COMl’ETITIVENESS AND COMPENSATION IN DECISION

MAKING: A FUZZY SET BASED INTERPRETATION

RONALD R. YAGERt
Iona College, New Rochelk, NY 10801,U.S.A.

seopcd pllrport_Many problemsof vital concern to decision makers involve multipk criteria decision
making. A problem of considerable interest in multiple-objectivedecision making involves the formulation
of an overall decisionfunction from the variousindividualobjectives.The purposeof this artick is to bring
togetherin a general framework two different approachesto this formubtion problem.The first approachis
that suggestedby Zeleny[2]. The second approach is based upon the idea of fuzzy subsetswhich was
developedby Zadeh[7.8]. An uptodate summaryof the state of the art of fuzzy set tbcory can be found in
Gupta, Ragade, andYager, Advances in Fuzzy Set Theory and Applications, publisbedby North-Holland.

Abatraet-The multiple objective decisionprobkm is investigated-par&ularly the questionof the form of

the decisionfunction. Different modelsare investigated.The relationshipof competitivenessand compen-
sation to the form of the models is studied. DitTering methods of including distinctions bchveen objectives
are discussed.

INTRODUCTION
In this paper we are interested in investigating some aspects of the multiple objective decision
problem. We first discuss a framework in which to investigate the situation. In particular we are
interested in analyzing two polar concepts. Competitive and non-competitive decisions. Com-
pensatory and non-compensatory models. We define and discuss these ideas. We next in-
vestigate these ideas using fuzzy sets as a methodology for building decision models. We then
discuss a vector space approach to multi-objective decision making. We are particularly
interested in Zeleny’s method of the displaced ideal [t-3]. We then relate these vector models to
the fuzzy set models. We discuss possible interpretations of the various vector models. We then
investigate the situation when the objectives are not equivalent. We see how to incorporate this
information in both the competitive and non-competitive models. Finally, we make some
comments on the idea of tradeoff in muhiobjective decision models and relate these to the
models discussed.

A FRAMEWORK FOR MULTI-OBJECTIVE DECISIONS

The multiple objective decision problem can be considered in the following framework from
which certain interesting observations can be made.
One has a set X of alternative solutions and a set of criteria which the decision maker
desires to satisfy. Furthermore, one has some evaluation which measures the degree of
satisfaction each alternative gives to each objective. That is, if X = {x,, x2,. . . ,x.} are the
alternatives and A,, AZ,. . . A, are the criteria then, Ai is a measure of the satisfaction which
alternative Xi gives to objective Ai. There has been considerable work done on the question of
how one obtains these evaluations[M]. We shall not concern ourselves in this paper with this
problem, but assume that this information is available in the form numbers in the unit interval.
The larger the number the more satisfaction.
As Zeleny states in [ I] we are faced with a decision problem only if the same alternative is
not best for all the objectives. Under this dissonant condition, where there is no one clear cut
best alternative, some means must be chosen to select an al&native. In general, the
procedures used involved the combining of the multiple objectives to form an overall decision
function D, a selection is then made by choosing the alternative which best satisfies this
decision function.
A number of different techniques or forms have been suggested for combining multiple
objectives [6,12,25]. We shall be interested in investigating some of these forms and seeing

tRonald R Yager received his BEE from the City Colkge of New York and his PhD. from the Po&ta%ic I&it& of
Brooklyn in Systems Science. He is an associate professor of Management science at the Gmduate School of Business of
Iona Colkge. Fuzzy sets, multiple criteria decision making and art&ial intelligence are his cummt subjects of principal
interest.

285
286 R. R. YAGER

what implied relationships between the objectives are necessary to either justify or interpret
that form.
The crucial question is: how should the decision function be formed from the individual
multiple objectives? The manner in which the individual objectives are combined implies some
relationships between them. That is, given a set of objectives, if we have some additional
information relating them it can help decide how we connect the objectives to form an overall
decision function. Usually the information available for relating the objectives is soft. That is,
there is some vagueness in the specification of the relationships. The objectives are usually
related via some concept of tradeoff between the objectives. We shall not, in this paper, be
especially interested in the question of tradeoffs, but be more interested in certain more general
relationships between multi-objectives.
We shall be interested in two polar concepts which relate objectives. The first pair is
compensation-non-compensation. The second is competitive-non-competitive. The concepts of
compensation-non-compensation involves the question of whether, for a given alternative a low
value in one objective can be offset by a high value in a second objective[4,11,12,26]. In its
most general sense this concerns itself with the question described as follows: Assume x and y
are two alternatives and A and B are objectives, assume a <b < c, where A(x) = a, A(y) = b,
and B(y) = c, then A and B are said to be compensatorily related if for all a, b, c, the decision
function combining A and B is such that there exists a d = B(x) such that the pair (a, d) is as
satisfactory as (b, c). Complete non-compensation occurs in the opposite case when for any a,
b, c, there exists no d. It should not be interpreted as simply the weights associated with each
objective because it involves much more fundamental questions of scaling, etc.
The second concept, competitive/non-competitive can be best understood if we draw upon
the following analogy. We can consider the multiple objectives as individuals coming together
to form a society. The alternatives are possible societal structures. One alternative must be
agreed upon by all objectives. Each objective has a valuation function which measures its
satisfaction by each alternative. In deciding upon which alternative to choose as the best one
we must concern ourselves with the manner in which the objectives are coming together to
form this society. This manner in essence effects the form of the combined decision function D.
In constructing D from a set of multiple-objectives there are two opposite ways in which the
individual objectives could combine. These are in Rawls[l3] terminology the competitive and
utilitarian view of D. In the competitive view each objective is solely interested in its own
satisfaction. The only reason why an objective is willing to join the other objectives in selecting
a societal alternative is that it can’t do better alone. That is, in the competitive approach each
objective is not concerned with anything else but maximizing its owtrsatisfaction. The only
thing it is constrained by is the fact that all the objectives must agree on the selected alternative.
This situation, in essence, involves a bargaining type of model in which each objective is
bargaining with the other objectives to get a joint solution which is most beneficial to itself.
The utilitarian approach implies that the individual objectives satisfactions play a secondary
role to the satisfaction of the group as a whole. In a sense, this group is manifested by the
decision function D. In this approach the objectives are not each trying to get what’s best for
itself but, are cooperating to get what’s best for the overall society. This implies that the
individual objectives are only useful in helping D reach its objective. That is, the objectives are
useful only in that they supply a means in which the overall society can manifest its
satisfaction. In particular, in this approach any satisfaction which an alternative gives to an
objective is good not in that the objective itself has benefitted but that the more the society as a
whole has benefitted. In this case each objective wants the alternative which gives it the most
satisfaction because in doing so it is supplying its most satisfaction to the group as a whole.
Furthermore, each alternative is willing to make any sacrifice in its own satisfaction to increase
the overall satisfaction. In this case the objectives are cooperating to obtain the most
satisfaction for the group as a whole. This utilitarian approach implies a certain inter-
changeability between objectives. That is, society can choose to satisfy whichever objectives
gives it the most satisfaction regardless of how the satisfaction is dispersed among the
individual objectives.
In the competitive case each objective also wants the alternative which gives it the most
satisfaction however it is not willing to sacrifice for the overall group. It only compromises
 Competitiveness and compensation in decisionmaking 287

under the threat of otherwise obtaining no solution. In this approach a solution is very
dependent upon what each alternative gets. In this case there is a uniqueness of objectives.
We shall first use the medium of fuzzy sets [7-l I] to help analyze these concepts as applied
to multi-objective decision making. This theory will give us some insights into the quantification
of the above ideas.

A FUZZY SET THEORETIC INTERPRETATION

Assume X is a set of elements, a fuzzy subset A of X is a subset of X which has a

characteristic function which takes values in the unit interval,

A: X+[O, 11.

If x E X then A(x) can be interpreted as the degree to which x satisfies the condition
specified by A. An alternative interpretation of A(x) is the truthfulness of the statement x is A.
If X is a set of alternatives and A is some objective in a decision then we can express A as
a fuzzy subset of X. In this representation A(x) would be a measure of the satisfaction which
alternative x gives to objective A. Furthermore, if we had a set of q objectives we could
represent each by a fuzzy subset of X. This would give us q fuzzy sets A,, A*, . . . A,. We shall
investigate various ways of combining these objectives to form a decision function D. In
particular, we shall investigate the implications of the polar concepts competitivelnon-com-
petitive (utilitarian) and compensatory/non-compensatory on the formulation of D.
When the objectives come together in a competitive manner, they all want to be satisfied,
thus any measure of satisfaction, which is what the overall decision function 1) is, must reflect
this fact. In particular for any x E X, D should measure the degree to which x satisfies Al and
A2 and A3.. . and A,,. Thus the “and” operation for combining fuzzy sets is consistent with the
concept of competitiveness [8-10,131. A good alternative satisfies all the objectives.
On the other hand, if the objectives come together in a non-competitive or utilitarian manner
than the decision functions can choose which objectives to satisfy in order to optimize its
satisfaction. That is, the interchangeability implied by this approach indicates that a good
decision function should satisfy A, or A, or A3 or . . . A,.
The distinction between the competitive and the utilitarian joining of the objectives lies in
the use of the connectives “and” and “or” for the joining of the objectives.
The definitions of the “and” and “or” connectives for fuzzy sets have been intensively
studied. These studies have been both theoretical [I I, 14,15] and experimental [I6-181. In
Bellman and Zadeh[ I I] and Bellman and Gertz[ 14) they show that the only way to define “and”
on fuzzy sets so that the condition of non-compensation is satisfied is via the min operation.
That is, for any x E X

D(x) = Min [A,(x), A,(x), . . . . . . , A,(x)].

We shall denote D when using this method of connection as:

D = A, rl A2 f-l A3. . . . n A,.

An alternative derivation of this form of connection has been discussed by Yager[lO]. In[lO]
it is suggested that when the objectives come together in the competitive situation they are
bargaining with each other for the selection of the alternative, a situation which can be
described in a game theoretic formulation. In this formulation we have q players, the q
objectives. Each objective has n strategies, the selection of an alternative. The payoff matrix
consists of q-tuples, each element corresponding to the satisfaction of an objective. Further-
more, this matrix has the property that the q-tuples have zero value unless all the objectives
pick the same solution. That is, the objectives must all agree on one solution for anybody to get
any satisfaction. The only non-zero payoff values lie on the “main diagonal” of the payoff
matrix. It is known that one possible solution to this game is the minimax solution. It is shown
in [ IO] that this minimax solution corresponds to the non-compensatory “and” described above.
288 R. R. YAGER

A second possible solution to this bargaining problem is the Nash[19] solution, where D(x) =
[A,(x). A,(x). A,(x). . . . . . AP(x and the alternative selected is the x which maximizes D.
In Bellman and Zadeh[ 1l] they have shown that this multiplicate joining of fuzzy sets also
satisfies the properties of “anding”. However, this formulation has the property of partial
compensation. Thus we shall denote the multiplicate form as the partially compensatory “and”
and denote it as:

D=A,.A2. . . . . . . . .A,

An alternative “and” is obtained by using a form related to the bounded sum[22], where we
define

A(x)*B(x) = Max [0, A(x) + B(x) - 11,

we denote “and” as

AyAf . . . . . . . . . . . *A,

Having chosen definitions for “and” the corresponding definitions for “or” naturally follow.
A particularly interesting derivation has been suggested by Oden[17] and Goguen[20]. If A and
B are two fuzzy-sets
-- of X then DeMorgans Law requires (A(x) and B(x)) =
A(x) or B(x), where A(x) is not A defined as I- A(x). If we assume without loss of generality that
A(x) 2 B(x), then for the non-compensatory “and” we get
A(x) and B(x)-- = Min [A(x), B(x)] = B(x) and not (A(x) and B(x)) = 1 -B(x). Since
(A(x) and B(x)) = A(x) or B(x), then A(x) orB(x) = 1 -B(x). Furthermore, since 1 -B(x) 2
A(x) this implies that “or” is the max operation.
Thus for the non-compensatory utilitarian model we get

D(x) = MaxMI(X), &(x), AJx)] denoted D(x) = Al U A2 U A3 . . . . . . A,. Similarily for

compensatory case we get using the second of DeMorgans Laws

A(x) or B(x) = A(x) and-)

- -
A(x) or B(x) = A(x) and B(x) = (I- A(x)). (I- B(x)) = 1 - B(x) - A(x) + A(x)B(x),

A(x) or B(x) = A(x) + B(x) - A(x) *B(x).

Thus in the case compensatory non-competitive we get

D = A, . A2.. . . . A,

Since A,(x). A,(x) = A,(x) + A2(x) - A,(x). A,(x) then in general

D(x)= ii=l A(x)- 2 2 Ai(x)*Aj(x)+ K$+,

j=i+l ill
j$+i
2 Ai(x)Aj(x)Adx) + * * *
For the other compensatory case

A(x) and B(x) = Max IO,A(x) + B(x) - 11

then

not (A(x) and B(x)) = 1 - Max [0, A(x) + B(x) - l]

 Competitiveness and compensation in decision making 289

from this we see that

A(x) or B(x) = Min [I, A(x) + B(x)]. Since not A(x) or not B(x) = Min [l, 1 -A(x) + I-
B(x)] = Min [l, 2 - A(x) - B(x)].
This is easily seen to be not (A(x) and B(x)). Thus we have developed, using the medium of
fuzzy sets, a typology for decision functions.

A VECTOR SPACE APPROACH TO DECISION MAKING

In this section we shall describe a vector space approach to solving multiple objective
decision functions based upon the method of the displaced ideal suggested by Zeleny [ l-31.
Assume, as before, we have a set of alternatives X = {x1, x2.. . . xn} and a set of q
objectives, each expressed as a fuzzy subset over X. That is, for each objective we have a
membership function Ai which associates with every x E X a number is the unit interval
indicating how well x satisfies objective Ai.
Let us reformulate this information. That is, instead of looking at the information in terms
of objectives, we shall concentrate on alternatives. In particular, we can associate with each
alternative a vector, whose elements are its satisfactions to the various objectives. That is, if Vi
is the vector associated with the ith alternative then

The jth element of vector Vi is the grade of membership of xi in the jth fuzzy set, if we
denoted this Vii then OS V, S 1.
Vi can be called the satisfaction vector for ith alternative. If there exists some alternative
xk such that

Vki2 V, for ah j and ah i

then xk is the optimal alternative. In general, this condition is not satisfied. Zeleny[l-31 has
proposed a methodology for finding the best alternative in cases when this condition is not
satisfied. This method is called the method of the displaced ideal. Using this method one defines
the ideal alternative as the alternative which has one in all the components of its vector V. That
is, the vector I, which consists of all ones would be the decision makers preference because it
satisfies each objective perfectly. One could then use as a criteria for selecting the best among
the available alternatives the one which has a satisfaction vector nearest to I. In this
methodology he has suggested using the LP metric to measure the closeness of an alternative to
the ideal. For each alternative he has suggested calculating

Then calculating i* such that Lp(i*) = Min Lp(xi) xi E X

This he calls the compromise alternative with respect to p. It should be noted that i* depends
upon p. In his papers, Zeleny emphasis the fact that “no specific choice of p is made or
recommended.”
An approach related to the method of displaced ideal can also be described. Let 0 be the
alternative with zero satisfaction to each object. Then one could consider as a criteria for
selecting the best available alternative the selection of the alternative which is furthest from 0.
That is, we aspire to get as far away from the worst condition as possible. In this case we can
also use the Mp metric to measure the distance from 0. We let

Mp(i)=($(K,)p)l’P p=l,2,...

CAOR Vol. 7. No. 4-E

290 R.R.YAGER
measure the distance from the 0 solution.
Then we calculate x* s.t.

Mp(x*) = max A@(x) x E X.

This would be the solution furthest from the 0 alternative with respect to P.
In the following we shall relate the vector approach to the fuzzy set approach discussed in
the previous section. In particular, we shall be interested in seeing the relationship between the
two vector approaches and the value of p to the ideas of compensation and competitiveness.

COMPARISONOFFUZZYANDVECTORMETHODS
We shall first look in detail at the solution using the fuzzy set approach for the non-
compensatory competitive model.

If we have q objectives A,, A*, A3,. . . A,,

D=A, II A2 rl A3... fl A, and
D(Xi) = min [AI( A&Xi) . . . Aq(xi)].
D is a fuzzy subset where for each Xi E X,
D(Xi) is the value of the least satisfaction xi gives to any objective. Finally, the optimal
alternative xOPis selected s.t.

D(xop)= FM$D(xi)-
t

That is, xOPis the minimax solution. That is, the procedure consists of selecting for each
alternative the min satisfaction over all the objectives, this gives us D(x), than taking the
maximum member of D.
Theorem 1. The optimal solution to the competitive non-compensatory fuzzy model is the
alternative which is closest to the ideal alternative when using p = 03(the sup metric in R”).
Proof: Consider some arbitrary alternative xi with its associated satisfaction vector

Then the distance from I,$ to I is

Q(i) = d( V, I) = (,z(1- Vij/‘)“‘s

By definition

L,(i) = Max (1- Viji(.

icjrq

Since the optimal solution is the i* s.t.

L,(i*) = lim L,(i)

and
L,(i) = m;x (1 - V& = 1 - min {vi,}
i
then

L,(i*) = rnp {I - min ) Vijll = max min (Vjl,

i i
 Com~titiveness and com~nsation in decision making 291

which is the exact same solution as in the competitive non~om~nsato~ case.

We now look at the non-competitive non-compensatory case. In this case we have
D=A, U A2 U A3... U A, implying that for each alternative x E X, D(x) = Max [A,(x),
A&c), A,(x)], for each x, D(x) is the value of the most satisfaction x gives to any objective.
Finally, in this case, x,, is then again selected as

D(x,,,) = Max D(x).

XEX

In essence, we select i* s.t. Vi*j= Max V;, over al1i and J

Theorem 2. The optimal solution to the noncompetitive non~ompensatory case is the
alternative which is furthest from the 0 (zero) alternative using p = CQ.
Proof. Recalling

MM) = d( Vi9 a) = [)J( VijY]"'

As in the previous case M,(i) = max 1Viii. The optimal solution is the i* s.t.
I

Mp(i*) = Max M,(i).

This procedure selects the alternative which has the highest satisfaction to any objective.
Thus we see that in both cases when p = m we get a non-compensatory type solution.
However, the method of the displaced ideal selects the competitive optimal while the other
method selects the non-competitive optimal.
In the case when p = 1, we note that the method of the displaced ideal works as follows:

If we let K = 2 V+ the sum of the satisfactions given by alternative xi, then

j=l

L,(i) = 1- 6.

The optimal solution in the case is Xi*s.t.

L,(i*) = Min (1 - F).

This implies L,(i*) = Max 77. That is, xi* is the alternative which has the greatest sum of
I
satisfactions.
Let us ROWlook at the compensatory competitive models in fuzzy sets. In this case

D=ATA$... *%

where Al(x)*A&) = Max (0, A(x) + B(x) - 1) Then xoPis selected such that

We shall first prove a lemma

Lemma: AI(X) * A*(X) * A&X) * * * * * A&) I= Max 10,( E Ai -(n - l))].
i=l
292 R. R. YM.%R

Proof: We shall use induction. The result is evident for n = X and n = 2.

Assume that it is true for some fixed n an&consider n + 1.
Let

There are twocases. First if

then

and

Thus the result holds in this CEXLOn the other hand if

either

or

which concludes the proof. Based upon the preceding lemma tha following theorem follows by
inspection.
TBeama 3..~~~~~~

This theorem then implies that %LII

optimal sofution in this compensatory competitivit)model wiil
 Com~titiven~ss and compensationindecision
making 293
be the alternative with the greatest sum of membership just as in the displaced ideal case when
D= 1.
In the case where p = 1 the method of furthest distance from the 0 vector works as follows:

M (i) = 4 vi,@)= aA&Xi)

and the optimal alternative is the alternative which, maximizes M,(i). In this case, it is the
alternative with the largest total satisfaction. Let us look at the compensatory non-competitive
models in fuzzy sets. In this case

where

A(x) 0 B(x) = Min [l, A(x) + B(x)],

the optimal solution is selected as x* p.t.

0(x*) = pz; D(x)

We can prove the following theorem

Theorem 4. Assume x and y are such that

2 Ai(Yl>,$
i=l ‘w
Ai( if D = Al 0 A2 0 ***0 A, then D(y) > D(X).

~f~~~. Let us define

E=A,*Al*As**+* A, and ,?!?=~,*&*.&*~~~A,, where A=(l-A).

Recalling the results of three we show that if

S:&‘x)>~
i=1 i=l
A<(y) then E(X) =ZE(y),

Therefore if

we note that

if 2 (I-
i=l
43)) > 2 (1-MY)) than &9 2 @Y).

However, since our hypothesis is that

then this is true. Thus g(x) z g(y). Recallingthe definition of the 0 which implies that 0 and *
satisfy DeMorgans law that is,
294 R.R.YAGER

This implies that

g(y) = 1 -D(y) and B(x) = 1 -D(x)

therefore
D(y) = 1 - J??(Y) and D(x) = 1 - E(x).

This implies that if ,??(x)~B(y) then D(y)rD(x). This theorem then implies that optimal
solutions to the compensatory non-competitive model are also the solution or the vector model
based on the furthest distance from the origin.
Let us look at the other compensatory-type competitive model.

In this case

D(x) = A,(x) * A2 - (x) * A,(x) * - . A&)

if we take the log of D(x) we get

In D(x) = In A,(x) + In A*(X) + - * * In A,(x).

Since In is a monotonic transformation In D(x) and D(x) have the maximum at the same value.
Nothing that the expansion (23) of In A(x) about the point A(x) = 1 is

lnA(x)=fF (A(x)-1).=(A(x)-1)-~(A(x)-1)‘+~(A(x)-1)’+
j=l

and since 0 s A(x) I 1 we get

Thus

In D(X)=- 2 (1 -A,(x)+; 2 (1-&x),Z+~ 2 (1-Ai(x))3+* *’

1

In D(x) = - P$ 2 f (1- Ai(X)Y’*

Thus this model involves a summation of terms similar to those found in the L,, metric used in
the method of the displaced ideal. Thus we see that the multiplication “and” is in a sense a
weighted average of the Lp metric “ands.”

ANINTERPRETATIONOFTHEVECTORMODELS
We would like to use the ,results of the previous section to help give some possible
interpretation to the vector models.
The first vector model, Zeleny’s displaced ideal model, measures for each alternative its
distance from the ideal solution by

L,(i) = [,$ (1 - Aj(Xi))‘]“’ p = 1, 2, 3,. . .

The best solution for a given p is that Xi which minimizes L,(i).

The second vector model, measures for each alternative its distance from the anti-ideal Cpas

M,(i) = [A (Ai@)Y]“‘, JJ= 1,2,3,. . . .

i=I
 Competitiveness and compensation in decision making 295

It then selects as the best solution for a given p the Xi which maximizes M,(i) over all
Xi E X.
Two questions arise. The difference between the two models and the meaning of p. As noted
before, different p’s will give different optimal solutions. In the previous section we proved four
theorems. L,et us summarize these theorems which relate fuzzy set based models to the vector
based models.
Theorem 1 said that the solution to the non-compensatory competitive model is the same as the
solution to the L, model.
‘Z’korem 2 said that the solution to the non-compensatoryutilitarianmodel is the solution to the
M, model.
Theorem 3 said that the solution to the compensatory competitive model is the same as the
solution to the L, model.
Theorem 4 said that the solution to the compensatory utilitarian model is the same as the
solution to the M, model.
Based upon these theorems we conjecture the following understanding of the vector models.
Fist, we note that the competitive solutions apply to the L type model. Whereas the
non-competitive solutions apply to the M type model, Thus, we suggest that if the objectives
are strung together via “and,” that is, they are truly competitive then we use the L type model.
However, if the objectives are strung together via an “or” operation, that is, if the objectives
are not competitive but interchangeable, we use the M type model.
Next we note that p = 0~corresponded to the cases when there was no compensation between
the objectives. Whereas p = 1 corresponded to the cases where there was absolute compen-
sation. Thus, we Suggest that p is inversely related to the degree of compensation between the
objectives. That is, if we define r E (0,l) as the degree of compensation between the
objectives, then p = (l/r).
In order to reinforce this interpretation of compensation let us consider MJx) =
[,E, A!(x)]“~. The idea of compensation involves the ability of a small value for A,(x) to
‘S
counteract the effects of a big Al(x). By considering the partial derivative of Mp with respect to
A’s we can get some understanding of the effect.

aMp

(Add >p-’.
aAj(x) = Ai
aM,,
aAk(x)

Thus as p increases, decreasing the compensation, this goes to zero and diminishes the ability
of i to compensate for K.

NON EQUIVALENT OBJECTIVES

Our discussion so far has implicitly assumed that each of the objectives are equivalent in
their effects on the overall decision function. This is not usually the case in most situations met in
practice. There is usually some distinction between the objectives with respect to their effects
on the decision function. In the vector type models the usual approach has been to associate
some weight to each objective and then multiply the components in the metric by there
appropriate weights. This is what is done by Zeleny[l-31. In Zeleny[l], however, mentions the
possibility of incorporating the weights in a number of different manners. In Yager [ 10,241 he has
suggested an approach based upon fuzzy sets for incorporating these differences in the
competitive case. In this section we shall extend this approach to include the non-competitive
case and the vector type models. As a prelimiary we shall introduce another operation on
fuzzy sets, the raising of a set to a power. Assume A is a fuzzy subset of X, with grade of
membership A(x) for each x E X. Let a be a non-negative real number. The fuzzy subset A”
is defined as a fuzzy subset of X in which the membership grade for each x E X is [A(x)
2% R. R. YAGER

That is, each grade of membership is raised to the a power. When

A(x) E (0,l) if a > 1, A”(x) <A(x) and if 0 I a < 1, A”(x) > A(x). If A(x) E (0, l}

raising to a power has no effect. Zadeh[22] has suggested the appropriateness of using this type
of operation for linguistic hedges, for example he suggests a = 2 corresponds to “very.” It
should be noted that the requirements of being able to do this type of operation on fuzzy sets
implies that Zadeh’s fuzzy sets have more structure than the lattices discussed by Goguen[20].
In order to see how to incorporate the effects of non-equivalence of objectives, we must
distinguish between its effects in the competitive and non-competitive models, in that the
non-equivalence of objectives have to be interpreted differently in these cases. Recalling, that
in the competitive case each of the objectives is solely concerned with its own satisfaction and a
solution is obtained after a “struggle” between the objectives to get their preferred alternative
accepted. In this case, it appears that the most natural way for any distinction between
objectives to enter the model is via some measure of there individual “strengths” in the struggle
for selection of the accepted alternative. A common name used for this distinction is the
importance of the objective. Therefore, we shall mean by the importance of an objective the
strength of the objective in the competitive type struggle for alternative selection.
In the non-competitive or utilitarian case the situation is different, in that the overall
satisfaction is all that counts. Thus, the objectives are not competing but are conduits through
which the overall decision function can obtain and measure satisfaction, hence the overall
satisfaction is a result of the satisfactions to the various objectives. In this case a natural way
for differences between alternatives to enter the model is via some measure for the overall
decision function preference for the type of satisfaction one objective gives rather than the
other. Something along the lines of a units of satisfaction to objective A is equivalent to b units
of satisfaction to object B, that is the structure has a certain bias towards various objectives.
We shall use the term contribution equivalence to measure this concept. In the sense, that
the more preferred the objective, the less its contribution equivalence. If objective A is more
preferred than objective B then a lower satisfaction to A is an equivalent contribution to the
decision function than some higher value of B. If we use the idea of preference to denote the
distinction between objectives then contribution equivalence is inversely related to preference.
It should be noted that our definitions of preference and importance are very distinct and
non-interchangeable concepts. For there is no struggle involved in the utilitarian case to
measure the importance. While in the competitiveness case no objective is willing to forego its
sovereignty to some higher power to impose its preferences.
In the competitive case one should expect that as the importance (the strength in the
struggle) of an objective increases the influence of that objective in determining the optimal
alternative increases. In Yager [lo, 241he has suggested a model for including importances in the
competitive case. This model is based upon the fuzzy set approach to multiple objective
decision making. He suggests that we associate with each objective a number a indicative of its
importance, then we use A? instead of Ai in the decision model. Thus for the non-compen-
satory “and” we get

D = A?’ n A;’ rl AT'. . . A=q

4 *

Where ai > al if Ai is more important than Ah Furthermore, since as ai increases AT’decreases, then
as ai increases the more likely for A:‘(x) to be the min [AT/(x)] and hence more influential in
I
determining the decision.
Using the multiplicative “and” we get

D(x)= fi &TX).
Recalling that if

K= fi Di then $= fi ai,
L-l I i-l
i#j
 Competitiveness and compensation in decision making 297

then (&3&Q is largest when uj is smallest. This implies that the smallest term in the product is
the most significant in determining the product. Since as cujincreases A?(x) decreases the more
important an objective becomes the more it effects the decision function.
An alternative interpretation of importance in the multiplicative case can be also seen.
Assume we have equal objectives. Then as before

If we interpret the idea of more important as being more powerful in the struggle for
alternative selection then an increase in importance can be expressed as an increase in the
number of allies or “clones” in the struggle, as an objective becomes more powerful it gets help
in the struggle. In particular, this help is in the form of clones of itself. Thus

D(x) = A,(x)A,(n). . . A,(x). AZ(x). . . A,(x) 1* . A4(x). **A,(x)

‘- -
ni R2 %
where ni is the number of clones. The more powerful the Ai the greater the n, Therefore

D(x) = AT’(x) . A;*(x). . . A;$x).

So that nj increases as an objective becomes more important.

Let us now investigate the noncompetitive or utili~ri~ case. In this case as the p~~e~~ce
for the satisfaction from an objective increases then alternatives which are high in that objective
should be more likely to be selected. We suggest the following procedure for the introduction of
preference information into the non-competitive decision function.
Associate with each objective a preference value pi, a non-negative number. The more
preferred, the higher the pi. Then the cont~bution equivalent is Ci = (I/p&. Thus the larger the pi
the smaller the Ci. For each objective calculate A?, that is, raise each objective to the
reciprocal of its preference. Then use these new fuzzy sets in non-competitive model.

Thus D(x)=Af’ U A2” U Af?.. U A$

and A(x) = Max [A?(x)].

We noted that as pi increases then A?(x) increases and therefore, the satisfaction of n to the ith
alternative increases. Furthermore, consider two objectives A and B. As suggested previously
the concept of preference in utilitarian decision making implies that if A is preferred to B then
less satisfaction in A is equivalent to the higher equivalent of B. In order to unders~nd this let
us consider a two objective case A and I?. Assume pa >pb this implies Ca < Cb and
D = Ace U BCb For tangibility assume A is the criteria a cheap car and B a luxurious car. The
fact that Pa > Pb implies that the decision function gets more satisfaction out of a cheap car
than a luxurious car. Assume in particular that p. = 2pb = l/2, cb = 2 and Ca = l/2, then

Using Zadeh’s concept of linguistic hedges then,

D = moderately cheap car or a very luxurious car.
If x is an alternative, A”2(~) is the degree that x satisfies the condition of being a moderately ’
cheap car and A(x) is the degree x satisfies the condition of being a cheap car and Aln(x) L
A(x). B*(x) is the degree to which x satisfies the co~ition of being a very htxurious car and
B(x) is the membership for a luxurious car and B*(x) 5 B(x). We see that the more preferred
objectives have their membership grades increased and thereby making them more infhrential in
the formulation of D. This linguistic interpretation brings home the idea that if Pa > Pb then
less A is needed to satisfy D than B.
In the multiplicative case, for mathematical simphcity we shah look at the two objective
298 R. R. YAGER

case.

D=A.B
D(x) = A(x) + B(x) - A(x) *B(x).

If we introduce preferences C, < C,, then D(x) = A’“(x) + Bcb(x) - A’“(x) *Bcb(x). If we
let AC”(x)= a and Bcb(x)= b we get. D= a t b-ab. Furthermore (dD/&z)= 1-b and
(dD/ab) = 1 - a, are the rate of change of D(x) with respect to A and B respectively. We notice
that as A becomes more preferred pa increases, Cu decreases, and a increases. As a increases,
1 -a decreases and, therefore, the rate of change of D with respect to a increases over that
with respect to b.
Let us now investigate the vector type models with inclusion of these operations for
non-equality.
In the competitive case we have

for the case of equivalent objectives. If we consider the non-equivalent objective case and use
the methodology just developed we get L,(x) = Ii!, [l - Api(~))p]“~ where ai is the im-
portance associated with the ith objective. It is suggested in[lO] that the average of the ai be 1.
Denoting

A?(X) as Ui,we get L(p) = (~$,>p= [ $ (1 - ai)‘] and g(P, = -p(l - ai)‘-‘.
I

First we note that (aL@)/aUi) is always non-positive. That is, as Ui increases L(p) decreases.
This is as it should be, since recalling in this case the best alternative is the one with the smallest
Lp’ Thus let US concern ourselves with I(aL(p)/aai)l. AS ai increases Ui decreases and (I - Ui)
increases, then I(aL(p)/aai)l increases making the ith term more significant in the overall
function. That is as ai increases the term becomes more influential in the determination of
L(P).
In the cooperative case

is the decision function for non-equivalent objective situation and

As objective i becomes preferred, Ci decreases, causing AC+’ and hence (JM(p)/aCi) to

increase and therefore making the ith objective more influential in the decision model.

TRADEOFFS IN MULTIOBJECTIVE MODELS

In many instances the relationship between the objectives in multiple objective decision
making is not purely competitive or cooperative, but some combination. Many decision
situations involve a set of criteria or objective functions plus some information on the decision
makers willingness to make tradeoffs betweeen these objectives. For example, if the decision
maker has four objectives A,, AZ, As, A4 he desires a solution which satisfies these four
objectives. However, he may be willing to make tradeoffs between the objectives in the sense
that if some alternative is very Al then it could be moderately AZ. Using the ideas of linguistic
hedges as discussed in[ll, 221 we can incorporate these types of tradeoffs into a decision
 Competitivenessand compensationin decision making 299

model. That is, as suggested in Zadeh [ 11,221 and Lakoff (271linguistic hedges such as very, sort
of, moderately, etc. can be associated with some real or fuzzy positive number a such that for
example, “very” A = A”, for the appropriate value of a.
Therefore, assume in the context of a decision the decision maker wants an x (alternative)
that is A, and A2 and A3 and A, or if x is “very A,” then it can be “moderately AZ” or if it is
“very, very A3” then it can be sort of A,, etc.
Using the above ideas we can express this type of decision as follows:
Let T,, = A, fl A2 fl A3 f~ Al. Let each tradeoff be donoted as T . Then

D = T,, or T, or T2 or T3. . . . or T..

That is, in essence the tradeoffs are connected to each other via an “or” operation as
indicated by the statement of the decision maker.
Furthermore we can use linguistic hedges to represent the individual tradeoffs. That is,

Where &ii is the power associated with hedge associated with the jth objective in the ith
tradeoff.
Using this approach we can formulate very complicated models using the fuzzy set
structure.
The difficulty associated with applying this method to decisions centers around the problem
of obtaining the (I’, associated with various hedges. The current state of knowledge has not yet
developed a relationship between hedges and powers. It may be possible to find these
experimentally.
Nevertheless, the structure suggested by this approach allows one to see the connection
between the concepts of importance, preference and tradeoffs.
In particular, if we approximate D as D, = AT1 fl Af2 rl A;3 fl A,“‘, this is the model we
used as the competitive model with a signifying the importance. Thus we see that these
importances are in essence a reflection of the tradeoffs the decision maker is willing to make. In
Yager[24] we discusses a method for obtaining these values via a pairwise comparison of the
objectives.
A second possible approximation to D may be Q = Afl U A? U A? U A?, in this case
the C’s are associated with the contribution equivalence. Again these may be a reflection of the
tradeoffs. D2 would be a good approximation in the case where each tradeoff, T, T =
A?’ fl A92 n A?3 fl A>’ is such that for j E (1, 2, 3, 4} aij+ (Yikfor all kf j. That is for
example, if j = 1 then air % aiz, ai3, ai), which occurs when Ti = very Al and sort A2 and
moderately A3 and sort of Al. For example: then since “and” is the min operation and high a’s
reduce the grades of membership T = “very A,” = APit. Then if each Ti is of this form we
would get Q as a good approximation.
It is also possible to get approximation involving combinations at D, and Q type models.
The idea of using these approximations is that it is easier for a decision maker to supply
information with respect to his feelings for importance and preference than it is to obtain the
linguistic hedge values.

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