch in the proceedings below. Hence this petition. NO. As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to
the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations
Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the entrusted to their jurisdiction With respect to the present case, we find no
running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of
file his answer. Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG
Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to
HELD: dismiss the administrative charge against him.
NO. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No. 343- In the first place, complaints against public officers and
M-92) with the RTC, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are
Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional
Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal
expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer
of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of Particulars, shall Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago
apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman.
1, Part I provides: Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a
judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the
"SEC. 2. Applicability. These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims
actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum
apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Election 7[b-2) of RA 6713) prohibiting a
general or limited jurisdiction It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession,
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.
and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protest or quo warranto Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local
cases pending before the regular courts. Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81
violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's
rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local
power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply
in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 6 prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest
[5]). between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of
Private respondent received a copy of the order of the RTC their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
denying his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not
Section l(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and
five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation.
a bill of particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had until August 11, Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members .may practice
1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed timely. during session hours. " If there are some prohibitions that apply
The instant case is different from a pre-proclamation particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of
controversy which the law expressly mandates to be resolved in a

law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public perpetually enjoin respondent Commission of Internal Revenue and
service. Finance Office of the SC from making any deductions of withholding taxes
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. from their salaries. They submit that a tax withheld from their
compensation as judicial officers constitute a decrease or diminution of
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT their salaries contrary to the provision of Sec.10 of Art.VIII of the
MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ Constitution mandating that "during their continuance in office, their salary
221 SCRA 464 [1993] shall not be decreased.
FACTS: ISSUE: Is the deduction in the said salaries in violation of Sec.10 of

Petitioner Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda seeks the review of Art.VIII?
the following orders of the office of the Ombudsman:
1.) The order dated September 18, 1991 denying ex parte motion refer to HELD:
the SC filed by the Petitioner and YES. The draft proposal of Sec 10 Art VIII reads as "their
2.) The order dated November 22, 1951 denying the petitioner's motion for salary shall not be decreased" and the words "not subjected to income
reconsideration and directing petitioners to file his counter affidavit and tax" was deleted so as to give substance to equality among the three
other controverting evidences. branches of government.
In his affidavit-complaint, respondent Napoleon Abiera Thus, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was
asserts that petitioner falsely certified that all civil and criminal cases to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of
which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 income tax to members of the Judiciary. In the course of deliberations, it
days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998 was made clear that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be
where in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been subject to general income tax does not fall within their continuance in
rendered in the cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent office.
Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificate of The court disregarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer that
service. declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of
Petitioner counters that he had been granted by this court an income tax and considered such payment as diminution of their salaries
extension of 90 days to decide said cases, and that the Ombudsman has during their continuance in office.
no jurisdiction over the case since the offense charged arose from the Furthermore, in constructing Sec 10 Art VIII of the 1987
judge's performance of his official duties, which is under control of this Constitution, it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a
Court. law fixing another rate of compensation of Justice and Judges but such
rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of the
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain criminal enactment, of if lower, it would be applicable only to the appointed after its
complaints for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted approval. It would be strained construction to read into the provision an
to the supreme court to the SC, and assuming that it can, whether a exemption from taxation when the true intent of the framers was to make
referral should be made first to the SC. the salaries of the Judiciary taxable.
HELD:
The Court disagrees with the first part if the petitioners basic ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
argument, there is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only DE LA LLANA vs. ALBA
to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge (G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982)
who falsifies his certificate is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and inefficiency under Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the rules of Court FERNANDO, C.J.:
and criminally liable to the state under the revised Penal Code for his FACTS:
felonious Act. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa
However, we agree with petitioner that in the absence of any Blg. 129 entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his Therefore and for other Purposes," the same being contrary to the security
certificate of service, the investigation being conducted by the of tenure provision of the Constitution as it separates from the judiciary
Ombudsman over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
of separation of powers. municipal circuit courts except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and
Articles VIII, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court established by such Act. They likewise impute lack of good faith in its
personnel, from the presiding Justice of the CA that can oversee the enactment and characterize as undue delegation of legislative power to
judge's and court personnel's compliance commit any violation thereof. No the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date
afoul of the doctrine separation of power. when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. The Solicitor
The Ombudsman cannot justify it's investigation of petitioner General maintains that there is no valid justification for the attack on the
on the powers granted to it by Constitution, for such a justification not only constitutionality of the statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power
runs counter to the specific mandate of the constitution grating supervisory vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the
powers to SC overall courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the
the independence of the judiciary. independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of support in law.
petitioner's certificate of service to this court for determination of whether
said certificate reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the ISSUE: Whether or not BP Blg. 129 is unconstitutional.
Court has the necessary records to make such determination. The
Ombudsman cannot compel this court, as one of the three branches of HELD:
government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on Yes. It is constitutional. After an intensive and rigorous
this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit- study of all the legal aspects of the case, the Supreme Court dismissed
complaint. the petition, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in been shown. It held that the enactment thereof was in answer to a
this case. Administratively, the question before us is this, should a judge, pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the judiciary; that
having been granted by this court an extension of time to decide before the attendant abolition of the inferior courts which shall cause their
him, report these cases in his certificate of service. As this question had incumbents to cease from holding office does not impair the independence
not yet been raised these cases less resolved by, this Court how could be of the judiciary and the security of tenure guarantee as incumbent justices
the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the and judges with good performance and clean records can be named anew
resolution of this question. in legal contemplation without interruption in the continuity of their service;
In fine, where the criminal complaint against a judge or other that the provision granting the President authority to fix the compensation
court employees arises from their administrative duties, the ombudsman and allowances of the Justices and judges survives the test of undue
must defer action on said complaints and refer the same to this Court for delegation of legislative power, a standard having been clearly adopted
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the therefor; that the reorganization provided by the challenged Act will be
scope of their administrative duties. carried out in accordance with the President's constitutional duty to take
Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby granted. The care that the laws be faithfully executed, and the judiciary's commitment to
Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by the public guard constitutional rights.
respondent Atty. Napoleon Abiera and to refer the same to this court for
appropriate action.
PEOPLE VS. HON. ESTAQUIO GACOTT
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT (G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995)
NITAFAN VS. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE
152 SCRA 284 [1987] BIDIN, J.:
FACTS:
FACTS: Respondents Strom and Reyes were charged with violation
Petitioners David Nitafan Wenceslao Polo and Maximo of the Anti-Dummy Law. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss,
Savellano are duly appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC, NCR arguing that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-
Manila. They sought to prohibit and/or Dummy Board under RA 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has

no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the
pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by discharge of the powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos
Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. (Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request
Respondent judge granted the motion. The prosecution for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as
moved for reconsideration but respondent judge denied the same in an follows:
order, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder: (1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to assume
“. . . . It may be ignorance of the law to insist that the law, and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;
Republic Act 1130 was repealed or amended by Letter of Instruction (sic) (2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither
No. 2, Series of 1972 as what the City Prosecutor has harped all along. A violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12,
Letter of Instruction (sic) is not law by any standard and neither has it the Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section 7, Article IX (B), both of
force and effect of law. A contrary contention would be violative of Article 7 the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my
of the New Civil Code which provides that laws are repealed only by present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court,
subsequent ones and of the Rules of Statutory Construction. First Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; x x x”
Besides, penal statutes are strictly construed against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. The rules in all criminal ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Judge Manzano as member of
prosecutions is that all counts are resolved in favor of the accused. In the the Provincial Committeee on Justice violates the Constitution.
case at bar, the court seriously doubts that the City Prosecutor has the
power or the authority to investigate violations of the Anti-Dummy Law and HELD:
to file and to prosecute cases of this kind before our courts, as that is Yes. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme
lodged with the Anti-Dummy Board under R. A. 1130.” Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12,
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash Art. VIII, Constitution).
gravely abused his discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the
certiorari. Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges
administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is
HELD: constrained to deny his request.
Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring
text of the cited LOI; otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged the opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. As correctly “While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative
observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of
1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law powers government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a
have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a
by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise
[1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust
promulgated, issued, or done by the former President are part of the law reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by
of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that
decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to
legal order issued by former President Marcos in the exercise of his be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility
martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. no leas than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied
1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or with nothing less."
repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law. (Rollo, pp. 7- This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should
8). adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to
Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form
ordains: part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
repealed, or revoked. assistance to said Committees to help promote the landable purposes for
But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably
inexcusable neglect to check the citations of the prosecution is the incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court on the applicable law to a ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is
particular case devolves solely upon the Prosecution or whoever may be DENIED.
the advocate before the court. Respondent judge should be reminded that
courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws of the 1 and
(Sec. 1, Rule 129 Rules of Court). Being the trier of facts, judges are ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
presumed to be well-informed of the existing laws, recent enactments and NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as members of the bar (G.R. NO. 88709, FEBRUARY 11, 1992)
(and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments
The Court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a CRUZ, J.:
judge in the performance of his duties is subject to censure. But where, as FACTS:
in the present case, the error could have been entirely avoided were it not In its complaint, petitioners alleged that on January 24, 1980,
for public respondent's irresponsibility in the performance of his duties, it is NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a P2M loan from private
but proper that respondent judge be reprimanded and his order of respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and to secure payment
dismissal set aside for grave ignorance of the law. For, respondent judge's thereof, executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land. The
error is not a simple error in judgment but one amounting to gross mortgage was foreclosed for alleged non-payment of the loan, and the
ignorance of the law which could easily undermine the public's perception sheriff's sale was held without re-publication of the required notices after
of the court's competence. the original date for the auction was changed without the knowledge or
consent of the mortgagor. UCPB was the highest and lone bidder and the
mortgaged lands were sold to it.
UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private
respondent Manuel Co, who transferred them to Golden Star Industrial
Corporation, another private respondent, upon whose petition a writ of
possession was issued to it. NICOS and the other petitioners filed suit for
"annulment of sheriff's sale, recovery of possession, and damages, with
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT prayer for the issuance of a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
IN RE: MANZANO injunction."
[A.M. NO. 88-7-1861-RTC. OCTOBER 5, 1988.] Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page demurrer to the
evidence where they argued that the action was a derivative suit that
PADILLA, J: came under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission;
FACTS: that the mortgage had been validly foreclosed; that the sheriff's sale had
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive been held in accordance with Act 3135; that the notices had been duly
Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter published in a newspaper of general circulation; and that the opposition to
which reads: the writ of possession had not been filed on time. No opposition to the
“By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable demurrer having been submitted despite notice thereof to the parties,
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Fariñas, I was Judge Nestor F. Dantes considered it submitted for resolution and on June
designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on 6, 1986, issued the following —
Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 ORDER
December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, Acting on the "Demurrer to Evidence" dated April 30, 1986
1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable filed by defendants Victorino P. Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member Corporation to which plaintiff and other defendants did not file their
of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith comment/opposition and it appearing from the very evidence adduced by
machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment. the plaintiff that the Sheriff's Auction Sale conducted on July 11, 1983 was

in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135 under Rightfully it is latitudinarian in scope. It is wide-ranging and all embracing
which the auction sale was appropriately held and conducted and it in its reach. It can dig deep into the facts to assure that there be no
appearing from the allegations in paragraph 13 of the plaintiff's pleading toleration of illegal restraint. Detention must be for a cause recognized by
and likewise from plaintiff Carlos Coquinco's own testimony that his cause law. The writ imposes on the judiciary the grave responsibility of
is actually-against the other officers and stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos ascertaining whether a deprivation of physical freedom is warranted. This
Industrial Corporation ". . . for the purpose of protecting the corporation it has to discharge without loss of time. The party who is keeping a person
and its stockholders, as well as their own rights and interests in the in custody has to produce him in court as soon as possible. What is more,
corporation, and the corporate assets, against the fraudulent ants and he must justify the action taken. Only if it can be demonstrated that there
devices of the responsible officials of the corporation, in breach of the trust has been no violation of one's right to liberty will he be absolved from
reposed upon them by the stockholders . . ." a subject matter not within responsibility. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must
the competent jurisdiction of the Court, the court finds the same to be thereby cease.
impressed with merit. The above formulation of what is settled law finds no
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed. The application to the present situation. Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in
Defendants' respective counterclaims are likewise dismissed. accordance with a warrant of arrest properly issued after a determination
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction heretofore issued is by the judge in compliance with the constitutional provision requiring the
dissolved and set aside. examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
It is this order that is now assailed by the petitioners on the witnesses produced. No allegation to the contrary may be entertained.
principal ground that it violates the aforementioned constitutional There was no question, however, as to the legality of the warrants of
requirement. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and arrest previously issued to petitioner. Habeas corpus, under the
does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial circumstances, would not therefore lie.
court.
2. NO. BAIL is the remedy by which, notwithstanding the absence of any
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a failure to state clearly and distinctly the flaw in one's confinement, provisional liberty may still be had. Such a
facts and the law in which the order of dismissal is based. remedy, as a matter of fact, was granted him in accordance with an order
of the municipal court of Mulanay. Thereafter, however, the bail was
HELD: revoked by the Court of First Instance in the order now challenged. Such
Yes.The questioned order is an over-simplification of the actuation he would now condemn as a grave abuse of discretion.
issues, and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged
the Constitution.It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a with capital offense when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows
litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled
court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby
against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is
its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a
appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make
should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his cage. A bail is
the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the
to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who language of Cooley, a mode short of confinement which would, with
is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused for the
tribunal. subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right
It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision does to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as
not apply to interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against
postponement or quashing a subpoena, because it "refers only to him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the
decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.
incidental matters." The precise question however, is whether once the provisional liberty has
As for the minute resolutions of this Court, we have already been thus obtained, it could be terminated by the cancellation of the bail.
observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals that — The two basic objections are:
The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by One was that petitioner, when the bail was granted, was still
minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a at large. The municipal court, therefore, could not have granted bail in
case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in accordance with our ruling in Feliciano v. Pasicolan. Thus: "'The
nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial constitutional mandate that all persons shall before conviction be bailable
evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely strong, is subject to the limitation that the person applying for bail should
to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with be in custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose
the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous as to grant
always gives the legal basis. bail to one who is free.'"
xxx xxx xxx Secondly, and what is worse, the prosecution was never
The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all given a chance to present its evidence. The authoritative doctrine in
the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute People v. San Diego is thus squarely in point: "Whether the motion for bail
resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in
a case. summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution
The order in the case at bar does not come under either of must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
the above exceptions. As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for evidence that it may desire to introduce before the Court should resolve
insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is imperative that it be the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special
a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there
law on which it is based. would be a violation of procedural due process, and order of the Court
granting bail should be considered void."
No grave abuse of discretion to justify the grant of the writ certiorari prayed
for has been shown. That is why our resolution sought to be reconsidered
should stand.

MENDOZA VS. CFI ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
G.R. NO. L-35612-14 JUNE 27, 1973 BORROMEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NO. L-82273, JUNE 1, 1990)
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS: PER CURIAM
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari and FACTS:
mandamus. Said petitions were dismissed by the court for lack of merit Petitioner Joaquin T. Borromeo charges Attys. Julieta Y.
due to the fact that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that Carreon and Alfredo P. Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst.
his confinement was marked by illegality or that the order cancelling the Division Clerk of Court, respectively, of the Third Division, and Atty. Jose I.
bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, Ilustre, Chief of the Judicial Records Office of this Court, with usurpation of
this petition for reconsideration. judicial functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased,
fake, baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in
ISSUES: G.R. No. 82273.
WON the petitioner can invoke the habeas corpus rule. This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed
Granted that petitioner may not be released on a habeas corpus charges/complaints against officials of the Court. In several letter-
proceeding, is he, however, entitled to bail? complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman Borromeo had
repeatedly alleged that he "suffered injustices," because of the disposition
HELD: of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this Court which were
1. NO. Habeas corpus could be invoked by petitioner if he were able to resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3),13
show the illegality of his detention. There is aptness and accuracy in the and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable complaint is
characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as the writ of liberty. that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the

signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and Petitioner challenged the foreclosure sale saying that it was
resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He likewise null and void because the Deed of Release necessarily includes the
complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice mortgage to the PNB. The Court did not agree that the extrajudicial
and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were based foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole property is null and void. And
and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore due to the unfavorable decision Petitioner filed a pleading denominated as
"unconstitutional, null and void." a Motion for Leave to file Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration
The Supreme Court through its Third Division disposed of of the Resolution sayibg that the "minute resolutions" it assails are
Borromeo's petition in a four-page resolution which more than adequately supposedly in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the present
complies with the constitutional requirements governing resolutions Constitution. It insinuates that such procedure adopted by this Court is a
refusing to give due course to petitions for review. The petition and its culpable constitutional violation and can be subject of impeachment
incidents were discussed and deliberated upon by the Justices of the proceedings.
Third Division. The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants
that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees ISSUE: WON the minute resolutions of the court are in violation of Section
them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merits 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed
from is supported by: substantial evidence and, is in accord with the facts HELD:
of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that NO. It has been stressed that these "resolutions" are not
the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and "decisions" within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold
for non-compliance with the rules. that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the
ISSUES: decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound
1. WON the certification of the Chief Justice is imperative in judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court's denial
minute resolutions. since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
2. WON the resolution in question lacked necessary facts Court of Appeals' decision.
and law on which they are based. The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases
"submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs
HELD: or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is
1. NO. Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the refused due course, with the resolution therefor stating the legal basis
Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the thereof. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and
certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the court to subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and
sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in
resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions the respondent court's decision, there is sufficient compliance with the
more properly performed by the Clerk of court and which time could be constitutional requirement.
more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants
decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with the use that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees
of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit,
accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed
cases coming to it. Remedial-legislation to meet this problem is also from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of
pending in Congress. the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that
In discharging its constitutional duties, the Court needs the the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and
fun time and attention of its Clerks of Court and other key officials. Its for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or
officers do not have the time to answer frivolous complaints filed by dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.
disgruntled litigants questioning decisions and resolutions of the Court and
involving cases deliberated upon and resolved by the Court itself. As
earlier stated, all resolutions and decisions are actions of the Court, not its ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
subordinate personnel. The Court assumes full responsibility: for all its PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. CASTRO
acts. Its personnel cannot answer and should not be made to answer for (A.M. NO. 2756, MARCH 15, 1988)
acts of the Court.
PER CURIAM
2. NO. In Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. FACTS:
(May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a Respondent Grecia filed a "Petition for Redress and
decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition", praying that the decision of
based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall November 12,1987, and the resolution of the denial of the motion for
under the constitutional provision which states that, "No petition for reconsideration of the said decision be set aside and a new one entered
review ... shall be refused due course ...without stating the legal basis by this Court dismissing the administrative complaint and exonerating the
therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after respondent. Respondent’s ire results from an administrative case filed
deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, against him and the subsequent collective decision of the Court to disbar
comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and him.
states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the Respondent questions the validity of Court’s decision due to
respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated the fact that the said decision is violative of the 1987 Constitution due to
in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional lack of certification by the Chief Justice and that the conclusions of the
requirement. Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a
member for the writing of the opinion of the Court.
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT ISSUE: WON the certification of the Chief Justice is required for the
KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS validity of the assailed decision.
(G.R. NO. 127682, APRIL 4, 1998)
HELD:
REGALADO, J. NO. The certification requirement refers to decisions in
FACTS: judicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning,
NIDC granted petitioner KIPI a direct loan of P8M and a P2M resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been
guarantee to secure PNB. As security thereof, KIPI executed in favor of accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would
NIDC a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, covering, among others, a parcel be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to
of land with all its improvements. Upon full payment of KIPI's account with be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court.
NIDC and the P2.0 M Credit Line with Respondent PNB, NIDC executed a But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond
Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, which provided that: doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after
"Whereas, the credit accommodations had been fully paid by the Borrower consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually
to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and NIDC which subsequently took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per
returned the owner's copy of the TCT No. 469737 of the petitioner and curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente
accordingly the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage was although any member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In
registered with the Registry of Deed. However, it appeared that there were such cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.
some accounts chargeable to KIPI on deferred letters of credit opened
which came to the knowledge of PNB only in 1981 and 1982. Hence, PNB
requested for the return of the owner's copy of TCT No. 469737 and the
said title was returned to PNB.
PNB filed a "Petition for Correction of Entry and Adverse
Claim" with the office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati, and was able to
have the same annotated. It then filed a Petition of Sale to extra-judicially
foreclose various properties belonging to KIPI. KIPI received an undated ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Notice of Sheriff's Sale to the effect that the land covered by TCT No. OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
469737 would be foreclosed extra-judicially on December 19, 1983 at 9:00 G.R. No. 114323. July 23, 1998
a.m.
MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS: cargo at the first instance but also the failure of the replacement cargo to
The dispute between the parties had its origin in the non- conform to the specifications of the contract, a matter clearly within the
delivery of the 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner. The coverage of Clause 16.
petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the
Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation 2. As specified in the order of the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, "Award Paper
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. A contract No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree". This is a categorical declaration
was entered into between the two parties whereby the private respondent that the foreign court adopted the findings of facts and law of the arbitrator
undertook to supply the petitioner 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement for a as contained in the latter's Award Paper. Award Paper No. 3/B-1, contains
consideration of US$477,300.00. Notwithstanding the fact that the private an exhaustive discussion of the respective claims and defenses of the
respondent had already received payment and despite several demands parties, and the arbitrator's evaluation of the same. Inasmuch as the
made by the petitioner, the private respondent failed to deliver the oil well foregoing is deemed to have been incorporated into the foreign court's
cement. Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and they judgment the appellate court was in error when it described the latter to be
agreed that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons a "simplistic decision containing literally, only the dispositive portion".
of oil well cement with Class "G" cement cost free at the petitioner's The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be
designated port. However, upon inspection, the Class "G" cement did not rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the
conform to the petitioner's specifications. The petitioner then informed the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of
private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact
to Clause 16 of their contract. and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if
dispute in petitioner's favor. To enable the petitioner to execute the award only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower
in its favor, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is
Dun. India (foreign court), praying that the decision of the arbitrator be particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy
made "the Rule of Court" in India. The foreign court refused to admit the and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at, as in this
private respondent’s objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of eighteen (18) single
Thus, an order was issued ordering privare respondent to pay petitioner. spaced pages.
Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign
foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the
therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from
the foreign court as owing to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner filed that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. Thus, if
a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid
City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator's findings, then the
court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the
following grounds: (1) plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue; (2) lack of foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and
cause of action; and (3) plaintiffs claim or demand has been waived, executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. The RTC dismissed private this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply
respondent’s complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. Anent the issue because our rules provide otherwise.
of the sufficiency of the petitioner's cause of action, however, the RTC The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to
found the referral of the dispute between the parties to the arbitrator under be done than to order its enforcement, despite the fact that the petitioner
Clause 16 of their contract erroneous. The RTC characterized the merely prays for the remand of the case to the RTC for further
erroneous submission of the dispute to the arbitrator as a “mistake of law proceedings. As this Court has ruled on the validity and enforceability of
or fact amounting to want of jurisdiction”. Consequently, the proceedings the said foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further proceedings in the
had before the arbitrator were null and void and the foreign court had RTC for the reception of evidence to prove otherwise are no longer
therefore, adopted no legal award which could be the source of an necessary.
enforceable right.
The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the
appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign A. COMMON PROVISIONS
court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. In addition, the ARULEO VS. CA
appellate court observed that the full text of the judgment of the foreign 227 SCRA 311 [1993]
court contains the dispositive portion only and indicates no findings of fact
and law as basis for the award. Hence, the said judgment cannot be FACTS:
enforced by any Philippine court as it would violate the constitutional Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-Mayoralty candidates in
provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court without Batangas, Bulaean. Gatchalian was declared the winner. Thereupon,
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is Aruelo filed with the RTC a civil case protest in the same elections. Aruelo
based. Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the claims that in elections contests, the COMELEC Rules give the
present petition. respondent only 5 days from summons to file his answer and that this 5-
day period has lapsed. According to him, the tiling of Motions to Dismiss
ISSUES: and Motion to Bill of particulars is prohibited by Sec. 1 Rule 13 of
(1) Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between COMELEC. Rules of Procedures, hence, the filling by Gatchalian of said
the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract. pleadings did not suspend the running of the 5-day period.
(2) Whether or not the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this
jurisdiction in view of the private respondent's allegation that it is bereft of ISSUE: Is Aruelo’s contention correct?
any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the
petitioner was based. HELD:
NO. Part VI of the Come lee Rules does not provide that
HELD: MTDE and Bill of particulars are not allowed in election contest pending
1. It is noted that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is not in the nature before the regular courts constitutionally speaking. Comelec cannot adopt
of a dispute arising from the failure to execute the supply order/contract a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The
design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the materials as power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure
provided for in the Clause 16 of their Contract. That Clause 16 should in all courts is vested on the SC.
pertain only to matters involving the technical aspects of the contract is but Gatchalian received a copy of the RTC order denying his
a logical inference considering that the underlying purpose of a referral to motion for Bill of Particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Sec.1 (b) Rule 12
arbitration is for such technical matters to be deliberated upon by a person of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his
possessed with the required skill and expertise which may be otherwise answer I after receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of
absent in the regular courts. particulars. His answer was filed right on time.
This Court agrees with the appellate court in its ruling that
the non-delivery of the oil well cement is a matter properly cognizable by
the regular courts as stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of their
contract:
All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of
or in connection with this supply order, shall be subject to the exclusive ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
jurisdiction of the court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and the A. COMMON PROVISIONS
place from which this supply order is situated. CUA VS. COMELEC
We believe that the correct interpretation to give effect to 156 SCRA 582 [1987]
both stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all
claims or disputes arising from or relating to the design, drawing, FACTS:
instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the supply The COMELEC First Division rendered a 2:7 decision on
order/contract, and for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes. August 10, 1987 favoring Cua as winner in the lone Congressional scat of
But the Court finds merit on the contention that the failure of Quirino but his proclamation was suspended due to lack of unanimous
the replacement cement to conform to the specifications of the contract is vote required by the procedural rules in Comelec Resolution No.1669
a matter clearly falling within the ambit of Clause 16. Undoubtedly, what regarding transaction of official business of a Division.
was referred to arbitration was no longer the mere non-delivery of the

Pursuant to said rule, private respondent Puzon filed a that the Commission had no coercive powers — unlike a court — to
motion for reconsideration with the Comelec en banc. On October 28, enforce its final decisions/resolutions.
1987, three members voted to sustain the First Decision, with 2 dissenting Respondent court denied it on the ground that the "petitions
and one abstaining (one died earlier). But respondent insists that no valid (for mandamus) are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for . . . (said)
decision was reached by the COMELEC en banc because only three claim of damages."
votes were reached in favor of Cua and theses did not constitute a De la Fuente sought reconsideration, contending that the
majority of the body. Appellate Court had competence to award damages in a mandamus
action. He argued that while such a claim for damages might not have
ISSUE: Is the Cua’s contention correct? been proper in a mandamus proceeding in the Appellate Court "before the
enactment of B.P. Blg. 129 because the CA had authority to issue such
HELD: writs only 'in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,'" the situation was changed by
Yes. The 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was said BP 129 in virtue of which three levels of courts — the Supreme Court,
valid decision under Art.IX-A Sec.7 of the Constitution. the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals — were conferred
Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm the concurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the CA was given
First division constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated power to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues.
and voted thereon en bane. Their decision is also valid under the To require him to separately litigate the matter of damages he continued,
aforesaid Constitutional provision. would lead to that multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law.
On the other hand, in an attempt to nullify the adverse
dispositions of the Court of
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Appeals — and obtain "the ultimate and corollary relief of dismissing
A. COMMON PROVISIONS respondent de la Fuente's claim for damages" — the Solicitor General's
ACENA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Office had instituted the special civil action of certiorari at bar. It contends
193 SCRA 623 [1991] that the CA is not legally competent to take cognizance of and decide the
question of damages in a mandamus suit.
FACTS:
Petitioner Acena was appointed as an Administrative Officer ISSUES:
of Rizal Technological Colleges (RTC), a state college. He was approved 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil
as permanent by the CSC. Dr. Profets later extended to Acena a action of mandamus against a public officer, to take cognizance of the
promotional appointment as Associate Professor and at the same time matter of damages sought to be recovered from the defendant officer.
designated the latter as Acting Administrative Officer, despite the 2. Whether or not the Solicitor General may represent the defendant
promotional appointment. public officer in the mandamus suit, in so far as the claim for damages is
Dr. Estolas replaced Dr. Profets as RTC OTC. In a concerned.
memorandum Dr. Estolas revoked the designation of Acena as Acting
Administrative Officer. HELD:
Subsequently, petitioner Acena filed suit with the Merit 1. No. The Solicitor General's Office correctly identifies Section 9, B.P.
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) against Ds. Estolas for illegal 129 as the legal provision specifying the original and appellate jurisdiction
termination. MSPB initially dismissed the complaint, but it subsequently of the Court of Appeals. The section pertinently declares that the
reversed itself after having been informed of the opinion of the CSC "Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) shall
Chairman Gotdalera to the effect that Acena is still Administrative Officer exercise . .," among others: Original jurisdiction to issue writs of
of the RTC because his appointment as Associate Professor had been mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
withdrawn. auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
Dr. Estolas and Salvador (the one to replace Acena) filed a jurisdiction .
petition for review with the Office of the President, which refered said Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of
petition to the CSC. The CSC ruled in favor of Sr. Estolas and Salvador. Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to
Hence, this petition. claims "for moral and exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the
word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to
ISSUE: Whether or not esc acted without in excess of jurisdiction or with try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of damages
grave abuse of discretion when it set the order of MSPB. accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases falling within their
specified jurisdiction.
HELD:
It is settled rule, that a respondent tribunal exercising judicial 2. No. As laid down in the Urbano and Co cases: (T)he Office of the
function acts without jurisdiction if does not have the authority by law to Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public official at any
hear and decide the case. There is excess of jurisdiction where the stage of a criminal case.
respondent has the legal power to decide the case but oversteps his This observation should apply as well to a public official who
authority. And there is gave abuse of discretion where the respondent acts is haled to court on a civil suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly
in capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his committed by him (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Any pecuniary
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. liability he may be held to account for on the occasion of such civil suit is
Under PD 1409 the CSC has the jurisdiction to review the for his own account. The State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the
decision of the MAPB. However, said the authority to review can only be Office of the Solicitor General likewise has no authority to represent him in
exercised if the party adversely affected by the decision of the M APB had such a civil suit for damages.
filed an appeal with the Commission within the I5-day reglementary It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here
period. Here, it is admitted by CSC and not disputed by the private charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for damages arising from a
respondent Estolas that the petitioner for review was filed outside the crime, there is no legal obstacle to her being represented by the Office of
reglementary period. This being so, the public respondents exceeded its the Solicitor General.
jurisdiction when it entertained the petition that was erroneously filed with
the Office of the President. Having exceeded its jurisdiction the CSC
committed a reversible error when it set aside the order the MSPB which ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
had long become (final and executory. Final decision or order can no A. COMMON PROVISIONS
longer be subject to review. FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP VS. JAIME N.
Moreover, Estolas has not even bothered to offer an FERRER
explanation why she incurred delay and why she filed a petition with the G.R. NO. L-31455, FEBRUARY 28, 1985
Office of the President. Such being the case, the public respondent CSC
cannot legally invoke and justify the assumption of jurisdiction on grounds CUEVAS, J.:
of equality and substantial justice. FACTS:
In a bid for the manufacture and delivery of voting booths for
COMELEC, respondent COMELEC Bidding Committee Chairman and
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Members rejected Acme Company’s bid and instead awarded it to
A. COMMON PROVISIONS petitioner Filipinas. After an ocular inspection of all the samples submitted
VITAL-GOZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS was conducted and after the Commissioners noted that Acme submitted
G.R. NO. 101428, AUGUST 5, 1992 the lowest bid, the COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the contract
(for voting booths) to Acme.
NARVASA, C.J.: Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then CFI of Manila
FACTS: against herein public respondents COMELEC Commissioners, chairman
President Aquino reorganized the various offices of the and members of the Comelec Bidding Committee, and private respondent
Ministry of Health. Dr. de la Fuente was demoted but the CSC declared Acme. Filipinas also applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. After
the transfer from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II as illegal. hearing petitioner's said application, the respondent Judge denied the writ
Three months elapsed without any word from Dr. Vital- prayed for.
Gozon or anyone in her behalf, or any indication whatever that the CSC Thereafter the public respondents filed a motion to Dismiss
Resolution would be obeyed. Dr. de la Fuente, apprehensive that the on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of
funds to cover the salaries and allowances otherwise due him would revert suit, and that the complaint states no cause of action.
to the General Fund, asked the CSC to enforce its judgment. He was Acting on the motion (to dismiss), the respondent Judge
however "told to file in court a petition for mandamus because of the belief issued the questioned Order dismissing Civil Case No. 77972. Filipinas'
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant appeal. Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MWD)
employees, petitioners MWD Board Members conducted an investigation
ISSUES: on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then Gen. Manager. He was
1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a placed under preventive suspension and Maximo San Diego was
suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract designated in his place as Acting Gen. Manager. He was later dismissed.
arising from its invitation to bid; Challenging his dismissal, private respondent filed for Quo
2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the trial court.
the premises against the COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground that the court had no
enjoin them from complying with their contract. jurisdiction over the disciplinary actions of government employees which is
vested exclusively in the CSC. Respondent Judge denied the motion to
HELD: dismiss and the motion for reconsideration.
1. Yes. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before this court, which
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of referred the case to respondent court. The CA dismissed the petition and
elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition.
upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all
administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving
the number of location of Polling places, and the appointment of election dismissal of an employee of quasi-public corporation?
inspectors and of other election officials. ... The decisions, orders and
rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme HELD:
Court. (Section 2, Article X, 1935 Philippine Constitution, which was then No. There is no question that MWD is a quasi-public
in force) corporation. Indeed, the established rule is that the hiring and firing of
It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court, employees of government-owned and controlled corporations are
not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and
on certiorari final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to Regulations.
the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws. So We held in Mancita v. Barcinas, no appeal lies from the
We are however, far from convince that an order of the decision of the Service Commission, and that parties aggrieved thereby
COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid of Court, within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to section
comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.
appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term Mancita, however, no longer governs for under the present
"final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by rules, Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative
certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals.
the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In any event, whether under the old rule or present rule, RTCs have no
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and
Constitution and the law on the Commission on Elections may either be employees covered by the Civil Service Law.
classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, Petition granted. Decision and resolution annulled and set
or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in aside.
character.
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the
Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 May 16, 1995
legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective (REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 1-91)
pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was
issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, THE
authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL,
In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE,
favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the PHILIPPINES.
conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed
as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from
non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC Judgment or Final Orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Agencies.
Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be
well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. 1. SCOPE. — These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final
2. No. Filipinas, the losing bidder, has no cause of action under the orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
premises to enjoin the COMELEC from pursuing its contract with Acme, exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil
the winning bidder. Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities
While it may be true that the lower court has the jurisdiction over and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
controversies dealing with the COMELEC's award of contracts, the same Commission, Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
being purely administrative and civil in nature, nevertheless, herein Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
petitioner has no cause of action on the basis of the allegations of its Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
complaint. Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657,
Indeed, while the law requires the exercise of sound Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
discretion on the part of procurement authorities, and that the reservation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission,
to reject any or all bids may not be used as a shield to a fraudulent award, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, and
petitioner has miserably failed to prove or substantiate the existence of Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.
malice or fraud on the part of the public respondents in the challenged 2. CASES NOT COVERED. — These rules shall not apply to judgments or
award. final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Pursuant to COMELEC's Invitation to Bid No. 127, a bidder 3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appeal under these rules may be taken to
may have the right to demand damages, or unrealized or expected profits, the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided,
only when his bid was accepted by resolution of the COMELEC. Filipinas' whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions
bid, although recommended for award of contract by the bidding of fact and law.
committee, was not the winning bid. No resolution to that effect appeared 4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
to have been issued by the COMELEC. Decidedly then, Filipinas has no days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from
cause of action. the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its
In issuing the resolution awarding the contract for voting effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
booths in Acme's favor, the Commissioners of the COMELEC had taken reconsideration filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or
into account that Acme's bid was the lowest; that Acme was a responsible agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.
manufacturer; and that upon an ocular inspection of the samples Upon proper motion and the payment of the full a mount of the docket fee
submitted by the bidders, Acme's sample was favorable chosen subject to before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may
certain conditions cited in the resolution. In fine, the public respondents grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
properly exercised its sound discretion in making the award. petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen
(15) days.
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified
A. COMMON PROVISIONS petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals,
MATEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the
(G.R. No. 113219. August 14, 1995) court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the
Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.
PUNO, J.: Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of
FACTS: Court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and
deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of

docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
by the Court of Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the grounds TUPAS V. NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION
relied upon. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall (G.R. NO. 49677, MAY 4, 1989)
pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the denial. REGALADO, J.:
6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. — The petition for review shall (a) FACTS:
state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the Petitioner TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a
courts or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a certification election in order to determine the exclusive bargaining
concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied representative of the workers in NHC. The petition was dismissed. On
upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, the order of dismissal was
original or certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or reversed and the holding of the election was ordered. Upon a motion for
resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such reconsideration, this order was set aside. Hence, the instant petition for
material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other certiorari.
supporting papers; and (d) state all the specific material dates showing
that it was filed within the reglementary period provided herein; and (e) ISSUE: WON petitioner organization can be allowed to hold a certification
contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as required in election.
Revised Circular No. 28-91.
7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. — The HELD:
failure of the petitioner to comply with the foregoing requirements Yes. The civil service now covers only government owned or
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those
costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation.
grounds for the dismissal thereof. The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the
8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. — The Court of Appeals may require the right to form unions or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or
respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to
within ten (10) days from notice. The Court, however, may dismiss the employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.
petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are
unsubstantial to require consideration. covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or
9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. — The comment shall be filed within ten controlled corporation without an original charter.
(10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by It is meet, however, to also call attention to the fact that,
clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of the record insofar as certification elections are concerned, subsequent statutory
referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It shall point out developments have rendered academic even the distinction between the
insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, two types of government-owned or controlled corporations and the laws
and state the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A governing employment relations therein, as hereinbefore discussed. For,
copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such service whether the employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the
shall be filed with the Court of Appeals. civil service laws, a certification election may be conducted.
10. DUE COURSE. — If upon the filing of the comment or such other Resolution annulled and set aside. Conduct of a certification
pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court of election granted.
Appeals or upon the expiration of period for the filing thereof, and on the
bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds prima facie
that the court or agencies concerned has committed errors of fact or law ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the DE LOS SANTOS VS. MALLARE
petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the 97 PHIL 289 [1950]
court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall
be binding on the Court of Appeals. FACTS:
11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. — Within fifteen (15) days from notice Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner was appointed City
that the petition has been given due course, the Court of Appeals may re- Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946 by the President, appointment which
quire the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible was confirmed by the CA on August 6. On June I, 1050, Gil Mallure was
certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The extended an "ad interim" appointment by the President to the same
record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to position, after which, on June 3, the undersecretary of the Department of
the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent the Public works directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works
correction of or addition to the record. for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office. The petitioner
12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall not stay the award, rests his case on the Constitution which reads, ''No officer or employee in
judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court the Civil Service shall be removed or suspend except for cause as
of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. provided by law."
13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. — If the petition is given due course,
the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral argument or require the ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of the petitioner was constitutional.
parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from
notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of HELD:
the last pleading or memorandum required by these rules or by the Court NO. There are three classes of positions-policy-determining,
itself. primarily confidential and highly technical - as excluded from the merit
14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. — All petitions for certiorari against the system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed
Civil Service Commission and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals herein is allowed by the Constitution. These positions involve the highest
filed and pending in the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of this degree of confidence, or are, closely bound with the dependent 011 other
Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions for review positions to which they are subordinates or are temporary in nature.
hereunder and shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate However, the office of the City Engineer is neither primarily confidential,
disposition. Petitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which policy determining nor highly technical. Thus, the constitutional provision
may be filed after the effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall is very much applicable in his case wherein he is protected from removal
likewise be considered as petitions for review and shall be referred to the without cause.
Court of Appeals for the same purpose.
In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in
Section 4 hereof, the date of receipt by the Court of Appeals of the ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
petitions thus transferred or referred to it shall be considered as the date B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals may SALAZAR VS. MATHAY
require the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings and the 73 SCRA 285 [1976]
submission of such further documents or records as it may deem
necessary in view of and consequent to the change in the mode of FACTS:
appellate review. Petitioner Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General
15. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are Confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor General, GSIS. Her
hereby appointment was noted by the Commission of Civil Service.
After six years, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor
repealed and superseded by this Circular. General that her service as confidential in the office of the Auditor OSIS
16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be published in two (2) has been terminated.
newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995. Thereafter, the Auditor General issued an appointment to the
petition as Junior Examiner receiving a lower compensation. On the day of
May 16, 1995. the appointment petitioner assumed the position.
(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA Petitioner wrote the Commission of Civil Service that she be
Chief Justice reinstated to her former position as confidential agent in the office of the
auditor, GSIS. However, no action was taken.
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

ISSUE: Whether or not the service of petitioner as confidential agent was NO. It is noted that the appointment of the petitioner was not
validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution.
whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the
the position of Junior Examiner in the same office. right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and
call it temporary.
HELD: The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY"
The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential ends did not change the character of the appointment, which was clearly
upon loss of confidence because their term of office lasts only as long as described as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service Form
confidence in them endures. No. 33, dated February 18, 1983. What was temporary was the approval
of the appointment, not the appointment itself and what made the approval
temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION appointee to the position.
CORPUZ VS. CUADERNO The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to
13 SCRA 591 [1965] determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
FACTS: appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law.
Petitioner Corpuz, then holding the position of Special When the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal
Assistant to the Governor in charge of the Export Department in the requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to
Central Bank, a position declared by the President as highly technical in the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Indeed, the
nature, was administratively charged by several co - employees in the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that
export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named.
abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public official Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must
and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank. be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
The Monetary Board suspended the petitioner. After which lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
he filed an action for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and damages qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
with preliminary injunction with the CFI of the Manila. The CFI declared faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should
the Board Resolution null and void and ordered the reinstatement of the have been preferred. It is different where the Constitution or the law
petitioner. As aforesaid, both the petitioner and respondent appealed the subjects the appointment to the approval of another officer or body, like
judgment. the Commission on Appointments under 1935 Constitution. Appointments
The appeal of the Central Band and Monetary Board is made by the President of the Philippines had to be confirmed by that body
planted on the proposition that officers holding highly technical positions and could not be issued or were invalidated without such confirmation. In
may at anytime for lack of confidence by the appointing power be fact, confirmation by the Commission on Appointments was then
removed. It argued that for the three classes of positions (policy- considered part of the appointing process, which was held complete only
determining. primarily confidential and highly technical) lack of confidence after such confirmation.
of the one making the appointment constitute sufficient and legitimate Significantly, the CSC acknowledged that both the petitioner
cause of removal. and the private respondent were qualified for the position in controversy.
That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and
ISSUE: Whether or not highly technical employees may be removed by prevented it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the
reason of lack of confidence by the one making the appointment. petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke the said
appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was
HELD: better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the
The tenure of official holding primarily confidential positions discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
ends upon 19s5 of confidence, because their terms of office lasts only as WHEREFORE, the resolution of the respondent Commission
long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no on Civil Service dated March 22, 1984, is set aside, and the petitioner is
removal. But the situation is different for those holding technical posts, hereby declared to be entitled to the office in dispute by virtue of his
requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly permanent appointment thereto dated February 18, 1983. No costs.
distinguished the primarily confidential from highly technical, and to apply
the loss of confidence to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the
differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter. Moreover, it is ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
illogical that while an ordinary technician, say clerk, stenographer, enjoys B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
security of tenure and may not be removed at any pleasure, a highly PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. CA
technical officers such as an economist or a scientist of a avowed time, GR NO. 104639. JULY 14, 1995
without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. No technical men
worthy would be willing to accept work under such condition. Ultimately, FACTS:
the rule' advocated by the bank would demand that highly technical Private respondent Tito Dato was appointed Assistant
positions be filed by persons who must labor always with an eye cocked at Provincial Warden by then Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr. Since he had no civil
the humor of the superiors. It would signify that the so-called highly service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, what was extended
technical positions will have to be filed with incompetents and yes-men. to him was a temporary appointment which was renewed annually.
Who must rely not on their own qualifications and skill but on their ability to Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato’s employment
carry favor with the powerful. The entire objective of the constitution in status from temporary to permanent upon the latter’s representation that
establishing and dignifying the civil service on the basis on merit should be he passed the necessary civil service exam. However, the CSC did not
thus negated. favorably act upon this change of status.
After criminal charges were filed against him and a prison
guard, Dato was indefinitely suspended. Lope Rama, head of the
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Camarines Sur Unit of the CSC, wrote the Governor of Camarines Sur,
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION informing him that the status of Dato has been changed from temporary to
LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION permanent, the latter having passed the required examination. The
(G.R. NO. L-69137. AUGUST 5, 1986) change of status was to be made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of
release of said examination.
CRUZ, J.: Dato was acquitted of the charges. Thus, he asked for
FACTS: reinstatement and backwages. When his request was not heeded, Dato
Petitioner Felimon Luego was appointed Administrative sued for mandamus before the RTC which ruled in his favor. On appeal,
Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon the CA affirmed the assailed decision. Hence this present petition.
on February 18, 1983. The appointment was described as permanent" but
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved it as "temporary," subject to ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Tito Dato was a permanent
the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was
another employee, and provided "there (was) no pending administrative suspended.
case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment
nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the HELD:
approval of the appointment." The CSC then found the private respondent NO. Private respondent does not dispute the fact that at the
better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position, and time he was appointed Assistant Provincial Wasrden in 1974, he had not
accordingly, appointed Tuozo as administrative officer and revoked the qualified in an appropriate examination for the aforementioned position.
appointment of Luego. The private respondent was so appointed on June Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and
28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner, in the without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the
present petition questions the order and the private respondent’s title. pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private respondent
obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having
ISSUE: Is the CSC authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto
the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. In cases such
on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter? as the one at bench, what is required is a new appointment since a
permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary
HELD: appointment – these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority.

It is worthy to note that private respondent rests his case There is no question that the constitution recognizes the
entirely on the letter dated March 19, 1976 communicated by Mr. Rama to right of government employees to organize as shown in the following
the Governor of Camarines Sur. The foregoing is a clear arrogation of articles: XIII Sec. 3, Art.XI (B) Sec. 2 (1) and (5) Art. III Sec. 8.
power properly belonging to the appointing authority. It was already held However, those articles are silent as to whether such
before (Luego v. CSC) that the CSC has the power to approve or recognition also includes the right to strike. Resort of the intent of the
disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning
make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitution
the employment status of an employee. The CSC can only inquire into the Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person recognizing the right government employees to organize, the associations
qualified it must attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The only, without including the right to strike.
duty of the CSC is to attest appointments and after that function is The Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government
discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases. In the employees may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage, but then
case at bench, CSC should have ended its participation in the the Civil Service Decree is equally silent on the matter.
appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed On July 1, 1987, to implement the constitution guarantee of
the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service the rights of government employees to organize, the President issued EO
eligibility. No. t 80 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize
Moreover, the Court is not prepared to accord said letter any government employees. In Sec. 4 thereof, it is provided that "the Civil
probative value the same being merely a purported photocopy of the Service law and Rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the
alleged letter, initialed and not even signed by the proper officer of the government services shall be observed, subject to many legislation that
CSC. Based on the foregoing, private respondent Tito Dato, being merely may be enacted by congress by Congress." The President was apparently
a temporary employee, is not entitled to the relief he seeks, including his referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6 of the Civil Service Commission
claim for backwages for the entire period of his suspension. which "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning
Wherefore, premises considered, the appealed decision is strike by government employees enjoying under pain of administrative
hereby REVERSED and the petition for mandamus instituted by herein sanctions all government demonstration, mass leaves, walkouts and other
private respondent Tito Dato is hereby DISMISSED. forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption
of public service" the air was thus cleared 'of the confusion. At present, in
the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS recognize their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION are prohibited from striking. This being the case, the strike staged by
DE LOS SANTOS V. YATCO employees of the SSS was illegal.
GR NO. L-13932. DECEMBER 24, 1959
FACTS:
A compromise agreement was submitted referring to the
sale by installment of a parcel of land made by plaintiffs therein Pacita de
los Santos and Jose de los Santos to Franicsco Mendonez. The
agreement was subsequently approved.
Plaintiffs moved for execution because defendant had ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
allegedly neglected to pay monthly installments since January 1958. B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Defendant sought postponement of the hearing for the motion which was CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
granted by respondent Judge. Respondent then issued a motion for 194 SCRA 317 [1991]
execution but the defendant moved to quash the writ of execution. The
parties were heard and in view of a possible amicable settlement, the FACTS:
motion to quash was held in abeyance for two weeks during which period Petitioner contends that Section 13 run counter to See 13
they can settle the case. Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution -The President, Vice-m President and the
After the pre-trial conferences, respondent quashed the writ members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
of execution. Hence this petition for certiorari. otherwise provided in this constitution, hold any office of employment
during their tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of By virtue of the opinion rendered by then Secretary of
the respondent Judge. Justice Sedfrey Ordonez, construing Section 13 Art. VII in relation to
Section 7, par.2 Art.IX-B that cabinet members, their deputies and
HELD: assistants may hold other office including membership in the board of
NO. In the first place, there being opposition on the part of GOCC's when a) directly provided by the constitution as in case of Sec of
the defendant, who alleged and proved a subsequent verbal agreement Justice which is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
amending the compromise, execution could not validly be decreed without Council; b) if allowed by law; c) if allowed by the primary functions of their
a hearing. respective positions, the President of the Philippines issued EO 284 two
In the second place, the allegations proved by Mendonez days before Congress convened.
about their verbal agreement, his having secured a loan from the GSIS Petitioners argue that the exception to the prohibition in See
and his consequent ability to discharge his obligation seemingly justified 7 Par 2 Art IX applies to the officers and employees of the Civil Service
the court’s refusal to eject defendant from the premises (on execution) Commission in general and do not or cannot be extended to Sec.13 Art.VII
with the consequent forfeiture in favor of the plaintiffs of more than 12,000 which applies specifically to President, Vice- Presiednt and members of
already paid by defendant as previous installments of the purchase price the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The difference in the contention
not to mention the loss of defendant’s use of the house and theater of the parties therefore lies in the interpretation of the phrase 'unless
erected on that parcel of land. Upon the other hand, the respondent otherwise provided in the Constitution' used in Sec.13 of Art.VII which has
judge’s action caused no irreparable or undue harm to plaintiffs, because petitioner claims to refer only to those expressly provided by the
the latter still have the judgment that may be enforced upon any further Constitution such as the Vice President being allowed to become member
default of defendant Mendonez. of the Cabinet or Secretary of Justice to become an ex-officio member of
Wherefore, as the court had jurisdiction and has committed the Judiciary and Bar Council, while respondents insists it make reference
no grave abuse of discretion, the writ of certiorari may not be issued. to Sec 7 of Art IX-B in so far as the appointive official mentioned therein is
Petition denied, with costs against petitioners. concerned.
ISSUE: Does the prohibition in Sec.13 Art.VII insofar as cabinet members,

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS their deputies and assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION made for appointive officials in general under Sec 7 par 2 Art IXB unless
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. CA otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
175 SCRA 686 [1989] appointive officials shall hold any other office or employment in the
government.
FACTS:
When the SSS failed to act on the SSEA's demands, the HELD:
latter went to strike. The SSS filed with the RTC complaint for damages We rule in the negative. In construing the Constitution, it
and asked for a writ of preliminary injunctions to stop the strike. The trial should be borne in mind the objects it sought to accomplish by its
Court issued a TRO while the Union filed a Motion of Dismiss alleging the adoption, and the evils if any, it sought to prevent or remedy.
trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
The position of the union is that the RTC had no jurisdiction government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took
to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order advantage of this scheme for the purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant
and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the DOLE of betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of
the NLRC, since the case involves a labor dispute discontent with the Marcos regime.
A comparison of Sec 13 Art VII with other provisions of the
ISSUE: Whether or not the SSS Employees have the right to strike Constitution on the disqualification of the public official such as Sec. 13 Art
VI on members of Congress, Sec 5 par 4 Art XVI on members of the
HELD: Armed Forces and even Sec '7 provisions on disqualification pertains to
an office or position in the government and GOCC's. Unlike Sec 13 Art. VI

the prohibition is all-embracing and covers both public and private office member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the
and position in the government. Judicial and Bar Council.
Thus, while all the other appointive officials in the civil The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to
service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to
during their tenure when such is allowed by law and the primary function elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph.
of their office, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants may WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227,
do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other which states: ". . . Provided, however, That for the first year of its
words, Sec., Art IX- B is meant to officials while sec 13 Art VII is meant to operations from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of
the exception applicable only to the President, Vice-President, members Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer
of the cabinet and their deputies and assistants. of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional; consequently, the
This being the case, the qualifying phrase 'unless otherwise appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent
provided in this Constitution' in see 13 Art VII cannot possibly refers to the Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
broad exceptions provided under Sec.7 Art.IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
The position under See 13 Art VII is not to be interpreted as covering
positions held without compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
law or as requires by the primary functions of their office. B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Mandating additional duties and functions of the President, QUINTOS VS. OZAETA
Vice-President, Cabinet members and their deputies and assistants which 98 PHIL 705 [1956]
are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or
employment by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in FACTS:
their respective offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. Appellants Braulio Quimson was a deputy Provincial
It bears repeating through that such additional duties or functions may not Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal. In addition from
transgress the prohibition must be required by the primary functions of the being treasurer, he was appointed as Agent Collector of Rural Progress
official covered, who is to perform the same in an ex officio capacity as Administration, a public corporation. He assumed the office without waiting
provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefore. for the approval of the President.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment as agent is constitutional and if it is,

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS whether he is entitled to additional compensation.
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FLORES VS. DRILON HELD:
(G.R. NO. 104732, JUNE 22, 1993) YES. The employment of appellant as agent collector is not
in itself unlawful because there is no incompatibility between said
BELLOSILLO, J.: appointment and his employment as Deputy Provincial Treasurer and
FACTS: Municipal Treasurer. There is no legal objection to government official
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 occupying two government offices and performing functions to both as
otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of long as there is no incompatibility. The Constitutional prohibition refers to
1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City double appointments and performance of functions of more than one
was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay office.
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with
prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office . . C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
. ." CAYETANO VS. MONSOD
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the (G.R. NO. 100113 SEPTEMBER 3, 1991)
U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the
Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, PARAS, J.:
maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 of the said law infringes the FACTS:
constitutional provision set forth in Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
during his tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
official and the subject posts are public offices. years pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 1 (1) of the 1987 Constitution.
The Commission on Appointments confirmed the
ISSUE: Does the proviso in Sec.13, par. (d) of R.A. 7227 which states, nomination. Subsequently, respondent took his oath and assumed office
"Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the as Chairman of the COMELEC.
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violate Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner, as a
the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
elective officials to other government posts? praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
HELD: ISSUE: Whether or not Christian Monsod has been engaged in the
YES. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an practice of law for at least ten years as required by the Constitution?
elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government
posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). HELD:
Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to YES. “Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. give notice or render any kind of service which device or service requires
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill (III ALR 23).”
(LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. 8 But, the “practice of law," particularly the modern concept of law practice, and
contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since the economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is that section negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity. poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he
Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
for its validity. The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling
In any case, the view that an elective official may be the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of
paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

HELD:
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS NO. COMELEC's statement that fake and spurious ballots
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS may have been introduced to increase the votes of protestant was taken
BRILLANTES VS. YORAC out of context. Thus, it cannot be made as basis for denying the execution
192 SCRA 358[1990] pending appeal. To be precise, the COMELEC merely said that there is a
possibility that fake spurious ballots were placed in the ballot box to
FACTS: increase private respondent's votes, but the COMELEC correctly ruled
President Aquino designated Associate Commissioner that an examination of the ballots to resolve that petition for certiorari is
Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC, in place of not proper at said time for the only issue it resolved was whether there
Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact- was a grave abuse of discretion in granting the execution pending appeal.
finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d'etat attempt. In his petition for certiorari before the COMELEC, petitioner
Petitioner challenged the designation contending that the mainly anchored his opposition to the order of execution pending appeal
President has no power to make such designation in view of the following on his allegation that the trial judge did not examine the original ballots,
reasons: but relied only on the xerox copy of the ballots in deciding the protest
1. The status of the Commission on Elections as an case. However, this contention raises a factual issue and its determination
independent constitutional body, and; in best left in the appeal pending before the COMELEC. Its resolution will
2. The specific provision of Art IX-C Section 1(2) of the involve the merit of the case. We are only concerned with the issue of
Constitution that (1) no case shall any member of the whether grave abuse of discretion was committed in ordering execution
COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or pending appeal. And there was a good reason for ordering execution
acting capacity. pending appeal.
Petitioner invokes Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, where Thus, petitioner's recourse would be to pursue his appeal
President Quirino designated the Solicitor General as acting member of with the COMELEC, where the opening of the ballot boxes and the
the COMELEC and the Court revoked the designation as contrary to the examination of original ballots may be made so that the true will of the
Constitution. It is also alleged that the respondent is not even the senior electorate can be finally ascertained.
member of the COMELEC, being outranked by Associate Commissioner It also bears emphasis that Rule 143 of the Rules of Court
Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. allows execution pending appeal in election cases upon good reasons
The Solicitor General counters that the designation should stated in the special order.In its Order of execution, respondent RTC
be sustained for reasons of 'administratively expediency,' to prevent Judge Dilag cited two reasons to justify execution of his decision pending
disruption of the functions of the COMELEC in the absence of legal appeal, viz: (1) the grant of execution would give substance and meaning
provisions for temporary succession similar to the Supreme Court's (Sec to the people's mandate, especially since the RTC has established private
12 Judiciary Act of 1948) as well as the CA (Sec 5 BP 129). respondent's right to office, and; (2) barely 18 months is left on the tenure
of the Ternate mayor and the people have the right to be governed by
ISSUE: Does the President of the Philippines have the power to make their chosen official. In the recent case of Gutierrez v. COMELEC, the
designation of a COMELEC Chairman in an acting Capacity? same grounds for execution pending appeal of the decision in the protest
case were relied upon by the trial court and we found them to be valid
HELD: reasons for execution.
No. President has no such authority and expediency is a
dubious justification. Art IX-A. Sec.1 of the Constitution expressly
describes all the Constitutional Commissions as 'independent.' Although ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
President in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these GALLARDO V. JUDGE TABAMO
Commissions conducts in own proceedings under the applicable laws and (G.R. NO. 104848, JANUARY 29, 1993)
its own rules and the exercise of its discretion. The choice of a temporary
chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that DAVIDE, JR., J.
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, FACTS:
by the President of the Philippines. Petitioners seek to prohibit the enforcement of the TRO
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms issued by respondent Judge on 10 April 1992, on the ground that the latter
essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need be acted whimsically, capriciously and without jurisdiction when he took
established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation cognizance of the case and issued the said order. It is the petitioners'
of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections thesis that the said case—the hiring of hundreds of laborers in the
may be withdrawn by the President at any time and for whatever reason different projects continues unabated in flagrant violation of paragraphs
she sees fit and the respondent, having accepted such designation, will be (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, among
stopped from challenging its withdrawal. (Note: This illustrates how the others—principally involves an alleged violation of the provisions of the
independence pf the Constitutional Commissions may be undermined.) Omnibus Election Code the jurisdiction over which is exclusively vested in
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no the COMELEC.
justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending
the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The members of the ISSUE: Does respondent judge have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
COMELEC could have handled the situation themselves without the complaint or petition based on election offenses prior to the conduct of
participation of the President, however well-meaning. preliminary investigation by the Commission on Elections.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the
Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the HELD:
seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, No. The material operative facts alleged in the petition
that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to therein inexorably link the private respondent's principal grievance to
make. alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read:
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of
LINDO VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS an election offense:
G.R. NO. 127311 JUNE 19, 1997 (v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public
funds. Any public official or employee including barangay officials and
PUNO, J. those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their
FACTS: subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty
Petitioner Conrado Lindo and private respondent Rosario days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public
Velasco (incumbent mayor of Ternate, Cavite) were mayoralty candidates. funds for:
When petitioner was declared as the winner, Velasco filed an election (1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:
protest with the trial court. xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Judge Napoleon Dilag took over the protest (w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials
case. Velasco moved for execution pending appeal, which motion was for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices . —
granted. Dilag thus issued the writ of execution. Petitioner filed a petition During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty
for certiorari and prohibition with the COMELEC, with prayer for the days before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the
issuance of a preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in
Order and writ of execution. the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants
COMELEC denied the petition for certiorari and lifted the or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things
preliminary injunction. It ruled that the trial court did not commit grave of value chargeable against public funds.
abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution pending appeal Essentially, therefore, Civil Case No. 465 before the trial
since on the basis alone of the physical count of ballots, private court is for the enforcement of laws involving the conduct of elections the
respondent would still be ahead of petitioner by 90 votes. It also held that present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid
the examination of original ballots shall be made at the appeal proper to statutory authority to grant the Commission broader and more flexible
dispose of all the issues relative to the merits of the case. powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from
Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition. legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to
depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time.
ISSUE: Is the petition proper? Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent
Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest,

peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of
people's sacred right of suffrage — the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed
a peaceful change of government and in achieving and promoting political perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal, or on 6 July
stability. 1994.
The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the On 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of
Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations. The appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due
pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article IX-C thereof reads as follows: course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of the case
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was
and functions: divested of its jurisdiction over the case. Since the motion for execution
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. (Emphasis the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have
supplied). been otherwise if the motion was filed before the perfection of the appeal.
The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the
It is thus clear that its incorporation into the present Constitution took into jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
account the Commission's power under the Omnibus Election Code mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), which was already in force when the said motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the
Constitution was drafted and ratified, to: trial court.
xxx xxx xxx
Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the
provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
enforce and administer, . . . . 16 C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special EDDING V. COMELEC
Civil Action No. 465 before the court a quo are matters falling within the (G.R. NO. 112060 JULY 17, 1995)
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. It is not true that, as contended
by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the FRANCISCO, J.
election laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus FACTS:
Election Code. The Constitution itself grants to it exclusive original During the May 1992 elections, petitioner Norbi H. Edding
jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials. 27 Neither it and respondent Pablo S. Bernardo were among the candidates for the
is tenable that the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in office of the municipal mayor of Sibuco Zamboanga del Norte. When
the court below involves the prosecution of election offenses; the said respondent was declared the winner, petitioner filed an election protest
action seeks some reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged election with the trial court, which proclaimed the latter as the winner and declared
offenses; specifically, what is sought is the prevention of the further null and void the election of respondent.
commission of these offenses which, by their alleged nature, are Respondent appealed while petitioner moved for the
continuing. immediate execution of the decision. Bernardo opposed Edding's motion,
The petition is granted. claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction to order execution pending
appeal, and invoked Section 17 of Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which allows execution only if the judgment has become final.
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS The RTC approved Bernardo's Notice of Appeal but later
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS granted Edding's Motion, and ordered the records of the case to be
RELAMPAGOS V. CUMBA forwarded to the COMELEC. Thereafter, Edding replaced Bernardo and
(G.R. NO. 118861, APRIL 27, 1995) assumed office. Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a Petition for
Certiorari with Application for Preliminary Injunction and for Issuance of a
DAVIDE, JR., J. Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin the Order of the RTC
FACTS: granting execution pending appeal. The COMELEC gave due course to
Petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were the petition, and issued a temporary restraining order. Finally, the
candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, COMELEC issued the assailed Order, ordering respondent Judge to
Agusan del Norte. When Cumba was proclaimed the winner, petitioner cease and desist from enforcing the assailed Resolution.
filed an election protest with the trial court, which found the latter to have Petitioner argues that the COMELEC lacks jurisdiction to
won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent. issue writs of certiorari; and that the power of the RTC to grant execution
Cumba appealed to the COMELEC. The trial court gave due pending appeal in election cases has already been confirmed in the case
course to the appeal. Petitioner moved for execution pending appeal, of Tobon-Uy vs. COMELEC where it was held that "the COMELEC is
which was granted. The corresponding writ of execution was thus issued. bereft of authority to deprive Regional Trial Courts of the competence to
Since her motion for reconsideration was denied, Cumba filed with the order execution pending appeal."
COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the assailed order of the trial Respondents counter that the COMELEC has the power to
court. issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, invoking Sections 2(2)
COMELEC promulgated its resolution, declaring null and and 3 of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part:
void the order and the writ of execution issued by the lower court. Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
Accordingly, petitioner was ordered restored to her position as Municipality following powers and functions: (2) …Appellate jurisdiction over all
Mayor. contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
Respondents contend that Sec. 50 of BP Blg. 697 was general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881), citing jurisprudent courts of limited jurisdiction.
where it was declared that, indeed, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in
issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its two divisions, and shall promulgate its rule of procedure in order to
appellate jurisdiction. expedite disposition of election case, including pre-proclamation
controversies…
ISSUE: Whether the Commission has the authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari in election cases. ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has
jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari against the interlocutory order of the
HELD: Regional Trial Court (RTC) in election cases.
Yes. Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice HELD:
performing judicial power and said power includes the determination of None. The court decided to abandon the rule laid down in
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack the aforecited cases. In Relampagos vs. Cumba and the COMELEC, the
or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by Court upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to issue writs of certiorari,
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari prohibition and mandamus over election cases where it has appellate
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. jurisdiction by virtue of Section 50 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, which
In abandoning the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria provides as follows:
cases, the Court held that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. Sec. 50. Definition. —
697 providing as follows: The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive The commission is hereby vested with the exclusive
authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus involving election cases, remains in full force and effect but mandamus involving election cases.
only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of But notwithstanding the decision in Relampagos vs. Cumba,
the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the instant case
COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, when it enjoined the order of the RTC, dated July 13, 1993, granting
prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. petitioner's motion for immediate execution. Private respondent's petition
That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction before the
of discretion in granting the petitioner's motion for execution pending COMELEC is anchored on the former's claim that the trial court acted
appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all too obvious. Since both without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
the petitioner and the private respondent received copies of the decision granting execution despite the filling of a notice of appeal by private
on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed within five days from 1 respondent within the reglementary period. It appears however that on
July 1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for execution pending July 8, 1993, the same day when private respondent filed his notice of
appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal. appeal with the RTC, petitioner in turn filed his motion for immediate
Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, execution. Both actions were therefore seasonably filed within the five-day

reglementary period for filling an appeal since the decision of the RTC was COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election
promulgated in open court on July 8, 1993. contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply
The settled rule is that the mere filing of a notice of appeal established jurisprudence in support of its findings and conclusion; and
does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the
pending incidents. Where the motion for execution pending appeal was exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has
filed within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, as in the been abused to the prejudice of either party. Petition is therefore
case at bench, the filing of a notice of appeal by the opposing party is of dismissed.
no moment and does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to resolve
the motion for immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal [Note: A short lesson in Remedial Law. You must distinguish the nature of
because the court must hear and resolve it for it would become part of the the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
records to be elevated on appeal. Since the court has jurisdiction to act on which is not a mode of appeal, but rather an original action.]
the motion at the time it was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the
matter was resolved and was not lost by the subsequent action of the
opposing party. ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Considering however that the term of office for the disputed C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
mayoralty seat will already expire on June 30, 1995, in addition to the fact PEOPLE VS JUDGE INTING
that the election for the next term of office for the contested post has 187 SCRA 788 [1990]
recently been concluded, the instant petition has therefore become moot.
FACTS:
Mrs. Editha Barba filed letter-complaint against OIC Mayor
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC, for
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the
GAUDO VS COMELEC office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without
193 SCRA 78 [1991] obtaining prior pennission or clearance from COMELEC as required by
law.
FACTS: Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervision of Dumaguete City to conduct
position of mayor in the Garcia Herna.ndez, Bohol. Petitioner was the preliminary investigation of the case to file the necessary information
proclaimed duly-elected Mayor. in court and prosecute, if warranted.
In an election protest by private respondent before the RTC, After a preliminary investigation, Atty. Lituanas filed a
the court upheld the proclamation of petitioner as the duly-elected Mayor criminal case with the respondent trial court which in turn issued a warrant
of Garcia-Hernandez, by a majority of eleven (11) votes. of arrest against the Ole-Mayor.
Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the Subsequently, however, the trial court set aside its order of
COMELEC. Through its First Division, affirmed by COMELEC en bane, arrest on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine
reversed the trial court's decision and declared private respondent the probable cause pursuant to Sec 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution and
duly-ejected mayor by a plurality of five (5) votes. The COMELEC held further required Atty. Lituanas to secure the written approval of the
that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial "C" provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the
after the name "Galido" (petitioner herein) were marked ballots and, supervision and control of the latter. Atty. Lituanas failed to comply so the
therefore invalid. case was dismissed.
Petitioner filed before the Supreme court a petition for
certiorari and injunction. Private respondent moves for the dismissal of the ISSUE: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial
petition contending the following: Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed
1. Final decisions, orders or ruling of the COMELEC in election through the Provincial Fiscal, before the Regional Trial Court may take
contests involving elective municipal offices are final and cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable
executory and not appealable citing Artkle IX (C), Section 2 cause exists?
(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which is
implemented in the Rules of Procedure promulgated by the HELD:
COMELEC , particularly Part VII, Rule 39, Section 2 thereof, NO. The Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the
which reads: prosecution of election offenses. If ever the Fiscal or Prosecutor files
"Section 2 Non-reviewable decisions-Decisions in appeals information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation or
from courts of general or limited jurisdiction in election cases relating to election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He
the ejections, returns, and qualifications of municipal and barangay does not do so under the sole authority of his office (People vs. Basilla, et
officials are not appealable." al G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, ] 989). In the instant case, there is no
2. The petition involves pure questions of fat as they relate to averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the
appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is beyond the power Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to
of review of this Court. The COMELEC found that the writing "approve" the COMELEC's preliminary investigation, which is not proper.
of the letter "C" after the word "Galido" in the fifteen (15)
ballots of Precinct 14 is a clear and convincing proof of a Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
pattern or design to identify the ballots and/or voters. This "Sec. 2 The Commission on Election shall exercise the
finding should by conclusive on the Court. following powers and functions:
Petitioner, on the other hand, cites Article IX (A), Section 7 of 1. Enforce and administer all laws and
the Constitution, to support his petition. It states: "Unless otherwise regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of initiative. referendum, and recall.
each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court xxx xxx
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a xxx
copy thereof." 2. File upon a verified complaint, or on its
own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of votes,
ISSUE: May the decision by the COMELEC in election contest involving investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of
municipal officials be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for election laws, including acts or omission constituting election
certiorari by the petitioner? frauds. offenses, and malpractices" (Emphasis supplied)
HELD: In effect, the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not

YES. The fact that decision, final orders or ruling of the only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws.
Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of
preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing information in
certiorari. The proceedings in the Constitutional Commission on this court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
matter are enlightening. Thus-
"MR. REGALADO: It is understood, however, that while
these decisions with respect to barangay and municipal ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
officials are final and immediately executory and C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
therefore not appealable, that does not rule out the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BASILLA
possibility of an original special civil action for certiorari, (G.R. NOS. 83938-40, NOVEMBER 6, 1989)
prohibition, or mandamus, as the case may be, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court" FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC As an aftermath of the May 1987 congressional elections in
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of Masbate, complaints for violations of Section 261, par.a-1 (vote buying)
jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. It is settled that the and par. p (carrying of deadly weapon) of the Omnibus Election Code (BP
function f a writ of certiorari is toe keep an inferior court or tribunal within Blg. 881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate
the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave against the private respondents. After preliminary investigation of the
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. foregoing complaints, the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate the said criminal complaints. In three (3) separate

orders, accused respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio dismissed In its petition, the COMELEC contends that as an
the three (3) informations giving the following justification: “….. The record independent constitutional body, its actions on election matters may be
shows that the complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not with reviewed only on certiorari by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the
the COMELEC. The COMELEC did not investigate the case.” respondents contend that since the cases were filed in court by the
The Petition argues principally that the Commission on COMELEC as a public prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its power to
Elections ("Comelec") has authority to deputize the chief state decide election contests, the trial court has authority to order a
prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections reinvestigation.
2 (4) and (8), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and that the Comelec
did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court has the power or authority to
of complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute criminal order the Commission on Elections through its Regional Election Director
information therefore. The respondent judge therefore committed grave of Region VII or its Law Department to conduct a reinvestigation
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the case.
HELD:
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in deciding that YES. The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply
COMELEC in the case at bar failed to perform its function as provided in with the order of the trial court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation
the 1987 Constitution. in this case and to submit to the court the record of the preliminary
investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its actions is
HELD: certainly untenable.
Yes. There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with It is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power and authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all election power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative
offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the
such offenses in court. Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C) of 1987 Constitution exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the
provides…”investigate and, when appropriate prosecute cases of violation prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the
of election laws, including acts or omissions, constituting election frauds competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized
offenses, malpractices." law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense
It must be noted that while Section 265 of the Omnibus and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in
Election Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.
of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject
same time authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a
prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1987 reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so
Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be compelled to ordered by the court.
carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone: The records of the preliminary investigation required to be
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial
following powers and functions: court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information,
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of
xxx xxx xxx the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that the record of
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcementi the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is
agencies and instrumantalities of the Government, including the Armed probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free . The petition is brought in the name of the People of the
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Philippines. Only the Solicitor General can represent the People of the
xxx xxx xxx Philippines in this proceeding. In the least, the consent of the Office of the
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court Solicitor General should have been secured by the COMELEC before the
for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, filing of this petition. On this account alone, the petition should be
prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions dismissed.
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS VS. SILVA, JR
xxx xxx xxx (GR. NO. 129417 FEBRUARY 10, 1998)
The contention of private respondents that the deputation by
the Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be MENDOZA, J.:
warranted only before the elections and only to ensure tree, honest, FACTS:
orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace- The COMELEC charged private respondents Erasto
keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There is nothing in Tanciongco and Norma Castillo with violations of §27 of R.A. No. 6646,
Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a together with Zenon Uy, in twelve separate informations filed with the
pinched niggardly interpretation of the authority of the Comelec to appoint Regional Trial Court of Bataan. Tanciongco and Castillo then filed a joint
as its deputies, officials or employees of other agencies and "Omnibus Motion for Examination of Evidence to Determine the Existence
instrumentalities of the government. The prompt investigation and of Probable Cause; Suspension of Issuance of Warrant of Arrest; and
prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute an Dismissal of the Cases." Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño, who had
indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful been designated by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases,
and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election filed a comment joining in private respondents' request. In view thereof,
offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance respondent judges Silva and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases
of physical order in election precinct. ' against private respondents.
All this the respondent Judge disregarded when he motu proprio The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases
dismissed the criminal informations filed in this case. The cases he cited in to the Court of Appeals, but the respondent judges denied due course to
his identical orders can offer him no comfort at all; for these cases do not its appeal. The sole basis for the denial was the fact that the prosecutor,
relate to the authority of the Comelec to deputize the regular prosecution whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases, had earlier
arms of the Government for the investigation and prosecution of election taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC. Said prosecutor stated that
offenses and those cases are not in conflict with our ruling here. he cannot give his conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by the Comelec
as it would not be consistent with his position that he would abide by
whatever finding the court may come up with on the existence of probable
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS cause as against the accused Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo.
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
PEOPLE VS. DELGADO ISSUES:
(GR. NO. 93419-32, SEPTEMBER 18, 1990) (1) Is the order denying due course to the Notice of Appeal of the
COMELEC correct?
GANCAYCO, J.: (2) Who has authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders
FACTS: of dismissal — the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?
Comelec filed an information against each of the private
respondents for violation of Section 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus HELD:
Election Code. In three separate manifestations, the Regional Election NO. Ther order of the respondent judges denying due
Director of Region VII was designated by the COMELEC to handle the course to the Notice of Appeal of the COMELEC is not correct. . The
prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor. authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the
Private respondents, through counsels, then filed motions for COMELEC. Art. IX-C, § 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the
reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the power and function to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
conducted. An order was then issued by respondent court directing the constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." As this Court has
COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to held:
conduct a reinvestigation of said cases and to submit his report within ten In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not
(10) days after termination thereof. only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws.
This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary

investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of Section l(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least
helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for
in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. a bill of particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had until August 11,
Indeed, even before the present Constitution, the Omnibus 1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) and, before it, the 1971 Election Code (R.A. Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed timely.
No. 6388) and the 1978 Election Code (P.D. No. 1296) already gave the The instant case is different from a pre-proclamation
COMELEC the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all controversy which the law expressly mandates to be resolved in a
election offenses and to prosecute them in court. The purpose is to place summary proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX, Sec. 246; COMELEC Rules
in the hands of an independent prosecutor the investigation and of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, Sec. 2). Pre-proclamation controversies
prosecution of election offenses. should be summarily decided, consistent with the legislators' desire that
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidate be
cases act as its deputies. They derive their authority from it and not from done with dispatch and without unnecessary delay. An election protest
their offices. Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an
Prosecutor Zuño to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, office. Over and, above the desire of the candidate to win, is the deep
it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to public interest to determine the true choice of he people. For this reason, it
the trial courts the determination of whether there was probable cause for is a well-established principle that laws governing election protests must
the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases should be be liberally construed to the end that the popular will expressed in the
dismissed. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after appropriate election or public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be
preliminary investigation. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was defeated
no probable cause for proceeding against private respondents, he should We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court
have discussed the matter with the COMELEC and awaited its instruction. of Appeals.
If he disagreed with the COMELEC's findings, he should have sought WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
permission to withdraw from the cases. But he could not leave the
determination of probable cause to the courts and agree in advance to the
dismissal of the cases should the courts find no probable cause for ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
proceeding with the trial of the accused. It was, therefore, grave abuse of C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
discretion on the part of the respondent judges to rely on the manifestation ANTONIO VS. COMELEC
of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño as basis for denying due course to the GR NO. 135869, SEPTEMBER 22, 1999
notices of appeal filed by the COMELEC.
FACTS:
The parties in this case were rival candidates for the Punong
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Barangay of Barangay Ilaya, Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. Protestee
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Rustico Antonio was proclaimed as the winner. Protestant Vicente
ARUELO VS. CA Miranda, Jr. then filed an election protest before the Las Piñas MeTC,
GR NO. 107852. OCTOBER 20, 1993 which declared Miranda as the duly elected Barangay Chairman.
Antonio appealed from this judgment. Meanwhile, Miranda
FACTS: moved to execute the court's decision but such was denied and records
Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-Mayoralty candidates in were forwarded to the COMELEC Second Division.
Balagtas, Bulacan in the May 1992 elections. Gatchalian was proclaimed The COMELEC dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
as the duly elected vice-mayor. Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a petition It was stated therein that petitioner failed to perfect his appeal within the
seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent prescribed period. The Period aforestated is jurisdictional and failure of the
alteration and tampering" of votes. Aruelo also filed with the RTC a petition protestee to perfect his appeal within the said period deprives the
protesting the same election. Commission of its appellate jurisdiction.
Gatchalian moved to dismiss, claiming that: (a) the petition Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
was filed out of time; (b) there was a pending protest case before the
COMELEC; and (b) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash ISSUE: Is the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to the
deposit on the petition. COMELEC in an election protest involving a barangay position five (5)
The COMELEC denied Aruelo's petition. However, the trial days per COMELEC Rules of
court denied Gatchalian's Motion to Dismiss and ordered him to file his Procedure or ten (10) days as provided for in Republic Act
answer to the petition. 66791 and the Omnibus Election Code?
Aruelo prayed before the CA for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial court HELD:
from implementing the Order of August 11 1992, regarding the revision of In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC relied on Section
ballots. The CA belatedly issued a temporary restraining order. 21, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:
Meanwhile, Gatchalian filed with the CA another petition for certiorari (CA- "SEC. 21. Appeal - From any
G.R. SP No. 28977), again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved
of the trial court in issuing the Order, which denied his Motion for Bill of party may appeal to the Commission on
Particulars. The CA dismissed this petition for lack of merit. Elections within five (5) days after the
The CA rendered judgment, denying Gatchalian's petition, promulgation of the decision."
but declaring, at the same time, that Gatchalian's Answer With Counter- On the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of
Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed. The appellate court also lifted appeal from decisions of the Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial
the temporary restraining order and ordered the trial court to "proceed with Courts involving barangay officials is governed by Section 9 of Republic
dispatch in the proceedings below. Hence this petition. Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 9 of
Republic Act 6679 reads:
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill "SEC. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a
of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC barangay official may be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan
Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy
running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to and has been voted for a barangay office within ten (10) days after the
file his answer. proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide the
election protest within thirty (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision
HELD: of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten (10)
NO. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No. 343- days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional
M-92) with the RTC, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised trial court which shall decide the issue within thirty (30) days from receipt
Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of of the appeal and whose decision on questions of fact shall be final and
Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As non-appealable. For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-
expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules proclamation cases shall be allowed."
of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of Particulars, shall Similarly, Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code
apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule provides:
1, Part I provides: "SEC. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. - A sworn
"SEC. 2. Applicability. These rules, except Part VI, shall petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the
apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly
VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office
courts of general or limited jurisdiction It must be noted that nowhere in within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The
Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing
dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protest or quo thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be
warranto cases pending before the regular courts. appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty
rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The days from its submission, and whose decisions shall be final."
power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure No less than the 1987 Constitution (Article IX-A, Section 6
in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 6 and Article IX-C, Section 3) grants and authorizes this Commission to
[5]). promulgate its own rules of procedure as long as such rules concerning
Private respondent received a copy of the order of the RTC pleadings and practice do not diminish, increase or modify substantive
denying his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under rights. Hence, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure promulgated in 1993 as

amended in 1994 is no ordinary interpretative or administrative ruling. It is rule of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
promulgated by this Commission pursuant to a constitutionally mandated including pre proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
authority which no legislative enactment can amend, revise or repeal. heard and decided in division, provided that the motions for
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 37 Section 21) reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
provides that from the decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party bane.'
may appeal to the Commission on Elections within five (5) days after the It is clear that election cases include pre proclamation
promulgation of the decision. Rule 22 Section 9 (d) of Our Rules of controversies and all. such cases must first be heard and decided by a
Procedure further provides that an appeal from decisions of courts in Division of the Commission. The Commission sitting en bane does not
election protest cases may be dismissed at the instance of the have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance. In the
Commission for failure to file the required notice of appeal within the Comelec Rules of Procedures, pre proclamations are classified as special
prescribed period. cases and in compliance with the provision of the constitution, the two
In case at bar, Antonio filed his notice of appeal before the divisions of the Commissions are vested with the authority to hear and
trial court on the ninth (9) day from receipt of the decision appealed from decide these special cases. Rule 127 thereof governs special cases,
or four (4) days after the five-day prescribed period to appeal lapsed. especially See 9 of the said Rule provides that appeals from ruling of the
Therefore, the present appeal must be dismissed. For it is axiomatic that assigned and not by the Commission en bane.
the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down Indisputably then, the Comelec en banc acted without
by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not only mandatory but also jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals
jurisdictional. As a consequence, the failure to perfect an appeal within the of petitioners ion the special cases without first referring them to any of its
prescribed period as required by the Rules has the effect of defeating the divisions.
right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring Accordingly, the instant petitions are dismissed without
jurisdiction over the case. prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular election protests.
Petitioner's argument raises the presumption that the period
to appeal can be severed from the remedy or the appeal itself which is
provided in Section 9, Republic Act 6679 and survive on its own. The ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
presumption cannot be sustained because the period to appeal is an C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the remedy. Petitioner REYES VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO
also cites the case of Flores v. COMELEC. However, when this Court (G.R. NO. 108886, MAY 5, 1995)
stated in the aforementioned case that "Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 is
declared unconstitutional insofar as it provides that barangay election MENDOZA, J.:
contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be FACTS:
appealable to the regional trial court", it meant to preserve the first two Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo
sentences on the original jurisdiction of municipal and metropolitan trial Comia were candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang
courts to try barangay election protests cases but not, as advanced by the Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992 synchronized
petitioner, the ten-day period to appeal to the Regional Trial Court. This is elections. On May 13, 1992, during the proceedings of the Municipal
the logical and sound interpretation of subject portion of the Flores case. Board of Canvassers, private respondent moved for the exclusion of
We cannot indulge in the assumption that Congress still certain election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in counting in
intended, by the said laws, to maintain the ten (10) day period to appeal favor of petitioner Aquiles Reyes votes cast for "Reyes" only, considering
despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of the appellate jurisdiction of that there was another candidate (Epitacio Reyes) bearing the same
the regional trial court, Republic Act No. 7166 amending the Omnibus surname. However, without resolving his petition, the Municipal Board of
Election Code, evinces the intent of our lawmakers to expedite the Canvassers proclaimed on the same day petitioner as the eighth winning
remedial aspect of election controversies. The law was approved on candidate with 7,205 votes. On May 25, 1992 petitioner took his oath of
November 26, 1991, after the Flores case which was promulgated on April office. Private respondent later filed an election protest before the trial
20,1990, and presumably, the legislature in enacting the same was court. He alleged that "a vital mistake [had been] committed by the Board
cognizant of the ruling in Flores. Said law provides the same five (5) day of Canvassers in the mathematical computation of the total number of
period to appeal decisions of the trial court in election contests for votes garnered by petitioner [now private respondent]. Petitioner filed a
municipal officers to the COMELEC. Section 22 thereof reads: motion to dismiss private respondent's petition on the ground that it was
"Sec. 22. Election Contests for Municipal Officers. -All filed beyond the reglementary period of ten days from proclamation, which
election contests involving municipal offices filed with the Regional Trial petition was denied by the trial court.
Court shall be decided expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the On June 23, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision
Commission within five (5) days from promulgation or receipt of a copy annuling the proclamation of petitioner and declaring private respondent
thereof by the aggrieved party. The Commission shall decide the appeal as the eighth winning candidate for the position of councilor of the
within sixty (60) days after it is submitted for decision, but not later than six Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. A copy of the decision
(6) months after the filing of the appeal, which decision shall be final, was served on petitioner on June 26, 1992.
unappealable and executory." Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC. In
There would be no logic nor reason in ruling that a longer addition, he filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of
period to appeal to the COMELEC should apply to election contests for Appeals, to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to recognize him as the duly
barangay officials. proclaimed member of that body and prohibit it from further recognizing
And since the whole remedy was invalidated, a void was private respondent. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because
created. Thus, the COMELEC had to come in and provide for a new of petitioner's pending appeal in the COMELEC. The appellate court cited
appeal in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution. As correctly Supreme Court Circular 28-91 which prohibits the filing of multiple
pointed out by the COMELEC, Section 6, Article IX-A14 of the 1987 petitions involving the same issues. Petitioner filed a motion for
Constitution grants and authorizes the COMELEC to promulgate its own reconsideration but his motion was denied. The appellate court's decision
rules of procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure have became final and executory on December 10, 1992.
provided a uniform five (5) day period for taking an appeal consistent with Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan met in inaugural
the expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It would be absurd session on July 3, 1992, during which private respondent was recognized
and therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period for as the eighth member of the body and thereafter allowed to assume office
barangay election contests. Hence, Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC and discharge its functions.
Rules of Procedure is not in conflict with any existing law. To adopt a On the other hand, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed
contrary view would defeat the laudable objective of providing a uniform on January 22, 1993 petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had failed to
period of appeal and defy the COMELEC's constitutional mandate to enact pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period.
rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases. Petitioner then brought the present action. Petitioner
The COMELEC, therefore, did not commit an abuse of contends that both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division
discretion in dismissing the appeal. committed a grave abuse of discretion, the first, by assuming jurisdiction
over the election contest filed by private respondent despite the fact that
the case was filed more than ten days after petitioner's proclamation, and
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS the second i.e., the COMELEC's First Division, by dismissing petitioner's
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS appeal from the decision of the trial court for late payment of the appeal
SARMIENTO VS. COMELEC fee.
212 SCRA [1992]
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner violated Article IX A of the
FACTS: Constitution.
Petitioner impugn the resolution of the Comelec as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion in the, inter alias, the HELD:
Commission sitting en bane, took cognizance and decided the appeals Yes, petitioner violated Article IX A of the Constitution which
without first referring them to any of its division. provides that only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari. In the present case, he filed the present
ISSUE: petition without first filing a motion for reconsideration before the
Whether or not the Comelec en banc has the jurisdiction over the said COMELEC en banc.
resolution. It is now settled that in providing that the decisions, orders
and rulings of COMELEC "may be brought to the Supreme Court on
HELD: certiorari" the Constitution in its Art. IX, A, §7 means the special civil action
Sec. 3 Art IX-C of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: of certiorari under Rule 65, §1. Since a basic condition for bringing such
'The Comelec may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its action is that the petitioner first file a motion for reconsideration, it follows

that petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of
the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal to his present action. charge, among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the
Petitioner argues that this requirement may be dispensed province or city served by the newspaper or radio or television station.
with because the only question raised in his petition is a question of law. Some of the petitioners are apparently apprehensive that Comelec might
This is not correct. The questions raised by petitioner involve the not allocate "Comelec time" or "Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions in light of the facts among the several candidates. Should such apprehensions materialize,
of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore, not pure questions of candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations
law. effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial remedies available, so
Moreover, that a motion for reconsideration before the long at least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the Comelec is
COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a petition for certiorari is entitled to the benefit of the presumption that official duty will be or is
clear from Article 9C pars. 2 & 3 of the Constitution: being regularly carried out. It seems appropriate here to recall what
Conformably to these provisions of the Constitution all Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral Commission 7 that the
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided possibility of abuse is no argument against the concession of the power or
by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the authority involved, for there is no power or authority in human society that
decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC is not susceptible of being abused. Should it be objected that the Comelec
en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en might refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and "Comelec space," much
banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, §7, "may be brought to the the same considerations should be borne in mind. As earlier noted, the
Supreme Court on certiorari." Comelec is commanded by statute to buy or "procure" "Comelec time" and
"Comelec space" in mass media, and it must be presumed that Comelec
will carry out that statutory duty in this connection, and if it does fail to do
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS so, once again, the candidate or candidates who feel aggrieved have
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS judicial remedies at their disposal.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution
(G.R. NO. 102925 MARCH 5, 1992) may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of
exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec
FELICIANO, J.: for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for
FACTS: political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some
This is a consolidation of three cases filed before the limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. For supervision or
Supreme Court which involves the same issue. Petitioners in these cases regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable
consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the
selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) general, time-honored one — that a statute is presumed to be
individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must
provincial office) in the May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion.
claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of Petition denied for lack of merit.
the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that
Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners
maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and
repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS
of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.. VS. COMELEC
information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, (G.R. NO. 132922. APRIL 21, 1998)
petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of
candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political MENDOZA, J.:
propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the FACTS:
newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and
information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers,
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion. and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates
radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 runs under a franchise granted by Congress. The Supreme Court explained
contradictory to Articles III [4] and IX (C) (4) of the Constitution. that TELEBAP has no legal standing to file the case. A citizen will be
allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he
HELD: has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by favorable action. Members of petitioner have not shown that they have
huge campaign "war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation suffered harm as a result of the operation of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. The
of print space and air time "for campaign or other political purposes" High Court, however, recognized the legal standing of Petitioner GMA to
except to the Commission on Elections ("Comelec"). Upon the other hand, bring the constitutional challenge. GMA claims that it suffered losses
Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
procure "Comelec space" in newspapers of general circulation in every connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial
province or city and "Comelec time" on radio and television stations. election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do
Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec so. Petitioner’s allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is
space" and "Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis required to provide free air time is sufficient to give it standing to question
among all candidates within the area served by the newspaper or radio the validity of §92 of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code).
and television station involved. As pointed out in Osmeña v. COMELEC, §11(b) of R.A. No.
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of 6646 and §90 and §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 are part and parcel of a regulatory
Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and scheme designed to equalize the opportunity of candidates in an election
freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in in regard to the use of mass media for political campaigns. These
conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special statutory provisions state in relevant parts:
provision applicable during a specific limited period — i.e., "during the B.P. Blg. 881, (Omnibus Election Code)
election period." SEC. 90. Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure
It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon space in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every
freedom of speech and freedom of the press of Section 11 (b) is province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said
circumscribed by certain important limitations: [1] Section 11 (b) is limited newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or
in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited “Comelec Space” wherein candidates can announce their
in its applicability in time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge,
dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates
authority by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period within the area in which the newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45,
from 12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period; 1978 EC).
[2] Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section SEC. 92. Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio
11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, and television time to be known as “Comelec Time” which shall
including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, 4 of print space and be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates
air time for "campaign or other political purposes." Section 11 (b) does not within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations.
purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and
television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or
their qualifications, political parties and programs of government; [3] television time, free of charge, during the period of the
Section 11 (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC)
the Comelec of print space or air time, which space and time Comelec is

Thus, the law prohibits mass media from selling or donating because of the unique and pervasive influence of the broadcast media,
print space and air time to the candidates and requires the COMELEC “[n]ecessarily . . . the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is
instead to procure print space and air time for allocation to the somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and
candidates. It will be noted that while §90 of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the print media.”
COMELEC to procure print space which, as we have held, should be paid To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public
for, §92 states that air time shall be procured by the COMELEC free of broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of
charge. public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast
Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights,
process clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the
taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations without people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right
payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary source of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm
of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people’s right to
advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free air time is to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a
authorize a taking which is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the
restraint upon the use of private property.” According to petitioners, in common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in
1992, the GMA Network, Inc. lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with
of one (1) hour every morning from Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour the holding of elections is for that common good.
on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and,
further, it stands to lose in the 1998 Elections, P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC’s requirement that radio and television stations provide at least ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time. C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BLO UMPAR ADIONG VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 92 of the Omnibus Election Code is valid. (G.R. NO. 103956 MARCH 31, 1992)
HELD: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Yes, Section 92 of BP 881 is valid. FACTS:
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated
is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution,
as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other
frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other election laws. Section 15 of the said Resolution provides for lawful election
things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional propaganda while Section 21(f) thereof provides for what is unlawful. It
provision that “any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to states:
amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit
so requires.” Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or
amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or
and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political
thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, §11 of party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house
the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for “the common or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that
good.” such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)
are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through The statutory provisions sought to be enforced by
which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given COMELEC are Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code on lawful
the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere election propaganda and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 on
privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with prohibited forms of election propaganda.
the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. Thus, in Petitioner Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the 1992
De Villata v. Stanley, a regulation requiring interisland vessels licensed to elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the
engage in the interisland trade to carry mail and, for this purpose, to give posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other
advance notice to postal authorities of date and hour of sailings of vessels moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section
and of changes of sailing hours to enable them to tender mail for 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No.
transportation at the last practicable hour prior to the vessel’s departure, 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio,
was held to be a reasonable condition for the state grant of license. television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the
Although the question of compensation for the carriage of mail was not in field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this
issue, the Court strongly implied that such service could be without prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving
compensation, as in fact under Spanish sovereignty the mail was carried vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a
free. senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner
In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not
and thereafter supervising radio and television stations, the state spends received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire
considerable public funds in licensing and supervising such stations. It country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."
would be strange if it cannot even require the licensees to render public
service by giving free air time. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may
Petitioners claim that §92 is an invalid amendment of R.A. prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or
No. 7252 which granted GMA Network, Inc. a franchise for the operation private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting
of radio and television broadcasting stations. They argue that although §5 areas that it fixes.
of R.A. No. 7252 gives the government the power to temporarily use and
operate the stations of petitioner GMA Network or to authorize such use HELD:
and operation, the exercise of this right must be compensated. The basic No. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and
flaw in petitioner’s argument is that it assumes that the provision for stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated
COMELEC Time constitutes the use and operation of the stations of the areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on
GMA Network, Inc. This is not so. Under §92 of B.P. Blg. 881, the constitutional grounds.
COMELEC does not take over the operation of radio and television The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a
stations but only the allocation of air time to the candidates for the purpose poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their
of ensuring, among other things, equal opportunity, time, and the right to candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1
reply as mandated by the Constitution. Indeed, it is wrong to claim an in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by
amendment of petitioner’s franchise for the reason that B.P. Blg. 881, posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared
which is said to have amended R.A. No. 7252, actually antedated it. The to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of
provision of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 must be deemed instead to be expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of
incorporated in R.A. No. 7252. And, indeed, §4 of the latter statute does. marginal significance. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and
For the fact is that the duty imposed on the GMA Network, Inc. by its stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles
franchise to render “adequate public service time” implements §92 of B.P. needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of
Blg. 881. Undoubtedly, its purpose is to enable the government to the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the
communicate with the people on matters of public interest. financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and,
Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 singles out radio therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers or poor and
and television stations to provide free air time. They contend that without the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers
newspapers and magazines are not similarly required as, in fact, in is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC we upheld their right to the and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his
payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide under own decals or stickers for posting on his personal property. To strike down
§90. In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties.
be imposed on the grantees or licensees. The reason for this is that, as In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
already noted, the government spends public funds for the allocation and "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas
regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
print media. To require the radio and television broadcast industry to justified by the Constitution:
provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what . . . The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
the industry gets. From another point of view, this Court has also held that setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether

proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in
postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the newspapers or to specific radio or television times.
rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung
in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the
discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard GUEVARA VS. GIMENEZ
lest the restrictions on its authority, either substantive or formal, be (G.R. NO. L-17115, NOVEMBER 30, 1962)
transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or
disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as CONCEPCION, J.:
found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate FACTS:
what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review Miguel Cuaderno, the then Governor of the Central Bank of
to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the the Philippines, acting for and in behalf thereof, asked petitioner to
course of adjudication is a logical. corollary of this basic principle that the cooperate with the legal counsel of the Central Bank in defending the
Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that same and its Monetary Board in a civil case. Accordingly petitioner
fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being entered his appearance as counsel for the respondents in said case and
the supreme law. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra) argued therein, verbally and in writing.
Petition is granted. The portion of Section 15 (a) of The Governor presented to the Board and the latter
Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that approved by unanimous vote, the designation of Judge Guillermo Guevara
"decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting as counsel to collaborate with the Legal Counsel of the Central Bank. The
areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL Board also authorized the Governor to arrange with Judge Guevera the
and VOID. amount of fee which the latter will charge the Central Bank for handling
the said cases. Prior thereto the latter had sent to the Central Bank his bill
for the retainer's fee of P10, 000. The Bank Auditor sought advice thereon
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS from the Auditor General, who stated that he would not object to the
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS retainer's fees, provided that its payment was made in installments.
SANIDAD VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS With the understanding that, "in case there is no appeal from
(G.R. NO. 90878 JANUARY 29, 1990) the CFI decision, the balance will be paid in full", once, presumably, the
decision has become final. As regards the P300 per diem, the Auditor
MEDIALDEA, J.: General express however, the belief that it is "excessive and may be
FACTS: allowed in audit". Hence, the present action for mandamus to compel
RA 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC respondent to approve payment of petitioner's retainer fee and his per
ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted diem aggregating P3,300, for the 11 hearings attended by him.
into law, pursuant to which provinces included therein shall take part in a
plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act. The COMELEC ISSUE: Whether or not the Auditor General has the authority to
promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite disapprove the expenditures he deemed unwise or that the amount
on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. stipulated thereon is unreasonable?
Petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of the
"OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, assailed the HELD:
constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which The Auditor General has no mandate to disapprove
provides: expenditures which in his opinion excessive and extravagant.
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or Under our Constitution, the authority of the Auditor General,
announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before in connection with expenditures of the Government is limited to the
and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, auditing of expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or held in trust
announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to by the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof (Article XI,
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. section 2, of the Constitution). Such function is limited to a determination
Petitioner maintains that if media practitioners were to of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose; whether
express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered into in conformity
plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said
disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions
issue. thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and whether payment
COMELEC counters that the Resoultion is not violative of therefore has been authorized by the officials of the corresponding
the constitution and it is a valid implementation of its power to supervise department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the
and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass in audit the
the Constitution. It stated that it does not absolutely bar petitioner from voucher and treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion or
expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic authority to disapprove said payment upon the ground that the
Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon
through the Comelec space and airtime. is unreasonable. If he entertains such belief, he may do so more than
discharge the duty imposed upon him by the Constitution (Article XI,
ISSUE: The constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. section 2), "to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer
2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the expenditures of funds or Property which, in his opinion, are irregular,
freedom of expression and of the press during the conduct of a plebiscite. unnecessary, excessive or extravagant". This duty implies a negation of
the power to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, for its
HELD: disapproval, if he had authority therefore, would bring to the attention of
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null the aforementioned administrative officer the reasons for the adverse
and void and unconstitutional. action thus taken by the General Auditing office, and, hence, render the
It is clear in the Constitution that what was granted to the imposition of said duty unnecessary.
Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment
of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public OROCIO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. (G.R. NO. 75959 AUGUST 31, 1992)
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section
11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec FACTS:
has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by An accident occurred at the Malaya Thermal Plant of the
media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during National Power Corporation (NPC), when the plug from the leaking tube
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of gave way, thereby releasing steam and hot water which hit two of the
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor employees working on the tube leak.
the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. The NPC initially advanced this amount by setting it up as an
Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory account receivable from OPLGS (employees’ agency) and deducted on a
basis. staggered basis from the latter's billings against NPC until the same was
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's fully satisfied. OPLGS requested for a refund of the total amount deducted
freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum from their billings representing payment of the advances made by the
where he may express his view. NPC. Petitioner, as officer-in-charge, recommended favorable action on
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The OPLGS' request.
people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make Thus, the amount for the hospitalization expenses was
a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion refunded to the contractor OPLGS. In Certificate of Settlement and
of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues Balances (CSB) No. 01-04-83 prepared by respondent Jose M. Agustin,
presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on Unit Auditor of the COA assigned to the NPC-MRRC, the refund of the
the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec hospitalization expenses was disallowed for "[u]nder the NPC-O.P.
spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but Landrito contract, there is no employer-employee relationship between the
they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public

Corporation and the latter's employees." Hence, the NPC is not
answerable for such expenses. HELD:
A Debit Memorandum was issued in petitioner's name Yes. The Compromise Agreement entered between the City
debiting his account with the NPC for the amount of the hospitalization of Cebu and Sps. De la Cerna was constitutional.
expenses. Petitioner claims that he prepared the questioned legal opinion The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable
in the performance of his official functions as mandated by law. At the time settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a
he rendered it, he was the officer-in-charge of the NPC's Office of the compromise relative thereto, are indubitably within its authority and
General Counsel. Section 15-A of its charter provides that all legal matters capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in which
shall be handled by the General Counsel of the Corporation. As such, he it is involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only
provides legal advice and/or renders legal opinions on legal matters recognized but even encouraged by law.
involving the NPC. Since this function is quasi-judicial in nature, the That the City of Cebu complied with the relevant formalities
discretion exercised in the discharge thereof is not subject to re- contemplated by law can hardly be doubted. The compromise agreement
examination or controversion by the respondents; when the latter did what was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
was proscribed, they in effect usurped the statutory function of the which approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure,
General Counsel of the NPC. There is no law which expressly authorizes particularly the stipulation for the payment of P30, 000.00 to the de la
the respondents to re-examine or controvert the General Counsel's Cerna family. Neither may it be disputed that since, as a municipal
opinion. Petitioner additionally stresses that he is not personally liable for corporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued, it has the
the amount disallowed as he was merely performing his official functions. authority to settle or compromise suits, as well as the obligation to pay just
Besides, his questioned opinion is not alleged to have been rendered with and valid claims against it.
malice and bad faith.
ISSUES: ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

(1) Does the legal opinion of petitioner, which was relied upon for the D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
disbursement in question, preclude or bar the COA from disallowing in SAMBELI V. PROVINCE OF ISABELA
post-audit such disbursement? G.R. NO. 92279 JUNE 18, 1992
(2) Has the General Counsel of the COA the authority to decide a motion
to reconsider the disallowance in question? FACTS:
(3) Is the petitioner personally liable for the disallowance on the theory that An agreement was entered into by and between the Province of
the disbursement was made on the basis thereof? Isabela and ECS Enterprises for the purchase of 300 units of
wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels and 1 set of radio communication
HELD: equipment. Out of the items delivered, a partial delivery was made. The
1. Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions conferred upon the COA a more Provincial Auditor allowed the payment of only 50% “pending receipt of
active role and invested it with broader and more extensive powers. These reply to the query to Price Evaluation Division of COA.”
were not meant to make it a toothless tiger, but a dynamic, effective, A second delivery was made and payment of 50% was allowed by
efficient and independent watchdog of the Government. the Provincial Auditor. Based on the findings of the Price Evaluation
In determining whether an expenditure of a Government agency or Division of COA, there has been an overpricing. The President/GM of ECS
instrumentality such as the NPC is irregular, unnecessary, excessive, Enterprises made no comment on the overpricing but instead proposed a
extravagant or unconscionable, the COA should not be bound by the 10% deduction on the unpaid balance. The Provincial Auditor forwarded
opinion of the legal counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may the matter to the COA Regional Director who formally endorsed the stand
have been the basis for the questioned disbursement; otherwise, it would of the Provincial Auditor.
indeed become a toothless tiger and its auditing function would be a ECS Enterprises appealed to COA, which denied the appeal.
meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon lights then should be nothing Hence the present petition.
more than the pertinent laws and its rules and regulations.
2. No. The General Counsel of the COA does not have the authority to ISSUE: Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
decide a motion to reconsider the disallowance in question The COA, both decision of the Provincial Auditor and the Regional Director?
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, is a collegial body. It must resolve
cases presented to it as such. Its General Counsel cannot act for the HELD:
Commission for he is not even a Commissioner thereof. He can only offer No. In the exercise of its regulatory power vested upon it by the
legal advice or render an opinion in order to aid the COA in the resolution Constitution, COA adheres to the policy that government funds and
of a case or a legal question. property should be full protected and conserved and that irregular,
3. Even if we assume that the disallowance was proper, there would still unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds
be no basis for directly holding petitioner liable. owned by, or pertaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions,
If he rendered the opinion in the just performance of his official duties and agencies and instrumentalities (Article IX (D-1) Section 2(1), 1987
within the scope of his assigned tasks, he would not be personally liable Constitution) . That authority extends to the accounts of all persons
for any injury that may result therefrom. respecting funds or properties received or held by them in any
Compromise Agreement between the City of Cebu and accountable capacity. (Section 26, P.D. No. 1445). In the exercise of its
Spouses de la Cerna which involves monetary consideration was upheld jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal responsibility that rests
constitutional. directly with the head and whether or not there has been loss or wastage
of government resources.
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the petition is dismissed.
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
OSMEÑA VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
(G.R. NO. 110045 NOVEMBER 29, 1994) D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
BUSTAMANTE VS. COMMISSIONER ON AUDIT
FACTS: (G.R. NO. 103309, NOVEMBER 27, 1992)
Reynaldo de la Cerna, the son of the de la Cerna Spouses
was stabbed by an unknown assailant. He was rushed to the Cebu City CAMPOS, JR. J.:
Medical Center but later died due to severe loss of blood. His parents FACTS:
claimed that Reynaldo would not have died were it not for the "ineptitude, Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of the National
gross negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and incompetence of the Power Corporation (NPC) for the Northern Luzon Regional Center
medical staff" of the hospital. covering the provinces of Rizal up to Batanes. As such he was issued a
The Spouses thus filed suit for damages against the city of government vehicle. Pursuant to NPC policy as reflected in the Board
Cebu, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and five physicians of the Cebu City Resolution No. 81-95 authorizing the monthly disbursement of
Medical Center. transportation allowance, the petitioner, in addition to the use of
The parties entered into a compromise agreement, which government vehicle, claimed his transportation allowance for the month of
included a provision for the payment of the sum of P30, 000.00 to the January 1989. Ppetitioner received an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable
plaintiffs by defendant City of Cebu. The agreement was submitted to the from respondent Regional Auditor Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City, which ratified the same. The P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation allowance.
sanggunian authorized "the City Budget Officer, Cebu City, to include in Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Regional
Supplemental Budget No. IV of the City . . . for the year 1989 the amount Auditor denied. Petitioner appealed to COA, which denied the appeal.
of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30, 000.00) PESOS for financial assistance to Hence, this petition.
the parents of the late Reynaldo de la Cerna, all of Cebu City.
Respondent COA disallowed the "financial assistance" thus ISSUE: Did the COA grave abuse of discretion in its denial to give due
granted to the Spouses, averring that it is not within the powers of the course to the petitioner’s appeal? Did the COA, in the exercise of its
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu to provide, either under the general constitutional powers, usurp the statutory functions of the NPC Board of
welfare clause or even on humanitarian grounds, monetary assistance Directors?
that would promote the economic condition and private interests of certain
individuals only. HELD:
No. It is beyond dispute that the discretion exercised in the denial
ISSUE: Whether or not the Compromise Agreement between the City of of the appeal is within the power of the Commission on Audit as it is
Cebu and Spouses de la Cerna which involves monetary consideration provided in the Constitution:
constitutional?

Sec. 2. The Commission on Audit shall have the following powers and
functions: HELD:
(1) Examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with law and regulations, and No. The COA is clothed under Section 2(2), Article IX-D of
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held the 1987 Constitution with the "exclusive authority, subject to the
in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate
corporations; keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such accounting and auditing rules, and regulations including those for the
period vouchers pertaining thereto; and promulgate accounting and prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention of extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of and properties." The authority granted under this constitutional provision,
funds and property. . . . (Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution) being broad and comprehensive enough, enables COA to adopt as its
We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's contention that the own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of
Commission, in the exercise of its power granted by the Constitution, repromulgation, already existing rules and regulations. It may also expand
usurped the statutory functions of the NPC Board of Directors for its leads the coverage thereof to agencies or instrumentalities under its audit
to the absurd conclusion that a mere Board of Directors of a government- jurisdiction. It is in this light that we view COA Memorandum No. 88-565
owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a resolution, can put to issued on August 1, 1988.
naught a constitutional provision which has been ratified by the majority of WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for being
the Filipino people. If We will not sustain the Commission's power and moot and academic.
duty to examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to this particular
expenditures or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this
government-owned and controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
rendering inutile this Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the BAGATSING VS. COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
government's, and ultimately, the people's property. (G.R. NO. 112399 JULY 14, 1995)
WHEREOF, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
Petron is a government acquired company aimed to provide
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS for a buffer against the vagaries of oil prices in the international market by
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT serving as a counterfoil against price manipulation that may go uncheck if
SALIGUMBA all oil companies were foreign-owned. It owns the largest, most modern
VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT complex refinery in the Philippines and is also the country's biggest
(G.R. NO. L-61676, OCTOBER 18, 1982) combined retail and wholesale market of refined petroleum products.
Following President Corazon Aquino’s desire to raise revenue for the
ABAD SANTOS, J.: government and the ideal of leaving business to private sector, the
FACTS: privatization of Petron was initiated. This privatization was subsequently
On the basis of the sworn complaint of Editha Saligumba, approved by President Fidel V. Ramos as recommended by PNOC and
the COA instituted the administrative case against Leonardo Estella, the Committee on Privatization. 40 % was to be sold to a strategic
Auditing Examiner III, in the Auditor's Office of Misamis Occidental. The partner, 40% was to be retained by the government and the remaining
charge was that the respondent raped Editha Saligumba on several 20% was to be offered to the public. The floor bid price was finally set at
occasions. us$440 million
On April 12, 1982, the COA rendered a decision with the The bidding for the 40% block share was participated by
following judgment: PETRONAS, ARAMCO and WESTMONT. WESTMONT’s proposal was
Wherefore, for insufficiency of evidence, the instant charge rejected for not having met the pre-qualification criteria of financial
is hereby dropped. Respondent is, however, warned to comport himself capability and lack of technical and management expertise. The bid of
henceforth in such a manner as would forestall the filing of similar ARAMCO was for US$502 million while the bid of PETRONAS was for
complaints in the future. US$421 million. ARAMCO was declared the winning bidder.
Editha Saligumba now wants The Court to review the COA Petitioner argues that there was a failed bidding as provided
decision. She insists that the decision of the COA is contrary to the for in COA circular No. 89-296. It provides that there is a failure of public
evidence. auction when: 1) there is only one offeror; or (2) when all the offers are
non-complying or unacceptable.
ISSUE: Can the Supreme Court review COA decisions on administrative
matters? ISSUE: Whether or not the public bidding was tainted with haste and
arbitrariness because there was a failed bidding for having only one
HELD: offeror?
No. The petition has to be dismissed for the following
reasons: HELD:
1. Our power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to No. While two offerors were disqualified, PETRONAS for
administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel. submitting a bid below the floor price and WESTMONT for technical
2. Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review decisions on reasons, not all the offerors were disqualified. To constitute a failed
administrative matters as mentioned above, We can not do so on factual bidding under the COA Circular, all the offerors must be disqualified.
issues; Our power to review is limited to legal issues. Petitioners urge that in effect there was only one bidder and
that it can not be said that there was a competition on "an equal footing.
But the COA Circular does not speak of accepted bids but of offerors,
without distinction as to whether they were disqualified.
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT procedure to be followed by government offices and corporations, had
PHILIPPINE AIRLINESVS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT upheld the validity and legality of the questioned bidding. The
(G.R. NO. 91890 JUNE 9, 1995) interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight
than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to
ROMERO, J.: administer.
FACTS:
At the time of the filing of the petition, majority of PAL’s
shares of stock was owned by the GSIS. To assure itself of continuous, ARTICLE X - LOCAL GOVERNMENT
reliable and cost-efficient supply of fuel, PAL adopted a system of bidding BORJA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
out its fuel requirements under a multiple supplier set-up whereby PAL (G.R. NO. 133495 SEPTEMBER 3, 1998)
awarded to the lowest bidder 60% of its fuel requirements and to the
second lowest bidder the remaining 40%, provided it matched the price of MENDOZA, J.
the lowest bidder. FACTS:
COA wrote PAL a letter stating: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-
It has come to our attention that PAL international fuel mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. In
supply contracts are expiring this August 31, 1989. In this connection, you 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
are advised to desist from bidding the company's fuel supply contracts, incumbent. In 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a 3-year term. On
considering that existing regulations require government-owned or May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term.
controlled corporations and other agencies of government to procure their Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros
petroleum product requirements from PETRON Corporation. relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja Jr.,
PAL sought reconsideration but was denied by COA. A final also a mayoralty candidate, sought Capco's disqualification, arguing that
appeal for reconsideration was also denied in the now assailed COA the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms
Decision No. 1127. by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another
term after that.
ISSUE: Did respondent commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to The COMELEC ruled petitioner’s favor and declared
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering PAL to desist from bidding the Capco’s disqualification. However, on motion of private respondent, the
company’s fuel supply contracts?

COMELEC reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for BAYAN MUNA Representatives SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A.
mayor. CASIÑO, and JOEL G. VIRADOR, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY
Representative LIZA L. MAZA, ANAKPAWIS Representatives
ISSUE: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor RAFAEL V. MARIANO and CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Rep. FRANCIS G.
by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to ESCUDERO, Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, Rep. LORENZO R.
have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit? TAÑADA III, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO and RENATO M.
REYES, JR. of BAYAN, MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ of KARAPATAN,
HELD: ANTONIO L. TINIO of ACT, FERDINAND GAITE of COURAGE,
No. Article X, §8 of the Constitution provides, that the term of GIOVANNI A. TAPANG of AGHAM, WILFREDO MARBELLA of KMP,
office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be LANA LINABAN of GABRIELA, AMADO GAT INCIONG, RENATO
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for CONSTANTINO, JR., DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN, SHARON R.
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for DUREMDES of the NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the PHILIPPINES, and BRO. EDMUNDO L. FERNANDEZ (FSC) of the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS OF THE
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to PHILIPPINES (AMRSP), petitioners, vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same capacity as Executive Secretary, ROMULO NERI, in his capacity as
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has Director-General of the NATIONAL ECONOMIC and DEVELOPMENT
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also AUTHORITY (NEDA) and the Administrator of the NATIONAL
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO), respondents.
before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by
considering the following cases or situations: FACTS:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari,
by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the next prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it
mayor in the next election? is unconstitutional. EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads:
by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND
expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO
applying the term limit. Under Art. X, §8, voluntary renunciation of the STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID)
office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE
for the full term only if the term is one "for which he was elected." Since A DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER
he was elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His PURPOSES
resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term. Under EO 420, the President directs all government
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a
term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID)
twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next systems. The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format
election? are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility,
Yes, because he has served only two full terms and provide convenience to the people served by government entities.
successively. Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home
because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of
provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight;
has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served (12) Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent
three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is distinguishing features like moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification
considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation Number. Section 5 of EO 420 prescribes the safeguards on the collection,
before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right
elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected to privacy. The following safeguards are instituted:
three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used
terms. only for purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order; aEAIDH
by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in
the purpose of applying Art. X, §8. Suppose he is twice elected after that violation of a person's right to privacy be allowed or tolerated under this
term, is he qualified to run again in the next election? order;
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the
the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. identification system shall be instituted;
Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and
interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written authorization of the
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;
in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by
only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to advanced security features and cryptographic technology;
choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall
a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting be required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or under such
him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall
mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is prescribe.
just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first
term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit. ISSUES:
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord (1) Whether or not EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the
with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the President.
people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political (2) Whether or not EO 420 infringes on the citizen's right to privacy.
power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice
is not unduly curtailed. HELD:
Further, resort to historical examination would show (1) No, EO 420 is not a usurpation of legislative power by the President.
adherence to the fundamental tenet of representative democracy wherein Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. — All government agencies and
the people should be allowed to choose those whom they please to government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their
govern them. To bar the election of a local official because he has already members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order." EO
served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their
operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this functions under existing laws. These government entities have already
principle. been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these
government entities are the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayor's Office, LTO,
PRC and similar government entities. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these
2006 CASES government entities to "adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system." Thus, all
government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing
[G.R. NO. 167798. APRIL 19, 2006.] laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR IDs.
UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. Second, the President may by executive or administrative
USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, order direct the government entities under the Executive department to
MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN, petitioners, vs. THE adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the
DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall have control of all
AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and executive departments, bureaus and offices." The same Section also
MANAGEMENT, respondents. mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the
[G.R. NO. 167930. APRIL 19, 2006.] President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their

functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID government one (1) transponder free of charge for the government's
format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and exclusive use for non-commercial purpose, as well as the right of first
convenience to the public. The President's constitutional power of control refusal to another one (1) transponder in the Philippine satellite, if
is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation. available. 4 The Philippine government, through the DOTC, was tasked
Of course, the President's power of control is limited to the under the MOU to secure from the InternationalTelecommunication Union
Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the required orbital slot(s) and frequency assignment(s) for the Philippine
the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply satellite.
to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also PASI itself was organized by the consortium in 1996. The
authorized to issue voter's ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International
establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a Telecommunication Union two (2) orbital slots, designated as 161º East
single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government. Longitude and 153º East Longitude, for Philippine satellites. On 28 June
Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the 1996, PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr.,
laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating seeking for official Philippine government confirmation on the assignment
government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, of the two aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its satellites,
improve public services. which PASI had designated as the Agila satellites. Secretary Lagdameo,
The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format Jr. replied in a letter dated 3 July 1996, confirming "the Philippine
under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in Government's assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to
general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is [PASI] for its [Agila] satellites."
simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are PASI avers that after having secured the confirmation from
faithfully executed. the Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations for the
launching, operation and management of its satellites, including the
(2) No, EO 420 does not infringe on the citizen’s right to privacy. Section availment of loans, the increase in its capital, negotiation with business
3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform partners, and an initial payment of US$3.5 Million to the French satellite
ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; manufacturer. However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary
(3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) for Communications, allegedly "embarked on a crusade to malign the
Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two name of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI."
index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing Lichauco's purported efforts against PASI culminated allegedly in her
features like moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number. offering orbital slot 153º East Longitude for bidding to other parties
These limited and specific data are the usual data required sometime in December 1997, despite the prior assignment to PASI of the
for personal identification by government entities, and even by the private said slot. It was later claimed by PASI that Lichauco subsequently
sector. Any one who applies for or renews a driver's license provides to awarded the orbital slot to an entity whose indentity was unknown to PASI.
the LTO all these 14 specific data. Thus, a complaint was filed against Lichauco for damages. A
The data collected and stored for the unified ID system Motion to Dismiss was then filed by Lichauco. She rooted her prayer for
under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself the dismissal of the complaint primarily on the grounds that the suit is a
will show only eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID suit against the State which may not be sued without its consent; that the
card system under EO 420 will even require less data collected, stored complaint stated no cause of action; and that the petitioners had failed to
and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO 420. exhaust administrative remedies by failing to seek recourse with the Office
Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in of the President.
determining the kind, nature and extent of data to be collected and stored In an order 13 dated 14 August 1998, the RTC denied the
for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and motion to dismiss. Lichauco assailed the RTC order through a Petition for
record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, which subsequently
addition, government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these nullified the RTC order.
specific data, seven less data than what the Supreme Court's ID shows.
Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to ISSUE: Whether or not the suit against Lichauco, the undersecretary of
government entities prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, DOTC, is a suit against the State.
and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy.
Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are instituted: HELD:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the
only for purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. 'Inasmuch as
to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order; the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
violation of a person's right to privacy be allowed or tolerated under this against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
order; violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same
identification system shall be instituted; tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written authorization of the claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and
Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data; property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the
advanced security features and cryptographic technology; State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
be required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or under such immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall Thus, Lichauco, in alleging in her Motion to Dismiss that she is shielded by
prescribe. the State's immunity from suit, to hypothetically admitted the truth of the
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID allegations in the complaint. Such hypothetical admission has to be
system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of government deemed a concession on her part that she had performed the tortious or
entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, damaging acts against the petitioners, which if true, would hold her liable
reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject for damages.
of executive issuance under the President's constitutional power of control The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and the RTC is ordered
over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under to try the case on its merits.
the President's constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive [G.R. NO. 171396. MAY 3, 2006.]
Order No. 420 is declared VALID. PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD
LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER
R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES,
[G.R. NO. 142362. MAY 3, 2006.] CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, petitioners, vs. GLORIA
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. and MICHAEL C. U. DE MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-
GUZMAN, complainants, vs. JOSEFINA TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO
Undersecretary for Communications, Department of Transportation CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL
and Communication (DOTC), respondent. GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF,
FACTS: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, respondents.
Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) is a duly
organized corporation, whose President and Chief Executive Officer is co- [G.R. NO. 171409. MAY 3, 2006.]
petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a NIÑEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC.,
consortium of private telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the DOTC, HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO,
through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of respondents.
a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. Under the MOU, the launch
of the satellite was to be an endeavor of the private sector, and the [G.R. NO. 171485. MAY 3, 2006.]
satellite itself to be owned by the Filipino-owned consortium (subsequently FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO,
organized as PASI). The consortium was to grant the Philippine TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA,

SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon
ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J. City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the
VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B. newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed
MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE outside the building.
ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G. A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily
VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-
FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL ISSUE: Whether or not PP1017 and G.O. 5 are constitutional.
LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG, petitioners,
vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. HELD:
CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional
DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP, respondents. suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed
[G.R. NO. 171483. MAY 3, 2006.] earlier. However, PP 1017's extraneous provisions giving the President
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to
ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose
(NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17,
CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a
ROQUE M. TAN, petitioners, vs. HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE business affected with public interest.
SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP the President — acting as Commander-in-Chief — addressed to
DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO, respondents. subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly,
it also provides a valid standard — that the military and the police should
[G.R. NO. 171400. MAY 3, 2006.] take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." But the words "acts of
SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made
AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, respondents. punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said
G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law
[G.R. NO. 171489. MAY 3, 2006.] has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. determine the limits of the AFP's authority in carrying out this portion of
RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, G.O. No. 5.
FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C.
BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND REASONS FOR THE RULING (IMPORTANT POINTS TO REMEMBER):
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), petitioners, vs. HON. 1) The President is granted an Ordinance Power under
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, 1987). She may issue any of the following:
AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing for rules
PNP CHIEF, respondents. of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive
[G.R. NO. 171424. MAY 3, 2006.] orders.
LOREN B. LEGARDA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL- Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate
ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN- to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties
CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR- as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or
GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force
respondents. of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on matters of
FACTS: administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 in memorandum orders.
declaring a state of national emergency, thus: Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on matters
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be
Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . . embodied in memorandum circulars.
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the
prevent or suppress . . . rebellion. . . ," and in my capacity as their President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent President Arroyo's ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances.
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President
or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of
hereby declare a State of National Emergency. Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
Thereafter, the President issued G.O. No. 5 implementing This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
PP1017. It called upon the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative
PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article
carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
Immediately after the issuance of PP1017 and G.O. No. 5, of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo's exercise
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power of legislative power by issuing decrees.
I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows
governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With
which to the President's mind were organized for purposes of respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to enforce or implement
destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property
announced that "warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only
media, can already be implemented”. order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to
Those who staged rallies and public assemblies were suppress lawless violence.
violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained 2) A distinction must be drawn between the President's
policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and to exercise
tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18,
massed participants. Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
On the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, operatives of the constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold
CIDG and PNP raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding constitutional issues arise.
team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in Thereafter, Richard married the respondent, Candelaria
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to Guersey-Dalaygon, a Filipino citizen. They had two children Kimberly and
declare the existence of a state of war. Kevin. He died with a will. He left his entire estate to his second wife,
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress Candelaria, except his shares of stocks with A/G Interiors. The latter was
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to bequeathed to Kyle Guersey. His will was also probated in the U.S.A and
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and in the Philippines.
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by The ancilliary administrator in the probate of the will of
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next Richard here in the Philippines filed a project of partition with the probate
adjournment thereof. court wherein 2/5 of Richard's 3/4 undivided interest in the Makati property
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard's
refers not only to war but also to "other national emergency." If the three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under
intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire
President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy." Since
to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and
the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire 3/4 undivided
have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent. The
authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national respondent’s opposition was sustained by the probate court.
emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could The respondent also filed with the Court of Appeals a
validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the petition for the annulment of the judgment of the probate court with
absence of a Congressional enactment. regards to the probate of the will of Audrey here in the Philippines.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty
over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution
interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. of Audrey's estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati
materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely 3/4 thereof,
sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests
matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other. over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property
Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, should now pertain to respondent. The Court of Appeals sustained the
previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read respondent and ordered the annulment of the decisions of the probate
together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers. court.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers.
This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to ISSUE: Whether or not the passing of the land to respondent is valid
delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate despite the fact that records do not show when and how the Guerseys
a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave acquired the Makati property.
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet
and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to HELD:
allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to Yes, the passing of the land to respondent is valid. The
certain conditions, thus: Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American
(1) There must be a war or other emergency. citizens who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. not show when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution,
Congress may prescribe. the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, and other
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were
national policy declared by Congress. 124 reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of v. Quasha, the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946,
the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in
affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation,
generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does
"the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of
refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer
may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15,
delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986
thereof. Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of
he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born
claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the citizen.
President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly
from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it
reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The executive to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
Power shall be vested in a President . . . . ;" that "he shall take Care that title of the transferee is rendered valid. In this case, since the Makati
the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in- property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the
3) Since there is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the
President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is achieved.
absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate
arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over
the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and [G.R. NO. 146459. JUNE 8, 2006.]
gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the HEIRS OF DICMAN, namely: ERNESTO DICMAN, PAUL DICMAN,
name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the FLORENCE DICMAN FELICIANO TORRES, EMILY TORRES,
President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the TOMASITO TORRES and HEIRS OF CRISTINA ALAWAS and BABING
Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the "acts of terrorism" portion COSIL, petitioners, vs. JOSE CARIÑO and COURT OF APPEALS,
of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. respondents.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the
military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and FACTS:
appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of On advice of his lawyer and because there were already
their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered many parcels of land recorded in his name, Sioco Cariño caused the
illegal. survey of the land in controversy in the name of Ting-el Dicman. The
latter executed a public instrument entitled Deed of Conveyance of Part
Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land with Sioco Cariño. It stated that
[G.R. NO. 139868. JUNE 8, 2006.] he is an applicant for a patent over a parcel of land. That Mr. Sioco
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY- Cariño has advanced all expenses for said survey for me and in my name,
DALAYGON, respondent. and also all other expenses for the improvement of said land, to date; that
for and in consideration of said advance expenses, to me made and
FACTS: delivered by said Mr. Sioco Cariño, I hereby pledge and promise to
Spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey were convey, deliver and transfer unto said Sioco Cariño, of legal age, married
American citizens. They resided in the Philippines for thirty years. They to Guilata Acop, and resident of Baguio, P.I., his heirs and assigns, one
adopted Kyle Guersey. When Audrey died she left a will. Her estate half (1/2) of my title, rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of
consisted of a real estate property in Makati City, a bank account and land; same to be delivered, conveyed and transferred in a final form,
shares of stocks in A/G Interiors. She left her entire estate to Richard. according to law, to him, his heirs and assigns, by me, my heirs, and
Her will was admitted to probate in Maryland, U.S.A and in the Philippines.

assigns, as soon as title for the same is issued to me by proper
authorities.
Thereafter, Sico Cariño sold the said land to his son
Guzman Cariño through an Absolute Deed of Sale. Thereafter, Guzman
performed all acts of ownership over the land. He filed an opposition to
the petition of the heirs of Ting-el Dicman establishing ownership over the
questioned land. It was found by the court that Lot 76-A belongs to the
Dicmans. But there are still adverse claims over Lot 76-B. Thus, hearings
should still be held.
Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition
was pending in the trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued
Proclamation No. 628 "excluding from the operation of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land known as 'Igorot
Claims' situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the same open to
disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land Act."
The Proclamation further provided that the "Igorot Claims" enumerated
therein shall be "subject to the condition that except in favor of the
government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired by
virtue of this proclamation shall not be encumbered or alienated within a
period of fifteen years from and after the date of issuance of patent." One
such claim pertained to the "Heirs of Dicman,"
Before the trial court could dispose of the case, the Supreme
Court promulgated Republic v. Marcos which held that Courts of First
Instance of Baguio have no jurisdiction to reopen judicial proceedings on
the basis of Republic Act No. 931. As a consequence, on July 28, 1978,
the trial court dismissed the petition to reopen Civil Reservation Case No.
1, G.L.R.O. 211 insofar as Lot 76-B was concerned, and the certificate of
title issued pursuant to the partial decision involving Lot 76-A was
invalidated. The trial court stated that the remedy for those who were
issued titles was to file a petition for revalidation under Presidential Decree
No. 1271, as amended by Presidential Decrees No. 1311 and 2034.
After the dismissal of the case, Guzman Cariño was left
undisturbed in his possession of the subject property until his death on
August 19, 1982.
On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of
Ting-el Dicman, revived the foregoing case by filing a complaint for
recovery of possession with damages involving the subject property with
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 59-R. The RTC rendered a decision
in favor of the private respondent. The RTC’s decision was appealed to
the CA. The latter affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Dicmans as indigenous people are entitled to

the land in controversy.
HELD:
No, the Dicmans as indigenous people are entitled to the
land in controversy. Petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 628 issued
by then President Carlos P. Garcia on January 8, 1960 had the effect of
"segregating" and "reserving" certain Igorot claims identified therein,
including one purportedly belonging to the "Heirs of Dicman," and
prohibiting any encumbrance or alienation of these claims for a period of
15 years from acquisition of patent. But by the time the Proclamation had
been issued, all rights over the property in question had already been
vested in private respondent. The executive issuance can only go so far
as to classify public land, but it cannot be construed as to prejudice vested
rights. Moreover, property rights may not be altered or deprived by
executive fiat alone without contravening the due process guarantees of
the Constitution and may amount to unlawful taking of private property to
be redistributed for public use without just compensation.
The recognition, respect, and protection of the rights of
indigenous peoples to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and
institutions are vital concerns of the State and constitute important public
policies which bear upon this case. To give life and meaning unto these
policies the legislature saw it fit to enact Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, as a culminating
measure to affirm the views and opinions of indigenous peoples and
ethnic minorities on matters that affect their life and culture. The provisions
of that law unify an otherwise fragmented account of constitutional,
jurisprudential and statutory doctrine which enjoins the organs of
government to be vigilant for the protection of indigenous cultural
communities as a marginalized sector, to protect their ancestral domain
and ancestral lands and ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-
being, and to guard their patrimony from those inclined to prey upon their
ignorance or ductility. As the final arbiter of disputes and the last bulwark
of the Rule of Law this Court has always been mindful of the highest
edicts of social justice especially where doubts arise in the interpretation
and application of the law. But when in the pursuit of the loftiest ends
ordained by the Constitution this Court finds that the law is clear and
leaves no room for doubt, it shall decide according to the principles of right
and justice as all people conceive them to be, and with due appreciation of
the rights of all persons concerned.

I. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION; AMENDMENTS AND REVISION

1. Francisco v. House of Representatives
(G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
C i ee J ice c d c a i e iga i , i aid f legi la i , he a e f
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
he S e e C f c l able i la i f he C i i , be a al f he blic ust and other
high c i e . The c lai a e d ed b H e Re e e a i e , a d a efe ed he H e
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
c lai a fficie i f , b ed di i he a e 22 Oc be 2003 f bei g
insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with
the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied b a Re l i f
E d e e /I each e ig ed b a lea 1/3 f all he Me be f he H e f
Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court
against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article
XI f he C i i ha [ ] i each e ceedi g hall be i i ia ed agai he ame official
e ha ce i hi a e i d f e ea .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second impeachment is unconstitutional?
HELD:
Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning
of Section 3(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once and impeachment complaint has been initiated in
the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along
with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period
The well-settled principles of constitutional construction was also discussed in this case,
namely; First, verbal legis, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Second, ratio legis est anima, where
there is ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of
the framers. Third, ut magis valeat quam pereat, the Constitution has to be interpreted as a whole.
In the case at bar, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily,
the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.
2. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

(G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991)
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
On July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil
Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality
of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13,
Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
Ci il Libe ie U i a e ha b i e f he h a e le he i e ided i hi
C i i , he l e ce i agai h ldi g a he ffice e l e i G e e ae
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article VII; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article VIII.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional?
HELD:
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Article VII in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Article
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to
their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations,
EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the
express mandate of Sec 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members
of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above
clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet
members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule
laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
e ide he c i i a ife i e a d he e le de a di g he e f.
3. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

(G.R. No. 1221156, February 3, 1997)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Pursuant to a government decree, Government Insurance Service System (GSIS) decided to
sell through a public bidding 30% to 51% of the issues and outstanding shares of respondent Manila
Hotel Corporation (MHC).
On September 18, 1995, a close bidding was held between Manila Hotel Price Corporation, a
Filipino Corporation and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian Firm. Manila Prince Hotel Corporation offered
to buy 51% or 15, 300,000 shares of the MHC at 41.58 PhP per share while Renong Berhad bid for
the same at 44 PhP per share or 2.42 PhP more than the bid of Manila Hotel Prince Corporation.
In a letter to GSIS, the petitioner matched the bid price of the Renong Berhad but GSIS
rejected the offer. Petitioner filed a prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court (SC).
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution and argued that since 51%
of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent
GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any
transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
Respondents contend that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy and that it is not a self-executing provision which needs
implementing legislation/s for it to be effective. Furthermore, they maintain that the mandate of the
constitution is addressed to the State and not to GSIS which has a personality of its own which is
separate and distinct from the State.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. 12 is a self-executory provision?
(2) Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. 12 applies in the disposition of the shares of MHC?
HELD:
(1) Yes. A provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable.
(2) Yes. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of
the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch
or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as
it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules
be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws
and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution
lose their reason for being.
4. Imbong vs COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970)
MAKASIAR, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both interested in running as candidates in
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, filed separate petitions for declaratory relief, impugning the
constitutionality of RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as candidates. Congress, acting as
a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No.2 which called for the Constitutional Convention to
propose Constitutional amendments.
After its adoption, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 4914 implementing
said resolution, restating entirely the provisions of said resolution. Thereafter, Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the Resolution No. 2 by providing that
a he de ail ela i g he ecific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to,
and the holding of the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation xxx
Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4,
and expressly repealing R.A. 4914.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress in acting as a legislative body enact R.A.6132 to implement the resolution
passed by it in its capacity as a Constituent Assembly?
HELD:
Yes. The Court declared that while the authority to call a Constitutional Convention is vested
by the Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a constitutional assembly, the power
to enact the implementing details or specifics of the general law does not exclusively pertain to
Congress, the Congress in exercising its comprehensive legislative power (not as a Constitutional
Assembly) may pass the necessary implementing law providing for the details of the Constitutional
Conventions, such as the number, qualification, and compensation of its member.
The reasons cited by the Court in upholding the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. 6132
are as follows:
1. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution, has
authority to propose constitutional amendments or call a convention for the purpose by ¾ votes of
each house in joint session assembled but voting separately.
2. Such grant includes all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power
by necessary implication.
3. Implementing details are within the authority of the Congress not only as a Constituent
Assembly but also in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power which encompasses all
matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the
ambit of legislative action so long as it does not contravene any provision of the Constitution; and
4. Congress as a legislative body may thus enact necessary implementing legislation to fill in
the gaps which Congress as a Constituent Assembly has omitted.
5. Gonzales vs COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967)
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
FACTS:
The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously. The first, proposing amendments to the
Constitution so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of
120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180. The second, calling a convention
to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective
delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections. And the third,
proposing that the same Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the
House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention,
without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which,
upon approval by the President, became Republic Act No. 4913 providing that the amendments to
the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for approval by the people,
at the general elections. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said law contending that the
Congress cannot simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of
a constitutional convention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call
for the holding of a constitutional convention?
HELD:
Yes. The constituent power or the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is different from
the law-making power of Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments to the Constitution
and at the same time call for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not
included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the
people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours to make, and, hence,
to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution
merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said
that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but
as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, for
their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the

members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that
they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.
Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours
is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed
by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a
treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.
6. Arturo Tolentino v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. L- 34150, November 4, 1971)
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS:
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 Approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled
a , A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO
LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18. proposing to conduct an advanced plebiscite to lower the age
requirement for voting from 21 to 18 years of age. Such proposal to amend the Constitution is the
only part published before the rest of the Constitution. Arturo Tolentino, filed a motion for prohibition
to conduct such plebiscite.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention is
unconstitutional.
HELD:
No.
All amendments or revision to the constitution must be submitted to the people in a single
elec i lebi ci e a if ch cha ge . I de ha a lebi ci e f he a ifica i f a
Constitutional amendment may be valid, it must allot the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis
for an intelligent evaluation of the nature of the amendment intrinsically, but as well as its relation to
the other parts of the Constitution with which it must form a harmonious whole.
7. Sanidad v. Commission on Elections

(G.R. No. L-144640, October 12, 1976)
MARTIN, J.:
FACTS:
On September 2, 1976, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (PD) No. 991 calling for
a a i al efe e d Oc be 16 f he Ci i e A e blie ( ba a ga ) e l e, a g
other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of
his present powers.
On September 22, 1976, the President issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to be
submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The questions ask, to wit:
(1) D a a ial la be c i ed?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following
amendments to the Constitution?
For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite
i hi he c e la i f Sec. 2 f A icle XVI f he C i i (1973 C i i ).
Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the
proposed amendments thru PD No. 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, under the environmental circumstances, the President possess power to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This
is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by
proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.
In general, the government powers in crisis government the Philippines was a crisis
government are more or less concentrated in the President. There are moments in the life of any
government when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if this
means the temporary union of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The
more complete the separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more
necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis.
If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim
Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the functions of that Assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross
legislative power. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the
amending process would leave the governmental machinery at the stalemate or create in the powers
f he S a e a de c i e ac , he eb i edi g he bjec i e f a c i i g e e e d he
crisis and resto e al i e .
The P e ide ac i i a ila e al e. A ea l a he efe e d f Ja a 1973

and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly.
8. Lambino v. Comelec
(G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006)
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
On 15 February 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado (Lambino Group),
with other group and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act (RA 6735).
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had

the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered
voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections
1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and
by adding Article XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino
Groups petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.
The COMELEC invoked hi C li g i Santiago v. Commission on Elections declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and
mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC
to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a
binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to
that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the will of the sovereign people.
ISSUE:
Whe he he La bi G i i ia i e e i i c lie i h Sec i 2, A icle XVII f he
Constitution on amendments to the Constitutio h gh a e le i i ia i e?
HELD:
No. The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
C i i f c d c i g a e le i i ia i e. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as
the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Groups glaring failure to comply
with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Courts ruling in Santiago, no grave
abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commission on Elections.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows
a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec.2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed

by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The framers
plainly stated that before they sign there is already a draft shown to them. The framers
also envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents
must prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.
The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent
or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must
be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus,
an amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper
that the people signed as their initiative petition. There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence
of text of the Lambino Groups proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty.
Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet
does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign
the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the petition that the framers of the
Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
9. Lambino v. Comelec
(G.R. No. 174153, November 21, 2006)
CARPIO, J.:
RESOLUTION
G.R. No. 174153 (Lambino vs. COMELEC) and G.R. No. 174299 (Binay vs. COMELEC) -
The Court resolved by a unanimous vote to deny with finality for utter lack of merit the Motion to Inhibit
dated November 16, 2006 filed by counsel for intervenor Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc.,
praying that Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban and Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio inhibit
themselves from the instant petitions based on the grounds cited in the motion.
The Court further resolved to note the:
1. Letter dated November 9, 2006 of Atty. Ala Pag ia e i i g he C li g
on these cases
2. 1st Indorsement dated November 14, 2006 of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban,
referring three copies of the message to the Supreme Court Justices of the
Philippine Misereor Partnership, Inc., stating their appreciation of the decision
rendered in these case
3. Aforesaid message to the Supreme Court Justices
4. 1st Indorsement dated November 16, 2006 of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban,
referring the letter dated November 3, 2006 of BenignoCapulong relative to the
decision rendered in these cases
5. 1st indorsement dated November 16, 2006 of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
referring the letter (with enclosure) dated November 2, 2006 of Assistant Sec Ma.
LourdsVarona, Office of the President, transmitting a copy of the e-mail to the
decision in these cases
6. Ex-parte manifestation filed by counsel for intervenor-oppositor Senate of the
Philippines
Acting on the following motions for reconsideration of the decision of October 25, 2006, the
Court Resolved, by the same 8-7 vote, to DENY WITH FINALITY the said motions for reconsideration,
as the basic issued raised therein have been duly passed upon by this Court and no substantial
arguments were presented to warrant the reversal of the questioned decision.
II. CONCEPT OF THE STATE

1. Territory
a. Magallona v. Ermita
(G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011)
CARPIO, J:
FACTS:
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046, an act demarcating the maritime baselines
of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS). In March 2009, Congess enacted RA
9522 amending RA 3046. The change was prompted by the need to comply with the terms in
UNCLOS. Thus, this petition assails the constitutionality of RA 9522 on the following grounds: (1) it
ed ce he Phili i e a i i e e i , a d l gicall , he each f he Phili i e a e e eig
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris
a d a cilla ea ie a d (2) i e he c a e la d a d f he ba eli e aii e
passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
c a e i g he c clea -free policy , and damaging marine resources in violation of
relevant constitutional provisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RA 9522 is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes, RA 9522 is constitutional. RA 9522 i a a l de a ca e he c aii e
zones and continental shelf under UNCLOS III, not to delineate Philippine territory. Baseline laws
such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along
their coast from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic
starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. In addition, the
said ac i i c i e i h he Phili i e clai f e eig e he Kala aa I la d G
(KIG) and Scarborough Shoal. The statutory claim over Sabah under RA 5446 was retained. Lastly,
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitu i deli ea i f i e al a e .
b. Arigo v. Swift
(G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park and was inscribed by the United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-Class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. The US
E ba i he Phili i e e e ed di l a ic clea a ce f he aid e el e e a d e i he
territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive the Port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance and crew liberty.
The ship, while transiting the Sulu Sea, ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of
the Tubbataha Reefs. Vice Admiral Scott Swift expressed regret for the incident. The US Ambassador
to the Philippines assured DFA Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario that the United States will provide
appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship.
Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Kalikasan with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
environmental protection order. The Court required the respondents to pay just and reasonable
compensation in the settlement of all meritorious claims for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef
on terms and conditions no less severe than those applicable to other States.
The respondents assert that the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US
Government as regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively with the executive
branch.
ISSUE:
Whether or not US Government is liable for the damages on the Tubbataha Reefs.
HELD:
Yes. The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation
of a law enacted by the Congress to protect the Tubbataha Reefs and caused damage to the system,
brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the UNCLOS which provides: The flag State shall
bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-
compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the
laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the
provisions of this Convention or other rules of international la .
While warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Article 31
of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and
eg la i f he c a al S a e ega di g a age he la e i e al a ers and territorial sea.
Although the US has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy, the US
c ide i elf b db c a i e a i al le he adi i al e f he cea a
codified in UNCLOS. Non-membership in UNCLOS does not mean that the United States will
disregard the rights of the Philippines as a coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. It
is expected that the US will bear international responsibility under Article 31 in connection with the
USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha Reefs.
c. PCA Case No. 2013-19, In he Ma e of he So h China Sea A bi a ion Be een he

Rep blic of he Philippine and he People Rep blic of China
(October 29, 2015)
FACTS:
The Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings against China seeking the declaration that
he Pa ie e ec i e igh a d bliga i i egard to the waters, seabed and maritime features
f he S h Chi a Sea a e g e ed b UNCLOS, a d ha Chi a clai ba ed i i e da h
li e a e i c i e i h he C e i a d he ef e i alid.
Throughout the proceedings, China has rejected and returned correspondence from the
T ib al e b he Regi , e lai i g each cca i i ii ha i d e acce he
a bi a i i i ia ed b he Phili i e .
ISSUES and HELD:
I. THE NINE-DASH LINE AND CHINA S CLAIM TO HISTORIC RIGHTS IN THE MARITIME
AREAS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
As between the Philippines and China, the UNCLOS defines the scope of entitlements in the
S h Chi a Sea, hich a e e d be d he li i i ed he ei . Chi a clai
historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction are contrary to the UNCLOS and without
la f l effec he e e ha he e ceed he ge g a hic a d b a i e li i f Chi a
maritime entitlements under the UNCLOS.
II. THE STATUS OF FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Within the meaning of Art. 121(1) of the UNCLOS (Regime of islands), naturally formed areas
of land, surrounded by water, which are above water at high tide, However, under Art. 121(3)
of the UNCLOS, the high-tide features at Scarborough Shoal are rocks that cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of their own and accordingly shall have no EEZ or
continental shelf.
III. CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
A. Alleged Interference with the Philippines' Sovereign Rights in the EEZ and Continental
Shelf
China has, through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels breached Art. 77 of the
UNCLOS (Righ f he c a al S a e e he c i e al helf) i h e ec he Phili i e
sovereign rights over the non-living resources of its continental shelf in the area of Reed Bank.
The Tribunal further finds that China has, by promulgating its 2012 moratorium on fishing in
the South China Sea (including areas falling within the EEZ of the Philippines), breached Art.
56 of the UNCLOS (Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the EEZ) with respect
he Phili i e e eig igh e he li i g e ce f i EEZ.
B. Alleged Fail e P e e Chi e e Na i al f E l i g he Phili i e Li i g
Resources
China has, through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels at Mischief Reef and
Sec d Th a Sh al i Ma 2013, failed e hibi d e ega d f he Phili i e e eig
rights with respect to fisheries in its EEZ. Accordingly, China has breached its obligations under
Art. 58(3) of the UNCLOS (Rights and duties of other States in the EEZ.
C. Chi a Ac i i e ec f T adi i al Fi hi g a Sca b gh Sh al
China has, through the operation of its official vessels at Scarborough Shoal from May 2012
onwards, unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from engaging in traditional fishing at
Scarborough Shoal.
IV. THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES
Both parties are obliged to comply with the Convention regarding the resolution of disputes,
and to respect the rights and freedoms of other States under the UNCLOS.
2. Government
a. Edu v. Ericta
(G.R. No. L-32096, 24 October 1970)
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
The respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed a suit for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise
of the police power for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970
with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent
Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation
Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of
legislative power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 is constitutional and valid?
HELD:
Yes. Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 is constitutional and valid.
Police power is the authority of the state to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. It is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people. In negative terms, it is that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit
all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly
distinguishable with the totality of legislative power.
Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health
and prosperity of the state." The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on
reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress
may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the
exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be
delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test
is the completeness of the statute all its term and provision when it leaves the hands of the legislature.
To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enactment. The legislative does not abdicate
its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority. For a complex economy, that may be the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. Administrative Order No. 2 of the
Land Transportation Commissioner, issued pursuant to the authority granted him to promulgate rules
and regulations, giving life to and translating into actuality the fundamental purpose of the Reflector
Law to promote public safety, is not invalid as an undue exercise of legislative power.
b. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Court of Industrial Relations

(G.R. No. L-32052, July 25, 1975)
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court a
petition wherein seeking a relief for their alleged overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours
a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them the overtime compensation in accordance with
the Commonwealth Act No. 444 which clearly states that:
Sec.1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more
than eight (8) hours daily.
Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to them and the amount
allegedly due them.
There was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denying
the allegations and raising the special defences of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction as
it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act
No. 444.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt from the
Commonwealth Act No. 444?
HELD:
Yes. The Petitioner discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
Under Republic Act No. 2265, its purposes and objectives are:
(a) To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and
foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis
of economic security;
(b) To establish and maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginia
tobacco and its manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will
insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production
plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market;
(c) To create, establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and
marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling and buying of
Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a
fair return of their investments;
(d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying, and
inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and
(e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the people engaged in the
tobacco industry.
Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State
as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of
the people these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of
the government."
The Government owes its very existence to that aim and purpose to protect the people. In
a well-established rules, hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, ruled that it is
precisely respondent Court and not ordinary courts that should pass upon that particular labor
controversy. The contention of petitioner that the Eight-Hour Labor Law does not apply to it hardly
deserves any extended consideration. There is an air of casualness in the way such an argument
was advanced in its petition for review as well as in its brief. In both pleadings, it devoted less
than a full page to its discussion. There is much to be said for brevity, but not in this case. Such
a terse and summary treatment appears to be a reflection more of the inherent weakness of the
plea rather than the possession of an advocate's enviable talent for concision. It did cite Section
2 f he Ac , b i e la g age lea e d b ha "it shall apply to all persons employed

in any industry or occupation, whether public or private. xxx" Nor are private respondents
included among the employees who are thereby barred from enjoying the statutory benefits.
If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it
has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It
can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be
a cause for astonishment. It would appear; therefore, that such an objection based on this ground
certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.
c. Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 143377, 20 February 2001)
MELO, J:
FACTS:
On October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-318 was issued in favor of Rafael
Galvez, over four (4) parcel of land. On April 11, 196, Lots No. 1 and 4 were conveyed be Rafael
Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril, et al. On August 16, 1960, Mamaril, et al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4
to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. On February 1, 1963, unknown to Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company, the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, issued an Order
in Land Registration Case No. N-361 e i led Rafael Gal e , Applicant, Eliza Bustos, et al., Parties-
In-I e e ; Re blic f he Phili i e , M a decla i g OCT N . 0-318 of the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of La Union issued in the name of Rafael Galvez, null and void, and ordered the
cancellation thereof. On October 28, 1963, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company sold to herein
petitioner Lots No. 1 and 4 which starting since then exercised proprietary rights over the lots.
In the meantime, Rafael Galvez filed his motion for reconsideration against the order issued
by the trial court declaring OCT No. 0-381 null and void. The motion was denied. The Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued an Entry of
Judgment, certifying that its decision dated August 14, 973 became final and executory on October
23, 1973. Twenty four long years, thereafter, on January 14, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General
received a letter dated January 11, 1999 from Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro
Point Development Corporation, stating that the aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court
in L.R.C. No. N-361 have not been executed by the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union
despite receipt of the writ of execution.
On July 22, 1999, the petitioner, Shipside, Inc. filed its motion to dismiss. An opposition to the
motion was filed by the Solicitor General alleging among others that: (1) the real-party-interest is the
Republic of the Philippines; and (2) prescription does not run against the State.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines can maintain the action for revival of judgment herein.
HELD:
No, while it is true that the prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be
invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While
Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Gal e i le a de ed
cancelled, the same no longer holds true today. With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), the government no longer has a right or interest to
protect. BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate and distinct from the government
performing functions aimed in promoting public interest and public welfare but performing proprietary
functions.
The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not apply to corporations or
artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes, it being said that when the title of the
Republic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the
same category as ordinary persons.
d. Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority

(G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998)
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
The Philippine Coconut Authority was created by Presidential Decree No. 232 as an
independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the
coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become
direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme
set up by law.
The Philippine Coconut Authority issued a resolution declaring that it will no longer require
those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for
engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by
protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes.
The Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) filed a petition for mandamus to
compel the PCA to revoke the said resolution. According to them this caused cut-throat competition
among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling and the decline of coconut-
based commodities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition of the Association of Philippine Desiccators should be granted?
HELD:
Yes. Since the 1935 Constitution, we have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle.
Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless

reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote general welfare.
A ch, f ee e e i e d e call f he e al f ec i e eg la i f he be efi f he
general public. This is so because under our Constitution, it is very clear that the government reserves
the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public
interest so requires.
e. Government of Philippine Islands v. Monte de Piedad

(G.R. No. 9959, December 13, 1916)
TRENT, J.:
FACTS:
About $400,000 were subscribed and paid into the Treasury of the Philippine Islands by the
inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions for the relief of those damages by the earthquake which took
place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of that year, a
central relief board was appointed, by authority of King of Spain, to distribute the moneys thus
voluntarily contributed.
The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2109 empowering and directing the Treasurer of
the Philippine Islands to bring suit against he M e de Piedad ec e , h gh he A e -
Ge e al a d i e e e a i f he G e e f he Phili i e I la d , he $80,000, ge he
with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in
the Official Gazette under date of April 7, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine Islands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in stating that the Government of the Philippine Islands has
subrogated the Spanish Government in its rights, as regards an important sum of money resulting
from a national subscription opened by reason of the earthquake of June 3, 1863, in these Islands.
HELD:
No. Upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of the crown of Spain
devolved upon the United States.
Whe hi c achie ed i i de e de ce, he e ga i e f he c de l ed

upon the people of the States. And this power still remains with them except so far as they have
delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government. The sovereignty will is made known to us by
legi la i e e ac e . The S a e a a e eig , i he a e a iae. (F ai . Ra e el)
The e e a k i efe e ce i fa , i a e e a d e k , i
being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who are often capable of vindicating their rights, and
justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. xxx it now resides in
the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of
justice and right, and is as clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other
ca e ha e e . (S hie . Ma . Ge e al H i al)
The earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of small
contributions. The names of the contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are
unknown. They parted with the title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting
of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite numerous
also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It
would be impractical for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to
recover the $80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to
against assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined.
f. Cabañas v. Pilapil
(G.R. No. L-25843, July 25, 1974)
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff,
Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964.
The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and
instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his
death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is
living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant
would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance
policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State have the authority to interfere with the terms of the insurance policy by
virtue of parens patriae?
HELD:
The insurance proceeds belong to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor under the
custody and parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives with plaintiff or lives in
the company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property by lucrative title. Said property,
therefore, belongs to the minor child in ownership, and in usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since
under our law the usufructuary is entitled to possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the
insurance proceeds. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro
tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff
should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to
raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00.
The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its

adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is
called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his
best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may press their respective
claims. Certainly, the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae cannot
remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
g. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh

(G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945)
FERIA, J.:
FACTS:
The respondent judge of the lower court refused to take cognizance of and continue the
proceeding of civil case No. 3012 of said court which was initiated under the regime of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines.
He argued that the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the courts of the said
governments. He also argued that the said governments during the Japanese occupation were not
de facto governments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proclamation of Gen. McArthur rendered null and void all judgments and judicial
proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.
HELD:
No. The word p oce e of an o he go e nmen i he cla a i ha all la ,
eg la i a d ce e f he -called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
cc a i f he c ae ll a d id a d i h legal effec a be c ed
embrace judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional,
processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the
Philippines Island during the Japanese occupation, because to adopt such construction great
inconvenience and public hardship would result and great public interest would be endangered
and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled, accrued or
vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might easily
become immune for evidence against them may have already disappeared.
The legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates or

reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and before
the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief of the military
forces of invasion and occupation, it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was
acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States,
constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the
principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early
period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the
Hague Conventions of 1907.
h. Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino

(G.R. No. 73748, 22 May 1986)
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
g e e a i f e b a i g ha he e g e e a i alled h gh a di ec
exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Phili i e .
The legitimacy of the government of President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that her
government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government under Corazon Aquino is valid.
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. And the
people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is
in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government.
3. Sovereignty
a. Laurel v. Misa
(G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947)
FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel, a Filipino Citizen, was arrested by the United States Army and was charged
with treason because during the Japanese occupation, he adhered to the enemy by giving the latter
aid and comfort.
Anastacio claims that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason on the grounds that
the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and the correlative allegiance of
Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended; and that there was a change of sovereignty over these
Islands upon the proclamation of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absolute allegiance of a Filipino citizen to the Government is suspended during
enemy occupation.
HELD:
No. A citizen owes absolute allegiance to his government or sovereign.
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy
of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation
because the sovereignty of the government is not transferred to the occupier. It remains vested in the
legitimate government.
Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended, it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced.

Sovereignty per se is not suspended, rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended.
Hence, there is no suspended allegiance.
b. People v. Perfecto
(G.R. No. 18463, October 4, 1922)
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero,
discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in
the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. The Philippine Senate, having
been called into special session by the Governor-General, the Secretary of the Senate informed that
body of the lost of the documents. The day following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920,
the newspaper La Nacion edited by Mer. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article. The editorial was
alleged to have constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. Article 256 of the Penal Code
i he A e h ,b i i g, hall defa e, ab e, i l a Mi i e f he C
he e i a h i .
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 256 of the Penal Code is in the nature of a municipal law or a political law.
HELD:
Political law. On the acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded
egi a e all ab ga ed. P li ical i he e ed de i a e he la regulating the relations
sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and
legislative power and the latter is involved in the former to the United States, the laws of the
country in support of an established religion or abridging the freedom of press, or authorizing cruel
and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any
declaration to that effect.
Article 256 of the Penal Code was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States
established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an
agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people
themselves.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty
of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag. The defendant and
appellant should be acquitted.
c. Macariola v. Asuncion
(Administrative Case No. 133-J, May 31, 1982)
MAKASIAR, J.:
FACTS:
Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against Macariola, concerning the properties left
by their common father, Francisco Reyes. Asuncion was the judge who rendered the decision, which
became final for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion after the
finality of the decision. This project of partition was only signed by the counsel of the parties, who
assured the judge that they were given authorization to do so.
One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots.
One of these lots (Lot 1184-D) was sold to Anota, a stenographer of the court, while another (Lot
1184-E) was sold to Dr. Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the same lot to Judge Asuncion and
his wife. A year after, spouses Asuncion and Dr. Galapon sold their respective shares over the lot to
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion and his wife
were both stockholders, with Judge Asuncion as President and his wife as secretary of said company.
A ea af e he c a egi a i i h he SEC, Maca i la filed a c lai agai

J dge A ci allegi g: ha he i la ed A . 1491 (5) f he Ci il C de in acquiring a portion of the
lot, which was one of those properties involved in the partition case; and that he violated Art 14 (1
and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules,
and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics by associating himself with a private company while
he was a judge of the CFI of Leyte. This case was referred to Justice Palma of the CA for investigation,
report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice recommended that Judge
Asuncion should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the complaints filed against him.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not respondent judge Asuncion violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code when he
acquired by purchase portion of a lot which was involved in a civil case decided by him?
(2) Whether or not respondent judge Asuncion violated Article 14 of the Code of Commerce, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Civil Service Rules, and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, when he
associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and
a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that there was no violation of Paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code because the sale took place after finality of the decision; that respondent may not be held
liable under paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce (which is of Spanish vintage),
because the provision partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between
the government and certain public officers and employees and as such is deemed to have been
automatically abrogated with the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States; that
respondent cannot be held liable under Paragraph H, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act because there is no showing (a) that he participated or intervened in his official capacity
in the business or transaction of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., or (b) that
said corporation gained any undue advantage by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it,
and because neither the 1935 nor the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines or any existing law
expressly prohibits members of the Judiciary from engaging or having any interest in any lawful
business.
d. Vilas v. City of Manila

(229 US 345, April 3, 1911)
LURTON, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners are creditors of the City of Manila. After the incorporation under Republic Act No
183, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owned to him by the city. The City of Manila
that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cessation of Philippines to United States
by Treaty of Paris.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that the present
municipality is a totally different corporate identity from the previous one and is not liable for the debts
of the Spanish municipality. Its contention is founded on the theory that by virtue of Act. 183, its liability
has been extinguished.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the present municipality is liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to its
cession to the United States.
HELD:
Yes. The present municipality is still liable to the petitioners.
The contention that the liability of the city upon such obligations was destroyed by a mere
change of sovereignty is one which is without a shadow of moral force. The mere change of
sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation organized under the
former sovereign.
The city, acting as a corporation has two kinds of power: governmental and public. In view of
the dual character, there is no public reason for the presumption of their total dissolution as a
consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. The cession did not operate as an extinction
of corporations. The present city retains its character as successor of the old city. As such is entitled
to the property and property rights of the predecessor corporation and therefore is liable subject to all
its liabilities.
e. Peralta v. Director of Prisons

(G.R. No. L-49, November 12, 1945)
FERIA, J.:
FACTS:
William Peralta, petitioner-defendant, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and
penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines.
He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. The petition for habeas corpus is based on
the ground that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7,
was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and
purpose of which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, and therefore, null and void. The petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to
serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army, and the penalties provided for are much
severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the penalty of life imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation is valid.
(2) Whether or not the punitive sentence ceased to be valid upon re-occupation of the Philippines and
the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government? Whether or not Ramon Ruffy was subject
to military law at the time the alleged offense was committed.
HELD:
(1) Yes, the penalty imposed is valid. It is within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant
to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65
of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment
ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances
promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment or death as
maximum. While it is true that the offenses, when committed against the Commonwealth or United
States Government, are defined and also penalized by the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, they
became inapplicable as crimes against the occupier upon the occupation of the Islands by the
Japanese forces.
(2) Yes, the punitive sentence, although good and valid during the military occupation of the
Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of
these Islands and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. A prisoner detained
under it must be release, and no civil right conferred by it can be further enforced.
The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is granted and it is order that the petitioner be released.
f. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

(G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946)
TUASON, J.:
FACTS:
During the Japanese occupation, Ramon Ruffy, the petitioner, a provincial commander of the
Philippine Constabulary, retreated in the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy. He
ga i ed a d led a g e illa k a he b l a ea . I a ec g i ed a d laced de he
operational control of the US army in the South Pacific.
After sometime, Major Ruffy was relieved by Col. Jurado who effected a change of command
in the bolo area. Later on, Col. Jurado was allegedly slain by the petitioner.
The trial court convicted the petitioner. Ruffy filed a petition with the contention that he was
not subject to military law at the time of the offense for which he had been placed on trial was
committed. They contended that by the enemy occupation of the Philippines, the National Defense
Act and all laws and regulations which created the Philippine Army including the Articles of War were
suspended during such occupation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramon Ruffy was subject to military law at the time the alleged offense was
committed.
HELD:
Yes, petitioners were subject to military laws at the time the alleged crime was committed. By
occupation of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine Army did not
cease to be fully in service, though, in a measure, they were not subject to the military jurisdiction, if
they were not in active duty.
Moreover, the rule that the laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered
superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation is intended for the governing of civil
inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies in arms,
such as the Philippine Army.
g. Alcantara v. Director of Prisons

(G.R. No. L-6, November 29, 1945)
FERIA, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner
on the ground that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent
Director of Prisons in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Petitioner was convicted of the crime of
illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries.
Petitioner questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, on
the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation of the Islands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision convicting the petitioner is valid.
HELD:
As ruled in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, the so-called Republic of the
Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commission established in the Philippines during the
Japanese regime, were government de facto organized by the belligerent occupant, and the
judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, except those of a political complexion.
The sentence which the petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was
charged with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the
Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur, as modified by the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, is valid and enforceable.
A punitive or penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes either

a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime
against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as new
offenses committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for
the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

1. Test
a. Republic v. Feliciano
(G.R. No. 70853. March 12, 1987)
YAP, J.:
FACTS:
On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority,
for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an
aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur.
Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a
Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that
Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to
the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria.
That upon plaintiff's purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same,
introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey
was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954.
That on November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90

reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and
Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started
subdividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within
the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of plaintiff and should
therefore be excluded therefrom.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land?
HELD:
No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff
has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is
claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem,
but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment
therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein,
is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental
agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not
permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such
showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.
b. Sanders v. Veridiano
(G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988)
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner Dale Sanders during the time of incident occurred was the special services
director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base which includes the same station.
Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers (deceased) were both employed as
game room attendants in the special services department of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA). They
were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-
time. Their reaction was to protect the conversion and to institute grievance proceedings. The hearing
officer recommended the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus back
wages.
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau and Sanders, disagreed with the recommendation
and asked for its rejection. Moreau, even before the start of the grievance hearings, sent a letter to
he Chief f Na al Pe el e lai i g he cha ge f he i a e e de a a d e e ed
concurrence therewith.
Private respondents then filed suit for damages claiming that the letters contained libelous
imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and had caused them mental anguish, and prejudgment
of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. They make it
clear that petitioners were being sued in their personal capacity.
Petitioners then argued that the acts complained were performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine
of state immunity. A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed by the petitioner
and was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can invoke the doctrine of state immunity.
HELD:
Yes. The petitioners can invoke the doctrine of state immunity.
The court held that the petitioners cannot be sued, because it has been proven that they acted
on behalf of the government of the United States and not personally, thus it is the government and
not the petitioners personally responsible for their acts.
It is clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official function or duties. Petitioner Sanders as
director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision or authority over
its personnel including the private respondents and had a hand in their employment, work,
assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters.
The act of Petitioner Moreau is in fact, an official in nature, performed by him as the immediate
superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special
department of NAVSTA when the incident happened. The court finds that the acts of the petitioners
are protected by the presumption of good faith which has not been inverted by the private
respondents.
As we follow the generally accepted principle of the sovereign equality of the states which
wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium a d ha a c a a i de ld unduly
vex the peace of nations . Th , c j i dic i f hich a he adhe e ce he ece
formally expressed in Article II, Section2 of the 1987 Constitution where we reiterate from our
pe i cha e ha he Phili i e ad he ge e all acce ed i ci le f i e a i al la
a a f he la f he la d .
c. Tan v. Director of Forestry

(G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983)
MAKASIAR, J.:
FACTS:
In April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued advertising for public bidding a certain tract of
public forest land located within the U.S. Naval Reservation in Olongapo, Zambales, which was turned
over by the United States Government to the Philippines Government. It already conducted a public
bidding. Thereafter, question arose as to the area declared as a forest land by virtue of directive
issued by President Carlos P. Garcia to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry for the preparation and
submission immediately a draft of the proclamation establishing the said area as a watershed forest
reserve; it is also desired that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of the
timber license in the area during the public bidding be rejected. The Secretary of Agriculture and
National Resources sustained the recommendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that it
would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under certain
conditions. Then, the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant, Wenceslao Vinzon Tan.
Against this award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick file motions for
reconsiderations which were denied by the Director of Forestry. Ravago appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, which later on, declared the license issued to petitioner by
Di ec fF e a ll a d id. Pe i i e i f ec ide a i a de ied.
Petitioner-appellant filed the instant case before the court a quo. Petitioner claims that the
respondent-appellees unlawfully acted without or in excess of jurisdiction by revoking a valid and
existing timber license without just cause. The Director of Forestry dismissed the motion on the
following ground: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction; (2) that the respondent may not be sued without
their consent; (3) that the petitioner has not exhausted all available administrative remedies; (4) that
the petitioner does not state a cause of action; and (5) that purely administrative and discretionary
functions or administrative officials may not be interfered with by the courts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case would prosper.
HELD:
No, the case would not prosper since the petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies and note that his action is a suit against the State, which under the doctrine of State
immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued.
The petitioner-a ella ac i i j a a e ci c e he le e abli hi g S a e

exemption from suit. He cannot use that principle of law to profit at the expense and prejudice of the
State and its citizens. The promotion of public welfare and protection of the inhabitants near the public
forest are property, rights and interest of the State. In ch ca e, he S a e i i a be alidl
invoked against the action as he long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights
or interest of the State and not merely those of the officer nominally made party defendant.
d. Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 91359, September 25, 1992)
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
VMPSI alleged that some provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend
to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators,
Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.
Moreover, as such membership in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and
constitutional provisions.
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and PC Chief which fixed the
minimum monthly contract rate per guard. Odin Security Agency filed a complaint with PADPAO
accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services. As a
result, PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and
the cancellation of its license to operate as a security agency. The PC-SUSIA made similar finding
and likewise recommended cancellation.
VMPSI filed a Civil Case against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA. VMPSI also prayed that the
defendants pay damages. The Court issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents from
committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non- e e al f VMPSI lice e.
The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion to Dismiss, Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash the Temporary Restraining Order on the grounds that
the case is against the State which had not given consent thereto.
ISSUES:
(1) Whe he VMPSI c lai agai he PC Chief a d PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State
without its consent.
(2) Whether or not the PC Chief may be held liable in his personal capacity.
(3) Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement constitutes consent on the part of the State.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent. Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-
SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily
governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or
security guard agencies, said official a d age c a be ed i h he G e e c e ,
e eciall i hi ca e beca e VMPSI c lai eek l c el he blic e de
to act a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages from them.
Even if the action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the
State did not consent to appropriate necessary funds for that purpose.
(2) No. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in
bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. However, since the acts for which the
PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of
their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against
them in their private capacity.
(3) N . Wai e f he S a e I i f i , bei g a de ga i f e eig , ill be ligh l
inferred, but must be construed according to the strictest interpretation of the law. The Memorandum
of Agreement did not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued because it was intended
to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of the security guards. The consent of
the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a
mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public
respondents.
e. Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation

(G.R. No. 141309, December 23, 2008)
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent is an entity
e gaged i he a fac e f diffe e b a d f ciga e e , a g hich a e Cha i , H e,
a d M e cigarettes which were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate
of 20-45%.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect
on July 3, 1993. On July 1, 2003, petitioner issued Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93
ecla if i g Cha i , H e, a d M e a l call a fac ed ciga e e bea i g a f eig
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Section 142 f he RA 7654 ide , (c) (1) l call
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad
valorem tax of 55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less that 5.00 e ack.
The Court ruled in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals that RMC 37-93
has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance having issued without the
requisite notice, hearing and publication.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be personally liable for damages for acts done in connection with the
discharge of the function of her office.
HELD:
No. According to Sec. 227, Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997), when an
action is brought against any Internal Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act
done in the performance of official duty, any judgment, damages or costs recovered in such action
shall be satisfied by the Commissioner, upon approval of the Secretary of Finance, or if the same
be paid by the person sued shall be repaid or reimbursed to him.
Beca e he e de c lai does not impute negligence or bad faith to the

petitioner, any money judgement by the trial court against her will have to be assumed by the
Republic of the Philippines. As such, the complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.
2. Suit Against Government Agencies

a. Incorporated
i. Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan
(G.R. No. L-55273-83, December 19, 1981)
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
O Oc be 26, 1978, h Kadi g ck B laca . D e hi , he Na i al P e
Corporation (NPC), through its plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez, simultaneously opened 3
floodgates of Angat Dam. Separate complaints for damages arising from the precipitate and
simultaneous opening of floodgates of the Angat Dam resulting in the inundation of several Bulacan
towns were filed by petitioners before respondent Court against the National Power Corporation
(NPC) and the plant superintendent of Angat Dam. In its answer, the NPC invoked a special and
affirmative defense that in the operation of the Angat Dam, it is performing a purely governmental
function, hence it can not be sued without the express consent of the State. It asked for dismissal of
the case. Respondent court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against the NPC over the
opposition of petitioners stating that the NPC performs governmental function with respect to the
management and operation of the Angat Dam, and that its power to sue and be sued under its Charter
does not include the power to be sued for tort. Respondent Court denied reconsideration of its order.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether respondent National Power Corporation performs a governmental function with respect
to the management and operation of the Angat Dam?
(2) Whether the power of respondent National Power Corporation to sue and be sued under its
organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the NPC is a government owned and controlled corporation
which has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government; and that under
the NPC Charter provision, its power to "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the
cause of action, and accordingly, it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioner.
ii. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Judge Firme

(G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991)
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeep, gravel and sand
truck, and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union which was driven by Alfredo
Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeep including Banina, Sr. died.
The heir of Banina, Sr. instituted a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the
passenger jeep. However, the aforesaid defendant filed a third party complaint against the petitioner
and the driver of the dump truck of the petitioner. Thereafter, respondents amended the complaint
wherein the petitioner and its regular employee Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as
defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action,
non-suability of the state, prescription of cause of action, and the negligence of the owner and driver
of the passenger jeep as the proximate cause.
On October 10, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs, and defendants
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig. They are ordered to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs. The complaint against the driver and the owner of the passenger jeep was
dismissed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial. However, respondent judge
issued another order denying the motion for reconsideration of the order for having been filed out of
time. Hence, this motion for reconsideration was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando is liable for the tort committed by its employee.
HELD:
No. The municipality is not liable.
The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver acting in behalf of
the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary functions. It has already been remarked
that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and
be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in
a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the state merely gives the claimants the
right to show the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was inflicted
or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimants cannot
recover.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that he was on his
way to Naguilan River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of the municipal street. In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed.
Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Hence,
though the death may be imposed on the municipality, there is no duty to pay the monetary
compensation.
iii. Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos

(G. R. No. 159402, 23 February 2011)
BERSAMIN, J:
FACTS:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land
registered under Transfer Certificate of the Baguio City land records, was being used as part of the
runaway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation
Office (ATO). The respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of
sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount P 778,150.00. However, ATO failed to pay despite
repeated verbal and written demand. Respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and
some of its official in the Regional Trial Court. ATO invoked that RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain
he ac i ih he S a e c e c ide i g ha he deed f ale had bee e ered into the
ef a ce f g e e al f c i . RTC de ied he ATO i f a eli i a hea i g f
the affirmative defense. Thus, ATO commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to assail
he RTC de h e e , CA di i ed he etition.
ISSUE:
Whe he Ai T a ai c ld be ed i h he S a e c e ?
HELD:
Yes, Air Transportation could be sued even without the consent of the State. Though ATO is
an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own, ATO was
not immune from suit as it does not exercise sovereign but purely proprietary and business function.
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity
from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. ATO was
involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the
exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity.
Furthermore, the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a

valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper
e ia i ceedi g bei g fi e ed f he lai iff e . The Supreme Court ruled
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a
citizen. In exercising the right of eminent domain, the Court explained, that State exercised its jus
imperii, where private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid,
the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against as action for payment by
the owners.
iv. National Electrification Administration v. Morales

(G.R. No. 154200 July 24, 2007)
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Morales and 105 other employees of the NEA filed with the RTC a class suit against their
employer for payment of allowances authorized under R.A. No. 6758. The petition was granted by
the RTC.
Upon motion, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution and a Notice of Garnishment was issued
against the funds of NEA with DBP.
NEA filed a Motion to Quash the writs claiming that the garnished public funds are exempt
from execution under Presidential Decree No. 1445, but manifested their willingness to pay the claims
of the herein respondents only that it has no funds to cover the same, although it already requested
the DBM for a supplemental budget. However, DBM denied such request.
Morales filed a Motion to Implement the Writ of Execution since the DBM already denied the
requested funding. The motion was, however, denied. The Court of Appeals, in a petition for
Certiorari, reversed the decision and ordered the implementation of the Writ of Execution. The CA
held that, being a GOCC, NEA may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation;
specifically, its properties may be proceeded against by way of garnishment or levy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties of NEA may be subject to garnishment or levy.
HELD:
Yes. NEA is a GOCC, a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, with
capacity to sue and be sued. As such, it cannot evade execution its funds may be garnished or
levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment rendered against it. However, before execution may proceed
against it, a claim for payment of the judgment award must be first filed with the COA.
I i he COA hich ha i a j i dic i e a i e, a di a d e le all deb a d clai

f a d e f i g he G ernment or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities, including GOCCs and their subsidiaries. With respect to money claims, their
allowance or disallowance is for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for
certiorari to the Court.
The funds of NEA cannot be proceeded upon pursuant to the decision sought to be satisfied
is not a judgment for a specific sum of money susceptible of execution by garnishment. It is a special
judgment requiring petitioner to settle the claims of respondents in accordance with existing
regulations of the COA.
2. SUIT AGAINST GOVERNMENT

b. UNINCORPORATED
i. Philippine National Railways v. Intermediate Appellate Court
(G.R. No. 70547, January 22, 1993)
MELO, J.:
FACTS:
After colliding with a bus which killed 18 people and injured 53, the Philippine National
Railways (PNR) was ordered by the respondent court to pay for damages and costs of suit. The
petition at bar is directed against the judgement of the respondent court.
On the aspect of whether the Philippine National Railways enjoys immunity from suit, the
lawyer of the petitioner already agreed that the railroad company had the capacity to sue and be
sued. The respondent court opined that such prerogative was implied from the general power to
transact business pertinent or indispensable to the attainment of the goals of the railroad company
under Section 4 of RA 4156.
Respondent court characterized the railroad company as a private entity created nt to

discharge a governmental function but among other things, to operate transport service which is
essentially a business concern, and thus barred from invoking immunity form suit.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but respondent court was far from persuaded.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not PNR is immune from suits?
HELD:
(1) Yes. The court previously ruled that when the State participates in a covenant, it is deemed
to have descended from its superior position to the level of an ordinary citizen and thus virtually
opens itself to judicial process. However, this form of consent is applicable only to those contracts
concluded in a proprietary capacity
The restrictive interpretation laid down therein is of no practical worth nor can it give rise
he ei e i i e e eai i ce i he ca e f Malong v. Philippine National Railways, the
c led ha he Phili i e Na i al Rail a i ef i ga g e e al f c i
The charter of the PNR also provides that the PNR will transact as if it were a corporation,
and it shall exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation Law. Section 36 of
the Corporation Codes provides that every corporation had the power to sue and be sued, same
with Section 13(2) or the Corporation Law.
In the case of Malong, the court held that the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity
when it organized the PNR.
ii. Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Emplo ee A ocia ion

(L-15751, January 28, 1993)
GUTTIEREZ DAVID, J.:
FACTS:
A complaint was filed against Bureau of Printing, Salvador who was the Acting Secretary of
the Department of General Services, and Ledesma, the Director. The complaint alleged that the
Bureau of Printing has been engaging in unfair labor practices.
Answering the complaint, the petitioners denied the charges against and argued that the
Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and to be sued.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Bureau of Printing as the juridical personality to sue and be sued?
HELD:
(1) No. The Bureau of printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative
Code of 1986. As such instrumentality of the government, it operates under the direct
e i i f he E ec i e Sec e a , Office f he P e ide , a d i cha ged i h he e ec i
of all printing, and binding, including work incidental to those processes.
Even though the Bureau receives outside printing jobs, and that may of its employees are
paid for overtime work on regular working days and holidays, these facts do not justify the
c cl i ha i f c i a e e cl i el ie a i a e. The l e f i a e j b
done in comparison to government jobs is only one-half f 1 e ce f he B ea j b.
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the
Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Any suit, action or proceeding
against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against
the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its
consent, much less over its objection.
iii. Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals

(G.R. No. 42204, January 21, 1993)
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
In January 30, 1972, a vessel carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net of 500 rolls
consigned to Bagong Buhay arrived at the port of Manila. The importation was re-examined which
revealed that the shipment contained 1600 rolls of screen net. Initially, it was declared to be valued
at $3,750. When it was reappraised, the shipment was valued at $37,560. Due to the discrepancies,
the Collector of Customs forfeited the consignment in favour of the government.
Upon review, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs.
On July 25, 1986, Private respondent posted a cash bond of P149, 443.36 to release 64 bales
out of 80 bales since 16 bales were missing. Private respondent alleged that more than 26, 504 yards
out of the 143, 454 yards were in bad condition. As a result, Bagong Buhay demanded for the BOC
to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it actually lost.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the collector of customs may be held liable for the lost 43,050 yards?
HELD:
(1) No. The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private
e de ai ed i h ega d i g d . O he i e, e i i ae e de clai
prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. As an unincorporated government
agency without any separate juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys
immunity from suit. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for
actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious
that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state.
On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without its consent,"
categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical
personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely, taxation. As an
agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which
is definitely not a proprietary function. Thus, private respondent's claim for damages against the
Commissioner of Customs must fail.
iv. Mobil Philippines Exploration v. Customs Arrastre Service

(L-23139, December 17, 1966)
CLORIBEL, J:
FACTS:
Four cases of rotary drill parts consigned to Mobil were shipped to Manila. Upon arrival, the Customs
Arrastre Service delivered only three cases of the shipment.
Mobil filed a suit in the CFI of Manila against the Custom Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs
to recover the value of the undelivered case in amount of P18, 493.37 plus other damages.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under
the law, defendants cannot be sued. The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither
the Customs Arrastre Service nor BOC is suable.
On appeal, the appellant argues that Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrester service is
discharging a proprietary function.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the collector of customs may be held liable for the lost 43,050 yards
HELD:
(1) No. The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private
e de ai ed i h ega d i g d . O he i e, e i i ae e de clai
prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. As an unincorporated government agency
without any separate juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from
suit. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it
sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been
converted technically into a suit against the state.
On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without its consent," categorically
applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its
own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely, taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of
Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is definitely not a
proprietary function. Thus, private respondent's claim for damages against the Commissioner of
Customs must fail.
v. Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court of Appeals

(L-51806, November 8, 1988)
CORTES, J:
FACTS:
While walking on the terrace or viewing deck of the airport, private respondent tripped and fell on his
back and broke his thigh bone, he was operated the next day.
Private respondent then filed and action for damages against the petitioner, Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA). Judgement was rendered in favor of private respondent. The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that the present suit against
the CAA is a suit against the Republic which cannot be sued without its consent.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the present suit against the CAA is
a suit against the Republic?
HELD:
(1) No. It has been settled in the Teodoro case that the CAA as an agency is not immune from
suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. The court held that it is engaged in
an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of the state.
The CAA is tasked with private or non-governmental functions which operate to remove from the
purview of the rule on the State immunity from suit. For the correct rule as set forth in the Teodoro
case states:
Immunit from suits is determined b the character of the objects for hich the entit
was organized. The rule is stated in Corpus Juris:
but to engage in matters partaking to more of the nature of ordinar
business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are
not regarded as a suit against the state.
Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the management of airport operations which
primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail immunity from suit accorded to government
agencies performing strictly governmental functions.
3. SUIT AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS

a. Department of Health v. Philippine Pharmwealth
(G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 1993)
DEL CASTILLO, J:
FACTS:
On August 28, 2000, the Department of Health (DOH) issued a memorandum which provided
for a list and category of sanctions to be imposed on accredited government suppliers of
pharmaceutical products in case of adverse findings regarding their products (e.g. substandard, fake,
or misbranded) or violations committed by them during their accreditation.
In line with Memorandum No. 171-C, the DOH, invited representatives of 24 accredited drug
companies, including herein respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting on October 27,
2000. During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them copies of a document entitled "Report
on Violative Products"1 issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), which detailed violations or
ad e e fi di g ela i e he e acc edi ed d g c a ie d c . S ecificall , he BFAD f d
ha PPI d c hich e e being sold to the public were unfit for human consumption.
Instead of submitting its written explanation within the 10-day period as required, PPI belatedly
sent a letter dated November 13, 2000 addressed to Undersecretary Galon, informing her that PPI
has referred the Report on Violative Products to its lawyers with instructions to prepare the
corresponding reply. However, PPI did not indicate when its reply would be submitted; nor did it seek
an extension of the 10-day period, which had previously expired on November 6, 2000, much less
offer any explanation for its failure to timely submit its reply.
In a letter-reply da ed N e be 23, 2000 U de ec e a Gal f d " e able" PPI

November 13, 2000 letter and therein informed PPI that, effective immediately, its accreditation has
been suspended for two years pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C
PPI filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a Complaint seeking to declare null and
void certain DOH administrative issuances, with prayer for damages and injunction against the DOH,
former Secretary Romualdez and DOH Undersecretary Galon. Docketed as Civil Case No. 68200. In
a Manifestation and Motion dated July 8, 2003, petitioners moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No.
68200, claiming that the case was one against the State.
The RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 68200, declaring the case to be one instituted against the
S a e, i hich ca e he i ci le f a e i i f i i a licable. The CA e e ed he RTC
ruling. The petitioners contend that the individual petitioners acted officially and within their authority,
for which reason they should not be held to account individually.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Civil Case No. 68200 should be dismissed for being a suit against the State?
(2) Whether or not the individual petitioners may be sued?
HELD:
(1) Yes. The DOH, being an "unincorporated agency of the government" can validly invoke the
defense of immunity from suit because it has not consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be sued.
Significantly, the DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs functions of governmental
character.
(2) No. As regards the other petitioners, to wit, Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, and
Undersecretary Galon, it must be stressed that the doctrine of state immunity extends its protective
mantle also to complaints filed against state officials for acts done in the discharge and performance
of their duties. "The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was
acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of
official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government." Otherwise stated,
"public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in
connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad
faith." Moreover, "[t]he rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay
the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state x x x. In such a
situation, the state may move to dismiss the [C]omplaint on the ground that it has been filed without
its consent."
It is beyond doubt that the acts imputed against Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, as well
as Undersecretary Galon, were done while in the performance and discharge of their official functions
or in their official capacities, and not in their personal or individual capacities.
b. Sanders v. Veridiano
(G.R. No. L-4693. JUNE 10, 1988)
CRUZ CRUZ, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in
Olongapo City while Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, in the
said station; Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the
Philippines, as well as private respondent Wyer, who died two years ago.
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been
converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They protested the conversion and
institute grievance proceedings to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of
Defense and the result was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the
proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus
backwages. Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report and asked for the rejection of the
recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-
workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate
supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievant were under oath
not to discuss the case with anyone, they placed the records in public places where others not
involved in the case could hear.
Private respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners but the plaintiffs
claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused
them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their
personal and proprietary rights; they also made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their
private or personal capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the
petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official
duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state
immunity. The motion was denied on the ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence
that their acts were official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the allegation in the complaint
was that the defendants had acted maliciously and in bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which
they have been sued for damages by the private respondents.
HELD:
Yes, petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they
have been sued for damages by the private respondents.
A mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not
automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and the doctrine of state
immunity also the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability
and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.
A number of exceptions wherein a public officer may be sued as such is: (a) to compel him to do an
act required by law; (b) to restrain a Cabinet member; (c) to compel the national treasurer to pay
damages from an already appropriated assurance fund or the commissioner of internal revenue to
refund tax overpayments from a fund already available for the purpose; (d) to secure a judgment that
the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act
to assist him.
In this case, Sanders undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private
respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other
related matters. The letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, Moreau,
for more information regarding the case of the private respondents and even in the absence of such
request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticism that Special Services
was practicing an autocratic form of supervision. While Moreau wrote the Chief of Naval Personnel
for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the
grievance proceedings had even commenced; this act is clearly official in nature, performed by
Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters
involving the special services department of NAVSTA. Petitioners were being sued as officers of the
United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of
their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their
acts; if the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of
damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but
by the United States government as their principal. Furthermore, even under the law of public officers,
the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been
overturned by the private respondents and even mistakes concededly committed by such public
officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith
Therefore, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties.
c. Shauf v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 90314. NOVEMBER 27, 1990)
REGALADO, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino is married to an American who is a member of the United
States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance in the Base Education Office at Clark
Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified.
On October 1976, the position of Guidance Counselor became vacant, the Civilian Personnel
Division took immediate steps to fill the position by advertisement and as a result, one application
was received by the Civilian Personnel Office and two applications were retrieved from the applicants
supply file in the Civilian Personnel Office, namely: Mrs. Jean Holenshead, an employee of the DOD
Schools at Clark Air Base; Mrs. Lydia B. Gaillard, an unemployed dependent, and Mrs. Shauf.
Petitioner Shauf possessed all the qualifications, however, Mr. Edward B. Isakson who was not a
dependent of a military or civilian personnel was selected for the position. Shauf was offered a
temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition
that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy but if no vacancy occurs
af e 180 da , he ill be elea ed b ill be elec ed fill a f e aca c if he a ailable.
During that time, private respondents already knew that the position of Mrs. Mary Abalateo would be
vacant but petitioner Shauf was never appointed to the position occupied by Mrs. Abalateo whose
appointment was extended indefinitely by private respondent Detwiler. Thus, petitioner Shauf filed a
complaint for damages against private respondents Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi for the alleged
discriminatory acts in maliciously denying her application for the GS 1710-9 position but Private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that as officers of the United States Armed Forces
performing official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them under the Philippine
American Military Bases Agreement, they are immune from suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces.
HELD:
No, private respondents are not immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces.
Under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the doctrine of immunity from suit prohibit suits
against the state without its consent, is also applicable to complaints against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed in the discharge of their duties; however, the doctrine of immunity from suit
will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as the unauthorized acts of government officials are not acts of State; thus, public officers
may be sued and be held personally liable in damages for such acts.
In this case, petitioner Shauf was evidently highly qualified for the position of Guidance
Counselor but was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor on account of her sex, color and
origin. Thus, private respondents in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Shauf to
earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life committed acts of discrimination
for which they should be held personally liable.
Therefore, private respondents are not immune from suit as they are being sued in their
private capacity for discriminatory acts performed beyond their authority.
d. Wylie v. Rarang
(G.R. No. 74135. MAY 28, 1992)
GUTIERREZ, JR. J:
FACTS:
Petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer and petitioner Capt. James
Williams was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City while
private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned
as merchandise control guard.
Wylie supervised the publication of the Plan of the Day (POD) which was published daily at
the US Naval Base station. The POD featured important announcements, necessary precautions,
and general matters of interest to military personnel. On February 3, 1978, the POD made a
publication, under the "NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY" which mentioned a certain person named
A i g h i de c ibed a a di g ace he di i i a d he Office f he P Ma hal.
Private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the Office of the Provost Marshal
and was subsequently proven that it was her being referred to when petitioner Wylie. Petitioner Wylie
wrote her a letter of apology for the inadvertent publication then private respondent filed for damages
against petitioner Wylie, Williams and U. S. Naval Base. She alleged that the article constituted false,
injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation
exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule and that the libel was published and circulated
in the English language and read by almost all the U.S. Naval Base personnel. However, defendants
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they acted in the performance of their official functions as
officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore, immune from suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the officials of the United States Naval Base are immune from suit.
HELD:
No, officials of the United States Naval Base are not immune from suit.
Under the Constitution, where a public officer has committed an ultra vires act, or where there
is a showing a bad faith, malice or gross negligence, the officer can be held personally accountable,
even if such acts are claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties. A mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically
dropped. Moreover, Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered
in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
In this case, the records show that the offensive publication was sent to the commanding
officer for approval and that he approved it. The imputation of theft contained in the POD is a
defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie admitted
that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name A i g if the
article were to be published. However, the petitioners were negligent because they issued the
publication without deleting the name "Auring". Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part
of official duty and it was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. As a result of the
petitioner's act, the private respondent, according to the record, suffered besmirched reputation,
serious anxiety, wounded feeling and social humiliation, since the article was baseless and false.
Therefore, the petitioners in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the
private respondent.
e. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
(G.R. No. 142476. MARCH 20, 2001)
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:
FACTS:
A Falcon jet was leased by the United Coconut Chemicals Inc. from Faysound Ltd. that lapsed
in 1987 and that Cojuangco or any of the defendants has not claimed ownership in the Falcon jet and
no one questioned before the Sandiganbayan the legality of PCGG's sequestration of the aircraft. 2
years after the lease of the Falcon jet expired, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a "Motion For
Authority To Sell Sequestered Aircraft Pending Litigation" on the ground that it is fast deteriorating
but the Sandiganbayan denied PCGG's motion. On June 6, 1989, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) directing the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from enforcing its assailed
Resolution. Relying on the TRO, the PCGG sold the aircraft, without authority from the
Sandiganbayan, to Walter Fuller Aircraft, Inc., for US $7,138,168.65 which was deposited in escrow
with the PNB. The Supreme Court en banc dismissed PCGG's petition holding that the decision to
sell the aircraft is not within the limited administrative powers of the PCGG but requires the sanction
of the Sandiganbayan. Fuller Aircraft sued the Republic and PCGG for breach of warranty with
damages and the court rendered against the Republic and PCGG. The PCGG, in order to settle the
money judgment, entered into an "Agreement" with Fuller Aircraft providing that the Republic of the
Philippines agreed to pay Fuller $11 million on October 15, 1996 and $3 million, in equal monthly
installments in settlement of Fuller Aircraft's claim that amounts to $14,928,457.29. On April 13, 1998,
the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan an "Ex-Pa e M i Wi hd a . Pe i i e Re blic
contends that respondent Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it denied PCGG'S
motion to release the funds deposited in escrow with the PNB to the Bureau of Treasury for
transmission to Fuller Aircraft.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PCGG or any of its members may be held civilly liable for the sale of the aircraft
to Fuller Aircraft.
HELD:
Yes, PCGG or any of its members may be held civilly liable for the sale of the aircraft to Fuller
Aircraft.
The decision to sell the aircraft is not within the limited administrative powers of the PCGG
but requires the sanction of the Sandiganbayan which can grant or withhold the same in the exercise
of sound discretion and on the basis of the evidence before it. Without such approval by the judicial
authority concerned, and no abuse of discretion on its part having been established, it follows that
any sale of said aircraft would constitute a prohibited and invalid disposition by the PCGG. Petitioner
Republic cannot be held liable under the agreement because it did not authorize the PCGG to enter
into such contract with Fuller Aircraft; moreover, granting that the PCGG was authorized, it exceeded
its authority; thus, there can be no cause of action against it. However, it is the legal duty of petitioner
Republic to return to Fuller Aircraft, through the PCGG, the escrow deposit in the sum of US
$8,568,905.55. Otherwise, petitioner may enrich itself unjustly and may be held liable for keeping the
said amount indefinitely to the prejudice of Fuller Aircraft whose right to the escrow deposit has not
been questioned by any party
Therefore, PCGG may be held civilly liable as they did not act within the scope of their
authority in the performance of their official duties.
f. US v. Reyes
(G.R. No. 79253. MARCH 1, 1993)
DAVIDE, JR. J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Maxine Bradford is an American citizen who was the activity exchange manager at
the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City while
private respondent Montoya is an American citizen who was employed as an identification (I.D.)
checker at the JUSMAG headquarters.
On January 22, 1987, while she was already at the parking area, her body and belongings
were searched after she had bought some items from the retail store of the NEX JUSMAG, where
she had purchasing privileges. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told
that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day, Mrs. Kennedy then performed the
search on her person, bags and car in front of Bradford and other curious onlookers but nothing
irregular was found. Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day
and was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that as a matter of policy customers and
employees of NEX Jusmag are not searched outside the store unless there is a very strong evidence
of a wrongdoing. She knows no circumstances sufficient to trigger suspicion of a wrongdoing on her
a b he he ha d, he i a a e f he e i f B adf d la ici Fili i
for theft and/or shoplifting. Montoya filed a complaint against Bradford for damages due to the
oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as store manager
of the NEX JUSMAG. However, Bradford and the government of the United States of America filed a
Motion to Dismiss based on (a) that the action is in effect a suit against the United States of America,
a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent for the cause of action pleaded in the
complaint; and (b) Maxine Bradford, as manager of the US Navy Exchange Branch at JUSMAG,
Quezon City, is immune from suit for acts done by her in the performance of her official functions
under the Philippines-United States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases
Agreement of 1947.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Bradford is immune from suit.
HELD:
No, petitioner Bradford is not immune from suit.
Under Article 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG and
under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides an exception that a
diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall
also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in: (c) an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State. Moreover,
doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being
sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
In this case, since Bradford works as NEX-JUSMAG Ma age , he i a g h e
officers granted diplomatic immunity; moreover, it is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was
sued in her personal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and official functions, said
complaint is not to be dismissed based as the case falls within the exception to the doctrine of state
immunity. Therefore; petitioner Brandford was held to be personally liable.
g. Republic v. Sandoval
(G.R. No. 84607. MARCH 19, 1993)
CAMPOS, JR., J:
FACTS:
Heirs of the deceased and Caylao group filed a petition under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval
dismissing the complaint for damages. Republic of the Philippines seeks to set aside the Order of
respondent Judge dated May 31, 1988.
The massacre was the culmination of 8 days and 7 nights of encampment by members of the
militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the
Philippine Tobacco Administration Building. The KMP, led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems
and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by
landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments. On January 20, 1987, the meeting was held
at the MAR conference room; Tadeo demanded that the minimum comprehensive land reform
program be granted immediately and Minister Alvarez promised that he will bring the matter to the
attention of President Aquino, during the cabinet meeting. A tension mounted the following day, the
farmers barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from going inside their offices
and hoisted the KMP flag together with the Philippine flag. At around 6:30 p.m., Minister Alvarez
advised Tadeo to wait for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution to implement its comprehensive
land reform program but Tadeo did not believe in the Constitution. On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's
group decided to march to Malacañang to air their demands. In anticipation of a civil disturbance,
CAPCOM Commander General Ramon E. Montaño inspected the preparations and adequacy of the
government forces to quell impending attacks and the Citizens' Mendiola Commission stated that the
government anti-riot forces were assembled at Mendiola in a formation of three phalanges. No
dialogue took place between the marchers and the anti-riot squad and a clash occurred. After the
clash, 12 marchers were dead, 39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries in the
group of marchers. Of the police and military personnel, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered
minor physical injuries then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11 which
created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the
disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place in the vicinity of Mendiola. One of recommended by
the Commission was for the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be
compensated by the government. However, no concrete form of compensation was received by the
victims. Thus, petitioners instituted an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines,
together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident. Solicitor general
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent but
petitioners claimed that the State has waived its immunity from suit. Judge Sandoval dismissed the
case on the ground that there was no such waiver and the Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State should be liable for the incident.
HELD:
No, the State should not be liable for the said incident.
Under the Constitution, some of the instances when a suit against the State is proper are (1)
When the Republic is sued by name; (2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government
agency; (3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate
liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
In this case, while the Republic is sued in its name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to
the government. Although the military officers and personnel discharging their official functions when
the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority.
Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the
use of firearms. Moreover, the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed is
a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the
marchers. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply as when the relief demanded by
the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of
any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents
who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents
and servants.
Therefore, the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident but
instead, the liability should fall on the military personnel and policemen responsible for the 1989
Mendiola massacre having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority.
h. Lansang v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000)
QUISIMBING, J:
FACTS:
In 1970, the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic
body engaged in the development of national park, administered by high profile civic leaders and
journalists. Respondents were allegedly awarded a "verbal contract of lease" by the NPDC. No
document or instrument appears on record to show the grantor of the verbal license to private
respondents to occupy a portion of the government park dedicated to the national hero's memory.
With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC,
petitioner Amado J. Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and terminated the so-called verbal
agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately
within the public park.
The notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate
his conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who is totally blind, claims that he was deceived into
signing the notice. He was allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that
he was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, Iglesias as president was
knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business.
GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the Regional Trial Court but it was
dismissed ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the State which could not be sued
without its consent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his official capacity is not
enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman of NPDC, is
in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent?
HELD:
No. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials
for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one
against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require
the state itself to perform a positive act. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged
in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials
are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.
Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in
his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied
a public position.
The petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity.
The complaint filed by the respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as chairman of the
NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being sued in that capacity.
i. Department of Health Secretary v. Philippine Pharmawealth

(G.R. No. 169304, March 13, 2007)
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent, Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the Philippines.
Then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No.
27, outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for
pharmaceutical products. A.O. No. 27 was later amended by A.O. No. 10, 4 Series of 2000, providing
for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified
bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH).
Respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its
list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." Petitioner DOH,
through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of the pre-qualifications, bids and awards
committee, issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G
Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract). Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH
regarding respondent's request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products,
respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. In view, however, of the non-
accreditation of respondent's Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to YSS. The
respondent sued the DOH secretary and undersecretaries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a case may be filed against the petitioners?
HELD:
Yes. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was
acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of
official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In its complaint,
respondent sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity.
With regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being
an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are
preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary
injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of
state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or
financial liability against the State.
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against the state
where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive
act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded against them.
Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for
acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where
the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although
the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in
connection with their alleged act of illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff
Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and
with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law is permissible, in consonance
with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot
hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.
4. OTHER STATES
a. Minucher v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003)
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national, was charged for violation of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." The narcotic agents
who raided the house of Minucher were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo. Minucher
was acquitted by the trial court of the charges. Minucher filed a civil case before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of
drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo led a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to
diplomatic immunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity?
HELD:
Yes. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but
only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.
While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of the
Philippines and of the United States, the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the
activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts
heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the
government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of
Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the
Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at
the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give
enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug
suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be
expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the
poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal
case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official
function or duties.
Hence, respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency
allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem
on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
b. Arigo v. Swift
(G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu
Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral
Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity. In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United
Nations Educational ScientiFIc and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was
recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine
reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an
important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine species.
Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs
Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant
economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into
perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into
the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or
fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law
likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole
policymaking and permit-granting body of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In

vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay
for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." On January 6, 2013,
the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in
Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast
of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a press
statement. Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident
and assured Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will provide
appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship." By March 30, 2013, the US
Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights
to a balanced and healthful ecology. Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or
manifestation in this case?
2. Whether or not there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA?
HELD:
1. No, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any
pleading or manifestation. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local
jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition
would unduly vex the peace of nations. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers
of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged
act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity
therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice
and Robling.
2. No. The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines to promote "common security interests" between the US and the
Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and
further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and
supplies. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering
that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine
waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. As it is, the waiver of State immunity under
the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
c. Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, et al., v. Aquino

(G.R. No. L-35131, November 29, 1972)
TEEHANKEE, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, who was assigned on December 6, 1971 by the WHO from
his last station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health
Services, is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement executed on July 22,
1951 between the Philippine Government and the World Health Organization. Such diplomatic
immunity carries with it, among other diplomatic privileges and immunities, personal inviolability,
inviolability of the official's properties, exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption from taxation
and customs duties.ner contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods beyond the official needs of
said petitioner.
However, respondent COSAC allegedly suspected the personal effects of herein petitioner
that it contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods beyond the official needs of said petitioner.
Respondent judge issued respondents COSAC officers search warrant No. 72-138 for alleged
violation of Republic Act 4712 amending section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code 3 directing the
search and seizure of the dutiable items in said crates. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo,
personally wired on the same date respondent judge advising that "Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity
from search in respect of his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions"
pursuant to the Host Agreement and requesting suspension of the search warrant order "pending
clarification of the matter from the ASAC."
The Solicitor General accordingly joined petitioner Verstuyft's prayer for the quashal of the
search warrant. Hence, the petition at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Verstuyft is entitled to all privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded
to diplomatic envoys in accordance with international law?
HELD:
Yes, Verstuyft is entitled to all privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded
to diplomatic envoys in accordance with international law. The executive branch of the Philippine
Government has expressly recognized that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity,
pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The Department of Foreign Affairs formally advised
respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft
cannot be the subject of a Philippine court summons without violating an obligation in international
law of the Philippine Government" and asked for the quashal of the search warrant, since his personal
effects and baggages after having been allowed free entry from all customs duties and taxes, may
not be baselessly claimed to have been "unlawfully imported" in violation of the tariff and customs
code as claimed by respondents COSAC officers. The Solicitor-General, as principal law officer of
the Government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked
for the quashal of the search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers
that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity
is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then
the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal
law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his
direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction
by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in
conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial department of (this)
government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming
an antagonistic jurisdiction."
d. Lasco v. UNRFNRE
(G.R. Nos. 109095-109107, February 23, 1972)
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations
Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and
subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine
Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. Petitioners are the
complainants in NLRC Cases for illegal dismissal and damages.
Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its
personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations. In support thereof, private respondent attached a letter from
the Department of Foreign, which acknowledged its immunity from suit. The letter confirmed that
private respondent, being a special fund administered by the United Nations, was covered by the
1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the Philippine
Government was an original signatory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity?
HELD:
Yes, specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity. As a matter of state policy as expressed
in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law. Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine
Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized
agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law. Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded
performance of their functions. The purpose is "to shield the affairs of international organizations, in
accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the
prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their
functions"
The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the
Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance
with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations where the Philippine
Government was a party. The Supreme Court can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent
if it expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench. Hence, petition is dismissed.
e. Southeast Asia Fisheries Development center vs. NLRC

(G.R. No. 86773, FEBRUARY 14, 1992)
Nocon,J:
FACTS:
SEAFDEC-AQD (Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center Aqua Culture Department) is a
department of an international organization called SEAFDEC that was organized in Bangkok,
Thailand through an agreement last December 28, 1967 by the countries of Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country (Article 1,
Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC).
On April 20, 1975, on a probationary basis, respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a research
associate and in January 5, 1983, he was appointed as senior external affairs officer for a monthly
basic salary of 8,000 pesos and an allowance of 4,000 pesos per month. Thereafter, he was
appointed to the position of Professional III and designated as Head of External Affairs Office with
the same pay and benefits.
On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao as the chief of the SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination
to private respondent that due to financial constraints in the department his services shall be
terminated and on May 15, 1986 he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one month of his
basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits. On March 18, 1987, with the arbitration of
the NLRC, respondent filed a complaint against the petitioners upon the failure of petitioners to pay
to the respondent his separation pay and benefits. Petitioners in their answer alleged that the NLRC
has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization
and that private respondent and must first secure clearances from the proper departments for
property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and this case
clearances had not yet been obtained by respondent.
A formal hearing was conducted and private respondent alleged that the non-issuance of the
clearances by the petitioners was politically motivated and in bad faith. Then after the labor arbiter
rendered a decisions in favor of the respondent. On September 3, 1988, petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied on January 9, 1989. Thereafter, petitioners instituted this
petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent
Lazaga's complaint since SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to its international character
and the complaint is in effect a suit against the State which cannot be maintained without its
consent. The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-AquacultureDepartment (SEAFDEC-
AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. It was
established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Japan,
Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of
Thailand and Republic of Vietnam. The Republic of the Philippines became a signatory to the
Agreement establishing SEAFDEC on January 16, 1968. Being an intergovernmental organization,
SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from
control of the state in whose territory its office is located.
Issue: Whether the SEAFDEC-AQD may be sued by the NLRC ?
Held: finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or
local agency of the Philippine government, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC
dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
for having been rendered without jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
f. SEAFDEC vs. Acosta

(G.R. Nos. 97468-70. September 2, 1993)
Vitug, J:
FACTS: Several labor cases through labor arbiter NLRC were filed against petitioner SEAFDEC.
Respondents who filed charges against SEAFDEC claimed that they were wrongfully terminated from
service. On the ground that it is an international inter-government organization that is immune from
suit, the petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of NLRC and filed a motion to dismiss the cases.
However, respondent NLRC alleged that SEAFDEC waived its immunity when it raised the issue of
jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not SEAFDEC, as an international diplomatic agency can exercise immunity from
suit ?
Held: the issue of waiver of immunity, suffice it to say at the moment that the petitioner has timely
raised the issue of jurisdiction. While the petitioner did not question the public respondent's lack of
jurisdiction at the early stages of the proceedings, it, nevertheless, did so before it rested its case
and certainly well before the proceedings thereat had terminated.
WHEREFORE, our resolution, dated 30 March 1992, dismissing the petition for certiorari, is hereby
reconsidered, and another is entered (a) granting due course to the petition; (b) setting aside the
order, dated 20 September 1990, of the public respondent; and (c) enjoining the public respondent
from further proceeding with RAB Case No. VI-0156-86 and RAB Case No. VI-0214-86. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
g. Callado vs. International Rice Research institute

(G.R. No. 106483. May 22, 1995)
Romero, J:
FACTS: Ernesto Callado was an employed driver of IRRI (International Rice Research institute) from
April of 1983 to December of 1990. On Febuary 11, 1990, Callado was involved in an accident while
driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to IRRI.
Af e he eli i a i e iga i c d c ed b he IRRI h a e ce de artment, petitioner
was charged with the following:
"(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of your failure to report to your supervisors the failure of
your vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery which, you alleged, required
you to overstay in Manila for more than six (6) hours, whereas, had you reported the matter
to IRRI, Los Banos by telephone, your problem could have been solved within one or two
hours;
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of your duties."
In a Memorandum dated March 9, 1990, petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the
charges against him. After evaluating petitioner's answer, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint on December 19, 1990 before the Labor Arbiter
for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
On January 2, 1991, private respondent IRRI, through counsel, wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform
him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1620, and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international
organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. IRRI likewise wrote
in the same tenor to the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment. While
admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the
Institute on August 13, 1991 to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives
its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in
resolving the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not IRRI may invoke state immunity ?
HELD: The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-
General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear. Through
counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the Institute will not
waive its diplomatic immunity. In the second place, petitioner's reliance on the Memorandum with
"Guidelines in handling cases of dismissal of employees in relation to P.D. 1620" dated July 26,
1983, is misplaced.
The Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part. We
agree with private respondent IRRI that this memorandum cannot, by any stretch of the imagination,
be considered the express waiver by the Director-General.
h. International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja

(G.R. No. 85750. September 28, 1990)
Melencio-Herrera, J:
FACTS: On 23 February 1981, an Agreement was forged between the Philippine Government and
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for processing
Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan.
Then the Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) was organized. It is an accredited refugee
processing center in Morong,Bataan. It is a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian
and voluntary service. On July 14, 1986 Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a petition for Certification election among the
rank and file members employed by the ICMC. The government granted diplomatic privileges and
immunities to ICMC. ICMC, then, sought the dismissal of the petition filed by TUPAS on the ground
that it is under the immunity from suit granted by the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ICMC may invoke diplomatic immunity?
HELD: Yes. Since ICMC is granted with diplomatic immunity, it can exercise the status and privileges
similar to that of a specialized agency. According to Article III of the convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of Specialized Agencies, specialized agencies enjoy immunity from every form of legal
process. Also, the Executive branch of the government recognizes ICMC as an international
organization that enjoys immunity.
The grant of immunity to ICMC is necessary because of their international character and respective
purpose. This is to avoid danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal
workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor would defeat the purpose of
immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organization from political pressure or control
by the host country.
5. CONSENT
a. EXPRESS CONSENT
(i.) Republic vs. Feliciano
(G.R. No. 70853. March 12, 1987)
Yap, J:
FACTS:
On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority,
for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an
aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue
of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954;
that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title
to the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria; that upon plaintiff's purchase of the
property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and
caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October
24, 1954;
On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving

for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma,
Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started
subdividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within
the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of plaintiff and should
therefore be excluded therefrom. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of
the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on
informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal, valid and subsisting and that
defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.|
ISSUE:
Whether or not the state can be sued in this case?
HELD:
No. The doctrine of state immunity will apply on the following grounds:
(1). A suit for the recovery of a property must be directed towards a specific party. In this case, the
recovery was directed against the Republic of the Philippines.
(2.) The complaint submitted by the Feliciano is a suit against the State. According to the law, a suit
against the State is not permitted unless a fact that the State consented it to be sued. The complaint
filed fails to allege the existence of such consent. No consent can be drawn from the proclamation,
as well. The Court likewise declared that there be no merit in the submission by the respondent. The
plaintiff wants to recover a land not owned by a state, meaning it is privately owned; in this case,
Feliciano owns it.
(ii.) Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC

(G.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993)
Vitug, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their
arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA.
Thereafter, through the labor arbiter NLRC, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of
wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay,
and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the
security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the
security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The
Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of
the DA and the security agency. The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for
refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over
a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the
cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that
the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan
Security Agency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of state immunity may apply in this case?
HELD:
No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The general law
waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government
c e a d b i be ed a e clai i l i g liabili a i i g f c ac , e e
i lied, hich c ld e e a a ba i f ci il ac i be ee i a e a ie .
In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact,
performed any act proprietary in character. But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly
constitute money claims.
(III). Amigable v. Cuenca

(G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972)
Makalintal, J
Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as
shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation
in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the
construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the
President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated
by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it. On February
6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and
Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership
and possession of land used by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of
compensatory damage for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages, attorney's fees, and the
costs of the suit. The defendants filed a joint answer denying the allegations with the reasons of: (1)
that the action was premature for not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2)
that the right of action for the recovery due, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a
suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid
basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) the plaintiff
had no cause of action against the defendants. On July 29, 1959 the court rendered its decision
holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession
and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued
without its consent. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the
case to Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government?
Held:
Yes. In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, the Court held that where
the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through
the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a
suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
without its consent. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of
her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot
to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could
bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said
portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has
been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago.
(iv.) EPG Construction v. Secretary Vigilar

(G.R. No. 131544, March 16, 2001)
Buena, J:
Facts:
In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement initiated a housing project on a government
property along the east bank of the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City. The Ministry of Human
Settlement entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Ministry of Public Works and
Highways. The Ministry of Public Works and Highways forged individual contracts with herein
petitioners EPG Construction Co., Ciper Electrical and Engineering, Septa Construction Co.,
Phil. Plumbing Co., Home Construction Inc., World Builders Inc., Glass World Inc., Performance
Builders Development Co. and De Leon Araneta Construction Co., for the construction of the
housing units. After complying with the terms of said contracts, and by reason of the verbal
request and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds would
be available and forthcoming, petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional
constructions" for the completion of the housing units, despite the absence of appropriations and
i e c ac c e b e e e e e f he "addi i al c ci . Petitioners
received payment for the construction work duly covered by the individual written contracts,
thereby leaving an unpaid balance which represents the expenses for the "additional
c ci . O 14 N e be 1988, eii e e a de a d le e he
DPWH Secretary and submitted that their claim for payment was favorably recommended by
DPWH Assistant Secretary for Legal Services. DPWH Assistant Secretary Madamba opined that
payment of petitioners' money claims should be based on quantum meruit and should be
forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA) for its due consideration and approval. In a letter
dated 26 August 1996, respondent DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money
claims prompting herein petitioners to file before the RTC of Quezon City, a Petition for
Mandamus, which was dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent may invoke Non-suability of the State?
Held:
No. Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke State immunity,
considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any
case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance.
Th , i Amigable vs. Cuenca, this Court, in effect, shred the protective shroud which
shields the State from suit, reiterating our decree in the landmark case of Ministerio vs. CFI of
Cebu that "the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen." It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity
to legal norms on the part f fficiald if he le f la e e be ai ai ed.
(v.) Santiago v Republic

(G.R. No. L-48214, December 19, 1978)
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts:
On August 9, 1976, petitioner Ildefonso Santiago filed on an action in the CFI of Zamboanga
City naming as defendant the government of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry. His plea was for the revocation of a deed of donation
executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the donee.
As alleged in the complaint, the Bureau failed to "install lighting facilities and water system on the
property donated and to build an office building and parking lot thereon which should have been
constructed and ready for occupancy. The lower court sustained a motion to dismiss on the part of
the defendant Republic of the Philippines, now named as one of the respondents, the other
respondent being the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II. It decided an order on
the settled "rule that the state cannot be sued without its consent.
Issue: Whether or not the immunity from suit has been waived?
Held:
Ye . F a el , he c i i al i i i elf all a ai e . Whe e he e i c e ,
a suit may be filed. Consent need not be express. It can be implied. It must be emphasized, goes no
further than to rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled
to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be
heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non- abili ca a d i he a .
(vi.) Merritt v Government of the Philippine Islands

(G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916)
TRENT, J:
Facts:
The petitioner was riding on a motorcycle in the streets of Calle Padre Faura when it collided
with the General Hospital ambulance. He suffered serious injuries resulting to the petitioner being
slightly deaf, having a slight weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. According to
i e e , he e i i e e al a d h ical heal h a e celle i he accide .
Issue: Whether or not the State, on behalf of the ambulance driver, is immune from suit?
Held:
Yes. The State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, for the acts of its
agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents and that the chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent; therefore, the State may invoke its
immunity from suit.
(vii.) Republic v Purisima

(G.R. No. L-36084, August 31, 1977)
FERNANDO, J
Facts:
A motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit
in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach
of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. Such a motion to
dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, were Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction
of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery
of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. There
is thus more than sufficient basis for an allegation of jurisdictional infirmity against the order of
respondent Judge denying the motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whe he he e de a lica i f aei i is correct?
Held:
No, the doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which negates the
assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right
may be predicated.|
For the consent to be effective it must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute
as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn
Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government.
5. CONSENT
b. IMPLIED CONSENT
(i)..Froilan v Pan Oriental Shipping
(G.R. No. L-6060, September 30, 1954)
PARAS, C.J
Facts:
Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental
Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel and agreeing
to pay the balance in installments. There was non-payment of the installments as he was awaiting
the decision of the President on the petition of the shipowners for an extension of the period of
payment of the purchased vessels. They have entered into another agreement but Froilan failed
to complete the payment several times. On February 22, 1949, Pan Oriental Shipping Co offered
to charter said vessel for a monthly rent. The government accepted Pan Oriental's offer "in
principle" subject to the condition that the latter shall cause the repair of the vessel, advancing
the cost of labor and dry-docking thereof, and the Shipping Administration to furnish the
necessary spare parts. In accordance with this charter contract, the vessel was delivered to the
possession of Pan Oriental. The Executive Office advised the Administration and the
Commissioner of Customs not to dispose of the vessel in favor of another party pending final
decision by the President on the appeal of Froilan. Since the vessel was already cleared in favor
of Pan Oriental prior to the receipt of the foregoing communication, and allegedly in order to
prevent its being made answerable for damages, the General Manager of
the Shipping Administration advised the Collector of Customs not to suspend the voyage of the
vessel pending final decision on the appeal of Froilan. The Cabinet revoked the cancellation
of Froilan's contract of sale and restored to him all his rights on condition that he would settle
partially his overdue accounts and that reimbursement of the expenses incurred for the repair and
drydocking of the vessel performed by Pan Oriental. Froilan again failed to comply with these
conditions thus the Cabinet resolved authorizing the Administration to continue its charter contract
with Pan Oriental. Froilan petitioned anew for reconsideration of this action of the Cabinet,
claiming that other ship purchasers, including the President-Treasurer of
the Pan Oriental himself, had also defaulted in payment and yet no action to rescind their
contracts had been taken against them. He also offered to make a cash partial payment of
P10,000.00 on his overdue accounts and reimburse Pan Oriental of all its necessary expenses
on the vessel. Pan Oriental also tendered the sum of P15,000.00 which together with its alleged
expenses already made on the vessel, cover 25% of the cost of the vessel, as provided in the
option granted in the bareboat contract. This amount was accepted by the Administration as
deposit, subject to the final determination of Froilan's appeal by the President.
On August 25, 1950, the Cabinet resolved once more to restore Froilan to his rights under
the original contract of sale, on condition that he shall pay the sum of P10,000.00 upon delivery
of the vessel to him, said amount to be credited to his outstanding accounts; that he shall continue
paying the remaining installments due, and that he shall assume the expenses incurred for the
repair and drydocking of the vessel. Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Froilan's rights
under the contract of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it,
the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of the said property. Froilan filed an action
for replevin in the CFI of Manila to recover possession thereof and to have him declared the
rightful owner of said property.The court ordered the seizure of the vessel from Pan Oriental and
its delivery to the plaintiff. Pan Oriental tried to question the validity of this order in a petition for
certiorari filed in this Court but was also dismissed for lack of merit. The Republic of the
Philippines, having been allowed to intervene in the proceeding, also prayed for the possession
of the vessel in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over Republic of the Philippines, as the intervenor, with
regard to the counterclaim?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when
it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the
plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive the right
to sue private parties in its own courts.
(ii.) Lim v. Brownell

G.R. NO. L-8587. MARCH 24, 1960
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J:
FACTS:
The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, City of Manila, with
a total area of 29,151 square meters. The lands were registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, a
Japanese citizen, but was owned by Arsenia Enriquez.
On August 3, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (acting on behalf of the
President of the United States) and the President of the Philippines, executed two formal agreements,
one referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4, whereby the said Administrator transferred
all the said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines fully to indemnify the United States for all claims
in relation to the property transferred, which claims are payable by the United States of America or
the Philippine Alien Property Administrator of the United States under the Trading with the Enemy
Act.
Plaintiff Benito Lim was permitted to prosecute the claim as administrator of the intestate
estate of the deceased Arsenia Enriquez. Plaintiff alleged that the lots were once the property of
A e ia E i e , lai iff he , a d ha he ee gaged by her to the Mercantile Bank of
China. He also alleged that when the mortgage was foreclosed, the property was sold at public
auction during the war to the Japanese Asaichi Kagawa, who, by means of threat and intimidation
succeeded in preventing Arsenia Enriquez from exercising her right to redemption; and that Kagawa
never acquired any valid title to the property because he was ineligible under the Constitution to
acquire residential land in the Philippines by reason of alienage.
Plaintiff prayed that the sheriff's sale to Kagawa and the vesting of the properties in the
Philippine Alien Property Administrator and the transfer by the United States to the Republic of the
Philippines be declared null and void. He also prayed that Arsenia Enriquez be adjudged owner of
the said properties and the Register of Deeds of Manila be ordered to issue the corresponding transfer
certificates of title to her; and that the defendant Attorney General of the United States be required to
pay rental from March 14, 1946, and the Government of the Philippines from August 3, 1948, at the
rate of P30,000 per annum with legal interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the plaintiff can claim for damages against the defendant Attorney General
of the United States?
HELD:
No. The claim for damages for the use of the property against the intervenor defendant
Republic of the Philippines to which it was transferred cannot be maintained because of the immunity
of the state from suit. The Republic of the Philippines has not waived its right of non-suability by its
intervention because the Republic only intervened in the case merely to unite with the defendant
Attorney General of the United States in resisting plaintiff's claims, and for that reason asked no
affirmative relief against any party in the answer in intervention it led. On the other hand, plaintiff in
his original complaint made no claim against the Republic and only asked for damages against it for
the use of the property when the complaint was amended. In its answer to the amended complaint,
the Republic "reproduced and incorporated by reference" all the affirmative defenses contained in the
answer of the defendant Attorney General, one of which, as already stated, is that the lower court
had no jurisdiction over the claim for rentals because of lack of consent to be sued. Clearly, this is
not a case where the state takes the initiative in an action against a private party by filing a complaint
in intervention, thereby surrendering its privileged position and coming down to the level of the
defendant - as what happened in the case of Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al. 95 Phil.,
905 cited by plaintiff but one where the state, as one of the defendants merely resisted a claim
against it precisely on the ground, among others, of its privileged position which exempts it from suit.
(iii.) United States v. Ruiz

G.R. NO. L-35645. MAY 22, 1985
ABAD SANTOS, J:
FACTS:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of
those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. The
United States invited the submission of bids to repair the fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S.
Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines; repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline, including the
typhoon damage to shoreline revetment at NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach,
NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price
proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the requests.
In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins, director
at the Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners herein. The letter
said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous
unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S.
Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The company then sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway,
William I. Collins, Robert Gohier and all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy.
The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and,
in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay
damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there the immunity of the United States has been waived when it entered into
a business contract?
HELD:
No. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It
does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the
projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United
States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are
not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
(iv.) United States v. Guinto

G.R. No. 76607, 79470, 80018, 80258
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity.
In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force
stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for
barbering services in the said base. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the
private respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil
Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid. The private respondents complained
to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), and the latter explained that the Civil Engineering
concession had not been awarded to Dizon as a result of the February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon
was already operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession, and the expiration
of the contract had been extended from June 30, 1986 to August 31, 1986. The petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action
was in effect a suit against the United States of America, which had not waived its non-suability.
In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony
Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air
Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after
investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into
the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club
manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to
the collective bargaining agreement between the Center and its employees. The board unanimously
found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.
In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell,
an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the
individual petitioners of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special
Investigators (AFOSI). On the basis of the sworn statements made by the petitioners, an information
for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista
in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a
complaint for damages against the individual petitioners herein claiming that it was because of their
acts that he was removed.
In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the
herein petitioners (except the U.S.), for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the
acts of the defendants. There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the
defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several
parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim the
plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and
resisting arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of state immunity is applicable under the Republic of the
Philippines and United States of America Treaty for acts done in the performance of the official
duties?
HELD:
Yes. We are bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine
of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically
obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.
When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Not all
contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must
be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. It bears stressing at this point that the above
observations do not confer on the United States of America a blanket immunity for all acts done by it
or its agents in the Philippines.
RULING:
1. In G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by
the United States government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. This
being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the
private respondents in the court below.
2. In G.R. 79470, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air
Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States
government in its proprietary capacity. The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners
cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against
them by Genove.
3. G.R. No. 80018 that the individually-named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant
and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they
were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified
against the complainant.
4. In G.R. No. 8025, the record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging
their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question
occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this case.
(v.) JUSMAG Phil v. NLRC

G.R. NO. 108813, DECEMBER 15, 1994
PUNO, J:
FACTS:
Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support personnel
(SASP) working at JUSMAG-Philippines. He had been with JUSMAG from December 18, 1969, until
his dismissal on April 27, 1992. On March 31, 1992, private respondent led a complaint with the
Department of Labor and Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed
from service by JUSMAG. JUSMAG then led a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as
an agency of the United States.
JUSMAG was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement 10 dated March 21,
1947, between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America. As agreed upon, JUSMAG shall consist of Air, Naval and Army group, and its
primary task was to advise and assist the Philippines, on air force, army and naval matters.
In the Memorandum Agreement forged between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
JUSMAG-Philippines, section e provides:
"e. All SASP employed as of July 1, 1990 will continue their service with JUSMAG at their
current rate of pay and benefits up to 30 June 1991, with an annual benefits up employment
thereafter subject to renewal of their appointment with the AFP (employees and rates of pay
are indicated at Enclosure 3). No promotion or transfer internal to JUSMAG of the listed
personnel will result in the reduction of their pay and benefits.
A year later, or in 1992, the United States Embassy sent another note of similar import to the
Department of Foreign Affairs extending the funding agreement for the salaries of SASP and security
guards until December 31, 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not JUSMAG is immune from suit?
HELD:
Yes. The application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or
governmental activities, or jure imperii. The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to
commercial, private and proprietary acts, also known as jure gestionis.
It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing
a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement
dated March 21, 1947. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit,
the complaint against JUSMAG cannot not prosper.
(vi.) Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon

G.R. NO. 154705. JUNE 26, 2003
AZCUNA, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Republic of Indonesia entered into a Maintenance Agreement for its specified
buildings in the embassy with respondent James Vinzon as sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and
Services. The said Agreement was effective for four years and will renew itself automatically unless
cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry.
On August 31, 2000, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the said agreement. Respondent
claimed that the said termination was arbitrary and unlawful.
Thus, respondents led a complaint against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 145. Respondents alleged that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity
from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement:
"Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the
laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the
abovementioned provision in the Maintenance Agreement?
HELD:
No. The Maintenance Agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the
discharge of its governmental functions. In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have waived its
immunity from suit." As to the paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent, the Solicitor
General states that it "was not a waiver of their immunity from suit but a mere stipulation that in the
event they do waive their immunity, Philippine laws shall govern the resolution of any legal action
arising out of the agreement and the proper court in Makati City shall be the agreed venue thereof.
(vii.) Republic v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. NO. 142476. MARCH 20, 2001.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:
FACTS:
On July 31, 1987, petitioner Republic and the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) led with respondent Sandiganbayan for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and 60 other defendants. The PCGG issued several
sequestration orders, one of which covers an aircraft, more particularly the lease of Falcon jet by the
United Coconut Chemicals Inc. (Unichem) from a company in the US also known as Faysound Ltd.
The lease over the aircraft lapsed in 1987, at which time the aircraft should have been returned by
Unichem to Faysound.
Two years after the lease of the Falcon Falcon jet expired, the PCGG led with the
Sandiganbayan a "Motion For Authority To Sell Sequestered Aircraft Pending Litigation" on the
ground that it is fast deteriorating. The Sandiganbayan denied PCGG's motion, to which the PCGG
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari alleging in the main that the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion to sell the aircraft and praying that the Resolution be
nullified. The Court issued a temporary restraining order directing the Sandiganbayan to cease and
desist from enforcing its assailed Resolution.
The PCGG sold the aircraft to Walter Fuller Aircraft, Inc., a US corporation, for US
$7,138,168.65 which was deposited in escrow with the PNB. Meanwhile, Faysound Ltd., led with the
District Court of Arkansas in the United States an action to recover the Falcon jet from Fuller Aircraft.
Considering that it was deprived of the aircraft sold to it, Fuller Aircraft sued the Republic and PCGG
for breach of warranty with damages in the District Court of Texas, Dallas Division. In order to settle
the money judgment against it, PCGG entered into an "Agreement" with Fuller Aircraft providing,
among others, that the Republic of the Philippines agreed to pay Fuller $11 million and $3 million, in
equal monthly installments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic is liable for the agreement with Fuller Aircraft for the payment of
the recovered Falcon jet that was sold by the PCGG which was subsequently recovered by
Faysound?
HELD:
No. The petitioner Republic cannot be held liable under the "Agreement." It must be stressed
that petitioner did not authorize the PCGG to enter into such contract with Fuller Aircraft. Granting
that the PCGG was so authorized, however, it exceeded its authority. Worse, the sale of the aircraft
was without the approval of the Sandiganbayan. The decision to sell the aircraft is not within the
limited administrative powers of the PCGG but requires the sanction of the Sandiganbayan which can
grant or withhold the same in the exercise of sound discretion and on the basis of the evidence before
it. Without such approval by the judicial authority concerned, and no abuse of discretion on its part
having been established, it irresistibly follows that any sale of said aircraft under the circumstances
obtaining in this case would constitute a prohibited and invalid disposition by the PCGG.
Correspondingly, petitioner Republic cannot be bound by the terms of the said "Agreement"
and thus, there can be no cause of action against it.
5. CONSENT
C. SCOPE OF CONSENT; SUABILITY VS. LIABILITY
(i.) Republic vs. Villasor
(G.R. No. L-30671. November 28, 1973)
FERNANDO, J.,
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge
Guillermo Villasor, declaring final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the
funds of Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged
ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion.
A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P.J.
Kiener Co. Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and ICC (International Construction Corporation), and against
petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award subject of Special Proceedings.
Respondent Judge Guillermo Villasor issued an Order declaring the decision final and
executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and Manila to execute the said
decision. Due to the said order, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. The respondent
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment with several banks, most especially on the
monies due to the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits that are sufficient to cover
the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution.
The Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment. The funds of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans
Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and
allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel
and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Petitioner alleged that respondent Judge Guillermo acted in excess of jurisdiction / with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ
f e ec i agai he AFP e ie , he ce he Alia W i f E ec i a d Ga i h e ice
are null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Alias Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor valid?
HELD:
No, It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of
sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It
is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends." Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar.
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised
charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent." A corollary,
both dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the
object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and
the state liability adjudged.
(ii.) DA v. NLRC
(G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993)
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
The Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the Resolution denying the petition for
i j ci , hibi i , a d a da ha a e j i e a e l NLRC Regi al A bi a i
Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision of the Executive Labor
A bi e a d f a achi g a d e ec i g eii e e . The DA and Sultan Security
Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said
governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly rate of the guards, the same terms and
conditions were also made to apply to another contract, dated 01 May 1990, between the same
parties. Guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner.
Several guards of Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-
payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime
pay, as well as for damages, before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City against
the DA and Sultan Security Agency. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding
petitioner jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for payment of money claims of the
security guards.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Non-Suability applies to the case at bar?
HELD:
Yes, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from
its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages,
holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly
constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon
any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied
(iii.) PNB v. Pabalan

(G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978)
FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a petition requesting for certiorari against the
Writ of Execution authorized by the respondent Hon. Judge Pabalan with regard to the transfer of
funds belonging to the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA). This is not the first time
petitioner raised this issue.
The judgment against PVTA had reached the stage of finality. A writ of execution was,
therefore, in order. It was accordingly issued on December 17, 1970. There was a notice of
garnishment for the full amount mentioned in such writ of execution in the sum of P12,724,66. In
view of the objection, however, by petitioner PNB on the above ground, coupled with an inquiry as to
whether or not respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration had funds deposited with
petitioner's La Union branch, it was not until January 25, 1971 that the order sought to be set aside
in this certiorari proceeding was issued by respondent Judge.
As noted at the outset, petitioner would invoke the doctrine of non-suability. It is to be admitted
that under the present Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in
constitutional law has been set forth in express terms: "The State may not be sued without its
consent." If the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in the government,
then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case here.
Garnishment would lie.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PNB can be sued?
HELD:
Yes, when the State enters into a contract, the State is deemed to have divested itself of the
mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Hence, Funds of
public corporations could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment.
The government has entered with them into a commercial business hence it has abandoned
its sovereign capacity and has stepped down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is subject to
rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued. Tore, the petition of PNB La Union
is denied.
(iv.) National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Guivelondo

(G.R.No. 1554411, 19 June 2003)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner National Housing Authority filed with RTC Cebu City, an Amended Complaint for
eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot, and Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo. Petitioner alleged that defendant Associacion Benevola de Cebu was the claimant/owner
of a lot located in the Banilad State, Cebu City; that defendant Engracia Urot was the claimant/owner
of Lots, all of the Banilad State; that defendant Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo were the claimants/owners
of Cadastral Lot No. 1613-D located at Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City; and that the lands are within a
blighted urban center which petitioner intends to develop as a socialized housing project.
Respondent Heirs of Guivelondo filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their
bjec i eii e e e ia e hei e ie . The ial c i ed a de
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to expropriate properties of the defendants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the state can be compelled and coerced by the courts to exercise or continue with the
exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain?
HELD:
Yes, the right of the plaintiff to dismiss an action with the consent of the court is universally
recognized with certain well-defined exceptions. If the plaintiff discovers that the action which he
commenced was brought for the purpose of enforcing a right or a benefit, the advisability or necessity
of which he later discovers no longer exists, or that the result of the action would be different from
what he had intended, then he should be permitted to withdraw his action, subject to the approval of
the court.
(v.) Larkins v. NLRC

(G.R.No. 92432, 23 February 1995)
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Aldora Larkins was a member of the United States Air Force (USAF) assigned to
oversee the dormitories of the 3 AGS at Clark Air Base, Pampanga. 3 AGS terminated the contract
for the maintenance of the dormitories with the De Guzman Custodial Services. The employees,
including private respondents, were allowed to continue working for 3 AGS. It was left to the new
contractor, the JAC Maintenance Services owned by Joselito Cunanan, to decide whether it would
retain their services.
Joselito Cunanan chose to bring in his own workers. As a result, the workers of the De
Guzman Custodial Services were requested to surrender their base passes to Lt. Col. Frankhauser
or to petitioner.
On August 12, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration
Branch No. III of the NLRC, San Fernando, Pampanga, against petitioner, Lt. Col. Frankhauser, and
Cunanan for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages. On September 9, 1988, private
respondents amended their complaint and added therein claims for emergency cost of living
allowance, thirteenth-month pay, service incentive leave pay and holiday premiums.
The Labor Arbiter, with the conformity of private respondents, ordered Cunanan dropped as
party respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction to entertain and decide on the case, on the
basis of lack of proper jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and violation of the RP-US
Agreement and / or submission of the Government of America to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter?
HELD:
No, Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction. It is the Government of the United States of America
which is maintaining military facilities in the Philippines, one of which is located inside Clark Air Base.
The 3 AGS where the appellees previously worked as dormitory attendants is just one of the various
units of the United States Armed Forces (USAF) inside the said military base. While individual
respondents, particularly Lt. Col. William Frankhauser and T/Sgt. Aldora Larkins, are mere elements
of the USAF assigned to the 3 AGS. Thus, whatever awards, monetary or otherwise, the appellees
are entitled to by virtue of this case are the primary liabilities of their real employer, the United States
Government. Private respondents were dismissed from their employment by Lt. Col. Frankhauser
acting for and in behalf of the U.S. Government. The employer of private respondents was not Lt.
Col. Frankhauser nor petitioner. The employer of private respondents, as found by NLRC, was the
U.S. Government which, by right of sovereign power, operated and maintained the dormitories at
Clark Air Base for members of the USAF.
(vi.) Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. v. University of the Philippines
(G.R. No. 185918, April 18, 2012)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract
for security services with respondent UP.
Several security guards filed complaints against Lockheed and UP for payment of underpaid
wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and special holidays, service incentive leave
pay, NSDs, 13th month pay, and etc from December 16-31, 1998 a d a e fee .
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring Lockheed and UP solidarily liable to complainants.
B h L ckheed a d UP a ealed he Lab A bi e deci i . NLRC dified Lab A bi e
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not University of the Philippines can be sued?
HELD:
Yes, UP consented when it participated in the proceedings. What UP questions is the hasty
garnishment of its funds in its PNB account. This Court finds that the CA correctly applied the NEA
case. Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government and has the
capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be
subject to garnishment or levy. However, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the
judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
(vii.) University of the Philippines v. Dizon

(G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012)
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
On August 30, 1990, the University of the Philippines (UP), through its then President Jose V.
Abueva, entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation
(Stern Builders), for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of
Arts and Sciences Building on the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Banos (UPLB).
In the course of the implementation of the contracts, Stern Builders submitted three progress
billings but the UP paid only two of the billings. The third billing worth P 273,729.47 was not paid due
to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP
failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz to sue the UP and its correspondent
officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages.
UP i i ha he CA deci i i fa f he ga i h e f UP f d a i c i e
with the rulings in Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego and Department of Agriculture v.
NLRC to the effect that government funds and properties could not be seized under writs of execution
or garnishment to satisfy judgment awards.
In contrast, Stern Builders and dela Cruz aver that the ruling in Commissioner of Public Works
v. San Diego had no application because there was an appropriation for the project and that the UP
retained the funds allotted for the project only in a fiduciary capacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the funds of the UP were the proper subject of garnishment in order to satisfy the
judgment award?
HELD:
NO, UP f d , bei g g e e f d ,ae bjec ga i h e . The C held ha
he UP i a g e e i e ali , e f i g he S a e c i i al mandate of promoting
quality and accessible education. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any
i e e acc i g f he de i f ch f d i a ba ki g i i i , c i ea ecial
f d, he di b e e f hich h ld al a be alig ed i h he UP i i a d e, a d
should always be subject to auditing by the COA.. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not
be alidl ade he bjec f he RTC i f e ec i ga i h e . The ad e e j dgment
rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable
by execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.
Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable
f al a d ac al da age (i cl di g a e fee ) ld be a i fied c ide i g ha ch
e a liabili ie e e c e ed b he a ia i ea a ked f he aid jec .
(viii.) Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez

(G.R. No. L-61744, June 25, 1984)
RELOVA, J.:
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, et al. vs. Municipal
Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al.", rendered judgment holding herein petitioner municipality
liable to private respondents as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan, represented by Mayor Mar
Marcelo G. Aure and its Municipal Treasurer:
1. ordering the partial revocation of the Deed of Donation signed by the deceased Carlos
Imperio in favor of the Municipality of San Miguel Bulacan, dated October 27, 1947 insofar as Lots
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Block 11 of Subdivision Plan Psd-20831 are concerned, with an aggregate total
area of 4,646 square meters, which lots are among those covered and described under TCT No. T-
1831 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of the Municipal Government of San Miguel
Bulacan,
2. ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding Deed of Reconveyance over the
aforementioned five lots in favor of the plaintiffs in the proportion of the undivided one-half (½) share
in the name of plaintiffs Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, Adoracion, Rodolfo, Conrado, Ernesto, Alfredo,
Carlos, Jr. and Juan, all surnamed Imperio, and the remaining undivided one-half (½) share in favor
of plaintiffs uses Marcelo E. Pineda and Lucila Pongco;
3. ordering the defendant municipality to pay to the plaintiffs in the proportion mentioned in
the immediately preceding paragraph the sum of P64,440.00 corresponding to the rentals it has
collected from the occupants for their use and occupation of the premises from 1970 up to and
including 1975, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from January 1970 until fully paid;
4. ordering the restoration of ownership and possession over the five lots in question in favor
of the plaintiffs in the same proportion aforementioned;
5. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,000.00 for attomey's fees; and to
pay the cost of suit.
The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence presented
to substantiate the same.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 11-12, Rollo)
Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the
municipality's property or funds are all public funds exempt from execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan are public funds which are exempt
from execution for the satisfaction of the money judgment in Civil Case No. 604-B.
HELD:
YES, the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan are exempt from execution. In
Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law
that not only the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations Cannot
be seized under execution against them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments
rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not
subject to execution unless so declared by statute."
Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the Municipal
Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan,
are also public funds and as such they are exempt from execution. Also, under Presidential Decree
No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration", Section 2 (a) stated that, there must
be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan
before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that
the Sangguniang Bayan has passed an ordinance to this effect. Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of
the New Rules of Court, outlines the procedure for the enforcement of money judgment which has
not been followed.
(ix.) City of Caloocan v. Allarde

(G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003)
CORONA,J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in 1972, Marcial Samson, City Mayor of Caloocan City, through Ordinance No.
1749, abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions from the plantilla
of the local government of Caloocan. Then Assistant City Administrator Delfina Hernandez Santiago
and the 17 affected employees of the City Government assailed the legality of the abolition before
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City
In 1973, the CFI declared the abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the
dismissed employees and the payment of their back salaries and other emoluments.
In 1986, the City Government of Caloocan paid respondent Santiago P75,083.37 in partial
payment of her backwages, thereby leaving a balance of P530,761.91. In 1987, the City of Caloocan
appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries. This was included in Supplemental Budget No. 3 for
the fiscal year 1987. Surprisingly, however, the City later refused to release the money to respondent
Santiago.
On February 12, 1991, Judge Mauro T. Allarde, RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 123, issued a
writ of execution for the payment of the remainder of respondent Santiagos back salaries and other
emoluments.
On October 5, 1992, the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of
1992, which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by respondent Santiago as back salaries,
plus interest.
Thus, in an order dated May 7, 1993, Judge Allarde ordered Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo to
immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of
respondent Santiago.
When PNB immediately notified the City of Caloocan of the Notice of Garnishment, the City
Treasurer sent a letter-advice informing PNB that the order of garnishment was illegal, with a warning
that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding of the funds
of the city.
Petitioner argues that the garnishment of its funds in PNB was invalid inasmuch as these were
public funds and thus exempt from execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the garnishment was invalid?
HELD:
No, the garnishment was not invalid. The Court ruled that the rule on the immunity of public
funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under
execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against
the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial
processes.
In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No.
0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for respondent Santiagos back salaries
plus interest. Thus this case fell squarely within the exception. For all intents and purposes, Ordinance
No. 0134, Series of 1992, was the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The sum indicated
in the ordinance for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated from the other budgetary
allocations of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the Citys monetary obligation to her. The
judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.
(x.) Municipality of Makati v.Court of Appeals

(G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990)
CORTES, J.:
FACTS:
It appears that the action for eminent domain was filed on May 20, 1986. . Attached to
petitioner's complaint was a certification that a bank account (Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had
been opened with the PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the sum of
P417,510.00, made pursuant to the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 42. Respondent RTC judge
rendered a decision on June 4, 1987, fixing the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00,
and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was
earlier released to private respondent.
After this decision became final and executory, private respondent moved for the issuance of
a writ of execution.
Petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be garnished nor
levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio [G.R.
No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899].
Respondent trial judge issued an order dated December 21, 1988 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration on the ground that the doctrine enunciated in Republic v. Palacio did not apply to
the case because petitioner's PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was an account specifically
opened for the expropriation proceedings of the subject property pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 42.
ISSUE:
Whe he eii e PNB acc ae bjec le a d e ec i ?
HELD:
N , e i i e PNB account are not subject to levy and execution. In this jurisdiction, well-
settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided
for by statute [Republic v. Palacio, supra.; The Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, G.R.
No. L-30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616].
Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating
from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June
4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under
execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-
530850-7.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse.
Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money
judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel
the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds therefor [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo,
supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil. 247 (1960)].
(xi.) Pacific Products v. Ong

(G.R. No. L-33777, January 30, 1990)
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
Pacific Products, Inc. (Pacific, for brevity) filed an action for sum of money against Hilarion D.
Labrador (hereinafter referred to as H.D. Labrador), "doing business under the name and style of
BML Trading and Supply," with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Meanwhile, BML Trading and Supply (BML Trading, for brevity) won in a bid to supply the
Bureau of Telecommunications (Bureau, for brevity) with 15,000 pounds of bluestone copper sulfate
worth P10,500.00. H.D. Labrador, as agent of BML Trading delivered the compound. Before the
Bureau could release the payment to BML Trading, the Sheriff of Manila garnished P9,111.70 of
P10,500.00 on October 17,1962.
Unknown to Pacific, BML Trading, through its attorney in-fact, H.D. Labrador assigned its
tights over the P10,500.00 to herein respondent, Vicente S. Ong on October 19,1962.
H.D. Labrador was declared in default and was ordered to pay Pacific the sum of P 9,111.70
in a decision which was rendered by the trial court on December 21, 1962.
On February 15, 1963, Vicente Ong filed an action for damages against Macario Ofilada in
his capacity as Sheriff of Manila, the Pacific Products, Inc., and the First Quezon City Insurance, with
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals when it held that the garnishment of the
amount of P10,500.00 payable to BML Trading and Supply while it was still in the possession of the
Bureau of Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and void. It is also petitioner's
contention that the cases of Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 43 Phil. 384 and
Avendano et al. vs. Alikpala, et al., G.R. No. L-21189, November 28, 1964, wherein this Court
declared null and void the garnishment of the salaries of government employees, relied upon by the
appellate court are not applicable because no garnishment of salaries of government official or
employee is involved in this case.
Petitioner contends that immunity from suit was waived when the Bureau of
Telecommunications entered into a business transaction with BML Trading since in this jurisdiction,
it is now "a well established doctrine that when the Government engages in business, it abdicates
part of its sovereign prerogatives and ascends to the level of a citizen" (Price Stabilization Corporation
v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. L-9797 and L-9834. November 29. 1957). Likewise, petitioner
contends that in this case, where the Bureau is authorized to enter into a contract, the government
"may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other person," as was
held in the case of National Shipyards and Steel Corporation (NASSCO) vs. CIR, et al., G.R. L-17874,
August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 781.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of garnishment issued is illegal?
HELD:
YES, the writ of garnishment issued payable to BML Trading is illegal and therefore null and
void.The Court held that the Bureau of Telecommunications is a government agency created under
Section 78 of Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947. It has no charter and no distinct personality of
its own. Being a government agency, the doctrine of State immunity from suit applies.
For the foregoing reasons, We affirm the ruling of the appellate court that the writ of
garnishment issued against the P10,500.00 payable to BML Trading while still in the possession of
the Bureau of Telecommunications is illegal and therefore, null and void. In view of the assignment
and waiver by BML Trading of the said amount in favor of Vicente Ong, the latter became the rightful
owner thereof.
(xii.) National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 129169. November 17, 1999)
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
FACTS:
In a competitive bidding held by NIA in August 1978, Hydro Resources Contractors
Corporation (hereafter HYDRO) was awarded Contract MPI-C-2 for the construction of the main civil
works of the Magat River Multi-Purpose Project. The contract provided that HYDRO would be paid
partly in Philippine pesos and partly in U.S. dollars. HYDRO substantially completed the works under
the contract in 1982 and final acceptance by NIA was made in 1984. HYDRO thereafter determined
that it still had an account receivable from NIA representing the dollar rate differential of the price
escalation for the contract
After unsuccessfully pursuing its case with NIA, HYDRO, on 7 December 1994, filed with the
CIAC a Request for Adjudication of the aforesaid claim. On 6 January 1995, NIA filed its Answer
wherein it questioned the jurisdiction of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
alleging lack of cause of action, laches and estoppel in view of HYDROs alleged failure to avail of its
right to submit the dispute to arbitration within the prescribed period as provided in the contract.
On 13 March 1995, NIA filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction over the disputes.
NIA contended that there was no agreement with HYDRO to submit the dispute to CIAC for arbitration
considering that the construction contract was executed in 1978 and the project completed in 1982,
whereas the Construction Industry Arbitration Law creating CIAC was signed only in 1985.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CIAC has jurisdiction over the controversy?
HELD:
YES, the CIAC has jurisdiction over the controversy. Under the Executive Order No.1008,
otherwise known as the Construction Industry Arbitration Law which was promulgated on 4 February
1985, vests upon CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected
with contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute
arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. The
disputes may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the
parties to a dispute must agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

1. Section 1:
a. Villavicencio v Lukban
(G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919)
MALCOLM, J:
FACTS:
170 women who had lived in the segregated district for women of ill repute in the city of Manila,
were by orders of the Mayor of the city of Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated from
society and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or
to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown.
Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the
case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed
necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and
stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
ISSUE:
WON The Mayor of the city of Manila be cited in contempt of court for his failure to comply with the
order of the court?
HELD:
Yes. Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed
a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is
no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not
expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as
stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen.
This will be one of the means whereby the just hope expressed in the majority decision will
be realized, that is, that in the Philippine Islands there should exist a government of laws and not a
government of men and that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly
Government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachments.
2. Section 2:
a) Kuroda vs Jalandoni
(42 O.G. 4282)
MORAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission
of war crimes for unlawfully disregarding and failing "to discharge his duties as such commander
tocontrol the operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and
other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in
violation of the laws and customs of war".
Kuroda questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes
Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. The petitioner also seek to enjoin
and prohibit Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's
case before the Military Commission. He contended that the Philippines is not a signatory to the
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of
crimes not based on law, national and international.
ISSUE:
WON E.O. No. 68 is valid and constitutional?
HELD:
Yes. EO No. 68 which was issued by the President is valid. It was stated in section 2 Article 2 of
he 1987 C i i ha The Phili i e e ce a a an instrument of national policy, and
ad he ge e all acce ed i ci le f i e a i al la a a f he la f he a i . The
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second Convention only in 1947. It cannot be
denied that the rules and regulation of The Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are
wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. These rules and principles
were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United State and Japan, who were signatories to
the two Convention. These rules and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall
be a signatory. At the same time, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to
consummate this unfinished aspects of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals,
through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
b) Co Kim Chan vs Valdez Tan Keh

(G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945)
FERIA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila
initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation. The respondent judge refused to continue
hearings on the case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that
he cla a i i ed b Ge e al MacA h ha all la , eg la i a d ce e f a he
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal
effect in areas of the Phili i e f ee f e e cc a i a d c l had he effec f i alida i g
and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in
the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. Respondent, additionally contends that the
government established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto government.
ISSUE:
WON judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid and
remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and
Filipino forces?
HELD:
The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were valid. The governments by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation
being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court
of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, valid. Those not only judicial
but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, remained
valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under
the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.
c) Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association vs Duque

(G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007.)
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One
of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World
Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured
that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued the assailed Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant International Agreements,
Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR).
Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code,
amending and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR
implements not only the Milk Code but also various international instruments regarding infant and
young child nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international instruments are deemed part
of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.
ISSUE:
Whether the pertinent international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of
the land and may be implemented by the DOH through the RIRR.
HELD:
No. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law such as Art. 2 Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution.
Unlike what has been done with the ICMBS where the legislature enacted most of the
provisions into law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, absolutely prohibiting
advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted as a domestic law.
Under Art. 23 of the WHO Constitution, the WHA shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization.
The Court finds it conspicuous that there are no specified mechanisms as to make the
ec e da a e f he WHA a h i be bi di g i e be . The ef e, he
resolutions promulgated by the WHA should be considered as non-binding recommendations. The
provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. Thus, only
the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly
implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
d) Ichong vs Hernandez
(G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957)
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his
fell Chi e e b i e e e j ed a l i he l cal a ke i Pa a . U il i J e 1954
when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is
to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the
nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP
which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sunt servanda). He said that as
a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income
generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Retail Trade Nationalization Act is unconstitutional for it is in conflict with treaties
which are generally accepted principles of law.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court said it saw no conflict. The reason given by the court was that the
Retail Trade National Law was passed in the exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained
away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.
The law in question was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country
from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power
of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy
a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the
retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the state, through which and by which it protects
its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien
and citizen in the exercise of occupation regulated, nor the due process of the law clause; because
the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry
out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate
but actually necessary - and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the legislature,
with whose power and discretion the judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that
the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has
not misled the legislature of the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be
void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on
the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
e) Gonzales vs Hechanova
(G.R. No. L-21897. October 22, 1963)
CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS:
President Diosdado Macapagal entered into an executive agreement with Vietnam and Burma
for the importation of rice. The said agreements were not in compliance with the requisite that it must
secure a certification from the National Economic Council that there is a shortage on cereals. On
September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary Rufino Hechanova authorized the importation
of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources and created a rice procurement
committee composed of Sec. of Defense Macario Peralta, Jr., Auditor General Pedro Gimenez, Sec.
of Commerce Cornelio Balmaceda, and Sec. of Justice Salvador Mariño for the implementation of
said proposed importation. Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo
Palay and Corn Planters Association filed the petition averring that in making or attempting to make
said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends
Republic Act No. 2207 explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the president may, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
HELD:
No. It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two
contracts for the purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the Government
of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; that
such agreements became binding and effective upon signing thereof by representatives of the parties
thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and the
aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute
are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved under the American jurisprudence
in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts
of the executive relative to foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot
interfere; and that the aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the Government
of the Philippines having already paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters
of credit in favor of the sellers of said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense.
f) In Re: Garcia
FACTS:
Herein petitioner Arturo E. Garcia applied for the admission to practice law in the Philippines
without having to take the required bar examinations. He avers that he is a Filipino citizen born in
Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in
Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the
"Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and
finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho". He contends that by virtue of
he ea be ee he Phili i e a d S ai he T ea f Acade ic Deg ee a d he E e ci e f
P fe i he i entitled to the practice of law in PH without submitting himself to the bar
examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Garcia is entitled to the practice law in the Philippines without submitting
himself to the bar examinations by virtue of the treaty concluded between Spain and Philippines.
HELD:
No. The court resolved to deny the petition on the grounds that the provisions of the Treaty
on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Spanish State cannot be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 thereof it could clearly be
discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession
in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant
is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject
to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals
desiring to practice in the Philippines. It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty
invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting
State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in
connection with Sections 2,9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone
can practice the legal profession in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar
examinations; and
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission
to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not
encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission
to the practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being
reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
g) Secretary of Justice vs Lantion

(G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000)
MELO, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner herein filed for a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial
C (RTC). Sec e a f J ice F a kli D il ig ed i Ma ila he e adi i T ea Be ee he
Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the
said Treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark
Jiminez to the United States. Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary
requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government. The petitioner denied
the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the
Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out
of a request for extradition.
ISSUE:
Whe he e de e i le e ice a d hea i g d i g he e al a i tage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
HELD:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed
in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The
duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with
its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as
a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated
in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions
of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by
the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given
equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
3. Section 3:
a) Alih vs Castro
(G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987)
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and
elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov.
Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives.
Respondent, Major General Delfin C. Castro, raided the compound occupied by the petitioners, the
Alih Clan, in Zamboanga City in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and other explosives.
Petitioners demand to recover the arms and ammunition seized from them and respondents be
enjoined from using the same against them since it was illegal search, due to the lack of search
warrant.
ISSUE:
WON Recovered arms and ammunitions be used as admissible evidence against the court?
HELD:
No. In acting as the respondents did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at
all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. In the instant case,
the respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or
not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make
the raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent.
They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before
making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away,
they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was
absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the
Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the
menace of a military invasion.
If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all
the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of
the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree." As Judge
Learned Hand observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed." Pending determination of the
legality of such articles, however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate
disposition as the corresponding courts may decide.
4. Section 4 & 5:
a) People vs Lagman
(66 Phil. 13)
AVANCEÑA, J.:
FACTS:
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman, a Filipino citizen with the age of 20, is being charged with
i la i f ec i 60 f he C eal h Ac 1, k a he Na i al Defe e La . Sec i 60
of the Commonwealth Act 1 compelled Filipinos having reached the age of twenty years in 1936 to
join and render the military service. However, Lagman refused to join the military and argued the
provision was unconstitutional. He also defended that reason he does not want to serve the military
is because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed.
Lagman was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment,
with the costs.
ISSUE:
WON Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 is constitutional?
HELD:
Yes. Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act 1is constitutional, because it is the duty of the Government
to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. Thus, the National Defense Law,
may require its citizens to compulsory render military service. Sec. 4, Art. II of the Constitution states
ha The i e d fg e e , a d i he f lfill e f hi d all ci i e a be e i ed b
la e de e al ili a ci il e ice.
b) Chavez vs Romulo
(G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004)
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
On January 2003, former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech to members
of the PNP regarding the suspension of the issuance of Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of
Residence (PTCFOR). Acting on the presidents directive, PNP Chief Ebdane then issued regulations
ba i g he ca i g fi ea ide f e e ide ce. F a ci c Cha e , i e i i g he
ban as a violation of right to property, requested to the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the said regulation. DILG denied the request
of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional for violating right to property
HELD:
The revocation is a valid exercise of police power. In Sec. 5, Art II of the Constitution it is
a ed ha he ai e a ce f life, libe , a d e , a d he i f he ge e al elfa e
is of paramount importance. Thus, like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may be
revoked at any time. The revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity,
or privilege.
5. Section 6:
a) Aglipay vs Ruiz
(G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937)
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS:
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. In spite of the protest
of the petitioner, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of
the postage for printing as follows: in the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as
border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1.094
inches. The said stamps were actually issued and sold but the greater number thereof, to this day,
remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner as this
action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 13, Article VI, of the Constitution which
provides as follows:
"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher
or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the stamp, the design of which is commemorative of a large religious event,
violates the principle of separation of church and state.
HELD:
No. The issuance of the postage stamps in question was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to
favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to
that church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, that
the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people".
It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of
showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the
location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the
capital of the Philippines, as the venue of that congress.
It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with a religious event, however, the aim and purpose of the Government was not
to favor such religion. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of
incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose is one which could legitimately
be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated.
b) Garces vs Estenzo
(G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 19881)
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
The barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City issued four (4) resolutions regarding
the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual
feast day. One of the resolutions further provided that the barangay council, in accordance with the
practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the
fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in
his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day.
Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a
mass, Father Osmea allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C.
Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file
against Father Osmea in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation. Father
Osmea retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso on the grounds of immorality,
grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law. Meanwhile, the
image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmea
did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored"
the council's resolutions, the council enacted another resolution, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to
file a replevin case against Father Osmea for the recovery of the image. On June 14, 1976, the
barangay council passed another resolution, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin
case.
The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmea and Bishop
Cipriano Urgel. After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father
Osmea turned over the image to the council. ln his answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed
the constitutionality of the said resolutions library
Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and
two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its
members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying
for the annulment of the said resolutions. The lower court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the
validity of the resolutions.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional
HELD:
No. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights
of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church
when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and
having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron
saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the
first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in
rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to
forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that
arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available
to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.
The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner Garces
swore that the said resolutions favored the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and
Edullantes swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image in
the church only once a year or during the fiesta. The Court finds that the momentous issues of
separation of church and state, freedom of religion annd the use of public money to favor any sect or
church are not involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly. lt is not a microcosmic test case
on those issues. This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never have
arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmea had taken the trouble
of causing contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image
of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.
There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father
Osmea claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image,
has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. If it chooses to change its mind and
decides to give the image to the Catholic church that action would not violate the Constitution because
the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property. The council has the right to take
measures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has
some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and
state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64
Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which appropriated sixty thousand pesos for the cost
of plates and the printing of postage stamps with new designs. Under the law, the Director of Posts,
with the approval of the Department Head and the President of the Philippines, issued in 1936
postage stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church. The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and
advertise the Philippines. The design of the stamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing
about the Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended. The instant case is easily
distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49 Phil., 627 and 55 Phil. 307, where a religious
brotherhood, La Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the purpose of raising funds
to meet the expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the Most Holy Sacrament and the Virgin Lady
of Guadalupe, was held accountable for the funds which it held as trustee.
Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the barangay
resolutions, the lower court's judgment dismissing their amended petition is affirmed.
c) Everson vs Board of Education

(330 U.S. 1)
BLACK, J.:
FACTS:
A New Jersey statute authorizes its local school districts to make rules and contracts for the
transportation of children to and from schools. The appellee is a township board of education, acting
pursuant to this statute, authorized reimbursement to parents of money expended by them for the
bus transportation of their children on regular busses operated by the public transportation system.
Part of this money was for the payment of transportation of some children in the community to Catholic
parochial schools. These church schools give their students, in addition to secular education, regular
religious instruction conforming to the religious tenets and modes of worship of the Catholic Faith.
The superintendent of these schools is a Catholic priest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the New Jersey statute in question is in violation of the separation of Church
and State.
HELD:
No. The New Jersey statute is challenged as a "law respecting an establishment of religion." The
First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, commands that a state "shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...." These
words of the First Amendment reflected in the minds of early Americans a vivid mental picture of
conditions and practices which they fervently wished to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for
themselves and for their posterity. Doubtless their goal has not been entirely reached; but so far has
the Nation moved toward it that the expression "law respecting an establishment of religion," probably
does not so vividly remind present-day Americans of the evils, fears, and political problems that
caused that expression to be written into our Bill of Rights. Whether this New Jersey law is one
respecting an "establishment of religion" requires an understanding of the meaning of that language,
particularly with respect to the imposition of taxes. Once again, therefore, it is not inappropriate briefly
to review the background and environment of the period in which that constitutional language was
fashioned and adopted.
d) Engel vs Vitale
(370 U.S.421, June 25, 1962)
Court J.:
FACTS:
The state of New York approved a piece of legislation which required students to start
hei ch l da i h he Pledge f Allegia ce a d a a e i h he e : Al igh G d, e
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our
eache a d c . A e . The ca e a brought by a group of families of public school
students in New Hyde Park, New York, who complained that the voluntary prayer written by the
state board of regents to "Almighty God" contradicted their religious beliefs. Led by Steven Engel, a
Jewish man, the plaintiffs sought to challenge the constitutionality of the state's prayer in school
policy.
The plaintiffs argued that opening the school day with such a prayer violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment), which says, in part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion".
ISSUE:
Whether or not the school-sponsored non-denominational prayer in public schools violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
HELD:
Yes. In a 6 1 decision, the Supreme Court held that reciting government-written prayers in public
schools was unconstitutional, violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Black explained the importance of separation between church and state
by giving a lengthy history of the issue, beginning with the 16th century in England. He noted that
prayer is a religious activity by the very nature of being a prayer, and that prescribing such a religious
activity for school children violates the Establishment Clause.
The Court rejected the defendant's arguments that students were not asked to observe any
specific established religion and that the prayer was voluntary. The Court held that the mere
promotion of a religion is sufficient to establish a violation, even if that promotion is not coercive. The
Court further held that the fact that the prayer is vaguely-enough worded not to promote any particular
religion is not a sufficient defense, as it still promotes a family of religions (those that recognize
"Almighty God"), which still violates the Establishment Clause.
e) I lamic Da ah Co ncil of he Philippine Office of he E ec i e Secretary

(G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003)
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines,
Inc. (IDCP) praying for the declaration of nullity of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001 and the prohibition
of herein respondents Office of the Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) from
implementing the subject EO.
IDCP i acc edi ed b Regi al I la ic Da ah C cil f S hea A ia a d Pacific

(RISEAP) to issue Halal Certificate in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries
out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified
products and manufacturers.
Petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also
due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures
based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal
certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products
and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo
registered in the Philippine Patent Office under Patent No. 4-2000-03664.
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating
the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates
and perform other related regulatory activities.
On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification"
was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In said article, OMA warned
Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those without said
certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its
derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal
certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109. As a result, petitioner lost revenues
after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 46 violated the constitutional provision on the Separation of Church and State?
HELD:
Yes. EO 46 violated the constitutional provision on the Separation of Church and State. OMA
was created in 1981 through EO 697 "to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream
of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions." OMA deals
with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national
cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier
between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely
religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion"
provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law.
And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect
the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs,
to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good."
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards
used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify
food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like
herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption.
Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced
Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos'
right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies
charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption,
properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of
Muslims.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court granted the petition herein and declared EO 46 null and void.
6. Section 7:
a) Bayan vs Executive Secretary

(G.R. No. 1138570, October 10, 2000)
BUENA, J:
FACTS:
The Visiting Force Agreement (VFA) is an agreement between the Philippines and the United
States of America. VFA is to further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines
and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the VFA, the
parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels,
and aircraft. President Estrada submitted the agreement which was treated as a treaty to the Senate
and was ratified by 2/3 votes of its members.
Petitioners herein questions the validity of VFA.
ISSUE:
WON VFA is unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to nal acceptance, and with the
exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes
obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the
terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, 46 declares that
the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations.
As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally

accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves
upon the state and not upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government,
the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any branch or subdivision of
its government or any official thereof. As an integral part of the community of nations, we are
responsibleto assure that our government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international
obligation. 47 Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-
compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law.
b) Lim vs Executive Secretary

(G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002)
DE LEON, JR., J.:
FACTS:
This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in-intervention.
On the beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started arriving in
Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine mili a , i Balika a 02-1 . The a e a
simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense
agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. On February 2002, Lim filed
petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the
so-called Balika a 02-1 , a d ha af e d e ice a d hea i g, j dg e be e de ed i i ga
permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basilan and
Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WON he Balika a 02-1 i c e ed b he VFA?
HELD:
Yes. Under the doctrine of incorporation, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current. Balikatan
e e ci e a d e i US e el e gage a i e a e ba i , i he ac i i ie . Balika a
02-1 i a al a i-terrorism advising assisting and training exercise falls under the umbrella of
sanctioned activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense
Treaty and the VFA are indeed authorized. Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces
Agreement, as in all other treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party,
must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution. In particular, the Mutual Defense Treaty was
concluded way before the present Charter, though it nevertheless remains in effect as a valid source
of international obligation. The present Constitution contains key provisions useful in determining the
extent to which foreign military troops are allowed in Philippine territory. Thus, in the section 7 Article
2 of the 1987 Constitution which falls under Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is provided
that the State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the
paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the
right to self-determination.
7. Section 10:
a) Calalang vs Williams
(G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940)
LAUREL, J:
FACTS:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along
Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m.
to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic;
that the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director
of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance
of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940,
the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of
Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public
Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed
to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles
are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not
only of their owners but of the riding public as well. The petitioner further contends that the rules and
regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National
Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.
ISSUE:
WON CA No. 548 is unconstitutional
HELD:
No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the
bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority
because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because
then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
b) Almeda vs Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. L-43800, July 29, 1977)
MARTIN, J.:
FACTS:
Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant on the 46,529-square land of the Angeles
family situated in Tanauan, Batangas, and devoted to sugar cane and coconuts. On September 30,
1968, the landowners sold the property to petitioners-spouses Leonila Laurel Almeda and Venancio
Almeda without notifying respondent-tenant in writing of the sale. Respondent-tenant thus seeks the
redemption of the land in a complaint filed on March 27, 1971, with the Court of Agrarian Relations
at Lipa City.
Answering the complaint, petitioners-spouses state, among other things, that long before the
execution of the deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles and his nephew Cesar Angeles first offered the sale
of the land to respondent Gonzales, but the latter said that he had no money; that respondent-tenant,
instead, went personally to the house of petitioners-spouses and implored them to buy the land for
fear that if someone else would buy the land, he may not be taken in as tenant; that respondent-
tenant is a mere dummy of someone interested in buying the land; that respondent-tenant made to
tender of payment or any valid consignation in court at the time he filed the complaint for redemption.
On October 10, 1973, the Agrarian Court rendered judgment authorizing, the respondent-
tenant, Eulogio Gonzales, to redeem the tenanted land for P24,000. Petitioners-spouses then
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. On January 30, 1976, the Appellate Court, however,
affirmed the decision of the Agrarian Court and denied their motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Gonzales is entitled to redeem the disputed land.
HELD:
No. The Court concurs that property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of
society as well and that the State, in the promotion of social justice, may regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property,
ownership and profits. However, while the law secures to the tenant-farmer this right of redemption,
in particular, the exercise thereof must still be in accordance with the law in order to be valid.
Neither prior tender nor judicial consignation of the redemption price accompanied the filing
of the redemption suit. The right of redemption under Agricultural Land Reform Code may be
exercised within one hundred eighty (180) days from notice in writing which shall be served by the
vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the
sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The statutory periods within
which the right must be exercised "would be rendered meaningless and of easy evasion unless the
redemptioner is required to make an actual tender in good faith of what he believed to be reasonable
price of the land sought to be redeemed." The absence of such tender or consignation leaves the
Court, with no alternative but to declare that respondent-tenant had failed to exercise his right of
redemption in accordance with law. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.
c) Ondoy vs Ignacio
(G.R. No. L-47178, May 16, 1980)
FERNANDO, C.J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Estrella Ondoy filed a claim for compensation for the death of her son, Jose Ondoy,
who drowned while in the employ of respondent Virgilio Ignacio. Respondent moved to dismiss on
the ground of lack of employer employee relationship. However, during the hearing of the case,
respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel that the
deceased, a fisherman, was in that ship, undeniably a member of the working force, but after being
invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. The referee
summarily ignored the affidavit of the chief-mate of respondent employer to the effect "that sometime
in October, 1968, while Jose Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the actual performance of his work with
said fishing enterprises, he was drowned and died on October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in
line of Duty." The hearing officer or referee dismissed the claim for lack of merit. A motion for
reconsideration was duly filed, but the then Secretary of Labor, denied such motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim for compensation was validly dismissed?
HELD:
No. There is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the deceased was drowned
while "in the actual performance of his work" with the shipping enterprise of private respondent. Even
without such evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of compensability under
the Act once it is shown that the death or disability arose in the course of employment, with the burden
of overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim.
This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the
interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. What
was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission is not amiss: "There
is need, it seems, even at this late date, for [private respondent] and other employers to be reminded
of the high estate accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of social
justice and protection to labor." No other judicial attitude may be expected in the face of a clearly
expressed legislative determination which antedated the constitutionally avowed concern for social
justice and protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on resort to
doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would result in frustrating such a national policy." To
be more specific, the principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. As between
a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal
advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases
is not equality but protection.
d) Salonga vs Faralles
(G.R. No. L-47088. July 10, 1981)
FERNANDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Julita Farrales is the title owner of a certain residential lot in Olongapo City. While spouses
Consolacion and Wenceslao Salonga are the lessees of the said land where they build their house
upon. Before 1986, the Salongas failed to pay for the rentals, subsequently Farrales filed an ejectment
case for non-payment of rentals against the petitioner. Petitioners offered to buy the land that they
were occupying instead of vacating it but respondent rejected the idea.
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of plaintiff correct by invoking the promotion of social justice, provided
in Sec. 6, Art. II of the Constitution.
HELD:
No. Social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under our
Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our constitution
was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled
thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and contracts, and
is, therefore, beyond the power of the Court to grant.
8. Section 11:
a) Simon vs Commission on Human Rights

(G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994)
VITUG J.:
FACTS:
Herein petitioners assail the extent of authority of the Commission on Human Right, with prayer
for a restraining order and prelimenary disjunction. The petitioners ask the SC to prohibit public
respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et
al. vs. Quimpo, et al." The case started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by
Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City
Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and
received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3)
days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.1 Prior to
their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that
their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by
their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the
CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to
be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA.
ISSUE:
Whe he CHR j i dic i i c fi ed l he i e iga i of violations of civil and political
rights?
HELD:
Yes. Court finds that the petition has merit. The Commission on Human Rights was created by
the 1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive
Order No. 163, issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It
succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.
It was now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the
Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," has been defined as referring

to those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They
include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as
otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state
or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action. Political rights right to participate, directly or indirectly in the
establishment or administration of government (suffrage, run for public office). In the particular case
at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respond
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings
and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. The challenge on the CHR's
disbursement of the amount of P200, 000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the
demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on
the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the
appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become
moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard,
and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy
to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act
already accomplished. Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its
resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580.
The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from
precisely doing that. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission
on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from
implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by
this Court is made permanent.
9. SECTION 12 & 13:
a) Meyer vs Nebraska
(262 U.S. 390., June 4, 1923)
FACTS:
Petitioner, Robert Meyer is an instructor in Zion Parochial School, was tried and convicted in
the district of Hamilton, Nebraska under an information which charged him for unlawfully teaching the
German language to a student named Raymond Partpar, a ten year old child who had not successfully
reached the eight grade.
The i f ai a ba ed A Ac Rela i g he Teachi g f F eig La g age i
the State of Nebraska, which prohibited any subject in any language other than English to any person
who has not successfully passed the eight grade.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can prohibit the teaching of foreign language to children who has not reach
a certain grade level?
HELD:
No. the State cannot prohibit the teaching of foreign language to children who has not reach
a certain grade level.
It was held that it is incompetent for the government to prohibit the teaching of the German
language to students between certain age levels since there is nothing inherently harmful in the
language that will impair the upbringing of the child; and in fact such a subject could improve his
academic background.
b) Pierce vs Society of Society

(266 U.S. 610)
FACTS:
Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain
academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an
elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders
prohibiting appellants from enforcing O eg C l Ed ca i Ac . The Ac e i ed all
parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants
appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.
ISSUE:
The act deprives liberty to the pa e a d g a dia di ec i g he b i gi g a d ed ca i f
children under their control?
HELD:
Yes. Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, The United States Supreme Court think it
entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children [268 U.S. 510, 535] under their control. As often
heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which
has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state. The fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
c) Cabañas vs Pilapil
(G.R. No. L-25843, July 25, 1974)
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil (deceased), insured himself and made his child, Millian Pilapil, the
be eficia . Millia a Fl e i child i h a a ied a a ed Melch a Caba a . D i g
the minority of his child, he authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as the trustee. When
Florentino died, his brother, Francisco, took over the insurance and got the proceeds. Melchora,
whom is living with Millian, filed a complaint seeking the delivery of such sum. Meanwhile, the
defendant, Francisco, contends that it is the term of the insurance policy that must be followed and
the proceeds must be retained with him.
ISSUE:
WON the state may interfere to the terms of the insurance policy by virtue of Doctri e f Pa e
Pa iae ?
HELD:
Ye . The a e a i e fe e, b i e f a e a iae ega di g i h he e f he
i a ce lic . I a a ed i ec i 12 f A icle II f he 1987 C i i ha The S a e
recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and straighten the family as a basic autonomous
cial i i i . I a lie ha he a e be f a fa il ld be ej diced a d hi i e e
would be affected, the judiciary should help resolve the case according to the best interest. In the
case at bar, the state can intervene when litigation affects the interest of the minor as it is the act as
Pa e Pa iae . The c led ha he ee h ld be he he f he child beca e he ca e
more and pays greater attention to the child than the uncle. At the same time, the minor lives with her
mother and there was no evidence of lack of maternal care.
d) People vs Ritter
(G.R. No. 88582, March 5, 1991)
GUTIERREZ, JR.:
FACTS:
On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his
hotel room in Olongapo City. Inside the hotel room, the Ritter told them to take a bath. When Rosario
came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by the Ritter and to join him in bed. At
that time, Jessie was already asleep but Rosario touched him to call his attention. When he looked,
he saw the accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was trying to
penetrate but it would not fit. The following morning the Ritter left after paying the children. Rosario
then told Jessie that the accused inserted something in her vagina. Sometime the following day,
Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object was already removed from her b1ody
and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie claimed that on the evening of that same date, he
saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina and when he asked her, she said that
the foreign object was not yet removed. Seven months later, Rosario was brought to the hospital with
bloodied skirt, unconscious and foul smelling. After 6 days, Rosario got serious and was pronounced
dead subsequent to her operation with a portion of a sexual vibrator extracted from her vagina. A
case for rape with homicide was filed against Ritter. The Regional Trial Court of Olongapo rendered
a decision declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt citing the rationale of Art 4 of the Revised
Penal He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. The Supreme Court however, reversed
the judgment of the lower court and acquitted Ritter.
ISSUE:
WON Ritter was liable for rape with homicide
HELD:
It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build
an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As
earlier stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's
vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have caused her death. The Court cannot convict on
probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy
(Article 21 Civil Code). The Court cannot overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults
in the Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed
by the appellant should not and cannot be condoned.
e) People vs Larin
(G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
On April 17, 1996, after a practice swim at the university pool in U.P. Los Baños, Carla
Cal a g ceeded h e a d de ; acc ed, E e La i , e f he ch l
swimming instructors, followed and then instructed her to undress to allow him to shave her pubic
hair which he allegedly noticed was visible. He asked her to sit down while he took a squatting and
performed the act of cunnilingus; she backed away saying "Nandidiri ako" but accused kept on saying
"Huwag mong lagyan ng malisya"; then accused removed the right cap of her brassiere and licked
her right breast while touching her vagina at the same time. The accused then forced her to hold and
squeeze his penis, and thereafter left the scene. The next day, she went to see the accused to return
a book and there she told him that she was confused, bothered and terribly upset with what happened.
The accused then forced her to kiss him on the right cheek and on the lips. The RTC found that the
accused is guilty of violating Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, imposing a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused alleges that that the lower court erred in giving weight to the highly incredible
and unnatural testimony of the offended party as the lone eyewitness for the prosecution and that
there is no proof or allegation that complainant 'indulged in lascivious conduct' with the accused-
appellant 'for money, profit or any other consideration'; or "that she was 'coerced or influenced' by
accused-appellant 'to indulge in lascivious conduct' as it is one of the elements of the offense Larin
is being accused of.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an error in the ruling of the RTC.
HELD:
No. Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a witness
and his or her testimony is entitled to the highest degree of respect. The victim's testimony, given in
a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner, is worthy of faith and belief. 25 No
proof of ill motive on her part to falsely accuse and testify against appellant has been offered. The
Court stresses that no young and decent girl like Carla would fabricate a story of sexual abuse, subject
herself to medical examination and undergo public trial, with concomitant ridicule and humiliation, if
she is not motivated by a sincere desire to put behind bars the person who assaulted her.
La i defe e ha he did c i he aid ac f e , fi , he c ide a i
is untenable. He sexually abused Carla Calumpang, in violation of RA 7610, which was duly alleged
in the Information and proven during the trial. The Information clearly states: "The above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his authority, influence and moral ascendancy as trainor/swimming
instructor of minor CARLA LENORE CALUMPANG, and through moral compulsion, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, commit lascivious conduct against the person of said
i . The la clea l eek i h l i i g child e for profit, but also other forms of
child abuse.
f) Department of Education vs San Diego

(G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989)
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
The Department of Education disqualified the San Diego who had actually taken and failed four
times the National Medical Admission Test from taking it again under its regulation. But the private
respondent contends that he is still entitled and hence, applied to take a fifth examination based on
constitutional grounds: right to academic freedom and quality education, due process and equal
protection. He filed a petition for mandamus. The respondent judge declared the said rule invalid and
granted the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the three flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power?
HELD:
Yes. The police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Thus, the subject of the challenged regulation is certainly
within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure
that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust
their lives and health. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times and this is
sufficed to say that he must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. The
Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to
medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a
medical education. The decision of the respondent judge is reversed.
g) Virtuoso vs Municipal Judge

(G.R. No. L-47841. March 21, 1978)
FERNANDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
On February 23, 1978, Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., seventeen-year-old minor, file an
application for the writ of habeas corpus primarily on the ground that the preliminary examination for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality as respondent Municipal
Judge of Mariveles, Bataan failed to meet the strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain
whether there was a probable cause. He also alleged that the bail imposed was clearly excessive.
An amount of P16,000.00 was imposed on petitioner for alleged robbery of a TV set. Respondent
judge contended that the warrant of arrest was justified but nevertheless, he reduced the bail to
P8,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable
cause was constitutionally deficient.
HELD:
The Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code,
which is an implementation of the specific constitutional mandate: "The State recognizes the vital role
of the youth in nation building and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being." it
must ever be kept in mind by occupants of the bench that they should always be on the alert lest by
sloth or indifference or due to the economic or social standing of the alleged offended party, as was
intimated in this petition, the rights of an accused, instead of being honored, are disregarded.
h) Imbong vs Ochoa
(G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Herein cases are consolidated fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said
Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH
Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared
policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. Also petitioners herein are assailing its constitutionality
because they contend that the RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products; the right to religious freedom; the constitutional provision on involuntary
e i de; he igh e al ec i f he la ; he igh f ee eech; RH La i id-for-
vaguenes i i la i f he d e ce cla e f he C i i ; a d that the law intrudes into
he e f i ac f e fa il ec ed b he C i i .
ISSUE/s:
Substantial Issues: Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5.. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
RULING:
1.Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific
and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Co i i a e : The S a e ec g i e he a c i f fa il life a d
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
ec he life f he he a d he life f he b f c ce i .
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
c ce i acc di g reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) c ce i efe he e f
fe ili a i a d (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-
abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent
the Legislature from passing a measure prevents abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word
i defi i g ab ifacie (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside
he he b. The RH La ec g i e ha he fe ili ed al ead ha life a d ha he
State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
ab ifacie b i g he e i a il . Rec g i i g a ab ifacie l h e ha
i a il i d ce ab i he de ci f a fe i ide he he b he e e i f
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the he b (Sec. 3.01(a) f he IRR) ld
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason,
the defi i i fc ace i e de he IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), hich al e he e i a il ,
must be struck down.
2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to
the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the
provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices
will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Mea hile, he e i e e f Sec i 9 f he RH La i be c ide ed a da l af e
these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress
ca de e i e ha c ace i e a e afe, legal, -ab ificie a d effec i e .
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of
modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to
e d g a belief. H e e , he C ha he a h i de e i e he he he RH
Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of
any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate
Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance
its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the
spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social
institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a)
the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate
in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot
infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II,
Sec i 12 f he C i i , hich a e : The a al a d i a igh a d d f ae i
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of he G e e . I addi i , he i f Sec i 23(a)(ii) hich ead i he ca e f

minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising
parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in electi e gical ced e i i alid a i
de ie he igh f a e al a h i i ca e he e ha i i l ed i - gical ced e .
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates
the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
de el e f hei child e i h he e f he e i a . The igh f a e i b i gi g
their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement
(rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups
in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line
with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of
several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The defi i i f i a e heal h ca e e ice ide be ee i ela i Sec i 4( ) f he
RH La hich defi e a blic heal h e ice ide . The i a e heal h ca e i i i ci ed
de Sec i 7 h ld be ee a i a e heal h ca e e ice ide .
The e e ice a d e h d a e al b ad e gh i cl de idi g f i f ai a d
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH
Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH La al defi e i c ec i f a i . U ed together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the
e i c ec a d k i gl c e a e e f alice a d ill i e i lead
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
7. To provide tha he a e be gi e i i i he g e e RH ga i a i la i
of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution,
which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled,
women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH
Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to
have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may
have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only
seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards
the teaching of reproductive health education.
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care
service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest
that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH
service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed
should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not
allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise.
The SC partially granted the petition. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or
minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her
religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not
in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of
his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or
shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of
his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its
Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which
have been herein declared as constitutional.
10. SECTION 14:
a) Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. vs NLRC

(G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997)
Regalado, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) seeks a relief through
the extraordinary writ of certiorari. PT&T hired the private respondent herein, Grace de Guzman as a
reliever, specifically as a "Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period from November 21, 1990
until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement
hich he ig ed i h e i i e c a , he e l e a be i edia el e i a ed
expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19,
1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondent's services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner,
this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. After August
8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join PT&T as a probationary
employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished
her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was
single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.
When petitioner supposedly learned about the marriage, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia
M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain
the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting
married women for employment. The private respondent was then dismissed by the petitioner. Thus,
the private respondent contested the dismissal by initiating a complaint, coupled with a claim for non-
payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.
The Labor Arbiter then made the decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally
dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it
was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company policies. The petitioner then filed an appeal before the NLRC, but the latter
upheld the decision made by the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged concealment of civil status can be a ground to terminate an employee?
HELD:
No. The alleged concealment of civil status can be a ground to terminate an employee. In the case at
bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker
who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all
women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's
assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the
record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the
company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely
because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination
merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate
manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business
j dg e , e ce i h e ca e f la f l di c i i a i h e ided b la . PT&T lic f
not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the
right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution.
The ec d di cl e clea l ha de G a ie i h PT&T e e di l ed i ci all beca e f
he c a lic ha a ied e are not qualified for employment in the company, and not
merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition herein.

11. SECTION 15 & 16:
a) Oposa vs Factoran
(G.R. 101083, July 30, 1993)
DAVIDE, JR. J.:
FACTS:
A Group of minors, namely, Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., represented by their parents, file a
a a e cla i , e e e i g hei ge e a i agai he Sec e a f he De a e f
Environment and Natural Resources who was Fulgencio Factoran Jr. The petition was a prayer to
cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country, and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs, and granting the petitioners
which the ecified a he elief j a d e i able de he e i e . The al alleged ha
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and a healthful ecology and are entitled to
ec i b he S a e i i ca aci a ae a i ae. They also claimed that allowing of TLA
holder to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and impairment of the
national resources property.
The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the petitioners
have no cause of action against him, and the issues raised by the plaintiffs are political by nature
which properly pertains to legislative and executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a cla i e e he i a ia i
i ai e f Phili i e ai f e ?
HELD:
Yes. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature."
Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Needless to say,
every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those
to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
b) C&M Timber Corporation vs Alcala

(G.R. No. 111088, June 13, 1997)
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari by which C & M Timber Corporation seeks the nullification of the order
dated February 26, 1993 and the resolution dated June 7, 1993 of the Office of the President,
declaring as of no force and effect Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued to petitioner on
June 30, 1972. Afterwards, Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto Maceda suspended TLA No. 360
f FLDC g i la i f he e a d c di i he e f, e eciall he ef e a i a d
selective logging activities and in accordance with the national policy on forest conservation. Maceda
issued another order on July 26, 1986, cancelling the license of FLDC on the ground that in spite of
the suspension order dated June 26, 1986, the logging operations of the FLDC had a ceaseless
operation in violation of forestry rules and regulations. In an order dated May 2, 1988, Secretary
Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., of the DENR, declared petitioner's TLA No. 106 as of no more force and
effect and consequently denied the petition for its restoration, even if he denied FLDC's motion for
reconsideration of the cancellation of TLA No. 360. It was ruled that petitioner's petition was barred
by reason of laches, because petitioner did not file its opposition to the issuance of a TLA to FLDC
until February 13, 1987, after FLDC had been logging under its license for almost two years. FLDC's
motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Was the cancellation of the TLA valid?
HELD:
Yes. The DENR order of May 2, 1988, declaring petitioners TLA No. 106 as no longer of any force
and effect, was based on its finding that although TLA No. 106s date of expiry was June 30, 1997 it
had been suspended on June 3, 1983 because of CMTCs mediocre performance in reforestation
and petitioners laches in failing to protest the subsequent award of the same area to FLDC. There
is a considerable dispute whether there was really an order dated June 3, 1983 suspending
petitioners TLA because of mediocre performance in reforestation, just as there is a dispute
whether there indeed was a letter written on September 24, 1984 on behalf of petitioner protesting
the award of the concession covered by its TLA No. 106 to FLDC, so as to show that petitioner did
not sleep on its rights. And the reinstatement of FLDC a ega e he e ha ce c e ai
and protection of forest resources which was covered in the section 16 of Article 2 of 1987
C i i i ha The S a e hall ec a d ad a ce he igh f he e le a bala ced a d
healthful ecology i acc d i h he h h a d ha f a e.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

c) Imbong vs Ochoa
(G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
ISSUE:
WON RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the following:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
HELD:
A icle II, Sec i 12 f he C i i a e : The S a e ec g i e he a c i f fa il life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
ec he life f he he a d he life f he b f c ce i . I i plain and ordinary
ea i g (a ca i a c c i ), he adi i al ea i g f c ce i acc ding
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at fertilization. The framers of the Constitution also intended
for (a) c ce i efe he e f fe ili a i a d (b) the protection of the unborn child
upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional;
only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that prevent the
union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible. The intent of the framers of
the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing
a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this
i e a d hibi ab i . B i g he d i defi i g ab ifacie (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion
a d i d ce he de ci f a fe i ide he he b. The RH La ec g i e ha he
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it. However, the
authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by
i g he e i a il . Rec g i i g a ab ifacie l h e ha i a il induce abortion or
he de ci f a fe i ide he he b he e e i f he fe ili ed each
a d be i la ed i he he b (Sec. 3.01(a) f he IRR) ld a e he a f he a al
of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives
de he IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), hich al e he e i a il , be ck d . The RH Law
does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling
its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH
La i be c ide ed a da l af e he e de ice a d a e ial ha e bee e ed,
evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contrace i e a e afe, legal,
non-ab ificie a d effec i e. The C ca de e i e he he he e f c ace i e
or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b)
right or wrong according to o e d g a belief. H e e , he C ha he a h i de e i e
whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. The
State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures
even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content),
intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates
the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions
of marriage and the family. The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a
procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
a d i la e A icle II, Sec i 12 f he C i i , hich a e : The a al a d i a igh a d
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
hall ecei e he f he G e e . I addi i , he i f Sec i 23(a)(ii) hich ead
i he ca e f i , he i e c e f ae legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-ki hall be e i ed l i elec i e gical ced e i
i alid a i de ie he igh f a e al a h i i ca e he e ha i i l ed i -surgical
procedures. H e e , a i a ecei e i f a i (a ed ced e ) ab fa il
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in
this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures. The Court declined to rule on the
constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should
an actual case be filed before it. Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the
Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in
the development of their children with the use of the e i a . The igh f a e i b i gi g
their youth is superior to that of the State. The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and
corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the
parents in the moral development of their children. By incorporating parent-teacher-community
associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it
could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. The
RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms
as observed b he e i i e a e ag e. The defi i i f i a e heal h ca e e ice ide
must be seen in ela i Sec i 4( ) f he RH La hich defi e a blic heal h e ice ide .
The i a e heal h ca e i i i ci ed de Sec i 7 h ld be ee a i ae
heal h ca e e ice ide . The e e ice a d e h d are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided
for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures. The RH Law
al defi e i c ec i f a i . U ed ge he i ela i Sec i 23 (a)(1), he e i c ec
a d k i gl c e a e e f alice a d ill i e i lead i e e ent the public as to
the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. To provide that the poor are
be gi e i i i he g e e RH ga i a i la i f he e al ec i cla e.
In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall
prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers. The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to
reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who
are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not
prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor. The exclusion of
private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid.
There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to
involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect
and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government
RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed
should they do otherwise. However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their
religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
12. SECTION 17:
a) Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. vs Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 112844, June 2, 1995)
BELLOSILLO, J:
FACTS:
Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. (PMMSI), was established in Manila in 1950 to train
and produce competent marine officers. Private respondent, Department of Education, Culture and
S (DECS) f e e al i e , di a ed e i i e e e f e e al f e i / ec g i i
for not complying with the minimum standard of requirements, such as insufficient training equipment
and instructional facilities as well as conducting classes in the 5th floor of a supermarket which was
deemed not conducive for learning.
Despite being withheld authority, PMMSI still continued to accept enrollees for its maritime
programs. DECS then called petitioner's attention to the provisions of the Implementing Rules of the
Education Act of 1982 which punishes the operation of a school offering educational programs without
prior government authorization. After further ocular inspections by request of the petitioner, DECS
issued a Closure Order for the maritime programs as they still did not attain the minimum
requirements.
The petitioner then appealed to the Office of the President regarding the matter. However, the
appeal was dismissed as no plausible reason to disturb the action of the DECS Secretary was found,
in the light of the fact that petitioner had repeatedly failed to comply with the DECS Orders. Thereafter,
the petitioner brought the matter to the Court of Appeals, which sustained the ruling of the Office of
the President even with attempts of improving school facilities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling of the CA is correct.
HELD:
Yes. The educational operation of schools is subject to prior authorization of the government
and is effected by recognition. The rules and regulations governing recognition are prescribed and
enforced by the DECS, defining therein who are qualified to apply, providing for a permit system,
stating the conditions for the grant of recognition and for its cancellation and withdrawal, and providing
for related matters. The requirement on prior government authorization is pursuant to the State policy
that educational programs and/or operations shall be of good quality and therefore shall at least
satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical plant and facilities and
of administrative or management viability.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled in favor of DECS because in spite of the claim that
it spent on improvements, the basic problem remained as it still occupies the 5th of the William Liao
building, which is not conducive to learning, and has a limited area for expansion and development.
b) Villar vs Technological Institute of the Philippines

(G.R. No. 69198, April 17, 1985)
FERNANDO, C.J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression against the respondents, in their refusal to
admit the said petitioners at the Technological Institute of the Philippines. However, reference was
made to some of the petitioners' school records. Petitioners Rufino Salcon Jr., Romeo Guilatco,
Venecio Villar, Inocencio Recitis had failed in one or two of their subjectsin 1983-1985. However,
petitioner Noverto Baretto had five failing grades in the first semester in the first school year, six
failing grades in the second semester of 1984-1985. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon Jr. had three failing
grades, one passing grade and one subject dropped in the first semester of school year 1984-1985.
Petitioner Regloben Laxamana had five failing grade with no passing grade in the first semester of
1984-1985 school year. Petitioners Barreto, de Leon Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment
in view of such failing grades.
ISSUE:
Whether or not TIP violated the right of education by barring the petitioners to enroll?
HELD:
No. The constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of free public
elementary education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free
public education" up to the high school level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in
colleges and universities. It is only at the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a
duty to be obligatory in the case of students in the colleges and universities. As far as the right itself
is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right because of the lack of funds, Article
26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to education.
Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education
shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and
higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."
It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social economic, and
cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the
phrase used being "generally available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all
should be on the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of
the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency.
The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set
academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion
of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot
be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus
prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded.
c) Tablarin vs Gutierrez
(G.R. No. 78164. July 31, 1987)
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner(s): Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, Evangelina S. Labao, in
their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during the school year
1987-88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT)
Petitioners raised a motion to enjoin that the Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM) to enforce Section
5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985. They
also sought that the requirement of taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the
NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future, be
scrapped.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, series of 1985.
HELD:
Yes. Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which
the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously
undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative order
they assail collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other
words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the
constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in
behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the
constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language
descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore highly
generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are
not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned as
unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners.
d) Guingona vs Carague
(G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991)
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
In herein case, petitioner assails the constitutionality of of the automatic appropriation for debt
service in the 1990 budget.
Alleged in the petition are the following facts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in
automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under
Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion,1 while the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to
P27,017,813,000.00. The automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD no. 81 entitled
"Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as
Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in
Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled
"An Act Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on
Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the repeal or
amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative body
and not this Court.
ISSUE/s:
1. Is the appropriation of P86billion in the P233 billion 1990 budgets violative of section 5,
articles XIV of the constitution?
2. Are PD No.81, PD No. 1177 and PD No.1967 still operative under the constitution?
HELD:
1. No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
"assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and
retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means
of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any power, guided
only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation that can reasonably service our enormous
debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter
of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger
than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be
thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
2. Yes. The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement
and are therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which requires,
among others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills authorizing increase of public debt" must be passed
by Congress and approved by the President is untenable. Certainly, the framers of the Constitution
did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees
appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative
million The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills"
is that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers
thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a more direct or express manner.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental
is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not
retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
In accordance with Section 22, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon C.
Aquino submitted to Congress the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing for the Fiscal
Year 1990. The proposed 1990 expenditure program covering the estimated obligation that will be
incurred by the national government during the fiscal year amounts to P233.5 Billion. Of the proposed
budget, P86.8 is set aside for debt servicing as authorized under P.D. 1967 and R.A. 4860 and 245,
as amended. The Court, therefore, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31
of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are
repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty
to implement the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

e) Professional Regulation Commission vs De Guzman

(G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004)
Tinga, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner seeks to nullify the decision made by Court of Appeals which allowed he respondents
to take their physician's oath and to register as duly licensed physician. The respondents herein are
all graduates of Fatima College of Medicine in Valenzuela City. They all passed the licensure
examination held in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Shortly after the petitioner
released the successful examinees, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine
successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure
exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and
exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-
Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board
also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both
subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates
from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were
true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the
Physician Licensure Examination.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians of
all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993
Ph icia Lice e E a i a i . The NBI f d ha he e i able a i g a e f Fa i a
examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees
gai ed ea l acce he e e i .
On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose
Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan
(Arlene V. De Guzman et al., for brevity) filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the other respondents as intervenors.
Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with
"immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne
examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. The case
was docketed as Adm. Case No. 1687 by the PRC.
On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 93-66530 granting the preliminary
mandatory injunction sought by the respondents. It ordered the petitioners to administer the
physician's oath to Arlene V. De Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC.
The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside the
mandatory injunctive writ. The CA then dismissed the case and affirmed the assailed decision.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of law in sustaining the judgment of the
trial court that respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?
HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in sustaining the judgment of the trial
court that respondents are entitled of writ of mandamus. Until the moral and mental fitness of the
respondents could be ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board has discretion to hold in
abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the certificates to them. The
writ of mandamus does not lie to compel performance of an act which is not duly authorized.
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by
law. If no legal right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ
of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right. There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal
right to the thing demanded. It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege
or franchise granted by the government.
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or
course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned
professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the
field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance among those who would practice medicine.
It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit
of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive
manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both
forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not,
however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. Under
the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on
a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public
officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession,
or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the
exercise of their power.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court granted the petition herein.

13. SECTION18:
a) JMM Promotion and Management vs Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 120095, August 25, 1996)
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing
artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train
performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE
gh a 4 e la eali e he la hich i cl ded a A i Rec d B k hich a e f i g
artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the
Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing
contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause
of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE:
WON the regulation by EIAC is valid
HELD:
Yes. The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police
power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. The welfare of Filipino
performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No.
3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high-risk"
destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at
the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable
educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately
prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that
this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by auditions,
where those deemed unt are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective
and vulnerable to bias and differences in taste. The ARB requirement goes one step further, however,
attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by denning minimum skills required from
entertainers and performing artists. As the Solicitor General observed, this should be easily met by
experienced artists possessing merely basic skills. The tests are aimed at segregating real artists or
performers from those passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any available job and
therefore exposing themselves to possible exploitation.
b) Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs Drilon

(163 SCRA 386)
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female for overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept.
Order No. 1 Series f 1988 f DOLE e i led G ideli e G e i g he Te a S e i f
De l e f Fili i D e ic a d H eh ld W ke . I c e d ha ch de i a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only
to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it
also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation i lic a d deci i -making processes affecting
hei igh a d be efi a a be ided b la . Af e , he S lici Ge e al behalf f DOLE
submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines invoking the police power of the State and
informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there
exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police
power?
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers,"
but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all
men and w e . A a ed i he ec i 18 A icle II f he 1987 C i i , The S a e affi
the labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the right of the workers and promote their
elfa e I ad i f cla ifica i , ided ha (1) ch classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to
existingconditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is satisfied
that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions.
c) Bernardo vs NLRC
(G.R. No. 122917, July 12, 1999)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to
1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly
worded agreement called E l e Contract for Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they are
dismissed. Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task
as money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent
bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280
and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as ecial workers
and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Ba k. Rather,
they were ecial workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners become regular employees
HELD:
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a
period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed
to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at
any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract
shall automatically expire at the end of the term. Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract
with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them
worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the
hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More
important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions.
In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee
should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied
person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides: Sec i 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. No
disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled
employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same
compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied
e . The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the
employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of
qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed
to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of the e l e and The primary standard, therefore, of
determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is
whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and
its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has
been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely
intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence
of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is
considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity e i . Respondent
bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the
contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the
contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks
were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they
were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not
render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them. Without a doubt, the task of counting
and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the exception
of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months.
14. SECTION 19 & 20:
a) Tañada vs Angara
(G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as a founding member with the goal, as
articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate, of improving "Philippine access
to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products." On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate
adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it
hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization."
It is petitioners' position that provisions of the WTO Agreement that require the products of
the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin, which is
in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless
the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos" in Art. 2 Sec. 19. Petitioners further argue that these
provisions negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods. On the other hand, respondents counter that such Charter provisions are not self-
executing and merely set out general policies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 2 Sec. 19 of the Constitution is self-executing.
HELD:
No. By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state
policies." These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise
of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the case of
Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and
some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to
a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation."
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional
principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to
wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making." When substantive standards
as general as 'the right to a balanced and healthy ecology' and 'the right to health' are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as 'a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,' the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy making. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
b) Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs Philippine Coconut Authority

(G.R. No. 156041, February 21, 2007)
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by Presidential Decree No. 232 as an
independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the
coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct
participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set
up by law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. In
March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those
wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such
business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations
and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators
specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based
commodities. The Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for
mandamus to compel PCA to revoke B.R. No. 018-93.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD:
Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an
economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the
ge e al elfa e. A ch, f ee e e i e d e call f he e al f ec i e eg la i f
the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art. 12, Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that
the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare
and when the public interest so requires.
c) Pest Management Association of the Philippines vs Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority

(G.R. No. 156041. February 21, 2007)
FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, is an association of pesticide handlers duly licensed by respondent Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA). It assailed the validity of Section 3.12 of the 1987 Pesticide Regulatory
Policies and Implementing Guidelines. Petitioner argued that the specific provision on the protection
of the proprietary data in FPA's Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing Guidelines is
unlawful for going counter to the objectives of Presidential Decree No. 1144 (P.D. No. 1144); for
exceeding the limits of delegated authority; and for encroaching on the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Intellectual Property Office. The RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory relief for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, petitioner resorted to filing this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the propriety data protection is an unlawful restrain of free trade.
HELD:
No. Under P.D. No. 1144, the FPA is given the broad power to issue rules and regulations
to implement and carry out the purposes and provisions of said decree, i.e., to regulate, control and
develop the pesticide industry. In furtherance of such ends, the FPA sees the protection of proprietary
data as one way of fulfilling its mandate.
Verily, in this case, the Court acknowledges the experience and expertise of FPA officials who
are best qualified to formulate ways and means of ensuring the quality and quantity of pesticides and
handlers thereof that should enter the Philippine market, such as giving limited protection to
proprietary data submitted by applicants for registration. The Court ascribes great value and will not
disturb the FPA's determination that one way of attaining the purposes of its charter is by granting
such protection, specially where there is nothing on record which shows that said administrative
agency went beyond its delegated powers.
d) Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association vs Duque

(G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007)
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986
by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of
the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breast milk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World
Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured
that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breast milk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of
said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and
child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed
of the advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
On June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breast milk
substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE:
Whe he e de ffice f he DOH ac ed i h i e ce f
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in
violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR
RULING:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being
ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said
provisions. The international instruments pointed out by the respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW,
are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the
RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom or
c a i e a i al la ea a ge e al a d c i e ac ice f a e f ll ed by them
from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through
ac i i al echa i ch a l cal legi la i . Ge e all acce ed i ci le f i e a i al
la efe f ge e al c a i e a i al la hich a e bi di g all a e . The
Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other
forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that
advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly
authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions
adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-bi di g. Thi a c i e f
la -binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have
not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the
member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states and
obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law
of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent
evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all
the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors,
the Court sees no harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of
the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code.
e) Espina vs Executive Secretary

(G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010)
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also
known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which
absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. It also allowed those
natural-born Filipino citizens who subsequently lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines,
to engage to retail trade business with the same rights as the Filipino Citizens.
On October 11, 2000 the petitioners herein assailed the constitutionality of RA 8762 on the
following grounds: First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of
the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos
to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full employment, and
protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies. Second, the implementation
of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with alien dominance
of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.
Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store
vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment. Fourth, the World Bank-
International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the government
as a condition for the release of certain loans. Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law
would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade.
The respondents then countered the petition with the following grounds: First, petitioners
have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers
since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public funds. Nor can they invoke the fact
that they are members of Congress since they made no claim that the law infringes on their right
as legislators. Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable controversy. Petitioners of
course claim that, as members of Congress, they represent the small retail vendors in their
respective districts but the petition does not allege that the subject law violates the rights of those
vendors. Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A.
8762. Indeed, they could not specify how the new law violates the constitutional provisions they
cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are
judicially demandable. Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of
foreign investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments
upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest so dictates. But
the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such reservation.
It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 8762 is unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. RA 8762 is constitutional. The Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, the provisions of
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-
executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. It further explained that, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of economic
nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt
measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development
of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs,
it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is
simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure
that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires
the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements
of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive
in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor
of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.
In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods, and services. While it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not
prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a
balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and
services.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
15. SECTION 21
a. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
(G.R. No. 78742. July 14, 1989)
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
In G.R. No. 78742, Petitioner, Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines invoke the
right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven
hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. They claim that they cannot
eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of
Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the Presidential Decree
No. 27. They filed a writ of mandamus in the Court to compel the respondent, Secretary of Agrarian
Reform to issue the said rules.
In G.R. No. 79777, Petitioners, Nicolas S. Manaay, and Agustin Hermano, Jr. files a petition,
assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 and 229 on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. They
contend that President Corazon Aquino violates Article VI, Section 25 (4), for not conforming to the
other requisites of a valid appropriation, and Article XIII, Section 4 when she promulgated E.O No.
228.
I c ec i i h he de e i a i fj c e a i , he e i i e i ked he c
ruling on the case of EPZA v. Dulay, and Manotok v. National Food Authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, P.D No. 27 and E.O No. 228 and 229 are constitutional?
Whether or not the manner of just compensation for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
violates the Constitution?
HELD:
Yes, the Court finds no reason to modify or reverse the promulgation of P.D No. 27 by former
President Ferdinand Marcos in the exercise of his powers under Martial Law since it has been
sustained in the case of Gonzales v. Estrella. To promulgate E.O No. 228 and 299, the latter is
a P e ide C a A i e de T a i P i i f he 1987 C i i .
Significantly, the Congress which is alleged to have been undercut by her has not rejected but
substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be
suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.
No, the Court held in this case that although the traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is Money, it only refers to traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. The
reform program, according to the Court, is a Revolutionary kind of Expropriation, because such
program will require hundreds of billions of pesos if cash will be used to pay just compensation.
Hence, the Court allowed bonds and other securities for just compensation.
16. SECTION 25
a. League of Provinces of the Philippines vs. Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
(G.R No. 175368, April 11, 2013)
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Golden Falcon filed with the DENR an Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement in Bulacan. Their subsequent applications and appeals were later denied by the DENR.
While Golden Falcon's appeal was pending, Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R.
Cruz, and Liberato Sembrano filed with the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) of Bulacan their respective Applications for Quarry Permit (AQP), which covered the same
area Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an Application
for Exploration Permit (AEP) covering 5,281 hectares of the area covered by Golden Falcon's
Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Director Cabantog, who was the concurrent Chairman of the Provincial Mining Regulatory
Board PMRB, endorsed to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, Governor Josefina M. Dela Cruz, and
the aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit that had apparently been converted to Applications for
Small-Scale Mining Permit of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz, and Lucila
S. Valdez (formerly Liberato Sembrano).
On August 10, 2005, Governor Dela Cruz issued the corresponding Small-Scale Mining
Permits in favor of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz, and Lucila S.Valdez AMTC appealed
to respondent DENR Secretary the grant of the aforesaid Small-Scale Mining Permits.
On August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary rendered a Decision in favor of AMTC. The
Small-Scale Mining Permits granted by the PMRB and the Governor were null and void. On the
other hand, the DENR Secretary declared that AMTC filed its Application for Exploration Permit
when the area was already open to other mining applicants; thus, AMTC Application for
Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the DENR Secretary held that the questioned Small-Scale
Mining Permits were issued in violation of Section4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of
the Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942, because the area was never
proclaimed to be under the People's Small-Scale Mining Program.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 17(B) (3) (III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No.7076 are
unconstitutional for providing for executive control and infringing upon the local autonomy of
provinces?
Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding and cancelling the small-scale mining
permits amounts to executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all
provinces?
HELD:
No, In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the Small-Scale
Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control
over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by
respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State." Under said provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the
Pe le Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the Pe le Small-Scale Mining Program is
to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government
agencies. The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution Art. X,
Sec. 2, refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization
of government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign within the State. The Local
Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial
government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which
is in-charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural resources.
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the
Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that
a statute is presumed to be valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers
which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for
each other's acts. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where
a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, leaving no doubt or
hesitation in the mind of the Court.
No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with
the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided
for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The
decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was
valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the
Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A.
No.7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
The DENR Secretary's power to review and decide the issue on the validity of the issuance
of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a
quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights
of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and
the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-
judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent
necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial
function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the
Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the
Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on
the law.
b. Basco v. PAGCOR
(G.R. No. 91649. May 14, 1991)
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created under Presidential Decree 1869 which enabled the Government to regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. To attain the objectives stated
in P.D. 1869, PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines.
In this instant petition, petitioners seek to annul P.D. 1869 because it is allegedly contrary to
morals, public policy and order. Section 13(2) of P.D. 1868 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder
from pa i g a a f a ki d f ,i c e he i e, a ell a fee , cha ge le ie f
ha e e a e, he he Na i al L cal. Pe i i e c e d ha he P e ide ial Dec ee i
e i ai ed he Ma ila Ci g e e igh i e l cal taxes and license fees, which is
recognized by law. This is in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local
autonomy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. 1869 is unconstitutional?
HELD:
N . Pe i e c e i i i h ei.
The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes.
Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality
ca a ei. I " e a " he ef e al a ield o a legislative act, which is superior
ha i g bee a ed b he a e i elf hich ha he "i he e e a .
In addition, the charter of Manila City is subject to control by the Congress. Municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over
local governments. If Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can
also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
F he e, he Ci f Ma ila e i se license fees on gambling has long been

revoked by P.D. 771. Pursuant to this decree, the power of local governments to regulate gambling
h he g a f f a chi e, lice e e i a e ed e cl i el he a i al g e e .
Therefore, only the national government has the power to issue licenses or permits for operation of
gambling and to demand or collect license fees.
Also, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the national government.
PAGCOR is a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter of its own. All of
its shares of stocks are owned by the national government.
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations"
which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended,
repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an
exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot
therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Hence, P.D. 1869 is constitutional.

c. Limbonas vs. Mangelin

(G.R. No. 80391. February 28, 1989)
Sarmiento, J.:
FACTS:
On March 12, 1987, petitioner Sultan Alimbusa Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly).
On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam invited petitoner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, to partake with the consultations and dialouges with local
government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on political developments
and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII. Limbona accepted the invitation and advised Acting
Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to inform all Assemblymen that there shall be no session
in November.
However, on November 2, 1987, he A e bl held e i i defia ce f e i i e ad ice.

On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the
affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant.
Petitioner prays for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987 and for judgment be
rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null
and void.
On January 9, 1988, pending further proceedings, the Supremem Court received a resolution
filed b he Sa gg ia g Pa k EXPELLING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP
OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK, AUTONOMOUS REGION XII.
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by P.D.
1618 lga ed J l 25, 1979. P a he dec ee, i e al a a e abli ehed i
the two regions.It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are
a , he c a igh f ll i e e e i hei affai , ch le ike d hei ac .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
Yes. Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government
of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous.
In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
d. Lina v. Pano
(G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001)
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked
Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet.
This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial
was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, Taon 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995, expressing its objection to the operation
of and/or all forms of gambling including the Lotto operation in the Province of Laguna.
As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On February 10, 1997,
the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from
implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was subsequently denied. Thus, this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of a mayor's permit based on Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995 is valid?
HELD:
No. The ordinance, however, merely states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It
is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it
serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. As a
policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This
is part of the local government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
g e e . H e e , his freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through
an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which
grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. While lotto is clearly a game of
chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that
would seek to prohibit permits. The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening
the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, Congress retains control
of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still
includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax [Art. X,
Sec. 5, Constitution], which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the
national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it. Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form
of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent
allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments sovereign within
the state.
e. Dadole v. Commission on Audit

(G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002)
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of
P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.
On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed
Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55). Acting on this DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued
notices of disallowance to herein petitioners in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Beginning
October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000
each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to
September, 1994.
Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue
City by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances
to judges stationed therein. They maintain that said circular is not supported by any law and therefore
goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President; and that said circular is void for lack of
publication.
ISSUE:
Whether or not LBS 55 of the DBM is void for going beyong the supervisory powers of the
President?
HELD:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise
of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision
by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that he P e ide
f he Phili i e hall e e ci e ge e al e i i e l cal g e e . B c i i al fia ,
he a e bjec he P e ide e i i l , c l, l g a hei ac a e e e ci ed
within the sphere of their legitimate powers. Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs
and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This
is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President
or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by
the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment
on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local
autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing
municipal corporations.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of
enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160 which allows the grant of
additional allowances to judges "when the finances of the city government allow." The said provision
does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges.
The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition
that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of
the circular had no legal basis.
17. SECTION 26
a. Pamatong v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 161872. April 13, 2004)
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, Rev. Elly Chavez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candicacy for President on
December 17, 2003. However, Respondent, COMELEC on February 11, 2004, denied the Petitioner
and other thirty-five nuisance candidates on the grounds that they could not wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political
party with a national constituency.
Rev. Pamatong, then, filed a petition for writ of certiorari before the court on the grounds that
his constitutional right under Article II, Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution was violated; by limiting
the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are nominated by political parties. The petitioner argues that COMELEC indirectly amended
the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people
to choose their leaders.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Article II, Section 26 provides constitutional right to run or hold for public
office?
HELD:
No, the Court held that Article II, Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution neither bestows such a
right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. The provision is not self-executing,
and does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely species a guideline for
legislative or executive action. The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of
he O ib Elec i C de N i a ce Ca dida e a d COMELEC Re l i N . 6452 da ed
December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give
due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
b. Maquera v. Borra
(G.R. No. L-24761, September 7, 1965)
PER CURIAM.:
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 4421 requires that all candidates for national, provincial, city, and municipal
offices to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which
he is a candidate and non-compliance would disqualify the person, even though he is qualified by
law. Petitioner Masquera now seeks to nullify such act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 4421 is unconstitutional?
HELD:
Yes. The said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the
Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the
same, for said political system is premised and all government authority emanates from them, and
this, in turn, implies necessrily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon
the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all,
rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance
to be elected to public office and that the bond required and the confiscation of said bond are not
predicated upon the necessity of defraying certain expenses or of compensating services given
connection with elections, and is, therefore, arbitrary and oppressive. Therefore, RA 4421 is
unconstitutional.
18. SECTIONS 27&28

a. Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission
(G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987)
Cortes, J.:
FACTS:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in
this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner against respondent. The respondent had
de ied e i i e e e f i f ai he ci il e ice eligibili ie f J lia Sib gha a d
Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. They had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligible who passed the civil service examinations
for sanitarians.
Petitioner claims that the right to be informed of the said eligibilities is guaranteed by the
Constitution and prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to to compel the
respondent to disclose said information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, petitioner has access to government records to validate the civil service eligibilities
of the Health Department employees?
HELD:
Yes. The Constitution recognizes the right of people to information on matters of public
concern, which they specified that information shall be provided, subject only to limitations provided
by law.
Government agencies have no discretion have no discretion to refuse disclosure of, or access
to, information of public concern, a recognition of the essential nature of the free flow of ideas and
information in a democracy. The denying agency has the burden to prove that the information is not
of public concern. In this case, the information was of public concern because it is the legitimate
concern of the citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are
occupied only by eligible pe , a d he CSC failed ci e a la li i i g he e e e igh
know. Thus the Court ordered the CSC to provide information.
b. Valmonte v. Belmonte
(G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989)
Cortes, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners, Valmonte et al. in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction
invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed to: (a) furnish petitioners a list
of Batasang Pambansa Members belonging to the UNIDO and the PDP-Laban who were able to to
secure loan loans immediately before the Feb 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos, (b) and/or certified true copies of the documents, (c) and/or to allow
petitioners access to public records for the subject information.
On June 20, 1986, the Deputy General counsel of the Government Service and Insurance
System (GSIS) turned down his request on the ground that there exists a confidential relationship
between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, which the GSIS shall preserve its confidentiality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioner to
be done, in pursuance of their right to information?
HELD:
Yes. The court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-
c lled c a i c ea ed b ecial legi la i a e i hi he a bi f he e le igh be
informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Its funds
assume a public character, since it is the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds
are managed properly with the end view of maximizing the benefits to insured government
employees.
Petitioners are entitled to access the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS,
subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate to or loss relating to the manner and
hours of examination, to the end that damage or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of other persons entitled to insect the records may be insured, as held in
Legaspi vs CSC. The second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners is meritorious,
however the first act sought cannot be granted. Although citizens are afforded the right to information
a d, a he e , a e e i led acce fficial ec d , he c i i d e acc d
them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern.
c. Garcia v. Board of Investments

(G.R. No. 88637, September 7, 1989)
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation
(BPC) and applied with the BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. In its
application, Bataan was specified as the plant site. BOI issued to BPC was a certificate of registration
on February 24, 1988.
In February 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor in
BPC, e a le e T ade Sec e a , J e C ce ci ad i i g hi f BPC de i e a e d he
original registration certification of its project by changing its site from Bataan to Batangas. Petitioner
opposed the proposal.
Petitioner, a Congressman for the second district of Bataan, requested Secretary Concepcion
to be furnished a copy of the proposed amendment with its attachments, but was denied by the BOI.
BOI a ed he e i i f he egi a i f BPC e chemical project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BOI committed grave abuse of discretion in not refusing to furnish petitioner a copy
f BPC a lica i ?
HELD:
Ye , The C led ha BOI i la ed Ga cia igh ha e acce i f ai a e
of public c ce . The O ib C de f 1987 (E ec i e O de N . 226) e i e he publication of
a lica i f egi a i . Si ce he BPC' a e ded a lica i ( a ic la l he cha ge f l ca i
from Bataan to Batangas) was in effect a new application, it should have been published so that
whoever may have any objection to the transfer may be heard. The BOI's failure to publish such notice
and to hold a hearing on the amended application deprived the oppositors, like the petitioner, of due
process and amounted to a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BOI.
The provision in the Investments Code requiring publication of the investor's application for
registration in the BOI is implicit recognition that the proposed investment or new industry is a matter
of public concern on which the public has a right to be heard. And, when the BOI approved BPC's
application to establish its petrochemical plant in Limay, Bataan, the inhabitants of that province,
particularly the affected community in Limay, and the petitioner herein as the duly elected
representative of the Second District of Bataan acquired an interest in the project which they have a
right to protect.
The petitioner's request for Xerox copies of certain documents filed by BPC together with its
original application, and its amended application for registration with BOI, may not be denied, as it is
the constitutional right of a citizen to have access to information on matters of public concern under
Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution. The confidentiality of the records on BPC's applications
is not absolute for Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that they may be disclosed
"upon the consent of the applicant, or on orders of a court of competent jurisdiction.'
However, just as the confidentiality of an applicant's records in the BOI is not absolute, neither is the
petitioner's right of access to them unlimited. The Constitution does not open every door to any and
all information. The law may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny. The trade
secrets and confidential, commercial and financial information of the applicant BPC, and matters
affecting national security are excluded from the privilege.
d. Aquino-Sarmiento v Morato
(G.R. No. 92541, November 13, 1991)
BIDIN, J.:
FACTS:
In February 1989, petitioner, a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Cla ifica i B a d (MTRCB), e e ed ha he be all ed e a i e he b a d ec d
regarding the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies
and television production. Such films are either banned, cut, or classified on the basis of said voting
slips.
Pe i i e e e a de ied b e de , Ma el M a , chai a f MTRCB, he

ground that the slips are conscience votes and are purely and completely private and personal.
Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in
character and that respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any
citizen seeking examination of the board's records.
On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to
discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of
the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the
same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato
denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July
27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private
and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.
Petitioner now seeks the nullification of MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27,
1989) declaring as strictly confidential, private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee
which previously reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the
committee that reviewed the film.
ISSUE:
Whe he , he ci i e igh f acce blic ec d a i la ed?
HELD:
Yes, respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of respondent MTRCB,
pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members,
as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art.
III of the Constitution.
The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person,
company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation,
state, or community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions of respondent
Board and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private?
Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification
board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve
public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers
tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. There can be no invasion of privacy in the
case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of
performing official functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an
impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the
members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither
personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access
to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
e. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority

(G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002)
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways,
signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to
reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the
construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out
all the works in consideration of 50%t of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA.
PD No. 1084 mandating PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to
develop, improve, acquire, . . . lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." President Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore
of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so
that "All future works in MCCRRP . . . shall be funded and owned by PEA."
ISSUES:
Whether or not the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement?
HELD:
Yes. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest
underpins the people's right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is
expressly stated in Section 28, Article II f he C i i , acc di gl : S bjec ea able
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest."
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which
may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, leaving them no option but to
accept it. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the joint-venture agreement. The scope of the
right only to access records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and
copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his
expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of
the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when
and how to conduct the inspection and copying.
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS
1. Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission
(G.R. No. 47065, June 26, 1940)
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner has been engaged for the past 20 years in the business of transporting
passengers in the Province of Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by means of motor
vehicles commonly known as TPU buses, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
certificates of public convenience issued in its favor by the former Public Utility Commission. On
August 26, 1939, the petitioner filed with the Public Service Commission an application for
authorization to operate 10 additional new Brockway trucks, on the ground that they were needed to
comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of
he Eigh H Lab La . The P blic Se ice C i i g a ed he e i i e a lica i f
increase of equipment given two conditions that the certificates of public convenience and
authorization mentioned above will be valid and subsisting only for 25 years, counted from the date
of the promulgation of this decision; and that the company of the applicant may be acquired by the
Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any dependence thereof at any time that he wishes it after
payment of the price of his useful equipment, less a reasonable depreciation that has been set by the
Commission at the time of its acquisition. However, the petitioner, not agreeing with these conditions,
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the PSC.
On November 20, 1939, the present petition for a writ of certiorari was instituted in this court.
The petitioner contended that the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is unconstitutional and void; and that even if it be assumed
that Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is valid delegation of legislative powers, the Public
Service Commission has exceeded its authority because the Act was applied to valid and subsisting
certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939, when said Act took effect, and the Act, as applied by the
Commission, violates constitutional guarantees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission by Commonwealth Act
No. 454 is unconstitutional and void?
HELD:
No. The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional. The
theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time
to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby
obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which narrows the
range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain devices. However, one thing
is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of
delegata potestas non potest delegari has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation
in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the court. All that has been delegated to the
Commission, therefore, is the administrative function, involving the use discretion, to carry out the will
of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of "public interests in a proper and
suitable manner." The fact that the National Assembly may itself exercise the function and authority
thus conferred upon the Public Service Commission does not make the provision in question
constitutionally objectionable.
2. La Bugal-B Laan T ibal A ocia ion Inc. . Ramo

(G.R. No. 127882; December 1, 2004)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality
of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the government with Western
Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and
declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire
FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service
contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being
similar to service contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently
denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because
they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the
Filipino nation.
The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts
for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise,
including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production,
expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products
discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and
beneficial ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution
(Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos
(Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director,
Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC
(Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the EDU of
our natural resources?
HELD:
The Chief E ec i e i he fficial c i i all a da ed e e i ag ee e ih
f eig ed c ai . O he he ha d, C g e a e iew the action of the President
ce i i ified f e e c ac e e ed i i acc da ce i h hi [c i i al] i i
i hi hi da f i e ec i . I c a hi e e a da e f he P e ide a d
Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the
Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress
gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their
residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the
exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate
branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and
must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our
country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of
o people and an e hei c fo iable emplo men oppo ni ie in he co n . The
judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their
official f nc ion . A a l elled e e decade ag b J ice Ge ge Malc l , J a he

Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
e e l b i lica i c fe ed i b he O ga ic Ac . Let the development of the mining
industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court
interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of
the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to
strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed
to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to
attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the
ble i g f e i a d eace. The C f ll a hi e i h he ligh f La B gal B laa a d
other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot
justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the
nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not
unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and
complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-
scale mining operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of international
ade, c led i h he S a e eed ai ai fle ibili i i deali g , i de e e ea d
e ha ce c c eii e e i ld a ke . O he ba i f hi c l a dard, the
Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and
Regulations - insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well as the
subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).
3. Maceda v. Vasquez
(GR No. 102781, April 22, 1993)
NOCON, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent, Napoleon A. Abiera, filed before the office of the Ombudsman his affidavit-
complaint alleging that petitioner, Bonifacio Senz Maceda, falsified his Certificate of Service (dated
February 6, 1989) No decision has been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases. Respondent further
alleged that this has been done for a total of 17 months (Feb-Aug 1989, Jan-Sep 1990)
Petitioner contends that he has been granted by the Court a 90-day extension to decide
aforementioned cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the
alleged fal ifica i f a j dge ce ifica i b i ed he S e e C ?A i g i ca , h ld
a referral be made first to the Supreme Court?
HELD:
No. The investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme
C c i i al d f e i i e all i fe i c . The ffe e cha ged a e f he
j dge ef a ce f his official duties, which is under the control of the Supreme Court. A judge
who falsifies his certificate of service shall be administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious
misconduct and inefficiency (Sec 1, Rule 140, Rules of Court), and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. Art VIII, Sec 6, 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in
the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest MTC clerk. No other branch may institute into this
power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, the Ombudsman should
first refer the matter to this Court for determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel the Court to
submit records, allow personnel to testify on the matter.
4. Angara vs. Electoral Commission

(G.R. No. L-45081. July 15, 1936)
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS:
Jose Angara (petitioner), Pedro Ynsua (private respondent), Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio
Mayor are candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly (NA) for the 1st
district of Province of Tayabas
On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member elect.
Consequently, he took his oath on November 15, 1935.
On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution (Resolution No.8)

confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus
far been filed.
On December 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission (EC) a Motion of Protest
against the election of Angara and prayed that Ynsua be declared member elect of NA. On December
9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution Par. 6 which fixed said date as the last day
for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA.
On December 20, 1935, Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss the Protest that the protest in
question was filed out of the prescribed period. On December 27, 1935, Ynsua filed an Answer to the
Motion of Dismissal alleging that there is no legal provision barring the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member of NA. The Electoral Commi i de ied A ga a M i Di i
Protest.
Petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission from taking cognizance of the protest filed by Ynsua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and such
controversy?
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court, being the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine proper allocation of powers, has jurisdiction over matter of conflict between the several
departments. The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
5. Arnault v. Nazareno
(G.R. No. L-3820. July 18, 1950)
OZAETA, J.:
FACTS:
The Senate of the Philippines, on February 27, 1950, adopted Resolution No. 8; creating a
special committee to investigate the anomalies and irregularities of the transaction of the Government
for purchased of Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates. The special committee, determine who
were responsible for and who benefitted from the transaction at the expense of the Government,
invited petitioner Jean L. Arnault to question the alleged irregularity of payment of the Government to
his client Ernest H. Burt amounting to PHP 1,500,000 when in fact he already forfeited his alleged
interest in the estates amounting to PHP 20,000 around October, 1949.
During the course of the investigation, the petitioner testified that he drew two checks on the
new account he created for Ernest H. Burt; the first check amounting to PHP 500,000 which was
transferred to Associated Agencies, Inc. and the other amounting to PHP 440,000 which he cashed
himself. The committee asked the petitioner who received the PHP 440,000, however the petitioner
repeatedly refused to name the recipient. Due to the constant refusal of the petitioner, the Senate
decided to cite him in contempt under the custody of the Sergeant-at-arms until he reveal the name
of the person whom he gave the PHP 440,000. Petitioner, then filed a petition for habeas corpus to
relieve him from his confinement in the New Bilibid Prison.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the Congress may punish non-members for contempt?
HELD:
Yes, the Court held that although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it
may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislations is intended
to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
which is not frequently true.
The power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to
institute the inquiry or investigation; that once that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control
the exercise of that jurisdiction or the use of Congressional discretion, In other words, the ruling of
the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness is not subject to review by
this Court under the principle of the separation of powers.
6. Osmeña v. Pendatun
(G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960)
BENGZON, J.:
FACTS:
On June 23, 1960, petitioner Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a privilege speech
e i led A Me age Ga cia. He ade e i i ai f b ibe agai he P e ide . The
House of the Representatives, through House Resolution No. 59, created a Special Committee
consisted of 15 members to investigate the truth of the charges made against the President made by
the petitioner, and to summon Osmeña to appear before it to substantiate his charges and if he fails
to do so, he should prove why he should not be punished.
On July 14, 1960, the petitioner filed a verified petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against Salipada. Pendatun and 14 other congressmen in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee. The petitioner alleged that the resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; his words
constituted no actionable conduct; after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House
took up other business; and the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its
members.
On July 18, 1960, the committee submitted its report finding Osmeña guilty of serious
disorderly behavior and acting on the report, the House approved House Resolution No. 175,
declaring him guilty and suspending him from office for 15 months.
The following day, the respondents filed their answer, challenging the jurisdiction of the Court
to entertain the petition; defending the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension;
upholding H.R. No. 175; and inviting the attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session
on July 18, 1960, the Committee had thereby ceased to exist.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition?
HELD:
No. The House has exclusive power and the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere. The
House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on the factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for
the presentation to and adjudication by the Court. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to
determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed
appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of
the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in
such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. Where the state
Senate is given power to expel a member, the courts will not review its action or revise even a most
arbitrary or unfair decision.
7. Vera v. Avelino
(G.R No. L-543, August 31, 1946)
BENGZON, J.:
FACTS:
Pursuant to a constitutional provision (section 4, Article X), the Commission on Elections
submitted, last May, to the President and the Congress of the Philippines, its report on the national
elections held the preceding month, and, among other things, stated that, by reason of certain specied
acts of terrorism and violence in the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the
voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.
During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum (Pertinent parts
of the resolution) resolution was approved referring to the report which stated that dead bodies have
been found with notes attached to their necks, reading, 'Bomoto kami kay Roxas' (we voted for
Roxas). The Commission believes that the election in the provinces aforesaid did not reflect the true
and free expression of the popular will. It should be stated, however, that the Commission is without
jurisdiction, to determine whether or not the votes cast in the said provinces which, according to these
reports have been cast under the inuence of threats or violence, are valid or invalid.
Ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included
among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the
Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending
the termination of the of the protest lodged against their election.
Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their colleagues responsible for the
resolution. They pray for an order annulling it, and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy
their seats, and to exercise their senatorial prerogatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the Court may entertain the petition?
Whether or not, the Senate has exceeded its powers?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers and
affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.
I a held i he ca e f Aleja d i ha Thi court believed the suspension was legally wrong,
because, as senator appointed by the Governor-General, he could not be disciplined by the Philippine
Senate; but it denied the prayer for relief, mainly upon the theory of the separation of the three powers,
E ec i e, Legi la i e a d J dicial. (Aleja d i .Q e , 46 Phil., 81.)
(Why not Angara case) Here, there is actually no anatagonism between the Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate and the Senate itself, for it is not suggested that the former as adopted a rule contradicting
the Pendatun Resolution. Consequently, there is no occasion for our intervention. Such conict of
jurisdiction, plus the participation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are essential ingredients to make
the facts of this case fit the mold of the Angara doctrine.
Granting that the postponement of the administration of the oath amounts to suspension of the
petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the power of
the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon), was
explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a
member thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic
pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.
No. Independently of constitutional or statutory grant, the Senate has, under parliamentary
practice, the power to inquire into the credentials of any member and the latter's right to participate in
its deliberations. As we have seen, the assignment by the Constitution to the Electoral Tribunal does
not actually negative that power provided the Senate does not cross the boundary line, deciding
an election contest against that member. Which the respondents at the bar never attempted to do.
Precisely, their resolution recognized, and did not impair, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to
decide the contest. Then it must be conceded that the passage of the disputed resolution meant no
invasion of the former's realm.
Another line of approach. The Senate, in the exercise of its authority and discretion and of its
inherent power of self-preservation, resolved to defer the administration of oath and the sitting of the
petitioners pending determination of the contest. It is not clear that the measure had no reasonable
connection with the ends in view, and neither does it palpably transcend the powers of a public
deliberative body. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe it was prompted by the dictates of
ordinary caution, or of public policy. As reported by the corresponding constitutional agency, the
elections held in the Provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija were so tainted with
acts of violence and intimidation, that the result was not the legitimate expression of the voters' choice,
the Senate made no grievous mistake in foreseeing the probability that, upon proof of such
widespread lawlessness the Electoral Tribunal would annul the returns in that region and declare
herein petitioners not entitled to seats in the Senate. Consequently, to avoid the undesirable results
following from the participation of disqualified members in its deliberations, it was prudent for it to
defer the sitting of the respondents.
True, they may have no direct connection with the acts of intimidation; yet the votes may be
annulled just the same, and if that happens, petitioners would not be among the sixteen senators
elected. Nor was it far-fetched for the Senate to consider that "in order to maintain alive the respect
for democratic institutions among our people, no man or group of men (should) be permitted to profit
from the results of an election held under coercion, in violation of law and contrary to the principle of
freedom of choice which should underlie all elections under the Constitution."
8. Arnault v. Balagtas
(G.R No. L-6749, July 30, 1955)
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee, Jean L. Arnault, was an attorney-in-fact of ERNEST H. BURT in the
negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the government of the
Philippines. On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 which created a Special
C i ee de e i e he he he aid cha e f e a e a h e , alid, a d e. I
the investigation conducted by the Special Committee, petitioner-appellee was asked to whom the
PHP 440,000 was delivered as partial payment, but he refused to answer and was submitted to the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison in Rizal, until such time he reveals the
identity of the person of matter.
On December 1951, petitioner-appellee executed an affidavit where he reveals the identity of one
Jess D. Santos, as the recipient of the PHP 440,000. Petitioner-appellee was then submitted for
questioning and Committee adopted Resolution No. 114 which held him in custody until he has
purged himself of contempt of the Senate.
Arnault then filed for petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance, Rizal, Pasay
City Branch, the lower court declared Resolution No. 114 illegal and petitioner-appellee has purged
himself of contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and discharged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has the power to review or interfere in the proceedings?
HELD:
No.There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed.
It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the
prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as
legislative process. The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of
departmental discretion in the means used to accomplish legitimate legislative ends. The only
instances when judicial intervention may be lawfully invoked is when there has been a violation of a
constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion. All
that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken against petitioner-appellee prior to his
incarceration, is to determine if the constitutional guarantee of due process has been accorded to him
before his incarceration by legislative order.
9. Philippine Bar Association v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 72915, December 19, 1985)
TEEHANKEE, J.:
FACTS:
President Marcos in his letter to the Batasang Pambansa, that the opposition seeks a new
mandate calling for special national elections to be held on 1986 for the offices of the President and
Vice-President of the Philippines, that he would resign and vacate his position and turn it over to the
Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa who will be the Acting President, until a new President and
VicePresident is elected by the people, which would effectively shortened his tenure by 16 months to
February 7, 1986, that would have lasted to June 30, 1987, when his successor-elect take his oath
of office after the proclamation as the winner.
ISSUE:
Whe he B.P. 883 calli g f ecial a i al elec i a elec i Feb a 7, 1986
for the offices of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines is unconstitutional?
HELD:
Yes. B.P. 883 unconstitutional, because there is no actual vacancy of office, only a fictitious
vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President at the time when B.P. 883 is enacted and
the Constitution cannot allow such; for it contravenes the intent, letter and spirit of the succession
provision stated in section 9, Article VII of the Constitution.
According to Sec. 9, Art. VII of the Constitution, a special election becomes necessary only
when a vacancy is created by death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation. It is
elementary in the law of public officers that no valid appointment or election to any public office may
be affected if the office is not vacant. In the normal course of events, the office of the President
becomes vacant upon the expiration of the term of an incumbent. But the Court failed to muster 10
votes to declare it unconstitutional, hence, the court upheld its constitutionality. The issue also
transformed to a political question wherein the sovereign people will decide in a fair, clean and honest
election.
The Court dismissed the petitions and denied their prohibitions.
10. Avelino v Cuenco

(G.R. L-2821, March 4, 1949)
PER CURIAM.:
FACTS:
On February 18, 1949, during the session of the senate, Senator Lorenzo Tañada requested
that his right to speak on the senate floor on the next session day be reserved. He intends to formulate
charge against then Senate President Jose Avelino. His request was approved.
On February 21, 1949, Senator Tañada and Senator Sanidad filed with the Secretary of
Senate Resolution No. 68 enumerating charges against Avelino and ordering an investigation. The
session on that day did not immediately open. When the session opened at 12nn, delaying tactings
were made to prevent Tañada from making his speech. As a result, a commotion ensued and Senator
David moved for the adjournment of the session. However, it was opposed by respondent, Cuenco,
and moved that the motion be submitted to vote. Petitioner walked out with his followers.
Senator Arranaz, Senate President pro-tempore, took the chair and proceeded with the
session. Afterwards, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67 declaring the position of
President of the Senate vacant and designating Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President
of the Senate.
Hence, a quo warranto petition was filed by Avelino seeking to be declared the rightful Senate
President and to oust respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter?
HELD:
No, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be
interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. A fortiori the Court should abstain in this case because
the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time
to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate
Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
11. Marcos vs. Manglapus

(G.R. No. 88211. October 27, 1989)
EN BANC:
FACTS:
On February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was ousted from the presidency via a non-violent
people power revolution. In his deathbed, Marcos wishes to return to the Philippines to die. President
Aquino barred the return of Marcos and his family at the present time and under the present
circumstances because their return poses a threat to national interest and welfare. On September 28,
1989, Ferdinand Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
In a statement, President Aquino said that the remains of Marcos will not be allowed to be
brought to the Philippines until such time as the government shall otherwise decide.
On October 2, 1989, petitiners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. They contend that the
President has no pwer to bar a Filipino from his own country and if she has, she had exercised it
arbitrarily.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. 1869 is unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are
not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members
of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the
abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power.
Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath
of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the
return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under
present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.
12. Casibang v. Aquino

(G.R. No. L-38025, August 20, 1979)
MAKASIAR, J.:
FACTS:
On November 9, 1971, respondent Remigio Yu was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his rival, herein petitioner.
Casibang filed a protest against the election of the respondent with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, on the grounds of anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and
consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; terrosism; rampant vote buying; open voting or
balloting; and excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.
Proceedings continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before CFI of Pangasinan
presided by respondent Judge, who initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a
justiciable question.
On September 21, 1972, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire
country under Martial Law. Thereafter, a new Constitution was approved. Respondent Yu moved to
dismiss the election protest on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in
view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which Section 9 of Article XVII
[Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI a political question has intervened in the case.
Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss relying mainly on Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII
and G.O. No. 3, contended that the New Constitution did not divest the Court of First Instance of its
jurisdiction to hear and decide election protests pending before them at the time of its ratification and
effectivity. However, on December 18, 1973, the trial court, presided by respondent Judge, sustained
the political question theory of respondent Yu and ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest. Thus,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case involves a political question and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court?
HELD:
No. The electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No
political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent
President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent
Judge decides the election protest. The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of political
question is who between protestant Casibang and protestee Yu was the duly elected mayor of
Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant
thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and obligations of the position. If the protestee's election
is upheld by the respondent Judge, then he continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein
petitioner. That is the only consequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved a purely
justiciable question or controversy as it implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable,
an act or ommission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said
breach of right. Before and after the ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution, the nature of
the aforesaid issue as well as the consequences of its resolution by the Court, remains the same.
13. Tañada v Cuenco

(G.R. L-10520, February 28, 1957)
CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorenzo Tañada i a e be f he Se a e a d he l e be f he Ci i e
Party in the senate. On the other hand, Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of
Representatives and one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for Senate at the national
elections held in November 1955, but lost the elections.
Petitioner Macapagal contested the election of senators-elect in Senatorial Case No. 4,

pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
The Senate, then, was composed of 23 members from the Nationalista Party and 1 member
f he Ci i e Pa . O Feb a 22, 1956, Se a P i icia , behalf f Na i ali a Pa ,
nominated Senators Laurel, Lopez, and himself as member of such electoral tribunal. Whereas,
Se a Ta ada, behalf f Ci i e Pa , ominated only himself. Therefore, Senator Primicias,
on behalf of Committee on Rules of Senate, further nominated Senators Cuenco, and Delgado as
members of the Electoral Tribunal.
Petitioners allege that Senate acted without power or authority and in violation of Sec. 6, Art
XI of the Constitution. Respondents alleged that the Court has no jurisdiction and that petitioners
have no cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter?
Whether or not the Senate violated Sec 6, Art. XI of the Constitution?
HELD:
1.) Yes, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the
Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the
manner in which the authority shall be exercised. Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is
vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the
courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by
the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a
member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of
its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number
of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not
clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be
mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon
the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
2.) Yes, the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment,
first, of an Electoral Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was
to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members
of the lawmaking body. It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the
parties having the largest, and the second largest, number of votes in each House may nominate, to
the Electoral Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them.
It is patent, however, that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation
of said parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme
Court as members of said Tribunals. In the words of the members of the present Senate, said feature
reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to which the Senate Electoral
Tribunal should be organized.
The adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers
intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure
thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the
Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of
power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral
Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals.
Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null
and void.
14. Defensor Santiago vs Guingona

(G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the 11 th
Congress. The agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and
Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to
2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate;
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator
Fernan comprised the majority while those who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the
discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. as minority leader. No consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from the 7
members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as minority
leader. The Senate President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senator Santiago and Senator Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition for
quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising
the position of Senate Minority Leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator
Tatad.
ISSUE:
Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
HELD:
1.) Yes. In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate Minority Leader. They also
i ke he c j dicial e de e i e he he he e ha bee a g a e ab e f
di c e i a i g lack e ce f j i dic i he a f the respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that it is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
2.) None. The C did fi d a i la i i ce all ha he Cha e a i ha [e]ach
H e hall ch e ch he ffice a i a dee ece a . The C held ha , he e h d
of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by
the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the
manner of creating them or choosing the holders thereof. However, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.
15. Vinuya v. Executive Secretary

(G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010)
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing
aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ,
DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military
officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines. However,
officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners and took the position that the
individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan's
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners' claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan?
HELD:
No. The Executive Department did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
e i i e clai f fficial a l g a d he f f e aai agai Ja a . The e i i lack
merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
de e i e he he e e e i i e clai agai Ja a .
The issue is a Political Question in nature, certain types of cases often have been found to
present political questions one such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that " the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
C i i he e ec i e a d legi la i e he li ical de a e f he g e e , a d he
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry
or decision, therefore the Courts cannot meddle.
16. Belgica v. Ochoa

(G.R. No. 208566; November 19, 2013)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It
de e e e al legal de ig a i f C g e i al P k Ba el he la e Pi i
Development A i a ce F d PDAF. The all ca i f he k ba el i i eg a ed i he a al
General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 illi f ha d
jec (i f a c e jec like ad , b ildi g , ch l , e c.), a d P30 illi f f jec
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million
for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects.
Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya
Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived
from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July
2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in
the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
la ake i f eli g hei k ba el f d i ab 20 b g NGO ( -government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing
jec b a e i fac g i g gh jec . A a di a he c d c ed b he C i i
Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before
the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUE:
Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto
are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; et.al?
HELD:
Definition of Terms
Pork Barrel System - as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which
lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The
Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
1. Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effec i el c l ce ai a ec f he f d ili a i h gh a i -enactment
measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under
the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure
that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;
2. Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier
stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund.
Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel (relative issue to the topic)
Separation of Powers
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government." To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make
laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce
laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws.
Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere."
There is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or
(b) a i f a he de a e f ci .
Application:
The Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which
legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as
acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment. Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not
have, whether through formal measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in
government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested
as its own.
VI. DELEGATION OF POWERS

1. CONCEPT
a. Lim v. Pacquing
(G.R. No. 115044, January 27, 1995)
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
September 1, 1994- petition in G.R. 115044 was dismissed based on the finding that there
a ab e f di c e i , ch le f e ce f j i dic i , he a f e de j dge
[Pac i g], i i i g he e i ed de :
1.) Order directing Mayor Lim to issue the permit/license to operate jai-alai in favor of
Associated Development Corporation (ADC);
2.) Directing Mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited in contempt for non-compliance
of previous order;
3.) Reiteration of previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue permit/ license to
ADC.
On September 13, 1994- petitioner Guingona issued a directive to then chairman of Games
and Amusement Board (GAB), Francisco Sumulong, Jr. to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or
if any had been issued, to withdraw such grant of authority, to ADC to operate jai-alai in Manila, until
the following legal questions are properly resolved:
1.) Whether P.D. 771 is unconstitutional;
2.) Whether the franchise granted, assuming the city of Manila has the power to grant
franchise to operate jai-alai to ADC, is valid;
3.) Whether city of Manila has the power to issue a jai-alai franchise to ADC in view of E.O.
392.
On September 15, 1994- respondent, ADC, filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus,
injunction and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction in the RTC of Manila against petitioner, Guingona and GAB chairman, Sumulong. Judge
Re e i ed a Te a Re ai i g O de (TRO) e j i i g GAB f i hd a i g ADC
provisional authority.
October 19, 1994- Judge Reyes issued another order granting ADC a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against Guingona and GAB to compel them to issue in favor of ADC to operate
jai-alai.
October 25, 1994- hi C g a ed e i i e i f lea e file le e al e i i
and to admit attached supplemental petition with urgent prayer for restraining order. (G.R. No.
117263).
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not, the intervention by the Republic of the Philippines at this stage of the
proceedings is proper?
2. Assuming such intervention is proper, Whether or not, the ADC has a valid and subsisting
franchise to maintain and operate jai-alai?
3. Whether or not, there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes
in issuing the aforementioned TRO?
4. Whether or not, there was a grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes
in issuing the aforementioned writ of preliminary mandatory injunction?
HELD:
I
On the propriety of intervention by the Republic citing Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals
(93 SCRA 238), this Court allowed the intervention even beyond the period prescribed in Section 2
Rule 12 of the Rules of C . A de ial f he i f i e e i ld lead he C c i
an act of injustice to the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in
good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood, and misreprese a i , h ld i e e
clai be e be e.
In the present case, the resulting injustice and injury are manifest, since the national
government has squarely questioned the very existence of a valid franchise to maintain and operate
the jai-alai in favor of ADC. The national government contends that Manila Ordinance No. 7065 which
purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct jai-alai operations is void and ultra vires since
Republic Act No. 954 requires a legislative franchise not a municipal franchise for the operation of
jai-alai. The a i al g e e a g e ha ADC f a chi e a e hele effec i el e ked
by P.D. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of
gambling facilities issued by local governments.
There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD 771 has been repealed, altered
or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance.
And on the q e i WON he g e e i e ed f c e i g ADC e i f
a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or
errors, if any, of its officials or agents. Consequently, the Republic may be allowed to intervene in
G.R. No. 115044. The Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise, not of its business
or propriety functions, but in the exercise of its governmental functions to protect public morals and
promote the general welfare.
II
Petitioners in G.R. 117263 argue that R.A. No. 954 effectively removed the power of the
Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchises for gambling operations. It is argued that the term
legi la i e f a chi e i R.A. N . 954 i ed efe f a chises issued by Congress.
Further, the government argues that E.O. No. 392 transferred even the power to regulate jai-
alai from the local governments to the GAB, a national government agency.
What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in R.A. 409, with respect to wagers or betting,
a he e lice e, e i , eg la e . The e e l i ha he a h i g a f a chi e
for the operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the GAB.
In relation, therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no franchise from Congress to
operate jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate
the jai-alai in the City of Manila.
The government contends that P.D. No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power
of the State. The police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the
State.
It should also be remembered that P.D. No. 771 provides that the national government can
b e e l g a f a chi e e a lica i a d e ifica i f he alifica i f he
a lica . O he he ha d, i i e h ha hile he P e . A i i ed E.O. No. 169

revoking P.D. 810, she did not scrap or repeal P.D. No. 771 which had revoked all franchises to
operate jai-alais issued by local governments.
The purpose of P.D. No. 771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to the national
government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises. Thus, all franchises the existing were
revoked but were made subject to reissuance by the national government upon compliance by the
applicant with government-set qualifications and requirements.
III/IV
On the issue WON there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge
Reyes in issuing the TRO and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, this Court holds and rules
that there was.
Respondent judge should have taken judicial notice of R.A. No. 954 and P.D. No. 771. Since
P.D. No. 771 and R.A. No. 954 are presumed valid and constitutional until ruled otherwise by the
Supreme Court after due hearing, ADC was not entitled to the writs issued and consequently there
was grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.
b. Jaworski v. PAGCOR
(G.R. No. 144463. January 14, 2004)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under Presidential
Decree No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos. The PAGCOR was
granted the authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or
amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football, lotteries, etc. for a period of 25
years, renewable for another 25 years.
On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR granted SAGE the authority to operate and maintain Sports
Betting station in PAGCOR casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and
international bettors. Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its
operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and
redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets
Senator Robert S. Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the petition for certiorari and prohibition,
praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that
PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized
under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason
that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its
enactment the internet was yet in existent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-
space. Further he argues that the internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily
transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate
internet gambling contravenes the limitation in PAGCORs franchise.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, PAGCOR legislative franchise include the right to vest another, entity,
SAGE, with the authority to operate Internet gambling?
HELD:
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege
of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public
control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such
conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is
Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the
manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business,
the charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in
exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language.
After a circumspect consideration of the foregoing discussion and the contending positions of the
parties, we hold that PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on or shared
its franchise to SAGE.
In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the former grants the
latter the authority to operate and maintain sports betting stations and Internet gaming operations. In
essence, the grant of authority gives SAGE the privilege to actively participate, partake and share
PAGCORs franchise to operate a gambling activity. The grant of franchise is a special privilege that
constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must not perform its
activities arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere
to its terms and conditionality. A corporation as a creature of the State is presumed to exist for the
common good. Hence, the special privileges and franchises it receives are subject to the laws of the
State and the limitations of its charter. There is therefore a reserved right of the State to inquire how
these privileges had been employed, and whether they have been abused.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or management
contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less
grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in
view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing
in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.
c. Garcia v. Drilon
(G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
On March 23, 2006, Private Respondent, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia, on behalf of her children,
filed a petition for the issuance of Temporary Protection Order (TPO) before the Regional Trial Court
of Bacolod City, against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia, pursuant to R.A 9262, which she claimed she
was a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.
The Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, issued the TPO on March 24, 2006. However, the
respondent claimed that the petitioner did not faithfully comply with the TPO, even after some
modifications on it, and continues to deprive them of financial support, and harassing her and their
three children. The respondent, then filed for application of TPO Ex-parte which was issued by TRO
of Bacolod City on August 23, 2006, and gives the petitioner a period of five days to show cause why
the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. However, the petitioner no longer submitted
the required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would
only be an "exercise in futility."
During the pendency of the case, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of
Appeals (CA), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 on the grounds that it is violative of the due process and the equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted
product of an invalid law."
However, on January 24, 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition on the ground that
he failed to raise the constitutional issue and challenging the validity of RA 9262 through a petition
for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral
attack on said law. Hence, this petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative
of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the Court of Appeals, seriously erred in not declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to the barangay officials?
HELD:
No, there is no undue delegation of judicial power to the barangay officials. The Court held
that whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof, the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to
believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to
recur that would necessitate the issuance of a Barangay Protection Order. The mere fact that an
officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in
order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private
rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers and such function of the Punong Barangay is,
thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code.
Assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to
enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
2. PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION
a. Garcia v. Executive Secretary
(G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992)
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported
into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across
the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines. In 1991, E.O. No. 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, E.O. No.
475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products
continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that E.O. Nos. 475
and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All a ia i , e e e a iff bill , bill a h i i g i c ea e f he blic deb , bill f

local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
b he Se a e a e c c iha e d e .
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress,
the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are
in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. No. 475 and 478 are constitutional?
HELD:
Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and
tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the
Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and
478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by
the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
There is thus e lici c i i al e i i C ge a h i e he P e ide bjec ch

li i a i a d e ic i a [C g e ] a i e fi i hi ecific li i a iff a e . . . a d
he d ie i . . . . I hi ca e, i i he Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the
President to issue the said E.O.s.
b. Philippine Interisland Shipping Association v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 100481, January 22, 1997)
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Pi ae e de U i ed Ha b Pil A ciation of the Philippines, Inc. (UHPAP) is the
umbrella organization of various groups rendering pilotage service in different ports of the Philippines.
The service consists of navigating a vessel from a specific point, usually about two (2) miles off shore,
to an assigned area at the pier and vice versa.
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is the government agency which regulates pilotage.
P a P e ide ial Dec ee N . 857, i ha he e e i e, c l, eg la e . . . ch
services as are ece a i he e ed i , bel gi g he A h i a d c l, eg la e
a d e i e il age a d he c d c f il i a P Di ic . I al ha he e i e,
fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees. . . for the services rendered by the
Authority or by any private organization within a Port District.
On February 3, 1986, Pres. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 1088, PROVIDING FOR
UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND
COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order increase
substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA.
PPA refused to enforce the E.O. No. 1088 claiming, it was drawn hastily and without prior
consultation. UHPAP announced its intention to implement E.O. No. 1088 effective November 16,
1986. PPA drew a warning that there will be disciplinary sanctions to those who would charge rates
under the E.O. No. 1088. PPA then issued a Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, fixing pilotage fees at
lower rates lower than those provided in E.O. No. 1088.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Executive Order No. 1088 is valid, and Petitioners are bound to obey it?
Whether or not, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of intervenors from the decision
of the Trial Court invalidating Administrative Order No. 02-88 of the PPA?
Whether or not, the Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the contempt charges against
petitioners?
HELD:
Yes. E.O. No. 1088 is valid, and petitioners are bound to obey it.
Fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When the same is delegated to the
President he may exercise it directly. The issuance of E.O. No. 1088 without thereby
withdrawing an earlier delegation made to PPA. But when the President directly exercises the
delegated authority, the PPA may not revise the rates fixed by the former. The orders
previously issued by PPA were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in
the exercise of delegated power. As such these could only be amended or revised by a law,
as the President did by E.O. No. 1088.
No to both remaining issues. The Trial Court and CA has no jurisdiction over the appeal.
The issue that was raised was political questions and it is beyond the ambit of powers of the
Court delegated by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the several petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.
c. Araneta v. Dinglasan
(G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949)
TUASON, J.:
FACTS:
These five consolidated cases are challenging the validity of four executive orders of the
President, avowedly in virtue of the Emergency Powers Act or Commonwealth Act No. 671, which
does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness.
Involved in two cases is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots
for residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI of Manila
for violation of the provisions of this EO, and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the
judge and the city fiscal. Involved in a case is Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports
from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the
Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation
of shoes by the petitioner. Both official refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that
the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO. Another case relates to
Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other
purposes. The petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the
Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from
disbursing this EO. Affected in one of the five cases is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates
P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national
elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and
voter, asks this Court to prevent the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing
of that amount or any part of it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect?
HELD:
Yes. Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The
intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be
subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law
passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." Limited has been defined to mean "restricted;
bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." The
d li i ed e i d a ed i he C i i a e be d e i i e ded ea e ic i e i
duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, must be temporary or it
can not be said to be an emergency. It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
approved with this limitation in view.
Section 4, which stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full
force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide", goes far to settle the
legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671. The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the
authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued
in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was
no necessity to provide for the former. Thus, Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when
Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225
and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead of the first
special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, giving effect to the purpose and
intention of the National Assembly.
d. Rodriguez v. Gella
(G.R. No. L-6266, February 2, 1953)
PARAS, C.J;
FACTS:
Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the
first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second
setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods,
droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. They sought to have Vicente Gella, then
National Treasurer, be enjoined from releasi g f d a aid EO . The e EO ee
pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671 declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of
war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines
makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting
emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy
declared in section 1."
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed
that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act
has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers
delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be
repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.
This eventuality has in fact taken place when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing
all Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the President or either as the
principal authority to determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, in
palpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must be for a limited
period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of
either the Congress or the President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Orders are still valid?
HELD:
NO.
1. Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become
a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress
formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed
presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd,
situation that, "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be
able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress
to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be
the law."
2. Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of the constitution, in virtue of which Act No. 671 was
passed, authorizes the delegation of powers by the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other
national emergency. The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section 1 of the
Act is one "in time of war," as distinguished from "other national emergency" that may arise
as an after-effect of war or from natural causes such as widespread earthquakes, typhoons,
floods, and the like. Certainly the typhoons that hit some provinces and cities in 1952 not only
did not result from the last world war but were and could not have been contemplated by the
legislators. At any rate, the Congress is available for necessary special sessions, and it cannot
let the people down without somehow being answerable thereover.
3. The President, in returning to the Congress without his signature House Bill No. 727, did not
invoke any emergency resulting from the last world war, but only called attention to an
impending emergency that may be brought about by present complicated and troubled world
conditions, and to the fact that our own soldiers are fighting and dying in Korea in defense of
democracy and freedom and for the preservation of our Republic. The emergency thus feared
cannot, however, be attributed to the war mentioned in Act No. 671 and fought between
Germany and Japan on one side and the Allied Powers on the other; and indications are that
in the next world war, if any, the communist countries will be aligned against the democracies.
No departure can be made from the national policy declared in section 1 of Act No. 671. New
powers may be granted as often as emergencies contemplated in the Constitution arise.
4. It is pointed out that the passage of House Bill No. 727 is inconsistent with the claim that the
emergency powers are non-existent. But, from the debates in the House, it is patent that the
Bill had to be approved merely to remove all doubts, especially because this Court had
heretofore failed, for lack of necessary majority, to declare Act No. 671 entirely inoperative.
5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing
delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other
national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty
of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide
because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope
and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their
faithful adherence to the Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing
delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other
national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of
coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide
because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and
survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful
adherence to the Constitution.
e. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
(G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006)
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo proclaimed PP 1017, declaring a
state of state of national emergency on the eve of 20th celebration of EDSA People Power I citing
factual basis that the political opposition conspired with the left and the extreme right trying to bring
her down, this series of action are hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the trust and
confidence of the people to the Government, and it threatens the security of the people.
On the same day, she issued General Order No. 5 implementing PP 1017 assigning the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and Philippine National Police to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism. During the dispersal of the rallyist along EDSA, one of the petitioner, Professor Randolf S.
David, professor at University of the Philippines and a newspaper columnist, was arrested without
warrant by the police along with his companion, Ronald Llamas, Akbayan party-list President.
At around 12:20 AM of February 25, 2006, operatives of CIDG raided Daily Tribune offices in
Manila citing PP 1017, and General Order No. 5 confiscating news stories and other document to
warned the media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels bring down the
G e e he ill ec e d a ake e . O he a e da , he lice a e ed A ak a i
party-list Representative Crispin Beltran, Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo, Teodoro
Casiño, Josel Virador, Retired Majojr General Ramon Montaño, former head of the Philippine
Constabulary, and Gabriela party-list Representative Liza Maza
On March 3, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo lifted PP 1017 and issued

Proclamation No. 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Seven (7)
petitions are challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, Three (3) of these petitions
impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers
incident to Martial Law are used?
HELD:
Yes, the Court held in this case Article XII, Section 17, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing
PP 1017 does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from
C g e . The i i f A icle XII, Sec i 17 hich a e ha he S a e a , d i g he
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation
fa i a el ed blic ili b i e affec ed i h b i e i e e , efe C ge ,
not the President.
In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State
under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
f. People v. Vera
(G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937)
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and
four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he
appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge
of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing.
The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation
because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting
provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law
is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1
Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion
to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation
law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power?
HELD:
An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or
definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions,
fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary
power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a
i gc i i hich enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section
11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards
to determine.
The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and
void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying
out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of
the constitution and the doctrine of the non-delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so
protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial
fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to
the direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does
not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the
needed amount for the salary of a probation officers.
g. Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v POEA

(G.R. No. 114714, April 21, 1995)
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., and its co-petitioners, urges the
Court to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994.
Memorandum Circular No. 05, issued on 19 January 19942 by POEA Administrator Felicisimo
Joson and addressed to all Filipino seafarers, manning agencies, shipowners managers and
principals hiring Filipino seafarers, informed them that Governing Board Resolution No. 01 adjusted
the rates of compensation and other benefits in Part II, Section C. paragraph 1; Section L, paragraphs
1 and 2; and Appendix 1-A of the POEA Standard Employment Contracts for Seafarers, which
adjustments took effect on 20 March 1994.
P blic e de c e i i ha he e i i i ih e i a d h ld be di i ed
because the issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum circular was a valid exercise of
the POEA's rule-making authority or power of subordinate legislation;
ISSUE:
Whether or not POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power?
HELD:
Yes, the constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based on
impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by the public
respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA. The power of the
POEA is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers
"fai a d e i able e l e ac ice .
With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
It is, of course, well established in our jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-
delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally
delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the
standards prescribed by the law.
3. TEST
a. Pelaez v. Auditor General
(G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965)
CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964, the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders
Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129 creating thirty-three (33) municipalities. On November 10, 1964
petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the
present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and any disbursement by said
municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and said EOs constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected
by the aforementioned executive orders intervened in the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power upon the Chief Executive?
HELD:
Yes. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill
in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (1) be complete in itself it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (2) fix
a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could
thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse
to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances,
and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
The creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and
eminently legislative in character. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet
these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred
to. Thus, Sec. 68 of the RAC authorizing the President to create municipalities through EOs was
unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power.
b. US vs. Ang Tang Ho

(G.R. No. L-17122. February 27, 1922)
JOHNS, J.:
FACTS:
The Phili i e Legi la e a ed Ac N . 2868 e i led A Ac e ali i g he l a d
hoarding of, and speculation in palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating
the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-general, with the consent of the
Council of States to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation
for this e.
On August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice
should be sold.
On August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against Ang Tang Ho charging with the sale of rice
at an excessive price. He sold one Janet of rice to a certain Pedro Trinidad at the price of Php0.80
greater than that fixed by E.O. 53.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and was sentenced to five months imprisonment
and to paya fine of Php500.00, from which he appealed, claiming that the lower court erred in dindingf
E.O. 53, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, andn in
imposing the sentence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay,
rice and corn may be sold is a violation of the organic law?
HELD:
Yes. The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a
law unto itself and within itself, and it does not thing more than to authorize the Governor-Gneral to
make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no
delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime
and is not complete and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the
doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the delegation of legislative power is
unconstitutional and void.
The Act gave the Governor-Ge e al le di c e i de e i e a ca e f e f ci g he ac ,

and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard
to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether
he la hall be e f ced. H e e , he Legi la e fail ide he defi i i f a
ca e , ha a a e a di a i e i he ice f ice, ala c . M e e , i did
specify the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued.
c. Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court

(G.R. Mp. 74457 March 20, 1987)
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
President Marcos enacted EO No. 626-A prohibiting that no carabao shall be transported
from one province to another, allowing confiscation and forefeiture of such. Petitioners transported
6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo which were confiscated by the police. The petitioner sued for
recovery and the RTC of issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of 12k. The
RTC sustained the confiscation, ordered confiscation of the bond, and declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the EO No. 626-A for lack of authority and its presumed validity. Petitioner
appealed the decision to the IAC which upheld the decision of the RTC. Petitioner contended that
EO No. 626-A is unconstitutional that it authorizes outright confiscation of carabao or carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries. Also, he argued that the penalty is invalid as it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. Lastly, he further alleged that there was an improper exercise of
legislative power by the former President.
Issue:
Whether or not, EO No. 626-A is constitutional?
Held:
No. EO No. 626-A is unconstitutional.
(On the power used by President Marcos in promulgating EO 626-A) - The law passed was
named an EO, but really is a PD, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an
existing law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
There is no exigency, petitioner has reason to question the validity of the EO.
(On due process) The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain
also conveniently resilient. Flexibility was meant to adapt easily to any situation. The requirements
for due process are notice and hearing, however there are exceptions such as conclusive
presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on
human experience or rational connection between facts proved and fact presumed. The carabaos
are not inimical per se which requires their immediate destruction. There was no reason why the
offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of justice with the accused acquired the
rights in the constitution. The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because
the method to confiscate carabaos was oppressive. Due process was violated because the owner
was denied the right to be heard or his defense and punished immediately.
(On delegation of powers) The manner of confiscation has been authorized to "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may ee fi , i he ca e f ca aba ." The h a e a
ee fi ld be e ab e a d c i . The e i li i a i g ideli e. The ffice a e
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. There is here a
"roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
d. De la Llana v. Alba
(G.R. No. L-57883, March 12, 1982)
FERNANDO, C.J.:
FACTS:
Pe i i e a ailed he c i i ali f Ba a Pa ba a Blg. 129 e i led A Ac
Re ga i i g he J dicia , A ia i g f d he ef e a d f he P e , he a e bei g
contrary to the security of tenure provision of the constitution as its separates from the Judiciary,
Justices and judges of inferior Courts from the Court of Appeals to Municipal Circuit Courts except
the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior
courts established by such Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not B.P. No. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is contrary to the
Constitutional provision relating to the security of tenure?
HELD:
No. B.P. No. 129 is not contrary to the Constitution.
The enactment of such Act maintains the unimpaired independence of the judiciary. The
termination by virtue of the abolition of office prescribed in B.P. No. 129 thereof, does not impair
security of tenure. It is the power of the President to exercise his legislative power in enacting such
law and it is within his power to appoint or remove persons from such offices.
There is also no jurisdictional question involved wherein the constitutionality of the law is in
issue. It is presumed to be constitutional. The petitioners have no locus standi even as tax payers
Judge de la Llana has no cause of action for prohibition because he is not being removed from his
position.
The J dicia Re ga i a i La a e ac ed i g d fai h a d cl ak a

c i i al a d e il e. The la aki g b d ac ed i hi he c e f i c i i al
powers and prerogatives. The creation and abolition of the courts inferior to the Supreme Court is a
constitutional prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the
power to reorganize said courts, and in the process, abolish them to give way to new substantially
diffe e e . T c e d he i e ld be f ge a ba ic d c i e f c i i al la ha
irre ealable la hall be a ed
The institutional reforms and changes envisioned by the law are conducive to the promotion
of national interests. The objectives of the legislation, namely: (a) An institutional restructuring by the
creation of an Intermediate Appellate Court, thirteen (13) RTC, MeTC, MTC and MCTC; (b) A re-
appointment of jurisdictional geared towards greater efficiency; (c) A simplification of procedures; and
(d) The abolition of the inferior courts created by the Judiciary Act of 1948 and other statutes, as
approved by the Congress of the Philippines are undoubtedly intended to improve the regime of
justice and thereby enhance public good and order.
The infringement of the right of security of tenure is justified through the exercise of police power.
Whe he i ee c flic a ha had gi e i e he e e ca e. The d f he
legislature to provide society with a fair, efficient and effective judicial system, on one hand, and the
right of judges to security of tenure, on the other, the latter must of necessity prevail over the
former. One involves public welfare and interest more directly and on greater magnitude than the
right of security of tenure of the judges which is, as is easily discernible, more of a personal benefit
to a just a few, as only the judge affected could seek judicial redress of what he conceives to be its
i la i . The ie f he e e ci e f lice e f he S a e, if hi c ce de lie e e
the Constitution, has to be invoked as a constitutional justification of the passage of the Act in
question. It is a conflict between the primary power of the legislature to create courts, and mere
consequential benefit accorded to judges and justices after the creation of the courts in indeed
perceivable, which the writer fails to see, or at least, would disappear upon a reconciliation of the
two apparently conflicting interests which, from the disposition, is not hard to find. It is, without
doubt, in the essence of the exercise of police power that a right assessable by individuals may be
infringed in the greater interest of the public good and general welfare. This is how it is
demonstrated in how the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights enjoyable be entire
people, not just a handful in comparison, are made subject to the lawful exercise of the police
power of the State.
e. Chiongbian v. Orbos
(G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995)
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, the Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in some provinces
which resulted to 4 provinces, namely, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi Tawi voting in
favor of creating an autonomous region and therefore became the ARMM. Art. 19, Sec. 13 of R.A.
No. 6734 states That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be
included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions. Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination,
merge the existing regions.
President Cory then issued the EO No. 429 stating that the provinces/cities that will be
e ged, transferring provinces from their existing region to another. Petitioners contended that
here is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within existing
regions and restructure them to new administrative regions. The transfer of one province under its
current region to another is a form of reorganization, an alteration of the existing structures of the
government. Petitioners further argued that P e ide authority under RA 6743 to "merge existing
regions" cannot be construed to include the authority to reorganize them. Petitioners brought this
suit for certiorari and prohibition.
Petitioners argued that it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing
him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no
standard for the exercise of the power delegated.
The Solicitor General contends that there is no undue delegation, but only a grant of power to
fill up or provide the details of legislation because the Congress did not have the facility to provide for
them.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not, the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, or whether
it is executive in character, and, in any event, whether Art. 19, Sec. 13 is invalid because it contains
no standard to guide the President's discretion?
(2) Whether or not, the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces
and cities in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region
or did not vote in favor of it?
HELD:
(1) It is executive in character. The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative
regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the
President the power "to merge the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating
back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. As held in the case of Abas, "while
the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local g e e The regions themselves are not territorial and political
divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes." The power conferred on the President is similar to the power
to adjust municipal boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General or as
"administrative in nature." There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in
conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions.
This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in
the exercise of power. Standard can be gathered or implied. Standard can be found in the same
policy underlying grant of power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the
Executive Department: promote simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to enable it to
pursue its programs consisted with the national goals for accelerated social and economic
de el e .
(2) Yes. Art. 19 is subject to the qualification that "the President may by administrative
determination merge the existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and
cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they
may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of
administration may require. The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are
definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating
the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient
delivery of essential services.
f. Tatad v Secretary of Energy

(G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997)
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
The e i i e e i he c i i ali f RA N . 8180 A Ac De eg la i g he
D ea Oil I d a d F O he P e . The de eg la i ce ha two phases: (a)
the transition phase and the (b) full deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
In March 1996, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or
purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease
or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use
the same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.
The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation
phase. During the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing aspects of the oil industry were to be
lifted. Upon full deregulation, controls on the price of oil and the foreign exchange cover were to be
lifted and the OPSF was to be abolished.
The first phase of deregulation commenced on August 12, 1996. And on February 8, 1997,
the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No. 372.
ISSUE:
Whether or not section 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
power?
HELD:
No, section 15 of RA 8180 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
power. The Court thru, Mr. Justice Moreland, held that "the true distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." Over the years, as the legal engineering
of men's relationship became more difficult, Congress has to rely more on the practice of delegating
the execution of laws to the executive and other administrative agencies. Two tests have been
developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the
abdication of the power to make law itself.
.There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the
law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard
test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a
total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of undue delegation of legislative
power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will
start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the
end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of
March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President he is to
time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market
are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
g. Gerochi vs. Department of Energy

(G.R. No. 159796. July 17, 2007)
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners pray that Section 34 of Republic Act 9136 and Rule 18 of the Rules and
Regulations be declared unconstitutional.
The Congress enacted Republic Act 9136 otherwise known a he Elec ic P e I d

Ref ac f 2001 hich i e a U i e al Cha ge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose
of funding National Power C ai (NPC) projects. Furthermore, the act provides that the
Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC?
HELD:
No. There is no undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.
It can be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA the Universal Charge is not a tax but an exaction in the
e e ci e f he S a e lice e . P blic elfa e i el ed.
A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of

powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been
delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of
his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, subordinate legislation or the delegation
of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies/bodies (the principal agencies
tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields) is allowed as an exception to this principle. All that
is needed for the validity of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but inconformity with the
standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are labeled as the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries
of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that "within one (1) year from the effectivity
thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on
all electricity end-users," Sec 43 (b) (ii) provides that the ERC, within the effectivity of the Act, can
e f ce a d lga e a Na i al G id C de a d a Di ib i C de hich ca de e i e, fix,
and approve, after due notice and public hearings the universal charge, to be imposed on all electricity
end- e a Sec i 34 he e f.
In addition, Sec. 51 also mandates that the basis for ERC in the determination of the universal
charge is he The PSALM C . calc la i f he a f he a ded deb a d a ded
contract costs of NPC
As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: interest of law and order, adequate and efficient instruction, public interest, justice and
equity, public convenience and welfare, simplicity, economy and efficiency, standardization and
regulation of medical education, and fair and equitable employment practices. Provisions of the
EPIRA such as, among others, "to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality,
reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power" and "watershed rehabilitation and
management" meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC's
power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
Therefore, the law passes both the first and second test.
h. Belgica v. Ochoa
(G.R. No. 208566; November 19, 2013)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It
de e e e al legal de ig a i f Congressional Pork Barrel he la e Priority
Development Assistance Fund PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 illi f hard
projects (i f a c e jec like ad , b ildi g , ch l , e c.), a d P30 illi f soft
projects ( ch la hi g a , edical a i a ce, li elih d g a , IT de el e , e c.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects.
Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya
Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived
from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July
2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in
the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
la ake i f eli g hei k ba el f d i ab 20 b g NGO ( -government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing
jec b a e i fac g i g gh jec . A a di a he c d c ed b he C i i
Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
1. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto
are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on; (b)
non-delegability of legislative power;
2. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910, relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential

Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative
power?
HELD:
Definition of Terms
Pork Barrel System - as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which
lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The
Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
3. Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effec i el c l ce ai a ec f he f d ili a i h gh a i -enactment
measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under
the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure
that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;
4. Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier
stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund.
1. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel (relative issue to the topic)
Non-delegability of Legislative Powers

This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only
recognized exceptions thereto would be:
(a) Delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are
allowed to legislate on purely local matters;
(b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law,
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war
or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
Application:
The Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as
settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that:
"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
2. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel

1. Validity of Appropriation
The Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and
specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal
provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a
particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence,
already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation
of the Constitution.
The 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said
constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures
which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations
are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators
after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law.
2. Undue Delegation
The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the
li i f he P e ide a h i i h e ec he ef hich he Mala a a F d a
be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds
for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be stricken
down as unconstitutional since similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910
it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are
severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally
effective and subsisting.
THE ADONIS CASES 2014-2015
The act of ratification is the act of voting

by the people. The canvass of the votes
thereafter is merely the mathematical
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
confirmation of what was done during the date of
PHILIPPINES
the plebiscite, and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory
*Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution declaration of an act which was actually done by
(Sec.27, Art. 18, 1987 Constitution) the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution
when they cast their votes on the date of the
DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA plebiscite.
(G.R. NO. 78059. AUGUST 31, 1987)
*Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: *Concept of Self Executing Provisions
FACTS: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, (G.R. NO. 122156, FEB. 3, 1997)
petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel BELLOSILLO, J.:
S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. FACTS:
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo The controversy arose when respondent
M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC pursuant to the privatization program under
Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, Proclamation No. 50 decided to sell through
1987 designating respondent Florentino G. public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by inning bidder, or he e en al s ra egic
the OIC Governor was "by authority of the partner, is o pro ide managemen e per ise
Minister of Local Government." and/or an international marketing/reservation
Also on February 8, 1987, Esguerra system, and financial support to strengthen the
signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, In a close bidding only two (2) bidders
et al., as members of the Barangay Council of the participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
same Barangay and Municipality. Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered
Petitioners maintain that with the to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Esguerra no P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
longer has the authority to replace them and to Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
designate their successors. operator, which bid for the same number of
However, respondents rely on Section shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, which the bid of petitioner.
provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive Pending the declaration of Renong
officials and employees under the 1973 Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner
Constitution shall continue in office until matched the bid price tendered by Renong
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive Berhad.
order or upon the designation or appointment and Apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
qualification of their successors, if such disregarded the tender of the matching bid and
appointment is made within a period of one year that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
from February 25, 1986. hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this
ISSUE: Whether the designation of the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended on ISSUE:
February 25, 1987.
1. Whether or not the disposition of 51% of
HELD: Manila Hotel falls under the application
NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly of Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the 1987
still within the one year deadline under the Constitution.
Provisional Constitution, the same must be 2. Whether or not Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII
deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading: executing provision.
This Cons i ion shall ake HELD:
effect immediately upon its
ratification by a majority of the 1. Yes. Manila Hotel has been identified
votes cast in a plebiscite held with the Filipino nation and has
for the purpose and shall practically become a historical
supersede all previous monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Cons i ions. Philippine heritage and culture. It is a
proud legacy of an earlier generation of
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the sacredness of independence and its
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have power and capacity to release the full
been superseded. Having become inoperative, potential of the Filipino people. To all
Section 2, Article III of the Provisional intents and purposes, it has become a
Constitution could not be relied on by the part of the national patrimony. Since
respondent OIC Governor. The memorandum 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
dated February 8, 1987 by the respondent OIC with it the ownership of the business of
Governor could no longer have any legal force the hotel which is owned by respondent
and effect. GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel

business of respondent GSIS being a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is

part of the tourism industry is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
unquestionably a part of the national executing. If the constitutional provisions are
economy. Thus, any transaction treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
involving 51% of the shares of stock of executing, the legislature would have the power
the MHC is clearly covered by the term to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
national economy, to which Sec. 10, the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.
second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
applies. Hence, since Manila Hotel is always been, that -
part of the national patrimony and its
business also unquestionably part of the x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should
national economy petitioner should be be considered self-executing rather than non-
preferred after it has matched the bid self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is
offer of the Malaysian firm. For the clearly intended, the provisions of the
bidding rules mandate that if for any Constitution should be considered self-executing,
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be as a contrary rule would give the legislature
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may discretion to determine when, or whether, they
offer this to the other Qualified Bidders shall be effective. These provisions would be
that have validly submitted bids subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body,
provided that these Qualified Bidders which could make them entirely meaningless by
are willing to match the highest bid in simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
terms of price per share. statute.
2. A constitution is a system of
fundamental laws for the governance *Principles of Constitutional Construction
and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REP.
unalterable except by the authority from (GR NO. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003)
which it emanates. It has been defined
as the fundamental and paramount law CARPIO MORALES, J.:
of the nation. It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of FACTS:
government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives
and duties, and establishes certain fixed adopted a Resolution, which directed the
principles on which government is Committee on Justice "to conduct an
founded. The fundamental conception investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
in other words is that it is a supreme law of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
to which all other laws must conform Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
and in accordance with which all private Development Fund (JDF).
rights must be determined and all public On June 2, 2003, former President
authority administered. Under the Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
doctrine of constitutional supremacy, complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against
if a law or contract violates any norm of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
the constitution that law or contract Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable
whether promulgated by the legislative violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
or by the executive branch or entered trust and other high crimes." The complaint was
into by private persons for private endorsed by Representatives Suplico, Zamora
purposes is null and void and without and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
any force and effect. Thus, since the Committee on Justice in accordance with Section
Constitution is the fundamental, 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
paramount and supreme law of the The House Committee on Justice ruled
nation, it is deemed written in every that the first impeachment complaint was
statute and contract. "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same
for being insufficient in substance.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely On October 23, 2003, the second
declarations of policies and principles. Their impeachment complait was filed with the
provisions command the legislature to enact laws Secretary General of the House against Chief
and carry out the purposes of the framers who Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
merely establish an outline of government alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated
providing for the different departments of the by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
governmental machinery and securing certain second impeachment complaint was
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.A accompanied by a "Resolution of
provision which lays down a general principle, Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a Representatives.
provision which is complete in itself and becomes Thus arose the instant petitions against
operative without the aid of supplementary or the House of Representatives, et. al., most of
enabling legislation, or that which supplies which petitions contend that the filing of the
sufficient rule by means of which the right it second impeachment complaint is
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self- unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self- Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that
executing if the nature and extent of the right "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by against the same official more than once within a
the constitution itself, so that they can be period of one year."
determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating ISSUE:
that the subject is referred to the legislature for Whether or not Constitution has
action. excluded impeachment proceedings from the
coverage of judicial review.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a
HELD: held that the Court in construing a Constitution

No. In cases of conflict, the judicial should bear in mind the object sought to be
department is the only constitutional organ which accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if
can be called upon to determine the proper any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A
allocation of powers between the several doubtful provision will be examined in the light of
departments and among the integral or the history of the times, and the condition and
constituent units thereof. circumstances under which the Constitution was
The Constitution is a definition of the framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
powers of government. Who is to determine the which induced the framers of the Constitution to
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The enact the particular provision and the purpose
Constitution itself has provided for the sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational construe the whole as to make the words
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate consonant to that reason and calculated to effect
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any that purpose.
superiority over the other departments; it does Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat.
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the The Constitution is to be interpreted as a
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and whole.
sacred obligation assigned to it by the It is a well-established rule in
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of constitutional construction that no one provision
authority under the Constitution and to establish of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights others, to be considered alone, but that all the
which that instrument secures and guarantees to provisions bearing upon a particular subject are
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is as to effectuate the great purposes of the
the power of judicial review under the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
Constitution. More than that, courts accord the subject should be considered and interpreted
presumption of constitutionality to legislative together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
enactments, not only because the legislature is the Constitution and one section is not to be
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
because the judiciary in the determination of construction, the two can be made to stand
actual cases and controversies must reflect the together.
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed In other words, the court must
through their representatives in the executive and harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
legislative departments of the government. favor of a construction which will render every
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this word operative, rather than one which may make
"moderating power" to "determine the proper the words idle and nugatory.
allocation of powers" of the different branches of If, however, the plain meaning of the
government and "to direct the course of word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids
government along constitutional channels" is is available. While it is permissible in this
inherent in all courts as a necessary jurisdiction to consult the debates and
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is proceedings of the constitutional convention in
"the power of the court to settle actual order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
controversies involving rights which are legally resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had
demandable and enforceable." only when other guides fail as said proceedings
To determine the merits of the issues are powerless to vary the terms of the
raised in the instant petitions, this Court must Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which in the constitutional convention "are of value as
employs the well-settled principles of showing the views of the individual members,
constitutional construction. and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but
First, verba legis, that is, wherever they give us no light as to the views of the large
possible, the words used in the Constitution majority who did not talk, much less of the mass
must be given their ordinary meaning except of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
where technical terms are employed. gave that instrument the force of fundamental
We look to the language of the law. We think it safer to construe the constitution
document itself in our search for its meaning. We from what appears upon its face." The proper
do not of course stop there, but that is where we interpretation therefore depends more on how it
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which was understood by the people adopting it than in
constitutional provisions are couched express the the framers's understanding thereof.
objective sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where *Power to Amend the Constitution by the
technical terms are employed in which case the Legislature (Sec.1 & 2, Art. 17, 1987
significance thus attached to them prevails. As Constitution)
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to GONZALES VS. COMELEC
obtain that it should ever be present in the (GR. NO L-28196, NOVEMBER 9, 1967)
people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they CONCEPCION, C.J.:
have in common use. What it says according to FACTS:
the text of the provision to be construed compels The Congress passed 3 resolutions
acceptance and negates the power of the courts simultaneously. The first, proposing amendments
to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers to the Constitution so as to increase the
and the people mean what they say. Thus these membership of the House of Representatives
are the cases where the need for construction is from a maximum of 120, as provided in the
reduced to a minimum. present Constitution, to a maximum of 180. The
Second, where there is ambiguity, second, calling a convention to propose
ratio legis est anima. The words of the amendments to said Constitution, the convention
Constitution should be interpreted in to be composed of two (2) elective delegates
accordance with the intent of its framers. from each representative district, to be elected in
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional the general elections. And the third, proposing
construction is the intention underlying the that the same Constitution be amended so as to
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been
authorize Senators and members of the House of Convention, filed separate petitions for
Representatives to become delegates to the declaratory relief, impugning the constitutionality
aforementioned constitutional convention, without of RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights
forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. as candidates.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, Congress, acting as a Constituent
upon approval by the President, became Assembly, passed Resolution No.2 which called
Republic Act No. 4913 providing that the for the Constitutional Convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the Constitutional amendments. After its adoption,
aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted
approval by the people, at the general elections. R.A. 4914 implementing said resolution, restating
The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the entirely the provisions of said resolution.
said law contending that the Congress cannot Thereafter, Congress, acting as a
simultaneously propose amendments to the Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4
Constitution and call for the holding of a amending the Resolution No. 2 by providing that
constitutional convention. an o her de ails rela ing o he specific
apportionment of delegates, election of delegates
ISSUES: to, and the holding of the Constitutional
(1) Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional? Convention shall be embodied in an
(2) WON Congress can simultaneously propose implemen ing legisla ion
amendments to the Constitution and call for the Congress, acting as a legislative body,
holding of a constitutional convention? enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Resolution
Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. 4914.
HELD:
YES as to both issues. The constituent
power or the power to amend or revise the ISSUE: May Congress in acting as a legislative
Constitution, is different from the law-making body enact R.A.6132 to implement the resolution
power of Congress. Congress can directly passed by it in its capacity as a Constituent
propose amendments to the Constitution and at Assembly?
the same time call for a Constitutional
Convention to propose amendments. HELD:
Indeed, the power to amend the YES. The Court declared that while the
Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is authority to call a Constitutional Convention is
not included in the general grant of legislative vested by the Constitution solely and exclusively
powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent in Congress acting as a constitutional assembly,
powers of the people as the repository of the power to enact the implementing details or
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours specifics of the general law does not exclusively
to make, and, hence, to amend their own pertain to Congress, the Congress in exercising
Fundamental Law. Congress may propose its comprehensive legislative power (not as a
amendments to the Constitution merely because Constitutional Assembly) may pass the
the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, necessary implementing law providing for the
when exercising the same, it is said that Senators details of the Constitutional Conventions, such as
and Members of the House of Representatives the number, qualification, and compensation of
act, not as members of Congress, but as its member.
component elements of a constituent assembly. The reasons cited by the Court in
When acting as such, the members of Congress upholding the constitutionality of the enactment of
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike R.A. 6132 are as follows:
the people, when performing the same function, 1. Congress, acting as a Constituent
for their authority does not emanate from the Assembly pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution they are the very source of all Constitution, has authority to propose
powers of government, including the Constitution constitutional amendments or call a
itself . convention for the purpose by ¾ votes
Since, when proposing, as a constituent of each house in joint session
assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the assembled but voting separately.
members of Congress derive their authority from 2. Such grant includes all other powers
the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that essential to the effective exercise of the
they do not have the final say on whether or not principal power by necessary
their acts are within or beyond constitutional implication.
limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set 3. Implementing details are within the
the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet authority of the Congress not only as a
that ours is a government of laws, not of men, Constituent Assembly but also in the
and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such exercise of its comprehensive legislative
rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the power which encompasses all matters
Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme not expressly or by necessary
Court, the power to declare a treaty implication withdrawn or removed by the
unconstitutional, despite the eminently political Constitution from the ambit of legislative
character of treaty-making power. action so long as it does not contravene
any provision of the Constitution; and
*The Congress acting as a constituent assembly, 4. Congress as a legislative body may thus
may propose amendments to the Constitution, enact necessary implementing
and exercising its general legislative power, legislation to fill in the gaps which
provide for the details of the Constitutional Congress as a Constituent Assembly
Convention. has omitted.
IMBONG VS. COMELEC

(GR NO. L-32432, SEPT. 11, 1970) THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARTICLE XVII, SECTION 15, 1973
FACTS: CONSTITUTION
Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul OCCENA VS. COMELEC
Gonzales, both interested in running as G.R. NO. L-56350, APRIL 2, 1981
candidates in the 1971 Constitutional

FERNANDO, C.J.: President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.

FACTS: Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by
The challenge in these two prohibition virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is
proceedings is against the validity of three clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose
Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing the amendments embodied in the resolutions
constitutional amendments. Petitioners urged that now being assailed.
the amendments proposed are so extensive in
character that they go far beyond the limits of the 3. Yes.The question of whether the proposed
authority conferred on the Interim Batasang resolutions constitute amendments or revision is
Pambansa as successor of the Interim National of no relevance. It suffices to quote from the
Assembly. For them, what was done was to opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the
revise and not to amend. Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon to dispose of this contention. Whether the
A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar Constitutional Convention will only propose
and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional amendments to the Constitution or entirely
Convention that framed the present Constitution, overhaul the present Constitution and propose an
are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology
aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the foreign to the democratic system, is of no
1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. moment; because the same will be submitted to
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on the people for ratification. Once ratified by the
March 6 and March 12, 1981. sovereign people, there can be no debate about
the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that
ISSUES: the present Constitution may be revised and
Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is replaced with a new one ... is no argument
already in effect. against the validity of the law because
Whether or not the Interim Batasang 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total
Pambansa has the power to propose overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate,
amendments. whether the Constitution is merely amended in
Whether or not the three resolutions are part or revised or totally changed would become
valid. immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people."
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petitions are
1.Yes. it is much too late in the day to deny the dismissed for lack of merit.
force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In
the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its SECTIONS 1 & 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987
ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a CONSTITUTION
vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being TOLENTINO VS. COMMISSION ON
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial ELECTIONS
obstacle to the new Constitution being (GR. NO. L-34150, OCTOBER 16, 1971)
considered in force and effect."
With such a pronouncement by the BARREDO, J.:
Supreme Court and with the recognition of the FACTS:
cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court A Constitutional Convention was called
says is not only entitled to respect but must also upon to propose amendments to the Constitution
be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. of the Philippines, in which, the delegates to the
The Supreme Court can check as well as said Convention were all elected under and by
legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not virtue of resolutions and the implementing
only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The
may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1,
there is an affirmation that what was done cannot amending section one of article 5 of the
be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The Constitution of the Philippines so as to lower the
mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. voting age to 18. Said resolution also provided in
That is the meaning of the concluding statement its Section 3 that the partial amendment, which
in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably refers only to the age qualification for the
applied the present Constitution. The latest case exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to
in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two other amendments that will be proposed in the
weeks ago. During the first year alone of the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on
effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten other portions of the amended Section or on
cases may be cited. other portions of the entire Constitution.
The main thrust of the petition is that
2. Yes.The existence of the power of the Interim Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other
Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The implementing resolutions thereof subsequently
applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is approved by the Convention have no force and
quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: effect as laws in so far as they are in
"The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the contravention to Section 1 Article XV of the
same powers and its Members shall have the Constitution. Under the said provision, the
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, proposed amendment in question cannot be
and disqualifications as the interim National presented to the people for ratification separately
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and from each and all of the other amendments to be
the Members thereof." One of such powers is drafted and proposed by the Convention.
precisely that of proposing amendments. Article
XVII, Section 15 of the 1973 Constitution in its ISSUE:
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Is the Resolution approved by the 1971
Assembly with the power to propose Constitutional Convention constitutional?
amendments upon special call by the Prime
Minister by a vote of the majority of its members HELD:
to be ratified in accordance with the Article on NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the
Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the implementing acts and resolutions of the
Convention, insofar as they provide for the basis that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitution,
holding of a plebiscite, as well as the resolution of there is no grant to the incumbent President to
the respondent Comelec complying therewith are exercise the constituent power to propose
null and void. amendments to the new Constitution, hence, the
The Court is of the opinion that in Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
providing for the questioned plebiscite before it legal basis.
has finished, and separately from, the whole draft Petitioner Guzman filed another action
of the constitution it has been called to formulate, asserting that the power to propose amendments
the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and to or revision of the Constitution during the
all subsequent acts of the Convention transition period is expressly conferred to the
implementing the same violate the condition in interim National Assembly under sec.16, Art. XVII
Section 1, Article XV that there should only be of the Constitution.
one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of A similar action was instituted by
all the amendments the Convention may petitioners Gonzales and Salapantan arguing
propose. We are not denying any right of the that:
people to vote on the proposed amendment; We 1. Even granting him legislative powers under
are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV the martial law, the incumbent President
of the Constitution, the same should be submitted cannot act as a constituent assembly to
to them not separately from but together with all propose amendments to the Constitution,
the other amendments to be proposed by this 2. A referendum-plebiscite is untenable under
present Convention. the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973,
Prescinding already from the fact that 3. The submission of the proposed
under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is amendments in such a short period of time
evident that no fixed frame of reference is for deliberation renders the plebiscite a
provided the voter, as to what finally will be nullity,
concomitant qualifications that will be required by 4. To lift martial law, the President need not
the final draft of the constitution to be formulated consult the people via referendum, and
by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy 5. Allowing 15-year-olds to vote would amount
the right of suffrage, there are other to an amendment of the Constitution, which
considerations which make it impossible to vote confines the right of suffrage to those
intelligently on the proposed amendment. No one citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age
knows what changes in the fundamental and above.
principles of the constitution the Convention will The Solicitor General, in his comment
be minded to approve. To be more specific, we for respondent COMELEC, maintains that:
do not have any means of foreseeing whether the 1. Petitioners have no standing to sue
right to vote would be of any significant value at 2. The issue raised is political in nature, beyond
all. Who can say whether or not later on the judicial cognizance of the court
Convention may decide to provide for varying 3. At this state of the transition period, only the
types of voters for each level of the political units incumbent President has the authority to
it may divide the country into. The root of the exercise constituent power
difficulty in other words, lies in that the 4. The referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
Convention is precisely on the verge of normalization.
introducing substantial changes, if not radical
ones, in almost every part and aspect of the ISSUES:
existing social and political order enshrined in the Do the petitioners have the standing to sue?
present Constitution. How can a voter in the 1. Is the question of the constitutionality of the
proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the Presidential Decrees 991, 1031, and 1033
effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the political or judicial?
different institutions which the Convention may 2. Does the President possess the power to
establish and of which presently he is not given propose amendments to the Constitution as
any idea? Clearly, there is improper submission. well as set up the required machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of
his proposal, in the absence of an interim
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES National Assembly?
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC 3. Is the submission to the people of the
73 SCRA 333 (1976) proposed amendments within the time frame
FACTS: allowed therefore a sufficient and proper
President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for submission?
a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for
he Ci i ens Assemblies ( Baranga ) o resol e, HELD:
among other things, the issues of martial law, the 1. YES. At the instance of taxpayers, laws
interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of providing for the disbursement of public
such replacement, the period of its existence, the funds may be enjoined upon the theory that
length of the period for the exercise by the the expenditure of public funds by the State
President of his present powers. for the purpose of executing an
Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, unconstitutional act constitutes a
amending P.D. 991 by declaring the provisions of misapplication of such funds.
P.D. 229 applicable as to the manner of voting 2. It is a judicial question.
and canvassing of votes in barangays for the 3. YES. If the President has been legitimately
national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, discharging the legislative functions of the
1976. P.D. 1033 was also issued, declaring Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he
therein that the question of the continuance of cannot validly discharge the function of that
martial law will be submitted for referendum at assembly to propose amendments to the
the same time as the submission of his Constitution, which is but adjunct, although
(President) proposed amendments to the peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This
Constitution through a plebiscite on October 16, is not to say that the President has
1976. converted his office into a constituent
Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for assembly of that nature normally constituted
Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction, seeking to by the legislature. Rather, with the Interim
enjoin the COMELEC from holding and Assembly not convened and only the
conducting said Referendum-Plebiscite on the Presidency and Supreme Court in operation,
the urges of absolute necessity render it only laws and not constitutional amendments
imperative upon the President to act as because the latter takes effect only upon
agent for and in behalf of the people to ratification and not after publication.
propose amendments to the Constitution. 3. COMELEC Resolution No.2300, adopted on
Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Jan ar 16, 1991 o go ern he cond c of
Supreme Court possesses no capacity to initiative on the Constitution and initiative
propose amendments without constitutional and referend m on na ional and local la s ,
infractions. For the President to shy away is ultra vires insofar as initiative or
from that actuality and decline to undertake amendments to the Constitution are
the amending process would leave the concerned, since the COMELEC has no
governmental machinery at a stalemate or power to provide rules and regulation for the
create in the powers of the State a exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
destructive vacuum. After all, the constituent Constitution. Only the Congress is
assemblies or constitutional conventions, like authorized by the Constitution to pass the
the President now, are mere agents of the implementing law.
people. 4. The people s ini ia i e is limi ed o
4. YES. Art. XVI of the Constitution makes no amendments to the Constitution, to the
provision as to the specific date when the revision thereof. Extending or lifting of the
plebiscite shall be held, but simply states term limits constitutes a revision and is
ha i shall be held no la er han 3 mon hs herefore o side he po er of he people s
after the approval of such amendment or initiative.
re ision. The period from Sep ember 21 o 5. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated
October 16, or a period of three weeks is not f nds for people s ini ia i e, nei her he
too short for free debates or discussions on COMELEC nor any other department,
the referendum-plebiscite issues. The agency or office of the government has
issues are not new. They are the issues of realigned funds for the purpose.
the day, and the people have been living The Supreme Court gave due course to
with this petition and granted the Motions for
5. them since the proclamation of martial law Intervention filed by Petitioners-Intervenors DIK,
four years ago. The referendums of 1973 MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator Roco.
and 1975 carried the same issue of martial
law. That notwithstanding, the contested ISSUES:
brief period for discussion is not without 1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
counterparts in previous plebiscites for Constitution is a self-executing provision?
constitutional amendments. 2. Whether R.A.6735 is a sufficient statutory
implementation of the said constitutional
provision?
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 3. Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid?
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC 4. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective
270 SCRA 106, MARCH 19, 1997 national and local officials as proposed
would constitute a revision, or an
FACTS: amendment to the Constitution?
Private respondent Delfin filed with the
COMELEC a Pe i ion o Amend he Cons i ion, HELD:
to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by NO. Although the mode of amendment
People s amendmen s o he Cons i ion gran ed which bypasses congressional action, in the last
under Section 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 analysis, it is still dependent on congressional
Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC action. While the Constitution has recognized or
Resolution No. 2300. The proposed granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if
amendments consist of the submission of this the Congress for whatever reason, does not
proposition to the people Do o appro e he provide for its implementation.
lifting of the term limits of all elective officials, 1. NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete
amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of to fully comply with the power and duty of the
Art.VI, Section 4 of Art.VII, and Section 8 of Art. X Congress to enact the statutory
of he Philippine Cons i ion? implementation of sec.2, Art.XVII of the
The COMELEC issued an order Constitution. Although said Act intended to
directing the publication of the petition and the include the system of initiative on
notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for amendments to the Constitution, it is
hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the deemed inadequate to cover that system
IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon and accordingly provide for a local initiative
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng required for proposing Constitutional
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as changes.
intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco moved to 2. NO. The COMELEC Resolution insofar as it
dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is prescribes rules and regulations on the
not the initiatory party cognizable by the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
COMELEC. Constitution is void, as expressed
Petitioners filed a special civil action in he La in ma im Po es as delega e non
direc ing responden s COMELEC and Delfin s delegari potest. In every case of permissible
Petition to directly propose amendments to the delegation, it must be shown that the
Constitution through the system of initiative under delegation itself is valid.
sec.2 of Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. 3. The resolution of this issue is held to be
Petitioners raise the following arguments: unnecessary, if not academic, as the
1. The cons i ional pro ision on people s proposal to lift the term limits of elective local
initiative to amend the Constitution can only and national officials is an amendment to the
be implemented by law to be passed by Constitution and not a revision. Thus, the
Congress. No such law has been passed. petition was granted, and the COMELEC is
2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative permanently enjoined from taking
on the Constitution, unlike in the other cognizance of any petition for initiative on
modes of initiative. It only provides for the amendments to the Constitution until a
effectivity of the law after the publication in sufficiently law shall have been validly
print media indicating that the Act covers
enacted to provide for the implementation of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
the system. petition must state the fact of such attachment.
This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC seen the full text of the proposed amendments
G.R. NO. 174153, OCTOBER 25, before signing. Otherwise, it is physically
2006 impossible, given the time constraint, to prove
that every one of the millions of signatories had
FACTS: seen the full text of the proposed amendments
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in before signing.
G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Section 2, Article XVII of the
Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with Constitution does not expressly state that the
other groups and individuals, commenced petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
gathering signatures for an initiative petition to amendments. However, the deliberations of the
change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August framers of our Constitution clearly show that the
2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the framers intended to adopt the relevant American
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular,
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). intended that the people must first see the full
The Lambino Group alleged that their text of the proposed amendments before they
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals sign, and that the people must sign on a petition
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of
all registered voters, with each legislative district Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes
its registered voters. The Lambino Group also as valid, requires that the people must sign the
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had "petition x x x as signatories."
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million The proponents of the initiative secure
individuals. the signatures from the people. The proponents
The Lambino Group's initiative petition secure the signatures in their private capacity
changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying and not as public officials. The proponents are
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative not disinterested parties who can impartially
Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII explain the advantages and disadvantages of the
(Executive Department) and by adding Article proposed amendments to the people. The
XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proponents present favorably their proposal to
proposed changes will shift the present the people and do not present the arguments
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral- against their proposal. The proponents, or their
Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino supporters, often pay those who gather the
Group prayed that after due publication of their signatures.
petition, the COMELEC should submit the Thus, there is no presumption that the
following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' proponents observed the constitutional
ratification. requirements in gathering the signatures. The
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group proponents bear the burden of proving that they
filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC complied with the constitutional requirements in
indicating modifications in the proposed Article gathering the signatures - that the petition
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full
text of the proposed amendments.
ISSUE: For sure, the great majority of the 6.3
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative million people who signed the signature sheets
petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of did not see the full text of the proposed changes
the Constitution on amendments to the before signing. They could not have known the
Constitution through a people's initiative. nature and effect of the proposed changes,
among which are:
HELD: 1. The term limits on
NO. The court declared that Lambino members of the legislature will
Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional be lifted and thus members of
because it dismally fails to comply with the Parliament can be re-
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the elected indefinitely;
Constitution that the initiative must be "directly 2. The interim
proposed by the people through initiative upon a Parliament can continue to
petition." function indefinitely until its
The essence of amendments "directly members, who are
proposed by the people through initiative upon a almost all the present
petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a members of Congress, decide
petition by the people. This means two essential to call for new parliamentary
elements must be present. First, the people must elections. Thus, the
author and thus sign the entire proposal. No members of the interim
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Parliament will determine the
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the expiration of their own
proposal must be embodied in a petition. term of office;
These essential elements are present 3. Within 45 days from
only if the full text of the proposed amendments the ratification of the proposed
is first shown to the people who express their changes, the interim
assent by signing such complete proposal in a Parliament shall
petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly convene to propose further
proposed by the people through initiative upon a amendments or revisions to the
petition" only if the people sign on a petition that Constitution.
contains the full text of the proposed These three specific amendments are
amendments. not stated or even indicated in the Lambino
The full text of the proposed Group's signature sheets. The people who signed
amendments may be either written on the face of the signature sheets had no idea that they were
proposing these amendments. These three

proposed changes are highly controversial. The HELD:
people could not have inferred or divined these Yes. It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign
proposed changes merely from a reading or country is to be identified with a state, it is
rereading of the contents of the signature sheets. required in line with Pound's formulation that it be
The Constitution entrusts to the people a politically organized sovereign community
the power to directly propose amendments to the independent of outside control bound by ties of
Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the nationhood, legally supreme within its territory,
people even if the members of this Court do not acting through a government functioning under a
personally know the people who sign the petition. regime of law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person
However, this trust emanates from a fundamental with the people composing it viewed as an
assumption: the full text of the proposed organized corporate society under a government
amendment is first shown to the people before with the legal competence to exact obedience its
they sign the petition, not after they have signed commands. It has been referred to as a body-
the petition. politic organized by common consent for mutual
defense and mutual safety and to promote the
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE general welfare. Correctly has it been described
by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE nation." This is to view it in the light its historical
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. development. The stress is on its being a nation,
CAMPOS RUEDA its people occupying a definite territory, politically
(G.R. No. L-13250, Oct. 29, 1971) organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals
FACTS: within it and maintaining its separate international
This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio personality. Laski could speak of it then as a
Campos Rueda, administrator of the estate of the territorial society divided into government and
deceased Doña Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. subjects, claiming within its allotted area a
de Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent supremacy over all other institutions. McIver
Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against similarly would point to the power entrusted to its
and demanding from the former the sum government to maintain within its territory the
P161,874.95 as deficiency state and inheritance conditions of a legal order and to enter into
taxes, including interests and penalties, on the international relations. With the latter
transfer of intangible personal properties situated requisites satisfied, international law does not
in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de exact independence as a condition of
la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la statehood. So Hyde did opine.
Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria
Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national, by Even on the assumption then that Tangier is
reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and bereft of international personality petitioner has
was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up not successfully made out a case. It bears
to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of repeating that four days after the filing of this
her demise she left, among others, intangible petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector of
personal properties in the Philippines." Then Internal Revenue v. De Lara, it was specifically
came this portion: "On September 29, 1955, held by us: "Considering the State of California
petitioner filed a provisional estate and as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of
inheritance tax return on all the properties of the our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the
late Maria Cerdeira. On the same date, Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is
respondent, pending investigation, issued an entitled to exemption from the inheritance tax on
assessment for estate and inheritance taxes the intangible personal property found in the
which tax liabilities were paid by petitioner. Philippines." There can be no doubt that
On November 17, 1955, an amended California as a state in the American Union was
return was filed . . . where intangible personal lacking in the alleged requisite of international
properties with were claimed as exempted from personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a
taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, foreign country within the meaning of Section 122
pending investigation, issued another of the National Internal Revenue Code.
assessment for estate and inheritance taxes. In a
letter dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied
the request for exemption on the ground that the THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of BACANI V. NACOCO
the National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, [GRN L-9657 NOVEMBER 29, 1956]
respondent demanded the payment OF
deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and FACTS:
compromise penalties . . . . In a letter dated The plaintiffs are court stenographers
February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First
the following day, petitioner requested for the Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil
reconsideration of the decision denying the claim Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco
for tax exemption of the intangible personal Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation,
properties and the imposition of the 25% and 5% Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala,
ad valorem penalties. However, respondent counsel for defendant, requested said
denied this request, in his letter dated May 5, stenographers for copies, of the transcript of the
1956 . . . and received by petitioner on May 21, stenographic notes taken by them during the
1956. Respondent premised the denial on the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by
grounds that there was no reciprocity [with delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed
Tangier, which was moreover] a mere transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter
principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, submitted to him their bills for the payment of
respondent demanded the payment of deficiency their fees. The National Coconut Corporation
estate and inheritance taxes including paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani
surcharges, interests and compromise penalties and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript
at the rate of P1 per page.
ISSUE: Upon inspecting the books of this
Is Tangier a foreign country? corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the
payment of these fees and sought the recovery of Company, the Government divested itself of its
the amounts paid. The respondents argue that sovereign character so far as respects the
National Coconut Corporation may be considered transactions of the corporation. Unlike the
as included in the term "Government of the Government, the corporation may be sued
Republic of the Philippines" for the purposes of without its consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet
the exemption of the legal fees provided for in the National Coal Company remains an agency
Rule 1-30 of the Rules of Court. or instrumentality of government." (Government
of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil.,
ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a part of the 288.)
Government of the Philippines by virtue of its
performance of government functions.
HELD:
No, NACOCO does not acquire that
status for the simple reason that it does not come THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
under the classification of municipal or public PVTA VS.CIR
corporation. To resolve the issue in this case [GRN L-32052 JULY 25, 1975]
requires a little digression on the nature and
functions of our government as instituted in our FACTS:
Constitution. To begin with, we state that the term Private respondents filed with the CIR a
"Government" may be defined as "that institution petition, alleging their employment relationship,
or aggregate of institutions by which an the overtime services in excess of the regular
independent society makes and carries out those eight hours a day rendered by them, and the
rules of action which are necessary to enable failure to pay them overtime compensation in
men to live in a social state, or which are accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.
imposed upon the people forming that society by Their prayer was for the differential between the
those who possess the power or authority of amount actually paid to them and the amount
prescribing them" (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia
This institution, when referring to the national Tobacco Administration denied the allegations.
government, has reference to what our The then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of
Constitution has established composed of three respondent Court sustained the claims of private
great departments, the legislative, executive, and respondents for overtime services from
the judicial, through which the powers and December 23, 1963 up to the date the decision
functions of government are exercised. These was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing
functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had
The former are those which constitute the very already paid. Petitioner claims that the matter is
bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; beyond the jurisdiction of the CIR as it is
the latter are those that are undertaken only by exercising governmental functions and that it is
way of advancing the general interests of society, exempt from the operation of C.A. 444, invoking
and are merely optional. the doctrine announced in the leading Agricultural
To this latter class belongs the Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration
organization of those corporations owned or decision, and the distinction between constituent
controlled by the government to promote certain and ministrant functions of governments as set
aspects of the economic life of our people such forth in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation.
as the National Coconut Corporation. These are
what we call government-owned or controlled ISSUE: Whether or not the traditional
corporations which may take on the form of a classification of function of government as
private enterprise or one organized with powers ministrant and constituent applicable in the case
and formal characteristics of a private corporation at bar.
under the Corporation Law.
But while NACOCO was organized for HELD:
the ministrant function of promoting the coconut No. The irrelevance of such a
industry, however, it was given a corporate power distinction considering the needs of the times
separate and distinct from our government, for it was clearly pointed out by the present Chief
was made subject to the provisions of our Justice. Under this traditional classification, such
Corporation Law in so far as its corporate constituent functions are exercised by the State
existence and the powers that it may exercise are as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to
concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of
No. 518). the people - these latter functions being
Go ernmen of he Rep blic of he ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on
Philippines" used in section 2 of the Revised the part of the government."
Administrative Code refers only to that Nonetheless, as he explained so
government. entity through which the functions of persuasively: "The growing complexities of
the government are exercised as an attribute of modern society, however, have rendered this
sovereignty, and in this are included those arms traditional classification of the functions of
through which political authority is made effective government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
whether they be provincial, municipal or other The areas which used to be left to private
form of local government. These are what we call enterprise and initiative and which the
municipal corporations. They do not include government was called upon to enter optionally,
government entities which are given a corporate and only 'because it was better equipped to
personality. separate and distinct from the administer for the public welfare than is any
government and 'which are governed by the private individual or group of individuals,'
Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and continue to lose their well-defined boundaries
liabilities have to be determined in the light of that and to be absorbed within activities that the
law and of their corporate charters. government must undertake in its sovereign
As this Court has aptly said, "The mere capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
fact that the Government happens to be a challenges of the times. Here as almost
majority stockholder does not make it a public everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly
corporation" (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of towards a greater socialization of economic
Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586-597). "By forces. Here of course this development was
becoming a stockholder in the National Coal envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy,
by the Constitution itself in its declaration of Government, even considering it a loan, was
principle concerning the promotion of social wiped out on the change of sovereignty.
justice." Whether or not the Government is a proper party
Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in to the case under the doctrine of parens
Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation, based patriae.
on the Wilsonian classification of the tasks Whether or not the Philippine Government is
incumbent on government into constituent and bound by the statute of limitations.
ministrant in accordance with the laissez faire
principle. HELD:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of 1.No.Documentary evidence shows that Monte
March 21, 1970 and the Resolution of respondent de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the
Court, denying a motion for reconsideration are Governor-General its financial condition and its
hereby affirmed. absolute necessity for more working capital,
asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the
Treasury of the Philippine Islands, there be
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE transferred to it the sum of $80,000. The Monte
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS V. de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these
MONTE DE PIEDAD funds should not be approved by the Government
(G.R. NO. L-9959, DECEMBER 13, 1916) of Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It
did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a
TRENT, J.: donation.
FACTS: The Department of Finance, acting
About $400,000, were subscribed and under the orders of the Governor-General,
paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by understood that the $80,000 was transferred to
the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the the Monte de Piedad well knew that it received
relief of those damaged by the earthquake which this sum as a loan interest." Furthermore, the
took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as
1863. Subsequent thereto a central relief board late as March 31, 1902, that it received the
was appointed to distribute the moneys thus $80,000 "as a returnable loan, and without
voluntarily contributed and allotted $365,703.50 interest." Thus, there cannot be the slightest
to the various sufferers named in its resolution. doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received
By order of the Governor-General of the the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not as
Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, a donation.
together with the names of those entitled thereto,
was published in the Official Gazette of Manila. 2.No. Court ruled that if legal provisions are in
These were later distributed up to the sum of conflict with the political character, constitution or
$30,299.65, leaving a balance of $365,403.85. institutions of the new sovereign, they became
Upon the petition of the governing body inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of
of the Monte de Piedad, the Philippine the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if
Government, by order, directed its treasurer to they are among "that great body of municipal law
turn over to the former the sum of $80,000 of the which regulates private and domestic rights," they
relief fund in installments of $20,000 each and continued in force and are still in force unless
were received on the following dates: February they have been repealed by the present
15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and Government.
are still in the possession of the Monte de From the nature and class of the subject
Piedad. On account of various petitions of the matter, it is clear that it falls within the latter class.
persons, and heirs of others to whom the above- They are laws which are not political in any sense
mentioned allotments were made, the Philippine of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish
Islands filed a suit against the Monte de Piedad a Government the right and duty to supervise,
recover, "through the Attorney-General and in regulate, and to some extent control charities and
representation of the Government of the charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in
Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with exempting "provident institutions, savings banks,
interest. After due trial, judgment was entered in etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable
favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed and institutions, from taxation, placed such
made the following contentions: institutions, in so far as the investment in
that the $80,000, given to the Monte de securities are concerned, under the general
Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so supervision of the Insular Treasurer.
given as a donation, and that said
donation had been cleared; 3.Yes.The ground upon which the right of the
that the Government of the Philippine Islands Government to maintain the action rests on the
has not subrogated the Spanish fact that the money, being given to a charity
Government in its rights, as regards an became a public property, only applicable to the
important sum of money specific purposes to which it was intended to be
abovementioned; devoted. It is but within those limits consecrated
that the only persons who could claim to be to the public use, and became part of the public
damaged by this payment to the Monte, resources for promoting the happiness and
if it was unlawful, are the donors or the welfare of the Philippine Government. To deny
cestuis que trustent, thus, the plaintiff is the Government's right to maintain this action
not the proper party to bring the action; would be contrary to sound public policy.
that the court erred in holding in its decision The Supreme Court of the United States
that there is no title for the prescription in Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital, ruled that:
of this suit brought by the Insular insane persons and person no kno n, or no in
Government against the defendant being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who
appellant. are often in capable of vindicating their rights,
and justly look for protection to the sovereign
ISSUES: authority, acting as parens patriae. They show
Whether or not the $80,000 received by Monte that this beneficient functions has not ceased to
de Piedad was in form of donation. exist under the change of government from a
Whether or not the obligation on the part of the monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in
Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the the legislative department, ready to be called into
exercise whenever required for the purposes of
justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being Commonwealth are null and void and without
exercised in cases of charities as in any other legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
cases ha e er. enem occ pa ion and con rol has
Chancelor Kent says: In this country, the invalidated al judgments and judicial acts
legislature or government of the State, as parens and proceedings of the said courts.
patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of 4. Whether the courts of Commonwealth, which
public nature, by virtue of its general were the same courts existing prior to and
superintending authority over the public interests, continue during the Japanese military
where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 occupation of the Philippines may continue
Kent Com., 508, note.) those proceedings in said courts at the time
the Philippines were reoccupied and
4.No. In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by liberated by the US and Filipino forces and
numerous authorities, is stated as follows: the Commonwealth of the Philippines were
In the absence of express statutory provision to reestablished.
the contrary, statute of limitations do not as a
general rule run against the sovereign or HELD:
government, whether state or federal. But the 1. YES. The government established
rule is otherwise where the mischief to be under the names of Philippine Executive
remedied are of such a nature that the state must Commission and Republic of the Philippines
necessarily be included, where the state goes during the Japanese occupation was a civil
into business in concert or in competition with her government and a de facto government of the
citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his second kind: that which is established and
private rights by suit in the name of the state or maintained by military forces who invade and
government, so that the latter is only a nominal occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of
party. war. The distinguishing characteristics of this
In the instant case the Philippine kind of de facto government are; (1) that its
Government is not a mere nominal party because existence is maintained by active military
it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is power within the territories, and against the
exercising its sovereign functions or powers and rightful authority of an established and lawful
is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it government; and (2) that while it exists it must
when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by
United States. private citizens who, by acts of obedience
For the foregoing reasons the judgment rendered in submission to such force, do not
appealed from is affirmed. become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those
acts, though not warranted by the laws of the
rightful government.
CO KIM CHAN V. VALDEZ TAN KEH 2. YES. Being a de facto government, it
75 PHIL 113, SEPTEMBER 17, 1945 necessarily follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts of justice of those
FERIA, J: governments, which are not of a political
FACTS: complexion, were good and valid, and, by
Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus virtue of the well known principle of postliminy
praying that the respondent judge be ordered to in international law, remained good and valid
continue the proceedings in civil case no. 3012 after the liberation or reoccupation of the
which was initiated under the regime of the so- Philippines by the American and Filipino
called Republic of the Philippines established forces.
during the Japanese military occupation of the
islands. 3. NO. The phrase processes of an o her
The respondent judge refused to take go ernmen is broad and ma refer no onl o
cognizance of and continue the proceedings on judicial processes, but also to administrative or
the following grounds: (1) the proclamation legislative, as well as constitutional processes
issued on October 23, 1944 by Gen. Mac Arthur of the Republic of the Philippines or other
had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all governmental agencies established in the
judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts Islands during the Japanese occupation.
of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Taking into consideration the fact that,
Commission and the Republic established during according to the well-known principles of
the Japanese occupation;(2) the lower courts international law, all judgments and judicial
have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and proceedings, which are not of a political
continue judicial proceedings pending in the complexion, of the de facto government during
courts of the defunct Republic in the absence of the Japanese occupation were good and valid
enabling law granting such authority; (3) the before and remained so after the occupied
government established in the Philippines during territory had come again into the power of the
the Japanese occupation was not a de facto titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it
government. was not, and could not have been, the intention
of the Gen. Mac Arthur, in using the phrase
ISSUES: processes of an go ernmen o refer o
1. Whether the government established during judicial processes, in violation of said principles
the Japanese occupation was a de facto of international law. The only reasonable
government. construction of the said phrase is that it refers
2. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of to governmental processes other than judicial
the courts existing in the Philippines under processes, or court proceedings, for according
the Phil. Executive Commission and the to a well-known statutory construction, statute
Republic of the Philippines were good and ought never to be construed to violate the law
valid and remained so even after the of nations if any other possible construction
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines remains.
by the US and Filipino forces.
3. Whether the proclamation issued by Gen. 4. YES. Although in theory, the authority of
Mac Ar h r declaring all la s, reg la ions the local civil and judicial administration is
and processes of any other government in suspended as a matter of course as soon as
the Philippines than that of the military occupation takes place, in practice, the
invader does not usually take the Moreover, the concept of sovereignty
administration of justice into his own hands, but as auto-limitation, is the property of a state-
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to force due to which it has the exclusive capacity
administer the laws of the country to which he of legal self-determination and self-restriction. x
is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented. If the x x A state is not precluded from allowing
proceedings pending in the different courts of another power to participate in the exercise of
the Islands prior to the Japanese military jurisdictional right over certain portions of its
occupation had been continued during the territory. If it does so, it by no means follows
Japanese military administration, the that such areas become impressed with an
Philippine Executive Commission and the so- alien character. They retain their status as
called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to native soil. They are still subject to its authority.
reason the same courts, which become Its jurisdiction may be dimished, but it does not
reestablished and conceived of as having been disappear. So it is with the bases under lease
in continued existence upon the reoccupation to the American armed forces by virtue of the
and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. they are not
principle of postliminy, may continue the and cannot be foreign territory.
proceedings in cases then pending in said
courts, without necessity of enacting laws
conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue CONCEPT OF THE STATE
said proceedings. LAUREL V. MISA
77 PHIL 856, JANUARY 30, 1947
CONCEPT OF THE STATE PER CURIAM:

PEOPLE V. GOZO FACTS:
53 SCRA 476, OCTOBER 26, 1973 Sometime in May 1945, Anastacio
Laurel, herein petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was
FERNANDO, J: arrested by the US Army and was interned, under
FACTS: a commi men order for his ac i e collabora ion
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot with the Japanese during the Japanese
located inside the US Naval Reservation within occ pa ion . He as charged i h reason as
the territorial jurisdiction of Olangapo City. She defined and penalized by Art. 114 of the Penal
demolished the house and built another one in its Code. But in September 1945, he was turned
place without securing a building permit from the over to the Commonwealth government and
City Mayor of Olangapo City. The City Court of since then he has been under the custody of the
Olangapo found her guilty of violating a municipal Director of Prisons.
ordinance that requires permit from the municipal Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas
mayor for construction of building as well as any corpus mainly asserting that he cannot be
modification, repairs or demolition thereof. prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reason
On appeal with the Court of Appeals, (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate
Gozo put in issue the validity of such ordinance government in the Philippines and, consequently,
by invoking due process. She likewise the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens
questioned the applicability of the ordinance to thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there
her in view of the location of her dwelling within was a change of sovereignty over these Islands
the naval base leased to the American Armed upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
Forces; she contended that the municipal
government cannot exercise therein ISSUES:
administrative jurisdiction. 1. Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and,
ISSUES: consequently, the correlative allegiance of
1. Whether municipal ordinance is valid? Filipino citizens were suspended during the
2. Whether the municipal corporation retains its Japanese occupation.
administrative jurisdiction over the area 2. Whether the petitioner can be prosecuted for
here Go o s ho se as loca ed? the crime of treason by giving aid and
support to the enemy during the Japanese
HELD: occupation.
1. YES, the municipal ordinance is valid.
The authority to require building permits is HELD:
predicated upon the general welfare clause. Its 1. NO. The absolute and permanent
scope is wide, well-nigh all embracing, allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
covering every aspect of public health, public occupied by the enemy to their legitimate
morals, public safety, and the well being and government or sovereign is not abrogated or
good order of the community. se ered b he enem s occ pa ion,
because the sovereignty of the government
2. YES, the municipal corporation retains or sovereign de jure is not transferred
its administrative jurisdiction over the said thereby to the occupier and if its is not
area. By the agreement, the Philippine transferred to the occupant it must
Government merely consents that the United necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. government; that the sovereignty vested in
This consent was given purely as a matter of the titular government must be distinguished
comity, courtesy or expediency. The Philippine from the exercise of the rights inherent
Government has not abdicated its sovereignty thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed
over the bases as part of the Philippine territory and transferred to another, but it cannot be
or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over suspended because the existence of
offenses committed therein. Under the terms of sovereignty cannot be suspended without
the treaty, the United States Government has putting it out of existence or divesting the
prior or preferential but not exclusive possessor thereof at least during the so-
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine called period of suspension; that what may
jurisdiction retains not only jurisdictional rights be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
not granted, but also such ceded rights as the sovereignty with the control and government
United States Military authorities for reasons of of the territory occupied by the enemy
their own decline to make use of. passes temporarily to the occupant; x x x
and that as a corollary of the conclusion that 1. YES, petitioner was subject to military
the sovereignty itself is not suspended and law at the time the alleged offense was
subsists during the enemy occupation, the committed. The rule that laws of political nature
allegiance of the inhabitants to their or affecting political relations are considered
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, superseded or in abeyance during the military
and therefore there is no such thing as occupation, is intended for the governing of the
suspended allegiance. civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is
not intended for and does not bind the enemies
2. YES. Article 114 of the Revised Penal in arms.
Code was applicable to treason committed By the occupation of the Philippines by
against the national security of the legitimate Japanese forces, the officers and men of the
government because the inhabitants of the Philippine army did not cease to be fully in the
occupied territory were still bound by their service, though, in a measure, only in
allegiance o he la er d ring he enem s measure, they were not subject to the military
occupation. jurisdiction, if they were not in active duty. In
Just as a citizen or subject of a the latter case, like officers and soldiers on
government or sovereign may be prosecuted leave of absence or held as prisoners of war,
for and convicted of treason committed in a they could not be held guilty of breach of the
foreign country, in the same way a inhabitant discipline of the command or of a neglect of
of a territory occupied by the military forces duty x x x; but for an act unbecoming of a
of the enemy may commit treason against gentleman or an act which constitutes an
th
his own legitimate or sovereign if he adheres offense of the class specified in the 95 Article
to the enemies of the latter by giving them of War, they may in general be legally held
aid and comfort. subject to military jurisdiction and trial.
Moreover, petitioners, by their acceptance
of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area
th
CONCEPT OF THE STATE from the General Headquarters of the 6
RUFFY VS. CHIEF OF STAFF Military District, they became members of the
75 PHIL 875, AUGUST 20, 1946 Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of
War. x x x As officers in the Bolo Area and the
th
TUASON, J: 6 Military District, the petitioners operated
FACTS: under the orders of a duly established and duly
During the Japanese occupation, herein appointed commanders of the United States
petitioner, Ramon Ruffy, a Provincial Army and thus covered by Article 2 of the
Commander of the Philippine Constabulary, Articles of War which provides for persons
retreated in the mountains instead of subject to military law.
surrendering to the enemy. He organized and led
a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat Team or 2. YES, 93d of the Articles of War was
Bolo Area. The said Bolo Area was a contingent constitutional. It does not violate Article VII,
th
of the 6 Military District, which has been section 2 of the Constitution which provides
recognized and placed under the operational ha he Na ional Assembl ma no depri e
control of the US Army in the South Pacific. the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction
Sometime later, Col. Jurado effected a over all criminal cases in which the penalty
change of command in the Bolo Area. Major imposed is death or life imprisonmen . Co r
Ruffy who was then acting as Commanding Martial are agencies of executive character,
Officer for the Bolo Area was relieved of his and one of he a hori ies for ordering of
position. Later on or on October 19, 1944, Lieut. courts martial has been held to be attached to
Col Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners. the constitutional functions of the President as
I as his m rder hich ga e rise o pe i ioner s Commander in Chief, independently of
trial. legisla ion . Unlike co r s of la , he are no a
The trial court convicted petitioner and portion of the judiciary.
he now filed this instant petition with the x x x court martial are in fact simply
contention that he was not subject to military law instrumentalities of the executive power,
at the time the offense for which he had been provided by Congress for the President as
placed on trial was committed. Petitioners Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly
contended that by the enemy occupation of the commanding the army and navy and enforcing
Philippines, the National Defense Act and all laws discipline therein, and utilized under his orders
and regulations creating and governing the or those of his authorized military
existence of the Philippine Army including the representatives.
Articles of War, were suspended and in
abeyance during such belligerent occupation. He
also assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
War hich pro ides ha an person s bjec o
military law who commits murder in the time of
war should suffer death or imprisonment for life, THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
as he co r mar ial ma direc . Pe i ioner arg ed SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO II
that the said law was in violation of Article VII, 162 SCRA 88 (1988)
section 2 of the Constitution since 93d of Article
of War fails to allow a review by the Supreme FACTS:
Court of judgments of courts martial imposing Private respondents Anthony Rossi and
death or life imprisonment. Ralph Wyers (deceased) were both employed as
game room attendants in the special services
ISSUES: department of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA).
1. Whether petitioner was subject to military They were advised that their employment had
law at the time the alleged offense was been converted from permanent full-time to
committed. permanent part-time. Their reaction was to
2. Whether 93d of Articles of War was protect the conversion and to institute grievance
constitutional. proceedings. The hearing officer recommended
the reinstatement of private respondents to
HELD: permanent full-time status plus back wages.

In a letter addressed to petitioner Secondly, whatever acts or utterances

Moreau, Commanding Officer of Subic Naval that then President Aquino may have said or
Base, petitioner Sanders, Special Services done, the same are not tantamount to the state
Director of NAVSTA, disagreed with the having waived its immunity from suit.
recommendation and asked for its rejection. The principle of state immunity from suit
Moreau, even before the start of the does not apply in this case, as when the relief
grievance hearings, sent a letter to the Chief of demanded by the suit requires no affirmative
Naval Personnel explaining the change of the official action on the part of the state nor the
pri a e responden s s a s and req es ed affirmative discharge of any obligation which
concurrence therewith. belongs to the state in its political capacity, even
Private respondents filed suit for though the officers or agents who are made
damages claiming that the letters contained defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a
libelous imputations that had exposed them to title of the state and as its agents and servants.
ridicule and had caused them mental anguish,
and prejudgment of the grievance proceedings
was an invasion of their personal and proprietary THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
rights. They make it clear that petitioners were FESTEJO VS. FERNANDO
being sued in their personal capacity. A motion to 94 PHIL 504 (1954)
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was
filed by the petitioner and was denied. FACTS:
Plaintiff Carmen Festejo filed an action
ISSUE: Were the petitioners performing their against defendant Isaias Fernando, Director of
official duties when they did the acts for which Bureau of Public Works for unlawfully taking
they are being sued for damages? possession of portions of her three parcels of
land and causing the construction of irrigation
HELD: canal without obtaining right of way and without
YES. It is clear in the present case that her consent or knowledge.
the acts for which the petitioners are being called The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiff
to account were performed by them in the Festejo. On appeal, defendant Fernando
discharge of their official duties. Sanders as invoked his being a public officer of the
director of the special services department of government of the Philippines and thus, enjoys
NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its immunity from suit and should be absolved from
personnel including the private respondents and liability for damages.
had a hand in their employment, work,
assignments, discipline, dismissal and other ISSUE: May defendant invoke immunity from
related matters. The act of Moreau is deadly suit?
official in nature, performed by him as the
immediate superior of Sanders and directly HELD:
answerable to Naval Personnel in matters NO. Ordinarily, the officer or employee
involving the special department of NAVSTA. committing the tort is personally liable and may
be sued as any other citizen and held answerable
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY for whatever injury.
REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL
220 SCRA 124 (1993)
FACTS: SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE
By reason of the Mendiola massacre, CONSTITUTION
wherein 12 rallyists died in their quest for U.S.A VS. GUINTO
gen ine agrarian reform , Presiden Aq ino (G.R. NO. 76607 FEBRUARY 26, 1990)
issued Administrative Order No.11 which created
he Ci i en s Mendiola Commission for he CRUZ, J.
purpose of conducting an investigation for the FACTS:
disorders, death and casualties that took place. In the first case, the private respondents
The most significant recommendation of are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force
the Commission was for the deceased and other stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the
victims of Mendiola incident to be compensated bidding conducted by them for contracts for
by the government. barber services in the base.
Due to the recommendation, petitioners In the second case, private respondents
filed a formal letter of demand for compensation filed a complaint for damages against private
from the government to which the latter did not petitioners for his dismissal as cook in the U.S.
take heed. The group then instituted an action Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air
for damages against the Republic of the Station.
Philippines together with military officers and In the third case, private respondent,
personnel involved in Mendiola incident. who was employed as a barracks boy in a U.S.
Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed Base, was arrested following a buy-bust
the complaint as against the Republic of the operation conducted by the individual petitioners,
Philippines on the basis that there was no waver officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents
by the state. Hence, the petition for certiorari. of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators.
He then filed a complaint for damages against
ISSUE: the individual petitioners claiming that it was
Whether the State by virtue of the administrative because of their acts that he was removed.
order waived its immunity from suit? In the fourth case, a complaint for
damages was filed by the private respondents
HELD: against the private petitioners, for injuries
NO. Firstly, recommendation made by allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of
the commission does not in any way mean that the acts of the defendants. According to the
liability automatically attaches to the state. In plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up,
effect, the same shall only serve as a cause of handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them
action on the event that any party decides to which bit them in several parts of their bodies and
litigate his or her claim. The commission is caused extensive injuries to them.
merely a preliminary venue.
These cases have been consolidated state has allowed itself to be sued. When the
because they all involve the doctrine of state state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only
immunity. The United States of America was not giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can,
impleaded in the complaints below but has that the defendant is liable.
moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in The said article establishes a rule of
effect suits against it to which it has not liability, not suability. The government may be
consented. It is now contesting the denial of its held liable under this rule only if it first allows
motions by the respondent judges. itself to be sued through any of the accepted
forms of consent. Moreover, the agent performing
ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of State his regular functions is not a special agent even if
Immunity is not applicable thereby making the he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No
State liable less important, the said provision appears to
regulate only the relations of the local state with
HELD: its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the
NO. While suable, the petitioners are Philippine government and not to foreign
nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the governments impleaded in our courts.
claim for damages cannot be allowed on the The complaints against the petitioners in
strength of the evidence, which have been the court below were aptly dismissed.
carefully examined.
The traditional rule of immunity exempts
a State from being sued in the courts of another THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE
necessary consequence of the principles of CONSTITUTION
independence and equality of States. However, VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE
the rules of International Law are not petrified; SERVICE, INC. VS CA
they are constantly developing and evolving. And (G.R. NO. 91359, SEPTEMBER 25, 1992)
because the activities of states have multiplied, it
has been necessary to distinguish them - FACTS:
between sovereign and governmental acts (jure A suit was filed against the PC Chief for
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary failure to act on the request by petitioner seeking
acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State to set aside the findings of PADPAO expelling it
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. from PADPAO and considering its application for
The restrictive application of State immunity is renewal of its license even without a certificate of
now the rule in the United States, the United membership from PADPAO. A Motion to Dismiss
Kingdom and other states in Western Europe. was filed invoking that it is a suit against the
The restrictive application of State State which had not given its consent.
immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial ISSUES:
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its Whether or not the action taken by the
commercial activities or economic affairs. petitioners is a suit against the State.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have Whether of not the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA
descended to the level of an individual and can are liable in their private capacities.
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent Whether or not the Memorandum of
to be sued only when it enters into business Agreement constitute as an implied
contracts. It does not apply where the contract consent of the State to be sued
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the HELD:
naval base which is devoted to the defense of Yes, it is a suit against the State, the PC Chief
both the United States and the Philippines, and PC-SUSIA being instrumentalities of the
indisputably a function of the government of the State exercising the governmental function of
highest order; they are not utilized for nor regulating the organization and operation of
dedicated to commercial or business purposes. private detective watchmen or security guard
There is no question that the United agencies. Even if its action prospers, the
States of America, like any other state, will be payment of its monetary claims may not be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability enforced because the State did not consent to
if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or appropriate the necessary funds for the
private capacity, as in the cases at bar. It is only purpose.
when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may No, since the acts for which the PC Chief and
be implied. A State may be said to have PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this
descended to the level of an individual and can case, were performed by them as part of their
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent official duties, without malice, gross negligence
to be sued only when it enters into business or bad faith, no recovery may be held against
contracts. them in their private capacities.
The private respondents invokes Article
2180 of the Civil Code which holds the No, the Memorandum of Agreement did not
government liable if it acts through a special constitute an implied consent by the State to
agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised be sued because it was intended to
on the ground that since the officers are professionalize the industry and to
designated "special agents," the United States standardized the salaries of the security
government should be liable for their torts. guards. It is merely incidental to the purpose of
There seems to be a failure to RA No. 5487 which is to regulate the
distinguish between suability and liability and a organization and operation of private security
misconception that the two terms are agencies.
synonymous. Suability depends on the consent The State is deemed to have given
of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable tacitly its consent to be sued when it enters into
law and the established facts. The circumstance a contract. However, it does not apply where
that a state is suable does not necessarily mean the contact relates to the exercise of its
that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be sovereign functions.
held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE right or interest in the property appears at the
CONSTITUTION back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation
MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE or negotiated sale, the government used a
PHILIPPINES portion of said lot for the construction of the
(G.R. NO. L-11154, MARCH 21, 1916) Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues already
TRENT, J. existed since 1921. In 1958, Amigable's counsel
FACTS: wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting
Merritt, while riding his motorcycle was payment of the portion of her lot which had been
hit by an ambulance owned by the Philippine appropriated by the government. The claim was
General Hospital. A driver employed by the indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed
hospital drove it. In order for Merritt to sue the it. Amigable then filed in the court a quo a
Philippine government, Act No. 2457 was complaint against the Republic of the Philippines
enacted by the Philippine Legislature authorizing and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Merritt to bring suit against the Government of Commissioner of Public Highways for the
the Philippine Islands and authorizing the recovery of ownership and possession of the land
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
suit. A suit was then filed before the CFI of She also sought the payment of compensatory
Manila, which fixed the responsibility for the damages for the illegal occupation of her land,
collision solely on the ambulance driver and moral damages, attorney's fees and the costs of
determined the amount of damages to be the suit. The Government had not given its
awarded to Merritt. Both parties appealed from consent to be sued.
the decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of
damages and defendant in rendering the amount ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may
against the government. properly sue the government under the facts of
the case
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant, Government
of the Philippines, waived its immunity from suit HELD:
as well as conceded its liability to the plaintiff YES. Where the government takes
when it enacted Act No. 2457 away property from a private landowner for public
use without going through the legal process of
HELD: expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
NO. By consenting to be sued, a state party may properly maintain a suit against the
simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not government without thereby violating the doctrine
thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff, or of governmental immunity from suit without its
create any cause of action in his favor, or extend consent. The doctrine of governmental immunity
its liability to any cause not previously from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
a pre-existing liability and submit itself to the government followed the procedure indicated by
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to the governing law at the time, a complaint would
interpose any lawful defense. have been filed by it, and only upon payment of
The Government of the Philippines the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after
Islands is only liable, for the acts of its agents, tender to the party entitled to such payment of
officers and employees when they act as special the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter
agents. A special agent is one who receives a in and upon the land so condemned, to
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to appropriate the same to the public use defined in
the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a the judgment." If there were an observance of
special official. The special agent acts in procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in
representation of the state and being bound to the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then
act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust that precisely because there was a failure to
confided to him. This concept does not apply to abide by what the law requires, the government
any executive agent who is an employee of the would stand to benefit. It is not too much to say
acting administration and who on his own that when the government takes any property for
responsibility performs the functions which are public use, which is conditioned upon the
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and payment of just compensation, to be judicially
which are regulated by law and the regulations. ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
The responsibility of the state is limited to that the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought
which it contracts through a special agent, duly then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could
empowered by a definite order or commission to still be appropriately invoked.
perform some act or charged with some definite
purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not
where the claim is based on acts or omissions THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
imputable to a public official charged with some REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
administrative or technical office who can be held 204 SCRA 212 (1991)
to the proper responsibility in the manner laid
down by the law of civil responsibility. The FACTS:
chauffeur of the ambulance of the General The PCGG filed with the
Hospital was not such an agent. Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
against private respondents Bienvenido Tantoco
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY and Dominador Santiago, et al.
SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE Pri a e responden s join l mo ed o
CONSTITUTION strike out some portions of the complaint and for
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA bill of par ic lars of o her por ions , hich mo ion
(G.R. NO. L-26400 FEBRUARY 29, 1972) was opposed by the PCGG. The Sandiganbayan
gave the PCGG 45 days to expand its complaint
MAKALINTAL, J. to make more specific certain allegations.
FACTS: Private respondents then presented a
Amigable is the registered owner of a lot Mo ion o lea e o file in erroga ories nder R le
covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title, where 25 of he R les of Co r .
no annotation in favor of the government of any
The Sandiganbayan denied private Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

responden s mo ions. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in
Private respondents filed an Answer to question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a
with Compulsory Counterclaim. In response, the Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by
PCGG presen ed a Repl o Counterclaim with a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954;
Mo ion o Dismiss comp lsor co n erclaim. that Gardiola had acquired the property by
Private respondents filed a pleading purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado
denomina ed In erroga ories o Plain iff , and whose title to the said property was evidenced by
Amended In erroga ories o Plain iff as ell as a an informacion posesoria that upon his purchase
motion for production and inspection of of the property, he took actual possession of the
documents. same, introduced various improvements therein
The Sandiganbayan admitted the and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which
Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion survey was approved by the Director of Lands on
for production and inspection of documents October 24,1954.
respectively. On November 1, 1954, President
The PCGG moved for reconsideration, Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90
arguing that the documents are privileged in reserving for settlement purposes, under the
character since they are intended to be used administration of the National Resettlement and
against the PCGG and/or its Commission in Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of
violation of Sec.4 of EO No. 1, V12: land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac
a) No civil action shall lie against the and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the
Commission or any member thereof for anything NARRA and its successor agency, the Land
done or omitted in the discharge of the task Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the
contemplated by this Order. land to the settlers; that the property in question,
b) No member or staff by the Commission while located within the reservation established
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in under Proclamation No. 90, was the private
any judicial, legislative or administrative property of Feliciano and should therefore be
proceedings concerning matter within its official excluded therefrom. Feliciano prayed that he be
cognizance. declared the rightful and true owner of the
The Sandiganbayan promulgated two property in question consisting of 1,364.4177
Resolutions. The first, denying reconsideration of hectares; that his title of ownership based
the Resolution allowing production of the on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-
documents, and the second, reiterating, by interest be declared legally valid and subsisting
implication the permission to serve the amended and that defendant be ordered to cancel and
interrogatories on the plaintiff. nullify all awards to the settlers.
ISSUE: Is the PCGG immune from suit? ISSUE:

Whether or not the State can be sued
HELD: for recovery and possession of a parcel of land
NO. The state is of course immune HELD:
from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be A suit against the State, under settled
sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a
in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign showing that the State hasconsented to be sued,
character and sheds its immunity from suit, either expressly or by implication through the use
descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. of statutory language too plain to be
The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the
status to the State, even while assuming of an courts sua sponte at any stage of the
act for the State. The suggestion that the State proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a
makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred
suit except when in doing so it acts in, or in lightly, but must be construed instrictissimi
matters concerning, its proprietary or non- juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the
governmental capacity, is unacceptable. It Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent
attempts a distinction without support in principle of the State to be sued must emanate from
or preceden . On he con rar , he consen of statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can
the State to be sued may be given expressly or only be made by an act of the legislative body.
impliedl . E press consen ma be manifested Also, it is noteworthy, that as pointed out by the
either through a general law or a special law. Solicitor General, that the informacion
Implied consent is given when the State itself posesoria registered in the Office of the Register
commences litigation or when it enters into a of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23,
contract. 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory
information; it was "reconstituted from the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO duplicate presented to this office (Register of
FELICIANO Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the
AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT submission of proof that the alleged duplicate
G.R. NO. 70853; MARCH 12, 1987 was authentic or that the original thereof was lost.
Reconstitution can be
FACTS: validly made only in case of loss of the original.
Petitioner seeks the review of the These circumstances raise grave doubts as to
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court the authenticity and validity of the "informacion
dated April 30, 1985, which dismissed the posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano.
complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for Adding to the dubiousness of said document is
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel the fact that "possessory information calls for an
of land on the ground of non-suability of the area of only 100 hectares," whereas the land
State. On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises
complaint with then Court of First Instance of 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064
Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by hectares.
the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of
four (4) THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. RUIZ
hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, 136 SCRA 487 (1985)
FACTS: THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

Petitioner invited the submission of bids THE HOLY SEE VS. DEL ROSARIO JR
for repair of its wharves and shoreline in the 238 SCRA 524 (1994)
Subic Bay Area. Eligion and Co. responded to
the invitation and submitted bids. Said company FACTS:
was requested by telegram to confirm its price Lot 5-A is registered under the name of
proposals and for the name of its bonding the petitioner The Holy See. This lot is
company, and from which it complied. contiguous to lots 5-B and 5-D registered in the
Later, the United States, through its name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
agents, informed said company that it was not These three lots were sold through an agent
qualified to receive an award at the project for the Msgr. Domingo Cirilos Jr. to Ramon Licup. Licup
poorly completed projects it awarded to third assigned his rights to private respondent
parties. The company sued petitioner for specific Starbright Sales Ent. Inc. (SSEI).
performance and if no longer possible, for Due to refusal of the squatters to vacate
damages. It also asked for a writ of preliminary the lots, a dispute arose as to who of the parties
injunction to restrain the defendants from has the responsibility of eviction and clearing the
entering into contracts with others. land. SSEI insists that petitioner should clear the
The United States entered a special property of the squatters. Petitioner refused and
appearance for the purpose only of questioning proposed that either SSEI undertake the eviction
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject or that the earnest money be returned. Msgr.
matter of the complaint and the persons of the Cirilos returned the P100,000.00 earnest money,
defendants, the subject matter of the complaint and the property was sold to Tropicana
being acts and omissions of the individual Properties and Development Corporation
defendants as agents of the defendant United (Tropicana).
States of America, a foreign sovereign which has SSEI filed suit for annulment of sale,
not given its consent to this suit or any other suit specific performance and damages against Msgr.
for the cause of action asserted in the complaint. Cirilos, PRC, and Tropicana.
US filed a motion to dismiss and The petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos moved
opposed the writ. The trial court denied the to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on
motion and issued a writ. sovereign immunity from suit. It was denied on
he gro nd ha pe i ioner shed off i s so ereign
ISSUE: Whether the US may be sued? imm ni b en ering in o he b siness con rac
in question.
HELD: A motion for reconsideration was also
No. The traditional rule of State denied. Hence, this special civil action for
immunity exempts a State from being sued in the certiorari.
courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of ISSUE: Did the Holy See properly invoke
the principles of independence and equality of sovereign immunity for its non-suability?
States. However, the rules of International Law
are not petrified; they are constantly developing HELD:
and evolving. And because the activities of states YES. In the case at bar, lot 5-A was
have multiplied, it has been necessary to acquired as a donation from the archdiocese of
distinguish them — between sovereign and Manila for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, Nuniciature in the Philippines. The subsequent
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). disposal was made because the squatters living
The result is that State immunity now extends thereon made it impossible for petitioner to use it
only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive for the purpose of the donation. Petitioner did not
application of State immunity is now the rule in sell lot 5-A for profit or gain.
the United States, the United Kingdom and other There are two conflicting concepts of
states in western Europe. (See Coquia and sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. established. According to the classical or
207-209 [1984].) absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
The restrictive application of state consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
immunity is proper only when the another sovereign. According to the newer or
proceedings arise out of commercial restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its is recognized only with regard to public acts or
commercial activities or economic affairs. acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to
Stated differently, a state may be said to have private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States
descended to the level of an individual and can of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987];
be thus deemed to have tacitly given its consent Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public
to be sued only when the contract relates to the International Law 194 [1984]).
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case, The restrictive theory, which is
the projects are an integral part of the naval base intended to be a solution to the host of problems
which is devoted to the defense of both the US involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has
and the Philippines, undisputed a function of the created problems of its own. Legal treatises and
government of the highest order, they are not the decisions in countries which follow the
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing
business purposes. The correct test for the whether a contract of a sovereign state with a
application of State immunity is not the private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure
conclusion of a contract by a State but the imperii.
legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. The restrictive theory came about
Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the because of the entry of sovereign states into
plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the purely commercial activities remotely connected
United States of America for the use of its military with the discharge of governmental functions.
officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover This is particularly true with respect to the
possession of the premises on the ground that Communist states which took control of
the term of the leases had expired, They also nationalized business activities and international
asked for increased rentals until the apartments trading.
shall have been vacated.
This Court has considered the following Moreover the Department of the Foreign
transactions by a foreign state with private parties Affairs has formally intervened and officially
as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a
government of apartment buildings for use of its duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the
military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 Republic of the Philippines and as such is
[1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for the exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all
repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station the rights, privileges and immunities of a
(United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and diplomatic mission or embassy in this court.
(3) the change of employment status of base The determination of the executive arm
employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 of the government that a state or instrumentality
[1988]). is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is
On the other hand, this Court has a political question that is conclusive upon the
considered the following transactions by a foreign courts. Where the plea of immunity is reacquired
state with private parties as acts jure gestionis: and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the
(1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to
consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a embarrass the executive arm of the government
bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at in cond c ing he co n r s foreign rela ions.
the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater
to American servicemen and the general public
(United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR
of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City 54 SCRA 84 (1973)
(United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA
644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and FACTS:
other facilities open to the general public is A decision was rendered in a Special
undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a Proceeding against the Republic of the
governmental activity. By entering into the Philippines thereby confirming the arbitration
employment contract with the cook in the award of P1,712,396.40 in favor of respondent
discharge of its proprietary function, the United corporation. After the decision became final and
States government impliedly divested itself of its executory, respondent judge issued an order
sovereign immunity from suit. directing the sheriff to execute the said decision,
In the absence of legislation defining and the corresponding alias writ of execution was
what activities and transactions shall be thus issued.
considered "commercial" and as constituting acts Hence the sheriff served notices of
jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own garnishment with several banks especially the
guidelines, tentative they may be. monies due to the AFP in the form of deposits
Certainly, the mere entering into a sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the
contract by a foreign state with a private party writ. PNB and Philippine Veterans Bank received
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only such notice. As certified by the AFP Comptroller,
be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is these funds of the AFP with the said banks are
whether the foreign state is engaged in the public funds for the pensions, pay, and
activity in the regular course of business. If the allowances of its military and civilian personnel.
foreign state is not engaged regularly in a The petitioner, in this certiorari and
business or trade, the particular act or transaction prohibition proceedings, challenges the validity of
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in the Order issued by Judge Villasor declaring the
pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident decision final and executory and subsequently
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially issuing an alias writ of execution directed against
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. the funds of the AFP in pursuance thereof.
As held in United States of America v. ISSUE:

Guinto, (supra): May the writs of execution and notices of
garnishment be sued against public funds?
"There is no question that the United
States of America, like any other state, will be HELD:
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability NO. Although the State may give its
if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or consent to be sued by private parties, there is
private capacity. It is only when the contract corollary that public funds cannot be the object of
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity garnishment proceedings even if the consent to
that no such waiver may be implied." be sued has been previously granted and the
In the case at bench, if petitioner has s a e s liabili has been adj dged.
bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a Thus in the case of Commission of
real estate business, surely the said transaction Public Highways vs. San Diego, such a well-
can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of
However, petitioner has denied that the Justice Teehankee. The universal rule that
acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A where the state gives its consent to be sued by
were made for profit but claimed that it acquired private parties either by general or special law, it
said property for the site of its mission or the ma limi claiman s ac ion onl p o he
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
respondent failed to dispute said claim. execution and that the power of the courts ends
Under Art.31(A) of the 1961 Vienna when the judgment is rendered, since the
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic government funds and properties may not be
envoy is granted immunity from the civil and seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state satisfy such judgment, is based on obvious
over any real action relating to private immovable considerations of public policy. Disbursement of
property situated in the territory of the receiving public funds must be covered by the
state which the envoy holds on behalf of the corresponding appropriations as required by law.
sending state for the purposes of the mission. If The functions and public services rendered by
this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
with all the more reason should immunity be disrupted by diversion of public funds from their
recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which legitimate and specific object is appropriated by
in this case is the Holy See. law.
PNB VS. PABALAN

83 SCRA 595 (1978)
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS. NLRC FACTS:
227 SCRA 693 (1993) A judgment was rendered against
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
FACTS: (PVTA). Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of
The DAR and Sultan Security Agency execution followed thereafter by a notice of
entered into a contract for security services to be garnishment of the funds of respondent PVTA
provided by the latter to the said governmental which were deposited with the Philippine National
entity. Several guards of the agency assigned to Bank (PNB). PNB objected on the constitutional
he pe i ioner s premises filed a complaint for law doctrine of non-suability of a state. It alleged
th
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13 that such funds are public in character.
month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay as ISSUE: Was the contention of PNB correct?
well as for damages, before the Regional
Arbitration, against the petitioner and the agency. HELD:
The Executive Labor arbiter rendered a decision NO. It is to be admitted that under the
finding the petitioner and the agency jointly and present Constitution, what was formerly implicit
severally liable for the payment of the money as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law
claims. The decision became final and executory. has been se for h in e press erms: The S a e
The Labor Arbiter then issued a writ of execution ma no be s ed i ho i s consen . If he
which resulted in the property of the petitioner funds appertained to one of the regular
being levied. The petitioner asserts the rule of departments or offices in the government, then,
non-suability of the State. certainly such a provision would lie a bar to
garnishment. Such is not the case here.
ISSUE: Garnishment would lie. The Supreme Court, in a
Can the Department of Agriculture be sued under case brought by the same petitioner precisely
the contract entered with the agency? invoking such doctrine, left no doubt that the
funds of a public corporation could properly be
HELD: made the object of a notice of garnishment.
YES. The basic postulate under Art. X It is well settled that when the
section 3 of he Cons i ion ha he S a e ma government enters into commercial business, its
no be s ed i ho i s consen is no absol e abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be
for it does not say that the State may not be sued treated like any other corporation. (Manila Hotel
under any circumstances. On the contrary, as Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel
correc l phrased, he doc rine onl con e s ha Company)
the State may not be s ed i ho i s consen .
Its import then is that the State may at times be
s ed. The S a e s consen ma be gi en ei her
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through a general law waiving the immunity
of the State from suit which is found in Act 3083,
here he Philippine go ernmen consen s and
submits to be sued upon any money claim THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
involving liability arising from contract, express or RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN
implied, which could serve as basis of civil action 110 SCRA 460 (1981)
be een pri a e par ies. Implied consen on the
other hand, is conceded when the State itself FACTS:
commences litigation, thus opening itself to During the height of the infamous
counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. typhoon Kading, the NPC, acting through its plant
In this situation, the government is superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, opened or
deemed to have descended to the level of the caused to be opened simultaneously all the three
other contracting party and to have divested itself floodgates of the Angat Dam. The many
of its sovereign immunity. The rule relied upon by unfortunate victims of the man-caused flood filed
the NLRC is not, however, without qualification. with the respondent court eleven complaints for
Not all contracts entered into by the government damages against the NPC and Benjamin
operate as a waiver of its non-suability. Chavez. NPC filed separate answers to each of
Distinction must still be made between one which the eleven complaints and invoked in each
was executed in the exercise of its sovereign answer a special and affirmative defense that in
function and another which is done in its the operation of the Angat Dam, it is performing a
proprietary capacity. In the instant case, the purely governmental function. Hence, it cannot
petitioner has not pretended to have assumed a be sued without the express consent of the State.
capacity apart from its being a governmental The respondent court dismissed the case on the
entity when it entered into the questioned grounds that said defendant performs a purely
contract, not that it could have in fact performed governmental function in the operation of the
any act proprietary in character, but be that as it Angat Dam and cannot therefore be sued for
may, the claims of private respondents arising damages in the instant cases in connection
from the contract for security services clearly therewith.
constitute money claims for which Act 3083 gives
the consent of the state to be sued. ISSUE: Was the NPC performing a governmental
However, when the State gives its function with respect to the management and
consent to be sued, it does not thereby operation of the Angat Dam?
necessarily consent to an unrestricted execution
against it. When the State waives immunity, all it HELD:
does, in effect, is to give the other party an YES. However, it is not necessary to
opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has determine whether NPC performs a
any liability. governmental function with respect to the
management and operation of the Angat Dam. It
is sufficient to say that the government has
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY organized a private corporation, put money in it
and has allowed itself to sue and be sued in any ISSUE: Can the Customs Arrastre Service or the
court under its charter. As a government owned Bureau of Customs be sued?
and controlled corporation, it has personality of
its own, distinct and separate from that of the HELD:
government. Moreover, the charter provision that NO. The Bureau of Customs, acting as
the NPC can sue and be sued in any court is part of the machinery of the national government
without qualification on the cause of action as the in the operations of arrastre service, pursuant to
one instituted by the petitioners. express legislative mandate and a necessary
incident of its prime governmental function, is
immune from suit, there being no statute to the
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY contrary.
BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. BUREAU OF The Bureau of Customs has no
PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION personality of its own apart from that of the
1 SCRA 340 (1961) government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting
FACTS: lawful revenues from imported articles and all
Bureau of Printing Employees other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges,
Association filed a case against herein petitioners fines, and penalties. To this function, arrastre is a
Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, and necessary incident. Although said arrastre
Mariano Ledesma. The complaint alleged that function is deemed proprietary, it is necessarily
Salvador and Ledesma have been engaging in an incident of the primary and governmental
unfair labor practices by interfering with, or function of the Bureau of Customs, so that
coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing, engaging in the same does not necessarily
particularly the members of the complaining render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it
association, in the exercise of their right to self- could not perform its governmental function
organization, and by discriminating in regard to without necessarily exposing itself to suit.
hiring and tenure of their employment in order to Sovereign immunity granted as to the end should
discourage them from pursuing their union not be denied as to the necessary means to that
activities. Answering the complaint, Salvador end.
and Ledesma denied the charges, and
contended that the Bureau of Printing has no
juridical personality to sue and be sued. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION VS
ISSUE: Can the Bureau of Printing be sued? COURT OF APPEALS
167 SCRA 28 (1988)
HELD:
NO. As a government office, without FACTS:
any juridical capacity, it cannot be sued. Ernest Simke went to Manila
The Bureau of Printing is an International Airport to meet his future son-in-law.
instrumentality of the government; it operates While walking towards the viewing deck or the
under the direct supervision of the Executive terrace to get a better view of the incoming
Secretary. It is designed to meet the printing passengers, he slipped over an elevation about
needs of the government. It is primarily a service four inches high, and he fell on his back and
bureau. It is obviously not engaged in business or broke his thigh bone.
occupation for pecuniary profit. It has no He filed an action for damages based on
corporate existence. Its appropriations are quasi-delict with the CFI of Rizal against the Civil
provided for in the budget. It is not subject to the Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the entity
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. empowered to administer, operate, manage,
Any suit, action or proceeding against control, maintain, and develop the MIA.
the Bureau of Printing would actually be a suit, Judgment was rendered in his favor, and on
action or proceeding against the government appeal to the Court of Appeals, judgment was
itself. The government cannot be sued without its affirmed.
consent, much less over its objection.
ISSUE: Whether the CAA, being an agency of

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY the government, can be made a party defendant?
MOBIL PHILS. EXPLORATION, INC. VS.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE HELD:
18 SCRA 1120 (1966) YES. Not all government entities
whether corporate or not are immune from suits.
FACTS: Immunity from suits is determined by the
Four cases of rotary drill parts were character of the objects for which the entity was
shipped from abroad consigned to Mobil organized. The CAA is not immune from suit it
Philippines. The Customs Arrastre later being engaged in functions pertaining to a private
delivered to the broker of the consignee three entity. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far
cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines from being the exclusive prerogative of the state,
Exploration Inc. may more than the construction of public roads,
filed suit in the CFI against the Customs Arrastre be undertaken by private concerns. The CAA
Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover was created not to maintain a necessity of the
the value of the undelivered cases plus other government, but to run what is essentially a
damages. business even if the revenues be not its prime
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss objective but rather the promotion of travel and
the complaint on the ground that not being a the convenience of the traveling public.
person under the law, defendants cannot be
sued.
After the plaintiff opposed the motion, THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
the court dismissed the complaint on the ground MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION VS.
that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the JUDGE FIRME
Bureau of Customs is suable. 195 SCRA 692 (1991)
FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, death of the passenger, tragic and deplorable
La Union, is a municipality corporation. though, it may be imposed on the municipality no
Respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded duty to pay the monetary compensation.
in his official capacity as the presiding judge,
while private respondents are heirs of the
deceased Laureano Banina, Sr. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
On December 16, 1965, a collision MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN
occurred involving a passenger jeep, a gravel VS. FERNANDEZ
and sand truck, and a dump truck of the 130 SCRA 56 (1984)
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union which
was driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, FACTS:
several passengers of the jeep including Banina, In Civil Case No. 604-B, the then CFI of
Sr. died. Bulacan rendered judgment holding herein
The heir of Banina, Sr. instituted a petitioner municipality liable to respondents
complaint for damages against the owner and Imperio, et al. When the judgment became final,
driver of the passenger jeep. However, the respondent judge issued a writ of execution to
aforesaid defendant filed a third party complaint satisfy the same. Petitioner municipality filed a
against the petitioner and the driver of the dump motion to quash the writ on the ground that the
truck of the petitioner. m nicipali s proper or f nds are p blic e emp
Thereafter, the private respondents from execution. The motion was denied. The
amended the complaint wherein the petitioner respondent judge issued another order requiring
and its regular employee Alfredo Bislig were both the municipal and provincial treasurer to
impleaded for the first time as defendants. comply with the money judgment. When the
Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative treasurers failed to do so, respondent judge
defenses such as lack of cause of action, non- issued an order for their arrest and that they will
suability of the state, prescription of cause of be released upon compliance, hence the present
action, and the negligence of the owner and petition.
driver of the passenger jeep as the proximate
cause of the collision. ISSUE: Whether the funds of the municipality in
On October 10, 1979, the trial court the hands of the Provincial and Municipal
rendered a decision for the plaintiffs, and Treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel,
defendants Municipality of san Fernando, La respectively are public funds which are exempt
Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly from execution?
and severally the plaintiffs. The complaint
against the driver and the owner of the HELD:
passenger jeep was dismissed. YES. Municipal funds in possession of
Petitioner filed a motion for municipal and provincial treasurers are public
reconsideration and for a new trial. However, funds exempt from execution. The reason for
respondent judge issued another order denying those was explained in the case of Municipality of
the motion for reconsideration of the order for Paoa s. Manaois ha are held in r s for he
having been filed out of time. Hence, this people intended and used for the accomplices of
petition. the purposes for which municipal corporations
are created and that to subject said properties
ISSUE: Whether the municipality is liable for the and public funds to execution would materially
tort committed by its employee? impede, even defeat and in some instance
des ro said p rpose. Th s i is clear ha all he
HELD: funds of petitioner municipality in the possession
NO. The test of liability of the of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel as well
municipality depends on whether or not the driver as those in the possession of the Provincial
acting in behalf of the municipality is performing Treasurer of Bulacan are also public funds and
governmental or proprietary functions. It has as such they are exempt from execution.
already been remarked that municipal Besides PD 447, known as the Decree
corporations are suable because their charters on Local Fiscal Administration, provides in
grant them the competence to sue and be sued. sec ion 3 (a) ha no mone shall be paid o of
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful
torts committed by them in the discharge of appropriation or other specific statutory
governmental functions and can be held a hori . O her ise s a ed, here m s be a
answerable only if it can be shown that they were corresponding appropriation in the form of an
acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang
such entities to be sued, the state merely gives Bayan before any money of the municipality may
the claimants the right to show the defendant was be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been
not acting in its governmental capacity when the shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed
injury was inflicted or that the case comes under any ordinance to this effect.
the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this,
the claimants cannot recover.
In the case at bar, the driver of the THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
dump truck of the municipality insists that he was MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. COURT OF
on his way to Naguilan River to get a load of APPEALS
sand and gravel for the repair of the San 190 SCRA 206 (1990)
Fernando municipal street. FACTS:
In the absence of any evidence to the An expropriation proceeding was
contrary, the regularity of the performance of initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati
official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the against private respondent Admiral Finance
dump truck was performing duties or tasks Creditors Consortium Inc., Home Building
pertaining to his office. System and Reality Corp., and Arceli P. Jo
After careful examination of existing involving a parcel of land and improvements
laws and jurisprudence, we arrive at the thereon located at San Antonio Village, Makati.
conclusion that the municipality cannot be held An action for eminent domain was filed.
liable for the torts committed by its regular A ached o he pe i ioner s complain as a
employee, who was then engaged in the certification that a bank account had been
discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the opened with the PNB. After the decision has
become final and executory, a writ of execution G.R. NO. 107271; SEPTEMBER 10, 2003
was issued and a notice of garnishment was
served upon the manager of PNB where the FACTS:
petitioner had bank accounts. However, the In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of
sheriff was informed that a hold code was placed Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City
on the account of the petitioner. Administrator and 17 other positions via
The petitioner contended that its funds Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees
at the PNB cocked neither be garnished nor assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI in
levied upon execution for to do so would result in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the
the disbursement of public funds without the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and
proper appropriation required under the law. the payment of their back-wages and other
In a petition with the Court of Appeals, emoluments. The City Government appealed the
petitioner alleges for the first time that it has decision but such was dismissed. In 1986 the
actually two accounts with the PNB, one City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment
exclusively for the expropriation of the subject of her back-wages. The others were paid in full.
property with the outstanding balance of P99, In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her
743. 94. The other account was for the unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3)
obligations and other purposes of the municipal but the City refused to release the money to
government with a balance of P170,098,421.72. Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that
Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July
ISSUE: Whether the bank account of a 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public
municipality may be levied on execution to satisfy auction one of the motor vehicles of the City
a money judgment against it absent showing that Government for P100,000. The amount was
the municipal council has passed an ordinance given to Santiago. The City Government
appropriating from its public funds an amount questioned the validity of the sale of motor
corresponding to the balance due to the RTC vehicle; properties of the municipality were
decision? exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the
motion and directed the sheriff to levy and
HELD: schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On
YES. Since the first PNB account was October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan
specifically opened for expropriation proceedings passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the
it has initiated over the subject property, there is amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as
no objection to the garnishment or levy under back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued
execution of funds therein amounting to an order to the City Treasurer to release the
P4,965,506.40, the funds garnished in excess of check b he Ci Treas rer can do so beca se
P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7,
for the municipal government. Other statutory 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to
obligations are exempted from execution without immediately garnish the funds of the City
the proper appropriation required under the law. Government of Caloocan corresponding to the
nd
The funds deposited in the 2 PNB claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was
account are public funds of the municipal forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent
government. The rule is well-settled that public an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was
funds are not subject to levy and execution, illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any
unless otherwise provided by the statute. More damages which may be caused by the
particularly, the properties of a municipality, withholding the funds of the city.
whether real or personal, which are necessary for
public use cannot be attached and sold on
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment ISSUE:
against the municipality. Municipal revenues Whether or not the funds of City of
derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt
and which are intended primarily and exclusively from execution), to sa isf San iago s claim.
for the purpose of financing governmental
activities and functions of the municipality are HELD:
exempt from execution. The foregoing rule finds Garnishment is considered a specie of
application in the case at bar. attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks
This is not to say that private to subject to his claim property of the defendant
respondents are left with no legal recourse. in the hands of a third person, or money owed by
When a municipality fails or refuses without such third person or garnishee to the defendant.
justifiable reason to effect payment of a final The rule is and has always been that all
money judgment rendered against it, the claimant government funds deposited in the PNB or any
may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to other official depositary of the Philippine
compel the enactment and approval of the Government by any of its agencies or
necessary appropriation ordinance and the instrumentalities, whether by general or special
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds. deposit, remain government funds and may not
The co r ill no condone pe i ioner s bla an be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence
refusal to settle its obligation arising from an of a corresponding appropriation as required by
expropriation proceeding it has in fact initiated. law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a
Wi hin he con e of he s a e s inheren po er of state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts
eminent domain, just compensation means not ends when the judgment is rendered. Although
only the correct determination of the amount to the liability of the state has been judicially
be paid to the owner of the land but also the ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for
payment of the land within a reasonable time itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and
from its taking. The s a e s po er of eminen execution cannot issue on a judgment against the
domain should be exercised within the bounds of state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of
fair play and justice. In the case at bar, state property to satisfy judgments recovered,
considering that valuable property has been and only convey an implication that the
taken, the compensation to be paid is fixed, and legislature will recognize such judgment as final
the municipal has had more than reasonable time and make provision for the satisfaction thereof.
to pay full compensation. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a
well-defined exception, that is, when there is a
CITY OF CALOOCAN VS. ALLARDE corresponding appropriation as required by law.
In such a case, the monetary judgment may be AND STATE POLICIES

legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the KURODA VS. JALANDONI
City Council of Caloocan already approved and 83 PHIL. 171
passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992,
allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for FACTS:
San iago s back-wages plus interest. This case, Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a
thus, fell squarely within the exception. The Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial
judgment of the trial court could then be validly Army and Commanding General of the Japanese
enforced against such funds. Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period
covering 1943 and 1944, who is now charged
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES before a Military Commission with having
AND STATE POLICIES unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge
his duties as such commander to control the
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES operations of members of his command,
AND STATE POLICIES permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and
VILLAVICENCIO VS. LUKBAN other high crimes against noncombatant civilians
(39 PHIL 778) and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in
violation of the laws and customs of war"
FACTS: comes before this Court seeking to establish the
Respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the illegality of EO No. 68, which established a
city of Manila, for the best of all reasons, to National War Crimes Offices and provides that
exterminate vise, ordered the segregated district persons accused as war criminals shall be tried
for women of ill repute, which had been permitted by military commission; and to permanently
for a number of years in the City of Manila, prohibit respondents from proceeding with the
closed. The women were kept confined to their case of petitioner.
houses in the district by the police. At about Kuroda argues that EO No. 68 is illegal
midnight of October 25, the police, acting on the ground that it violates not only the
pursuant to the orders from the chief of the police provisions of our constitutional law but also our
and Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, local laws, to say nothing of the fact (that) the
hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to
and placed them aboard the steamers the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
Corregidor and Negros . The had no covering Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner
knowledge that they were destined for a life in is charged of `crimes' not based on law, national
Mindanao. The two steamers with their unwilling and international. Hence, petitioner argues
passengers sailed for Davao during the night of "That in view of the fact that this commission has
October 25, 1918. been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional
law and an illegal order, this commission is
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the Mayor of without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
the City of Manila is constitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippines can adopt
HELD: the rules and regulations laid down on The
The Supreme Court condemned the Hague and Geneva Conventions notwithstanding
ma or s ac . Responden s in ention to suppress that it is not a signatory thereto and whether it
the social evil was commutable. But his methods can create a Military Commission to try violations
were unlawfull. of the Hague Convention?
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from
the Philippines in conformity with an act of HELD:
Congress. The Governor-General can order the Yes. Executive Order No. 68, establishing a
eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules
the Islands. One can search in vain for any law, and regulations governing the trial of accused
order, or regulation, which even hints at the right war criminals, was issued by the President of the
of the Mayor of the City of Manila or the Chief of Philippines on the 29th day of July, 1947. This
Police of that City to force citizens of the Court holds that this order is valid and
Philippine Islands, and these women despite their constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution
being in a sense, lepers of society are provides in its section 3, that
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guarantees "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument
as other citizens. of national policy, and adopts the generally
Law defines power. The law is the only accepted principles of international law as part of
supreme power in our system of government, the law of the nation."
and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more In accordance with the generally accepted
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and principles of international law of the present day,
to observe the limitations which gives itself and including the Hague Convention, the Geneva
imposes upon the exercise of the authority which Convention and significant precedents of
it gives. international jurisprudence established by the
The fundamental rights of life, liberty United Nations, all those persons, military or
and the pursuit of happiness, considered as civilian, who have been guilty of planning,
individual possessions, are secured by those preparing or waging a war of aggression and of
maxims of constitutional law which are the the commission of crimes and offenses
monuments showing the victorious progress of consequential and incidental thereto, in violation
the race in securing to men the blessings of of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, civilization, are held accountable therefor.
so that, in the famous language of the Consequently, in the promulgation and
Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the
he common eal h ma be go ernmen of la s President of the Philippines has acted in
and no of men . conformity with the generally accepted principles
and policies of international law which are part of
our Constitution.
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES The promulgation of said executive order is an

exercise by the President of his powers as early warning devices to prevent vehicular
Commander in Chief of all our armed forces, as accidents was assailed for the lack of a
upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. legislative enactment that would authorize the
Styer L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 654) 1 when we said issuance of said LOI. The petition quoted two
whereas clauses of the assailed LOI: [Whereas],
"War is not ended simply because hostilities have the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic
ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities, have been recognized by international bodies
incidents of war may remain pending which concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna
should be disposed of as in time of war. Àn Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
important incident to a conduct of war is the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas],
adoption of measures by the military command the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by
not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
seize and subject to disciplinary measures those recommended the enactment of local legislation
enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede for the installation of road safety signs and
our military effort have violated the law of war.' devices.
(Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.)
Indeed, the power to create a military ISSUE: Whether or not a legislative enactment is
commission for the trial and punishment of war necessary in order to authorize the issuance of
criminals is an aspect of waging war. And, in the said LOI based on the 1968 Vienna Convention
language of a writer, a military commission `has on Road Signs and Signals and the United
jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war Nations Organization (U.N.).
continues. This includes the period of an
armistice, or military occupation, up to the HELD:
effective date of a treaty of peace, and may Not anymore. The petition must be dismissed for
extend beyond, by treaty agreement.' (Cowls, lack of merit. It cannot be disputed that this
Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution
American Bar Association Journal, June, 1944.)" possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * *
adopts the generally accepted principles of
Consequently, the President as Commander in international law as part of the law of the land, * *
Chief is fully empowered to consummate this *." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
unfinished aspect of war, namely, the trial and and Signals is impressed with such a character. It
punishment of war criminals, through the is not for this country to repudiate a commitment
issuance and enforcement of Executive Order to which it had pledged its word. The concept of
No. 68. Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such
an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
Petitioner argues that respondent Military principle of international morality.
Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner
for acts committed in violation of the Hague
Convention and the Geneva Convention because ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and AND STATE POLICIES
signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
denied that the rules and regulations of the 101 PHIL. 1155
Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and
are wholly based on the generally accepted FACTS:
principles of international law. In fact, these rules Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the
and principles were accepted by the two Retail Trade Nationalization Law, on the premise
belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, that it violated several treaties which under the
who were signatories to the two Conventions. rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted
Such rules and principles, therefore, form principle of international law, should be observed
part of the law of our nation even if the by the Court in good faith.
Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them, for our ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade
Constitution has been deliberately general Nationalization Law is unconstitutional for it is in
and extensive in its scope and is not confined conflict with treaties which are generally accepted
to the recognition of rules and principles of principles of international law.
international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or HELD:
shall be a signatory. The Supreme Court said it saw no
conflict. The reason given by the Court was that
Furthermore, when the crimes charged against the Retail Trade National Law was passed in the
petitioner were allegedly committed, the exercise of the police power which cannot be
Philippines was under the sovereignty of the bargained away through the medium of a treaty
United States, and thus we were equally bound or a contract.
together with the United States and with Japan, The law in question was enacted to
to the rights and obligations contained in the remedy a real actual threat and danger to
treaties between the belligerent countries. These national economy posed by alien dominance and
rights and obligations were not erased by our control of the retail business and free citizens and
assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our country from such dominance and control; that
emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
the right, on our own, of trying and punishing police power of the State, thru which and by
those who committed crimes against our people. which it protects its own personality and insures
its security and future.
Resuming what we have set forth above
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES we hold that the disputed law was enacted to
AND STATE POLICIES remedy a real actual threat and danger to
AGUSTIN VS. EDU national economy posed by alien dominance and
88 SCRA 195 control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from such dominance and control; that
FACTS: the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
A presidential letter of instruction (LOI) police power of the state, through which and by
prescribing the use of triangular reflectorized which it protects its own personality and insures
its security and future; that the law does not of conflict between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and
violate the equal protection clause of the 3452 on the one hand, and the aforementioned
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail,
the distinction between alien and citizen in the because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent
exercise of occupation regulated, nor the due with each other, the conflict must be resolved
process of the law clause; because the law is under the American jurisprudence in favor of
prospective in operation and recognizes the the one which is latest in point of time; that
privilege of aliens already engaged in the petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the
occupation and reasonably protects their executive relative to foreign relations in the
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot
to carry out its objectives appear to us to be interfere; and that the aforementioned contracts
plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not have already been consummated, the
only appropriate but actually necessary - and that Government of the Philippines having already
in any case such matter falls within the paid the price of the rice involved therein through
prerogative of the legislature, with whose power irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sellers
and discretion the judicial department of the of said commodity. We find no merit in this
Government may not interfere; that the provisions pretense.
of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and The Court is not satisfied that the status
this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled of said contracts as alleged executive
the legislature of the segment of the population agreements has been sufficiently established.
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for The parties to said contracts do not appear to
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because have regarded the same as executive
no treaty has actually been entered into on the agreements. But, even assuming that said
subject and the police power may not be curtailed contracts may properly be considered as
or surrendered by any treaty or any other executive agreements, the same are unlawful,
conventional agreement. as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES inconsistent with the provisions of Republic
AND STATE POLICIES Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the
GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA President may, under the American
9 SCRA 230 constitutional system, enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative
FACTS: authority, he may not, by executive
Respondent Executive Secretary agreement, enter into a transaction which is
authorized the importation of tons of foreign rice prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
to be purchased from private sources. Petitioner Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Gonzales - a rice planter, and president of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association filed Congress. The former may not interfere in the
this petition, averring that, in making or performance of the legislative powers of the
attempting to make said importation of foreign latter, except in the exercise of his veto
rice, the aforementioned respondents "are, power. He may not defeat legislative
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of enactments that have acquired the status of
jurisdiction", because RA No. 3452 which laws, by indirectly repealing the same
allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207 - through an executive agreement providing for
explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and the performance of the very act prohibited by
corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or said laws.
a a c . The American theory to the effect that,
Respondent contended among others in the event of conflict between a treaty and a
that the Government of the Philippines has statute, the one which is latest in point of time
already entered into two contracts for the shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
purchase of rice, one with the Republic of for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist
Vietnam, and another with the Government of that the contracts adverted to are not treaties.
Burma; that these contracts constitute valid Said theory may be justified upon the ground that
executive agreements under international law; treaties to which the United States is signatory
that such agreements became binding and require the advice and consent of its Senate,
effective upon signing thereof by representatives and, hence, of a branch of the legislative
of the parties thereto; that in case of conflict department. No such justification can be given as
between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452 on regards executive agreements not authorized by
the one hand, and the aforementioned contracts, previous legislation, without completely upsetting
on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if the principle of separation of powers and the
a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each system of checks and balances which are
other, the conflict must be resolved - under the fundamental in our constitutional set up and that
American jurisprudence - in favor of the one of the United States.
which is latest in point of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents, in ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

attempting to import foreign rice, are acting AND STATE POLICIES
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. IN RE: GARCIA
2 SCRA 984, 1961
HELD:
Yes. The respondents acted without FACTS:
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. It is Under the Treaty on Academic Degrees
respondents contend that the Government of the and the Exercise of Professions between the
Philippines has already entered into two (2) Philippines and Spain, nationals of each of the
contracts for the purchase of rice, one with the two countries who have obtained the required
Republic of Viet Nam, and another with the degrees can practice their professions within the
Government of Burma; that these contracts territory of the other. Efren Garcia, a Filipino,
constitute valid executive agreements under finished law in the University of Madrid, Spain
international law; that such agreements became and was allowed to practice the law profession
binding and effective upon signing thereof by therein. He invokes the treaty in order for him to
representatives of the parties thereto; that in case
be allowed to practice in the Philippines without its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with
taking the bar examinations. its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of
the citizen
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Treaty can modify regulations
governing admission to Philippine Bar.
HELD: ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

No. It is clear, under Article 1 of the AND STATE POLICIES
Treaty, that the privileges provided therein are AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ
made expressly subject to the laws and, 64 PHIL 201
regulations of the contracting State in whose
territory it is desired to exercise the legal FACTS:
profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay,
connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
which have the force of law, require that before Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a
anyone can practice the legal profession in the writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent
Philippines he must first successfully pass the Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage
required bar examinations. stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
Moreover, the Treaty was intended to International Eucharistic Congress.
govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their In May, 1936, the Director of Posts
profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
desiring to practice their profession in the order the issuance of postage stamps
Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino Citizen desiring commemorating the celebration in the City of
to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Manila of the Thirty- third International
He is therefore subject to the laws of his own Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
country and is not entitled to the privileges Catholic Church. In spite of the protest of the
extended to Spanish nationals desiring to petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly
practice in the Philippines. announced having sent to the United States the
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded designs of the postage for printing
between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish State could not have been intended to ISSUE: Is there a violation of principle of
modify the laws and regulations governing separation of church and state?
admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, for the reason that the Executive HELD:
Department may not encroach upon the In the case at bar, it appears that the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme respondent Director of Posts issued the postage
Court to promulgate rules for admission to stamps in question under the provisions of Act.
the practice of law in the Philippines, the No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.
power to repeal, alter or supplement such Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious
rules being reserved only to the Congress of purpose in view. What it gives the Director of
the Philippines. Posts is the discretionary power to determine
when the issuance of special postage stamps
would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES course, the phrase "advantageous to the
AND STATE POLICIES Government" does not authorize the violation of
PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN AND ZOSA the Constitution. It does not authorize the
66 PHIL 13, 1938 appropriation, use or application of public money
or property for the use, benefit or support of a
FACTS: particular sect or church. In the present case,
Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de however, the issuance of the postage stamps in
Sosa are charged with and convicted of refusal question by the Director of Posts and the
to register for military training as required by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
above-mentioned statute. On appeal, Zosa was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to
argued that he was fatherless and had a mother favor a particular church or religious
and eight brothers to support, while Lagman denominations. The stamps were not issued
alleged that he had a father to support, had no and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
military leanings, and did not wish to kill or be Church. Nor were money derived from the
killed; and both claimed that the statute was sale of the stamps given to that church. On
unconstitutional. the contrary, it appears from the letter of the
Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated
ISSUE: Whether or not the the National Defense on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the
Law is valid, under which the accused were only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps
sentenced. was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country." The officials concerned
HELD: merely took advantage of an event considered of
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed their international importance "to give publicity to the
conviction, holding that the law in question was Philippines and its people". It is significant to note
based on the afore-cited constitutional principle. that the stamps as actually designed and printed,
The National Defense Law, in so far as instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as
it establishes compulsory military service, does originally planned, contains a map of the
not go against this constitutional provision but is, Philippines and the location of the City of Manila,
on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII
The duty of the Government to defend the State International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,
cannot be performed except through an army. To 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic
leave the organization of an army to the will of Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
the citizens would be to make this duty of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is
Government excusable should there be no obvious that while the issuance and sale of the
sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. stamps in question may be said to be inseparably
The right of the Government to require linked with an event of a religious character, the
compulsory military service is a consequence of resulting propaganda, if any, received by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and The National Traffic Commission, in its
purpose of the Government. We are of the resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
opinion that the Government should not be recommend to the Director of Public Works and
embarrassed in its activities simply because of to the Secretary of Public Works and
incidental results, more or less religious in Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
character, if the purpose had in view is one which prohibited from passing along Rosario Street
could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
legislation. The main purpose should not be Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.
frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal
results not contemplated. Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
There is no violation of the principle of Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to
separation of church and state. The issuance and 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date
sale of the stamps in question maybe said to be of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic;
separably linked with an event of a religious that the Chairman of the National Traffic
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to
received by the Catholic Church, was not the aim the Director of Public Works the adoption of the
and purpose of the government (to promote measure proposed in the resolution
tourism). aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes
said Director of Public Works, with the approval
TARUC VS. DE LA CRUZ of the Secretary of Public Works and
G.R. NO. 144801; MARCH 10, 2005 Communications, to promulgate rules and
CORONA, J.: regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940,
FACTS: the Director of Public Works, in his first
Petitioners were lay members of the indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works
Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June and Communications, recommended to the latter
28, 1993, D e o pe i ioners adaman dri e o the approval of the recommendation made by the
create dissension within the diocese by Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as
celebrating their own open mass without aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of
participation from the parish priest, Bishop de la Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles
Cruz declared petitioners be limited to the portion thereof extending from
expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Independent Church. The good Bishop did so as Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the
a las resor , as he firs pleaded o he pe i ioners Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
to cease from riling up the community against the in his second indorsement addressed to the
diocese. Because of the order of Director of Public Works, approved the
expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-
against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional drawn vehicles, between the points and during
Trial Court. They contended that their expulsion the hours as above indicated, for a period of one
was illegal because it was done without trial thus year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
violating their right to due process of law. Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the
Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
ISSUE: and caused to be enforced the rules and
Whether or not the courts have regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence
jurisdiction to hear a case involving the of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles
expulsion/excommunication of members of a are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers
religious institution? in the places above-mentioned to the detriment
HELD: not only of their owners but of the riding public as
The Court rules that they do not have well.
such jurisdiction. The expulsion/excommunication The petitioner further contends that the
of members of a religious institution/organization rules and regulations promulgated by the
is a matter best left to the discretion of the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
officials, and the laws and canons, of said Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to unlawful interference with legitimate business or
exercise control over church authorities in the trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and
performance of their discretionary and official freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No.
functions. Rather, it is for the members of 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the
religious institutions/organizations to conform to exercise of the paramount police power of the
just church regulations. state.
Ci il Co r s ill no in erfere in he
internal affairs of a religious organization except
for the protection of civil or property rights. Those ISSUE: Whether the rules & regulations
rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil promulgated pursuant to the provisions of
court, and the courts have jurisdiction to Commonwealth Act No. 548 considered as
determine controverted claims to the title, use, or constitutional?
possession of ch rch proper .
Obviously, there was no violation of a HELD: Yes. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules
civil rights in the present case. and regulations complained of were promulgated,
aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES therefore, the National Assembly was prompted
AND STATE POLICIES by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve
CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a
70 Phil. 726, 1940 menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies
at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and
FACTS: the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons and him with the Clerk of Court within 15 days from
property may be subjected to all kinds of receipt of the decision.
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the On appeal, the CA affirmed the assailed
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the decision. Their motion for reconsideration was
state (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To denied. Hence, the present petition for review.
this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty ISSUE: Is there a tenant's right of redemption in
is a blessing without which life is a misery, but sugar and coconut lands?
liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to HELD:
prevail over liberty because then the individual Yes. Among those exempted from the
will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve automatic conversion to agricultural leasehold
the required balance of liberty and authority in his upon the effectivity of the Agricultural Land
mind through education and personal discipline, Reform Code in 1963 or even after its
so that there may be established the resultant amendments (Code of Agrarian Reforms) are
equilibrium, which means peace and order and sugar lands. Section 4 thereof states:
happiness for all. The moment greater authority "Agricultural share tenancy throughout the
is conferred upon the government, logically so country, as herein defined, is hereby declared
much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty contrary to public policy and shall be
which resides in the people. The paradox lies in automatically converted to agricultural
the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is leasehold upon the effectivity of this section. . . .
precisely the very means of insuring its Provided, That in order not to jeopardize
preservation. international commitments, lands devoted to
Petitioner finally avers that the rules and crops covered by marketing allotments shall be
regulations complained of infringe upon the made the subject of a separate proclamation by
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of the President upon recommendation of the
social justice to insure the well-being and department head that adequate provisions, such
economic security of all the people. The as the organization of cooperatives marketing
promotion of social justice, however, is to be agreement, or similar other workable
achieved not through a mistaken sympathy arrangements, have been made to insure
towards any given group. Social justice is efficient management on all matters requiring
"neither communism, nor despotism, nor synchronization of the agricultural with the
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization processing phases of such crops . . ."
of laws and the equalization of social and Sugar is, of course, one crop covered by
economic forces by the State so that justice marketing allotments. In other words, this section
in its rational and objectively secular recognizes share tenancy in sugar lands until
conception may at least be approximated. after a special proclamation is made, which
Social justice means the promotion of the proclamation shall have the same effect of an
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the executive proclamation of the operation of the
Government of measures calculated to insure Department of Agrarian Reform in any region or
economic stability of all the competent locality; the share tenants in the lands affected
elements of society, through the maintenance will become agricultural lessees at the beginning
of a proper economic and social equilibrium of the agricultural year next succeeding the year
in the interrelations of the members of the in which the proclamation is made. But, there is
community, constitutionally, through the nothing readable or even discernible in the law
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or denying to tenants in sugar lands the right of pre-
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of emption and redemption under the Code.
powers underlying the existence of all The exemption is purely limited to the
governments on the time-honored principle of tenancy system; it does not exclude the other
salus populi est suprema lex. rights conferred by the Code, such as the right of
pre-emption and redemption. In the same
ALMEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS manner, coconut lands are exempted from the
78 SCRA 194, 1977 Code only with respect to the consideration and
tenancy system prevailing, implying that in other
FACTS: matters the right of pre-emption and redemption
Respondent Gonzales is a share tenant which does not refer to the consideration of the
of Angeles et al., on land devoted to sugar cane tenancy the provisions of the Code apply. Thus,
and coconuts. The landowners sold the property Section 35 states: "Notwithstanding the
to petitioners Almeda without notifying provisions of the preceding Sections, in the case
respondent in writing of the sale. The sale was of fishponds, saltbeds and lands principally
registered with the Register of Deeds. planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, coffee, durian,
Respondent thus sued for redemption before the and other similar permanent trees at the time of
CAR. the approval of this Code, the consideration, as
Petitioners counter that long before the well as the tenancy system prevailing, shall be
execution of the deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles governed by the provisions of Republic Act
and his nephew Cesar Angeles first offered the Numbered Eleven Hundred and Ninety-Nine, as
sale of the land to respondent but the latter said amended."
that he had no money; that respondent, instead, It is to be noted that under the new
went personally to the house of petitioners and Constitution, property ownership is
implored them to buy the land for fear that if impressed with social function. Property use
someone else would buy the land, he may not be must not only be for the benefit of the owner
taken in as tenant; that respondent is a mere but of society as well. The State, in the
dummy of someone deeply interested in buying promotion of social justice, may "regulate the
the land; that respondent made to tender of acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and
payment or any valid consignation in court at the disposition of private property, and equitably
time he filed the complaint for redemption. diffuse property . . . ownership and profits."
The Agrarian Court rendered judgment One governmental policy of recent date projects
authorizing respondent to redeem the land for the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of
P24,000.00, the said amount to be deposited by the soil and the transfer to them of the ownership
of the land they till. This is Presidential Decree
No. 27 of October 21, 1972, ordaining that all poor and unlettered, and the employer, who
tenant farmers "of private agricultural lands has resources to secure able legal advice, the
devoted to rice and corn under a system of law has reason to demand from the latter
sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as stricter compliance. Social justice in these
landed estates or not" shall be deemed "owner of cases is not equality but protection.
a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5)
hectares if not irrigated and there (3) hectares if
irrigated."
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
SALONGA VS. FARRALES
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 105 SCRA 359, 1981
AND STATE POLICIES
ONDOY VS. IGNACIO FACTS:
97 SCRA 611, 1980 Defendant Farrales is the titled owner of
a parcel of residential land. Even prior to the
FACTS: acquisition by defendant Farrales of the land
Petitioner Estrella Ondoy filed a claim aforesaid, plaintiff Salonga was already in
for compensation for the death of her son, Jose possession as lessee of some 156 square meters
Ondoy, who drowned while in the employ of thereof, on which she had erected a house,
respondent Virgilio Ignacio. Respondent moved paying rentals thereon first to the original owners
to dismiss on the ground of lack of employer- and later to defendant Farrales.
employee relationship. However, during the Farrales filed an ejectment case for non-
hearing of the case, respondent submitted payment of rentals against plaintiff. Judgment
affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler was later rendered in favor of defendant Farrales
of the fishing vessel that the deceased, a and ordering the therein defendants, including
fisherman, was in that ship, undeniably a plaintiff herein and her husband, to vacate the
member of the working force, but after being portion occupied by them and to pay rentals in
invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the arrears.
vessel, and thereafter was found dead. The Evidence showed that plaintiff offered to
referee summarily ignored the affidavit of the purchase from said defendant the land in dispute,
chief-mate of respondent employer to the effect but, defendant, despite the fact that said plaintiff's
"that sometime in October, 1968, while Jose order to purchase was just, fair and reasonable
Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the actual persistently refused such offer, and instead,
performance of his work with said fishing insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the
enterprises, he was drowned and died on ejectment case.
October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in line Plaintiff then filed a complaint against
of Duty." The hearing officer or referee defendant Farrales praying the latter be ordered
dismissed the claim for lack of merit. A motion for to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land in question.
reconsideration was duly filed, but the then
Secretary of Labor, denied such motion for ISSUE: Is the plaintiff entitled for specific
reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence this performance?
petition for review.
HELD:
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for No. If plaintiff's offer to purchase was, as
compensation was validly dismissed. aforesaid persistently refused by defendant, it is
obvious that no meeting of the minds took place
HELD: and, accordingly, no contract, either to sell or of
There is evidence, direct and sale, was ever perfected between them.
categorical, to the effect that the deceased was Since contracts are enforceable only
drowned while "in the actual performance of his from the moment of perfection, and there is here
work" with the shipping enterprise of private no perfected contract at all, it goes without saying
respondent. Even without such evidence, the that plaintiff has absolutely nothing to enforce
petitioner could have relied on the presumption against defendant Farrales, and the fact that
of compensability under the Act once it is defendant Farrales previously sold portions of the
shown that the death or disability arose in the land to other lessees similarly situated as plaintiff
course of employment, with the burden of herein, does not change the situation because,
overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity as to said other lessees, a perfected contract
resisting the claim. existed which is not the case with plaintiff.
This Court, in recognizing the right of It must be remembered that social
petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the justice cannot be invoked to trample on the
interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this rights of property owners who under our
Court resolving all doubts in favor of the Constitution and laws are also entitled to
claimant. What was said in Victorias Milling Co., protection. The social justice consecrated in our
Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission is constitution was not intended to take away rights
not amiss: "There is need, it seems, even at this from a person and give them to another who is
late date, for [private respondent] and other not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for
employers to be reminded of the high estate social justice cannot nullify the law on
accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in obligations and contracts, and is, therefore,
the constitutional scheme of social justice and beyond the power of the Court to grant.
protection to labor." No other judicial attitude may
be expected in the face of a clearly expressed
legislative determination which antedated the ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
constitutionally avowed concern for social justice AND STATE POLICIES
and protection to labor. It is easily SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS.
understandable why the judiciary frowns on MANALO
resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively G.R. No. L-47841, October 7, 2008
plausible, would result in frustrating such a
national policy." To be more specific, the principle FACTS:
of social justice is in this sphere strengthened
and vitalized. As between a laborer, usually
The case at bar involves the rights to leas , he as a are of he pe i ioners cap i i a
life, liberty and security in the first petition for a the hands of men in uniform assigned to his
writ of amparo filed before this Court. command. In fact, he or any other officer
This case was originally a Petition for tendered no controversion to the firm claim of
Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in
Restraining Order to stop herein petitioners person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them
and/or their officers and agents from depriving what he wanted them and their parents to do or
them of their right to liberty and other basic rights no o be doing. Gen. Palparan s direc and
and enjoined them from causing the arrest of personal role in the abduction might not have
therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, been shown but his knowledge of the dire
curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their situation of the petitioners during their long
right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as captivity at the hands of military personnel under
guaranteed under Article III, Section 1 of the his command bespoke of his indubitable
1987 Constitution. command policy that unavoidably encouraged
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians
pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took without due process of law and without probable
effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein cause.
petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus We now come to the right of the
Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Petition. There is no quarrel that the enforced
On October 25, 2007, the Court disappearance of both respondents Raymond
resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they
a petition under the Amparo Rule have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But
On December 26, 2007, the Court of while respondents admit that they are no
Appeals rendered a decision in favor of herein longer in detention and are physically free,
respondents. Hence, this appeal. a a a
This pertains to the abduction of d a
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO continue to be restricted for fear that people
who were forcibly taken from their respective they have named in their Judicial Affidavits
homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, and testified against (in the case of Raymond)
Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified are still at large and have not been held
armed men and thereafter were forcibly accountable in any way. These people are
disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of directly connected to the Armed Forces of the
the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil Philippines and are, thus, in a position to
court against the herein suspects: Michael dela a d , b
Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula and security. Respondents claim that they
Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza are under threat of being once again
as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces abducted, kept captive or even killed, which
Geographical Unit (CAFGU). constitute a direct violation of their right to
The abduction was perpetrated by security of person.
armed men who were sufficiently identified by the Elaborating on the “right to security, in
petitioners (herein respondents) to be military general,” respondents point out that this right is
personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond “often associated with liberty;” it is also seen as
recalled that the six armed men who barged into an “expansion of rights based on the prohibition
his house through the rear door were military against torture and cruel and unusual
men based on their attire of fatigue pants and punishment.” Conceding that there is no right to
army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: security expressly mentioned in Article III of the
Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights “to
la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the be kept free from torture and from
CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, incommunicado detention and solitary detention
Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and places fall under the general coverage of the right
Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served to security of person under the writ of Amparo.”
as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was They submit that the Court ought to give an
sure that three of the six military men were expansive recognition of the right to security of
Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, person in view of the State Policy under Article II
who drove the van, and George. Subsequent of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that,
incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the “The State values the dignity of every human
petitioners, validated their assertion of the person and guarantees full respect for human
participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry rights.”
Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU In sum, respondents assert that their
auxiliaries. cause of action consists in the threat to their right
We are convinced, too, that the reason to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to
for the abduction was the suspicion that the security.
petitioners were either members or sympathizers
of the NPA, considering that the abductors were ISSUE: Whether the Petition for issuance of Writ
looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Amparo should be granted?
Rolando, the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military HELD: Yes. While the right to life under Article III,
Command to look into the abduction were, at Section 1[120] guarantees essentially the right to
best, merely superficial. The investigation of the be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other
Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division rights is preconditioned - the right to security of
focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this
auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might life, i : The life o hich each person has a
be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could right is not a life lived in fear that his person and
delve only into the participation of military property may be unreasonably violated by a
personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
should have refrained from outrightly exculpating assurance that the government he established
the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily and consented to, will protect the security of his
investigate. person and property. The ideal of security in life
Gen. Palparan s par icipa ion in he and proper per ades he hole his or of
abduction was also established. At the very man. It touches every aspec of man s
e is ence. In a broad sense, the right to security injuries constitute a crime against persons
of person emana es in a person s legal and because they are an affront to the bodily integrity
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his or security of a person.
body, his health, and his reputation. It includes
the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe
while existing, and it is invaded not only by a invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to
deprivation of life but also of vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to
those things which are necessary to the admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating
enjoyment of life according to the nature, information, it constitutes an invasion of both
temperament, and lawful desires of the bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of
indi id al. the human person includes the exercise of free
will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
A closer look at the right to security of person Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily
would yield various permutations of the exercise and psychological invasion, viz:
of this right.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or
First, the righ o sec ri of person is freedom intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
from fear. In i s hereas cla ses, he Uni ersal free will shall be used against him (any person
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates under investigation for the commission of an
ha a orld in hich h man beings shall enjo offense). Secret detention places, solitary,
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from incommunicado or other similar forms of
fear and want has been proclaimed as the detention are prohibited.
highes aspira ion of he common people.
emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and
freedom from fear is no onl an aspira ional intimidation that vitiate the free will - although
principle, but essentially an individual not involving invasion of bodily integrity -
in erna ional h man righ .[124] I is he righ o nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to
securit of person as he ord sec ri i self sec ri in he sense of freedom from hrea as
means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the afore-discussed.
UDHR provides, viz:
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security dehumanizing abuses of persons under
of person.[126] emphasis supplied) investigation for the commission of an offense.
Victims of enforced disappearances who are not
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, even under such investigation should all the more
Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil be protected from these degradations.
and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the
right to security of person, viz: An overture to an interpretation of the right to
security of person as a right against torture was
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of made by the European Court of Human Rights
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v.
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of Russia.[130] In this case, the claimant, who was
his liberty except on such grounds and in lawfully detained, alleged that the state
accordance with such procedure as are authorities had physically abused him in prison,
established by law. emphasis supplied) thereby violating his right to security of person.
Article 5(1) of the European Convention on
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR H man Righ s pro ides, i : E er one has he
and the ICCPR. right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, following cases and in accordance with a
freedom from fear is he righ and an hrea o proced re prescribed b la ... (emphases
the rights to life, liberty or security is the supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides
actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a ha (n)o one shall be s bjec ed to torture or to
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. inh man or degrading rea men or p nishmen .
Fear caused by the same stimulus can range Although the application failed on the facts as the
from being baseless to well-founded as people alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the
react differently. The degree of fear can vary ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in
from one person to another with the variation of holding, viz:
the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of
character or past experience with the stimulus. ...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the
Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to attention of domestic authorities at the time when
sa ha he righ o sec ri is ac all he they could reasonably have been expected to
freedom from hrea . Vie ed in his ligh , he take measures in order to ensure his security and
hrea ened i h iola ion Cla se in he la er to investigate the circumstances in question.
part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of xxx xxx xxx
violation of the right to security mentioned in the
earlier part of the provision. ... the authorities failed to ensure his security in
custody or to comply with the procedural
Second, the right to security of person is a obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or investigation into his allegations.[131] (emphasis
security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 supplied)
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule,
one s bod cannot be searched or invaded The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
without a search warrant. Physical injuries Discrimination against Women has also made a
inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and statement that the protection of the bodily
enforced disappearances constitute more than a integrity of women may also be related to the
search or invasion of the body. It may constitute right to security and liberty, viz:
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful
physical intrusion. As the degree of physical gender-based violence which impairs or
injury increases, the danger to life itself nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights
escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical and fundamental freedoms under general
international law or under specific human rights constructed and equipped for the school
conventions is discrimination within the meaning purposes. The law has already caused the
of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination withdrawal from its school of children, who would
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). other wise continue attending the same school.
These rights and freedoms include . . . the right Society then filed a suit to enjoin the enforcement
to liberty and security of person. of the law contending that the same
unconstitutional.
Third, the right to security of person is a
g aran ee of pro ec ion of one s righ s b he ISSUE: May the State require children to attend
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, only public schools before they reach a certain
this right is built into the guarantees of the right to age?
life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution and the right to security of HELD:
person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of The fundamental theory of liberty upon
bodily and psychological integrity) under Article which the government under the Constitution
III, Section 2. The right to security of person reposes excludes any general power of the State
in this third sense is a corollary of the policy to standardize its children by enforcing them to
a Sa aa c accept instruction from public teachers only. The
a d A c II, S c 11 child is not the mere creature of the State; those
the 1987 Constitution. As the government is who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
the chief guarantor of order and security, the right coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, prepare him for additional obligations.
liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
they are under threat. Protection includes AND STATE POLICIES
conducting effective investigations, VIRTUOSO VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE
organization of the government apparatus to 82 SCRA 191, 1978
extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or FACTS:
threats thereof) and/or their families, and Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr. filed an
bringing offenders to the bar of justice. application for the writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that the preliminary examination which
led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES him was a useless formality as respondent
AND STATE POLICIES Municipal Judge failed to meet the strict standard
MEYER VS. NEBRASKA required by the Constitution to ascertain whether
262 US 390 [1922] there was a probable cause. He likewise alleged
that aside from the constitutional infirmity that
FACTS: tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary
Robert Meyer, while an instructor in Zion examination, the bail imposed was clearly
Parochial School, was tried and convicted in the excessive. It was in the amount of P16,000.00,
district of Hamilton, Nebraska under an the alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to
information which charged him for unlawfully petitioner
teaching reading German language to Raymond It was later ascertained that the
Partpar, a ten year old child who had not petitioner is a seventeen year old minor entitled
successfully reached the eight grade. The to the protection and benefits of the child and
informa ion as based pon An Ac Rela ing o Youth Welfare Code.
the Teaching of Foreign Language in the State of
Nebraska, hich prohibi ed an s bjec in an ISSUE: Whe her or no pe i ioner s applica ion for
language other than English to any person who release should be granted.
has not successfully passed the eight grade.
HELD:
ISSUE: May the State prohibit the teaching of Yes. As a minor, he could be
foreign language to children who has not reach a provisionally released on recognizance in the
certain grade level? discretion of a court. This Court should,
whenever appropriate, give vitality and force
HELD: to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an
It was held that it is incompetent for the implementation of this specific constitutional
government to prohibit the teaching of the mandate. "The State recognizes the vital role
German language to students between certain of the youth in nation-building and shall
age levels since there is nothing inherently promote their physical, intellectual, and social
harmful in the language that will impair the well-being."
upbringing of the child; and in fact such a subject
could improve his academic background.
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

AND STATE POLICIES
PIERCE VS. SOCIETY OF SISTERS ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
262 US 390 AND STATE POLICIES
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
FACTS: 224 SCRA 792, 1993
The State of Oregon passed a law
requiring parents/guardians of children ages 8-16 FACTS:
to send their child to public school. The manifest The petitioner, all minors and alleges
purpose is to compel general attendance at that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic
public schools by children 8-16 who have not of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the
th
completed their 8 grade. full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
Society of Sisters operates a private resource treasure that is the country's virgin
school. It owns valuable building, especially tropical rainforests, duly joined and represented
by their parents instituted a complained as a natural resources. The right of the petitioners and
a pa ers class s i and pra ed for he rendering all they represent to a balanced and healthful
of judgment ordering defendant Factoran, then ecolog is as clear as he DENR s d o pro ec
Secretary of the DENR, his agents, and advance the said right.
representatives and other persons acting in his A denial or violation of that right by the
behalf to cancel all existing timber license owner who has the correlative duty or obligation
agreements in the country and to cease and to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
desist form receiving, accepting, processing, cause of action.
renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
The defendant moved for the dismissal
of the complaint on two grounds: 1) lack of cause
of action against him and 2) the issue raised was ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
a political question which properly pertains to the AND STATE POLICIES
legislative or executive branches. The trial court LLDA VS. CA
dismissed the complaint based on the 231 SCRA 292, 1994
aforementioned grounds. Thus, the petitioners
filed a special civil action for certiorari seeking to FACTS:
rescind and set aside. The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of
Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin,
ISSUE: Whether or not the said petitioners have Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the
a cause of action to prevent the misappropriation petitioner, seeking to stop the operation of the
or impairment of the Philippine rainforests and open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay
have the defendant stop form receiving, Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects
processing and approving timber license on the health of the residents and the possibility
agreements. of pollution of the water content of the
surrounding area. The LLDA conducted an on-
HELD: site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of
Yes. The petitioners have a cause of the leachate that seeps from said dumpsite to the
action. The complaint focuses on one specific nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao
fundamental legal right-the right to a balanced River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in found that the City Government of Caloocan was
our constitutional history, is solemnly maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, area without first securing an Environmental
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
provides that the State shall protect and advance Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful Department of Environment and Natural
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony Resources, and clearance from LLDA as required
of nature.This right unites with the right to health under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as amended by
which is provided for in SEC. 15 of Article 2. Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order
While the right to a balanced and No. 927
healthful ecology is to be found under the The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors,
it is less important than any of the civil and and other entities, to completely halt, stop and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage
right belongs to a different category of rights and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self- However, the City Government of Caloocan filed
preservation and self-perpetuation -- aptly and with the RTC an action for the declaration of
fittingly stressed by the petitioners -- the nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer
advancement of which may even be said to for the issuance of a writ of injunction. LLDA then
predate all governments and constitutions. As a filed a motion of Dismiss on the ground that their
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even order was merely subject to review of the CA and
be written in the Constitution for they are not the RTC.
assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned ISSUE:
in the fundamental charter, it is because of the Whether or not the LLDA have the power and
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the authority to issue a cease and desist order
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the HELD:
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their Yes. The LLDA, as a specialized
continuing importance and imposing upon the administrative agency, is specifically mandated
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
protect and advance the second, the day would laws to carry out and make effective the declared
not be too far when all else would be lost not national policy of promoting and accelerating the
only for the present generation, but also for development and balanced growth of the Laguna
those to come -- generations which stand to Lake including Caloocan City with due regard
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of and adequate provisions for environmental
sustaining life. management and control, preservation of the
The right to a balanced and healthful quality of human life and ecological systems, and
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
refrain from impairing the environment. The said deterioration and pollution. Under RA 4850 it
right implies, among many other things, the authorizes LLDA to “make, alter or modify orders
judicious management and conservation of the requiring the discontinuance of pollution.”
country's forests. Assuming arguendo that the
E.O. No.192 and the Administrative authority to issue a "cease and desist order"
Code of 1987 have set the objectives which were not expressly conferred by law, there is
serve as the bases for policy formulation and jurisprudence enough to the effect that the
have defined the powers and functions of the rule granting such authority need not
DENR, the primary government agency for the necessarily be express. While it is a
proper use and development of the countries fundamental rule that an administrative
agency has only such powers as are would have been necessary.
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a
settled rule that an administrative agency has The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as
also such powers as are necessarily implied amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA
in the exercise of its express powers. In the the means of directly enforcing such orders, has
exercise, therefore, of its express powers under provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to
its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body institute "necessary legal proceeding against any
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna person who shall commence to implement or
Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue continue implementation of any project, plan or
a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, program within the Laguna de Bay region without
implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to previous clearance from the LLDA."
a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that Clearly, said provision was designed to
in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in
Appeals, et al., 27 the Court ruled that the the regulation of all projects initiated in the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government
power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist or the private sector, insofar as the
order when there is prima facie evidence of an implementation of these projects is concerned. It
establishment exceeding the allowable standards was meant to deal with cases which might
set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The possibly arise where decisions or orders issued
ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers
Feliciano, declared: may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of
its laudable objective. To meet such
"Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and
by law and regulations in situations like that here injunction which are beyond the power of the
presented precisely because stopping the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper
continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated courts.
effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of
the Philippines cannot be made to wait until ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness AND STATE POLICIES
or propriety of such orders has run its full course, GARCIA VS. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
including multiple and sequential appeals such as 191 SCRA 288, 1990
those which Solar has taken, which of course
may take several years. The relevant pollution FACTS:
control statute and implementing regulations This is a petition to annul and set aside the
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of decision of the Board of Investments
that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the (BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of approving the transfer of the site of the proposed
the public, as well as the protection of plant and petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and
animal life, commonly designated as the police the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha
power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas
ordinary requirements of procedural due process (LPG).
yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests like those here involved, through the Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981,
exercise of police power. . . ." 576 hectares of the public domain located in
Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for the
The immediate response to the demands of Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the
"the necessities of protecting vital public administration, management, and ownership of
interests" gives vitality to the statement on the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
ecology embodied in the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies or the 1987 The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a
Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which wholly government owned corporation, located at
provides: Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of
naphtha.
"The State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project
ecology in accord with the rhythm and formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation
harmony of nature." (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a
new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of application specified Bataan as the plant site.
every person, it carries the correlative duty of One of the terms and conditions for registration of
non-impairment. This is but in consonance the project was the use of "naphtha cracker" and
with the declared policy of the state "to "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its
protect and promote the right to health of the petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was
people and instill health consciousness to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued
among them." 28 It is to be borne in mind a certificate of registration on February 24, 1988
that the Philippines is party to the Universal by BOI.
Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma
Conference Declaration of 1978 which BPC was given pioneer status and accorded
recognize health as a fundamental human fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like, (1)
right. 29 exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2)
repatriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and investments in currency originally made and at
desist order by the LLDA, as a practical the exchange rate obtaining at the time of
matter of procedure under the circumstances repatriation; and (3) remittance of earnings on
of the case, is a proper exercise of its power investments. As additional incentive, the House
and authority under its charter and its of Representatives approved a bill introduced by
amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist the petitioner eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax
order issued by the LLDA been complied with on naphtha if and when it is used as raw
by the City Government of Caloocan as it did materials in the petrochemical plant.
in the first instance, no further legal steps
However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong,

chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI
investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade committed a grave abuse of discretion in
Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant
January 25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire to from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the
amend the original registration certification of its change of feedstock from naphtha only to
project by changing the job site from Limay, naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the
Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the final say is in the investor all other circumstances
transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent
situation, and the presence in Batangas of a advantage to the government has been shown by
huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned this transfer. This is a repudiation of the
by the Philippine Shell Corporation. independent policy of the government expressed
in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its
The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal own affairs the way it deems best for the national
and no less than President Aquino expressed her interest.`
preference that the plant be established in
Bataan in a conference with the Taiwanese One can but remember the words of a great
investors, the Secretary of National Defense and Filipino leader who in part said he would not
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. mind having a government run like hell by
Filipinos than one subservient to foreign
Despite speeches in the Senate and House dictation. In this case, it is not even a foreign
opposing the transfer of the project to Batangas, government but an ordinary investor whom
BPC filed its request for approval of the the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do
amendments. Its application is as follows: "(1) with our heritage.
increasing the investment amount from US$220
million to US$320 million; (2) increasing the
production capacity of its naphtha cracker, ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) AND STATE POLICIES
changing the feedstock from naphtha only to ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC.
"naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas;" and (4) OF AGRARIAN REFORM
transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to 175 SCRA 343, 1989
Batangas. BOI states that it has taken a public
position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the FACTS:
site of the petrochemical complex, as this would In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible
provide a better distribution of industries around giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for
the Metro Manila area. In advocating the choice his life on his way to Mycenae after performing
of Bataan as the project site for the his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and
petrochemical complex, the BOI, however, made Hercules flung his adversary to the ground
it clear in its view that the BOI or the government thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even
for that matter could only recommend as to stronger to resume their struggle. This happened
where the project should be located. The BOI several times to Hercules' increasing
recognizes and respects the principle that the amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling,
final choice is still with the proponent who would it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son
in the final analysis provide the funding or risk of Gaea and could never die as long as any part
capital for the project. of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus
forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the
ISSUE: air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and
Whether or not there was abuse of discretion on crushed him to death.
the part of the Board of Investments for yielding
to the wishes of the investor, the national interest Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of
notwithstanding? life, without whose invigorating touch even the
powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
HELD:
YES. under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 The cases before us are not as fanciful as the
Constitution, it is the duty of the State to "regulate foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental
and exercise authority over foreign investments forces of life and death, of men and women who,
within its national jurisdiction and in accordance like Antaeus, need the sustaining strength of the
with its national goals and priorities." The precious earth to stay alive.
development of a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by "Land for the Landless" is a slogan that
Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, Article II of underscores the acute imbalance in the
the Constitution. distribution of this precious resource among our
people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary brooding centuries, it has become a battlecry
investment opportunity. It should not be treated dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of
like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as
venture, or even an assembler of cars or their place in the sun.
manufacturer of computer chips, where the BOI
reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935
The petrochemical industry is essential to the mandated the policy of social justice to "insure
national interest. the well-being and economic security of all the
people," especially the less privileged. In 1973,
In this particular BPC venture, not only has the new Constitution affirmed this goal, adding
the Government given unprecedented favors, specifically that "the State shall regulate the
but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and
surrenders even the power to make a disposition of private property and equitably
company abide by its initial choice, a choice diffuse property ownership and profits.'
free from any suspicion of unscrupulous Significantly, there was also the specific
machinations and a choice which is injunction to "formulate and implement an
undoubtedly in the best interests of the agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating
Filipino people. the tenant from the bondage of the soil."
The expropriation before us affects all private

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. agricultural lands whenever found and of
Besides echoing these sentiments, it also whatever kind as long as they are in excess of
adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on the maximum retention limits allowed their
Social Justice and Human Rights, containing owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for
grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the benefit not only of a particular community or
the uplift of the common people. These include a of a small segment of the population but of the
call in the following words for the adoption by the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our
State of an agrarian reform program. society, from the impoverished farmer to the
land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover
The cases involved have been consolidated only the whole territory of this country but goes
because they concern common legal questions, beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it
including serious challenges to the hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the
constitutionality of RA 6657 otherwise known as sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos.
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of Generations yet to come are as involved in this
1988 and other supplementary to RA 6657 such program as we are today, although hopefully only
as PD 27 (providing for the compulsory as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life
acquisition of private lands for distribution among we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our
tenant-farmers and to specify maximum land thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27) forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution
Pres. Proc. 131 (instituting CARP) and EO 229 itself that has ordained this revolution in the
(providing the mechanics of implementation of farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the
CARP) RA 6657 is the most recent legislation, farmers of lands that have heretofore been the
signed into law by Pres. Aquino on June 10, prison of their dreams but can now become the
1988. key at least to their deliverance.
ISSUE: WON RA 6657, PD 57, Proc. 31 & Eos Such a program will involve not mere millions of
228 & 229 considered as valid and pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering
constitutional? the vast areas of land subject to expropriation
under the laws before us, we estimate that
HELD: hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far
YES. The assailed laws are considered as a valid more indeed than the amount of P50 billion
exercise of both police power and of eminent initially appropriated, which is already staggering
domain. The extent that it sets retention limits is as it is by our present standards. Such amount is
an exercise of police power. It must be noted that in fact not even fully available at this time.
like taxation, the power of eminent domain could
be used as an implement of police power of the We assume that the framers of the Constitution
state. The expressed objective of the law was the were aware of this difficulty when they called for
promotion of the welfare of the farners, which agrarian reform as a top priority project of the
came clearly under the police power of the state. government. It is a part of this assumption that
To achieve this purpose, the law provided for the when they envisioned the expropriation that
expropriation of agricultural lands (subject to would be needed, they also intended that the just
minimum retention limits for the landowner) to be compensation would have to be paid not in the
distributed among the peasantry. As the orthodox way but a less conventional if more
ponencia observed: practical method. There can be no doubt that
they were aware of the financial limitations of the
The cases before us present no knotty government and had no illusions that there would
complication insofar as the question of be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent the lands they wanted to be distributed among
that the measures under challenge merely the farmers. We may therefore assume that their
prescribe retention limits for landowners, intention was to allow such manner of payment
there is an exercise of the police power for as is now provided for by the CARP Law,
the regulation of private property in particularly the payment of the balance (if the
accordance with the Constitution. But where, owner cannot be paid fully with money), or
to carry out such regulation, it becomes indeed of the entire amount of the just
necessary to deprive such owners of compensation, with other things of value. We
whatever lands they may own in excess of the may also suppose that what they had in mind
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a was a similar scheme of payment as that
taking under the power of eminent domain for prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in
which payment of just compensation is force at the time they deliberated on the new
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a Charter and with which they presumably agreed
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is in principle.
required is the surrender of the title to and the
physical possession of the said excess and all In relation thereto, the just compensation to be
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of made by the Government in the form of financial
the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an instruments and not money is justified by the
exercise not of the police power but of the power revolutionary character of of the scheme and the
of eminent domain. need to allow the government time to raise the
funds needed.
It bears repeating that the measures
challenged in these petitions contemplate ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
more than a mere regulation of the use of AND STATE POLICIES
private lands under the police power. We deal BASCO VS. PAGCOR
here with an actual taking of private 197 SCRA 52, 1991
agricultural lands that has dispossessed the
owners of their property and deprived them of FACTS:
all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle Petitioners seek to annul the Philippine
them to the just compensation mandated by Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
the Constitution. Charter - PD 1869, because it is allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and order.
Petitioners also claim that said PD has a
"gambling objective" and that Section 13 par 2 of Petitioner sent a telegram through the
the same PD which exempts PAGCOR from Secretary of the Assembly to all the members
paying any tax, any kind of term income or thereof informing ha here ill be no session
otherwise as well as fees, charges as levies of his No ember in ie of he in i a ion of Cong.
whatever nature whether national or local is Matalam. However, on November 2, 1987, the
violative of the principles of local autonomy for it Assembly held session and declared the seat of
is a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to the Speaker vacant. This was reiterated in
impose taxes and legal fees. another session on November 5 of same year.
ISSUE: Whether or not the local autonomy Respondents allege that because the
clause is violated by PD 1869 Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the
courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs,
HELD: much less strike down their acts.
The pe i ioner s con en ions are i ho
merit for the following reasons: ISSUE:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Are the so-called autonomous governments of
corporation hits no inherent right to impose Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to
taxes the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other
2. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject words, what is the extent of self-government
to control by Congress. It should be stressed given to the two autonomous governments of
that "municipal corporations are mere Region IX and XII?
creatures of Congress" which has the
power to "create and abolish municipal HELD:
corporations" due to its "general Yes, it may assume jurisdiction. In
legislative powers". Congress, therefore, resolving this case the SC made a differentiation
has the power of control over Local between decentralization of administration and
governments. And if Congress can grant decentralization of power.
the City of Manila the power to tax certain There is Decentralization of
matters, it can also provide for administration when the central government
exemptions or even take back the power. delegates administrative powers to political
3. The City of Manila's power to impose license subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
fees on gambling, has long been revoked. government power and in the process to make
Only the National Government has the local governments "more responsive and
power to issue "licenses or permits" for the accountable," and "ensure their fullest
operation of gambling. Necessarily, the development as self-reliant communities and
power to demand or collect license fees make them more effective partners in the pursuit
which is a consequence of the issuance of of national development and social progress." At
"licensesor permits" is no longer vested in the same time, it relieves the central government
the City of Manila. of the burden of managing local affairs and
4. Local governments have no power to tax enables it to concentrate on national concerns.
instrumentalities of the National The President exercises "general supervision"
Government. PAGCOR is a government over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs
owned or controlled corporation with an are administered according to law." He has no
original charter. control over their acts in the sense that he can
5. The power of local government to substitute their judgments with his own.
"impose taxes and fees" is always Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
subject to "limitations" which Congress involves an abdication of political power in the
may provide by law. Since PD 1869 favor of local governments units declared to be
remains an "operative'' law, its "exemption autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
clause" remains as an exception to the government is free to chart its own destiny and
exercise of the power of local governments shape its future with minimum intervention from
to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore central authorities.
be violative but rather is consistent with the An examination of the very Presidential
principle of local autonomy. Besides, the Decree creating the autonomous governments of
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Mindanao persuades us that they were never
Constitution simply means "decentralization". meant to exercise autonomy in the second
It does not make local governments sense, that is, in which the central government
sovereign within the slate or an - imperiurn in commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential
imperio. Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates
that "the President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions." In the second place, the
Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES made to discharge chiefly administrative
AND STATE POLICIES services.
LIMBONA VS. MANGELIN
170 SCRA 786, 1989 ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
FACTS: PAMATONG VS. COMELEC
Petitioner is the elected speaker of the G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
Batangas, pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly for brefity). Respondents are FACTS:
members of said Assembly.
Congressman Matalam, Chairman of Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong
the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President.
Representative invited the petitioner in his Respondent Commission on Elections
capacity as speaker of the Assembly to (COMELEC) refused to give due course to
participate in consultation and dialogue regarding pe i ioner s Cer ificate of Candidacy in its
the charting of the autonomous government of Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004.
Muslim Mindanao to be held in Manila. The decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and
Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as provision. Like the rest of the policies
they believed he had parties or movements to enumerated in Article II, the provision does not
back up his candidacy. contain any judicially enforceable constitutional
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved right but merely specifies a guideline for
for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. legislative or executive action.[3] The disregard of
Pe i ioner s Mo ion for Reconsidera ion as the provision does not give rise to any cause of
docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The action before the courts.
COMELEC, ac ing on pe i ioner s Mo ion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by An inquiry into the intent of the framers
other aspirants for national elective positions, produces the same determination that the
denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus provision is not self-executory. The original
Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. wording of the present Section 26, Article II had
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five read, T Sa a b ad
(35) others nuisance candidates who could not to public office and prohibit public
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not d a . Commissioner (now Chief Justice)
nominated by a political party or are not Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an
supported by a registered political party with a amendment that changed the word “broaden” to
national constituency. Commissioner Sadain the phrase “ensure equal access,” and the
maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, substitution of the word “office” to “service.” He
Commissioner Tancangco had retired. explained his proposal in this wise:
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari,
petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which I changed the word “b ad
were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to to ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO
eq al access o oppor ni ies for p blic ser ice because what is important would be
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 equal access to the opportunity. If
Constitution,[by limiting the number of qualified you broaden, it would necessarily
candidates only to those who can afford to wage mean that the government would be
a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by mandated to create as many offices
political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues as are possible to accommodate as
that the COMELEC indirectly amended the many people as are also possible.
constitutional provisions on the electoral process That is the meaning of broadening
and limited the power of the sovereign people to opportunities to public service. So, in
choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly order that we should not mandate the
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most State to make the government the
qualified among all the presidential candidates, number one employer and to limit
i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal offices only to what may be
qualifications for the office of the president, he is necessary and expedient yet offering
capable of waging a national campaign since he equal opportunities to access to it, I
has numerous national organizations under his change the word “broaden.” [7]
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an mphasis supplied)
international campaign since he has practiced
law in other countries, and he has a platform of Obviously, the provision is not intended
government. Petitioner likewise attacks the to compel the State to enact positive
validity of the form for the Certificate of measures that would accommodate as many
Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. people as possible into public office. The
Petitioner claims that the form does not provide a a Da d a d
clear and reasonable guidelines for determining indicates the design of the framers to cast the
the qualifications of candidates since it does not provision as simply enunciatory of a desired
ask for he candida e s bio-data and his program policy objective and not reflective of the
of government. imposition of a clear State burden.
ISSUE: Moreover, the provision as written leaves

Whether the constitutional provision ensuring much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the
eq al access o oppor ni ies for p blic office source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret
creates a constitutional right to run for or hold the clause as operative in the absence of
public office and, particularly in his case, to seek legislation since its effective means and reach
the presidency? are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under
HELD: this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended.[8]
NO.Implici in he pe i ioner s in oca ion Words and phrases such as “equal access,”
of he cons i ional pro ision ens ring eq al “opportunities,” and “public service” are
access o oppor ni ies for p blic office is he susceptible to countless interpretations owing to
claim that there is a constitutional right to run for their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was
or hold public office and, particularly in his case, not the intention of the framers to inflict on the
to seek the presidency. There is none. What is people an operative but amorphous foundation
recognized is merely a privilege subject to from which innately unenforceable rights may be
limitations imposed by law. Section 26, sourced.
Article II of the Constitution neither bestows
such a right nor elevates the privilege to the
level of an enforceable right. There is nothing As earlier noted, the privilege of equal
in the plain language of the provision which access to opportunities to public office may be
suggests such a thrust or justifies an subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations
interpretation of the sort. specifically on the privilege to seek elective office
are found in the provisions[9] of the Omnibus
The a acc provision is a Elec ion Code on N isance Candida es and
subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, COMELEC Resolution No. 6452[10] dated
en i led Declara ion of Principles and S a e December 10, 2002 outlining the instances
Policies. The provisions under the Article are wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse
generally considered not self-executing, and to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of
there is no plausible reason for according a Candidacy.
different treatment to the “equal access” As long as the limitations apply to
everybody equally without discrimination, Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by

however, the equal access clause is not violated. law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens full public disclosure of all its transactions
engendered by the limitations are meant to be involving public interest. (Art. II, Sec. 28).
borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional
is no showing that any person is exempt from the guarantee was bolstered by what this Court
limitations or the burdens which they create. declared as an imperative duty of the government
officials concerned to publish all important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES as well as all executive orders and proclamations
AND STATE POLICIES of general applicability. We granted Mandamus in
LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION said case, and in the process, We found
150 SCRA 530, 1987 occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said
duty:
FACTS:
The fundamental right of the people to . . . That duty must be enforced if the
information on matters of public concern is Constitutional right of the people to be informed
invoked in this special civil action for Mandamus on matters of public concern is to be given
instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi substance and reality. The law itself makes a list
against the Civil Service Commission. The of what should be published in the Official
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
for information on the civil service eligibilities of respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to
certain persons employed as sanitarians in the what must be included or excluded from such
Health Department of Cebu City. These publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, at 39)
government employees had allegedly
represented themselves as civil service eligibles The absence of discretion on the part of
who passed the civil service examinations for government agencies in allowing the
sanitarians. examination of public records, specifically,
the records in the Office of the Register of
ISSUE: Whether or not Legaspi should be Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. Ozaeta,
allowed such right supra:
HELD: Except, perhaps when it is clear that the

The constitutional right to information on purpose of the examination is unlawful, or
matters of public concern is recognized in the Bill sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is
of Rights. These constitutional provisions are the duty under the law of registration officers
self-executing. They supply the rules by means to concern themselves with the motives,
of which the right to information may be enjoyed reasons, and objects of the person seeking
by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty access to the records. It is not their
to afford access to sources of information. prerogative to see that the information which
Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized the records contain is not flaunted before
may be asserted by the people upon the public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it.
ratification of the constitution without need for any If it be wrong to publish the contents of the
ancillary act of the Legislature. What may be records, it is the legislature and not the
provided for by the Legislature are reasonable officials having custody thereof which is
conditions and limitations upon the access to be called upon to devise a remedy. . . . (Subido v.
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent Ozaeta, supra at 388).
with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements
interest. of this Court that government agencies are
For every right of the people without discretion in refusing disclosure of,
recognized as fundamental, there lies a or access to, information of public concern.
corresponding duty on the part of those who This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
govern, to respect and protect that right. That regulations which may be imposed by said
is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a agencies in custody of public records on the
constitutional regime. Only governments manner in which the right to information may
operating under fundamental rules defining the be exercised by the public. In the Subido case,
limits of their power so as to shield individual We recognized the authority of the Register of
rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons
claim to be constitutional. Without a government's desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy
acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by records relating to registered lands. However, the
the Constitution in order to uphold individual regulations which the Register of Deeds may
liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part promulgate are confined to:
of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to
the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a . . . prescribing the manner and hours of
sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion. examination to the end that damage to or loss of,
In recognizing the people's right to the records may be avoided, that undue
be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and interference with the duties of the custodian of
the New Charter expressly mandate the duty the books and documents and other employees
of the State and its agents to afford access to may be prevented, that the right of other persons
official records, documents, papers and in entitled to make inspection may be insured . . .
addition, government research data used as (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387).
basis for policy development, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We
guarantee has been further enhanced in the New recognized a similar authority in a municipal
Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the
public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable public of criminal docket records in the case of
conditions prescribed by law," in Article II, Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ,
Section 28 thereof, to wit: May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative
case was filed against the respondent judge for
his alleged refusal to allow examination of the second sentence). The law may therefore
criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a exempt certain types of information from public
finding by the Investigating Judge that the scrutiny, such as those affecting national
respondent had allowed the complainant to open security. It follows that, in every case, the
and view the subject records, We absolved the availability of access to a particular public record
respondent. In effect, We have also held that the must be circumscribed by the nature of the
rules and conditions imposed by him upon the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public
manner of examining the public records were concern or one that involves public interest, and,
reasonable. (b) not being exempted by law from the operation
of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We question is, therefore, whether or not the
were emphatic in Our statement that the authority information sought is of public interest or public
to regulate the manner of examining public concern.
records does not carry with it the power to
prohibit. A distinction has to be made between This question is first addressed to the
the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of government agency having custody of the
or access to a particular information and the desired information. However, as already
authority to regulate the manner in which the discussed, this does not give the agency
access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation concerned any discretion to grant or deny
upon the availability of access to the information access. In case of denial of access, the
sought, which only the Legislature may impose government agency has the burden of showing
(Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second that the information requested is not of public
pertains to the government agency charged with concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the
the custody of public records. Its authority to same has been exempted by law from the
regulate access is to be exercised solely to the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will
end that damage to, or loss of, public records serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly
may be avoided, undue interference with the observed, ". . . the government is in an
duties of said agencies may be prevented, and advantageous position to marshall and interpret
more importantly, that the exercise of the same arguments against release . . ." To safeguard the
constitutional right by other persons shall be constitutional right, every denial of access by the
assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra). government agency concerned is subject to
review by the courts, and in the proper case,
Thus, while the manner of examining public access may be compelled by a writ of
records may be subject to reasonable Mandamus.
regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the In determining whether or not a
information of public concern, and to afford particular information is of public concern there is
access to public records cannot be no rigid test which can be applied. "Public
discretionary on the part of said agencies. concern" like "public interest" is a term that
Certainly, its performance cannot be made eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a
contingent upon the discretion of such broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
1
agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the want to know, either because these directly
2
constitutional right may be rendered nugatory affect their lives, or simply because such
by any whimsical exercise of agency matters naturally arouse the interest of an
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for
discretionary, its performance may be the courts to determine in a case by case
compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper basis whether the matter at issue is of
case. interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to
issue? In the case before Us, the public right to The public concern invoked in the case of
be enforced and the concomitant duty of the Tañada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for
State are unequivocably set forth in the adequate notice to the public of the various laws
Constitution. The decisive question on the which are to regulate the actions and conduct of
propriety of the issuance of the writ of Mandamus citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra, the public
in this case is, whether the information sought by concern deemed covered by the statutory right
the petitioner is within the ambit of the was the knowledge of those real estate
constitutional guarantee. transactions which some believed to have been
registered in violation of the Constitution.
The incorporation in the Constitution of
a guarantee of access to information of public The information sought by the petitioner in this
concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the case is the truth of the claim of certain
free flow of ideas and information in a democracy government employees that they are civil service
(Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, eligibles for the positions to which they were
May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that appointed. The Constitution expressly declares
free discussion enables members of society to as a State policy that:
cope with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill
vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 [1939]), access to Appointments in the civil service shall be made
information of general interest aids the people in only according to merit and fitness to be
democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law determined, as far as practicable, and except as
Review 1505 [1974] by giving them a better to positions which are policy determining,
perspective of the vital issues confronting the primarily confidential or highly technical, by
nation. competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2. [2]).
But the constitutional guarantee to Public office being a public trust, [Const., Art.
information on matters of public concern is XI, Sec: 1] it is the legitimate concern of
not absolute. It does not open every door to citizens to ensure that government positions
any and all information. Under the requiring civil service eligibility are occupied
Constitution, access to official records, only by persons who are eligibles. Public
papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as officers are at all times accountable to the
may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7,
people even as to their eligibilities for their The public nature of the loanable funds
respective positions. of the GSIS and the public office held by the
alleged borrowers make the information sought
But then, it is not enough that the information clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
sought is of public interest. For Mandamus to Furthermore, the "constituent-ministrant"
lie in a given case, the information must not dichotomy characterizing government function
be among the species exempted by law from has long been repudiated. That the GSIS, in
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary
function would not justify the exclusion of the
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or transactions from the coverage and scope of the
deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has right to information.
failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Respondent next asserts that the
Law which would limit the petitioner's right to documents evidencing the loan transactions of
know who are, and who are not, civil service the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not
eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that covered by the Constitutional right to information
the names of those who pass the civil service on matters of public concern which guarantees
examinations, as in bar examinations and "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents,
licensure examinations for various professions, and papers pertaining to official acts,
are released to the public. Hence, there is transactions, or decisions" only.
nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility,
if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, It is argued that the records of the GSIS,
therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And a government corporation performing proprietary
when, as in this case, the government employees functions, are outside the coverage of the
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the people's right of access to official records. It is
public, through any citizen, has a right to verify further contended that since the loan function of
their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance
Commission. function, then its loan transactions are not
covered by the constitutional policy of full public
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian disclosure and the right to information which is
being of public concern, and in the absence applicable only to "official" transactions.
of express limitations under the law upon
access to the register of civil service eligibles First of all, the "constituent ----
for said position, the duty of the respondent ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government
Commission to confirm or deny the civil function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA v.
service eligibility of any person occupying the Confederation of Unions and Government
position becomes imperative. Mandamus, Corporations and Offices [G.R. Nos. L-21484 and
therefore lies. L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the
Court said that the government, whether carrying
out its sovereign attributes or running some
business, discharges the same function of
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES service to the people.
AND STATE POLICIES
VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting
170 SCRA 256, 1989 the loans, was exercising a proprietary function
would not justify the exclusion of the transactions
FACTS: from the coverage and scope of the right to
Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to information.
respondent Belmonte, General Manager of GSIS,
requesting the latter to furnish him the list of the Moreover, the intent of the members
names of the Batasang Pambansa members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who include government-owned and controlled
were able to secure clean loans immediately corporations and transactions entered into by
before the February 7 election thru the them within the coverage of the State policy
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady of full public disclosure is manifest from the
Imelda Marcos. records of the proceedings
The Deputy General counsel of the Considering the intent of the framers of
GSIS wrote back the petitioner turning down his the Constitution which, though not binding upon
request on the ground that there exists a the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
confidential relationship between the GSIS and considering further that government-owned and
all those who borrow from it, which confidence it controlled corporations, whether performing
is the GSIS is duty bound to preserve. proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus lies to compel convinced that transactions entered into by
respondent to perform the acts sought by the GSIS, a government-controlled
petitioner to be done, in pursuance of their right corporation created by special legislation are
to information within the ambit of the people's right to be
informed pursuant to the constitutional policy
HELD: of transparency in government dealings.
Yes. The people s righ o informa ion is In fine, petitioners are entitled to access
limited to matters of public concern and is further to the documents evidencing loans granted by
subject to such limitations as may be provided by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that
law. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the latter may promulgate relating to the manner
the government and its employees and and hours of examination, to the end that
administration of various insurance programs for damage to or loss of the records may be avoided,
the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds that undue interference with the duties of the
assume a public character. It is the legitimate custodian of the records may be prevented and
concern of the public to ensure that these that the right of other persons entitled to inspect
funds are managed properly with the end in the records may be insured
view of maximizing the benefits to insured However, although citizens are
government employees. afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the Constitution does not GRP.

accord them a right to compel custodians of The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the
summaries and the like in their desire to Malaysian government, the parties signing on the
acquire information on matters of public same date the Agreement on the General
concern. Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks
Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF
thereafter suspended all its military actions.
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES Formal peace talks between the parties
AND STATE POLICIES were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001,
AQUINO-SARMIENTO VS. MORATO the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
203 SCRA 515, 1991 Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001)
containing the basic principles and agenda on the
FACTS: following aspects of the negotiation: Security
Petitioner, a member of respondent Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral
MTRCB, wrote its records officer requesting that Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral
she be allowed to examine the board's records Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement
pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the 2001 simpl agreed hat the same be discussed
individual board members after a review of the f r her b he Par ies in heir ne mee ing.
movies and television productions. It is on the A second round of peace talks was held in
basis of said slips that films are either banned, Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which
cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request ended with the signing of the Implementing
was denied by respondent Morato on the ground Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli
that whenever the members of the board sit in Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status
judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected between the parties. This was followed by the
in the individual voting slips partake the nature of Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian
conscience votes and as such, are purely and Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the
completely private and personal. Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on
Petitioner counters that the records she May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia.
wishes to examine are public in character and Nonetheless, there were many incidence of
other than providing for reasonable conditions violence between government forces and the
regulating the manner and hours of examination, MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF
respondents have no authority to deny any Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July
citizen seeking examination of the board's 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad,
records. who was then the chief peace negotiator of the
MILF. M rad s posi ion as chief peace nego ia or
ISSUE: Was he responden s denial of was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.
pe i ioner s req es proper? In 2005, several exploratory talks were held
between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually
HELD: leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its
We find respondents' refusal to allow final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be
petitioner to examine the records of respondent signed last August 5, 2008.
MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review Before the Court is what is perhaps the most
committee as well as the individual voting slips of con en io s consens s e er embodied in an
its members, as violative of petitioner's instrument the MOA-AD which is assailed
constitutional right of access to public records. principally by the present petitions bearing docket
May the decisions of respondent Board numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and
and the individual members concerned, arrived at 183962. Commonly impleaded as respondents
in an official capacity, be considered private? are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. On
classification board, there is no doubt that its very July 23, 2008, the Province of North
existence is public in character; it is an office Cotabato[and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol
created to serve public interest. it being the case, filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for
respondents can Jay no valid claim to privacy. Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the
The right to privacy belongs to the individual Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
acting in his private capacity and not to a Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right
governmental agency or officers tasked with, and to information on matters of public concern,
acting in, the discharge of public duties. petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and
official copies of the MOA-AD including its
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of
AND STATE POLICIES the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTOBATO VS. GRP contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a
PEACE PANEL public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008 petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. This initial petition was followed
by several other petitions by other parties. The
FACTS: Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
assumed office, the military offensive against the ISSUE:
MILF was suspended and the government sought Whe her here is a iola ion of he people s righ
a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, to information on matters of public concern (1987
according to a leading MILF member, initially Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state
responded with deep reservation, but when policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
President Arroyo asked the Government of involving public interest (1987 Constitution,
Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation
Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL
to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991?
Central Committee to seriously discuss the
matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the HELD:
YES. The right of the people to information on inclusion of negotiations leading to the
matters of public concern shall be recognized. cons mma ion of he ransac ion. Cer ainl , a
Access to official records, and to documents, and consummated contract is not a requirement for
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or the exercise of the right to information.
decisions, as well as to government research Otherwise, the people can never exercise the
data used as basis for policy development, shall right if no contract is consummated, and if one is
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations consummated, it may be too late for the public to
as may be provided by law. expose its defects.
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the
Court has recognized the statutory right to Requiring a consummated contract
examine and inspect public records, a right which will keep the public in the dark until the
was eventually accorded constitutional status. contract, which may be grossly
The right of access to public disadvantageous to the government or even
documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has the State policy of full transparency on
been recognized as a self-executory matters of public concern, a situation which
constitutional right. the framers of the Constitution could not have
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge intended. Such a requirement will prevent the
Dimaano,the Court ruled that access to public citizenry from participating in the public
records is predicated on the right of the people to discussion of any proposed contract,
acquire information on matters of public concern effectively truncating a basic right enshrined
since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an
has a legitimate interest in matters of social and emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a
political significance. The incorporation of this re rea b he S a e of i s a o ed polic of f ll
right in the Constitution is a recognition of the disclosure of all its transactions involving public
fundamental role of free exchange of information in eres .
in a democracy. There can be no realistic In ended as a splendid s mme r to the
percep ion b he p blic of he na ion s problems, right to information under the Bill of Rights is the
nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if policy of public disclosure under Section 28,
they are denied access to information of general Article II of the Constitution. The policy of full
interest. Information is needed to enable the public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted
members of society to cope with the exigencies Section 28 complements the right of access to
of the times. As has been aptly observed: information on matters of public concern found in
Main aining he flo of s ch informa ion the Bill of Rights. The right to information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and guarantees the right of the people to demand
its dissemination since, if either process is information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty
in err p ed, he flo ine i abl ceases. of officialdom to give information even if nobody
In the same way that free discussion demands.
enables members of society to cope with the The policy of public disclosure establishes
exigencies of their time, access to information of a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of
general interest aids the people in democratic public affairs in a genuinely open democracy,
decision-making by giving them a better i h he people s righ o kno as he
perspective of the vital issues confronting the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
nation, so that they may be able to criticize and accountable by following such policy. These
participate in the affairs of the government in a provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom
responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It of expression and essential to hold public officials
is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited at all times accountable to the people.
exchange of ideas among a well-informed public Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the
that a government remains responsive to the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
changes desired by the people. Commission so disclose.
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
That the subject of the information
sought in the present cases is a matter of POLICE POWER
public concern faces no serious challenge. In
fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE
indeed of public concern. In previous cases, EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON. DRILON
the Court found that the regularity of real G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988, SARMIENTO,
estate transactions entered in the Register of J.
Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the
public of the various laws, the civil service Facts:
eligibility of a public employee, the proper
management of GSIS funds allegedly used to The petitioner, Philippine Association of
grant loans to public officials, the recovery of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
Ma c a d -gotten wealth,[120] "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
and the identity of party-list nominees, among workers, male and female, for overseas
others, are matters of public concern. placement," challenges the Constitutional validity
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
present cases is of public concern, involving Department of Labor and Employment, in the
as it does the sovereignty and territorial character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
integrity of the State, which directly affects TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
the lives of the public at large. DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for
Matters of public concern covered by certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the
the right to information include steps and measure is assailed for "discrimination against
negotiations leading to the consummation of males or females;" that it "does not apply to all
the contract. In not distinguishing as to the Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
executory nature or commercial character of females with similar skills;" and that it is violative
agreements, the Court has categorically ruled of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an
ha he righ o informa ion con empla es invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police
power being legislative, and not executive, in unrestricted license to act according to one's
character. will." It is subject to the far more overriding
In this petition for certiorari and demands and requirements of the greater
prohibition, PASEI, challenges the validity of number.
Department Order No. 1 (deployment ban) of the Notwithstanding its extensive sweep,
DOLE on the following grounds: 1) it is police power is not without its own
discriminatory as it only applies to female limitations. For all its awesome
workers; 2) it is an invalid exercise of the consequences, it may not be exercised
lawmaking power. The respondents invoke the arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in
police power of the Philippine State. that event, it defeats the purpose for which it
is exercised, that is, to advance the public
Issue: Whether or not the enactment of DO No. 1 good. Thus, when the power is used to further
is a valid exercise of police power. private interests at the expense of the
citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.
Held: Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. DO No. 1 applies only to "female
Police power has been defined as the "state contract workers," but it does not thereby make
authority to enact legislation that may interfere an undue discrimination between the sexes.
with personal liberty or property in order to Eq ali before he la " admi s of classifica ions,
promote the general welfare." It finds no specific provided that (1) such classifications rest on
Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to
does not owe its origin to the Charter. It is a the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined
fundamental attribute of government that has to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of to all members of the same class. It is the
governance. It constitutes an implied limitation on avowed objective of DO No. 1 to "enhance the
the Bill of Rights. However, police power is not protection for Filipino female overseas workers.
without its own limitations. It may not be Discrimination in this case is justified.
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Police power is the domain of the
It is admitted that Department Order No. legislature, but it does not mean that such an
1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The authority may not be lawfully delegated. The
only question is whether or not it is valid under Labor Code itself vests the DOLE with
the Constitution. rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
The concept of police power is well- Hence it is a valid exercise of police power.
established in this jurisdiction. It has been
defined as the "state authority to enact ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
legislation that may interfere with personal 101 PHIL. 1155
liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) FACTS:
an imposition of restraint upon liberty or Republic Act 1180 or commonly known
property, (2) in order to foster the common as An Ac o Reg la e he Re ail B siness as
good. It is not capable of an exact definition passed. The said law provides for a prohibition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general against foreigners as well as corporations owned
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in
embrace. our country.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the Retail Trade Nationalization Law, on the premise
future where it could be done, provides enough that it violated several treaties which under the
room for an efficient and flexible response to rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the principle of international law, should be observed
greatest benefits." by the Court in good faith.
It finds no specific Constitutional
grant for the plain reason that it does not owe ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade
its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing Nationalization Law is unconstitutional for it is in
power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the conflict with treaties which are generally accepted
very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a principles of international law.
fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of HELD:
governance. Marshall, to whom the expression The Supreme Court said it saw no
has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the conflict. The reason given by the Court was that
plenary power of the State "to govern its the Retail Trade National Law was passed in the
citizens." exercise of the police power which cannot be
"The police power of the State . . . is a bargained away through the medium of a treaty
power coextensive with self-protection, and it is or a contract.
not inaptly termed the 'law of overwhelming The law in question was enacted to
necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and remedy a real actual threat and danger to
plenary power in the State which enables it to national economy posed by alien dominance
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and control of the retail business and free the
and welfare of society." citizens and country from such dominance
It constitutes an implied limitation on and control; that the enactment clearly falls
the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is within the scope of the police power of the
"rooted in the conception that men in State, thru which and by which it protects its
organizing the state and imposing upon its own personality and insures its security and
government limitations to safeguard future.
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to Resuming what we have set forth above
enable an individual citizen or a group of we hold that the disputed law was enacted to
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the remedy a real actual threat and danger to
enactment of such salutary measures national economy posed by alien dominance and
calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, control of the retail business and free citizens and
good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill country from such dominance and control; that
of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even police power of the state, through which and by
liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not which it protects its own personality and insures
its security and future; that the law does not compensable taking is concerned. To the extent
violate the equal protection clause of the that the measures under challenge merely
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for prescribe retention limits for landowners,
the distinction between alien and citizen in the there is an exercise of the police power for
exercise of occupation regulated, nor the due the regulation of private property in
process of the law clause; because the law is accordance with the Constitution. But where,
prospective in operation and recognizes the to carry out such regulation, it becomes
privilege of aliens already engaged in the necessary to deprive such owners of
occupation and reasonably protects their whatever lands they may own in excess of the
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
to carry out its objectives appear to us to be taking under the power of eminent domain for
plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not which payment of just compensation is
only appropriate but actually necessary - and that imperative. The taking contemplated is not a
in any case such matter falls within the mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
prerogative of the legislature, with whose power required is the surrender of the title to and the
and discretion the judicial department of the physical possession of the said excess and
Government may not interfere; that the provisions all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is
this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled definitely an exercise not of the police power
the legislature of the segment of the population but of the power of eminent domain.
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for Wherefore, the Court holds the constitutionality of
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and
no treaty has actually been entered into on the E.O. Nos. 228 and 229. However, the title to all
subject and the police power may not be curtailed expropriated properties shall be transferred to the
or surrendered by any treaty or any other State only upon full payment of compensation to
conventional agreement. their respective owners.
WALTER LUTZ, et. al vs. ANTONIO ARANETA, FLORENTINA A. LOZANO vs. HONORABLE
G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955, REYES, ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, et.al
J.B L., J. G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986, YAP, J.
Facts: Plaintiffs seek to recover tax from the Facts: Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for
respondent alleging that such is unconstitutional short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check
and void, being levied for the aid and support of Law punishes a person "who makes or draws
the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's and issues any check on account or for value,
opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax knowing at the time of issue that he does not
may be constitutionally levied. The action having have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, bank for the payment of said check in full upon
the plaintiffs appealed the case directly to the presentment, which check is subsequently
Supreme Court. dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of tax under for the same reason had not the drawer, without
the CA No. 567 is a valid exercise of police any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
power. payment." Those who question the
constitutionality of BP 22 insist that it offends the
Held: Yes. The tax is levied with a regulatory constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment
purpose, to provide means for the for debt and it contravenes the equal protection
rehabilitation and stabilization of the clause.
threatened sugar industry. In other words, the
act is primarily an exercise of the police Issue: Whether or not the enactment of BP 22 is
power. The protection of a large industry a valid exercise of police power.
constituting one of the great sources of the
state's wealth and therefore directly or indirectly Held: Yes. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid
affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the exercise of the police power and is not
population of the State is affected to such an repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
extent by public interests as to be within the against imprisonment for debt. It may be
police power of the sovereign.The decision constitutionally impermissible for the
appealed from is affirmed. legislature to penalize a person for non-
payment of a debt ex contractu. But certainly
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
THE PHILIPPINES, INC., et. al body to proscribe certain acts deemed
vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
REFORM Acts mala in se are not the only acts which
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, CRUZ, J. the law can punish. An act may not be
considered by society as inherently wrong,
Facts: In these consolidated cases, petitioners hence, not malum in se but because of the
primarily assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. harm that it inflicts on the community, it can
6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. be outlawed and criminally punished as
228 and 229 arguing that no private property malum prohibitum. The state can do this in
shall be taken for public use without just the exercise of its police power. There is no
compensation. The respondent invokes the substance in the claim that the statute in question
police power of the State. denies equal protection of the laws or is
discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of
Issue: Whether or not the taking of property the check, but not the payee. Wherefore, the
under the said laws is a valid exercise of police decision rendered by the respondent judge is
power or of the power of eminent domain. hereby set aside.
Recent statistics of the Central Bank
Held: It is an exercise of the power of eminent show that one-third of the entire money supply of
domain. The cases present no knotty the country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion,
complication insofar as the question of consists of peso demand deposits; the remaining
two-thirds consists of currency in circulation. province to another for the purpose of

These demand deposits in the banks constitute preventing indiscriminate slaughter of these
the funds against which, among others, animals. The petitioner had transported six
commercial papers like checks, are drawn. The carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo where they were
magnitude of the amount involved amply justifies confiscated for violation of the said order. He
the legitimate concern of the state in preserving sued for recovery and challenges the
the integrity of the banking system. Flooding the constitutionality of the said order. The lower court
system with worthless checks is like pouring sustained the confiscation of the carabaos. He
garbage into the bloodstream of the nation's appealed the decision to the Intermediate
economy. Appellate Court which upheld the lower court.
The effects of the issuance of a Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
worthless check transcends the private interests
of the parties directly involved in the transaction Issue: Whether or not the purpose of E.O. 626-A
and touches the interests of the community at is a valid exercise of police power.
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong
to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the Held: No. We do not see how the prohibition
public. The harmful practice of putting of the interprovincial transport of carabaos
valueless commercial papers in circulation, can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
multiplied a thousandfold, can very well considering that they can be killed anywhere,
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, with no less difficulty in one province than in
injure the banking system and eventually hurt another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in
the welfare of society and the public interest. one province will not prevent their slaughter
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 there, any more than moving them to another
a valid exercise of the police power and is not province will make it easier to kill them there.
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
imprisonment for debt. apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by
simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However,
DECS v San Diego if the movement of the live animals for the
180 SCRA 233, Cruz, J. purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason
Facts: The petitioner disqualified the private either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be
respondent who had actually taken and failed flippant, dead meat.
four times the National Medical Admission Test Even if a reasonable relation between
from taking it again under its regulation. But the the means and the end were to be assumed, we
private respondent contends that he is still would still have to reckon with the sanction that
entitled and hence, applied to take a fifth the measure applies for violation of the
examination based on constitutional grounds: prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of
right to academic freedom and quality education, the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be
due process and equal protection. He filed a meted out by the executive authorities, usually
petition for mandamus. The respondent judge the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute
declared the said rule invalid and granted the was sustained because the penalty prescribed
petition. was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused.
Issue: Whether or not the three flunk rule is a Under the challenged measure, significantly, no
valid exercise of police power. such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the
Held: Yes. The police power is validly exercised police and declared, by the measure itself, as
if (a) the interests of the public generally, as forfeited to the government.
distinguished from those of a particular class, In the instant case, the carabaos were
require the interference of the State, and (b) the arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
means employed are reasonably necessary to commander, were returned to the petitioner only
the attainment of the object sought to be after he had filed a complaint for recovery and
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which
individuals. Thus, the subject of the challenged was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
regulation is certainly within the ambit of the produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial
police power. It is the right and indeed the court. The executive order defined the
responsibility of the State to insure that the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
medical profession is not infiltrated by immediately imposed punishment, which was
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily carried out forthright. The measure struck at once
entrust their lives and health. While every and pounced upon the petitioner without giving
person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
does not have a constitutional right to be a centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
doctor. The private respondent has failed the In the instant case, the challenged
NMAT five times and this is sufficed to say that measure is an invalid exercise of the police
he must yield to the challenged rule and give way power because the method employed to
to those better prepared. The Court upheld the conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse,
intended to limit the admission to medical schools is unduly oppressive. Moreover, there was no
only to those who have initially proved their such pressure of time or action calling for the
competence and preparation for a medical petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties
education. The decision of the respondent judge involved were not even inimical per se as to
is reversed. require their instant destruction. Thus, the Court
cannot say with equal certainty that it complies
with the second requirement, that there be a
Ynot v IAC lawful method. The reasonable connection
148 SCRA 659, Cruz, J. between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned
Facts: President Marcos issued E.O. 626-A measure is missing. Executive Order No. 626-A
amending E.O. 626, which prohibits the is hereby declared unconstitutional.
transport of carabaos or carabeefs from one
Ci G fQ e Ci E ic a The general power to exercise the right

122 SCRA 759, Gutierrez, Jr., J of eminent domain must not be confused with the
right to exercise it in a particular case. The
Facts: Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a power of the legislature to confer, upon
petition seeking to annul Section 9 of Ordinance municipal corporations and other entities
No. 6118, S-64, requiring private cemeteries to within the State, general authority to exercise
reserve 6% of its total area for the burial of the right of eminent domain cannot be
paupers, on the ground that it is contrary to the questioned by courts, but the general
Constitution. The petitioner contends that the authority of municipalities or entities must
said order was a valid exercise of police power not be confused with the right to exercise it in
under the general welfare clause. The particular instances. The moment the municipal
respondent court declared the said order null and corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
void. Hence, this instant petition. authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The
Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance necessity for conferring the authority upon a
in question is a valid exercise of police power. municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of
Held: No. Section 9 cannot be justified under the the legislature. But whether or not the
power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the municipal corporation or entity is exercising
license fee, and regulate such other business, the right in a particular case under the
trades, and occupation as may be established or conditions imposed by the general authority,
practice in the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, is a question which the courts have the right
R.A. 537). The ordinance in question not only to inquire into.
confiscates but also prohibits the operation When the courts come to determine the
of a memorial park cemetery. As defined, question, they must only find (a) that a law or
police power is 'the power of promoting the authority exists for the exercise of the right of
public welfare by restraining and regulating eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
the use of liberty and property'. In the instant authority is being exercised in accordance with
case, Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series the law. In the present case there are two
of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police conditions imposed upon the authority conceded
regulation but an outright confiscation. It to the City of Manila: First, the land must be
deprives a person of his private property without private; and, second, the purpose must be public.
due process of law, nay, even without The authority of the city of Manila to expropriate
compensation. There is no reasonable relation private lands for public purposes, is not denied as
between the setting aside of at least six (6) provided in its Charter. However, if the court,
percent of the total area of an private upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it
deceased paupers and the promotion of cannot be contended that the right is being
health, morals, good order, safety, or the exercised in accordance with law. In the instant
general welfare of the people. The ordinance case, the record does not show conclusively that
is actually a taking without compensation of a the plaintiff has definitely decided that there
certain area from a private cemetery to benefit exists a necessity for expropriation. The decision
paupers who are charges of the municipal of the lower court is affirmed.
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
the burden to private cemeteries. As a matter of Republic v PLDT
fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general 26 SCRA 620, Reyes, J.B.L., J.
welfare clause or on implied powers of the
municipal corporation, not on any express Facts: The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines,
provision of law as statutory basis of their is a political entity exercising governmental
exercise of power. The petition for review is powers through its branches and
hereby dismissed instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of
Telecommunications. While the respondent,
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN Philippine Long Distance Telephone has the
power to install, operate and maintain a
City of Manila v Chinese Community telephone system throughout the Philippines and
40 Phil 349, Johnson, J. to carry on the business of electrical transmission
of messages within the Philippines and between
Facts: The plaintiff prayed that certain lands be the Philippines and the telephone systems of
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a other countries. Sometime in 1933, the defendant
public improvement into an extension of Rizal and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into
Avenue, Manila which is necessary for the an agreement whereby telephone messages,
plaintiff to exercise in fee simple of certain could automatically be transferred to the lines of
parcels of land. The defendant on the other hand, PLDT; and vice-versa. The Bureau of
contends that the expropriation was not Telecommunications set up its own
necessary as a public improvement and that the Government Telephone System by utilizing its
plaintiff has no right to expropriate the said own appropriation and equipment and by
cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable
purposes. The lower court declared that there government offices to call private parties. The
was no necessity for the said expropriation. respondent said that the bureau was violating the
Hence, this appeal. conditions under which their Private Branch
Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the
Issue: Whether or not the Courts can inquire into PLDT's facilities. The petitioner prayed
the necessity of expropriation of delegate, such commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with
as the City of Manila? it, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities
of defendant's telephone system. The lower court
Held: The right of expropriation is not an rendered judgment that it could not compel the
inherent power in a municipal corporation, PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau
and before it can exercise the right some law because the parties were not in agreement. Both
must exist conferring the power upon it. parties appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the Bureau of

Telecommunications has the right to demand
interconnection between the Government
Telephone System and the PLDT. Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi
GR No. 20620, Aug.15, 1974
Held: Yes. It is true that parties cannot be
coerced to enter into a contract where no Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied
agreement was made between them. Freedom to the land of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi from 1
stipulate such terms and conditions is of the July 1947, by virtue of a contract of lease, on
essence of our contractual system, and by a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to
express provision of the statute, a contract may June 30 of the succeeding year). The Republic
be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused.
undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil The AFP refused to vacate the leased premises
Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has after the termination of the contract because it
apparently overlooked that while the Republic would difficult for the army to vacate the premises
may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract in view of the permanent installations and other
with it, the Republic, in the exercise of the facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were
sovereign of eminent domain, may require the erected and already established on the property.
telephone company to permit interconnection Castellvi then brought suit to eject the
of the Government Telephone System and Philippine Air Force from the land. While this
that of PLDT, as the needs of the government ejectment case was pending, the Republic
service may require, subject to the payment filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent
of just compensation. Ultimately, the domain against the respondents over the 3
beneficiary of the interconnecting service would parcels of land. In its complaint, the Republic
be the users of both telephone systems, so that alleged, among other things, that the fair market
condemnation would be for public use. value of the above-mentioned lands, according to
the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of
Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per
People v. Fajardo hectare.The court authorizes the Republic to take
GR 12172, Aug. 29 1958 immediate possession of the lands upon deposit
of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of
Facts: The municipal council of Baao, Camarines Pampanga.In 1961, the trial court, rendered its
Sur stating among others that construction of a decision in the ejectment case, finding that the
building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, unanimous recommendation of the
shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for
at the expense of the owner, enacted an the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just; and
ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written required the Republic to pay interests.
request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a
permit to construct a building adjacent to their Issue: Whe her he aking of Cas ell i s proper
gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in occurred in 1947 or in 1959.
Fajardo's name, located along the national
highway and separated from the public plaza by Held: The Republic urges that the "taking " of
a creek. The request was denied, for the reason Castellvi's property should be deemed as of the
among others that the proposed building would year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease
destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. agreement. In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26,
Defendants reiterated their request for a building 2nd edition, Section 157, on the subject of
permit, but again the mayor turned down the "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of
request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with "taking" (in eminent domain) as follows:
the construction of the building without a permit,
because they needed a place of residence very "Taking under the power of eminent domain
badly, their former house having been destroyed may be defined generally as entering upon
by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on private property for more than a momentary
leased property. Thereafter, defendants were period, and, under the warrant or color of legal
charged in violation of the ordinance and authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise
subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal. informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it
in such a way as substantially to oust the owner
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
exercise of police power. thereof."
Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of
power. The ordinance is unreasonable and circumstances must be present in the "taking" of
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently property for purposes of eminent domain.
deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police First, the expropriator must enter a private
power, and amounts to a taking of appellant s property. This circumstance is present in the
property without just compensation. We do not instant case, when by virtue of the lease
overlook that the modern tendency is to regard agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took
the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive possession of the property of Castellvi.
to the comfort and happiness of residents.
As the case now stands, every structure Second, the entrance into private property must
that may be erected on appellants' land, be for more than a momentary period.
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of
under the ordinance in question, because it but a moment's duration" (The Oxford English
would interfere with the view of the public plaza Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); "lasting a very
from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, short time; transitory; having a very brief life;
be constrained to let their land remain idle and operative or recurring at every moment"
unused for the obvious purpose for which it is (Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963
best suited, being urban in character. To legally edition.) The word "momentary" when applied to
achieve that result, the municipality must give possession or occupancy of (real) property
appellants just compensation and an should be construed to mean "a limited period"
opportunity to be heard. not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease
contract was for a period of one year, renewable monthly rentals until the time when it filed the
from year to year. The entry on the property, complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
under the lease, is temporary, and considered
transitory. The fact that the Republic, through It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's
the AFP, constructed some installations of a property for purposes of eminent domain cannot
permanent nature does not alter the fact that be considered to have taken place in 1947 when
the entry into the land was transitory, or the Republic commenced to occupy the property
intended to last a year, although renewable as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention
from year to year by consent of the owner of of Castellvi that two essential elements in the
the land. By express provision of the lease "taking" of property under the power of eminent
agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and
to return the premises in substantially the occupation by the condemnor must be for a
same condition as at the time the property permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in
was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed devoting the property to public use the owner
that the INTENTION of the lessee was to was ousted from the property and deprived of its
occupy the land permanently, as may be beneficial use, were not present when the
inferred from the construction of permanent Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi
improvements. But this "INTENTION" cannot property in 1947.
prevail over the clear and express terms of
the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced Untenable also is the Republic's contention that
from the language employed by the parties, although the contract between the parties was
and the terms of the contract, when one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in
unambiguous, as in the instant case, are reality a more or less permanent right to occupy
conclusive in the absence of averment and the premises under the guise of lease with the
proof of mistake or fraud the question being 'right and privilege' to buy the property should the
not what the intention wag, but what is lessor wish to terminate the lease," and "the right
expressed in the language used. Moreover, in to buy the property is merged as an integral part
order to judge the intention of the contracting of the lease relationship . . . so much so that the
parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent fair market value has been agreed upon, not as
acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, of the time of purchase, but as of the time of
Civil Code). If the intention of the lessee occupancy". 15 We cannot accept the Republic's
(Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy contention that a lease on a year to year basis
permanently Castellvi's property, why was the can give rise to a permanent right to occupy,
contract of lease entered into on year to year since by express legal provision a lease made for
basis? Why was the lease agreement renewed a determinate time, as was the lease of
from year to year? Why did not the Republic Castellvi's land in the instant case, ceases upon
expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, the day fixed, without need of a demand (Article
according to the Republic itself, it expropriated 1669, Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the
the other parcels of land that it occupied at the right of eminent domain may be exercised by
same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose simply leasing the premises to be expropriated
of converting them into a jet air base?" It might (Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it
really have been the intention of the Republic to be accepted that the Republic would enter into a
expropriate the lands in question at some future contract of lease where its real intention was to
time, but certainly mere notice much less an buy, or why the Republic should enter into a
implied notice of such intention on the part of the simulated contract of lease ("under the guise of
Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did lease", as expressed by counsel for the Republic)
not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind when all the time the Republic had the right of
the land itself. The expropriation must be actually eminent domain, and could expropriate
commenced in court. Castellvi's land if it wanted to without resorting to
any guise whatsoever. Neither can we see how a
Third, the entry into the property should be under right to buy could be merged in a contract of
warrant or color of legal authority. This lease in the absence of any agreement between
circumstance in the "taking" may be considered the parties to that effect. To sustain the
as present in the instant case, because the contention of the Republic is to sanction a
Republic entered the Castellvi property as practice whereby in order to secure a low price
lessee. for a land which the government intends to
expropriate (or would eventually expropriate) it
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public would first negotiate with the owner of the land to
use or otherwise informally appropriated or lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then
injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the expropriate the same when the lease is about to
circumstance of the property being devoted to terminate, then claim that the "taking" of the
public use is present because the property was property for the purposes of the expropriation be
used by the air force of the AFP. reckoned as of the date when the Government
started to occupy the property under the lease,
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use and then assert that the value of the property
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the the lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the
property. In the instant case, the entry of the property, for many good reasons, had in the
Republic into the property and its utilization of the meantime increased during the period of the
same for public use did not oust Castellvi and lease. This would be sanctioning what obviously
deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the is a deceptive scheme, which would have the
property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was effect of depriving the owner of the property of its
continuously recognized as owner by the true and fair market value at the time when the
Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease expropriation proceedings were actually instituted
contract from year to year, and by the provision in in court. The Republic's claim that it had the "right
the lease contract whereby the Republic and privilege" to buy the property at the value
undertook to return the property to Castellvi when that it had at the time when it first occupied the
the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the contract. What was agreed expressly in
property, because the Republic was bound to paragraph No. 5 of the lease agreement was
pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed that, should the lessor require the lessee to
return the premises in the same condition as at portion of said lot for the construction of the
the time the same was first occupied by the AFP, Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Amigable's
the lessee would have the "right and privilege" (or counsel wrote to the President of the Philippines,
option) of paying the lessor what it would fairly requesting payment of theportion of her lot which
cost to put the premises in the same condition as had been appropriated by the government. The
it was at the commencement of the lease, in lieu claim was indorsed tothe Auditor General, who
of the lessee's performance of the undertaking to disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement. Thus,
put the land in said condition. The "fair value" at Amigable filed in thecourt a quo a complaint,
the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease against the Republic of the Philippines and
agreement, does not refer to the value of the Nicolas Cuenca(Commissioner of Public
property if bought by the lessee, but refers to the Highways) for the recovery of ownership and
cost of restoring the property in the same possession of her lot.
condition as of the time when the lessee took On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its
possession of the property. Such fair value decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over
cannot refer to the purchase price, for purchase the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of
was never intended by the parties to the lease possession and ownership of the lot on the
contract. It is a rule in the interpretation of ground that the government cannot be sued
contracts that "However general the terms of a without its consent, that it had neither original nor
contract may be, they shall not be understood to appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff's
comprehend things that are distinct and cases claim for compensatory damages, being a money
that are different from those upon which the claim against the government; and that it had
parties intended to agree" (Art. 1372, Civil Code). long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over
said claim because the government had not
given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the
(A number of circumstances must be complaint was dismissed.
presen in he aking of proper for p rposes of
eminent domain. First, the expropriator must Issue: Can the appellant sue the government?
enter a private property. Second, the entrance
into private property must be for more than a Ruling: Yes. Considering that no annotation in
momentary period. Third, the entry into the favor of the government appears at the back of
property should be under warrant or color of legal her certificate of title and that she has not
authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted executed any deed of conveyance of any portion
to a public use or otherwise informally of her lot to the government, the appellant
appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth, the remains the owner of the whole lot. As
utilization of the property for public use must be registered owner, she could bring an action to
in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive recover possession of the portion of land in
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. question at anytime because possession is
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" one of the attributes of ownership. However,
of Castellvi's property for purposes of since restoration of possession of said
eminent domain cannot be considered to portion by the government is neither
have taken place in 1947 when the Republic convenient nor feasible at this time because it
commenced to occupy the property as lessee is now and has been used for road purposes,
thereof. We find merit in the contention of the only relief available isfor the government
Castellvi that two essential elements in the to make due compensation which it could and
"taking" of property under the power of eminent should have done years ago. To determine
domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and the due compensation for the land, the basis
occupation by the condemnor must be for a should be the price or value thereof at the
permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in time of the taking.
devoting the property to public use the owner As regards the claim for damages, the
was ousted from the property and deprived of its plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal
beneficial use, were not present when the interest on the price of the land from the time it
Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi was taken up to the time that payment is made
property in 1947. by the government. In addition, the government
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of
of Co r , he j s compensa ion is o be which should be fixed by the trial court after
determined as of the date of the filing of the hearing.
complaint. This Court has ruled that when the (NOTE: The owner does not need to file
taking of the property sought to be the usual claim for recovery of just compensation
expropriated coincides with the with the Commission on Audit if the government
commencement of the expropriation takes over his property and devotes it to public
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the use without the benefit of expropriation. He may
filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the immediatetly file a complaint with the proper court
just compensation should be determined as of for payment of his property as the arbitrary action
the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it of the government shall be deemed a waiver of
is undisputed that the Republic was placed in its immunity from suit.) Cruz, pg. 74)
possession of the Castellvi property, by Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC
authority of the court, on 10 August 1959. The GR No. 119694, May 22, 1995
a Ca
purposes of determining the just Facts:
compensation to be paid must, therefore, be The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is
reckoned as of 26 June 1959 when the before this Court assailing the constitutional
complaint for eminent domain was filed.) validity of resolution No. 2772 issued by
respondent Commission on Elections
("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec
directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition
Amigable v. Cuenca for Certiorari and Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a
GR No. 26400, August 15, 1974 non-stock, non-profit organization of news paper
and magazine publishers.
Facts: Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner On 2 March 1995, Comelec
of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior expropriation promulgated Resolution No. 2772, providing for a
or negotiated sale, the government used a Comelec Space, which is a free print space of
not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one or other imperious public necessity,
newspaper of general circulation in every indiscriminately and without regard the the
province or city. individual business condition of particular
In this Petition for Certiorari and newspapers or magazines located in different
Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a parts of the country, to take private property of
Temporary restraining order, PPI asks us to newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt
declare Comelec resolution No. 2772 was made to demonstrate that a real and
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of
violates the prohibition imposed by the print space confronted the Comelec and that
Constitution upon the government, and any of its Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself
agencies, against the taking of private property the only reasonable and calibrated response
for public use without just compensation. to such necessity available to Comelec.
Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise
Issue: May COMELEC compel the members of of the police power of the State.
prin media o dona e Comelec Space ?
Held: NO. To compel print media companies to Sumulong v. Guerrero

donate "Comelec space" amounts to "taking" of GR 48685, Sept 30,1987
private personal property for public use or
purposes. The taking of print space here sought Facts: On December 5,1977, the National
to be effected may first be appraised under the Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for
public of expropriation of private personal expropriation of parcels of land covering
property for public use. The threshold approximately 25 hectares, (in Antipolo Rizal)
requisites for a lawful taking of private including the lots of Lorenzo Sumulong and
property for public use need to be examined Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667
here: one is the necessity for the taking; square meters and 3,333 square meters
another is the legal authority to effect the respectively. The land sought to be expropriated
taking. The element of necessity for the were valued by the NHA at P1.00 per square
taking has not been shown by respondent meter adopting the market value fixed by the
Comelec. It has not been suggested that the provincial assessor in accordance with
members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of
at their normal rates to Comelec for election property in expropriation proceedings. Together
purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance with the complaint was a motion for immediate
of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of possession of the properties. The NHA deposited
the problem. Similarly, it has not been the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine
suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec Na ional Bank, represen ing he o al marke
has been granted the power of imminent domain al e of the subject 25 hectares of land,
either by the Constitution or by the legislative pursuant to Presidential Decree 1224 which
authority. A reasonable relationship between that defines he polic on he e propria ion of pri a e
power and the enforcement and administration of property for socialized housing upon payment of
election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is j s compensa ion. On 17 Jan ar 1978, J dge
not casually to be assumed. Buenaventura Guerrero issued the order issuing
The taking of private property for public a writ of possession in favor of NHA. Sumulong
use it, of course, authorized by the Constitution, and Vidanes-Balaoing filed a motion for
but not without payment of "just compensation" reconsideration on the ground that they had been
(Article III, Section 9). And apparently the deprived of the possession of their property
necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec without due process of law. This was, however,
space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the
by respondent Commission. There is nothing at Supreme Court.
all to prevent newspaper and magazine
publishers from voluntarily giving free print space Issue: Whether the taking of private property for
to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in sociali ed ho sing, hich o ld benefi a fe
Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of resolution No. and no all ci i ens, cons i es aking for p blic
2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional se.
basis for compelling publishers, against their will,
in the kind of factual context here present, to Held: Yes. The exercise of the power of eminent
provide free print space for Comelec purposes. domain is subject to certain limitations imposed
Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of by the constitution (1973), i.e. that private
the power of eminent domain. property shall not be taken for public use without
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General j s compensa ion (Ar . IV, sec. 9); and ha no
also contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
2772, even if read as compelling publishers to property without due process of law, nor shall any
"donate" "Comelec space," may be sustained as person be denied the equal protection of the
a valid exercise of the police power of the state. la s (Ar . IV, sec. 1).
This argument was, however, made too casually The term b c has acquired a
to require prolonged consideration on their part. more comprehensive coverage. To the literal
Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no import of the term signifying strict use or
inclination on the part of Comelec) to show employment by the public has been added the
that the police power - essentially a power of broader notion of indirect public benefit or
legislation - has been constitutionally advantage. Specifically, urban renewal or
delegated to respondent Commission. redevelopment and the construction of low-cost
Secondly, while private property may indeed housing is recognized as a public purpose, not
be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of only because of the expanded concept of public
the police power of the state, there was no use but also because of specific provisions in the
attempt to show compliance in the instant Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it
case with the requisites of a lawful taking incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain
under the police power. and ensure adequate social services including
housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. Shortage in housing is
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a a matter of state concern since it directly and
blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without significantly affects public health, safety, the
a showing of existence of a national emergency environment and in sum, the general welfare.
The public character of housing measures does considered in its general concept of meeting a
not change because units in housing projects public need or a public exigency. 16 Black
cannot be occupied by all but only by those who summarizes the characterization given by various
satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has courts to the term; thus:
to be made, for it is not possible to provide Public Use. Eminent domain.
housing for all who need it, all at once. The constitutional and statutory
Sociali ed ho sing falls i hin he confines of basis for taking property by
p blic se . eminent domain. For
Various factors can come into play in condemnation purposes, "public
the valuation of specific properties singled out for use" is one which confers same
expropriation. The values given by provincial benefit or advantage to the
assessors are usually uniform for very wide public; it is not confined to actual
areas covering several barrios or even an use by public. It is measured in
entire town with the exception of the terms of right of public to use
poblacion. Individual differences are never proposed facilities for which
taken into account. The value of land is based condemnation is sought and, as
on such generalities as its possible cultivation for long as public has right of use,
rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often whether exercised by one or
land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated many members of public, a
for generations. Buildings are described in terms "public advantage" or "public
of only two or three classes of building materials benefit" accrues sufficient to
and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate constitute a public use. Montana
than correct. Tax values can serve as guides Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457
but cannot be absolute substitutes for just P. 2d 769, 772, 773.
compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped Public use, in constitutional provisions
to question the valuations made by assessors restricting the exercise of the right to take private
since they had the opportunity to protest is property in virtue of eminent domain, means a
illusory. The overwhelming mass of landowners use concerning the whole community as
accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax distinguished from particular individuals. But each
declarations prepared by local assessors or and every member of society need not be equally
municipal clerks for them. They do not even look interested in such use, or be personally and
at, much less analyze, the statements. The idea directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a
of expropriation simply never occurs until a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient.
demand is made or a case filed by an agency Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S.
authorized to do so. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term
may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or
advantage, or what is productive of general
Manosca vs. Court of Appeals benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a
G.R. No. 106440 , 29 January 1996 small or restricted locality, but must be in
common, and not for a particular individual. The
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land which use must be a needful one for the public, which
was later declared as national landmark due to cannot be surrendered without obvious general
being ascertained by National Historic Institute loss and inconvenience. A "public use" for which
(NHI) as the birthplace of Felix Y. Manalo, the land may be taken defies absolute definition for it
founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. On the opinion of changes with varying conditions of society, new
Secretary of Justice, he said that the place must appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions
be subjected to the power of eminent domain of scope and functions of government, and other
since places invested with unusual historical differing circumstances brought about by an
interest is a public use which such power may be increase in population and new modes of
authorized. Thus, Republic, through the office of communication and transportation. Katz v.
Solicitor General instituted a complaint for Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586. 17
expropriation and filed an urgent motion for the The validity of the exercise of the power
issuance for an order to permit it to take of eminent domain for traditional purposes is
immediate possession of the property. The trial beyond question; it is not at all to be said,
court issued an order authorizing Republic to however, that public use should thereby be
take over the property once the required sum restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that
would have been deposited with the Municipal "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of
Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The "use by the public" has long been discarded.
petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint since The taking to be valid must be for public
such expropriation would constituted an use. There was a time when it was felt that a
application of funds directly or indirectly for the literal meaning should be attached to such a
use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, which requirement. Whatever project is undertaken
is contrary to the provision of Section 29 (2) must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the
Issue: Whe her or no he p blic se purpose of the taking is public, then the power of
requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492- the constitution in at least two cases, to remove
square-meter parcel of land as declared by the any doubt, determines what is public use. One is
NHI as a national landmark? the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The
Held: Yes.According to Justice Black, term other is the transfer, through the exercise of this
b c means one which confers benefit power, of utilities and other private enterprise to
or advantage to the public and it is not the government. It is accurate to state then that
confined to actual use by public. It may also at present whatever may be beneficially
be said to mean public usefulness, utility or employed for the general welfare satisfies the
advantage, or what is productive of general requirement of public use.
benefit. Chief Justice Fernando, writing the
The term "public use," not having been ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure
otherwise defined by the constitution, must be Administration, has viewed the Constitution a
dynamic instrument and one that "is not to be the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void,
construed narrowly or pedantically" so as to since constitutes an impermissible encroachment
enable it "to meet adequately whatever problems on judicial prerogatives. The determination of
the future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a
noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly judicial function. The executive department or the
observed that what, in fact, has ultimately legislature may make the initial determinations
emerged is a concept of public use which is just but when a party claims a violation of the
as broad as "public welfare." guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so- property may not be taken for public use without
called unusual interest that the expropriation of just compensation, no statute, decree, or
(Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to executive order can mandate that its own
be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the determination shag prevail over the court's
power of eminent domain" when only members of findings. Much less can the courts be
the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt
to give some religious perspective to the case Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty
deserves little consideration, for what should be Corporation
significant is the principal objective of, not the G.R. No. 127820, 20 July 1998
casual consequences that might follow from, the
exercise of the power. The purpose in setting Facts: A complaint for expropriation was filed by
up the marker is essentially to recognize the the Municipality of Parañaque against V.M.
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Realty Corporation involving two parcels of land
Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, located at Parañaque, Metro Manila. The
rather than to commemorate his founding and complaint was in pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan
leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993. The
The practical reality that greater complaint was for the purpose of alleviateing the
benefit may be derived by members of the living conditions of the underprivileged by
Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could providing homes for the homeless through a
well be true but such a peculiar advantage socialized housing project. Previously, an offer
still remains to be merely incidental and for the sale of the property was made by the
secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few petitioner, however, the latter did not accept. The
would actually benefit from the expropriation Regional Trial Court of Makati issued order
of property does not necessarily diminish the authorizing the petitioner to take possession of
essence and character of public use. the subject property upon deposit to the Clerk of
Court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its
fair market value base on its current tax
declaration. However, upon the private
EPZA vs. Dulay responden s mo ion o dismiss, he rial co r
G.R. No. L-59609, 29 April 1987 nullified its previous order and dismissed the
case. Thus, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Facts: A certain parcel of land was reserved by Appeals. But the appellate court affirmed in toto
the President of the Philippines for petitioner he rial co r s decision.
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) for the
establishment of an export processing zone.
However, not all of the reserved area was public Issue: Whether or not the exercise of the power
land. The petitioner made an offer to purchase of eminent domain is valid.
the lands registered in the name of the private
respondent, but, the parties failed to have an Held:The following essential requisites must
agreement on the sale of the property. Thus, the concur before an LGU can exercise the power
petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation with of eminent domain: (1) An ordinance is
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession enacted by the local legislative council
against private respondent on the Court of First authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
Instance of Cebu. The respondent judge favored of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent
the petition and issued a writ of possession domain or pursue expropriation proceedings
authorizing the petitioner to take into possession over a particular private property.(2) The
the said property. Having determined the just power of eminent domain is exercised for
compensation as only the issue to be resolved, public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
the respondent judge issued an order regarding benefit of the poor and the landless.(3) There
the appointment of certain persons as is payment of just compensation, as required
commissioners who are tasked to report to the under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution,
court the just compensation for the properties and other pertinent laws.(4) A valid and
sought to be expropriated. Consequently, definite offer has been previously made to the
commissioners were appointed and, afterwards, owner of the property sought to be
recommended in their report that the amount of expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
P15.00 per square meter as the fair and
reasonable value of just compensation for the The Supreme Court ruled that there was
properties. Subsequently, petitioners objected to no compliance with the first requisite since the
the said order on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 mayor sought to exercise the power of eminent
has superseded Section 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the domain pursuant to a resolution only. Ordinance
Rules of court on the ascertainment of just is not synonymous to resolution. An ordinance is
compensation through commissioners. a law, possesses a general or permanent
character, and makes third reading for its
Issue: Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 enactment necessary. On the other hand, a
of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed resolution is merely a declaration of the
or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
the appointment of commissioners to determine specific matter, temporary in nature and its
the just compensation is concerned. enactment required only the decision of majority
of all the Sanggunian members
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the P.D.
No. 1533, hich elimina es he co r s discre ion
to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of

POWER OF TAXATION prohibiting members of Congress from being

directly or indirectly financially interested in
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works and any contract with the Government, and,
Communications hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and
G.R. No. L10405, 29 December 1960 voidab initio, for the construction of the
projected feeder roads in question with public
Facts: funds would greatly enhance or increase the
value of the aforementioned subdivision of
On August 31, 1954, petitioner respondent Zulueta,
Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of
Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, Issue: Whether the contested item of Republic
with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act Act No. 920 unconstitutional and, therefor,
No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for illegal?
Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953,
contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item Held: No. The P85,000.00 appropriation for the
(43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for the construction, projected feeder roads in question, the legality
reconstruction, repair, extension and thereof depended upon whether said roads were
improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals, public or private property when the bill, which,
that, at the time of the passage and approval of latter on, became Republic Act 920, was passed
said Act, the said feeder roads were "nothing but by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by
projected and planned subdivision roads within the President and the disbursement of said sum
the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal" became effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see
near Shaw Boulevard, not far away from the section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on
intersection between the latter and EDSA, which which the projected feeder roads were to be
projected feeder roads "do not connect any constructed belonged then to respondent
government property or any important premises Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation
to the main highway"; that the aforementioned sought a private purpose, and hence, was null
Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on and void.
which said feeder roads were to be construed)
were private properties of respondent Jose C. The donation to the Government, over five (5)
Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and months after the approval and effectivity of said
approval of said Act, was a member of the Act, made, according to the petition, for the
Senate of the Philippines; that on May, 1953, purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or
respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not
Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to cure its aforementioned basic defect.
donate said projected feeder roads to the Consequently, a judicial nullification of said
municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, donation need not precede the declaration of
1953, the offer was accepted by the council, unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
subject to the condition "that the donor would
submit a plan of the said roads and agree to Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a
change the names of two of them"; that no deed statute may be contested only by one who
of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig will sustain a direct injury in consequence of
was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, its enforcement. Yet, there are many
respondent Zulueta wrote another letter to said decisions nullifying, at the instance of
council, calling attention to the approval of taxpayers, laws providing for the
Republic Act. No. 920, and the sum of disbursement of public funds, upon the
P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the theory that "the expenditure of public funds
construction of the projected feeder roads in by an officer of the State for the purpose of
question; that the municipal council of Pasig administering an unconstitutional act
endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to constitutes a misapplication of such funds,"
the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the which may be enjoined at the request of a
present "has not made any endorsement taxpayer.
thereon" that inasmuch as the projected Republic Act No. 920 is unconstitutional, since
feeder roads in question were private the legislature is without power to appropriate
property at the time of the passage and public revenue for anything but a public purpose
approval of Republic Act No. 920, the and the project feeder roads are at the time
appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for private properties. The right of the legislature
the construction, reconstruction, repair, to appropriate funds is correlative with its
extension and improvement of said projected right to tax, and, under constitutional
feeder roads, was illegal and, therefore, provisions against taxation except for public
void ab initio"; that said appropriation of purposes and prohibiting the collection of a
P85,000.00 was made by Congress because tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof
its members were made to believe that the to another purpose, no appropriation of state
projected feeder roads in question were funds can be made for other than for a public
"public roads and not private streets of a purpose.
private subdivision"'; that, "in order to give a
semblance of legality, when there is
absolutely none, to the aforementioned Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of the City of
appropriation", respondents Zulueta executed Manila
on December 12, 1953, while he was a G.R. No. L-4817, 26 May 1954
member of the Senate of the Philippines, an
alleged deed of donation of the four (4) Facts: An ordinance was approved by the
parcels of land constituting said projected Municipal Board of the City of Manila which
feeder roads, in favor of the Government of imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons
the Republic of the Philippines; that said exercising various professions in the city and
alleged deed of donation was, on the same penalizes non-payment of the tax by a fine of not
date, accepted by the then Executive more than two hundred pesos or by
Secretary; that being subject to an onerous imprisonment of not more than six months or by
condition, said donation partook of the nature both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion
of a contract; that, such, said donation of the court. The ordinance was in pursuance to
violated the provision of our fundamental law paragraph (1) Section 18 of the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila which empowers the Manila. What constitutes exercise or pursuit of a
Municipal Board of said city to impose a profession in the city is a matter of judicial
municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per determination. The argument against double
annum, on persons engaged in the various taxation may not be invoked where one tax is
professions above referred to the plaintiffs, after imposed by the state and the other is imposed by
having paid their occupation tax, now being the city (1 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it
required to pay the additional tax prescribed in being widely recognized that there is nothing
the ordinance. The plaintiffs paid the said tax inherently obnoxious in the requirement that
under protest. The lower court declared the license fees or taxes be exacted with respect
validity of the law authorizing the enactment of to the same occupation, calling or activity by
the ordinance, but declared the latter illegal and both the state and the political subdivisions
void since its penalty provided for the non- thereof.
payment of tax was not legally authorized.
Issue: Is this ordinance and the law authorizing it

constitute class legislation, are unjust and
oppressive, and authorize what amounts to Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
double taxation? GR L-19201, 16 June 1965
Held: NO. To begin with defendants' appeal, we Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod
find that the lower court was in error in saying City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin
that the imposition of the penalty provided for in Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias, Negros
the ordinance was without the authority of law. Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro
The last paragraph (kk) of the very section that Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic
authorizes the enactment of this tax ordinance Church in the locality. The total samount was
(section 18 of the Manila Charter) in express actually spent for the purpose intended. On 3
terms also empowers the Municipal Board "to fix March 1958, MB Es a e filed he donor s gif a
penalties for the violation of ordinances which return. Under date of 29 April 1960, the
shall not exceed to(sic) two hundred pesos fine Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued as
or six months" imprisonment, or both such fine assessmen for donee s gif a agains he
and imprisonment, for a single offense." Hence, Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental,
the pronouncement below that the ordinance in of which petitioner was the priest. The tax
question is illegal and void because it imposes a amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges,
penalty not authorized by law is clearly without interest of 1% monthly from 15 May 1958 to 15
basis. June 1960, and the compromise for the late filing
of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest to the
Secondly, In raising the hue and cry of "class assessment and requested the withdrawal
legislation", the burden of plaintiffs' complaint is thereof. The protest and the motion for
not that the professions to which they reconsideration presented to the Commissioner
respectively belong have been singled out for the of Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner
imposition of this municipal occupation tax; and in appealed to the CTA on 2 November 1960. After
any event, the Legislature may, in its hearing, the CTA affirmed the decision of the
discretion, select what occupations shall be Commissioner of Internal Revenue except the
taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it imposition of compromise penalty of P20. Fr.
may tax all, or it may select for taxation Lladoc appealed to the Supreme Court.
certain classes and leave the others untaxed.
(Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 4, 4th ed., pp. 3393- Issue: Whe her a donee s gif a ma be
3395.) Plaintiffs' complaint is that while the law assessed against the Catholic Church.
has authorized the City of Manila to impose the
said tax, it has withheld that authority from other Held: Yes. The phrase a a ,
chartered cities, not to mention municipalities. as employed in the Constitution should not be
We do not think it is for the courts to judge interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
what particular cities or municipalities should taxes. Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of
be empowered to impose occupation taxes in the Philippines, exempts from taxation
addition to those imposed by the National cemeteries, churches and personages or
Government. That matter is peculiarly within convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
the domain of the political departments and buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
the courts would do well not to encroach religious purposes. The exemption is only from
upon it. Moreover, as the seat of the National the payment of taxes assessed on such
Government and with a population and properties enumerated, as property taxes, as
volume of trade many times that of any other contra-distinguished from excise taxes. A
Philippine city or municipality, Manila, no donee s gif a is no a proper a b an e cise
doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of
practice of the professions, so that it is but gift inter vivos. Its assessment was not on the
fair that the professionals in Manila be made property themeselves. It does not rest upon
to pay a higher occupation tax than their general ownership, but an excise upon the use
brethren in the provinces. made of the properties, upon the exercise of the
privilege of receiving the properties. The
Thirdly, Plaintiffs brand the ordinance unjust and imposition of such excise tax on property used for
oppressive because they say that it creates religious purposes does not constitute an
discrimination within a class in that while impairment of the Constitution.
professionals with offices in Manila have to pay
the tax, outsiders who have no offices in the city
but practice their profession therein are not Abra Valley College vs. Aquino
subject to the tax. Plaintiffs make a distinction GR L-39086, 15 June 1988
that is not found in the ordinance. The ordinance
imposes the tax upon every person "exercising" Facts: Petitioner Abra Valley College is an
or "pursuing" in the City of Manila naturally educational corporation and institution of higher
any one of the occupations named, but does not learning duly incorporated with the SEC in 1948.
say that such person must have his office in On 6 July 1972, the Municipal and Provincial

treasurers (Gaspar Bosque and Armin Cariaga, answer, the respondents contend that the Act
respectively) and issued a Notice of Seizure upon was passed in the valid exercise of the police
the petitioner for the college lot and building power of the State, which exercise is authorized
(OCT Q-83) for the satisfaction of said taxes in the Constitution in the interest of national
thereon. The treasurers served upon the economic survival.
petitioner a Notice of Sale on 8 July 1972, the
sale being held on the same day. Dr. Paterno Issue: Whether or not the enactment of R.A No.
Millare, then municipal mayor of Bangued, Abra, 1180 is constitutional.
offered the highest bid of P 6,000 on public
auction involving the sale of the college lot and Held: Yes. The disputed law was enacted to
building. The certificate of sale was remedy a real actual threat and danger to
correspondingly issued to him. national economy posed by alien dominance and
The petitioner filed a complaint on 10 control of the retail business and free citizens and
July 1972 in the court a quo to annul and declare country from dominance and control; that the
oid he No ice of Sei re and he No ice of enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
Sale of i s lo and b ilding loca ed a Bang ed, police power of the State, thru which and by
Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and which it protects its own personality and insures
penalties amounting to P5,140.31. On 12 April its security and future; that the law does not
1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of violate the equal protection clause of the
facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
the government, holding that the second floor of exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
the building is being used by the director for process of law clause, because the law is
residential purposes and that the ground floor prospective in operation and recognizes the
used and rented by Northern Marketing privilege of aliens already engaged in the
Corporation, a commercial establishment, and occupation and reasonably protects their
h s he proper is no being sed e cl si el privilege. The petition is denied.
for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an
appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf
for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary of other alien residents corporations and
injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing partnerships adversely affected by the provisions
said petition on 17 August 1974. of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
Issue: Whether the College is exempt from unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
taxes. Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
Held: Yes. While the Court allows a more liberal enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the
and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it
e cl si el sed for ed ca ional p rposes, denies to alien residents the equal protection of
reasonable emphasis has always been made that the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
exemption extends to facilities which are without due process of law ; In answer, the
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
accomplishment of the main purposes. While the Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in
second floor s se, as residence of he direc or, is the valid exercise of the police power of the
incidental to education; the lease of the first floor State, which exercise is authorized in the
cannot by any stretch of imagination be Constitution in the interest of national economic
considered incidental to the purposes of survival;
education. The test of exemption from taxation is
the use of the property for purposes mentioned in a. The police power.
the Constititution. There is no question that the Act was approved in
the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
Adonis Notes: The SC stated that if only the claims that its exercise in this instance is
judge had read the 1973 Constitution, he should attended by a violation of the constitutional
have known the difference between the 1935 and requirements of due process and equal
the 1973 Constitution and he could not have protection of the laws. But before proceeding to
summarily dismissed the case. There is a the consideration and resolution of the ultimate
substantial distinction between the 1935 and the issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind
1973 Constitution. In the 1935 Constitution the certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary,
requirement for exemption for real property taxes considerations in the determination of the ever
is “exclusively” , while the 1973 Constitution recurrent conflict between police power and the
requires “actually, directly & exclusively”. The SC guarantees of due process and equal protection
remanded to the Court of Origin for further of the laws. What is the scope of police power,
hearing. (excerpts from Sababan Notes) and how are the due process and equal
protection clauses related to it? What is the
province and power of the legislature, and what is
the function and duty of the courts? These
consideration must be clearly and correctly
ART. III BILL OF RIGHTS understood that their application to the facts of
the case may be brought forth with clarity and the
SEC.1 DUE PROCESS OF LAW issue accordingly resolved.
Ichong vs. Hernandez It has been said the police power is so far -
GR L-7995; 31 May 1957 reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act existence from the very existence of the State
to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined
nationalizes the retail trade business. Petitioner in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending protection and survival, and as such it is the most
that it denies to alien residents the equal positive and active of all governmental
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty processes, the most essential, insistent and
and property without due process of law. In illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute
society and of nations have multiplied to almost liberty, for that would mean license and
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of
police power has become almost boundless, just life, liberty and property, provided there is due
as the fields of public interest and public welfare process of law; and persons may be classified
have become almost all-embracing and have into classes and groups, provided everyone is
transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, given the equal protection of the law. The test or
as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of standard, as always, is reason. The police
public interest and welfare in this constantly power legislation must be firmly grounded on
changing and progressive world, so we cannot public interest and welfare, and a reasonable
delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police relation must exist between purposes and
power by which and through which the State means. And if distinction and classification
seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So has been made, there must be a reasonable
it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or basis for said distinction.
extent of the police power of the State; what they
do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial
important of these are the due process clause review.
and the equal protection clause. Now, in this matter of EQUITABLE
BALANCING, what is the proper place and role
b. Limitations on police power. of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the
The basic limitations of due process and equal first place, that the legislature, which is the
protection are found in the following provisions of constitutional repository of police power and
our Constitution: exercises the prerogative of determining the
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be policy of the State, is by force of circumstances
deprived of life, liberty or property primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or
without due process of law, nor any reasonableness and wisdom, of any law
person be denied the equal protection of promulgated in the exercise of the police power,
the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution) or of the measures adopted to implement the
These constitutional guarantees which embody public policy or to achieve public interest. On the
the essence of individual liberty and freedom in other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but individual liberty and right, have nevertheless
are admittedly universal in their application, evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise
without regard to any differences of race, of color, of the legislative prerogative. They have done so
or of nationality. early where there has been a clear, patent or
palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the
c. The, equal protection clause. legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not
The equal protection of the law clause is against supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, f. Law enacted in interest of national
which is limited either in the object to which it is economic survival and security.
directed or by territory within which is to operate. We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all
It does not demand absolute equality among the facts and circumstances that the disputed law
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or
be treated alike, under like circumstances and discrimination, but the expression of the
conditions both as to privileges conferred and legitimate desire and determination of the people,
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is thru their authorized representatives, to free the
not infringed by legislation which applies only to nation from the economic situation that has
those persons falling within a specified class, if it unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or
applies alike to all persons within such class, and wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in
reasonable grounds exists for making a the interest of the public, nay of the national
distinction between those who fall within such security itself, and indisputably falls within the
class and those who do not. scope of police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and
d. The due process clause. the supreme welfare of its citizens.
The due process clause has to do with the
reasonableness of legislation enacted in The Due Process of Law Limitation.
pursuance of the police power. Is there public
interest, a public purpose; is public welfare a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation;
involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the determination by legislature decisive.
accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it We now come to due process as a limitation on
not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is the exercise of the police power. It has been
there sufficient foundation or reason in stated by the highest authority in the United
connection with the matter involved; or has there States that:
not been a capricious use of the legislative . . . . And the guaranty of due process,
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by as has often been held, demands only
the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified that the law shall not be unreasonable,
interference with private interest? These are the arbitrary or capricious, and that the
questions that we ask when the due process test means selected shall have a real and
is applied. substantial relation to the subject sought
to be attained. . . . .
The conflict, therefore, between police power and xxx xxx xxx
the guarantees of due process and equal So far as the requirement of due
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. process is concerned and in the
Properly related, the power and the guarantees absence of other constitutional
are supposed to coexist. THE BALANCING IS restriction a state is free to adopt
THE ESSENCE or, shall it be said, the whatever economic policy may
indispensable means for the attainment of reasonably be deemed to promote
legitimate aspirations of any democratic public welfare, and to enforce that policy
society. There can be no absolute power, by legislation adapted to its purpose.
whoever exercise it, for that would be The courts are without authority either to
declare such policy, or, when it is subject matter. Mr. Milado, allowing the
declared by the legislature, to override membership of other employees as stated,
it. If the laws passed are seen to have a granted the petition of PMPI. Petitioner then
reasonable relation to a proper moved to have the technical, professional and
legislative purpose, and are neither confidential employees removed from the
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the membership of the PMPI on April 16, 1990 to the
requirements of due process are Secretary of Labor and Employment and a
satisfied, and judicial determination to decision was made on August 7, 1990 dismissing
that effect renders a court functus the appeal and the subsequent motion for
officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. reconsideration. Then on July 8, 1991 the Court
ed. 940, 950, 957.) issued a temporary restraining order against the
holding of the certification election scheduled on
The test of reasonableness of a law is the July 12, 1991 pending judicial review.
appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out Issue: Whether or not PHILPHOS was denied
its purpose into effect. Judged by this test, due process when respondent Mediator-Arbiter
disputed legislation, which is not merely granted the amended petition of respondent
reasonable but actually necessary, must be PMPI without according PHILPHOS a new
considered not to have infringed the opportunity to be heard.
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained Held: No. The essence of due process is simply
in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
which later was enacted into law: administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
This bill proposes to regulate the explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
retail business. Its purpose is to reconsideration of the action or ruling
prevent persons who are not citizens complained of. Where, as in the instant case,
of the Philippines from having a petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its
strangle hold upon our economic life. position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and
If the persons who control this vital to consider the case submitted for decision
artery of our economic life are the on the basis of the position papers filed by
ones who owe no allegiance to this the parties, there was sufficient compliance
Republic, who have no profound with the requirement of due process, as
devotion to our free institutions, and petitioner was afforded reasonable
who have no permanent stake in our opportunity to present its side. Moreover,
people's welfare, we are not really the petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on
masters of our destiny. All aspects of a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses
our life, even our national security, of the other party. But it did not; instead, it opted
will be at the mercy of other people. to submit its position paper with the Mediator-
In seeking to accomplish the Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity
foregoing purpose, we do not to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the
propose to deprive persons who are Secretary of Labor
not citizens of the Philippines of their
means of livelihood. While this bill
seeks to take away from the hands of
persons who are not citizens of the Ynot vs IAC
Philippines a power that can be GR No. 74457, 20 March 1987
wielded to paralyze all aspects of our
national life and endanger our Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the
national security it respects existing transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one
rights. province to another. The carabaos of petitioner
The approval of this bill is necessary were confiscated for violation of Executive Order
for our national survival. No 626-A while he was transporting them from
Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The government argued that Executive Order No.
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power
Torres to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for
GR 98050, 17 March 1994 farm work or breeding.
Facts: The PhilPhos Movement for Progress Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a
(PMPI), a labor organization composed of violation of Substantive Due Process.
supervisory employees of the Philippine
Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation, filed a Held: Yes. The thrust of his petition is that the
certification election on July 7, 1989 with the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it
Department of Labor and Employment. The move authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or
was not contested by the Philippine Phosphate carabeef being transported across provincial
Fertilizer Corporation management and in fact boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid
was supported by a position paper submitted to because it is imposed without according the
the Mediator-Arbiter on August 11, 1989. The owner a right to be heard before a competent and
managemen hailed he crea ion of a s per isor s impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
union provided that they meet all the necessary
legal requirements. The closed mind has no place in the open
On October 13, 1989 the Mediator-Arbiter Milado society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play
issued an order for the holding of the elections to hear "the other side" before an opinion is
excluding the technical, professional and formed or a decision is made by those who sit in
confidential employees. Then on November15, judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of
1989 respondent PMPI prayed for the inclusion of the question; the other half must also be
technical, professional and confidential considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached
employees. On December 14, 1989 both parties based on an informed appreciation of the issues
submitted their position papers on the said in contention. It is indispensable that the two

sides complement each other, as unto the bow action may be validly taken in administrative
the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after proceedings as procedural due process is not
examination of the problem not from one or the necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases
other perspective only but in its totality. A accepted, however. there is a justification for the
judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or the immediacy of the problem sought to be
useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or corrected and the urgency of the need to correct
intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in it.
repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process

are notice and hearing which, generally Alonte v. Savellano
speaking, may not be dispensed with because GR 131652, March 9, 1998
they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying Facts: On December 5, 1996, an information for
commentary on our judicial system that the rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M.
jurisprudence of this country is rich with Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Biñan Laguna and
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a
to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair complaint filed by Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan.
play. We have consistently declared that every On December 13, 1996, Juvie-lyn
person, faced by the awesome power of the Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney
State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State
Daniel Webster described almost two hundred Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., filed with the
years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Office of the Court Administrator a petition for a
Case, as "the law which hears before it change of venue and to have the case
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial
renders judgment only after trial." It has to be Courts in Metro Manila.
so if the rights of every person are to be secured During the pendency of the petition for
beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn
zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and
process clause into a worn and empty catchword. counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance.
On June 28, 1997, Atty. Ramon
This is not to say that notice and hearing are C.Casano on behalf of petitioners, moved to have
imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are the petition for change of venue dismissed on the
a number of admitted exceptions. (1)The ground that it had become moot in view of
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the complainan s affida i of desis ance.
admission of contrary evidence as long as such On August 22, 1997, ACSP Guiab filed
presumption is based on human experience or his comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiab
there is a rational connection between the fact asserted that he was not aware of the desistance
proved and the fact ultimately presumed of private complainant and opined that the
therefrom. (2)There are instances when the need desistance, in any case, would not produce any
for expeditions action will justify omission of legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who
these requisites, as in the summary abatement of had direction and control of the prosecution of the
a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the
which may be killed on sight because of the motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives to change venue.
of the people. (3)Pornographic materials, On September 17, 1997, the case was
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with
inherently pernicious and may be summarily respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano,
destroyed. (4)The passport of a person sought Jr.,presiding.
for a criminal offense may be cancelled without On October 7, 1997, Juvie-lyn
hearing, to compel his return to the country he Punongbayan, through Atty. Balbin, submitted to
has fled. (5) Filthy restaurants may be summarily the Manila court, a compliance where she
padlocked in the interet of the public health and reiterated her decision to abide by her Affidavit of
bawdy houses to protect the public morals. In Desistance.
such instances, previous judicial hearing may However, in an Order, dated 09 October
be omitted without violation of due process in 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for
view of the nature of the property involved or the issuance of warrants for the arrest of
the urgency of the need to protect the general petitioners Alonte and Concepcion without
welfare from a clear and present danger. prejudice to, and independent of, this Courts
separate determination as the trier of facts, of the
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily voluntariness and validity of the [private
confiscated by the police station commander, complainant's] desistance in the light of the
were returned to the petitioner only after he had opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief
filed a complaint for recovery and given State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab.
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was On 02 November 1997, Alonte
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce voluntarily surrendered himself to Director
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of
executive order defined the prohibition, Investigation (NBI), while Concepcion, in his
convicted the petitioner and immediately case, posted the recommended bail
imposed punishment, which was carried out of P150,000.00.
forthright. The measure struck at once and On 07 November 1997, petitioners were
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him arraigned and both pleaded not guilty to the
a chance to be heard, thus denying him the charge. The parties manifested that they were
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went
on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to
It has already been remarked that there are proceed with the trial of the case on the
4
occasions when notice and hearing may be merits. According to Alonte, however, Judge
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual Savellano allowed the prosecution to present
requirement for these minimum guarantees of evidence relative only to the question of the
due process. It is also conceded that summary
voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of The respondent Judge committed

desistance grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
It would appear that immediately or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a
following the arraignment, the prosecution Decision in the case a quo without
presented private complainant Juvie-lyn conducting a trial on the facts which would
Punongbayan followed by her parents. During establish that complainant was raped by
this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity petitioner (Rule 119, Article III, 1, Constitution),
and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. thereby setting a dangerous precedent where
She stated that she had no intention of giving heinous offenses can result in conviction without
positive testimony in support of the charges trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses
against Alonte and had no interest in further could end up with the same result).
prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: Jurisprudence acknowledges that
(i) That she was compelled to desist because of DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS,
the harassment she was experiencing from the in particular, require (a) that the court or
media, (ii) that no pressures nor influence were tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of with judicial power to hear and determine the
desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is
parents received a single centavo from anybody lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
to secure the affidavit of desistance. accused; (c) that the accused is given an
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn opportunity to be heard; and (d) that
Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i) judgment is rendered only upon lawful
Punongbayans parents, who affirmed their hearing.
signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their The Court must admit that it is puzzled
consent to their daughters decision to desist from by the somewhat strange way the case has
the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after the
Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the
of desistance was signed by Punongbayan and trial of the case did proceed on the merits but
her parents in his presence and that he was that-
satisfied that the same was executed freely and “The two (2) accused did not
voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes manifested that present any countervailing
in light of the decision of private complainant and evidence during the trial. They
her parents not to pursue the case, the State had did not take the witness stand
no further evidence against the accused to prove to refute or deny under oath
the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved for the the truth of the contents of the
"dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and private complainant's
Concepcion. aforementioned affidavit which
Thereupon, respondent judge said that she expressly affirmed and
"the case was submitted for decision." confirmed in Court, but,
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an instead, thru their respective
"Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." During the lawyers, they rested and
pendency thereof, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. submitted the case for decision
Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte merely on the basis of the
received a notice from the RTC Manila, Branch private complainant's so called
53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, 'desistance' which, to them,
on 18 December 1997, of the decision on the was sufficient enough for their
case. The counsel for accused Concepcion purposes. They left everything
denied having received any notice of the to the so-called 'desistance' of
scheduled promulgation. the private complainant.”
On 18 December 1997, after the case
was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose According to petitioners, however,
Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not there was no such trial for what was
attend the promulgation of the decision because conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from
he was suffering from mild hypertension and was the arraignment of the accused, was merely a
confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other proceeding to determine the validity and
hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance
would appear not to have been notified of the executed by Punongbayan.
proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of While Judge Savellano has claims that
the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading petitioners-accused were each represented
concluded: during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered their respective counsel of choice; that none of
finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte their counsel interposed an intention to cross-
and Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion guilty examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even
beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous after she attested, in answer to respondent
crime of RAPE, judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness
and truth of her two affidavits - one detailing the
Issue: Was petitioner deprived of rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS? her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not
used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that
Held: Yes. The respondent Judge committed the right to confront and cross-examine a witness
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or 'is a personal one and may be waived.”
excess of jurisdiction when, in total disregard of It should be pointed out, however,
the Revised Rules on Evidence and existing that the existence of the waiver must be
doctrinal jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision positively demonstrated. The standard of
in the case a quo on the basis of two (2) affidavits waiver requires that it "not only must be
(Punongbayans and Balbins) which were neither voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent,
marked nor offered into evidence by the and done with sufficient awareness of the
prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner relevant circumstances and likely
an opportunity to cross-examine the consequences." Mere silence of the holder of
affiants thereof, again in violation of petitioners the right should not be so construed as a
right to due process (Article III, 1, Constitution). waiver of right, and the courts must indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver.
The Solicitor General has aptly the due process clause of the Constitution
discerned a few of the deviations from what The facts show that petitioner was not among
otherwise should have been the regular those charged by the PNP with violation of
course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he
directed to present evidence to prove their subjected by the City Prosecutor to a
defenses nor have dates therefor been preliminary investigation for such offense.
18
scheduled for the purpose; (2) the parties The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to
have not been given the opportunity to the petitioner that he was a respondent in the
present rebutting evidence nor have dates preliminary investigation is violative of due
been set by respondent Judge for the process which requires that the procedure
purpose; and (3) petitioners have not established by law should be obeyed.
admitted the act charged in the Information The COMELEC argues that petitioner
so as to justify any modification in the order was given the chance to be heard because he
20
of trial. There can be no short-cut to the was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor
legal process, and there can be no excuse for regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest
not affording an accused his full day in court. of his driver, and that petitioner in fact submitted
Due process, rightly occupying the first and a sworn letter of explanation regarding the
foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, incident. This does not satisfy the requirement
is an enshrined and invaluable right that of due process the essence of which is the
cannot be denied even to the most reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
undeserving. submit any evidence one may have in support
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further of his defense. Due process guarantees the
proceedings. observance of both substantive and
procedural rights, whatever the source of
such rights, be it the Constitution itself or
only a statute or a rule of court.
Aniag vs. Commission on Elections Such constituted a violation of his right
GR 104961, 7 October 1994 to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended
that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized meet the accusation against him as he was not
national and local elections scheduled on 11 May informed that he was himself a respondent in
1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the case. Thus, the warrantless search
iss ed Resol ion 2323 (G n Ban ), conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the
promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, firearms seized during the search cannot be used
carrying and transporting of firearms or other as evidence in any proceeding against the
deadly weapons, on security personnel or petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
security agencies or police organizations, and
organization or maintenance of reaction forces
during the election period. P rs an o he G n Philippine Communication Satellite Corp. v.
Ban, Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergean -at-Arms, Alcuaz
House of Representatives, wrote Congressman GR 84818, Dec 18, 1989
Francisc B. Aniag Jr., who was then
Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan Facts: By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the
requesting the return of the 2 firearms issued to Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
him by the House of Representatives. Aniag (PHILCOMSAT) as gran ed a franchise o
immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto establish, construct, maintain and operate in the
Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his house Philippines, at such places as the grantee may
at Valle Verde and return them to Congress. The select, station or stations and associated
policemen manning the outpost flagged down the equipment and facilities for international satellite
car driven by Arellano as it approached the comm nica ions. Since 1968, I has been
checkpoint. They searched the car and found the leasing its satellite circuits to PLDT, Philippine
firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and Global Communications, and other
placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano telecommunication companies. It was exempt
was then apprehended and detained. Thereafter, from the jurisdiction of the National
he police referred Arellano s case o he Office of Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did However, pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 196,
not include Aniag as among those charged with it was placed under the jurisdiction, control and
an election offense. The City Prosecutor invited regulation of NTC, including all its facilities and
Aniag to shed light on the circumstances services and the fixing of rates. Implementing
men ioned in Arellano s s orn e plana ion. Aniag said executive order, NTC required
explained that Arellano did not violate the PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite
firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it certificate of public convenience.. On 9
when apprehended by returning the firearms to September 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC
Congress. The Office of the City Prosecutor an application for authority to continue operating
issued a resolution recommending that the case and maintaining the same facilities, to continue
against Arellano be dismissed and that the providing the international satellite
nofficial charge agains Aniag be also communications services, and to charge the
dismissed. Nevertheless, the COMELEC current rates applied for in rendering such
directing the filing of information against Aniag services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a
and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of provisional authority so that it can continue to
BP 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus operate and maintain the facilities, provide the
Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of RA 7166 services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates
therein applied for. The NTC extended the
Issue: Whether or not the manner by which provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT, but it
COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified
counter to the due process clause of the reduced rates through a reduction of 15% on the
Constitution present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT assailed
said order.
Held: Yes. The manner by which COMELEC
proceeded against petitioner runs counter to
Issue: Whether the NTC is required to provide

notice and hearing to PHILCOMSAT in its rate-
fixing order, which fixed a temporary rate pending
final determination of PHILCOMSAT s ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
application. RELATIONS (CIR)
69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940
Held: YES. The order in question which was
issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay
all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather
exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
it is premised on a finding of fact, although scheme adopted to systematically discharge all
patently superficial, that there is merit in a the members of the NLU, from work. And this
reduction of some of the rates charged- based on averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner
an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial with the records of the Bureau of Customs and
statements-without affording petitioner the benefit Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
of an explanation as to what particular aspect or That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang
aspects of the financial statements warranted a Tibay is a company or employer union dominated
corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the
was offered nor were the attending NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case
contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But
percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said
to assume that petitioner could be in a better motion.
position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the
viability of its business requirements. The rates it Issue: Whether or not the motion for new trial
charges result from an exhaustive and detailed should be granted.
study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies
attendant to a public service undertaking of such Held: Yes. The interest of justice would be better
nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, served if the movant is given opportunity to
inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's present at the hearing the documents referred to
ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its in his motion and such other evidence as may be
rates would adversely affect its operations and relevant to the main issue involved.
the quality of its service to the public considering It must be noted that the CIR is a
the maintenance requirements, the projects it still special court. It is more an administrative board
has to undertake and the financial outlay than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
involved. Notably, petitioner was not even nation. CIR is not narrowly constrained by
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the technical rules of procedure, and equity and
inspector who issued the report on which substantial merits of the case, without regard to
respondent NTC based its questioned order. technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
At any rate, there remains the bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
categorical admission made by respondent NTC but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
that the questioned order was issued pursuant deem just and equitable. The fact, however, that
to its “QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS. It, the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of
however, insists that notice and hearing are not certain procedural requirements does not mean
necessary since the assailed order is merely that it can in justiciable cases coming before it,
incidental to the entire proceedings and, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is essential requirements of due process in trials
bereft of merit. and investigations of an administrative character.
The NTC, in the exercise of its rate- There are cardinal primary rights which must
fixing power, is limited by the requirements of be respected even in proceedings of this
public safety, public interest, reasonable character:
feasibility and reasonable rates, which
conjointly more than satisfy the requirements (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the
of a valid delegation of legislative power. The right to present one's cause and submit
NTC order violates procedural due process evidence in support thereof;
because it was issued motu proprio, without (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence
notice to PHILCOMSAT and without the presented;
benefit of a hearing. Said order was based (3) The decision must have something to
a a a a , c a support itself;
unilateral evaluation, but had PHILCOMSAT (4) The evidence must be substantial;
been given an opportunity to present its side (5) The decision must be based on the
before the order in question was issued, the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least
confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and contained in the record and disclosed to the
the consequent deterioration of the public parties affected;
service could have been shown and (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges
demonstrated to NTC. Reduction of rates was must act on its own independent
made without affording PHILCOMSAT the consideration of the law and facts of the
benefit of an explanation as to what particular controversy, and not simply accept the views
aspect or aspects of the financial statements of a subordinate;
warranted a corresponding rate reduction. (7) The Board or body should, in all
PHILCOMSAT was not even afforded the controversial questions, render its decision in
opportunity to cross-examine the inspector such manner that the parties to the
who issued the report on which NTC based its proceeding can know the various Issue
questioned order. While the NTC may fix a involved, and the reason for the decision
temporary rate pending final determination of rendered.
the application of PHILCOMSAT, such rate-
fixing order, temporary though it may be, is
not exempt from the statutory procedural ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON.
requirements of notice and hearing, as well as JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG
the requirement of reasonableness. 222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993
of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School,
of Petitioner University, died of serious physical notified and required respondent students on
injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four
initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido hours their written statement on the incident, the
Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol records show that instead of filing a reply,
Medical Center. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del respondent students requested through their
Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty- counsel, copies of the charges. While of the
Student Investigating Committee which was students mentioned in the February 11, 1991
tasked to investigate and submit a report within notice duly submitted written statements, the
72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were
death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991
respondent students to submit their written to file their statements.
statements within twenty-four (24) hours from Indubitably, the nature and cause of the
receipt. Although respondent students received a accusation were adequately spelled out in
copy of the written notice, they failed to file a petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20,
30
reply. In the meantime, they were placed on 1991. It is to be noted that the February 20,
preventive suspension. The Investigating 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules
Committee found a prima facie case against of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law
respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the School Catalogue was addressed individually to
Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters
Respondent students were then required to file dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly
their written answers to the formal charge. show that respondent students were given ample
Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf
hear the charges against respondent students. and to answer the charges leveled against them.
The Board found respondent students guilty of The requisite assistance of counsel was
violating Rules on Discipline which prohibits met when, from the very start of the
participation in hazing activities. However, in view investigations before the Joint Administration
of the lack of unanimity among the members of Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of
the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in
left the imposition of the penalty to the University its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of
Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed respondent students.
the penalty of dismissal on all respondent Respondent students may not use
students. Respondent students filed with RTC the argument that since they were not
Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. accorded the opportunity to see and examine
This was granted. A day after the expiration of the written statements which became the
the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order,
created a Special Board to investigate the they were denied procedural due process.
charges of hazing against respondent students Granting that they were denied such
Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be opportunity, the same may not be said to
stricken out by the respondents and argued that detract from the observance of due process,
the creation of the Special Board was totally for disciplinary cases involving students need
unrelated to the original petition which alleged not necessarily include the right to cross
lack of due process. This was granted and examination. An ADMINISTRATIVE
reinstatement of the students was ordered. PROCEEDING conducted to investigate
students' participation in a hazing activity need
Issue: Was there denial of due process against not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial
the respondent students. proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2,
1991 hearing which characterized the rules on
Held: There was no denial of due process, more the investigation as being summary in nature
particularly procedural due process. The Dean of and that respondent students have no right to
the Ateneo Law School, notified and required examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is
respondent students to submit their written but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz.
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a Respondent students' contention that
reply, respondent students requested through the investigating committee failed to consider
their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature their evidence is far from the truth because the
and cause of the accusation were adequately February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it
spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the was reached only after receiving the written
twin elements of notice and hearing. statements and hearing the testimonies of
The Minimum standards to be satisfied several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary
in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was
academic institutions, such as petitioner preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein
university herein, thus: respondent students were summoned to answer
clarificatory questions.
(1) the students must be informed in WRITING
of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired: People vs. Vera
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence GR 45685, Nov. 16, 1937
against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce Facts: The instant petition stems from the
evidence in their own behalf; and application for bail filed by Co Unjieng. He claims
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by that he is innocent of the crime charged against
the investigating committee or official him, that he has no existing criminal record and
designated by the school authorities to hear that he would observe proper conduct in the
and decide the case. future if his application for bail is granted. The
application was referred to the Insular Probation
It cannot seriously be asserted that the Office, but was consequently denied. The denial
above requirements were not met. When, in view was premised on the ground that Act No. 4221
provides probation only to those provinces with distinction between those who fall within
available funds for the salary of probation such class and those who do not.
officers, and the province referred to has no
sufficient funds. Thus, petitioner now comes
before the Court assailing the constitutionality of VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
the Act for being violative of the equal protection a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade.
clause. The next question that now poses solution is,
Does the law deny the equal protection of the
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of
equal protection guarantee? alienage is the root and cause of the distinction
between the alien and the national as a trader.
Held: Yes. The probation act is in violation of the The alien resident owes allegiance to the
said constitutional guarantee. It constitutes as a country of his birth or his adopted country;
class legislation which discriminates against his stay here is for personal convenience; he
persons of the same class and favor others. is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim
Person s i h similar circ ms ances ma be or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither
afforded with the privilege of probation merely illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally
due to the discretion of the provincial officers. lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for
Hence, the Court ruled that the said order is not this country where he temporarily stays and
constitutional. makes his living, or of that spirit of regard,
In the case at bar, the resultant sympathy and consideration for his Filipino
inequality may be said to flow from the customers as would prevent him from taking
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, advantage of their weakness and exploiting them.
although perhaps this is necessarily the result in The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the
every case. In the instant case, one province may alien go back to his beloved country and his
appropriate the necessary fund to defray the beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of
salary of a probation officer, while another the country is that the alien retailer has shown
province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a such utter disregard for his customers and the
case, the Probation Act would be in operation in people on whom he makes his profit, that it has
the former province but not in the latter. This been found necessary to adopt the legislation,
means that a person otherwise coming within the radical as it may seem.
purview of the law would be able to enjoy the Another objection to the alien retailer in this
benefits of probation in one province while country is that he never really makes a
another person similarly situated in another genuine contribution to national income and
province would be denied those same benefits. wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to
This is obnoxious discrimination. While inequality general distribution, but the gains and profits
may result in the application of the law and in the he makes are not invested in industries that
conferment of the benefits therein provided, would help the country's economy and
inequality is not in al cases the necessary result. increase national wealth. The alien's interest in
Whatever may be the case, it is clear that Section this country being merely transient and
11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to
which discrimination and inequality are permitted continue entrusting the very important function of
or allowed. retail distribution to his hands.
We are of the opinion that Section 11 of The practices resorted to by aliens in the control
Act. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal of distribution, as already pointed out above, their
protection of the law and is on that account bad. secret manipulations of stocks of commodities
We see no difference BETWEEN A LAW and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of
WHICH DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION and a their customers and of the ultimate happiness of
LAW WHICH PERMITS OF SUCH DENIAL . A the people of the nation of which they are mere
law may appear to be fair on its face and guests, which practices, manipulations and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade
unjust and illegal discrmmination, it is within by the nationals, show the existence of real and
the constitutional prohibition. actual, positive and fundamental differences
between an alien and a national which fully justify
the legislative classification adopted in the retail
trade measure. These differences are certainly a
Ichong vs. Hernandez valid reason for the State to prefer the national
GR 7995, May 31, 1957 over the alien in the retail trade. We would be
doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold
Facts: -supra- that no reason or ground for a legitimate
distinction can be found between one and the
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the other.
equal protection clause?
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes
Held: None. The equal protection of the law sufficient basis for distinction.
clause is against undue favor and individual or The above objectionable characteristics of the
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which
the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for
prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the legislative classification of retail traders into
object to which it is directed or by territory within nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with
which is to operate. It does not demand absolute the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To
equality among residents; it merely requires that this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the
all persons shall be treated alike, under like law-making power. Since the Court finds that the
circumstances and conditions both as to classification is actual, real and reasonable,
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The and all persons of one class are treated alike,
equal protection clause is not infringed by and as it cannot be said that the classification is
legislation which applies only to those patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in
persons falling within a specified class, if it duty bound to declare that the legislature acted
applies alike to all persons within such class, within its legitimate prerogative and it can not
and reasonable grounds exists for making a declare that the act transcends the limit of equal
protection established by the Constitution.
legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature being collected from every employed alien,
to make distinctions and classifications whether he is casual or permanent, part time
among persons is not curtailed or denied by or full time or whether he is a lowly employee
the equal protection of the laws clause. The or a highly paid executive.
legislative power admits of a wide scope of Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay
discretion, and a law can be violative of the down any criterion or standard to guide the
constitutional limitation only when the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has
classification is without reasonable basis. been held that where an ordinance of a
municipality fails to state any policy or to set up
(Adonis Notes: Under the abovementioned any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action,
case, the case was decided under the 1935 expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring
Constitution wherein PARITY RIGHTS were a permit, enumerates no conditions for its
granted to U.S. Citizens.) grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard,
thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho unrestricted power to grant or deny the
GR 29646, Nov. 10,1978 issuance of building permits, such ordinance
is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited
Facts: City ordinance No 6537, prohibits delegation of power to allow or prevent an
aliens from being employed or engaged or activity per se lawful.
participate in any position or association or In Chinese Flour Importers Association
business enumerated therein, whether vs. Price Stabilization Board, where a law
permanent, temporary or casual, without first granted a government agency power to
securing an employment permit from the Mayor determine the allocation of wheat flour among
of Manila is being questioned by the private importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the
respondent for allegedly in violation of the equal interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested
protection guarantee. The trial court ruled in favor in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion
of the nullity of the ordinance. On appeal, to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard
petitioner argues that the ordinance cannot be from which it can be measured or controlled.
invalidated on the ground that it violated the rule It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso
on uniformity of taxation, because it apples to that the authority and discretion to grant and
pure tax or revenues measures and said refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the
ordinance is not such but is an exercise of the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila
police power of the state. is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion
to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the said ordinance Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it
is unconstitutional? does not contain or suggest any standard or
criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the
Held: The ordinance is unconstitutional. power which has been granted to him by the
The contention that it was not purely a tax or ordinance.
revenue measure because its principle purpose The ordinance in question violates
was for regulation has no merit. It is obvious the due process of law and equal protection
that THE ORDINANCE WAS PURPOSELY FOR rule of the Constitution.
THE RAISING OF MONEY UNDER THE GUISE
OF A REGULATION. Further, the assailed (Requiring a person before he can be
ordinance violates the equal protection employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of
clause. To require a person to get a work Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is
permit before he can be employed from the tantamount to denying him the basic right of the
Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at will is people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
tantamount to the denial of the basic right of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a
a person to engage in a means of livelihood. State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
Aliens once admitted cannot be deprived of territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
life without due process of law. deprived of life without due process of law. This
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The
is not a purely tax or revenue measure because shelter of protection under the due process and
its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has equal protection clause is given to all persons,
no merit. While it is true that the first part which both aliens and citizens.)
requires that the alien shall secure an
employment permit from the Mayor involves the Dumlao vs. Comelec
exercise of discretion and judgment in the GR 52245, Jan. 22, 1980
processing and approval or disapproval of
applications for employment permits and Facts: The Petition alleges that petitioner,
therefore is regulatory in character the second Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva
part which requires the payment of P50.00 as Vizcaya. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions
employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
measure. There is no logic or justification in Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary
exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been to the equal protection and due process
CLEARED for employment. It is obvious guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4
that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise provides:
money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not "Sec. 4. Special Disqualification - In
only because it is excessive BUT BECAUSE addition to violation of section 10 of Art.
IT FAILS TO CONSIDER VALID SUBSTANTIAL XII-C of the Constitution and
DIFFERENCES IN SITUATION AMONG disqualification mentioned in existing
INDIVIDUAL ALIENS WHO ARE REQUIRED laws, which are hereby declared as
TO PAY IT. Although the equal protection disqualification for any of the elective
clause of the Constitution does not forbid officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
classification, it is imperative that the
classification, should be based on real and Any retired elective provincial, city of
substantial differences having a reasonable municipal official (1)who has received
relation to the subject of the particular payment of the retirement benefits to
which he is entitled under the law and [1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly
(2)who shall have been 65 years of age treated.
at the commencement of the term of In fine, it bears reiteration that the
office to which he seeks to be elected, equal protection clause does not forbid all
shall not be qualified to run for the same legal classification. What is proscribes is a
elective local office from which he has classification which is arbitrary and
retired." unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee
is not violated by a reasonable classification
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited is germane to the purpose of the law and
provision is directed insidiously against him, and applies to all those belonging to the same.
that the classification provided therein is based The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence
on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class of younger blood in local governments. The
legislation. classification in question being pursuant to that
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if
Issue: Whether or not said provision violates at times, it may be susceptible to the objection
the equal protection guarantee? that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
Held: No. Petitioner Dumlao's contention that (NOTE: The questioned law is germane to the
section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against purposes for which it was enacted)
him personally is belied by the fact that several
petitions for the disqualification of other
candidates for local positions based on the
challenged provision have already been filed with Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
the COMELEC. This tellingly overthrows inc. vs. Drillon
Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful GR 81958, June 30, 1988
discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. Facts: Philippine Association of Service
52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal Exporters, inc. (PASEI), is a domestic corporation
protection is neither well taken. The constitutional engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is workers, male and female for overseas
subject to rational classification. If the groupings employment. PASEI seeks to challenge the
are based on reasonable and real constitutionality of the Department Order No. 1
differentiations, one class can be treated and series of 1998 of the Department of Labor. Said
regulated differently from another class. For order prohibited and suspended the overseas
purposes of public service, employees 65 deployment of Filipina Domestic and household
years of age, have been validly classified workers. Their main contention is that the order is
differently from younger employees. invalid for the DOLE erroneously exercised police
Employees attaining that age are subject to power, which is an adjunct on the powers of
compulsory retirement, while those of congress, and not executive in character.
younger ages are not so compulsorily Moreover, it alleged that there was a violation of
retirable. the equal protection clause for it only sought to
In respect of election to provincial, city, suspend the deployment of Filipina workers, thus
or municipal positions, to require that candidates there was discrimination.
should not be more than 65 years of age at the
time they assume office, if applicable to Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable equal protection clause?
classification although, as the Solicitor General
has intimated, a good policy of the law should Held: No. The Court is satisfied that the
be to promote the emergence of younger classification madeN - the preference for female
blood in our political elective echelons. On the workers - rests on substantial distinctions.
other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 As a matter of judicial notice, the Court
years old may also be good elective local is well aware of the unhappy plight that has
officials. befallen our female labor force abroad, especially
Coming now to the case of retirees. domestic servants, amid exploitative working
Retirement from government service may or may conditions marked by, in not a few cases,
not be a reasonable disqualification for elective physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of
local officials. For one thing, there can also be maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina
retirees from government service at ages, say workers, even rape and various forms of torture,
below 65. It may neither be reasonable to confirmed by testimonies of returning workers,
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old are compelling motives for urgent Government
retiree could be a good local official just like one, action. As precisely the caretaker of
aged 65, who is not a retiree. Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that
local official, who has retired from a provincial, duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
city or municipal office, there is reason to The same, however, cannot be said of
disqualify him from running for the same our male workers. In the first place, there is no
office from which he had retired, as provided evidence that, except perhaps for isolated
for in the challenged provision. The need for instances, our men abroad have been afflicted
new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness with an identical predicament. The petitioner has
of the retiree for government work is present, proffered no argument that the Government
and what is emphatically significant is that should act similarly with respect to male workers.
the retired employee has already declared The Court, of course, is not impressing some
himself tired and unavailable for the same male chauvinistic notion that men are
government work, but, which, by virtue of a superior to women. What the Court is saying
change of mind, he would like to assume is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that
again. It is for the very reason that inequality will women domestic workers are being ill-treated
neither result from the application of the abroad in massive instances) and not upon
challenged provision. Just as that provision does some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the
not deny equal protection, neither does it permit Government acted in this case. It is evidence
such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration
and evidence this Court accepts. The Court
cannot, however, say the same thing as far as suspension from office of the member of the PNP
men are concerned. There is simply no evidence charged with grave offense where the penalty is
to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, six years and one day or more shall last until the
then, that insofar as classifications are termination of the case. The suspension cannot
concerned, this Court is content that be lifted before the termination of the case. The
distinctions are borne by the evidence. second sentence of the same Section providing
Discrimination in this case is justified. that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90)
There is likewise no doubt that such a days from arraignment does not qualify or limit
classification is germane to the purpose behind the first sentence. The two can stand
the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed independently of each other. The first refers to
objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the period of suspension. The second deals with
the protection for Filipino female overseas the time from within which the trial should be
workers." 17 This Court has no quarrel that in the finished.
midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers
have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety
be for their own good and welfare. days from arraignment, should the suspension of
accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no.
While the law uses the mandatory word "shall"
before the phrase "be terminated within ninety
HIMAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that
G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994, KAPUNAN, suggests that the preventive suspension of the
J.: accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated
within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who
Facts: Petitioner, a policeman was implicated fails to decide the case within the period without
in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the justifiable reason may be subject to
attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the administrative sanctions and, in appropriate
informations for murder and attempted murder cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or
were filed, the trial court issued an Order civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed
suspending petitioner until the termination of the without fault of the accused such that he is
case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975. In deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not
response, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal
for his suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss
807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his the case, the accused can compel its dismissal
suspension should be limited to 90 days. by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure
Respondent judge denied the motion pointing out his liberty by habeas corpus.
that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused
shall be suspended from office until his case is Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD
terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly
order of denial was, likewise, denied. Hence, the shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive
petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside suspension in pending administrative
the orders of respondent Judge and to command investigation, not in criminal cases, as here.
him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the
Petitioner posits that as a member of the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90)
Philippine National Police, he is covered by the days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The
Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall
of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the apply to all personnel of the Department" simply
maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) means that the provisions of the Civil Service
days. He claims that an imposition of preventive Law and its implementing rules and regulations
suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the are applicable to members of the Philippine
Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his National Police insofar as the provisions, rules
constitutional right to equal protection of laws. and regulations are not inconsistent with R.A.
6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service
Decree which limits the preventive suspension to
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the
preventive suspension of over 90 days is a PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides
violation of his constitutional right to equal differently, that is, the suspension where the
protection of laws? penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years
shall continue until the case is terminated.
Held No. He claims that an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso
to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from
of his constitutional right to equal protection of charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060),
laws. He further asserts that the requirements in otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall Practices Act which, unlike R.A. 6975, is silent on
immediately suspend the accused from office the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec.
until the case is terminated" and the succeeding 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:
sentence, "Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the Conference Committee on National Defense
accused" are both substantive and should be relative to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the
taken together to mean that if the case is not meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as
terminated within 90 days, the period of the period of suspension is concerned becomes
preventive suspension must be lifted because of all the more clear.
the command that the trial must be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment. The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative
intent to place on preventive suspension a
We disagree. member of the PNP charged with grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. years of imprisonment and which suspension
47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from continues until the case against him is
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the terminated.
intervenors with their own motion for

The reason why members of the PNP reconsideration-in-intervention.
are treated differently from the other classes
of persons charged criminally or ISSUES: 1) Whether the assailed decision is
administratively insofar as the application of contrary to the constitutional proscription against
the rule on preventive suspension is the participation of public appointive officials and
concerned is that policemen carry weapons members of the military in partisan political
and the badge of the law which can be used activity.
to harass or intimidate witnesses against 2) Whether the assailed provisions do
them, as succinctly brought out in the not violate the equal protection clause when they
legislative discussions. accord differential treatment to elective and
If a suspended policeman criminally appointive officials.
charged with a serious offense is reinstated 3) Whether the assailed provisions do
to his post while his case is pending, his not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth.
victim and the witnesses against him are
obviously exposed to constant threat and HELD: YES to all.
thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact
that the accused is in uniform and armed. The Court now rules that Section 4(a) of
The equal protection clause exists to Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus
prevent undue favor or privilege. Recognizing the Election Code, and the second proviso in the
existence of real differences among men, the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not
equal protection clause does not demand unconstitutional.
absolute equality. It merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like *Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678
circumstances and conditions both as to the Compliant with Law
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a
Thus, the equal protection clause does not faithful reflection of the present state of the law
absolutely forbid classifications, such as the and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
one which exists in the instant case. If the
classification is based on real and substantial Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section
differences; is germane to the purpose of the 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the
law; applies to all members of the same class; Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a
and applies to current as well as future public appointive office or position, including
conditions, the classification may not be active members of the Armed Forces of the
impugned as violating the Constitution's equal Philippines, and officers and employees in
protection guarantee. government-owned or -controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of
Quinto vs. COMELEC candidacy.
G.R. No. 189698, February, 22. 2010
Puno. CJ: Incumbent Elected Official. Upon the other
hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the
Note: The SC reversed its December 1, 2009 Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of
decision via the MRs of COMELEC and movant- the Omnibus Election Code and rendered
intervenors ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it
considered an elected official as resigned only
FACTS: In preparation for the 2010 elections, the upon the start of the campaign period
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued corresponding to the positions for which they are
Resolution No. 8678 the Guidelines on the running, an elected official is not deemed to have
Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and resigned from his office upon the filing of his
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, elected office or position. In fine, an elected
2010 National and Local Elections. Sec. 4 of official may run for another position without
Resol ion No. 8678 pro ides ha An person forfeiting his seat.
holding a public appointive office or position x x x
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his These laws and regulations implement
office upon the filing of his certificate of Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987
candidacy (automatic resignation) however it Constitution, which prohibits civil service
e emp s hose elec ed officials sa ing ha An officers and employees from engaging in any
person holding an elective office or position shall electioneering or partisan political campaign.
not be considered resigned upon the filing of his The intention to impose a strict limitation on
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other the participation of civil service officers and
elec i e office or posi ion. employees in partisan political campaigns is
Sec.13(par. 3) of Rep blic Ac ( R.A. ) No. 9369 unmistakable.
pro ides: an person holding a p blic
appointive office or position x x x shall be To emphasize its importance, this constitutional
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office ban on civil service officers and employees is
. presently reflected and implemented by a number
Sec. 66 of BP Blg. 881, or the Omnibus Election of statutes. (e.g. Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7
Code, reads: An person holding a p blic and Section 55, Chapter 8 both of Subtitle A,
appointive office or position x x x shall be Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
considered ipso facto resigned from his office 1987). Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
pon he filing of his cer ifica e of candidac . 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further makes
Petitioners were appointive officers of the intervention by civil service officers and
government who were planning to run in the 2010 employees in partisan political activities an
elections sought the nullification of Sec. 4(a) on election offense. The intent of both Congress
the ground, among others, that it is discriminatory and the framers of our Constitution to limit
and violates the equal protection clause of the the participation of civil service officers and
Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled in their employees in partisan political activities is
favor. This prompted the COMELEC to file a too plain to be mistaken.
motion for reconsideration and the movant-
But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
Constitution and the implementing statutes apply classification. Since the classification justifying
only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected
Stated differently, the constitutional ban does officials vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored
not cover elected officials, notwithstanding upon material and significant distinctions and
ac a [] c c b ac a all the persons belonging under the same
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, classification are similarly treated, the equal
and agencies of the Government, including protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not
government-owned or controlled infringed.”
c a a c a . This is
because elected public officials, by the very The Court declared these provisions compliant
nature of their office, engage in partisan with the equal protection clause. It held that (i) in
political activities almost all year round, even regulating the speech of its employees, the state
outside of the campaign period. Political as employer has interests that differ significantly
partisanship is the inevitable essence of a from those it possesses in regulating the speech
political office, elective positions included. of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must
therefore balance the legitimate interest of
*Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 employee free expression against the interests of
of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus the employer in promoting efficiency of public
Election Code Do Not Violate the Equal services; (iii) if he emplo ees e pression
Protection Clause interferes with the maintenance of efficient and
regularly functioning services, the limitation on
In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on speech is not unconstitutional; and (iv) the
whether these deemed-resigned provisions Legislature is to be given some flexibility or
challenged in the case at bar violate the equal latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be
protection clause of the Constitution in Fariñas, et covered by any statutory restrictions. Therefore,
al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. insofar as government employees are concerned,
the correct standard of review is an INTEREST-
The petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal BALANCING APPROACH, a means-end
protection challenge against Section 14, with the scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit
end in view of having the deemed-resigned between the governmental interests and the
pro isions appl eq all o bo h elec ed and prohibitions in question.
appointive officials. We held, however, that the
legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a
reasonable classification, as there are material
and significant distinctions between the two *Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13
classes of officials. Consequently, the contention of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus
that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation Election Code Do Not Suffer from
to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Overbreadth
Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of
the Constitution, failed muster. First, according to the assailed Decision, the
challenged provisions of law are overly broad
In said case, the Court ruled that: because they apply indiscriminately to all civil
“Substantial distinctions clearly exist between servants holding appointive posts, without due
elective officials and appointive officials. The regard for the type of position being held by the
former occupy their office by virtue of the employee running for elective office and the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to degree of influence that may be attendant
an office for a definite term and may be thereto. Such a myopic view obviously fails to
removed therefrom only upon stringent consider a different, yet equally plausible,
conditions. On the other hand, appointive threat to the government posed by the
officials hold their office by virtue of their partisan potential of a large and growing
designation thereto by an appointing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse
authority. Some appointive officials hold their a db a ca ac
office in a permanent capacity and are a a a a d ca d
entitled to security of tenure while others a a d
serve at the pleasure of the appointing c b a b a ab a
authority. on t .
Another substantial distinction between the Second, the assailed Decision also held that the
two sets of officials is that under Section 55, challenged provisions of law are overly broad
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service because they are made to apply indiscriminately
Commission, Book V of the Administrative to all civil servants holding appointive offices,
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), without due regard for the type of elective office
appointive officials, as officers and being sought, whether it be partisan or
employees in the civil service, are strictly nonpartisan in character, or in the national,
prohibited from engaging in any partisan municipal or barangay level. The Court ruled that:
political activity or take (sic) part in any A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately
election except to vote. Under the same disclose that the rules and guidelines set forth
provision, elective officials, or officers or therein refer to the filing of certificates of
employees holding political offices, are candidacy and nomination of official
obviously expressly allowed to take part in candidates of registered political parties, in
political and electoral activities. connection with the May 10, 2010 National
and Local Elections. Obviously, these rules
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section and guidelines, including the restriction in
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued
legislators deemed it proper to treat these two specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010
classes of officials differently with respect to National and Local Elections, which, it must
the effect on their tenure in the office of the be noted, are decidedly partisan in character.
filing of the certificates of candidacy for any Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section
position other than those occupied by them. 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the
Again, it is not within the power of the Court to candidacies of appointive officials vying for
partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 alleging that funds representing savings from
National and Local Elections. On this score, unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally
the overbreadth challenge leveled against disbursed. There were unfilled positions because
Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable. Similarly, one hundred ninety (190) personnel were
a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 dismissed, and allegedly, these 190 personnel
and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in con in ed o recei e heir salaries as ghos
conjunction with other related laws on the matter, agen s.
will confirm that these provisions are likewise Petitioner Almonte denied the
not intended to apply to elections for allegations and asked that the complaint be
nonpartisan public offices. The only elections dismissed and the case considered closed.
which are relevant to the present inquiry are Similarly petitioner Perez, budget chief of the
the elections for barangay offices, since these EIIB, denied savings had been realized from the
are the only elections in this country which implementation of of E.O. No. 127 (dismissal of
involve nonpartisan public offices. In this 190 personnel.)
regard, it is well to note that from as far back T he Graft Investigation Officer of the
as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Ombudsman's office, Jose F. Saño asked for
Code in 1985, Congress has intended that authority to conduct a preliminary investigation.
these nonpartisan barangay elections be Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a
governed by SPECIAL RULES, including a subpoena to petitioners Almonte and Perez,
separate rule on deemed resignations which requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits
is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus and the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as a
Election Code. subpoena duces tecum to the Chief of the EIIB's
Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth documents relating to Personal Services Funds
have been entertained only where, in the for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as
judgment of the court, the possibility that vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB
protected speech of others may be muted and for 1988."
perceived grievances left to fester (due to the Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad the subpoena and the subpoena duces
statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society tecum. Respondent Ombudsman granted the
in allowing some unprotected speech or conduct motion to quash the subpoena in view of the fact
to go unpunished. Facial overbreadth has that there were no affidavits filed against
likewise not been invoked where a limiting petitioners. But he denied their motion to quash
construction could be placed on the challenged the subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that
statute, and where there are readily apparent petitioners were not being forced to produce
constructions that would cure, or at least evidence against themselves, since the
substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of subpoena duces tecum was directed to the Chief
the statute. Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition
the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the
In the case at bar, the probable harm to Records a Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa
society in permitting incumbent appointive Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all
officials to remain in office, even as they documents relating to Personnel Service Funds,
actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs for the year 1988, and all documents, salary
the less likely evil of having arguably vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for
protected candidacies blocked by the 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."
possible inhibitory effect of a potentially Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for
overly broad statute. reconsideration, stating that, the Ombudsman
can act only "in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by
Biraogo et al. v. The Philippine Truth law" and that the complaint in this case is
Commission unsigned and unverified, thus the case is not an
GR No. 192935; December 7, 2010 appropriate one. According to them, those
J. Mendoza complainants who wrote the letter should be
identified and should sign the complaint.
FACTS: Otherwise, their right under the equal protection
clause of the Constitution will be violated. The
motion for reconsideration, having been denied,
hence, this petition.
COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE vs.
HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and Issue: WoN pe i oner s righ o eq al pro ec ion
CONCERNED CITIZENS of the laws has been violated.
G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995
Held: NO. The Constitution expressly enjoins the
To put this case in perspective it should be stated Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in
at the outset that it does not concern a demand any form or manner" concerning official acts or
by a citizen for information under the freedom of omissions. (Art. XI, § 12): The Ombudsman and
information guarantee of the Constitution. Rather his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall
it concerns the power of the Office of the act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection manner against public officials or employees of
with an investigation conducted by it vis-a-vis the the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
claim of privilege of an agency of the instrumentality thereof, including government-
Government. owned or controlled corporations and shall
in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of
Facts: Petitioner Almonte was formerly the action taken and the result thereof.
Commissioner of the Economic Intelligence and The Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides
Investigation Bureau (EIIB), while Perez is Chief in § 26(2): The Office of the Ombudsman shall
of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management receive complaints from any source in whatever
Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued form concerning an official act or omission. It
by the Ombudsman in connection with his shall act on the complaint immediately and if it
investigation of an anonymous letter, written by finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss
an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, the same and inform the complainant of such
dismissal citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a complainants are more often than not
reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall poor and simple folk who cannot
first furnish the respondent public officer or afford to hire lawyers
employee with a summary of the complaint and .
require him to submit a written answer within The Ombudsman is designated by the
seventy-two hours from receipt thereof. If the Constitution "protectors of the people" and as
answer is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the such they are required by it "to act promptly on
case. complaints in any form or manner against public
Accordingly, in Diaz officials or employees of the Government, or any
v. Sandiganbayan the Court held that testimony subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
given at a fact-finding investigation and charges including government-owned or controlled
made in a pleading in a case in court constituted corporation." Even if the subpoenaed documents
a sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to are treated as presumptively privileged, this
commence investigation, because a formal decision would only justify ordering their
complaint was really not necessary. Rather than inspection in camera but not their nonproduction.
referring to the form of complaints, therefore, the Above all, there must be a scrupulous protection
phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI, § 12 of the documents delivered. The Court thus
means any case concerning official act or dismissed the petition, but it is directed that the
omission which is alleged to be "illegal, unjust, inspection of subpoenaed documents be made
improper, or inefficient." The phrase "subject to personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and
such limitations as may be provided by law" with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.
refers to such limitations as may be provided by
Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such
limitations as may be imposed by the courts. (NOTE: Petitioners complain that "in all forum
Such limitations may well include a and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can
requirement that the investigation be only hale respondents via their verified
concluded in camera, with the public complaints or sworn statements with their
excluded, as exception to the general nature identities fully disclosed," while in
of the proceedings in the Office of the proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman. A reconciliation is thereby Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to
made between the demands of national start an investigation. In the first place, there
security and the requirement of accountability can be no objection to this procedure because it
enshrined in the Constitution. is provided in the Constitution itself. In the
What has been said above disposes of second place, it is apparent that in permitting
petitioners' contention that the anonymous letter- the filing of complaints "in any form and in a
complaint against them is nothing but a vexatious manner," the framers of the Constitution took
prosecution. It only remains to say that the into account the well-known reticence of the
general investigation in the Ombudsman' s people which keep them from complaining
office is precisely for the purpose of against official wrongdoings. As this Court had
protecting those against whom a complaint is occasion to point out, the Office of the
filed against hasty, malicious, and oppressive Ombudsman is different from the other
prosecution as much as securing the State investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
from useless and expensive trials. There may government because those subject to its
also be benefit resulting from such limited in jurisdiction are public officials who, through
camera inspection in terms of increased public official pressure and influence, can quash, delay
confidence that the privilege is not being abused or dismiss investigations held against them. On
and increased likelihood that no abuse is in fact the other hand complainants are more often than
occurring. not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire
Nor is there violation of petitioner's lawyers. )
right to the equal protection of the laws.
Petitioners complain that "in all forum and
tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., vs.
only hale respondents via their verified TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY
complaints or sworn statements with their G.R. No. L-23794, February 17, 1968,
identities fully disclosed," while in BENGZON, J.P., J.:
proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to Facts: In1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc
start an investigation. City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing "on any
and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at
In the first place, there can be no the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a
objection to this procedure because municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%)
it is provided in the Constitution per export sale to USA and other foreign
itself. countries." Payments for said tax were made,
In the second place, it is apparent under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
that in permitting the filing of Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed
complaints "in any form and in a before the CFI with service of a copy upon the
manner," the framers of the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of
Constitution took into account the Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board
well-known reticence of the people and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated
which keep them from complaining ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of
against official wrongdoings. the equal protection clause and the rule of
uniformity of taxation, aside from being an export
Thirdly, the Office of the Ombudsman tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised
is different from the other Administrative Code.The respondent asserted
investigatory and prosecutory that the tax ordinance was within the city's power
agencies of the government because to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that
those subject to its jurisdiction are the same did not violate the afore-cited
public officials who, through official constitutional limitations.
pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations held Issue: Whether or not the ordinance violates
against them. On the other hand the equal protection clause.

constitutional rights, be invoked against the

Held: Yes. The Constitution in the bill of rights state?
provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws." The equal RULING: NO. In the absence of governmental
protection clause applies only to persons or interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
things identically situated and does not bar a Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
reasonable classification of the subject of This constitutional right refers to the
legislation, and a classification is reasonable immunity of one's person, whether citizen or
where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions alien, from interference by government.The
which make real differences; (2) these are contraband in the case at bar came into
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the possession of the government without the
classification applies not only to present latter transgressing appellant's rights against
conditions but also to future conditions which are unreasonable searches and seizures.
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) The constitutional proscription against
the classification applies only to those who unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
belong to the same class. restraint directed only against the government
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that and its agencies tasked with the enforcement
the questioned ordinance does not meet them, of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against
for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing If the search is made at the behest or
ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, initiation of the proprietor of a private
Inc., was the only sugar central in the city of establishment for its own and private
Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to the intervention of police authorities, the right
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance against unreasonable searches and seizures
should not be singular and exclusive as to cannot be invoked for only the act of private
exclude any subsequently established sugar individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. In
central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the sum, the protection against unreasonable
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a searches and seizures cannot be extended to
similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to acts committed by private individuals so as to
the tax because the ordinance expressly points bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the intrusion by the government.
entity to be levied upon.
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
ART.2 SEARCHES & SEIZURES G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967
PEOPLE vs. MARTI Facts: Upon application of the officers of the

G.R. No. 81561, January 18,1991 government (respondent prosecutors), several
judges (respondent judges) issued a total of 42
FACTS: Andre Marti went to the booth of the search warrants against petitioners & or the
Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the corporations of which they were officers, directed
Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, to any peace officer, to search the persons
carrying with them 4 gift- wrapped packages. named and/ or the premises of their offices,
The packages were not inspected by Anita warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize
Reyes, the proprietress, as Marti refused, who several personal properties as the "subject of
assured her that the packages simply contained the offense; stolen or embezelled or the fruits
books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his of the offense," or "used or intended to be
friend in Zurich. However, before delivery of used as the means of committing the offense"
appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/ or as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes, proprietor and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC."
husband of Anita Reyes, following standard Alleging that the aforementioned search
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final warrants are null & void, said petitioners
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a Stonehill, et.al. filed w/ the SC this original action
peculiar order emitted therefrom. His curiosity for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
aroused. He squeezed one of the bundles injunction.
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves
inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out Issues:
a cellophane wrapper protruding from the 1. Whether the right against unlafwful search
opening of one of the gloves. He made an and seizures may be invoked by artificial
opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and beings?
took several grams of the contents thereof. Job 2. Whether or not the search warrants in
Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and question were validly issued?
requested a laboratory examination of the 3. Whether or not the articles seized by virtue
samples he extracted from the cellophane of the warrants are admissible in evidence?
wrapper. It turned out that the dried leaves were
marijuana flowering tops as certified by the Held:
forensic chemist of the Narcotics Section of the 1. YES. Artificial beings are also entitiled to
NBI. the guarantee although they may be required to
` Thereafter, an information was filed open their books of accounts for examination by
against appellant for violation of R.A. 6425 the State in the exercise of POLICE POWER.
(Dangerous Drugs Act). Appellant contends that
the evidence subject of the imputed offense had 2. YES. Two points must be stressed in
been obtained in violation of his constitutional connection with Art. III, Section 2 of the
rights against unreasonable searches and Constitution: (a) that no warrant shall issue but
seizures and privacy of communication and upon probable cause to be determined by the
therefore argues that the same should be held judge in the manner set forth therein; and (b) that
inadmissible in evidence. the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized.
ISSUE: Whether or not an act of a private None of these requirements has been
individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's complied with. Indeed, the same were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and DESCRIBED-- as well as tending to defeat its
juridical persons therein named had committed a major objective: the elimination of general
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and warrants.
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code."No specific offense had 3. NO. Relying upon Moncado vs. People's
been alleged in said applications. The Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondent- Prosecutors
averments thereof with respect to the offense maintain that, even if the searches and seizures
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it under consideration were unconstitutional, the
was impossible for the judges who issued the documents, papers and things thus seized are
warrants to have found the existence of a admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.
probable cause, for the same presupposes the Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
introduction of competent proof that the party unanimously of the opinion that the position taken
against whom it is sought has performed in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, position was in line with the American common
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed
To uphold the validity of the warrants in to go free merely "because the constable has
question would be to wipe out completely one of blundered," upon the theory that the
the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the searches and seizures is protected by means
domicile and the privacy of communication and other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, obtained, such as the common-law action for
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is damages against the searching officer, against
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the party who procured the issuance of the
the constitutional provision above quoted search warrant and against those assisting in the
to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is execution of an illegal search, their criminal
not difficult to imagine what would happen, in punishment, resistance, without liability to an
times of keen political strife, when the party in unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest as may be provided by other laws.
it, even though by legal means. However, most common law
Such is the seriousness of the jurisdictions have already given up this approach
irregularities committed in connection with the and eventually adopted THE EXCLUSIONARY
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed RULE, realizing that this is the only practical
it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former means of enforcing the constitutional
Rules of Court 14 by providing in its injunction against unreasonable searches
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned
15 that "a search warrant shall not issue upon Hand:
probable cause in connection with one specific "As we understand it, the reason for
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
"no search warrant shall issue for more than exclusion is the only practical way of
one specific offense." enforcing the constitutional privilege. In
The grave violation of the Constitution earlier times the action of trespass against
made in the application for the contested search the offending official may have been
warrants was compounded by the description protection enough; but that is true no longer.
therein made of the effects to be searched for Only in case the prosecution which itself
and seized, to wit: controls the seizing officials, knows that it
"Books of accounts, financial cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong
records, vouchers, journals, be repressed".
correspondence, receipts, We hold, therefore, that the doctrine
ledgers, portfolios, credit adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
journals, typewriters, and hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the
other documents and/or search of three (3) residences of herein
papers showing all business petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June
transactions including 29, 1962 are null and void.
disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related Soliven vs. Makasiar
profit and loss statements." GR No. 82585, November 14, 1988
Thus, the warrants authorized the Facts: Petitioner Luis Beltran contends, among
search for and seizure of records pertaining to others, that his constitutional rights were violated
ALL business transactions of petitioners herein, when respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest
regardless of whether the transactions were against him without personally examining the
legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the determine probable cause. Petitioner contends
aforementioned corporations, whatever their that the Constitution now requires the judge to
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit personally examine the complainant and his
command of our Bill of Rights that the things witnesses in his determination of probable cause
to be seized be particularly described as well for the issuance of warrants of arrests. The basis
as tending to defeat its major objective: the for his contention was the fact that the word
elimination of general warrants. personall was added after the word
General search warrants are de ermined , and he phrase o her responsible
outlawed because they place the sanctity of officers as ma be a hori ed b la as
the domicile and the privacy of omitted.
communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of Issue: Is he pe i ioner s con en ion correc ?
peace officers. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the Held: No. The pertinent Constitutional provision
aforementioned corporations, whatever their is highlighted herein below:
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights-- THAT THE Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the
THINGS TO BE SEIZED BE PARTICULARLY people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and

effects against unreasonable Issue: Whether or no pe i ioners righ o
searches and seizures of personal liberty and security of homes against
whatever nature and for any unreasonable searches and seizures as
purpose shall be inviolable, contemplated in Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987
and no search warrant or Constitution was violated.
warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause Held: Yes. The abovementioned section and
to be determined personally Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
by the judge after examination provide that the judge must, before issuing a
under oath or affirmation of search warrant, determine, whether there is
the complainant and the probable cause by examining the complainant
witnesses he may produce, and witness through searching questions and
and particularly describing the answers.The Court held that the judge failed to
place to be searched and the comply with the legal requirement that he must
persons or things to be examine the applicant and his witness in the form
seized. of searching questions and answers in order to
determine the existence of probable causes as
The addition of the word "personally" provided in the said statutory provision.
after the word "determined" and the deletion of The depositions of the witnesses did
the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to not only contain leading questions but it was
issue warrants to "other responsible officers as also very broad. The questions propounded
may be authorized by law", has apparently to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but
convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution were merely routinary. The deposition was
now requires the judge to personally examine the already mimeographed and all that the
complainant and his witnesses determination of witnesses had to do was fill in their answers
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of on the blanks provided.
arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation. The 'probable cause' required to
What the Constitution underscores is justify the issuance of a search warrant
the exclusive and personal responsibility of comprehends such facts and circumstances as
the issuing judge to satisfy himself the will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and
existence of probable cause. In satisfying act in pursuant thereof.Of the 8 questions asked,
himself of the existence of probable cause for the the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to identity. The 3rd
issuance of a warrant of arrest, THE JUDGE IS and 5th are leading not searching questions. The
NOT REQUIRED TO PERSONALLY EXAMINE 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the
THE COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES. personalities to be seized, which is identical to
Following established doctrine and that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the same lack of particularity. The examination
report and the supporting documents conducted WAS GENERAL IN NATURE AND
submitted by the fiscal regarding the MERELY REPETITIOUS of the deposition of
existence of probable cause and, on the basis said witness. Mere generalization will not
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on suffice and does not satisfy the requirements
the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, or probable cause upon which a warrant may
he may disregard the fiscal's report and issue."
require the submission of supporting Likewise, this Court previously declared
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at that search warrants issued are invalid if it is due
a conclusion as to the existence of probable to the failure of the judge to examine the witness
cause. in the form of searching questions and answers.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, Pertinent portion of the decision reads:
otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the "Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of
preliminary examination and investigation of P/Lt. Florencio Angeles shows that it was too
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on brief and short. RESPONDENT JUDGE DID
hearing and deciding cases filed before their NOT EXAMINE HIM 'IN THE FORM OF
courts. SEARCHING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS'.
ON THE CONTRARY, THE QUESTIONS
ASKED WERE LEADING AS THEY CALLED
Silva vs. Honorable Presiding Judge of RTC FOR A SIMPLE 'YES' OR 'NO' ANSWER. As
of Negros Oriental held in Quintero vs. NBI, 'the questions
GR No. 81756, October 21, 1991 propounded by respondent Executive Judge to
the applicant's witness are not sufficiently
Facts: On June 12, 1986, Villamor, Jr., chief of searching to establish probable cause. Asking of
the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City, leading questions to the deponent in an
Province of Negros Oriental, filed an Application application for search warrant, and
for Search Warrant with the RTC against conducting of examination in a general
petitioners Silva. Respondent Judge, on the manner, would not satisfy the requirements
same day issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing for issuance of a valid search warrant."
the police officers to search the room of Marlon Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the
Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for judge must strictly comply with the
violation of RA 6425 otherwise known as constitutional and statutory requirement that
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. During the search he must determine the existence of probable
conducted by the police officers, they also seized cause by personally examining the applicant
money belonging to petitioner Antonieta Silva and his witnesses in the form of searching
amounting to P1,231.40. questions and answers. His failure to comply
Thereafter, Antonieta Silva filed a with this requirement constitutes grave abuse
motion for the return of the said amount on the of discretion. As "the capricious disregard by the
ground that the search warrant only authorized judge in not complying with the requirements
the police officers to seize marijuana dried before issuance of search warrants constitutes
leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers abuse of discretion".
failed or refused to make a return of the said The officers implementing the search
search warrant in violation of Sec. 11, Rule 126 warrant clearly abused their authority when they
of the Rules of Court. seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is
highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva fact, after A fair though summary hearing, are
was not even named as one of the respondents, made conclusive.
that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of The determination of the propriety of
money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes deportation is not a prosecution for, or a
and joints, and that the search warrant was conviction of, crime; nor is the deportation a
issued for the seizure of personal property (a) punishment, even though the facts underlying
subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to the decision may constitute a crime under
be used as means of committing an offense and local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a
NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled refusal by the government to harbor persons
or other proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, whom it does not want. The coincidence of
the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused local penal law with the policy of congress is
his discretion when he rejected the motion of purely accidental, and, though supported by the
petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of same facts, a criminal prosecution and a
her seized money. proceeding for deportation are separate and
independent.
In consequence, the constitutional
Morano vs. Vivo guarantee set forth in Section 1(3), Article III
GR no. L-22196, June 30, 1967 of the Constitution aforesaid requiring that
the issue of probable cause be determined by
Facts: On November 23, 1961, Petititoner Chan a judge, does not extend to deportation
Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen, arrived in the proceedings.
Philippines to visit her cousin, Sameul Malaps, The view, we, here express funds
together with her minor son, with her first support in the discussions during the
marriage, Fu Yan Fun. They were permitted in constitutional convention. The convention
he Philippines nder a emporar isi or s isa recognized, as sanctioned by due process,
for 2 months after they posted a cash bond of possibilities and cases of deprivation of liberty,
P4,000.00. She married Morano, a Filipino other than by order of a competent court.
citizen. The Commissioner of Immigration asked Indeed, the power to deport or expel
them to leave the country due to the expiration of aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such power
the extensions they applied for. is planted on the "accepted maxim of
Instead of leaving, they petitioned the international law, that every sovereign nation has
CFI of Manila for mandamus to compel the the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
Commissioner to cancel petitioners Alien essential to self-preservation, to forbid the
Certificate of Registration; prohibition to stop the entrance of foreigners within its dominions." So
Commissioner from issuing a warrant of arrest. it is, that this Court once aptly remarked that
The trial court ruled in favour of Chan but there can be no controversy on the fact that
dismissed the petition with respect to Fu Yan where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors,
Fun. Both petitioners and respondent appealed. "the law is to the effect that temporary visitors
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of who do not depart upon the expiration of the
Sec. 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940, which period of stay granted them are subject to
states that, “The following aliens shall be arrested deportation by the Commissioner of Immigration,
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of for having violated the limitation or condition
Immigration or any other officer designated by under which they were admitted as non-
him for the purpose and deported upon the immigrants (Immigration Law, Sec. 37(a),
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after subsection (7) C.A. 613, as amended).
a determination by the Board of Commissioners And, in a case directly in point, where
of the existence of the ground deportation as the power of the Commissioner to issue warrants
charged against the alien xxx.” Petitioners of arrest was challenged as unconstitutional
contend that the above provision trenches upon because "such power is only vested in a judge by
the constitutional mandate in Art. III, Sec. 1 (3). Section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of our
They say that the Constitution limits to judges Constitution", this Court declared
the authority to issue warrants of arrest. "This argument overlooks the fact
that the stay of appellant Ng Hua To as
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 37 (a) of the temporary visitor is subject to certain
Immigration Act of 1940 is unconstitutional. contractual stipulations as contained in the
cash bond put up by him, among them, that in
Held: No. The Court held that, Sec. 1 (3), Art. III case of breach the Commissioner may require
does not require judicial intervention in the the recommitment of the person in whose
execution of a final order of deportation issued in favor the bond has been filed. The
accordance with law. The constitutional Commissioner did nothing but to enforce
limitation contemplates an order of arrest in such condition. Such a step is necessary to
the exercise of judicial power AS A STEP enable the Commissioner to prepare the
PRELIMINARY OR INCIDENTAL TO ground for his deportation under section 37
PROSECUTION OR PROCEEDINGS FOR A (a) of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary
GIVEN OFFENSE OR ADMINISTRATIVE interpretation would render such power
ACTION, not as A MEASURE nugatory to the detriment of the State."
INDISPENSABLE TO CARRY OUT A VALID It is in this context that we rule that
DECISION BY A COMPETENT OFFICIAL, such Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is
as legal order of deportation, issued by the not constitutionally proscribed.
Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance
of a valid legislation. Harvey vs. Santiago
It is thoroughly established that GR No. 82544, June 28, 1988
Congress has power to order the deportation
of aliens whose presence in the country it Facts: Petitioners were among the twenty-two
deems hurtful. Owing to the nature of the suspected pedophiles who were apprehended
proceeding, the deportation of an alien who is after a three-month surveillance by the
found in this country in violation of law is not Commission on Immigration and Deportation
a deprivation of liberty without due process of (CID) in Pagsanjan, Laguna. They were
law. This is so, although the inquiry devolves apprehended by virtue of Mission Orders issued
upon executive officers, and their findings of by respondent Santiago. Petitioner contends the
validity of their detention in CID Detention Center,
assailing, inter alia, that respondent violated Art. beginning" (Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77
III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting Phil. 1050 [1947]).
unreasonable searches and seizures since CID That petitioners were not "caught in the
agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of act" does not make their arrest illegal.
arrest, search and seizures as required by the Petitioners were found with young boys in
said provision. their respective rooms, the ones with John
Sherman being naked, Under those
Issues: circumstances the CID agents had reasonable
1. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless grounds to believe that petitioners had
arrest? committed "pedophilia" defined as "psycho-
2. Assuming arguendo that the arrest was not sexual perversion involving children" (Kraft-
valid, is there a valid basis for the Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis, p. 555; "Paraphilia
confinement of herein petitioner? (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are
3. Is the Constitutional prohibition against the preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third
warrantless arrest & searches applicable New International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665)
herein? [Solicitor General's Return of the Writ, on p. 10].
While not a crime under the Revised Penal
Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals
and violative of the declared policy of the
Held: State to promote and protect the physical,
1. YES. There can be no question that the right moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our
against unreasonable searches and seizures youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987
guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution).
Constitution, is available to all persons, including At any rate, the filing by petitioners of
aliens, whether accused of crime or not a petition to be released on bail should be
(Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]. considered as a waiver of any irregularity
One of the constitutional requirements of a valid attending their arrest and estops them from
search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must questioning its validity (Callanta v. Villanueva,
be based upon probable cause. Probable cause L-24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA
has been defined as referring to "such facts and 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, L-61770, January 31,
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the 1983, 120 SCRA 525).
warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce
a cautious man to rely on them and act in
p rs ance hereof . 3. NO. The deportation charges instituted by
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure respondent Commissioner are in accordance with
also provide that an arrest without a warrant may Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
be effected by a peace officer or even a private 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised
person (1) when such person has committed, Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an part:
offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense (a) The following aliens shall
has, in fact, been committed and he has personal be arrested upon the warrant
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to of the Commissioner of
be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section Immigration and Deportation
5). or any other officer
In this case, the arrest of petitioners designated by him for the
was based on probable cause determined purpose and deported upon
after close surveillance for three (3) months the warrant of the
during which period their activities were Commissioner of
monitored. The existence of probable cause Immigration and Deportation
justified the arrest and the seizure of the after a determination by the
photo negatives, photographs and posters Board of Commissioners of
without warrant. Those articles were seized the existence of the ground
as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are for deportation as charged
therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12, against the alien;
Rule 126, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The foregoing provision should be construed in
2. YES. Even assuming arguendo that the its entirety in view of the summary and indivisible
arrest of petitioners was not valid at its nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise,
inception, the records show that formal the very purpose of deportation proceedings
deportation charges have been filed against would be defeated.
them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988.
Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 Section 37(a) is not constitutionally
March 1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June
46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific
Administrative Code." A hearing is presently constraints in both the 1935 and 1987
being conducted by a Board of Special Constitutions, which are substantially
Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, identical, contemplate prosecutions
therefore, has become legal. The Writ has essentially criminal in nature. Deportation
served its purpose. The process of the law is proceedings, on the other hand, are
being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L-39823, administrative in character. An order of
February 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 543). "Where a deportation is never construed as a
person's detention was later made by virtue punishment. It is preventive, not a penal
of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases process. It need not be conducted strictly in
subsequently filed against the detainee, his accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and
academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014, April "It is of course well-settled that deportation
30, 1979, 89 SCRA 717). "It is a fundamental rule proceedings do not constitute a criminal
that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted action. The order of deportation is not a
when the confinement is or has become legal, punishment, it being merely the return to his
although such confinement was illegal at the country of an alien who has broken the
conditions upon which he could continue to
reside within our borders. The deportation be declared guilty of contempt for having
proceedings are administrative in character, disobeyed the order of the court.
summary in nature, and need not be The petitioner asks that the warrant of
conducted strictly in accordance with the June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First
ordinary court proceedings. It is essential, Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his
however, that the warrant of arrest shall give house and the seizure, at any time of the day or
the alien sufficient information about the night, of certain accounting books, documents
charges against him, relating the facts relied and papers belonging to him in his residence
upon. It is also essential that he be given a situated in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well
fair hearing with the assistance of counsel, if as the order of a later date, authorizing the
he so desires, before unprejudiced agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the
investigators. However, all the strict rules of articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside,
evidence governing judicial controversies do and prays that all the articles in question be
not need to be observed; only such as are returned to him.
fundamental and essential, like the right of
cross-examination. Issue: Is the warrant of arrest herein illegally
issued?
Held: YES. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III

of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights,
provides that "The right of the people to be
Alvarez vs. CFI secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937 effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
Facts: On June 3, 1936, the chief of the secret determined by the judge after examination under
service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge witnesses he may produce, and particularly
Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the describing the place to be searched, and the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of
alleging that according to reliable information, the General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search
petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, warrant shall not issue except for probable
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other cause and upon application supported by
papers used by him in connection with his oath particularly describing the place to be
activities as a money-lender, charging usurious searched and the person or thing to be
rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath seized." It will be noted that both provisions
at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret require that there be not only probable cause
service stated that his answers to the questions before the issuance of a search warrant but
were correct to the best of his knowledge and that the search warrant must be based upon
belief. He did not swear to the truth of his an application supported by oath of the
statements upon his own knowledge of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce.
facts but upon the information received by In its broadest sense, an OATH includes
him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in any form of attestation by which a party
question the judge, on said date, issued the signifies that he is bound in conscience to
warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it
ordering the search of the petitioner's house at is sometimes defined as an outward pledge
any time of the day or night, the seizure of the given by the person taking it that his
books and documents above-mentioned and the attestation or promise is made under an
immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed immediate sense of his responsibility to God.
of in accordance with the law. With said warrant, The oath required must refer to the truth of
several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the facts within the personal knowledge of the
the petitioner's store and residence at seven petitioner or his witnesses, because the
o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized purpose thereof is to convince the
and took possession of the following articles: committing magistrate, not the individual
internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to making the affidavit and seeking the issuance
1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, of the warrant, of the existence of probable
nine order books, four notebooks, four check cause .The true test of sufficiency of an
stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of warrant is whether it has been drawn in such
purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles a manner that PERJURY could be charged
of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, thereon and affiant be held liable for damages
one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two caused.
packages of correspondence, one receipt book
belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of It will likewise be noted that section 1,
invoices and other papers, many documents and paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution
loan contracts with security and promissory prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of Unreasonable searches and seizures are a
used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai menace against which the constitutional
Banking Corporation. The search for and seizure guaranties afford full protection. The term
of said articles were made with the opposition of "unreasonable search and seizure" is not
the petitioner who stated his protest below the defined in the Constitution or in General Orders,
inventories on the ground that the agents seized No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or
even the originals of the documents. As the unchangeable meaning, although the term has
articles had not been brought immediately to the been defined in general language. All illegal
judge who issued the search warrant, the searches and seizures are unreasonable
petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion on while lawful ones are reasonable. What
June 8, 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered search or seizure in any particular case is
immediately to deposit all the seized articles in purely a judicial question, determinable from
the office of the clerk of court and that said agent a consideration of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search,
the presence or absence of probable cause, insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively
the manner in which the search and seizure upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the
was made, the place or thing searched, and contention is equally well founded and that the
the character of the articles procured search could not legally be made at night.
In view of the foregoing and under the One of the grounds alleged by the
above-cited authorities, it appears that THE petitioner in support of his contention that the
AFFIDAVIT, which served as the exclusive warrant was issued illegally is the lack of an
basis of the search warrant, is insufficient adequate description of the books and
and fatally defective by reason of the manner documents to be seized. Section 1, paragraph
in which the oath was made, and therefore, it 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97
is hereby held that the search warrant in of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the
question and the subsequent seizure of the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the
books, documents and other papers are basis for determining whether probable cause
illegal and do not in any way warrant the exists and whether the warrant should be issued,
deprivation to which the petitioner was must contain a particular description of the
subjected. place to be searched and the person or thing
Another ground alleged by the petitioner to be seized. These provisions are mandatory
in asking that the search warrant be declared and must be strictly complied with but where,
illegal and cancelled is that it was not supported by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
by other affidavits aside from that made by the description must be rather general, it is not
applicant. In other words, it is contended that the required that a technical description be given,
search warrant cannot be issued unless it be as this would mean that no warrant could
supported by affidavits made by the applicant issue. The only description of the articles given
and the witnesses to be presented necessarily by in the affidavit presented to the judge was as
him. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the follows: "that there are being kept in said
Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits
but upon probable cause, to be determined by and other papers used by him in connection with
the judge after examination under oath or his activities as money-lender, charging a
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law."
he may produce. Section 98 of General Orders, Taking into consideration the nature of the
No. 58 provides that the judge or justice must, articles so described, it is clear that no other
before issuing the warrant, examine under oath more adequate and detailed description could
the complainant and any witnesses he may have been given, particularly because it is
produce and take their depositions in writing. It is difficult to give a particular description of the
the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the contents thereof. The description so made
affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to substantially complies with the legal
the application. It is admitted that the judge who provisions because the officer of the law who
issued the search warrant in this case, relied executed the warrant was thereby placed in a
exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent position enabling him to identify the articles,
Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require which he did.
nor take the deposition of any other witness. The last ground alleged by the
Neither the Constitution nor General Orders, No. petitioner, in support of his claim that the search
58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to warrant was obtained illegally, is that the
take the depositions of the witnesses to be articles were seized in order that the Anti-
presented by the applicant or complainant in Usury Board might provide itself with
addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose evidence to be used by it in the criminal case
of both in requiring the presentation of or cases which might be filed against him for
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the violation of the Anti-Usury Law. (fishing
committing magistrate of the existence of expedition) At the hearing of the incidents of the
probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the case raised before the court, it clearly appeared
applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge that the books and documents had really been
may dispense with that of other witnesses. seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent an investigation and later use all or some of the
in this case was insufficient because HIS articles in question as evidence against the
KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS WAS NOT petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed
PERSONAL but merely HEARSAY, it is the against him. The seizure of books and
duty of the judge to require the affidavit of documents by means of a search warrant, for the
one or more witnesses for the purpose of purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal
determining the existence of probable cause case against the person in whose possession
to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. they were found, is unconstitutional because it
When the affidavit of the applicant or makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is
complainant contains sufficient facts within equivalent to a violation of the constitutional
his personal and direct knowledge, it is provision prohibiting the compulsion of an
sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there accused to testify against himself. Therefore, it
exists probable cause; when the applicant's appearing that at least nineteen of the documents
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the in question were seized for the purpose of using
affidavit of one or more witnesses having a them as evidence against the petitioner in the
personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation
We conclude, therefore, that the warrant of the Anti-Usury Law, which it is attempted to
issued is likewise illegal because it was institute against him, we hold that the search
based only on the affidavit of the agent who warrant issued is illegal and that the documents
had no personal knowledge of the facts. should be returned to him.
The petitioner alleged as another
ground for the declaration of the illegality of the NOTE: In sum, the ruling may be summarized as
search warrant and the cancellation thereof, the follows:
fact that it authorized its execution at night.
Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes 1. That the provisions of the Constitution
that the search be made at night when it is and General Orders, No. 58, relative to search
positively asserted in the affidavit that the and seizure, should be given a liberal
property is on the person or in the place ordered construction in favor of the individual in order
to be searched. As we have declared the affidavit
to maintain the constitutional guaranties Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
whole and in their full force; motion was denied by the Judge, stating that the
court has made a thorough investigation and
2. That since the provisions in question are examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles
drastic in their form and fundamentally and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
restrict the enjoyment of the ownership, Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police
possession and use of the personal property District II INP; that in fact the court made a
of the individual, they should be strictly certification to that effect; and that the fact that
construed; documents relating to the search warrant were
not attached immediately to the record of the
3. That the search and seizure made are criminal case is of no moment, considering that
illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the rule does not specify when these documents
the warrant was based solely upon the are to be attached to the records. Mata came to
affidavit of the petitioner who had NO the Supreme Court and prayed that the search
personal knowledge of the facts necessary to warrant be declared invalid for its alleged failure
determine the existence or non-existence of to comply with the requisites of the Constitution
probable cause, and (b) because the warrant and the Rules of Court
was issued for the sole purpose of seizing
evidence which would later be used in the Issue: Whether or not the search warrant was
criminal proceedings that might be instituted valid.
against the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-
Usury Law;
Held: NO. We hold that the search warrant is
4. That as the warrant had been issued tainted with illegality for being violative of the
unreasonably, and as it does not appear Constitution and the Rules of Court.
positively in the affidavit that the articles were Under the Constitution "no search
in the possession of the petitioner and in the warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to
place indicated, neither could the search and be determined by the Judge or such other
seizure be made at night; responsible officer as may be authorized by law
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
5. That although it is not mandatory to complainant and the witnesses he may produce".
present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate More emphatic and detailed is the
the applicant or complainant in cases where implementing rule of the constitutional injunction,
the latter has personal knowledge of the Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the
facts, when the applicant's or complainant's judge must before issuing the warrant personally
knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is examine on oath or affirmation the complainant
the duty of the judge to require affidavits of and any witnesses he may produce and take
other witnesses so that he may determine their depositions in writing, and attach them to
whether probable cause exists; the record, in addition to any affidavits presented
to him.
6. That a detailed description of the person Mere affidavits of the complainant
and place to be searched and the articles to and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
be seized is necessary, but where, by the examining Judge has to take depositions in
nature of the articles to be seized, their writing of the complainant and the witnesses
description must be rather general, it is not he may produce and to attach them to the
required that a technical description be given, record. Such written deposition is necessary
as this would mean that no warrant could in order that the Judge may be able to
issue; properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable
(Adonis Notes: The conjunctive word AND in for perjury the person giving it if it will be
Art. 3, sec.3 is not to be meant as BOTH found later that his declarations are false.
Complainant & Witness should each produce We, therefore, hold that the search
affidavits. The Judge may require the affidavit warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of
solely of the complainant if it is itself sufficient to the Judge to conform with the essential requisites
establish probable cause. Alvarez vs. CFI) of taking the depositions in writing and attaching
them to the record, rendering the search warrant
Soriano Mata vs. Judge Josephine Bayona invalid.
GR 50720, March 26, 1984, De Castro J. The judge's insistence that she
examined the complainants under oath has
Facts: Soriano Mata was accused under become dubious by petitioner's claim that at
Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by the particular time when he examined all the
PD 1306, the information against him alleging relevant papers connected with the issuance
that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged of the questioned search warrant, after he
be s on he Jai Alai game b selling illegal icke s demanded the same from the lower court
kno n as Masiao icke s i ho an a hori since they were not attached to the records,
from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement he did not find any certification at the back of
Corporation or from the government authorities the joint affidavit of the complainants. As
concerned. stated earlier, before he filed his motion to quash
Petitioner claims that during the hearing the search warrant and for the return of the
of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his
records of the said case could be found the request, certified true copies of the said affidavits
search warrant and other pertinent papers by the Clerk of Court but which certified true
connected to the issuance of the same, so that copies do not bear any certification at the back.
he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of
whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of
Josephine K. Bayona replied, “it is with the court”. this case does not show also the certification of
The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal respondent judge. This doubt becomes more
who attached them to the records. This led Mata confirmed by respondent Judge's own admission,
to file a motion to quash and annul the search while insisting that she did examine thoroughly
warrant and for the return of the articles seized, the applicants, that "she did not take the
citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have

done so would be to hold a judicial proceeding shabu, an aluminum foil, a paltik .22 caliber atop
which will be open and public", such that, the TV set, three used ammunitions in a cup and
according to her, the persons subject of the three wallets, one containing the marked money.
intended raid will just disappear and move his SPO1 Novero found inside a show box aluminum
illegal operations somewhere else. foils, napkins and a burner.
Could it be that the certification was Normando del Rosario was charged
made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? with Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Be that as it may, there was no "deposition in Ammunitions and Illegal Sale of Regulated
writing" attached to the records of the case in Drugs.
palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition
heretofore quoted. Issues:
Respondent Judge impresses this Court 1. Whether or not the implementation of the
that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling that search warrant was lawful and that the
lures every man, woman and child, and even the object seized may be used to prove Del
lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends Rosario s g il ?
meet justifies her action. She claims that in order 2. Whether the ammunition was validly
to abate the proliferation of this illegal "masiao" seized as an incident to a lawful arrest?
lottery, she thought it more prudent not to
conduct the taking of deposition which is done
usually and publicly in the court room. Held:
Two points must be made clear. The 1. No. According to the version of the
term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad prosecution, during the alleged buy-bust
sense to describe any written statement verified operation, accused-appellant handed over to
by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate Veneracion Luna, the alleged poseur-buyer, a
sense the meaning of the word is limited to quantity of shabu, and Luna in turn paid accused-
written testimony of a witness given in the course appellant a marked 100 bill and then returned to
of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or the police station and informed the raiding team
hearing upon oral examination. 4 A deposition is that he had already bought the shabu from
the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, accused-appellant. Thereupon, the raiding team
under oath or affirmation before a commissioner, proceeded to the house of accused-appellant to
examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to implement the search warrant. The version of the
interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and usually prosecution is highly incredible. The record is
subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The searching devoid of any reason why the police officers did
questions propounded to the applicants of the not make any attempt to arrest accused-appellant
search warrant and his witnesses must depend to at the time he allegedly sold the shabu to
a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge Veneracion Luna who was accompanied by
just as long as the answers establish a another police officer. That was the opportune
reasonable ground to believe the commission of moment to arrest accused-appellant. The
a specific offense and that the applicant is one version foisted by the prosecution upon this
authorized by law, and said answers particularly Court is contrary to human experience in the
describe with certainty the place to be searched ordinary course of human conduct. The usual
and the persons or things to be seized. The procedure in a buy-bust operation is for the
examination or investigation which must be under police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at
oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the very moment he hands over the
the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is
is that the examination or investigation is not the every reason why such a police operation
merely routinary but one that is thorough and is called a "BUY-BUST" operation. The police
elicit the required information. To repeat, it must poseur-buyer "buys dangerous drugs from
be under oath and must be in writing. the pusher and "bust" (arrests) him the
moment the pusher hands over the drug to
the police officer.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs We thus entertain serious doubts that
NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO the shabu contained in a small canister was
G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994, MELO, J. actually seized or confiscated at the residence of
accused-appellant. in consequence, the manner
Facts: Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo the police officers conducted the subsequent and
Untiveros, RTC Judge Arturo de Guia issued in much-delayed search is highly irregular. Upon
the morning of September 4, 1991 a search barging into the residence of accused-appellant,
warrant authorizing the search and seizure of an the police officers found him lying down and they
"undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine immediately arrested and detained him in the
Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its living room while they searched the other parts of
paraphernalias" in the premises of appellant's the house. Although they fetched two persons to
house. However, the search warrant was not witness the search, the witnesses were called in
implemented immediately due to the lack of only after the policemen had already entered
police personnel to form the raiding team. At accused-appellant's residence (pp. 22-23, tsn,
about 9 o'clock in the evening of that day, a December 11, 1991), and, therefore, the
raiding team was finally organized. In the final policemen had more than ample time to plant the
briefing of the raiding team at the police station, it shabu.
was agreed upon that PO1 Venerando Luna will At any rate, accused-appellant
buy shabu from appellant and after his return cannot be convicted of possession of the
from appellant's house, the raiding team will shabu contained in a canister and allegedly
implement the search warrant. A marked money seized at his house, for the charge against
consisting of a P100 bill bearing serial no. PQ him was for selling shabu. Sale is totally
329406 was given by the Station Commander to different from possession.
PO1 Luna and entered in the police logbook Moreover, the search warrant
PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to implemented by the raiding party authorized only
appellant's house to implement the search the search and seizure shabu and
warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del paraphernalia for the use thereof and no
Rosario and appellant witnessed the search at other. he described q an i of
appellant's house. SPO3 de la Cruz and PO3 Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly
Francisco found a black canister containing known as shabu and its paraphernalia". A search
warrant is not a sweeping authority purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court

empowering a raiding party to undertake a for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore,
finishing expedition to seize and confiscate need not follow the usual procedure in the
any and all kinds of evidence or articles prosecution of offenses which requires the
relating to a crime. The Constitution itself and determination by a judge of the existence of
the Rules of Court, specifically mandate that probable cause before the issuance of a
the search warrant must particularly describe judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of
the things to be seized. Thus, the search bail if the offense is bailable. The absence of a
warrant was no authority for the police judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
officers to seize the firearm which was not arresting or capturing persons committing overt
mentioned, much less described with acts of violence against government forces, or
particularity, in the search warrant. any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of
the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is
2. NO. Neither may it be maintained that the thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation
gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for that involves the very survival of society and its
as earlier observed, Del Rosario's arrest was government and duly constituted authorities.
far from regular and legal. Said firearm,
having been illegally seized, the same is not People v. Sucro
admissible in evidence. GR 93239, 18 March 1991
Facts: Pa . F lgencio en o Arlie Regalado s

Umil v. Ramos house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of
GR 81567, 9 June 1990 Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to
be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away
Facts: The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit from Regalado s house. Sucro was monitored to
of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) have talked and exchanged things three times.
received confidential information about a member These activities are reported through radio to
of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with
being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. appellant and was reported and later identified as
Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon Ronnie Macabante. From that moment,
City. Upon verification, it was found that the P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the
wounded person, who was listed in the hospital police officers were at the Youth Hostel in
records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to
Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini
responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical
the day before. Dural was then transferred to the center. Macabante saw the police and threw a
Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante
security reasons. While confined thereat, Dural admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front
was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the of the chapel.
gunman who went on top of the hood of the The police team intercepted and
CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and
CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4
car.Consequently, Dural was referred to the teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the
Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest chapel and another teabag from Macabante.
and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City an information charging Issue: Whether or not the arrest without warrant
Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the is lawful.
crime of Do ble M rder i h Assa l Upon
Agen s of Persons in A hori . Held: Yes. Search and seizures supported by
A petition for habeas corpus was filed a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute
with the Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal
Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Procedure provides that a person lawfully
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus. A Return arrested may be searched for dangerous
of the Writ was filed. Umil and Villanueva posted weapons or anything, which may be used as
bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City proof of the commission of an offense,
where charges for violation of the Anti- without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller.
Subversion Act had been filed against them, and The failure of the police officers to secure a
they were accordingly released. warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge
required from the surveillance was insufficient to
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested fulfill requirements for its issuance. However,
without any warrant of arrest for the crime of warantless search and seizures are legal as
rebellion. long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The
police officers have personal knowledge of
Held: Yes. Dural was arrested for being a the actual commission of the crime from the
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an surveillance of the activities of the accused.
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion As police officers were the ones conducting
being a continuing offense, the arrest of the surveillance, it is presumed that they are
Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as regularly in performance of their duties.
it can be said that he was committing an
offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, (It was held that when a police officer
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in the distrurbances created thereby, and proceeds
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an
constitute direct assaults against the State and arrest without a warrant. The offense is deemed
are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest committed in the presence or within the view of
of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its the officer.)
fighting armed elements, or for committing non-
violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZA
armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the

G.R. No. 95902, February 4, 1992, Regalado, sanitary and building regulations, a search
J.: may be validly made even without a search
warrant.
Facts: CIC Taduran together with S/Sgt. In the case at bar, however, the raid
Molinawe and other officers received from a conducted by the NARCOM agents in the
confidential informer that there was an ongoing house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not
illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, authorized by any search warrant. It does not
Daraga, Albay. Sgt. Molinawe gave the money to appear, either, that the situation falls under
Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was any of the aforementioned cases. Hence,
told to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of appellant's right against unreasonable search
prohibited drugs. After agreeing on the price of and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM
P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted agents could NOT have justified their act by
and later on Don gave Taduran "a certain object invoking the urgency and necessity of the
wrapped in a plastic" which was later identified as situation because the testimonies of the
marijuana, and received payment therefor. prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had
Thereafter, Taduran returned to the headquarters already been put under surveillance for quite
and made a report regarding his said purchase of some time. Had it been their intention to
marijuana. Subsequently, Major Zeidem ordered conduct the raid, then they should, because
a team to conduct an operation to apprehend the they easily could, have first secured a search
suspects. In the evening of the same date, warrant during that time.
appellant, Lonceras and Segovia was arrested.
The constables were not, however, armed with a (In the case at bar, the police officer,
warrant of arrest when they apprehended the acting as poseur-b er in a b -b s opera ion ,
three accused. inst5ead of arresting the suspect and taking him
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics into custody after the sale, returned to police
Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the headquarters and filed his report. It was only in
house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of the evening of the same day that the police
appellant. During the raid, they were able to officer, without a warrant, arrested the suspect at
confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic he la er s ho se here dried marij ana lea es
syringe, among others. The search, however, were found and confiscated. It was held that the
was not authorized by any search warrant. The arrest and the seizure were unlawful.)
RTC found Rodrigueza guilty of violating the
Dangerous Drug Act. Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992,
Issue: Whether or not the evidence confiscated FELICIANO, J.:
during the raid conducted in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza is admissible in evidence. Facts: On July 2, 1991, petitioner entered Wilson
St., where it is a one-way street and started
Held: NO. A buy-bust operation is a form of travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At
entrapment employed by peace officers to the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts.,
trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante petitioner's and Eldon Maguan's cars nearly
delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his
flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car.
dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of Petitioner then boarded his car and left the
selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant
person acting or posing as a buyer. was able to take down petitioner's car plate
In the instant case, however, the number. Verification at the LTO showed that the
procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.The
failed to meet this qualification. Based on the security guard of the bake shop positively
very evidence of the prosecution, after the identified Go as the same person who had shot
alleged consummation of the sale of dried Maguan.
marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately The police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
released appellant Rodrigueza instead of On July 8, 1991, Petitioner presented himself
arresting and taking him into his custody. This act before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the reports that he was being hunted by the police;
supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The
decidedly contrary to the natural course of things police forthwith detained him. That same day, the
and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated
a buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his homicide against petitioner with the Office of the
part to let appellant escape without having Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The Prosecutor
been subjected to the sanctions imposed by filed an information for murder before the RTC.
law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an Counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an
agent of the law. omnibus motion for immediate release and
As provided in the present proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the
Constitution, a search, to be valid, must warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and
generally be authorized by a search warrant that no preliminary investigation had been
duly issued by the proper government conducted before the information was filed.
authority. True, in some instances, this Court
has allowed government authorities to Issue: W/N a lawful warrantless arrest had been
conduct searches and seizures even without effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
a search warrant. Thus, (1) when the owner of petitioner Go.
the premises waives his right against such
incursion; (2) when the search is incidental to Held: NO. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985
a lawful arrest; (3) when it is made on vessels R les on Criminal Proced re pro ides ha a
and aircraft for violation of customs laws; (4) peace officer or a private person may, without
when it is made on automobiles for the arran , arres a person :
purpose of preventing violations of (a) When, in his presence, the
smuggling or immigration laws; (5) when it person to be arrested has
involves prohibited articles in plain view; or committed, is actually
(6) in cases of inspection of buildings and committing, or is attempting to
other premises for the enforcement of fire, commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact between a warrantless search and seizure
just been committed, and he conducted at military or police checkpoints
has personal knowledge of and the search thereat in the case at bar, there
facts indicating that the person is no question that, indeed, the latter is more
to be arrested has committed reasonable considering that unlike in the former,
it; and it was effected on the basis of a probable cause.
(c) xxx The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted
In this case, there was no lawful to flee with the buri bag there was a probable
warrantless arrest of petitioner within the cause that he was concealing something
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. Petitioner's illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty
"arrest" took place six (6) days after the of the police officers to inspect the same.
shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers It is too much indeed to require the
obviously were not present, within the meaning of police officers to search the bag in the
Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly possession of the petitioner only after they
shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" shall have obtained a search warrant for the
effected six (6) days after the shooting be purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be
reasonably regarded as effected "when [the useless, futile and much too late.
shooting had] in fact just been committed" Clearly, the search in the case at bar
within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, can be sustained under the exceptions
none of the "arresting" officers had any heretofore discussed, and hence, the
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that constitutional guarantee against
petitioner was the gunman who had shot unreasonable searches and seizures has not
Maguan. The information upon which the police been violated.
acted had been derived from statements made
by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting. That there are many instances where a
information did not, however, constitute warrant and seizure can be effected without
"personal knowledge." necessarily being preceded by an arrest,
foremost of which is the "stop and search"
without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of
ROMEO POSADAS vs. CA which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte
G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990, GANCAYCO, vs. de Villa, 7 as follows:
J.
"Petitioner Valmonte's general
Facts: On October 16, 1986, Patrolman Ursicio allegation to the effect that he had
Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of been stopped and searched
the Integrated National Police (INP) of Davao without a search warrant by the
assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were military manning the checkpoints,
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes without more, i.e., without stating
Street, Davao City. While they were within the the details of the incidents which
premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they amount to a violation of his right
spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they against unlawful search and
noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They seizure, is not sufficient to enable
approached the petitioner and identified the Court to determine whether
themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner there was a violation of
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was Valmonte's right against unlawful
thwarted by the two notwithstanding his search and seizure. Not all
resistance.They then checked the "buri" bag of searches and seizures are
the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber prohibited. Those which are
.38 Smith & Wesson revolver, two (2) rounds of reasonable are not forbidden. A
live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke reasonable search is not to be
(tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions determined by any fixed formula
for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner but is to be resolved according to
to the police station for further investigation and the facts of each case.
asked him to show the necessary license or
authority to possess firearms and ammunitions Where, for example, the officer
found in his possession but he failed to do so. merely draws aside the curtain of
He was prosecuted for illegal a vacant vehicle which is parked
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the on the public fair grounds, or
RTC wherein after a plea of not guilty.Petitioner simply looks into a vehicle or
was found guilty of the offense charged. flashes a light therein, these do
not constitute unreasonable
Issue: W/N the warrantless search on the person search.
of petitioner is valid.
The setting up of the questioned
Held: Yes. At the time the peace officers in this checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
case identified themselves and apprehended the probably in other areas) may be
petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not considered as a security measure
know that he had committed, or was actually to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
committing the offense of illegal possession of mission of establishing effective
firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected territorial defense and
that he was hiding something in the buri bag. maintaining peace and order for
The said circumstances did not justify an the benefit of the public.
arrest without a warrant. Checkpoints may also be regarded
However, there are many instances as measures to thwart plots to
where a warrant and seizure can be effected destabilize the government in the
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, interest of public security. In this
foremost of which is the "STOP AND SEARCH" connection, the Court may take
(a.k.a. STOP & FRISK without a search judicial notice of the shift to urban
warrant at military or police checkpoints. As centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly whose object is either to determine the identity of

reflected in the increased killings in a suspicious individual or to maintain the status
cities of police and military men by quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to
NPA "sparrow units," not to mention obtain more information. This is illustrated in the
the abundance of unlicensed case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this
firearms and the alarming rise in case, two men repeatedly walked past a store
lawlessness and violence in such window and returned to a spot where they
urban centers, not all of which are apparently conferred with a third man. This
reported in media, most likely aroused the suspicion of a police officer. To the
brought about by deteriorating experienced officer, the behavior of the men
economic conditions - which all sum indicated that they were sizing up the store for an
up to what one can rightly consider, armed robbery. When the police officer
at the very least, as abnormal times. approached the men and asked them for their
Between the inherent right of the names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the
state to protect its existence and officer grabbed one of them, spun him around
promote public welfare and an and frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in
individual's right against a one, he did the same to the other two and found
warrantless search which is another weapon. In the prosecution for the
however reasonably conducted, offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the
the former should prevail. defense of illegal search and seizure was put up.
The United States Supreme Court held that "a
True, the manning of checkpoints by police officer may in appropriate circumstances
the military is susceptible of abuse by and in an appropriate manner approach a person
the men in uniform in the same for the purpose of investigating possible criminal
manner that all governmental power behavior even though there is no probable cause
is susceptible of abuse. But, at the to make an arrest." In such a situation, it is
cost of occasional inconvenience, reasonable for an officer rather than simply to
discomfort and even irritation to the shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to
citizen, the checkpoints during these stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to
abnormal times, when conducted determine his identity or maintain the status quo
within reasonable limits, are part of while obtaining more information. . . .
the price we pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community." Clearly, the search in the case at bar
can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore
Thus, as between a warrantless search and discussed, and hence, the constitutional
seizure conducted at military or police guarantee against unreasonable searches and
checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at seizures has not been violated."
bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is
more reasonable considering that unlike in the PEOPLE vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE
former, it was effected on the basis of a probable G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992, CRUZ, J.
cause. The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to Facts: On August 8, 1987, the Western Police
flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause District (WPD) received a telephone call from
that he was concealing something illegal in the an informer that there were three suspicious-
bag and it was the right and duty of the police looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna
officers to inspect the same. and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was
It is too much indeed to require the police officers forthwith dispatched to the place. Patrolmen
to search the bag in the possession of the Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan narrated that
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a they saw two men "looking from side to side," one
search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise of whom was holding his abdomen. They
may prove to be useless, futile and much too approached these persons and identified
late. themselves as policemen, whereupon the two
tried to run away but were unable to escape
In People vs. CFI of Rizal, this Court held as because the other lawmen had surrounded them.
follows: The suspects were then searched. One of them,
who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was
". . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
indispensably necessary, the mechanics revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His
prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos,
the Rules of Court must be followed and had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants
satisfied. But We need not argue that there are pocket. The weapons were taken from them.
exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events An information was filed against the
where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid accused-appellant before the RTC for illegal
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be possession of firearms. The Court convicted
performed except without warrant, what Mengote for violation of PD 1866 and sentenced
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search to reclusion perpetua. It is submitted in the
or seizure becomes purely a judicial question, Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have
determinable from the uniqueness of the been admitted in evidence because of its illegal
circumstances involved, including the purpose of seizure. No warrant therefor having been
the search or seizure, the presence or absence previously obtained. Neither could it have been
of probable cause, the manner in which the seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because
search and seizure was made, the place or thing the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having
searched and the character of the articles been also effected without a warrant.
procured."
Issue: W/N Mengote can be held liable for illegal
The Court reproduces with approval the following possession of firearms.
disquisition of the Solicitor General:
Held: NO. There is no question that evidence
"The assailed search and seizure may still be obtained as a result of an illegal search or
justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article might have been different if Mengote had been
III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place
celebrated exclusionary rule based on the where he had no reason to be, like a darkened
justification given by Judge Learned Hand that alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was
"only in case the prosecution, which itself controls arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by crowded street shortly after alighting from a
their wrong will the wrong be repressed." passenger jeep with his companion. He was not
skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear
The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, light of day. There was nothing clandestine about
maintains that it is not applicable in the case at his being on that street at that busy hour in the
bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of blaze of the noonday sun.
Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him
were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the On the other hand, there could have been a
Rules of Court reading as follows: number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his
eyes were darting from side to side and he was
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in
A peace officer or private person may without a the minds of the arresting officers, as the
warrant, arrest a person: prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not
been shown what their suspicion was all about.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be In fact, the policemen themselves testified
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or that they were dispatched to that place only
is attempting to commit an offense; because of the telephone call from the
informer that there were "suspicious-looking"
(b) When an offense has in fact just been persons in that vicinity who were about to
committed, and he has personal knowledge of commit a robbery at North Bay
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has Boulevard.(COMPARE THIS WITH PP vs.
committed it; and POSADAS). The caller did not explain why he
thought the men looked suspicious nor did he
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner elaborate on the impending crime.
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or could be summarily arrested and searched
has escaped while being transferred from one just because he is holding his abdomen, even
confinement to another. if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache,
or if a peace officer-could clamp handcuffs on
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) any person with a shifty look on suspicion
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant that he may have committed a criminal act or
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police is actually committing or attempting it. This
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against simply cannot be done in a free society. This is
in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. not a police state where order is exalted over
We have carefully examined the wording of this liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of
rule and cannot see how we can agree with the the arresting officer may be justified in the name
prosecution. of security.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, the
Mengote was not an escapee from a penal Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the
institution when he was arrested. We therefore accused because there was a bulge in his
confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness waist that excited the suspicion of the
of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned
this section. out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People
v. Claudio, the accused boarded a bus and
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the
after he has committed or while he is actually seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat
committing or is at least attempting to commit an in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, he
offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found
officer. to contain marijuana. He then and there made
the warrantless arrest and seizure that we
These requirements have not been established in subsequently upheld on the ground that probable
the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in cause had been sufficiently established.
question, the accused-appellant was merely
"looking from side to side" and "holding his The case before us is different because there
abdomen," according to the arresting officers was nothing to support the arresting officers'
themselves. There was apparently no offense suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes
that had just been committed or was being and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch
actually committed or at least being attempted by of the imagination could it have been inferred
Mengote in their presence. from these acts that an offense had just been
committed, or was actually being committed,
The Solicitor General submits that the actual or was at least being attempted in their
existence of an offense was not necessary as presence.
long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin,
induced in them the belief that an offense had where the Court held that the warrantless arrest
been committed and that the accused-appellant of the accused was unconstitutional. This was
had committed it." The question is, What effected while he was coming down a vessel, to
offense? What offense could possibly have been all appearances no less innocent than the other
suggested by a person "looking from side to side" disembarking passengers. He had not committed
and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not nor was he actually committing or attempting to
exactly forsaken? commit an offense in the presence of the
arresting officers. He was not even acting
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the suspiciously. In short, there was no probable
setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly
suggested, dispensed with the constitutional Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest of petitioner is
requirement of a warrant. valid.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less Held: No. Even granting ex gratia that petitioner
stringent requirements have also not been was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at search of petitioner were invalid, as will be
the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in discussed below.
fact just been committed and that the arresting The general rule as regards arrests,
officers had personal knowledge of facts searches and seizures is that a warrant is
indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they needed in order to validly effect the same. The
had was hearsay information from the telephone Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
caller, and about a crime that had yet to be arrests, searches and seizures refers to those
committed. effected without a validly issued warrant, subject
to certain exceptions. As regards valid
The truth is that they did not know then what warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5,
offense, if at all, had been committed and neither Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in
were they aware of the participation therein of the part:
accused-appellant. It was only later, after
Danganan had appeared at the police Sec. 5. Arrest, without
headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in warrant; when lawful A peace
his house and of Mengote's supposed officer or a private person may,
involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal without a warrant, arrest a
possession or the firearm found on Mengote's person:
person, the policemen discovered this only after
he had been searched and the investigation (a) When, in his presence,
conducted later revealed that he was not its the person to be arrested has
owners nor was he licensed to possess it. committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
Before these events, the peace officers had no commit an offense;
knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone
the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully (b) When an offense has in
carrying a firearm or that he was involved in fact just been committed, and he
the robbery of Danganan's house. has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be
At the time of the arrest in question, arrested has committed it; and
the accused-appellant was merely "looking
from side to side" and "holding his (c) When the person to be
abdomen," according to the arresting officers arrested is a prisoner who has
themselves. There was apparently no offense escaped . . .
that had just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
attempted by Mengote in their presence. contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
There was nothing to support the arresting denominated as one "in flagrante delicto,"
officers' suspicion other than Mengote's while that under Section 5(b) has been described
darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because has not Turning to valid warrantless
been shown that at the time of Mengote's searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
arrest an offense had in fact just been customs searches; (2) search of moving
committed and that the arresting officers had vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
personal knowledge of facts indicating that (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental
Mengote had committed it. All they had was to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk."
hearsay information from the telephone In the instant petition, the trial court
caller, and about a crime that had yet to be validated the warrantless search as a "stop and
committed. frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from the
accused as an appropriate incident to his arrest,"
hence necessitating a brief discussion on the
SAMMY MALACAT vs. CA nature of these exceptions to the warrant
G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997, DAVIDE, requirement.
JR., J. At the outset, we note that the trial court
confused the concepts of a "STOP-AND-FRISK"
Facts: In response to bomb threats reported and of a SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu, a member of the ARREST. These two types of warrantless
WPD, along with 3 other policemen were on foot searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum
patrol along Quezon Blvd, Quiapo when they of proof before they may be validly effected and
chanced upon 2 groups of Muslim-looking men in their allowable scope.
posted at opposite sides of Quezon Blvd. The In a SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A
men were acting suspiciously with their eyes LAWFUL ARREST, as the precedent arrest
moving very fast. Yu and his companions determines the validity of the incidental search,
observed the groups for about 30 mins. The the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large
members fled when they approached one of the majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
groups. However, Yu caught up with the was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
petitioner. Upon searching the latter, he found a search. In this instance, the law requires that
fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's there first be a lawful arrest before a search can
"fron ais line." One of Y s companions be made the process cannot be reversed. At
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting
caliber pistol was recovered. officer may search the person of the arrestee and
Sammy Malacat was charged with the area within which the latter may reach for a
violation of Sec.3 of PD 1866 for illegal weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any
possession of hand grenade. money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime,
or that which may be used as evidence, or which
might furnish the arrestee with the means of Second, there was nothing in petitioner's
escaping or committing violence. behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
Here, there could have been no valid elicited even mere suspicion other than that his
in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest eyes were "moving very fast" an observation
preceding the search in light of the lack of which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.
the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime Petitioner and his companions were merely
had just been committed, was being standing at the corner and were not creating any
committed or was going to be committed. commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared
Having thus shown the invalidity of the on cross-examination:
warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search
conducted on petitioner could not have been one Q And what were they doing?
incidental to a lawful arrest. A They were merely standing.
We now proceed to the justification for
and allowable scope of a "STOP-AND-FRISK" Q You are sure of that?
as a "limited protective search of outer clothing A Yes, sir.
for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a Q And when you saw them standing, there were
police officer observes unusual conduct which nothing or they did not create any commotion.
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his A None, sir.
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
armed and presently dangerous, where in the A None, sir.
course of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable Third, there was at all no ground, probable or
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages otherwise, to believe that petitioner was
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable armed with a deadly weapon. None was
fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
the protection of himself and others in the area to grenade was "discovered" "inside the front
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any
weapons which might be used to assault him. telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was
Such a search is a reasonable search under the indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been
Fourth Amendment . . . visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:
Other notable points of Terry are that When the policemen approached the accused
while probable cause is not required to and his companions, they were not yet aware
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless that a handgrenade was tucked inside his
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not waistline. They did not see any bulging object in
validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine his person.
reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant
conditions, to warrant the belief that the violations of petitioner's rights solemnly
person detained has weapons concealed guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III
about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a of the Constitution.
TWO-FOLD INTEREST: (1) the general interest
of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer PEOPLE vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an G.R.No. 74869, July 6, 1988, CRUZ, J.
appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal Facts: Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25,
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V
the more pressing interest of safety and self- Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo
preservation which permit the police officer to City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for
take steps to assure himself that the person with him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be him to their headquarters for investigation.
used against the police officer. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the laboratory for examination. When they were
"stop-and-frisk" was invalid: verified as marijuana leaves, an information for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim against him.
that petitioner was a member of the group which According to the prosecution, the PC
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days officers had earlier received a tip from one of
earlier. This claim is neither supported by any their informers that the accused-appellant was on
police report or record nor corroborated by any board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
other police officer who allegedly chased that carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited
group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
witness, this likewise diminishes the probability approached him as he descended from the
that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and gangplank after the informer had pointed to him.
search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the They detained him and inspected the bag he was
credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of
that petitioner and his companions had to be what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by
chased before being apprehended, the affidavit an NBI forensic examiner. In his defense,
of arrest expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon Aminnudin alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested
arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
and his companions were "immediately collared." confiscated without a search warrant.
Issues:
1. W/N the arrest was legal? FACTS: Accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead
2. W/N the seized effects may be used as was charged for violation of Section 4, Art. II of
evidence as the search was allegedly an Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
incident to a lawful arrest? known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish
Held: national, entered the Philippines for the third time
in December 1988 as a tourist. On May 11, 1989,
1. No. There was no warrant of arrest or search the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in
warrant issued by a judge after personal Sagada. An order to establish a checkpoint in the
determination by him of the existence of probable said area was because it was reported that in
cause. The accused-appellant was not caught in that same morning a Caucasian coming from
flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
or had just been committed to justify the During the inspection, suspecting the
warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the bulge on accused's waist, CIC Galutan required
Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging
invoked to dispense with the obtention of the on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be
warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, for a pouch bag with objects wrapped in brown
example. It was held that vessels and aircraft packing tape, prompting the officer to open one
are subject to warrantless searches and of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects
seizures for violation of the customs law turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
because these vehicles may be quickly marijuana. Before the accused alighted from the
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction bus, he stopped to get two (2) travelling bags
before the warrant can be secured. from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of
The present case presented no such the bus, the officers got the bags and opened
urgency. From the conflicting declarations of them. A teddy bear was found in each bagand
the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at when the officers opened the teddy bears it also
least two days within which they could have contained hashish.
obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin. His name was known. The vehicle ISSUE: Whether the search made by the
was identified. The date of its arrival was NARCOM officer was illegal having no search
certain. And from the information they had warrant issued.
received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to HELD: No. The Constitution guarantees the right
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did of the people to be secure in their persons,
nothing to comply Moreover, the accused- houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
appellant was not, at the moment of his searches and seizures. However, where the
arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there
that he was about to do so or that he had just is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful
done so. arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
In the many cases where this Court has officer or a private person under the following
sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of circumstances stated in Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the
the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been rules on criminal procedure.
shown that they were caught red-handed, as Accused was searched and arrested
result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A
operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113 was crime was actually being committed by the
clearly applicable because at the precise time of accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto.
arrest the accused was in the act of selling the Thus, the search made upon his personal effects
prohibited drug. falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the
In the case at bar, the accused- foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
appellant was not, at the moment of his warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown While it is true that the NARCOM officers were
that he was about to do so or that he had just not armed with a search warrant when the
done so. What he was doing was descending search was made over the personal effects of
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there accused, however, under the circumstances
was no outward indication that called for his of the case, there was sufficient probable
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of cause for said officers to believe that accused
the other passengers innocently was then and there committing a crime.
disembarking from the vessel. It was only Probable cause has been defined
when the informer pointed to him as the as such facts and circumstances which could
carrier of the marijuana that the suddenly lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
became suspect and so subject to believe that an offense has been committed, and
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that that the objects sought in connection with the
triggered his arrest. The identification by the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
informer was the probable cause as determined Warrantless search of the personal effects of an
by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized accused has been declared by this Court as
them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately valid, because of existence of probable cause,
arrest him. where the smell of marijuana emanated from
a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where
2. NO. The search was not an incident of a lawful the accused was acting suspiciously and
arrest because there was no warrant of arrest attempted to flee.
and the warrantless arrest did not come under Warrantless search of the personal
the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. effects of an accused has been declared by this
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal Court as valid, because of existence of probable
and the evidence obtained thereby was cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated
inadmissible. from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or
where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
attempted to flee.
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT Aside from the persistent reports
198 SCRA 401, G.R. No. 91107, 19 Jun 1991 received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and
other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer
also received information that a Caucasian Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of
coming from Sagada on that particular day had drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner
prohibited drugs in his possession. selling "something" to another person. After the
Said information was received by the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner,
Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same identified themselves as policemen, and frisked
morning that accused came down by bus from him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane
Sagada on his way to Baguio City. tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had
When NARCOM received the more marijuana, he replied that there was more
information, a few hours before the apprehension in his house. The policemen went to his
of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling residence where they found ten more cellophane
from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to
him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain the police headquarters where he was charged
a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24,
police authorities conducted a surveillance at the 1991, petitioner posted bail 3 and the trial court
Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San issued his order of release on July 29, 1991.
Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against
persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous Petitioner contends that the trial and
drugs, based on information supplied by some appellate courts erred in convicting him on the
informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting basis of the following: (a) the pieces of evidence
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was seized were inadmissible; (b)
apprehended and searched by the police
authorities. It was held that when faced with on- ISSUE: W/N the marijuana confiscated from the
the spot information, the police officers had to act house in addition to the marijuana confiscated
quickly and there was no time to secure a search while Espano waa frisked may be used as
warrant. evidence?
It must be observed that, at first, the
NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution guarantees
check of the bus (where accused was riding) freedom against unreasonable searches and
and the passengers therein, and no extensive seizures under Article III, Section 2 which
search was initially made. It was only when provides:
one of the officers noticed a BULGE on the
waist of accused, during the course of the "The right of the people to be secure in their
inspection, that accused was required to persons, houses, papers and effects against
present his passport. The failure of accused unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
to present his identification papers, when nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable,
ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
suspicion of the officer that accused was issue except upon probable cause to be
trying to hide his identity. For is it not a determined personally by the judge after
regular norm for an innocent man, who has examination under oath or affirmation of the
nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
present his identification papers when and particularly describing the place to be
required to do so? searched and the persons or things to be seized."
(1)The receipt of information by
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his search incidental to a lawful arrest for
possession, plus (2) the suspicious failure of dangerous weapons or anything which may
the accused to produce his passport, taken be used as proof of the commission of an
together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers offense. It may extend beyond the person of
to reasonably believe that the accused was the one arrested to include the premises or
trying to hide something illegal from the surroundings under his immediate control. In
authorities. From these circumstances arose a this case, the ten cellophane bags of
probable cause which justified the warrantless marijuana seized at petitioner's house after
search that was made on the personal effects of his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do
the accused. In other words, the acts of the not fall under the said exceptions.
NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to
open his pouch bag and in opening one of the As regards the brick of marijuana found inside
wrapped objects found inside said bag (which the appellant's house, the trial court correctly
was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility.
two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy While initially the arrest as well as the body
bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were search was lawful, the warrantless search
prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his made inside the appellant's house became
identity by refusing to present his passport, and unlawful since the police operatives were not
by the information received by the NARCOM that armed with a search warrant. Such search
a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited cannot fall under "SEARCH MADE
drugs in his possession. To deprive the INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST," the
NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act same being limited to body search and to that
accordingly, including, to search even without point within reach or control of the person
warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would arrested, or that which may furnish him with
be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in the means of committing violence or of
law enforcement, to the detriment of society. escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was
admittedly outside his house when he was
Espano vs. CA arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the
G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998 inner portion of his house was within his reach or
control.
FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution,
based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo The articles seized from petitioner during his
Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at about arrest were valid under the DOCTRINE OF
12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, SEARCH MADE INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL
Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and ARREST. The warrantless search made in his
Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District house, however, which yielded ten cellophane
(WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and bags of marijuana became unlawful since the
police officers were not armed with a search taken to the Manila Police, where they were
warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the detained."
reach and control of petitioner.
But even if there was a search, there is still
authority to the effect that no search warrant
Papa vs. Mago would be needed under the circumstances
G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968 obtaining in the instant case. The guaranty of
freedom from unreasonable searches and
FACTS: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the seizures is construed as recognizing a
counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police necessary difference between a search of a
Department, acting upon a reliable information dwelling house or other structure in respect
received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a of which a search warrant may readily be
certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat,
misdeclared and undervalued, would be released wagon, or automobile for contraband goods,
the following day from the customs zone of the where it is not practicable to secure a
port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly
upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of which the warrant must be sought.
the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance
at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the The question whether a seizure or a search is
trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the unreasonable in the language of the Constitution
afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in
counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and determining whether a seizure is or is not
intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, unreasonable, all of the circumstances under
Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of which it is made must be looked to.
nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were
seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. "The automobile is a swift and powerful
Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership vehicle of recent development, which has
of the goods and showed to the policemen a multiplied by quantity production and taken
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on possession of our highways in battalions,
Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the until the slower, animal- drawn vehicles, with
Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain their easily noted individuality, are rare.
Bienvenido Naguit. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the form in immense quantities, and with a
seizure and detention of the two trucks and their capacity for speed rivaling express trains,
cargo, Remedios Mago filed charges against the they furnish for successful commission of
Chief of Police and the Customs Commissioner. crime a disguising means of silent approach
and swift escape unknown in the history of
ISSUE: Where petitioners allowed to search and the world before their advent. The question of
seize the questioned artices even without a their police control and reasonable search on
warrant? highways or other public places is a serious
question far deeper and broader than their
HELD: Yes. The policemen had authority to use in so-called "bootlegging' or 'rum
effect the seizure without any search warrant running,' which is itself is no small matter.
issued by a competent court. The Tariff and While a possession in the sense of private
Customs Code does not require said warrant in ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed
the instant case. The Code authorizes persons for travel and transportation on highways.
having police authority under Section 2203 of Their active use is not in homes or on private
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass premises, the privacy of which the law
through or search any land, inclosure, especially guards from search and seizure
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling without process. The baffling extent to which
house; and also to inspect, search and examine they are successfully utilized to facilitate
any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, commission of crime of all degrees, from
box or envelope or any person on board, or stop those against morality, chastity, and decency,
and search and examine any vehicle, beast or to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a
person suspected of holding or conveying any matter of common knowledge. Upon that
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the problem a condition, and not a theory,
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning confronts proper administration of our
the need of a search warrant in said cases. But criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure
in the search of a dwelling house, the Code from an automobile upon a highway or other
provides that said "dwelling house may be public place without a search warrant is
entered and searched only upon warrant issued unreasonable is in its final analysis to be
by a judge or justice of the peace . . ." It is our determined as a judicial question in view of
considered view, therefore, that except in the all the circumstances under which it is made."
case of the search of a dwelling house,
persons exercising police authority under the Having declared that the seizure by the members
customs law may effect search and seizure of the Manila Police Department of the goods in
without a search warrant in the enforcement question was in accordance with law and by that
of customs laws. seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the
Alagao and his companion policemen did not exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
have to make any search before they seized the We have thus resolved the principal and decisive
two trucks and their cargo. In their original issue in the present case.
petition, and amended petition, in the court below
Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not
even allege that there was a search. All that People vs. Musa
they complained of was, "That while the trucks G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993
were on their way, they were intercepted without
any search warrant near the Agrifina Circle and FACTS: In the morning of December 13, 1989,
T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS
COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian, NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and
Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to arrested the appellant inside the house. They
conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain searched him to retrieve the marked money but
Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the
Information received from civilian informer was appellant said that he gave the marked money to
that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling his wife. Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego
marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt.
another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white
in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen."
the house of Mari Musa to which house the They asked the appellant about its contents but
civilian informer had guided him. The same failing to get a response, they opened it and
civilian informer had also described to him the found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the
appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able appellant questioned the admissibility of the
to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the
for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM trial court issued an Order ruling that these are
office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped admissible in evidence.
marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga
inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it
to be marijuana. ISSUE: May all the evidence herein confiscated
The next day, December 14, 1989, be exluded under the exclusionary rule?
about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt.
Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for HELD: NO. Built into the Constitution are
which purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN guarantees on the freedom of every individual
GA955883) by Belarga. The buy-bust money had against unreasonable searches and seizures by
been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:
Noh Sali Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section,
and for which Belarga signed a receipt. The team "The right of the people to be secure in their
under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up persons, houses, papers, and effects against
security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
The two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target issue except upon probable cause to be
site in two civilian v

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DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY.

ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019

VII. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

a. Aldaba vs. COMELEC

ISSUE: Whe he R.A. 9591, A ac c ea i g a legi la i e di ic f he Ci f Mal l ,

b. Aquino III v. COMELEC

ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

e. Montejo vs. COMELEC

f. Sema vs Commission on Elections

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM O ga ic Ac a d e i g i i h e

"The Regi al A embl ma e e ci e legi la i e e e ce he f ll i g ma e :

1. A mi f ll d micile f he a e . Tacl ba became Imelda d micile f igi b

3. A ife d e a ma icall gai he h ba d d micile beca e he e m e ide ce

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

b. AQUINO vs. COMELEC

ISSUE: Whe he e ide c i he ce ifica e f ca didac ac all c e d micile a a

A i ce ifica e f ca didac i a e i (1992) elec i i dica e ha he a a e ide

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

3. PARTY-LIST SYSTEM (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941)

a. Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

Political Law- Party-list system

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly

Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

b. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on Elections

ISSUES: WON COMELEC erred in delisting PGBI.

c. ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

O C i i ide i A icle III, Sec i 5 ha la hall be made e ec i g a

The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to

e. Abang Lingkod Party-list vs COMELEC

ISSUE: WON COMELEC g a el ab ed i di c e i i ca celi g he a egi ai de he

The la g age f Sec. 8 f RA 7941 d e l e he d hall i c ec i i h he

While COCOFED fail e bmi a c m le e li f e i eme ma ha e bee am g

h. Bantay Republic Act. v. COMELEC

(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available

(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

How is this done?

Applying the formula above:

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

4. ELECTION, SALARIES, PRIVILEGES

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

ISSUE: Whe he O me a imm i ha bee i la ed

The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished

5. DISQUALIFICATIONS AND OTHER INHIBITIONS

6. SESSIONS, OFFICERS, QUORUM, RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF

(1)the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall

c. Pacete v Commission on Appointments

In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was contended that his

That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective

ISSUE: Whe he he H e Re l i i la ed e i i e c i i all g a ed a liame a

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished

e. Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:

7. RECORDS AND BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS; LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL AND CONGRESSIONAL

c. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez

The enrolled bill however used he e m ea f maldeh de

ISSUE: Whe he he e m ea f maldeh de h ld be c ed a ea a d

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.

c. ABBAS V. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL