1.Cathay Pacific vs sps.

Fuentebella accommodations under the contract of carriage, and that petitioner

failed to perform its obligation.
The case originated from a Complaint for damages filed by
respondents Arnulfo and Evelyn Fuentebella against petitioner AWARD OF DAMAGES
Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., a foreign corporation licensed to do
Moral and exemplary damages are not ordinarily awarded in breach
business in the Philippines. Respondents prayed for a total of P13
of contract cases. This Court has held that damages may be awarded
million in damages for the alleged besmirched reputation and honor,
only when the breach is wanton and deliberately injurious, or the
as well as the public embarrassment they had suffered as a result of
one responsible had acted fraudulently or with malice or bad
a series of involuntary downgrades of their trip from Manila to
faith. Bad faith is a question of fact that must be proven by clear
Sydney via Hong Kong on 25 October 1993 and from Hong Kong to
and convincing evidence. Both the trial and the appellate courts
Manila. In its Answer, petitioner maintained that respondents had
found that petitioner had acted in bad faith.
flown on the sections and sectors they had booked and confirmed.
2.Travel and tours vs Cruz
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. Petitioner prays that the
Complaint be dismissed, or in the alternative, that the damages be Respondent Edgar Hernandez was driving an Isuzu Passenger jeepney
substantially and equitably reduced that he owns with plate number along Angeles-Magalang Road
around 7:50 p.m. Meanwhile, a Daewoo passenger bus (RCJ Bus
Respondents bought Business Class tickets for Manila to Sydney via
Lines) owned by petitioner Travel and Tours Advisers, Inc. and driven
Hong Kong and back. They changed their minds, however, and
by Edgar Calaycay travelled in the same direction as that of
decided to upgrade to First Class. The overarching disagreement was
respondent Edgar Hernandez' vehicle. Thereafter, the bus bumped
on whether respondents should have been given First Class seat
the rear portion of the jeepney causing it to ram into an acacia tree
accommodations for all the segments of their itinerary.
which resulted in the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. and the serious
Issue: WON there is a breach of contract which would amount to physical injuries of Virginia Muñoz.
award for damages?
Thus, respondents Edgar Hernandez, Virginia Muñoz and Alberto
Held: YES. Cruz, Sr., father of the deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr., filed a complaint
for damages, before the RTC claiming that the collision was due to
In Air France v. Gillego, this Court ruled that in an action based on a
the reckless, negligent and imprudent manner by which Edgar
breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to
Calaycay was driving the bus, in complete disregard to existing traffic
prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent; all that
laws, rules and regulations, and praying that judgment be rendered
he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its
ordering Edgar Calaycay and petitioner Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc.
nonperformance by the carrier. In this case, both the trial and
appellate courts found that respondents were entitled to First Class For its defense, the petitioner claimed that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employee Edgar Calaycay and further argued that it was Edgar
Hernandez who was driving his passenger jeepney in a reckless and
imprudent manner by suddenly entering the lane of the petitioner's
bus without seeing to it that the road was clear for him to enter said
lane. In addition, petitioner alleged that at the time of the incident,
Edgar Hernandez violated his franchise by travelling along an
unauthorized line/route and that the jeepney was overloaded with
passengers, and the deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr. was clinging at the
back thereof.
Issue: WON who is at fault
Held:
It was the fault of the bus but with the jeepney’s contributory
negligence
From the factual findings of both the RTC and the CA based on the
evidence presented, the proximate cause of the collision is the
negligence of the driver of petitioner's bus. The jeepney was bumped
at the left rear portion. Thus, this Court's past ruling, that drivers of
vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be
the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, can
be applied. The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver
of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position
to observe the vehicle in front of him. Consequently, the petitioner,
being the owner of the bus and the employer of the driver, Edgar
Calaycay, cannot escape liability.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 which states the
following: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Be that as it may, this doesn't erase the fact that at the time of the
vehicular accident, the jeepney was in violation of its allowed route
as found by the RTC and the CA, hence, the owner and driver of the
jeepney likewise, are guilty of negligence as defined under Article
2179 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
When the plaintiff's negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
3.NILO B. ROSIT, vs. DAVAO DOCTORS HOSPITAL
Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident. The X-ray soon taken the next
day at the Davao Doctors Hospital showed that he fractured his
jaw. Rosit was then referred to Dr. Gestuvo, a specialist in
mandibular injuries, who, operated on Rosit.
During the operation, Dr. Gestuvo used a metal plate fastened to the
jaw with metal screws to immobilize the mandible. As the operation
required the smallest screws available, Dr. Gestuvo cut the screws on
hand to make them smaller. Dr. Gestuvo knew that there were is the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and he
smaller titanium screws available in Manila, but did not so adequately proved the amount of such damage.
inform Rosit supposing that the latter would not be able to afford the
Rosit is also entitled to moral damages as provided under Article
same.
2217 of the Civil Code,22 given the unnecessary physical suffering he
Following the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and close his endured as a consequence of defendant's negligence.
mouth and was in pain. X-rays done on Rosit 2 days after the
A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong
operation showed that the fracture in his jaw was aligned but the
committed by a medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to
screws used on him touched his molar. Given the X-ray results, Dr.
or the death of a patient. There are four elements involved in a
Gestuvo referred Rosit to a dentist. The dentist who checked Rosit,
medical negligence case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate
Dr. Pangan, opined that another operation is necessary and that it is
causation.
to be performed in Cebu.
Duty refers to the standard of behavior which imposes restrictions on
In Cebu, Dr. Pangan removed the plate and screws thus installed by
one's conduct. The standard in turn refers to the amount of
Dr. Gestuvo and replaced them with smaller titanium plate and
competence associated with the proper discharge of the profession.
screws. Dr. Pangan also extracted Rosit's molar that was hit with a
A physician is expected to use at least the same level of care that any
screw and some bone fragments. Three days after the
other reasonably competent doctor would use under the same
operation, Rosit was able to eat and speak well and could open and
circumstances. Breach of duty occurs when the physician fails to
close his mouth normally.
comply with these professional standards. If injury results to the
On his return to Davao, Rosit demanded that Dr. Gestuvo reimburse patient as a result of this breach, the physician is answerable for
him for the cost of the operation and the expenses he incurred in negligence. (emphasis supplied)
Cebu amounting to P140,000, as well as for the P50,000
We have further held that resort to the doctrine of res ipsa
that Rosit would have to spend for the removal of the plate and
loquitur as an exception to the requirement of an expert testimony
screws that Dr. Pangan installed.
in medical negligence cases may be availed of if the following
Dr. Gestuvo refused to pay. essential requisites are satisfied: (1) the accident was of a kind that
does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
Issue: WON Dr. Gestuvo should reimburse
instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the
Held: YES. For the foregoing, the trial court properly exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered
awarded Rosit actual damages after he was able to prove the actual must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of
expenses that he incurred due to the negligence of Dr. Gestuvo. the person injured.
In Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez, 21 the Court explained that a
4.DY Vs People
claimant is entitled to actual damages when the damage he sustained
Petitioner was the former General Manager of MCCI. In the course of
her employment, petitioner assisted MCCI in its business involving
several properties. One such business pertained to the construction
of warehouses over a property (Numancia Property) that MCCI
leased from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Petitioner proposed
to William Mandy (Mandy), President of MCCI, the purchase of a
property owned by Pantranco. As the transaction involved a large
amount of money, Mandy agreed to obtain a loan from the
International China Bank of Commerce (ICBC). Petitioner represented
that she could facilitate the approval of the loan. True enough, ICBC
granted a loan to MCCI in the amount of P20,000,000.00, evidenced
by a promissory note. As security, MCCI also executed a chattel
mortgage over the warehouses in the Numancia Property. Mandy
entrusted petitioner with the obligation to manage the payment of
the loan.
MCCI received a notice of foreclosure over the mortgaged property
due to its default in paying the loan obligation. In order to prevent
the foreclosure, Mandy instructed petitioner to facilitate the
payment of the loan. MCCI, through Mandy, issued 13 Allied Bank
checks and 12 AsiaTrust Bank checks in varying amounts and in
different dates. The total amount of the checks, which were all
payable to cash, was P21,706,281.00. Mandy delivered the checks to
petitioner. Mandy claims that he delivered the checks with the
instruction that petitioner use the checks to pay the loan. Petitioner,
on the other hand, testified that she encashed the checks and
returned the money to Mandy. ICBC eventually foreclosed the
mortgaged property as MCCI continued to default in its obligation to
pay. Mandy claims that it was only at this point in time that he
discovered that not a check was paid to ICBC.
MCCI, represented by Mandy, filed a Complaint-Affidavit
for Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. An
Information was filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Manila.
Issue: The propriety of making a finding of civil liability in a criminal
case for estafa when the accused is acquitted for failure of the
prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime charged.
Held: This is the concept of civil liability ex delicto.
Civil Liability Ex Delicto in Estafa Cases
Whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the
delivery of any personal property was made pursuant to a contract,
any civil liability arising from the estafa cannot be awarded in the
criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from the
contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act
or omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the
liability sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed instituted
with the criminal case.
The situation envisioned in the foregoing cases, as in this case, is civil
liability ex contractu where the civil liability arises from an entirely
different source of obligation. Therefore, it is not the type of civil
action deemed instituted in the criminal case, and consequently must
be filed separately. This is necessarily so because whenever the court
makes a finding that the elements of estafa do not exist, it effectively
says that there is no crime. There is no act or omission that
constitutes criminal fraud. Civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded
as it cannot be sourced from something that does not exist.
When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a
contract, as in a contract of loan, it takes a position completely
inconsistent with the presence of estafa. In estafa, a person parts
with his money because of abuse of confidence or deceit. In a
contract, a person willingly binds himself or herself to give something Complainants filed a petition for review before CA.
or to render some service. In estafa, the accused's failure to account
for the property received amounts to criminal fraud. In a contract, a
party's failure to comply with his obligation is only a contractual PETITIONERS:
breach. Thus, any finding that the source of obligation is a contract Any actions in furtherance of the community’s welfare must be approved by
negates estafa. The finding, in turn, means that there is no civil ordinance and that unless a thing is nuisance per se, such a thing may not be abated
liability ex delicto. Thus, the rulings in the foregoing cases are via ordinance and extrajudicially.
consistent with the concept of fused civil and criminal actions, and
the different sources of obligations under our laws.
CA:
5. NATIVIDAD vs PANDACAN
It held that the Punong Barangay, Cruz, to be without power to declare a thing a
TOPIC: Nuisance nuisance unless it is nuisance per se. It declared the subject basketball ring as not
such a nuisance and, thus, not subject to summary abatement.
FACTS:

Petitioner Natividad was Punong Barangay of Barangay 848, Manila. One

day, within the vicinity of her barangay, she allegedly confronted persons playing CRUZ:
basketball with the following statements:
She asserts that she merely abated a public nuisance which she claimed was within
Bakit nakabukas ang (basketball) court? Wala kayong her power as barangay chie executive to perform and was part of her duty to
karapatang maglaro sa court na 'to, barangay namin ito! xxx xxx xxx Wala maintain peace and order.
kayong magagawa. Ako ang chairman dito. Mga walanghiya kayo, patay
gutom! Hindi ako natatakot! Kaya kong panagutan lahat!

Then, she allegedly gave an order to the Barangay tanod to destroy the ISSUE: Whether or not the basketball ring constitutes as a public nuisance per se,
basketball ring by cutting it up hackshaw. and may be a subject of summary abatemenr.

The acts of petitioner prompted the filing of a complaint for malicious HELD: NO.
mischief, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
Prevailing jurisprudence holds that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not
and abuse of authority.
be summarily abated.

There is a nuisance when there is "any act, omission, establishment, business,

Office of Ombudsman dismissed the decision and found that the act of condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or
destroying the basketball ring was only motivated by Cruz, performing their sworn safety of others; or (2) annoys or offends the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or
duty as defined under LGC. disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage
of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the
use of property."33 But other than the statutory definition, jurisprudence recognizes
that the term "nuisance" is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all
ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property,
the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort.34
A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or (2)
according to the object it affects; or (2) according to its susceptibility to summary
abatement.
As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects that it affects, a
nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which "affects a community
or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal"; or (b) a private
nuisance, or one "that is not included in the foregoing definition" which, in
jurisprudence, is one which "violates only private rights and produces damages to
but one or a few persons."35
A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal summary
abatement, in which case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the
immediate safety of persons and property, which may be summarily abated under
the undefined law of necessity;36 or, (b) a nuisance per accidens, which "depends
upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of
fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to
decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance;" 37 it may only be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose and may not be summarily abated
without judicial intervention.38
In the case at bar, none of the tribunals below made a factual finding that the
basketball ring was a nuisance per sethat is susceptible to a summary abatement.
And based on what appears in the records, it can be held, at most, as a mere
nuisance per accidens, for it does not pose an immediate effect upon the safety of
persons and property, the definition of a nuisance per se.
6. ORCHARD GOLF vs ERNESTO YU
TOPIC: INJURY vs DAMAGE / Damnum absque injuria vs damnum et injuria
FACTS:
On May 28, 2000, a Sunday, [respondents] Ernesto Yu and Manuel Yuhico
went to the Orchard Golf & Country Club to play a round of golf with another
member of the club. At the last minute, however, that other member informed them
that he could not play with them. Due to the "no twosome" policy.
This prompted Yu to file a complaint for purported damages incurred,
respondents testified during the trial to support their respective allegations. Yuhico
stated that he distanced himself from his usual group (the "Alabang Boys") and that
he became the butt of jokes of fellow golfers.36 On the other hand, Yu represented
that some of his friends in the business like Freddy Lim, a certain Atty. Benjie, and
Jun Ramos started to evade or refuse to have dealings with him after his
suspension.37 Apart from these self-serving declarations, respondents presented
neither testimonial nor documentary evidence to bolster their claims. Worse, Yu
even admitted that Freddy Lim and Atty. Benjie did not tell him that his suspension
was the reason why they did not want to transact with him.38
ISSUE: WON there was a legal ground to grant moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and costs of suit in favor of responents.
HELD: NONE.
The damages, if any, partake in the nature of damnum absque injuria. T]he mere fact
that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To
warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom.
Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of
action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused
by a breach or wrong.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains,
he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus,
there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should
be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that
act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.
7. ELIZABETH DIAZ vs ENCANTO and UNIVERSITY OF PHILIPPINES
TOPIC/S: Human Relations (Bad Faith) and Legal Interest on Awarding of Damages
FACTS:
Diaz has been in the service of [the University of the Philippines] U.P. since
1963. On May 3, 1988, Diaz filed a letter-application directly with U.P.'s Office of the
President (Abueva) for sabbatical leave with pay for one (1) year effective June 1988
to May 1989, for "rest, renewal and study." But was denied.
[While Diaz was able to teach during the second semester of AY 1988-89,
she was not able to claim her salaries for her refusal to submit the Report for Duty
Form. Diaz had to "accomplish the Report for Duty Form to entitle her to salaries and
make official her return to the service of the University."
Diaz filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB-00-89-
0049), against Gemino H. Abad, Ernesto G. Tabujara and Georgina R. Encanto, all
officials of the University of the Philippines, for the alleged violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019, involving the legality of a Report for Duty Form as a prerequisite to the
payment of her salary She likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
RTC:
Dismissed the claim of petitioner Diaz on the ground that her function waws purely
recommendatory in nature. Sabbatical leave is not a right but a privilege.
CA:
Trimmed down the issue to whether or not respondents U.P., Tabujara and Abad
were negligent or acted in bad faith in denying petitioner Diaz's application for
sabbatical leave and in withholding her salaries.
ISSUES: WON Diaz is entitled to sabbatical leave and WON there was undue delay on
withholding her salaries.
HELD: NOT entitled to leave but THERE WAS undue delay.
The resolution of this case hinges on the question of bad faith on the part of the
respondents in denying petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application and
withholding of her salaries. Bad faith, however, is a question of fact and is
evidentiary.
ON THE ISSUE ON APPLICATION FOR SABBATICAL LEAVE:
Articles 19 and 20 read as follows:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 19 of the Civil Code "prescribes a 'primordial limitation on all rights' by setting
certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof." 31 Abuse of right
under Article 19 exists when the following elements are present: (1) there is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Court, expounding on the concept of bad faith under Article 19, held:
Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to
the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It
consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to
prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud.
The crucial question is if they did so with the intention of prejudicing or injuring
petitioner Diaz.
We hold in the negative. There is no dispute, and both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals agree, that the grant of a sabbatical leave is not a matter of right, but a
privilege.
ON THE ISSUE ON WITHHELD SALARIES:
Diaz failed to show why she should be spared from the Report for Duty requirement,
which remains a standard practice even in other offices or institutions. BUT it cannot
be denied that during the periods of November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1988 and July 16,
1989 to May 31, 1990, petitioner Diaz rendered service to U.P. for which she should
be compensated. Diaz should be paid, as the RTC had computed, her salaries from
July 1, 1988 to October 1988 for the work she rendered during said periods, but
upon petitioner Diaz's submission of the documents required by U.P.
LEGAL INTEREST:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55165 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
the University of the Philippines, through its appropriate officials, is directed to pay
petitioner Elizabeth L. Diaz her withheld salaries 1) from July 1, 1988 to October 31,
1988, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, computed from
the date of the Decision of the RTC on April 17, 1996 until fully paid; and 2) from
November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989 and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, with legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the date petitioner
Elizabeth L. Diaz submits the documents required by the University of the Philippines
until fully paid.
8. SULPICIO LINES vs NAPOLEON SESANTE
TOPIC: Moral, temperate and exemplary damages.
Doctrine: Moral damages are meant to enable the injured party to obtain the means,
diversions or amusements in order to alleviate the moral suffering. Exemplary
damages are designed to permit the courts to reshape behavior that is socially
deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against
such behavior.
FACTS:
The M/V Princess of the Orient, a passenger vessel owned and operated
by the petitioner, sank near Fortune Island in Batangas. Of the 388 recorded
passengers, 150 were lost. Napoleon Sesante, then a member of the PNP sued the
petitioner for breach of contract and damages.
SESANTE:
 Alleged that M/V Princess left the Port of Manila while Manila was
experiencing stormy weather
 Witnessed strong winds and big waves pounding the vessel
 Called a certain Vency Caballos through his cellphone to request him to
inform the proper authorites of the situation
 Big waves rocked the vessel, tossing him to the floor where he was pinned
by a long steel bar
  That he had managed to stay afloat after the vessel sunk, and had been
carried by the waves to the coastline of Cavite and Batangas until he had
been rescued
 That he had suffered tremendous hunger, thirst, pain, fear, shock, serious
anxiety and mental anguish
 Sustained injuries, and had lost money, jewelry, important documents,
police uniforms and .45 caliber pistol issued him by PNP
 and because it had committed bad faith in allowing the vessel to sail
despite the storm signal, the petitioner should pay him actual and moral
damages of P500.000.00 and P1M respectively.
PETITIONER:
 insisted on the seaworthiness of the M/V Princess due to its having been
cleared to sail from the Port of Manila.
 That the sinking had been due to force majeure
 It had not been negligent
 Its officers and crew had also not been negligent because they had made
preparations to abandon the vessel because they had launched life rafts
and had provided passengers in that regard.
RTC:
 Ruled in favor of Sesante, awarding him P400k for temperate damages,
moral damages for 1M and costs of suit.
CA:
 Lowered the temperate damages to 120K which approximated the cost of
Sesante’s lost of personal belongings, and held that despite the
seaworthiness of the vessel, the petitioner remained civilly liable because
its officers and crew had been negligent in performing their duties.
ISSUES: 1. Is there sufficient basis for awarding moral and temperate damages?
2. Should exemplary damages be awarded?
HELD: YES
ON MORAL DAMAGES:
The petitioner argues that moral damages could be meted against a
common carrier only in the following instances: 1. In the situations enumerated by
Article 2201 of CC; 2. In cases of the death of a passenger; 3. Where there was bad
faith on the part of the common carrier. It contends that none of these instances
obtained herein; hence, the award should be deleted.
The court agrees with the petitioner that moral damages may be
recovered in an action upon breach of contract of carriage only when – a. death of a
passenger results; b. it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith,
even if death does not result. However, moral damages may be awarded if the
contractual breach is found to be wanton and deliberately injurious, or if the one
responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith.
While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what is a far and
reasonable amount of moral damages, the discretion to make the determination is
lodged in the trial court with the limitation that the amount should not be palpably
and scandalously excessive.
ON TEMPERATE DAMAGES:
Temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with
certainty. Article 2224, CC expressly authorizes the courts to award temperate
damages despite the lack of certain proof of actual damages.
Indubitably, Sesante suffered some pecuniary loss from the sinking of the
vessel, but the value of the loss could not be established with certainty. The CA,
which can try facts and appreciate evidence, pegged the value of the lost belongings
as itemized in the police report at 120k.
In fine, the petitioner, as a common carrier, was required to observe
extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of its passengers and their personal
belongings. It being found herein short of the required diligence rendered it liable
for the resulting injuries and damages sustained by Sesante as one of its passengers.
2. YES.
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the Court has the discretion to award
exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner. Indeed, exemplary damages cannot be recovered
as a matter of right, and is left the court to decide whether or not to award them.
In people vs Dalisay – “also known as ‘punitive’ or ‘vindictive’ damages,
exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
In this case, the BMI found that the “erroneous maneuvers” during the ill-
fated voyage by the captain of the petitioner’s vessel had caused the sinking. Clearly,
the petitioner and its agents on the scene acted wantonly and recklessly. Wanton
means characterized by extreme recklessness and utter disregard for the rights of
others; or marked by or manifesting arrogant recklessness of justice or of rights or
feelings of others. Conduct is reckless when it is an extreme departure from ordinary
care, in a situation in which a high degree of danger is apparent. It must be more
than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion and
more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simple inattention.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision w MODIFICATIONS:
a. moral damages – 1M
b. exemplary damages – 1M
c. temperate damages – 120K
- all to be paid to the heirs of the late Napoleon Sesante. In addition, all the
amoutns hereby awarded shall earn interest of 6% per annum from the
finality of this decision until fully paid. Cost of suit to be paid by petitioner.
[G.R. No. 210801. July 18, 2016.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALVIN CENIDO y
PICONES and REMEDIOS CONTRERAS y CRUZ, accused-appellants.
The Court rendered its Resolution July 7,2014 Resolution in this case
finding accused-appellants Alvin Cenido y Picones and Remedios
Contreras y Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Sale and
Possession of Prohibited Drugs.
On April 11, 2014, the Court however, received a Letter dated April
10, 2014 from the Correctional Institution for Women informing the
Court of the death of one of the accused-appellants in this case,
Remedios, on March 7, 2014.
As Remedios's death transpired before the promulgation of the
Court's July 7, 2014 Resolution in this case, i.e., when her appeal
before the Court was still pending resolution, her criminal liability is
totally extinguished in view of the provisions of Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code which states:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
In People v. Amistoso, the Court explained that the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Consequently,
Remedios's death on March 7, 2014 renders the Court's July 7, 2014
Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to her, and is therefore set
aside. Accordingly, the criminal case against Remedios is dismissed.
[G.R. No. 194605. June 14, 2016.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIANO
OANDASAN, JR., accused-appellant.
FACTS: Cutaran driver, at Navarro Construction, testified he and his
companions Ifurung, Cutaran and Montegrico were having a drinking
spree outside the bunkhouse, Gattaran, Cagayan.
Suddenly, appellant who appeared from back of a dump truck, aimed
and fired his gun at Montegrico. Cutaran ran away after seeing the
appellant shoot Montegrico. He did not witness the shooting of the
other two victims Edgar Tamanu and Mario Paleg. When he returned
to the crime scene, he saw the bodies of Montegrico, Tamanu and
Paleg lying on the ground. Cutaran and his companions rushed the
victims to Lyceum of Aparri Hospital.
Montegrico and Tmanu died, Paleg however survived. RTC found
Mariano Oandasan, Jr. guilty of murder for killing Montegrico,
homicide for Tamanu, Frustrated Homicide for Paleg. CA affirmed the
judgement, ORDERED to pay the heirs of Edgardo Tamanu the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and Mario Paleg, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Damages were awarded properly.
HELD: On April 5, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision in People
v. Jugueta (G.R. No. 202124), whereby it adopted certain guidelines
on fixing the civil liabilities in crimes resulting in the death of the
victims taking into proper consideration the stages of execution and
gravity of the offenses, as well as the number of victims in composite
crimes. Other factors were weighed by the Court. In the case of
murder where the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua, the
Court has thereby fixed P75,000.00 for moral damages, P75,000.00
for exemplary damages, and P75,000.00 for civil indemnity as the
essential civil liabilities, in addition to others as the records of each
case will substantiate. Hence, we impose herein the same amounts
for such items of damages in each count of murder.
Also in accordance with People v. Jugueta, supra, temperate
damages of P50,000.00 should further be granted to the heirs of
Montegrico and Tamanu considering that they were presumed to
have spent for the interment of each of the deceased. It would be
unjust to deny them recovery in the form of temperate damages just
because they did not establish with certainty the actual expenditure
for the interment of their late-lamented family members.
In this respect, we mention that Article 2230 of the Civil
Code authorizes the grant of exemplary damages if at least one
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. For
this purpose, exemplary damages of P75,000.00 are granted to the
heirs of Montegrico and Tamanu, respectively, based on the
attendant circumstance of treachery.
On his part, Paleg, being the victim of frustrated murder, is entitled
to P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P25,000.00 as temperate
damages (for his hospitalization and related expenses). This
quantification accords with the pronouncement in People v. Jugueta,
supra.
In line with pertinent jurisprudence, interest of 6% per annum shall
be charged on all the items of civil liability imposed herein, computed
from the date of the finality of this decision until fully paid.
[G.R. No. 170966. June 22, 2016.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner, vs. ALBERTO LOOYUKO, doing
business under the name and style of NOAH'S ARK SUGAR
HOLDINGS and WILSON T. GO, respondents.
FACTS: Due to the sugar crisis in 1985, former President Fidel Ramos Respondents herein prayed in their Answer with Counterclaim that
authorized the emergency importation of 100,000 metric tons of raw they be awarded the sum of P52,000,000.00 as damages for lost and
sugar from Thailand and Guatemala. unrealized income and business opportunities from other clients and
customers which they did not accommodate on account of their
National Sugar Refineries Corporation (NASUREFCO) was tasked by
Refining Contract with petitioner.
the government, thru petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA), to
handle the importation. They, however, failed to present any proof — whether testimonial or
documentary — of their alleged losses. In the same way, petitioner
Three refineries were given allocations to process and refine raw
merely gave an estimate of the value of the bags of refined sugar in
sugar: Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT); Central Azucarera de Don
the possession of respondents but likewise did not offer any
Pedro (CADP); Noah's Ark
testimonial or documentary evidence in support of the alleged value.
NASUREFCO contracted the services of MARUBENI to source the raw
Both parties, therefore, failed to present any persuasive proof that
sugar and handle the shipment and delivery thereof to each of the
they are entitled to the damages awarded by the trial court. Their
above-named refineries on a door-to-door arrangement with the
claim for damages remained unsubstantiated and unproven. Well-
stipulation that in case of non-delivery, short delivery or loss of the
settled it is that actual or compensatory damages must be duly
raw sugar, the latter would be held liable therefor.
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.
RTC ruled that there was undue delay in delivering the sugar
Nevertheless, under Article 2224 of the New Civil Code, temperate
allocation of respondents when it took petitioner four (4) months to
damages may be recovered when pecuniary loss has been suffered
deliver the raw sugar to respondents, which delivery was,
but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with
nonetheless, never completed. CA affirmed ruling that:
certainty. In such cases, the amount of the award is left to the
Jurisprudence teaches that an obligor incurs in delay even if the
discretion of the courts, according to the circumstances of each case,
contract does not categorically state the period for its performance,
but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate
if it can be inferred from its terms that time is of the essence.
damages should be more than nominal but less than compensatory.
ISSUE: Whether or not Damages were properly awarded.
Considering the incomes estimated to have been lost in the case at
HELD: Time and again, this Court has declared that actual damages bar (P80,000,000.00 for petitioner and P52,000,000.00 in the case of
cannot be presumed. "The claimant must prove the actual amount of respondents), this Court deems the amount of P4,000,000.00 as
loss with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent temperate damages for each party reasonable under the
proof and on the best evidence obtainable. Specific facts that could circumstances.
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
The ruling of the trial court and the CA to offset the amount of
damages are borne must be pointed out. Actual damages cannot be
damages awarded to respondent against that claimed by petitioner
anchored on mere surmises, speculations or conjectures."
is supported by law pursuant to Article 1283 of the New Civil
Code which states that: "If one of the parties to a suit over an
obligation has a claim for damages against the other, the former may
set it off by proving his right to said damages and the amount
thereof."
[G.R. No. 188020. June 27, 2016.]
REN TRANSPORT CORP. and/or REYNALDO PAZCOGUIN
III, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(2ND DIVISION), SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA REN TRANSPORT-
ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LABOR ASSOCIATIONS (SMART-
ADLO) represented by its President NESTOR
FULMINAR, respondents.
[G.R. No. 188252. June 27, 2016.]
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA REN TRANSPORT-ASSOCIATION OF
DEMOCRATIC LABOR ASSOCIATIONS (SMART-ADLO) represented
by NESTOR FULMINAR, petitioner, vs. REN TRANSPORT CORP.
and/or REYNALDO PAZCOGUIN III, respondents.
FACTS: Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Ren Transport (SMART) is a
registered union, which had a five-year CBA with Ren Transport Corp.
(Ren Transport). The 60-day freedom period of the CBA passed
without a challenge to SMART's majority status as bargaining
agent. SMART thereafter conveyed its willingness to bargain with
Ren Transport, to which it sent bargaining proposals. Ren Transport,
however, failed to reply to the demand.
NLRC. SMART contested only the failure of the labor arbiter to award
damages, which was affirmed.
The NLRC also awarded moral damages to SMART, saying that Ren
transport's refusal to bargain was inspired by malice or bad faith. The
precipitate recognition of RTEA (other union) evidenced such bad
faith, considering that it was done despite the pendency of the
disaffiliation dispute at the DOLE-NCR.
CA however, deleted the award of moral damages to SMART, but
affirmed the NLRC decision on all other matters ruling that SMART,
as a corporation, was not entitled to moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not SMART is entitled to moral damages.
HELD: We hold that the CA correctly dropped the NLRC's award of
moral damages to SMART. Indeed, a corporation is not, as a general
rule, entitled to moral damages. Being a mere artificial being, it is
incapable of experiencing physical suffering or sentiments like
wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.
Although this Court has allowed the grant of moral damages to
corporations in certain situations it must be remembered that the
grant is not automatic. The claimant must still prove the factual basis
of the damage and the causal relation to the defendant's acts. In this
case, while there is a showing of bad faith on the part of the employer
in the commission of acts of unfair labor practice, there is no
evidence establishing the factual basis of the damage on the part of
SMART.

The labor arbiter rendered a decision finding Ren Transport guilty of

acts of unfair labor practice. Both parties elevated the case to the